

Returning to the chronology, we find that when Sedamargi died, the place of Sunan was taken by his younger brother, Sunan Prapen. This event is said to have happened "not long after" the passing of Sedamargi.<sup>1</sup> Wiselius' version gives the date as two years after the death of Sunan Dalem which was in 1468 A.J. or 1546 A.D..<sup>2</sup> Prapen assumes control therefore in 1548 A.D. This transfer of power from one lineage to another was permanent: no descendant of Sedamargi ever sat on the *mimbar* (pulpit) of the Mosque after this transfer.

Professors de Graaf and Pigeaud, following Wiselius' line of argument, put forward the view that Prapen succeeded in taking direct control of the port of Gresik. They argue that prior to Prapen, the port was always administered by shahbandars appointed by either Demak, Madura, Padjang or Surabaya. This proposition has already been shown to be based on a misunderstanding of Sunan Giri's origins and his relationship with Nyai Ageng Pinatih. The Sunan's of Giri owned the Kebungson from the beginning and never allowed it to slip from their control until Gresik succumbed to the forces of Mataram much later. The Wiselius view extended itself to the point whereby he asserted that Gresik had become an

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1. BIG, p49.

2. Wiselius, J.A.B.: "Historische Onderzoek naar Geestelijke en Wereldlijke Suprematie van Grissee op Minden en Oost Java Gedurang de 16e en 17e Eeuw" in Tijdschrift voor Indisch Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 's-Hage, M. Nijhoff, 1876, deel XXIII, p482. Wiselius' conversion from the Javanese calender to the Gregorian is incorrect - he calculates the date as 1553 A.D..

ecclesiastical or papal state during Prapen's time. Prapen then is seen as a religious strongman and even a tyrant, oppressing the merchants of the port as well as terrifying the enemies of Islam. This cannot be sustained by the evidence however. Giri was always functionally integrated with Demak and its successors and can never really be considered a State of any kind except during specific episodes of civil war when it acted as a *de facto* state in itself.

Turning to his foreign policy and expeditions, we find that there is continuity with the policy of earlier Sunans in that they all aimed to spread Islam and reconstruct Java and the rest of the archipelago. Prapen has a rather exalted reputation for the sending out of Islamic "armadas" to the eastern islands of Nusa Tenggara and the Banda group. However these expeditions are no grander than the campaigns of the first Sunan to the central and west Javanese regions, and of the second Sunan's campaigns to east Java. Continuity of purpose is readily apparent. There is only variation in the means of transport; Prapen was obliged to use Javanese shipping to project power out into the archipelago and so his expeditions took on the appearance of the "armada". Even in this respect however, there is nothing new because the campaign in Pasuruhan, east Java, was launched from Javanese shipping, having sailed from Demak. The only difference is the distance travelled. There is little

novelty in the campaigns of Prapen to the east and much that would be familiar to his forbears.

Let us now turn to these campaigns in the east. To be sure, we are referring only to the second wave of Islamization that occurred in the last half of the 16th century; places that were an integral part of the trading network of the archipelago, such as Banda and Maluku, had been Islamized much earlier. The spreading of Islam to the islands east of Java, in this second wave, has a definite political rather than economic character. Though there is some trade with Bali, Sumbawa and especially Timor, there is little trade with the other islands such as Lombok, Flores, Solor and Sumba.

The *Babad Lombok* tells us that it was Prapen who first brought Islam to Lombok, and that it was done by force of arms. It states: "The Susuhunan Ratu of Giri ordered the new faith to be brought to the islands. Dilembu Manku Rat was sent with an army to Banjarmasin, Datu Bandan<sup>3</sup> was sent to Macassar, Tidore, Seram and Galeier, and a son of the Susuhunan, Pangeran Prapen, to Bali, Lombok and Sumbawa. Prapen sailed first to Lombok where by force of arms he converted the people to Islam. After having accomplished this, he sailed on to Sumbawa and Bima. During Prapen's absence, however, mainly because the women continued to profess the pagan faith, the people of Lombok largely converted back to the paganism. After his

3. The name is more usually spelt as Bandang.

victories in Sumbawa and Bima, Prapen returned, and, aided by the Raden of Sumuliya and the Raden of Salut (Sasak), he organized a new campaign which this time met with success...Prapen left the Raden of Sumuliya and of Salut in charge of maintaining Islam and moved on to Bali, where he began (fruitless) negotiations with the Dewa Agung of Klungkung."<sup>4</sup>

There are a number of interesting features in this material when we compare it with the process of Islamization of Maluku and Banda. Where trade is not significant, such as in Lombok, Flores and Sumba, Islam arrives late and only arrives to secure the area against rival religions and powers such as the Portuguese. In other words it only arrives for political reasons, to prevent the Portuguese from using such places as bases from which they can control shipping routes and trade. Where the trade of an island is modest, such as at Bima on the island of Sumbawa which had a small import-export trade with the Javanese ships passing to and from Banda and Maluku, then Islam will only appear in the port area. The chiefs of such a place will remain aloof. Only when security of the trade route is placed in question will Islamic power be projected onto it with force. This is the reason why Sumbawa was not already thoroughly Islamized through the normal trade process much earlier, and why Prapen continued on to Sumbawa after the Lombok

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4. Cited in Van der Kraan, A.: Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940. Heinemann, Singapore, 1980, p3.

campaign: to secure the area from Portuguese Christian influence and control. The Portuguese were making their presence felt in the nearby islands of Flores (at Ende) and Solor.

Where the trade of an island group is both significant and contested, the two characteristics rarely appearing independently, then Islam not only makes its presence felt in the port area, but is extended to the King of that island as well, either by force of arms by an outside power or through an internal conversion process designed to attract trade and protection from an outside Islamic power. The function of this process is to make the area and trade route secure for either or both the outside interested party and the local ruler.

Thus Islam will arrive peacefully with trade, but will dwell only in the port. When the security of that trade or of the trade route itself is placed in question, then the local monarch or chief will find himself in the centre of a highly charged matrix of pressure and attraction, and be confronted with a set of enticements and penalties, opportunities and dangers. Following upon this, the next generation of local rulers will find their sons studying at Giri or Ngampel and marrying daughters from there as well.<sup>5</sup> Sumbawa, therefore, is an interesting case of an island which, because it crossed

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5. De Graaf, H.J. and Pigeaud, Th.: *Kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di Jawa*, Grafitipers, Jakarta, 1985, pp192-193.

the threshold between an island of lesser significance to one of more significance, found itself with an Islamic armada on the horizon.

With Prapen leaving Sumbawa and returning to Lombok, another feature becomes apparent. Let us first put this matter in context. The Babad Lombok states that it was *Pangeran Prapen*, the son of Sunan Giri, who did these deeds in the east. The date must therefore be before his accession to the position of Sunan in 1548. Cederoth gives the date of Prapen's coming to Lombok as 1545.<sup>6</sup> If this is the case, and it would seem appropriate, then a more specific reason for the invasion of Lombok becomes apparent. To understand this we must first look at internal Javanese politics at this time of 1545. This was the year that Demak, upon the request of Sunan Dalem<sup>7</sup>, began the push to the Oosthoek region of Java (the far eastern quarter) to bring Islam to that quarter and to integrate all of Java under the control of Demak.<sup>8</sup> The war was to start with an attack on Pasuruhan and it involved all of the forces of the north coast, from Banten to Surabaya. It was expected by the Islamic leaders that the Hindhu kingdoms of far-east Java and of

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6. Cederoth, S.: *The Spell of the Ancestors and the Power of Mekkah - A Sasak Community on Lombok*. Acta Universitas Gothoburgensis, Sweden, 1981, pp 2 and 32.

7. "...and their *Cacismoubana* (Haji Maulana, Sunan), the sovereign dignity amongst the *Mahometans*, by whose counsel the *Pangueyran* (Pangeran, Lord of Demak) was come thither." Pinto, F.M.: *The Voyages and Adventures of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto*, trans. by H. Cogan, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1891, p388.

8. *Ibid*, p375.

Bali would act with solidarity and that Balinese forces would be brought into play in Java. Balinese chronicles assert that some of their monarchs are descended from Majapahit and that their ultimate goal is to return to that place in Java and re-establish the old kingdom.<sup>9</sup> Since Demak had called upon all of the available forces of the north coast, and done this upon Sunan Dalem's request, it is not conceivable that the latter would, at that time, send off to Nusa Tenggara an armada of Islamic Javanese troops to spread Islam to such far away places unless this was an attempt to tie down the Balinese on their own island. Prapen, upon returning to Lombok from Sumbawa, began assembling his forces on the west coast of Lombok, poised to cross the straits to the south-east coast of Bali. He then began his "fruitless" negotiations with the local Balinese King, Dewa Agung. Such a move could not fail to galvanize the forces of the Balinese kingdoms and cause them to be focussed on the east coast of Bali. Bali was therefore successfully removed from the real theatre of war in east Java.

Turning to the spice islands themselves, the history of the arrival of Islam in these areas is well related by other historians<sup>10</sup> and covers the period of the first wave of Islamic influence. The records of Gresik,

9. Nordholt, H.S.: "The Invented Ancestor: Origin and Legitimation in Bali." Seminar Paper, Murdoch University, 27th Oct., 1989.

10. See for example De Graaf, H.J.: "South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century," in P.M. Holt, A.K.S. Lambton and B. Lewis: *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol.2, C.U.P., 1970.

however, reflect on these events to a degree and allow us to make some small improvements to our knowledge of Gresik's relationship with these islands. De Graaf and Pigeaud entertain the idea that the Raja of Ternate, Zainu'l Abidin, who ruled from 1486 to 1500, was once a ruler of Giri and may in fact have been Sunan Giri.<sup>11</sup> Is this idea based on the report of Pires which states that the ruler of one part of the twin city of Gresik, the least prosperous part, was Pati Zainal? De Graaf and Pigeaud seem to be identifying this part of Gresik with Giri which has been shown above to be incorrect: Pati Zainal ruled over the Pakojan/Kampong Arab quarters. The dates do not tally either: Pati Zainal was ruling part of Gresik in 1516, when Pires arrived, yet Zainu'l Abidin was a student in Giri before 1486, while he was still the crown-prince of Ternate. Notwithstanding all this, there may in fact be a connection between the Pakojan of Gresik and the Kings of Ternate because of this similarity in names and the fact that the Pakojan must have had much of its trade in Ternate's cloves, but we have no definite evidence for it.

