PART TWO: GRESIK DURING THE PERIOD OF PAKU AND DALEM.

CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL HISTORY (1478-1546)
Raden Paku. Paku's origins and parentage have already been discussed in the preceding chapter. His life, character and the role he played in the downfall of the Kingdom of Majapahit are now to be examined.

Paku was born in Kebungson, the China-town of Gresik, where his mother was wife of the Pati or Shahbandar of the main part of the port. His parents were overseas-Chinese and their family name was Chiu. They had come from Palembang to escape the political turmoil that had erupted in his mother's family and to establish themselves in a Javanese port in order to trade. Paku was born in 1433 according to Raffles' version of the babad,¹ or in 1443 according to the present one.² We have no way of determining which is the correct date.

This family, having been given a political position by the King of Majapahit, became both wealthy and politically powerful.³ Pinatih and her husband, and both Sunan Ngampel of Surabaya and the latter's brother (Radja Pandhita of Gresik) should all be considered as being of a certain type. They were the first generation of Chinese and Champa people who had settled in this land. Though they brought with them resources from abroad, they could

2. BIG, p15: "Samirengnya oboring Jawa" (Let us all listen to the light of Java.)
3. It is possible that Pinatih and her husband were merely the "Kapten Cina" or head of the China-town, but even so, this part of the port had the lion's share of the trade according to Pires.
never escape from the fact that they were in the moral
debt of the King of Majapahit who had allowed them to
stay and trade or to teach Islam amongst their own people
in the port. Their wealth and local power waxed
throughout the 15th century, but their religious
principles were compromised fundamentally. They had to
live with a religious and political system which they
must have seen as contrary to their own principles. This
fundamental contradiction was inevitably transmitted on
to the second generation as a source of dynamic tension.
The resolution of this tension then became the
desideratum of this new generation.

Other factors reinforced this tension. Paku and his
fellows were born in Java and saw it as their natural
home, whereas his forbears were all too aware of their
precarious position and were always prepared to take to
their boats whenever anti-Chinese sentiment surfaced
amongst the Javanese. Furthermore, the earlier generation
had to establish themselves and their businesses from
their own resources and initiative. They were therefore
driven by economic insecurity and they took nothing for
granted even though, as the babad states, Pinatih became
"...very rich from this trade, and owned many ships..." 4
Paku's generation could afford to take this economic
security and wealth for granted. His generation even
developed a sense of contempt for the world of trade and
profit which is eloquently expressed in the story of
4. BIG, p10.
Paku's first trading expedition to Banjar. More significantly however, Paku and his friend, Bonang (Sunan Ngampel's son), are allowed by these fortunate economic circumstances to delve into the world of ideas and values; to treat them as the central objects of concern, instead of the business of making a living. Both of these characters then become men of principle and grow up determined to re-construct and re-integrate Java in the terms of Islamic law. They, unlike their forbears, were no longer willing to tolerate the compromised position of Islam in Java. They had to wait, however, for the passing of the previous generation before they could carry out their mission. It is no coincidence, then, that the outbreak of war with Majapahit follows so closely the deaths of Sunan Ngampel (1475 A.D.\(^6\)) and Pinatih (1477 A.D.\(^7\)).

While being educated by the Muslim teacher of Champa, Sunan Ngampel, at his pesantrin in Surabaya, studying and mastering the language of the Koran, the meaning of its scriptures and Islamic law, Paku also commuted back to Gresik where his father taught him the craft of sailing and shipping and the business of trading.\(^{6}\). Upon graduating from this school in Surabaya with the praise of his master, Paku was sent by his parents on his first

5. BIG, pp22-27.
6. BIG, p37. The babad's sangkala is: Pandhita Ngampel lena masjid. 1397 A.J.. (The Holyman of Ngampel dies at the Mosque.)
7. BIG, p38: "Wiwara trus uningeng tokit." (The door opens to knowledge of unity [with God].)
8. BIG, p21.
trading voyage. It was to be to Banjar, across the Java sea. It was here that his parents learnt that he was not blessed with that instinct for profit which so guides the best of the merchant community when our hero decided to give away his cargo to the beggars of Banjar as alms to the poor. Although he is spared the wrath of his parents upon his return to Gresik by an act of Divine Intervention which restored the profits, his parents decided that he should be sent off to Mecca where he could further himself in a field which was better suited to his temperament.