De Graaf and Pigeaud's story<sup>12</sup> of Ngusman who brought Islam to, and founded a state (negeri), at Tengah-Tengah, near Maluku, and who is buried at Kailolo, could be elaborated by drawing on the material in the babad of Gresik. The latter babad mentions this person as being

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11. De Graaf and Pigeaud, *op.cit.*, p192.

12. *Ibid.*, pp191-192. See also De Graaf: *op.cit.*, p136.



the son of Radja Pandhita who is also known as Raden Aliutama.<sup>13</sup> This Aliutama has been discussed above; he is the eldest brother of Raden Rahmat/Sunan Ngampel of Surabaya, the oldest Sunan of Java. Aliutama is a merchant of Wunut in the port of Gresik. His daughter married Raden Patah. His Islamic credentials are therefore very strong. If it is true that he traded in Maluku and the nearby islands, then it is not surprising that he was a significant bearer of Islam to that region.

Turning now to the islands north of the Java Sea we find that it is the person who is mentioned in the Babad Lombok, Datu ri Bandang, who is the bearer of Islam in the region of Makassar, South Sulawesi, the neighbouring states of Bone, Soppeng and Wajo, and across the sea to Kutai in East Kalimantan. His name is mentioned in some of the local chronicles of these places. He is described as a person from Minangkabau in Sumatra and as someone who studied religion under Sunan Giri.<sup>14</sup> Although the babad of Gresik makes no mention of his name, there is an interesting story about a man who carved the wooden walls for the crypt of the first Sunan of Giri.<sup>15</sup> This "wood-carver" was said to have been "a Malay person", according to the babad, and in return for the carving, he was given a *kris* by Sunan Prapen. The *kris* was made from a part of the pusaka (sacred heirloom) of Giri and therefore

13. BIG, pp8-9.

14. De Graaf and Pigeaud, op.cit., p191. Local informants say that he was from Palembang which may indicate that he is a relative of the Sunans of Giri.

15. BIG, p50.

represented the spiritual power of Giri itself. The payment therefore seems to be inordinately generous and one cannot help but ask why.

Dato ri Bandang is said, according to the Makassar chronicles, to have converted the King of Tallo in Southwest Sulawesi to Islam on the 22nd September 1605. This date means that the Dato's campaign was long after that of Prapen's in Lombok and Sumba. It places it in the period of the early Dutch attempts to take control of the spice islands, and in fact coincides with the Dutch attack on the Portuguese of Ambon. This attack was successful and was the first step by the Dutch to impose a monopoly over all the spices of these islands. This is the background of Dato ri Bandang's campaign. He continues this campaign to the neighbouring states of Makassar and across the sea to East Kalimantan. It is from this time that one can speak of Makassar becoming an important centre of trade, of Islam, and of resistance to the growing power of the Dutch.

It is interesting that Dato ri Bandang's name appears to be non-Malay and non-Javanese, despite the fact that he comes from somewhere in Sumatra. The "ri" is a Sulawesi language term for the Malay word "di", meaning "of". The name therefore means "Dato (Elder) of Bandang". Bandang, therefore, is likely to be a place-name, and one in the region of Sulawesi, not Sumatra. There are Bandangs mentioned in maps of Java and Sumatra but they are only

names of geographical features such as Cape Bandang in West Java. Near Sulawesi there is, however, an island called Bandang, located in the Banggai Archipelago, east of Central Sulawesi, in the Sea of Maluku.<sup>16</sup> Although studies of this archipelago are scarce, there is a description of it in the Admiralty Pilot book for this area.<sup>17</sup> The book describes the two islands of Bandang as being "low" in profile and separated from the neighbouring island of Banggai by a clear channel of one mile in width. It makes interesting comments about Banggai itself: "A mosque with a high profile at Banggai is very prominent...A brisk local trade is carried on with...Ternate." It adds that the population of this archipelago is of mixed race, made up from people of Ternate, Ceram and other places. These people may have been displaced from Dutch and Portuguese occupied areas. The tall Mosque in a part of the Indonesian world not otherwise known for its belief in Islam would reflect the Dato's earlier influence.

It is likely that the Dato came to this island to establish both of the elements mentioned by the Pilot book and that he did so with a specific purpose in mind. This purpose is reasonably apparent from the geography and location of the island. The purpose was to create a "back-door" to the spice islands through which the Dutch

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16. This group is at 123° East, 2° South.

17. Admiralty (Hydrographic Dept.): The Eastern Archipelago Pilot, vol. II, 1961, 7th edition, pp608, 610-611.

monopoly, or any European monopoly, could be subverted by "smuggling" the cloves, nutmeg and mace from the eastern islands through the maze of islands that exist in the Maluku Sea, to Bandang. This smuggling trade could avoid attracting the attention of the Dutch ships since the traders could use smaller prau. They would have been capable of sailing in and out of the islands with more agility than the Dutch ships. They could land at isolated beaches and have the spices loaded quickly without the use of warehouses and market-places. Closer to home, they would have been protected by war-prau operating from behind and amongst the many islands. The fast moving war-prau propelled by oar were capable of out-manoevering the larger vessels in windless conditions. From Bandang the spices would have been discreetly forwarded on around the Sulawesi coastline to Makassar where there was a safe international market place. It would seem, then, that in the island of Bandang, we have traced our Dato to his lair, a "smuggler's" paradise in the Maluku Sea. However, further empirical data is required before definite conclusions on this matter can be drawn. The subject of the Bandang archipelago deserves further investigation.

The giving of a holy kris from the pusaka of Giri to such a man as this Dato ri Bandang would be appropriate. The gift is not merely a payment for the carved walls mentioned above, but to give authority to a person charged with a religious and economic mission. We are inclined to believe therefore that the "Malay wood-

carver" and the Dato from Sumatra are the same man. The sending forth of Dato ri Bandang would seem to indicate that Sunan Giri wanted the Bandang island project to take place. In other words he was willing to accept a new and different trade-collection point to Gresik provided that centre was Islamic, had its leaders approved by Giri, and sent appropriate tribute to Giri. It would be an outpost of Gresik or Giri. The danger was that Gresik's shipping was threatened at sea by the Dutch; the solution was to secure Sulawesi and the islands around Bandang for Islam and to open a "backdoor" route to the spice islands. The Dato therefore received Sunan Giri's blessing and was empowered by the gift of Giri's pusaka, the holy kris named Mahesa Sundari. Such a gift of political power must have had obligations of the type mentioned above to have been in Giri's interest.

Returning to Gresik's activities in Banda and Maluku during the last third of the 16th century, the data for the Javanese armadas in Banda, Ambon, Hitu and Maluku is much enriched by the Portuguese writers, especially by De Sa.<sup>18</sup> It is unfortunate that this Portuguese material does not distinguish between the different powers in Java when it describes the activities of the Javanese. Demak and Jepara were also involved in these activities. Notwithstanding this however, the material ought to be included on the grounds that Gresik was an interested

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18. De Sa, Artur Basilio: Documentacao para a Historia das Missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente, 5 vols, Agencia Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1954-1958.

party and had strong trade, religious and family connections with the peoples of these islands.

Reasons for the struggle between the Portuguese and the Javanese in the eastern spice islands are readily apparent as the Portuguese, in the 1550's, were trying to drive the Javanese out of the trade by force: "Again, while I was visiting Ambon and looking for people to Christianise, I saw a ship going in the direction of Java. The ship was carrying more than 100 quintals of cloves...Meneses sent his soldiers to capture all the cloves in that ship, then the cloves were sent to his headquarters."<sup>19</sup>

The competition was also a religious one with the Javanese and local Muslims insisting on religious conversions of those natives who had already been converted to Christianity: "At Hitu there was a Mulla who was one of the sons of a principal of this land...He threatened them by saying that if they did not convert to the sect of Mafamede (Mahommed), they would be bombarded and burnt by the forces of the King of Java."<sup>20</sup> Similar events were occurring in Ambon: "...the King of Java sent and ordered 15 to 20 ships...to watch over the people who lived in the islands of Ambon, which consequently roused terrible fear among the Christians there."<sup>21</sup> The attack on the Portuguese and Christians generally was being co-

19. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.2, p83.

20. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.3, p23.

21. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.3, p24.

ordinated by the Javanese with the King of Maluku: "Among those ships, there was another big ship that was one of the King of Java's. This ship was carrying letters of the King to the King of Maluco."<sup>22</sup> These events took place in the mid-1560's.

In Ambon, by this time, the Portuguese Christians had been quite successful with 4000 converts in the Rocavine area (in the Bay of Ambon). However they "...were informed that the Javanese would come to destroy them soon...(and) a few days later, there were 13 ships full of Javanese coming to attack and destroy all Christians of Rocavine. The Javanese were a fanatic people and they used a lot of violence. Fortunately...this time the Javanese were driven by storm so they could not disembark at Rocavine, but ran aground at Banda. Only three ships could reach the bay of Ambon...They said they had come to trade in cloves and to spread Islam."<sup>23</sup>

The Javanese and local Muslims were also well armed with weapons that surprised the Portuguese with their technical knowledge and skill: "...a hundred muskets and eighteen short-cannons of the King were captured from these people. These things were made of metal and many others were imported from Java, including a rock-firing cannon of metal and gun-powder were captured as well,

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22. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.3, p25.

23. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.3, p40.

these things were made of well-refined material."<sup>24</sup> The combination of religious commitment and up-to-date weaponry must have given the Portuguese cause for concern.

After these struggles in the south, the King of Java, along with the Kings of Johore and of the Malays sent their ambassadors to witness the coronation of the ruler of Ternate as Sultan Babu, ruler of all the Maluku islands. De Sa states that this Sultan gave himself the title but it is more likely that the "King of Java" (Sunan Prapen?) gave him this title since it usually requires the religious services of a high Muslim religious figure to grant and perform the rite.<sup>25</sup> The close connection between Giri and Ternate, established over a long period of time, has already been described above.

The period of 1567 to 1580 was one of increasing difficulty for the Portuguese in the spice islands and the term "rescue" is used for the first time. The Hituese, De Sa notes, joined forces with the Javanese to fight against the Christians of Amboina.<sup>26</sup> The island of Hitu "...was in a state of war; at that time Aires de Saldhana who was the captain of Malaca (= Melaka), sent

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24. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.3, p473: "...cem espinguardas e dezoito bercos de el-rei, todos de metal, e muitos outros da Java, e huma roqueira de ferro, e polvora, que fazio muito refinada."

25. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.4, p325.

26. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.4, p200.



his soldiers via Java under the command of Manoel Henriques to rescue the Portuguese in Hitu."<sup>27</sup>

Dealing with the period of the late 1580's and early 1590's the tone of De Sa is more philosophical, punctuated by fervent protest at Muslim Javanese atrocities: "...the disciples of Mahamede in these islands, including the Javanese, the King of Tolo and the Dutch, impeded the propagation of Christianity itself. The Christians were tortured and killed by those people in several places...The Javanese who were the disciples of Mafamede caught him (Pastor Pestana of the Dominicans), they insulted and beat him and then they dragged him to the sea-shore. There, Pestana was crucified and finally they cut off his head. Even though he was being tortured, he still preached the word of Jesus Christ for whom he died."<sup>28</sup> The Portuguese increasingly hard pressed by their rivals, both local and Javanese, clung on to their fortress at Ambon until 1605 when a joint Dutch-Hitu force caused the inhabitants of the fortress to surrender.

Although De Sa does not distinguish between the Javanese, referring frequently to "the King of Java" and "the Javanese", it is probable that he is referring to people of Gresik and Giri. The reason for this is that the notion of a "King of Java" in the period after the

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27. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.4, p369.

28. De Sa: *ibid.*, vol.5, pp416, 437.

downfall of Demak in 1546 is highly problematic. The princes of Padjang and of Mataram were totally involved with the politics of central Java at this time and could not have found the time or resources to conduct a campaign in the eastern islands. Demak was certainly oriented toward capturing trade and power in the same way that Gresik was, through its overseas connections; indeed it is Demak which Islamizes Banjarmasin on the south coast of Kalimantan. Surabaya must also have won some share of the spice trade since it had succeeded in winning a powerful position in Java itself. However, it is Sunan Giri who has the longest established connection with these islands and who the people of Hitu referred to as "Raja Bukit" and to whom they sent tribute.<sup>29</sup> "Bukit" is the Malay word for the old Javanese word "Giri", meaning "hill". Coen refers to the "pope" of Giri saying that he "...has taken the Bandanese under his protection."<sup>30</sup> Valentyn cites a strong connection between Giri and Amboina: "...the king of Giri...several times has supported Amboina with ships and men."<sup>31</sup> From these observations it would not be too much to say that Gresik

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29. Coolhas, W.Ph.: *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie*, 's Gravenhage, M.N., 1960, vol.1, p360.

30. Coen, J.P.: *Bescheiden Omtrent Zijn Bedrijf in Indie*, 's-Gravenhage, 6 vols., M. Nijhoff, 1919, vol.1, p120.

31. Valentyn, F.: *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, vol.4, Dordrecht-Amsterdam, 1724-1726, p47. See also Schrieke, B.: *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, part 1, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1966 (1955), pp34-35: quoting a 1621 account Schrieke writes that the Ambonese believe that their "life and death are in his hands."

was a leading force amongst the "Javanese" in these campaigns.

Returning to internal Javanese politics, an overview of Gresik's official relations with the successive powers within Java would be useful in understanding Javanese politics in this period and of the part played by Gresik. As stated before, although Gresik claimed an authority of a religio-legal kind that transcended the power of the King, it had accepted a sub-ordinate role, in political terms, within a Javanese kingdom which had both a shifting centre and a shifting boundary. In the first instance Gresik recognized Demak as the legitimate successor to Majapahit and allowed Demak to appoint Shahbandars to the two parts of the port of Gresik between 1475 and 1546. The minutiae of this arrangement are not available to us but it is reasonable to assume that Demak appointed representatives of Sunan Giri's family to the Shahbandarships because of the close political, religious and family connection between Giri and Demak's ruling family. If the Javanese ruler did appoint an outsider to these positions, it is probable that Sunan Giri's youngest son still retained possession of the trading compound of Kabungson while the Shahbandar collected harbour and custom duties.

When Trenggana, the last ruler of Demak, died without sons, his daughters were the only sources of dynastic legitimacy; one had married the Prince of Madura while

the other married the Adipati of Padjang who had distant connections with the dynasty of Majapahit.<sup>32</sup> Sunan Sedamargi and Prapen gave recognition and fealty to the Prince of Madura rather than to Padjang. Madura then appointed the Shahbandars to Gresik between 1546 and 1568.<sup>33</sup>

This Maduran supremacy ultimately failed and Sunan Prapen gave formal recognition to the other surviving daughter's husband. The coronation at Giri is mentioned in all versions of the babad. The Adipati of Padjang decides that his progress in uniting the various parts of the disintegrated kingdom of Java can only come about with the assistance of the Sunans of Giri. Wiselius asserts that the Adipati had no choice but to ask for recognition from the religious leader of Giri rather than from the other religious leaders of central and west Java. He argues that the other *walis* of Java had either died without offspring, had vacated the stage of history for obscurity, or lacked the requisite prestige themselves. Giri was the only one left whose lineage was impeccable and intact, having survived the ravages of the civil wars of the mid-century. Wiselius thinks, however, that Padjang's choice of Giri was made reluctantly because of the latter's weak influence in central Java, but this may be projecting, anachronistically, the present day

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32. See Raffles: *op.cit.*, p138 and De Graaf and Pigeaud: *op.cit.*, pp83-92.

33. Raffles, T.S.: *The History of Java*, O.U.P., Oxford, 1978, vol. II, pp138-139.

pecking-order on to the 16th century. Surely east Java retained something of the prestige of Majapahit, while the Padjang area is still, at this time, too rude a country to warrant such scruples. The arrival of the Adipati of Padjang in Giri is not recorded with a sangkala chronogram in our version of the babad, nor in that of Raffles. The former merely gives the date as 1532 A.J or 1610 A.D., a date which is clearly too late since Padjang is dead by then. Raffle's date for this coronation is 1490 A.J. or 1568 A.D., which is far more reasonable.<sup>34</sup> Wiselius' version does provide us with a sangkala chronogram and Javanese date however: "Winang ijang mantri attata tunggil, 1532 A.J."<sup>35</sup> This sangkala has the meaning that a *mantri* (minister), in this case an *Adipati*, has been given sole authority (for the whole of Java). The date however suffers from the same defect as the one offered by our version of the babad. The date must be before the Adipati of Padjang is assassinated in 1589 A.D.<sup>36</sup> and before his successor, Senapati of the new Mataram, takes over the country of Padjang. This leaves us with Raffles' date of 1490 A.J. or 1568 A.D. as the only reasonable one. At this time the Shahbandars of Gresik are appointed by Padjang's Adipati in Surabaya.<sup>37</sup>

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34. Raffles: op.cit., pp142-143. Raffles' calculates the date to be 1570 A.D. but it should be 1568.

35. Wiselius: op.cit., p483. Wiselius gives a second sangkala and date for this event on p484 but with an even less appropriate date.

36. De Graaf and Pigeaud: op.cit., p204.

37. Raffles: op.cit., pp143-144.

Upon the death by assassination of this Adipati of Padjang in 1589, the emergence of Mataram's leader as the chief contender for power, and the latter's conquest of the country of Padjang, Giri refused to give recognition to Mataram. The central Javanese chronicle, interestingly, records a story in which Sunan Prapen notices the young Kiai of Mataram sitting alone during the coronation of Adipati Padjang at Giri.<sup>38</sup> The story relates how Prapen prophecizes that this Kiai will one day succeed in replacing Padjang and unite the whole of Java under his rule. It is interesting because the central Javanese story implicitly recognizes the Sunan of Giri as the source of legitimacy in Java. Javanese Kings felt the need for the recognition of the Sunan of Giri to unite the country. The blessing, however, never came easily, nor without conditions attached. Raffles claims that the conditions at this stage were that Mataram subdue Surabaya,<sup>39</sup> indicating that the subjection of Surabaya to Mataram was the key to integrating the rest of Java under Mataram's control since it was Surabaya which was the only serious obstacle to this goal. De Graaf and Pigeaud point out, however, that Mataram's enemies and victims took refuge at Giri, indicating Giri's real attitude at this stage to the new kingdom emerging in central Java.<sup>40</sup> We should add to this the two

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38. Poenika Serat Babad Tanah Djawi Wiwit Saking Nabi Adam Doemoegi Ing Taoen 1647, M. Nijhoff, 's-Gravenhage, 1941, p184. Cf. de Graaf and Pigeaud: op.cit., pp188-189. Also Wiselius: op.cit., pp484-486.