Paku and his friend Bonang therefore set sail in their boat for Melaka, where they intended to rest awhile and visit a local Maulana, before continuing on to Mecca. Their journey to Melaka was uneventful except for a fearful storm which blew up as they left their homeland. They survived the tempest with Bonang clinging to the side of the boat while being assured all the time by Paku, who was striking the waves with his trusty tjis, that the waves were indeed flattening down.

At Melaka, on the verandah of the Mosque, they had their meeting with the Muslim holyman spoken of by Sunan Ngampel. He told them that it was not necessary for someone to travel physically to Mecca if their minds were already truly focussed on it and that which it stood for.

10. A kind of staff.
11. BIG, pp31-33.
He seemed to believe that ordinary folk needed to make that long journey once in their life-time because, having their minds focussed on mundane matters of daily life throughout their life, they needed the discipline of the long journey to focus their minds on a spiritual object for an extended period of time to obtain any spiritual benefit. The two youths received wangsit, direct spiritual knowledge.\textsuperscript{12} The babad implies that Paku had already attained mystical knowledge of God after a period of fasting and prayer on the mountains outside Gresik, near Giri, and that this was the reason why he had no need to complete the Haj to Mecca.

What is interesting about this meeting was the advice given to Paku and Bonang by the holyman. The babad's tone is usually pious and non-political, but in this rare instance it barely conceals the political content of the advice. The holyman says to the two youths: "...you I will teach thoughts and ideas of human life, you have already acquired spiritual knowledge...do not go on kaji (Haji), it is better that you should return, may you light up the land of Java which is still dark."\textsuperscript{13} It is the consensus view of historians that Melaka was the main political influence on the ports of the north coast of Java, encouraging them to become independent of, and to overthrow, Majapahit. The babad of Gresik certainly confirms this view. The two youths are given new titles:

\textsuperscript{12} This story is related in BIG, pp29-33.  
\textsuperscript{13} BIG, pp32-33, italics added.
Paku is named Prabhu Satmata (the all-seeing King) and is given a cassock and crown-like head-dress, while Bonang is named Prabhu Anjakrawati. With their religious consciousness now sharpened by this political education, they are directed to return to Java to advance the Muslim cause there.

War with Majapahit. Paku returned to Gresik and began to carry out the suggestions of the pandhita. He first began to build a Mosque which he called the kedhaton. The Mosque was built on the peak of a mountain or hill called Gunungsari, a peak which has an altitude of 100 metres. The peak offered little room for anything but a construction of middling size. The babad states that it had seven levels but it is unlikely that this represented the number of roof-tiers. It is more likely that the levels were terraces carved out of the hilltop in order to increase the available land area. It should also be noted that Indonesian curators have located several of the timber post-holes which constituted the corners of the Mosque and that it would appear that the first terrace was included in the Mosque structure itself. This would have increased the available floor-space by 2 or 3 metres on the sides. It is true that Javanese Mosques have layered roofs and this one was certainly no exception but it is very unlikely that it was of such a size that it could support or require a roof with 7 levels.

14. One of the terraces is retained with bricks arranged in a relief pattern of Javanese style.
tiers. The simplest Mosques from earliest times had roofs with two tiers. This can be seen from the old Mosque of Ngampel, of Sunda Kelapa and from the old Sasak Mosque of Lombok. The function of the tier-system is partly to facilitate the circulation of the air so that large numbers of people may be accommodated. In the eyes of the Javanese it also enhances the appearance of the structure, lending it an air of dignity. We should assume therefore that the two-tiered roof is a minimum requirement for a Mosque. The largest Mosques of Java, the ones of great historical import, such as the one built by Sunan Prapen at Giri and the Great Mosque of Demak, had three tiers to their roofs. It is unlikely that the Kedhaton had more tiers than these because the Kedhaton was smaller. The Kedhaton, then was either a two- or three-tiered Mosque of middling size and built of timber. The babad mentions that plants of fragrant odour were planted nearby. Ablution tubs made of bricks were built into the ground in front of the Mosque and to the side.