39. Raffles: op.cit., vol. II, pp146-147.

40. De Graaf and Pigeaud: op.cit., p189.

facts that Giri always recognized the power of lineage, and that therefore Sultan Padjang's son was considered the legitimate heir to leadership in Java; secondly, when Mataram won the title of Sunan from Sunan Giri, it was extracted by force after a bloody campaign and entailed the degrading of the Sunan's own title to that of Panembahan.<sup>41</sup>

*Mataram and the Dutch.* With these relations of Gresik to the other powers in Java placed in broad perspective, we may now turn to the arrival of the Dutch and their impact on events both in Java and in the archipelago as a whole. The Dutch arrived in Java in 1596 during which voyage Gresik became known to them. It was during their second voyage, arriving on the 29th of January, 1599, that they "anchored off Jortan (i.e. Gresik) in 14 and 15 fathoms, about a musket shot from land."<sup>42</sup> They described the port as "a very beautiful and suitable port" and as the "staple" for the spice trade.<sup>43</sup> The Dutch were given permission to buy what they needed. The Captain sent Mr Bouwer to shore and he exchanged gifts with the "Queen" of Gresik: he gave a looking-glass to a lady who was probably the wife of the Shahbandar of East Gresik (the Pakojan) and in return he received a sheep.<sup>44</sup> They asked for a Javanese pilot to guide them to the source of the

41. q.v. below.

42. J. Keuning: *Der Tweede Schipvaert... onder J. van Neck en W. Waerwijck, 1598-1600*, vol. III, pp196-197, also vol. IV, p142; also *ibid.*, vol. IV, p54 where the date is 28th January.

43. Keuning: *ibid.*, vol. III, pp196-197.

44. Keuning: *ibid.*, vol. IV, p54.

spices, that is, Banda and the Moluccas, but the shahbandar at Gresik asked them to stay at Gresik and wait for the return of the spice-fleet of 60 ships which would soon be returning to Gresik.<sup>45</sup> The Dutch however insisted on proceeding to the source of the spices and so the shahbandar gave them a pilot.<sup>46</sup>

The first Dutch accounts also state that Gresik had many Portuguese traders<sup>47</sup>, trading in cotton cloth and other cloth from Coromandel in India<sup>48</sup>, and who were involved in "bottomry trade", advancing money to the local Javanese and charging 100% interest upon completion of the trading voyage<sup>49</sup>, indicating both the degree of disintegration of the Estado da India into unrestrained individualism, and of the extent to which Gresik had discouraged them from trading directly with the spice islands. Surabaya was likewise giving the Portuguese free access to its market and, indeed, even to the market in ships which the Portuguese took to leasing.<sup>50</sup> Both of these facts underline the real open-ness of these two

45. Keuning: *ibid.*, vol. III, p42n.

46. Keuning: *ibid.*, vol. III, pp196-197. It seems that the under-shahbandar of Jortan was reluctant to provide the pilot; it was the upper-shahbandar of the Pakojan, representing the King of Surabaya, who gave permission for the pilot to be provided.

47. There seems to have been a Portuguese factory in Gresik as well. See Schrieke, B.: *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, part 1, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1966 (1955), p48.

48. Keuning: *op.cit.*, vol. IV, p54. Also Stapel, F.W. (ed.): *Beschryvinge van de Ooste Indische Compagnie*, 2e boek, deel 1, 's Gravenhage, 1931, p313.

49. Keuning: *op.cit.*, vol. III, p204. See also Schrieke: *op.cit.*, p70-71.

50. See M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs: *Asian Trade and European Influence*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962.



Muslim ports to all-comers, even to Christian Europeans. It was the attempt by the Portuguese to monopolize the trade in the spice islands which brought the wrath of Gresik down upon them.

Several items of data from the first two voyages of the Dutch give interesting glimpses of the very first clashes between the newly risen state of Mataram on the one side and Surabaya and Gresik on the other. These accounts tell us that Blambangan had fallen to Mataram after January 1597, with the royal family having been killed; Panarukan fell between 1597 and 1598; Gresik and Surabaya submitted "before 1600".<sup>51</sup> From a military point of view, is it likely that Gresik and Surabaya would have been taken last? If so it would have left the heart and flank of Mataram exposed while it conducted its campaign in far-east Java. The *Tweede Schipvaert* account reports that the formerly great commercial quarter of Gresik was "presently declined" in 1599 but does not report fighting in progress.<sup>52</sup> We should conclude that Gresik and Surabaya fell in either 1596 or very early in 1599, with Mataram then proceeding further eastwards. The "King of Sorbay" (Surabaya) who is mentioned by Oliver Noort as having "besieged Blamboa (Blambangan), and destroyed the King with all his kindred" must therefore be the King of Mataram who has temporarily been acknowledged as King of

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51. Mollema, J.C.: *De Eerste Schipvaert der Nederlanders naar Oost-Indie Onder Coernelius de Houtman, 1595-1597*, 's Grav., M. Nijhoff, 1936, p323.

52. Keuning: *op.cit.*, vol.III, p41 n107.

Surabaya.<sup>53</sup> Both Surabaya and Gresik managed to free themselves from Mataram between 1601 and 1602.<sup>54</sup>

During the earliest voyages, the Dutch intended to buy the spices directly from the source, the spice islands themselves. However, because much of the crop of these islands was already committed or sold to the merchants of Gresik and other places, the Dutch decided that it was necessary to establish an agency at Gresik to obtain access to larger amounts of the spices,<sup>55</sup> and to also buy what they could from other ports such as Banten.<sup>56</sup> They must therefore have been paying Gresik merchants the market price. The building of the Dutch factory was begun on the 27th April, 1602.<sup>57</sup> It appears that the residence or "Lodge" of these Dutchmen was in the place that the Dutch called "Gressi" and not at Jortan; assuming by Jortan they meant the Kebungson, their office must therefore have been in or near the Pakojan.<sup>58</sup> Adriaan Schaeck, Hans Roef and Gerrit van Doornick, with 22 or 23,000 guilders in money and merchandise, were the resident agents, charged with orders to invest that sum

53. Noort: Oliver Noort's account in Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Postumas or Purchas His Pilgrims, W.H.S., vol.2, extra series, Glasgow, 1905-07, p204.

54. Mollema: op.cit., p323.

55. Cf. Stapel: op.cit., p313. Stapel implies that Gresik was an earlier Batavia or Dutch centre until the latter post was established.

56. See Mollema: op.cit., p285, where it is reported that a dispute broke out, in 1596 at Banten, between the Dutch and captains of two Gresik junks newly arrived from Maluku with "nuts" (nutmeg and mace).

57. Jonge, J.K.J. de, and Deventer, M.L. van: De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie, 's-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1862-1909, vol. II, p515.

58. Coen, J.P.: op.cit., vol.I, p522.

in nutmeg, mace and cloves for the return journey to Holland.<sup>59</sup> As this trade of the Dutch developed, they became more involved in the traffic of bulk foodstuffs to provide for the newly seized islands in the Banda and Ambon group, and later for the fortress at Batavia.<sup>60</sup>

It has been shown above how integrated the spice islands of Tidore, Ternate, Ambon and Banda were with the ports of the north coast of Java, especially with Gresik. This trade network of rice, cloth and manufactures being exchanged for nutmeg, mace and cloves was one of the main economic arteries of Gresik. Psychologically, the relationship was also intimate, and probably familial, between Giri and the orang kaya rulers of the island of Neira in Banda. Strategically, the Banda group were also important if not vital: as Pires had shown, the Javanese traders island-hopped through the Nusa Tenggara archipelago buying and selling as they went until they reached Banda where they stopped. The reason for stopping here was that the west wind could only take a ship that far, assuming it took that traditional southern route. To sail further north, to Maluku, meant waiting for the next season's winds; the entire return voyage would take more than a year. This was Banda's natural advantage: it was in a position to collect the cloves from the northern island groups and have it ready for sale in Banda by the time the Javanese arrived. It also meant that Banda

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59. de Jonge: *op.cit.*, vol. II, p515.

60. See chapter 7 above.

became a strategic point, in an economic sense, for the Javanese. Besides this, for the Javanese to lose control of Banda meant having to abandon the trade with Nusa Tenggara, or at least to separate that trade route off from the route to the spice islands, with all the inconvenience that this entailed. Furthermore, such a loss would, and did, force the Javanese to sail the northern route to Maluku, via Makassar or the new secret location in Bandang, thus attempting to open up a "back-door" to Maluku and the other islands. This would have entailed a decline in Gresik's importance since Makassar would be able to take over the role of marketing the spices to the west Asians and Europeans. Any threat to Banda was therefore of vital concern to Gresik.

It is in this context that we must view the progress of the Dutch in enforcing, gradually, their monopoly in the spice-producing islands. In 1599 a small factory was built by them at Lontor in the Banda group with the permission of the Bandanese; it was seen by the latter as a counter to the Portuguese.<sup>61</sup> In 1605 the Dutch seized the Portuguese fortresses on Ambon and in the Moluccas.<sup>62</sup> This was followed by the first attack on the Bandanese in 1609, when the Dutch occupied the island of Banda in the Banda group, imposing a monopoly on the nutmeg trade. While the Bandanese evaded the monopoly for a while,

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61. Villiers J.: "Trade and Society in the Banda Islands in the Sixteenth Century", *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 15, 1981, pp749-750.

62. *ibid.*, pp749-750.

trading with the English and attacking the Dutch, the latter replied by taking direct control over the Banda group as a whole.<sup>63</sup> First Gresik's sphere of influence in the Banda group, the trading station on Neira, was seized in 1615,<sup>64</sup> then the island of Banda was taken by the Dutch in 1621. It was in this year that the Dutch Governor-General, Jan Pieterzoon Coen, executed with great ruthlessness and savagery his campaign against the Bandanese orang kaya and inhabitants, killing them, seizing their lands and spice orchards and applying slave-labour to cultivate these orchards.<sup>65</sup> The English were driven out of their camp on the island of Run in the Banda group in this year as well.<sup>66</sup>

It is surprising that there is no evidence of an alliance between Gresik and either the English at Banten or the Portuguese at Melaka, to deal with this threat in Banda. Presumably the Portuguese were still alienated by the earlier wars with the Javanese, while the English had not yet grasped the connection between Gresik and Banda, and in any case such an alliance would have succumbed to the Anglo-Dutch negotiations in Europe which followed the initial clashes. Certainly there is evidence of an English-Bandanese cooperative effort against the Dutch. Gresik's response was to send military aid to Banda and

63. *ibid.*, pp749-750.