In the foreground of the Mosque is another structure, also made of bricks or shaped stones, which Indonesian curators have called a "pelenggahan" and "majlis sidang". The former means "sitting place" and the latter means "council chamber". It is in fact a miniature parliament house where the Sunan consulted with important people from the port of Gresik. An example of such a meeting is described in the babad where Sunan Dalem discusses
military strategy with two authorities from the port, namely Seh Grigis and Seh Kodja, during the war with Sengguruh. This pelenggahan has no roof and is sheltered only by a tree. Near the tree is a rock upon which, it is said, sat the Sunan. The location before the Kedhaton, and the fact that its earthen floor is raised above ground level by in-fill invites comparison with the traditional Javanese "sitinggil". The latter is a raised platform of earth with a roof over it; it is a pavilion used by the King to view and speak to the public as well as to receive visiting dignitaries. The pelenggahan was more spartan and its function more consultative than the sitinggil, though the pattern or layout of these structures conforms to Javanese tradition.

Now let us return to the historical event of building the Mosque. Wiselius states that Paku obtained permission for this from the court of Majapahit, but our version of the babad does not mention this. The point is significant because, while the older generation of Muslims had been given approval for the teaching of people of foreign descent and their children, they were to refrain from converting the Javanese. For the latter to have converted would have implied a change of political allegiance from the King because god and the King were still conceived as

15. BIG, p44.
being closely connected in the religion of the Javanese. Paku could not have received the blessing of the King to build a Mosque amongst the Javanese who inhabited the hills outside Gresik because he could not fail to influence them politically. The babad relates the story of the first conversions amongst the local Javanese by Raden Paku. 17

The building of the Mosque was therefore a provocative act by Paku and, was seen as such by the author of the babad. The latter's account describes the response of the King as imagined by the people of Giri: "Sheathe a kriss into this religious pupil at Giri." The King explains that it is a question of dousing a smouldering fire before it gets out of hand. 18

Before describing Gresik's part in the war with Majapahit, it is worthwhile to examine the cause of the war in a wider context. In Hall's earlier study of Southeast Asian states he details a strategy that river-mouth kingdoms are able to pursue to isolate and ultimately throttle hinterland kingdoms. 19 In part at least, this model is applicable: the coastal states of Java spread themselves from one harbour-site to the next; while there may be several sources of this expansion,

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17. BIG, pp37-38. The village near the Kedhaton called Bedji was the first village to be converted.
eventually one coastal state dominates the others; finally the hinterland kingdom finds itself isolated from international commerce and it eventually is over-come by the coastal state. This approach is critically examined in the following chapter and is found wanting in important respects in the case of Java. However some of the elements of this model seem to apply.

One element that does not apply is the occupation of river-mouths for harbours by foreign traders. River-mouths are, in general, unsuitable for harbour sites because of the problem of siltation. However, bays, headlands and even wide-open beaches offer suitable positions for harbours in Java. After the establishment of a port in a suitable harbour site there follows a period of expansion to other possible harbour-sites along the coast through a leap-frogging process, jumping from one suitable site to the next. There is definite evidence in the Cerebon chronicle that the expansion of Demak to Banten and then back to Cerebon was done deliberately to isolate the hinterland kingdom from contact with the outside world.21

As regards Gresik, the spreading of its influence to Demak is not well-documented but there are two pieces of

20. Hall has not claimed that the model has applicability to Java, but we have applied it here hypothetically because it has partial relevance.
data which point in that direction: Pires claims that Raden Patah, the founder of Demak, came from Gresik; secondly, the babad states that he married a granddaughter of Radja Pandhita (Raden Aliutama) who was an orang kaya of Gresik. This would indicate that Gresik acted as the spring-board for the founding of Demak but we still lack evidence of deliberation, of policy and of motivation. The point here is not that Gresik was acting as the controller of Demak, but that it was the spring-board. Actually we already know that Raden Patah was born and raised in Palembang, but it seems that his education and early married life was in Gresik. While Demak sought to establish and maintain (feudal) control over Banten and Cerebon, Gresik only wished to establish Demak and then appoint Raden Patah to rulership over not merely Demak but the whole of Java. Sunan Giri wanted to be the "kingmaker" or "Pope" of Java, as the Dutch noted at the end of the century. Here we are arguing that this was always the case. To understand why Gresik should opt for such an eccentric position in the power structure of Java is important if we are to grasp all of the determinants of power in Java at this time.

22. Pires, Tome: Summa Oriental, 2 vols., Works of the Hakluyt Society, 2nd series, London, 1944, vol. LXXXIX, p184. Raden Patah was actually born in Palembang, Sumatra, but, as I have argued, was a member of the Palembang ruling family from which Sunan Giri's mother came. He was also educated in either Giri or Surabaya, as argued in an earlier chapter.
23. Literally "rich person", hence a merchant. The marriage is noted in BIG, p36. (Radja Pandhita means "Priest-King" in Javanese.)
24. BTDj, p22. See also Raffles, op.cit., vol. 2, p123.
25. This policy is demonstrated in the next and later chapters.
One of the key determinants of power in Java is discernible in this historical material and must now be demonstrated. It has already been shown that Sunan Giri descended from Pinatih and that Pinatih was the eldest daughter of Chiu who ruled Palembang. When Chiu died, the eldest son was ousted by a younger sister, Er Chieh, possibly on the grounds that the son was an adopted son. Admiral Cheng Ho, who had appointed Chiu to rule Palembang, returned to Palembang to resolve this dispute. Upon his return, however, he found that the son and Pinatih had fled and therefore he decided to leave Er Chieh and her husband in power. Er Chieh and her husband were therefore appointed by the Emperor of China, through Admiral Cheng Ho, to rule Palembang. We know that Raden Patah came from this ruling family of Palembang and that there was no break in the lineage of this family and its rulership of Palembang until 1433 A.D. when Majapahit had the ruler killed in a campaign to re-unite the kingdom.²⁶ He was therefore either the son of Chiu or the son of Er Chieh. Since he married Radja Pandhita's grand-daughter it would be reasonable to suppose that he was younger than Sunan Giri.²⁷ This would rule him out as the son of Chiu and leave us with him being the son of Er Chieh. Raden Patah and Raden Paku (Sunan Giri) are therefore cousins with the latter being much the elder. Because of the age difference, the cousin relationship took on the

²⁷. This is a reasonable assumption because Sunan Giri married the daughter of Radja Pandhita's brother.
character of an avuncular relationship. The "kingmaker" role that Gresik played in relation to the Kings of Demak precisely reflects this avuncular quality.

The second point that needs to be highlighted here is that the reason Sunan Giri never appointed anyone to the kingship of Demak and Java who was not a direct descendant of Er Chieh was because Er Chieh was appointed by the Emperor of China and that, while the Emperor did not directly appoint her descendants to the succession, we may assume that such succession was valid implicitly by reason of lineal descent. The Sunans of Giri therefore deferred ultimately to the Imperial authority of China. The source of the apparently "charismatic" authority of Raden Patah and his descendants was not that they bore certain charismatic qualities in the Weberian sense, but that they carried the residual authority of Admiral Cheng Ho; the source of their authority was more bureaucratic and hereditary than charismatic.

This argument above has not been grasped by historians of this period and has not entered into the consensus view. It is important to realize that it has ramifications for our understanding of the "rivalry" between the ports of the north coast of Java. De Graaf and Pigeaud portray the port states as minor kingdom's imitating the grander hinterland kingdom and never being able to finally bury the rivalry between themselves to rebuild Java under the control of one single port except for a brief period. The
truth is however that there was a pre-ordained pecking order that prevailed at all times. This order, however, did have its limits: it has never been shown that Surabaya's early rulers were relatives of the Er Chieh or Chiu line. In fact, though they are probably overseas Chinese like the Palembang family, they are not descendants of Chiu. Sunan Ngampel (Raden Rahmat) of Surabaya and his brother Radja Pandhita (Raden Aliutama) of the port of Gresik came from Tjampa; the former may also have been appointed by Admiral Cheng Ho to rule Surabaya. With the establishment of Gresik and later of Demak the two lineage groups of Demak-Gresik and Surabaya had set the stage for the civil war that swept the north coast of Java after Demak attempted to spread Islam and its own authority to Pasuruan in Surabaya's neighbourhood. This is also the reason why, despite ties of marriage, the Sunans of Giri never appointed Sunan Ngampel's descendants to the throne of Java, not even after Surabaya had gained de facto control of the port of Gresik and most of East Java, nor even when the Er Chieh line had worn thin and the last descendant toppled by Mataram. The Sunan's of Giri held fast to their cousin's lineage despite all else. The rivalry amongst the ports was therefore limited to the division between Surabaya and Demak-Gresik; amongst the other ports, such natural commercial rivalry was attenuated by the respect for the authority of the Er Chieh line.
Returning to the question of the causes of the war with Majapahit, it appears that the deliberate spreading of Islam to the immediate hinterland around the port of Gresik was provocative and challenging to the King of Majapahit. Though the spreading of commercial civilization to Demak by people from Gresik seems to have been unauthorized, it was ultimately acceptable to the King. However, Raden Patah, the first ruler of Demak, was unwilling, according to the Javanese legends, to acknowledge the authority of the King. Such recalcitrance may be explicable by the killing of the ruler of Palembang by Majapahit's military commander in 1433 during the latter kingdom's attempt to re-unite all the outlying provinces; the Palembang ruler was probably Patah's father. Underlying this rebelliousness by Raden Patah lay the dynastic pride of the Chinese appointed Er Chieh line and the recognition of this line's authority by Sunan Giri.