64. *ibid.*, pp730-731.

65. *ibid.*, pp749-750.

66. Jourdain, J.: *The Journal of a Voyage to the East Indies 1608-1617, Describing His Experiences in Arabia, India and the Malay Archipelago*. Ed. by W. Foster. W.H.S., 2nd series, vol. XVI, Cambridge, 1905, p276.

Ambon and to supply them with Portuguese and English cloth in order to pre-empt the trade of the Dutch: Coen reports in 1615 that "...the offices in Grissi (Gresik), Macassar and Boutton should be abolished and that, in order to keep the Javanese junks from Amboina and Banda, since the Bandanese are backed against us by them and ruin the Amboina trade, marketing there the clothes of the Portuguese and the English...so that our clothes remain unsold...(We) have urged the king again through a letter given to the sabandar (Shahbandar of Gresik) that he should not permit any junks to sail to Mallacca, the Moluccas, Amboina, Banda nor Solor, as they are continuing as before since thus backing our enemies..."<sup>67</sup>

Coen also mentions the killing, in 1615, of two of the Dutch resident agents at Gresik: "A few months earlier 2 men of the lodge in the mountains outside Grissi, where the mahomedan pope lives, have been beaten to death like dogs, without anything being done about it. The king showed himself to be very angry, but who will excommunicate the pope? The aforesaid pope has taken the Bandanese under his protection."<sup>68</sup>

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67. Coen: op.cit., vol.I, p120. For the closure of the factory at Gresik on 26 October, 1615, see also Coolhas, W.Ph.: Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-General en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oost Indische Compagnie, 's Gravenhage, M.N., 1960, vol.1.

68. Coen: ibid., vol.I, p120. Coen is referring to the King of either Surabaya or of Mataram, and this King has appointed a shahbandar at Gresik who acts favourably toward the Dutch. The Sunan and the merchants of Gresik, however, have nothing but hostility toward them.

The seizure of Neira by the Dutch in 1615 must be seen as closely connected to the aforementioned events. The killing of the two Dutch agents, the closure of the lodge at Gresik, the letter to the shahbandar warning him to stop the junks of Gresik attacking the Dutch at Banda are almost certainly consequential to the Dutch attack on Gresik's trading station on the island of Neira. The year 1615, then, is a turning point for Gresik in that its economy has been seriously damaged by the Dutch. It is from this time that Coen begins to refer to Gresik and Giri bluntly as the "enemy".

It is worth noting at this point that Gresik and Surabaya had been humiliated by the army of Mataram twice<sup>69</sup> since 1596 but that after each campaign both ports managed to regain their independence. Mataram could not afford to station occupation armies in these places for any length of time. Furthermore it sought to control appointments to the shahbandarship in Gresik indirectly through its over-shahbandar at Surabaya, indicating even greater difficulties in maintaining control. It should not be thought that the King of Mataram was being lenient in this regard; the well-known aim of Mataram was to close all of the ports of the north coast of Java except Japara through which Mataram would conduct a monopoly trade in rice and other commodities. These early campaigns inflicted only flesh wounds on Gresik. Mataram had demonstrated militarily and financially an incapacity to

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69. For the second campaign see below.

drive home the sword till it touched either bone or vital organ. The homes of the Javanese populations of Gresik and Surabaya were torched and the people put to flight, but they simply returned a few days later to rebuild. It must be remembered, as Lombard has shown, that the mass of the population in Aceh suffered no less destructive flooding *seasonally* without ill effect. The vitals of Gresik lay overseas at Neira and the other spice islands, far from Mataram's reach. This highlights the crucial role played by the Dutch in the downfall of the north coastal ports of Java through their actions in these spice islands.

Turning to the second campaign of Mataram, it is reported by Coen, that on or about the 31st of December 1613, Gresik had fallen. The campaign was seen by Coen as temporarily successful: "Came to anchor off Crissi (Gresik) on the 14th (Jan., 1614). Learned and found that 14 days ago the Mattaram had taken Crissi and Jortan, razed the walls and burned the villages, but without much damage, since the inhabitants had fled with all their possessions. The merchant Andryes Soury had fled to Surabay with Yr Hons possessions so that the company suffered no other loss there excepting some 500 reals of eight in bulk wares."<sup>70</sup>. Wiselius argues that the local Dutch agents at Gresik protected Gresik's and Surabaya's coast from Mataram by using their ships.<sup>71</sup> This view

70. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p23.

71. Wiselius: op.cit., p491. The date for this is given as 1619.



finds some support in Coen's reports<sup>72</sup> but it is an attitude that does not persist and is eventually replaced by a policy of eliminating Gresik as a rival by piracy and blockade.

The evidence for Dutch actions at sea directed against the merchants of Gresik is very strong and comes from Coen's own reports to his masters in Holland. After closing the agency at Gresik, Coen prepared two frigates in 1615 to "...keep away (Gresik's junks) from Banda..." Only one frigate could be manned at this time however. A Japanese barque with Japanese crew was added and it had "...taken a Grissee junk and taken the goods as a prize. Further success will be reported later."<sup>73</sup> On the 3rd of November 1615 the Dutch seized a Gresik junk at Banda but found that the goods were of little value; more goods were pirated on the same day from other junks of Gresik and Puloway.<sup>74</sup> On the 2nd of December 1617 the Dutch forced junks of Gresik, Jortan and Tuban to sell their pepper to them; persons and ships were not to be damaged but the pepper had to be turned over to them; it was to be paid for in cash.<sup>75</sup> At the end of that month Coen wished for more yachts to "supervise the buying of pepper."<sup>76</sup> The tenor of Gresik-Dutch relations in February 1618 can be gaged from Coen's order to send fifty soldiers on board the Neptune, accompanied by the

72. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p653.

73. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p123.

74. Coen: op.cit., vol.2, pp22, 23.

75. *ibid.*, vol.2, p311.

76. *ibid.*, vol.2, p330.

galley Mare and the frigate Jacatra to Gresik "...to buy pepper and see what the enemy are up to."<sup>77</sup> A month later he added: "(We) should be careful of Madura, Giri (Bukit), Tuban and more because they have the courage and skill to attack our ships."<sup>78</sup>

The Portuguese who traded with Gresik were also targeted for the same sort of attention by the Dutch. Watching the Portuguese make their purchases and load them on their junks, the Dutch estimated the cargoes' worth to be 40,000 reals. Coen comments: "If we were not so pre-occupied in the Moluccas we could easily catch them with a few yachts."<sup>79</sup> The yacht Eolus and the sloop Cleen Middelburch were later sent to Gresik "...to observe the Portuguese who trade on Grissi from Mallacca..."<sup>80</sup> The Dutch then began piratical attacks against the Portuguese and on the 10th of June 1615, the yacht Aeolus "...conquered 5 junks from the Portuguese at Gresik including 20,000 guilders of goods."<sup>81</sup>

Besides the junks of the merchants of Gresik and the Portuguese, the Dutch also paid attention to the Gresik-China trade, seeking to re-direct by forceful persuasion the Chinese merchants heading for Gresik. On the 24th March, 1625 a Chinese junk on the high seas off the coast of Champa was approached and questioned as to its

77. *ibid.*, vol.2, p347.

78. Dated 19.3.1618. *Ibid.*, vol.2, p357.

79. Coen: *op.cit.*, vol.1, p74.

80. Coen: *op.cit.*, vol.1, p102.

81. Coen: *op.cit.*, vol.2, p9; vol.1, p145.

destination. The Chinese captain said that they were bound for Batavia, but later it was found making for Gresik.<sup>82</sup> Three days later the Daghregister records the sending of a Dutch frigate from Batavia to coerce the Chinese junks bound for Japara and Gresik, including those already there, to go to Batavia.<sup>83</sup> On the 20th May, 1625, a frigate was stationed at Gresik to watch for Chinese junks and to prevent them from unloading and reloading cargo there. This did not prevent the Dutch from carrying on their own trade with Gresik, a trade that was no doubt dictated by circumstances: the Daghregister reports the arrival at Batavia of a Dutch ship from Gresik bringing in a cargo of cows, buffaloes and horses on the same day.<sup>84</sup> The frigate at Gresik returned to Batavia on the 27th September; the Daghregister notes with irony, that it had been trying to "win Chinese favour and convoy them to Batavia." On that day it also notes that some Chinese junks had already loaded goods (pepper, sapan-wood and sandal-wood) and were preparing to return to China but they were forced to unload it and leave or go to Batavia.<sup>85</sup>

Gresik therefore was severely affected by the actions of the Dutch. Their source of wealth, the integrated and specialized trade network with the spice producing islands had been severed, their shipping attacked in

82. Heeres, J.E. (ed.): *Daghregister Gehonden int Casteel Batavia, 's Grave.*, M. Nijhoff, 1896, p136.

83. Heeres: *ibid.*, p137.

84. Heeres: *op.cit.*, pp255-6, 260.

85. Heeres: *op.cit.*, p287.

piratical fashion, their harbour itself was occupied and blockaded by armed vessels, their foreign traders forcibly re-routed to Batavia and their shipping boarded as far away as the South China Sea. It is not surprising then that Gresik was in a poor condition to confront the emerging Javanese kingdom in the hinterland.

It was shown above that Mataram was incapable of finishing off even a debilitated Gresik because although it had the chopping instrument, a large army, it did not have a chopping block. The merchants of Gresik always fled on board their ships while the other towns-folk could vanish into the wooded hills or the swamps and fish-ponds nearby. This is not to say that there was no military resistance proffered by the ports. Coen estimates that Mataram lost 40,000 men in the attack on Surabaya alone in 1613/4.<sup>86</sup> It was the Dutch who eventually provided the chopping block in the form of a naval blockade of the harbour and straits thus preventing the escape of the merchants and preventing also assistance from outside.<sup>87</sup>

Before this final misfortune descended upon Gresik, certain weaknesses in the Muslim side and the Indonesian side in general are said to have become apparent and need

86. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p74.

87. This point is discussed further below. Certainly the Dutch had provided an economic blockade of Gresik; whether they also provided a military one "preventing assistance from outside" is probable. Cf. however Ricklefs, M.C.: A History of Modern Indonesia, Macmillan, London, 1981, p42.

to be examined, especially the relationship that the Dutch had with Surabaya and Mataram. The evidence for collaboration between Surabaya and the Dutch is not very strong. Regarding the previously mentioned event of the Dutch coveting the 40,000 reals of cargo being loaded onto five Portuguese junks at Gresik, Coen commented in his report that "...we could easily catch them with a few yachts. The king of Sorabaya is of the same mind and is eager to share the booty even though his own junks are employed by the Portuguese."<sup>88</sup> This would seem to be a case of the King of Surabaya contemplating acting partially against his own interest in that he would no longer be able to hire out his junks to the Portuguese, in order that he would gain some temporary advantage in sharing the booty with the Dutch. Probably he was humouring the Dutch until he was able to determine where his natural advantage and long-term interest lay, it being still too early to tell at this time. Coen also added in this report that the King of Surabaya "...has been urged again in August by the Commodore Steven Doensz and Governor Jaspas Janssen that he should keep his junks away from Banda, since our foes are supported by them or would be obliged to attack him as an enemy...whereupon one of the principals answered that he would warn the skippers of the junks and we could do as we desired."<sup>89</sup> This statement implies a willingness on the part of the Dutch to form a co-operative relationship, but again the

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88. Coen: op.cit..

89. Coen: op.cit..

King of Surabaya is keeping his options open since he merely answers that he would only warn his skippers rather than forbid them.

In another passage Coen writes that "...our people have been favoured by the aforesaid king of Surabaya and Grissi more than by any other in the entire Indies."<sup>90</sup> By Grissi they mean the Muslim west Asian quarters of the port which we have called the Pakojan. The shahbandar here, at this time, was appointed by Surabaya and therefore any fraternizing between the Dutch and the Pakojan would have been limited to this man from Surabaya. The people of "Jortan" or Kebungson were connected closely to Giri and would have shared their hostility towards the Dutch. This leaves us with Surabaya and its representatives as the party hospitable towards the Dutch. Yet again there is a lack of substance to this view that Surabaya was co-operating with the Dutch against Gresik; we are left with this general notion of "favour" which can again be interpreted as Surabaya keeping its options open. To be sure, Surabaya needed an ally or trade partner amongst the European powers and this is probably one reason why the Portuguese were welcome there. The ally was needed to swing the balance of power away from Mataram to Surabaya. Surabaya must have been in the process of deciding which of those European powers would be the one which could provide most support and least threat. The enemy was not seen as Gresik but Mataram, the former was merely a trade

90. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p120.

rival. As for the Dutch, it was convenient for them to try to win Surabaya's support against Gresik since the latter was an all-round threat to the Dutch, challenging them in economic, religious, political and military terms. Yet Surabaya was a port and therefore a rival to the Dutch in the long run. Therefore Surabaya could only be of short term assistance and would have to be closed down in the long-run. The Netherlands natural ally would have to be Mataram since both had the common objective in the long term of destroying the ports on the north coast of Java. The Dutch must have had some difficulty establishing secure avenues of communication with Mataram since it would have to traverse one of the coastal ports.

A final piece of data needs to be aired in this regard. Coen writes that he had "...ordered (generally to retain friendship, good access and all requisites in Java) to honour the king of Surrabaya with a piece of artillery (which he had earlier requested by letter to buy) and with some other trifles."<sup>91</sup> Again this cannot be construed as co-operation with the Dutch but rather as a further example of Surabaya keeping its options open and getting whatever advantage it could out of its relationship with the Dutch. Summing up, one can say that Surabaya's relationship with Gresik remained constant despite some trade rivalry, yet in all other respects Surabaya was at sea in the flux of power looking for temporary allies amongst possible enemies that were

91. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p451.

strong enough to afford significant assistance but not so strong that the ally could turn upon and threaten Surabaya herself.

As for the relationship between the Dutch and Mataram, there is evidence of a growing understanding and de-facto co-operation between the two prior to the formal partnership that was inaugurated in 1646. On the 10th of March, 1614, Coen reported to the Directors of the Company that he had received the following communication from the King of Mataram: "I know that you people are not coming to conquer the land of Java; I have taken Grissi and Jortan, I shall now take Sorabaya and shall then donate Jortan to the General (Coen) (if he wants it); I have no enmity towards those of Bantam, but if they should cause you any trouble I shall give you 40 goraps or galleys to help you."<sup>92</sup> As for Coen's attitude, he was certainly convinced of the new power of Mataram in Java and was a man who respected the contours of power as they appeared to him. He comments later in that year that despite the heavy losses in the battle with Surabaya "...it does not matter a great deal for the Mataram since he rules a populous people, so there is no doubt but he will become master (of Java) and make further attempts."<sup>93</sup> In 1621 however the sea-borne campaign by Mataram against Surabaya had been inhibited because of the presence of Dutch shipping anchored at Gresik,<sup>94</sup>

92. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p74.

93. ibid.

94. Coen: op.cit., vol.1, p653.



indicating that Mataram had left orders with his admiral not to risk Mataram's relations with the Dutch by sailing too close to them. He reports that the inhabitants of Gresik had (temporarily) abandoned the port as they expected a Mataram attack and that it seems that Mataram had sent people disguised as vagabonds into Gresik to torch the city.<sup>95</sup> Apparently the Dutch had "stopped and hindered" the vagabonds as they still had some unfinished business there. Mataram was still concerned about not alienating and aggravating the Dutch because they did not want to increase the number of their enemies and thought that they may need their help. Hence Mataram's admiral of the sea sent an early warning to the Dutch of their plans in 1622 to "...send an army to Surabaya this year; that Grissi and Jortan...may be laid waste."<sup>96</sup> Finally, in 1625 the Dagregister reports that the "...people of Giri were in great famine because agriculture was stopped by the war and assistance prevented from outside, so that the place will fall of itself even without attack."<sup>97</sup> This was the battle mentioned previously in which Mataram had sent 30,000 troops to Gresik to trample down its rice crop. It is not absolutely clear who prevented the outside assistance but it was probably the Dutch since they had the harbour patrolled by frigates to prevent foreign merchants arriving to trade.

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95. *ibid.*

96. Coen: *op.cit.*, vol.1, p707.

97. Heeres: *op.cit.*, p148.

The evidence then shows that Mataram and the Dutch had a common enemy, Gresik, and that while the Dutch-Mataram treaty of 1646 was still in the future, a de-facto working arrangement emerged long before this. Gresik was undermined economically by Dutch military action in the spice-producing islands, on the high seas throughout the orient, and by the occupation of the harbour of Gresik itself. These actions enabled Mataram to get into a superior position militarily regarding Gresik and Surabaya, but even so, Mataram was unable to clinch its supremacy. The final blow to Gresik was carried out by Mataram's army attacking by land while the Dutch probably patrolled the harbour thus preventing help arriving from outside. As well as common enemies and interests, Mataram and the Company had similar internal structures as has been explained in a prior chapter; both represented a collapsing-in onto itself of social functions which had formerly been separate, namely the political, the military and the economic. They were both then, reactionary powers incapable, structurally, of advancing the socio-economic structure of Java. Indeed the final result is one of ashen port cities, merchants fleeing to Makassar permanently, trade monopolies, decline of the merchant class and of urban population generally. Eventually Giri itself was attacked, in 1680, after a joint Mataram-Dutch military expedition<sup>98</sup> in which the Sunan and his family were killed thus completing the

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98. This event goes beyond the temporal limits of the thesis and so cannot be treated here.

regressive process by collapsing the religio-legal institution of Giri into the now all-powerful monarchical institution.

We have been assuming that all of these events had taken place during the reign of Sunan Prapen yet this requires some justification. Sunan Prapen is said to have taken the *mimbar* or pulpit in the Mosque of Giri in 1548 and that he had, prior to this, already been involved in spreading Islam to Lombok and to have been very much involved in the strife which consumed Java at that time. He was therefore very much an adult by the time he assumed the position of Sunan. If we assume that he was at least 20 years of age in 1548, then he must have been at least 97 years old by 1625 when Gresik was finally conquered. On the face of it, it does not seem reasonable yet there is evidence supporting this view. Firstly the babad states the date of death as: "Prapen dadi gulinganing ratu" meaning that the mountain called Prapen became the final resting-place of the King (Sunan).<sup>99</sup> The words, according to the babad, have the numerological value of 7451 which reversed yields the Javanese date of 1547 or 1625 A.D.. Certainly the word for the decade is consistent within the babad: *dadi* always has the value of 4, implying that the date could not be before 1540 A.J. or 1618 A.D..<sup>100</sup> Secondly, the babad places his death in conjunction with the arrival of a "visitor" from a

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99. BIG, p51.

100. cf. BIG, p39.

hinterland kingdom, namely Sultan Padjang,<sup>101</sup> yet this is impossible since Padjang died long before this. The next visitor to arrive at Giri from the hinterland kingdom was his enemy the King of Mataram (designated as Senapati,<sup>102</sup> yet he too had already passed away and was replaced by Sultan Agung). The "visitation" by Agung, then, coincided with Prapen's death and we know that Agung finally conquered Gresik in 1625. The Dutch also spoke of the "chief priest (who) resides in a place without the Citie of Jortan, a man of a hundred and twentie years, who hath many wives to keep him warm, and with their milk to nourish him, eating no other meat."<sup>103</sup> This view also finds support from a Chinese source: "At Grissee there is a king who is more than 100 years old and can predict future events."<sup>104</sup> De Graaf and Pigeaud are also of the opinion that he was exceptionally old when he died, citing the same Dutch and Chinese records, but they place that date in 1605 A.D., which date is drawn from "local stories".<sup>105</sup> The local babad, however, gives the date of 1547 A.J., hence 1625 A.D. It is also significant that the heir to Prapen is forced to surrender permanently the title of Sunan to Agung and use the lesser title of

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101. BIG, pp50-51.

102. BIG, p51.

103. Noort: Oliver Noort's account in Samuel Purchas, *Hakluytus Postumas or Purchas His Pilgrims*, W.H.S., vol.2, extra series, Glasgow, 1905-07, p204.

104. W.P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago compiled from Chinese Sources*, V.B.G., XXXIX, 1880, C.V. Bhratara, Djakarta (1960), p54. The document is dated as 1618.

105. De Graff, H.J. and Pigeaud, Th.: *Kerajaan-kerajaan Islam di Jawa*, Grafitipers, Jakarta, 1985, p189.

Panembahan.<sup>106</sup> This year of 1625 must therefore be considered the correct date for Prapen's death.

While the ports of Java lay in ruins, the merchants fled to Makassar<sup>107</sup> to build a more defensible trading centre. In Makassar they had only weak threats from the interior; they also had the *wesi* (iron) for which Sulawesi was known and which was good for cannons; they had too the Buginese ship-builders and seamen. In the end, the merchants of Gresik were not themselves ruined. They moved on to where they thought they would have more of a fighting chance in dealing with the formidable challenge of the Netherlands.

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106. BIG, p51.

107. "The shipping of the Macassares has increased extraordinarily since not long ago because of the exiled foreigners from the Malay lands such as Johore, Pahang and Lingga as well as Grise, Bukit (or Giri), Jaratan, Sedayu and many other places, and this because the aforementioned Macassar treats these same foreigners very civilly..." cited by Schrieke, B.: Indonesian Sociological Studies, part 1, W. van Hove, The Hague, 1966 (1955), pp69-70.

This study of the history of Gresik has shown that the use of local *babad* sources is not only valid methodologically but also highly fruitful when it is brought into relation with other sources of information. Arguments by earlier 20th century historians that the *babads* were badly affected by distortions due to Hindu religious cosmology are less applicable to the *babad* of Gresik since Gresik did not have the misconception that it was the still-centre of the cosmos around which all mundane events revolved. It did not therefore try to force the historical material into that cyclical pattern that we recognise in the central Javanese *babads*. At the very least, the *babad* of Gresik provides a sound "king-list", or rather a "Sunan-list", which is a *sine qua non* for the history of Gresik. Although the stories related in the *babad* are distorted by its own cultural commitments, namely Islam and Middle Eastern mythology in general, one can turn this to advantage by recognising the myth being employed, then prising it loose from the material it attempts to mould. Recognition and comparison of the Middle Eastern myth with that of Gresik's variant form of the myth shakes loose much historical material. This material can then be brought into relation with material from other historical sources.

The location and structure of the city of Gresik has been a constant problem and source of confusion from the first account of Gresik by Tome Pires up to the writings of De Graaf and Pigeaud. By utilizing the material from the

*babad*, and by inspection of the physical remains of the city, the confusion was replaced by clarity. The twin city of Pires and the Grissee-Jortan dichotomy were seen to be nothing more than the traditional separation of *Kampong Arab* from the *Pacinan* or China-town, the latter known by the residents of Gresik as the *Kebungson*. Earlier locations of the port of Gresik became apparent with the discovery of the place called Rama. A more remote connection with the older port of Leran also came to light.

The question of the origins of Islam in the Gresik area led us unexpectedly to the neighbouring port of Leran and back to the 11th and 12th century. The *babad* contained a story that linked the earliest accounts of the origin of Islam in Gresik with that of Leran and did so in a way that contradicted the extant epigraphic evidence. By splitting the story into two parts much historical material was rescued and, surprisingly, a window opened up to the 11th and 12th century. The *babad* contained a usable account of the first Muslim inhabitants of Leran and their relations with the hinterland kingdoms of Djenggala and Kediri. A more distant connection with the *Pakojan* (*Kampong Arab*) in Gresik was also noted. The first Muslims to inhabit the shores of Java were those of Leran and they appear to have come from Gujarat and possibly from the city and province in Gujarat known as Kheda.

The port of Gresik was founded by two fellow-countrymen of the Gujaratis of Leran in 1374 A.D.. Their names are Malik Ibrahim and Muhamed Sidik and their gravestones are contained in the *Pakojan* cemetery in Gresik. The epigraphy on these gravestones indicates a Gujarati origin because of its style and its linguistic peculiarities. Because they founded Gresik as a port, they must be considered the first Muslims of Gresik. As Muslims, though, they were quietistic, having possibly learnt some hard lessons regarding missionary activities from their Leranian fellows in former times.

However, a second source of Islam appeared with the arrival of Muslim merchants from Champa and "Kambodja" in the early 15th century. The chief Champa merchant was Radja Pandhita (Raden Aliutama) who took up residence in Wunut, a part of the port of Gresik. He is well connected religiously with other Muslim preachers of Java and soon established ties of marriage to the aristocracies of Madura, possibly with the Maluku islands and with the ruler of Demak. It is likely that he did in fact come from Champa but that he was not ethnically Champan, but rather an overseas Chinese. This Champa group in Gresik was probably displaced by the war between Champa and Annam. Their transfer and establishment in Java may have been assisted by Admiral Cheng Ho.

The "Kambodja" merchants were said to have come from the royal family of Cambodia but this was shown to be



unlikely. Their origins were more likely to have been the mercantile classes. The "Kambodja" from which they arrived was more likely to have been the country of San-fu-ch'i, the country of Palembang, in Sumatra. The chief merchant of the China-town of Gresik was Lady Pinatih who appears to have been the same person as Lady Pinachih of Palembang, a Chinese woman who appointed herself as temporary *pati* of Palembang during some disturbances there. She established a trading compound at what became known as the Kebungson in the heart of Gresik. Spreading out in different directions from this Kebungson is a rich tapestry of evidence. To Palembang there was the connection with the Chinese family from which Pinatih descended and whose father was the ruler appointed by the Chinese Admiral, Cheng Ho. This family was to produce the only lineage which Sunan Giri, the "kingmaker" of Java, would recognise as the legitimate King. To the rest of the archipelago there was the connection with a rich trading network; Kebungson was the jewel of all the trading centres of Java, said Pires. To the Mosque on the hill at Giri, Kebungson had a very special relationship. The Muslim saint who preached there was the son of the Chinese woman who governed at Kebungson, Lady Pinatih. A close economic relationship became apparent between the Kedhaton at Giri and the Kebungson: Giri owned the Kebungson and sent its youngest offspring to govern it. It is for this reason that the Kebungson acquired such an unusual name since it means "place of the youngest child". Furthermore, the Chinese origin of the Muslim

*Sunan* of Giri became clear, supported by evidence from multiple sources. The *Sunan* was born and raised in Chinatown, in the Kebungson; his mother was a Chinese whose maiden name was *Shih*; his father was probably the Chinese of Palembang who bore the name *Chiu*; he appears to have had a guard of Chinese soldiers who protected him in time of war; he only recognizes the dynasty of rulers who were initially established in Palembang by Admiral Cheng Ho.

Raden Paku's generation were seen as a generation of religious idealists who had escaped from the need to be concerned with the mundane world of trade which so preoccupied their forbears yet which formed their secure foundation. They acted on religious motives to spread Islam into the hinterland of Java, to convert the Javanese. They were, at the same time, politically conscious and knew that their actions were going to lead to a confrontation with the Javanese monarchy. Other possible port sites are colonized along the north coast of Java and an alliance is formed which eventually isolates and overcomes the hinterland rice-plain kingdom. It is during this period that Raden Paku creates, or finds himself in, a new position in the Javanese polity: the position of "kingmaker".

Traditionally, historians have viewed the alliance between the ports as affected by two main factors. The first was the ties of marriage between the rulers of the ports; the second is the economic rivalry that always

undermined it. What was not seen was that the ties were closer than marriage: Raden Patah and Raden Paku were descended from the same ruling family of Palembang, forming collateral branches of it. This family was seen as being the bearer of legitimate authority in Java because of the authority vested in it by Admiral Cheng Ho. Even after the withdrawal of China from the world stage in the middle of the 15th century, this aura of legitimacy persisted. The weakness in the alliance was not economic rivalry but that there were *only* ties of marriage connecting Surabaya with this dynasty in Demak and Gresik; there was no descendant from this dynasty ruling in Surabaya since the latter's ruler descended from an independent Chinese family from Champa. Ties of marriage were not enough to subdue economic rivalry.

It is during the period of Sunan Dalem Wetan that certain pivotal events occurred which tipped the scales between Demak and Surabaya. Gresik had successfully defended itself against a revival of former Majapahit forces coming from the mountains of Java. In destroying this last vestige of Majapahit, it had allowed Surabaya to take possession of the rich rice-fields of Majapahit up-river. Surabaya could now rival Demak as a country that was founded on the binary compound of agriculture and foreign trade - it had become an agro-mercantile centre. Before this time it had merely existed on trade and, in this respect, was situated in a disadvantageous location vis-a-vis Gresik which commanded the entrance to the

Madura straits. It is in the year 1546 that the ties that bound Surabaya to Demak and Gresik truly failed and war broke out. This war was to put an end to Demak's control over most of Java. What replaced it was rivalry between Surabaya and an emergent kingdom, still ruled by the female line of descendants of Raden Patah, at Padjang.

Historians of Java tend to follow the social structure and development theories of either or both of Weber and Durkheim. These continental European social philosophers were very much concerned with theories of the emergence of the modern state out of other social forms which preceded it. Their weaknesses are that they tend to be overly pre-occupied with problems of *integration* of the nascent state to the degree that they cannot explain the emergence of the economy as an independent system, nor the rise of a free merchant class; indeed these institutions tend to be assumed. English pre-occupations with the emergence of *separate and balancing powers* have not been very influential in this field. This is unfortunate since it is relevant to this period in Javanese history. With the emergence of Sunan Giri in his Kedhaton on the mountain we have what appears to be the emergence of a double separation of powers: religion has become severed from the monarchy and it has taken the law with it. Law had become a separate institution with its own sources of authority, namely the religion of Islam which had its own legal history. Together with this separation came the assertion of supremacy of the *Sunan*

over the King in the respect that the *Sunan* determined who was to be King; crown law was to be subjected to scrutiny by the Islamic courts located in the Mosque; the Mosque courts therefore had their own system of recruitment, ensuring their autonomy. Of course, not every Mosque could query crown law, but the *Sunan*, because of his prestige, could. Furthermore, it would seem that the *Sunan* had a great deal of influence over foreign policy since it became apparent that it was he who had called for the campaign to spread Islam by holy-war to far-east Java. This notion of the separation of a religio-legal institution from the monarchy during this period of Java's history is contrary to the consensus view which holds that Islam represented a reversion to the times when Java's monarchs were seen as God-kings. Such a view must now be revised for the period of the first four *Sunans* of Giri.

The followers of Durkheim and Weber also overlook an alternative route taken by Demak and Surabaya to overcome those problems of social and state integration. The problem was that the kingdom's centre and periphery tended to come apart due to the lack of monetisation of the economy, inadequate communications and self-interest on the part of the peripheral rulers. What underlies this problem in Java is the fact that the centre, the Kraton, is founded on the cultivation of rice-plains while the periphery is in large measure based on trade and is located in the ports. Demak and Surabaya found a unique

way of overcoming this problem of holding the kingdom together by bringing agriculture and the Javanese peasantry to the port. Both of these states had extensive rice-fields in the immediate hinterland of the port. Their rulers could therefore supervise both operations closely; they had become, in other words, agro-mercantile kingdoms. Gresik, however, was excluded from this prospect because of its geographical limitations.

The worst problem that the Weberian and Durkheimian historians have to face is that when integration of the kingdom is finally achieved with the rise of Mataram, it is founded, not on an autonomous economic system with a free merchant class, but rather on the decimation of that class, the ruin of the ports and the advent of a partial royal monopoly in trade centred on Jepara and shared with the Dutch at Batavia. This points to the inadequate attention given to the economy and the merchant class within their approach to historical development. The market at Gresik was liberally managed, without severe customs and harbour fees. The market was allowed to determine prices and the local authorities did not claim special rights over incoming goods. Gresik's merchant class was prominent in Southeast Asia and Pires described the port as "o porto da Jemte Riqua" (the port of *orang kaya*) and as the "porto de mercadores" (the port of the merchants).

Turning to the economic aspects of Gresik's history we found that Gresik had a population of about 30,000 in the early 16th century. This contrasts strikingly with the estimate by Meilink-Roelofs of about 5,000 people in 1601. Gresik's trade was very substantial throughout this period having close connections with Banda (especially Neira) and Maluku in the spice trade; with Melaka in the provision of rice in bulk and the receipt of Indian cloth; with Sumatra (especially Jambi) in the purchase of pepper to be re-exported; with China in the import of luxuries and the export of pepper; and most importantly with the Javanese hinterland, especially with the Javanese aristocracy and *orang kaya*. Other commodities too numerous to mention were also traded at Gresik. Gresik was not simply an import-export centre but an entrepot as well: Sumatran pepper, Indian cloth and Malukan-Bandanese spices were all re-exported to other places.

The trade was not simply in small quantities of valuables carried on by peddling merchants, but involved commodities in bulk, such as rice, other foodstuffs, salt, timber, cloth and animals such as horses, buffalo and cattle. Large scale merchants were involved such as Lady Pinatih who controlled the extensive Kebungson trading compound. These conclusions support those of Meilink-Roelofs in this respect. There is evidence that the organization of business was along the lines of the family. There is also some evidence that polygamy was

used as a way of managing an elaborate and extensive inter-island trade network with different family members located at different parts of the trade network acting as agents. The connection with the spice-producing islands may have been familial with some of the local rulers being inter-married with traders from Gresik.

There is no doubt that Gresik was strongest, out of all of the north coastal ports, in matters of trade. However in the reign of Sunan Seda Margi it becomes apparent that Gresik's *only* material strength was in trade. With this Sunan's death after less than three years in the Kedhaton, a certain attenuation in Gresik's prospect becomes apparent. The attenuation was due to the geographical condition of Gresik and its hinterland: it was a dry country and had soil that was unsuitable for large scale rice cultivation. Without both rice and trade a kingdom had little chance of reconstructing Java under its own control. Of the ports, only Surabaya and Demak were in a position to marry the two and thus create a viable kingdom. After the civil strife amongst the Muslims in the period from 1546 to 1548, Demak's pre-eminent position amongst the coastal ports was gone forever. In its place rose a new Surabaya.

In the hinterland, however, Demak's royal lineage survived through its female line. The Adipati of Padjang, a Javanese, had married the daughter of Sultan Trenggana, the last ruler of Demak. Surabaya would one day have to



contend with a resurgent hinterland kingdom, but not with this one. Padjang had the lineage and the recognition from Sunan Giri to reconstruct Java; it also had the rice plain as a foundation. However it suffered from a lack of control over the ports just as did old Majapahit. It can be seen, from these events, that certain relatively immutable factors determined the fate of these endeavours. These factors were the geo-political, the ethnic and the religious. The geo-political factor determines that a viable kingdom must have both rice-agriculture and foreign trade. They may be either in the one place so that both are under the immediate supervision of the King, or that if both are possessed but one is possessed at a distance then close control and supervision is necessary. The latter case is the more difficult. Gresik's fate was sealed from its inception because it could not satisfy this criterion.

The ethnic factor determines that power must accrue to the indigenous people because they have, at minimum, the numbers. How can the coastal peoples claim the right to rule in Java if they cannot win the allegiance of the bulk of the Javanese peasantry who will usually prefer their own people to rule them. Without the peasantry the loss is magnified because one cannot have rice-agriculture either. The ports could only present themselves as convincing candidates for power in Java if they could show that their ruler was, at least in part, racially and ethnically integrated with the Javanese.

This was why Raden Patah invented the story of his descent from the last King of Majapahit through his Chinese wife. There was probably always a question mark in the minds of the Javanese about this matter. Surabaya's lineage is more difficult to determine because of insufficient source material about their rulers in the last part of the 16th century. Gresik does not score well in this category either.

The third factor was religion. By the time of Demak, the bulk of the Javanese peasantry knew that no King could rule unless he had accepted the new religion of Islam. Anything less than a universal religion would only meet the fate of Majapahit. The coastal ports of Java were well qualified in this area and in this period the Javanese were swayed from their ethnic prejudice by the new religion even though foreign traders were the bearers. However, while the Chinese could not readily overcome the ethnic factor, except temporarily, the Javanese merely had to embrace the new religion, they could steal the fire of their rivals.

The Adipati of Padjang was a Javanese. By converting to Islam and marrying the daughter of Trenggana as well as controlling a rice-plain of central Java he must have been considered the most likely candidate for power in Java. Yet he was unable to control the ports and therefore suffered the fate of the kingdoms of old. Furthermore, his legitimacy, as an heir to Raden Patah

and that lineage which sprang from Palembang, depended on his wife and this was considered a weakness. He was finally challenged by another Javanese, the Senapati of Mataram.

The ruler of Mataram was in control of potentially the richest rice plain in Java, the former terrain of the earliest kingdom of Java. It would take time to clear the land, but it would eventually provide the economic substratum for the new kingdom. Senapati was Javanese and was probably married to a Javanese. He was rejected by Sunan Prapen because he was not a descendant of Raden Patah. He himself rejected Sunan Prapen as kingmaker and sought Islamic recognition from West Java. This he appears to have attained. The element that he lacked was the port and all that this implied in the way of finance. His solution was to use sheer force. He would burn all the ports except one, Jepara, and establish a royal trade monopoly.

In this endeavour he had only limited success. The burnt ports would be rebuilt within weeks; the merchants would return; life would go on. With the advent of the Dutch United East India Company he found an ally. The Dutch attacked the very roots of Gresik's trade with the spice-producing islands. Later they would attack Gresik's custom and shipping, both in the harbour and on the high seas. The coastal ports were being undermined abroad while having to deal with a resurgent kingdom from the

hinterland. Not only were Mataram and the Company a threat to the ports of Java, later to even become partners, but they strangely mirrored each other in their respective internal structures and policies. They both represented the re-fusion into one body, of formerly separate functions of society, namely the political and the economic. They were both, that is to say, politico-economic institutions and royal monopolies, determined to put an end to free trade in the archipelago. In the case of Mataram, even religion and law had returned to the controlling power of the monarch once again, instead of being an outside check on that monarch's power. In the case of the Company, business and war merged together as one in the form of the merchant ship armed with layer upon layer of cannon. Both of these bodies were medieval in structure and it is not surprising that they developed a respect for each other. The ports of Java were ultimately unable to resist the combined attack of the two.

Gresik and its fellow Muslim ports were therefore abandoned by many of their inhabitants. Those who left sailed for Makassar across the Java Sea. It was said that the harbour there could be made secure from naval attack, that its hinterland was politically weak, that it had iron ore in the hills which would be useful for cannon manufacture and that its Buginese inhabitants were skilful at shipbuilding and the art of warfare at sea.