The economic prosperity and security of the coastal provinces constituted an even deeper strata that gave strength and substance to this growing confidence. It was in the field of religion, however, that a rupture with the fabric and contour of Javanese society had already occurred. Islam was no longer the correct manner of carrying out trade with strangers, it was not something contained in a drawer in the captain's cabin, something that he would put in a bag when he went ashore to

contemplate occasionally when there was some domestic strife or unfortunate business dealings. Islam had moved to the mountain, to a commanding position in society. Upon that mountain Islam emerged as an institution whose object was religion itself: around the Kedhaton was built a Madrasah or Muslim boarding school for pupils; later a Pesantrin or senior school was added to which merchants and princes from around the archipelago would send their offspring. It was no longer merely the religion of the merchant class but of the santri or those who are devotees. In the Javanese legends about the battle against Majapahit there is a children's story that tells of a swarm of bees leading the Muslim army to destroy the infidel kingdom of the hinterland. The characteristics of the bee are not dissimilar to those of the santri.

The victory in the war, in fact the process of the war itself, is hardly mentioned in the babad of Gresik, probably because of the sanction against violent passions in general. The war is presented as an assassination attempt by the King of Majapahit of the Sunan of Giri. A ministerial messenger is sent with his men, to "sheathe a kriss" in the body of Sunan Giri, explaining that it is a case of dousing a smouldering fire before it gets out of hand. At the crucial moment this messenger cannot bring himself to execute the plan and decides to convert to Islam and change sides. Much has been written by

historians of the gradual penetration of the kraton of Majapahit by Islam before this war began.\textsuperscript{31} There are Muslim graves in and around the royal graveyard. It is possible that religious uncertainties had crept into the minds of sufficient numbers of kraton officials that when it came to the execution of the Sunan, they could not do it. The messenger and his royal guardsmen therefore went to a neutral corner or even possibly changed sides. At the very least one can say that their heart was not in the battle, thus allowing their opponents to take the field. However the central Javanese chronicle relates a more widespread and long-lasting war that is led by Demak and Kudus and which results in the destruction of the kraton of Majapahit. This story is well related in the histories of De Graaf and Pigeaud. It is this account which is the more realistic and to which our babad adds merely a footnote.

Until now we have not given a date to this pivotal event in Javanese history. The consensus view is that adopted by Raffles and which is based on the account in Babad Tanah Djawi. This view has it that the kingdom was destroyed in the year: "Sirna ilang kertaning bhumi" meaning "Erased and disappeared is the prosperity of the

corrected this to 1527 and seemed to think that Demak was still under Majapahit's sovereignty when Demak took control of Cerebon in 1527.\textsuperscript{33} Pires claims to have received a messenger from the hinterland kingdom in 1516 while at Tuban, but this kingdom was centred on Daha/Kediri far from the old centre of Majapahit.\textsuperscript{34} Our babad relates the story of the battle of 1535 between Gresik and two former provinces of Majapahit indicating that remnants of the kingdom were still extant at this time. This story will be related in more detail below. De Graaf's view must surely be incorrect since Pires places the centre of the kingdom at Daha, much further inland than Majapahit, in 1516. This leaves us with 1478 as the only other candidate. It seems to be an appropriate date since it coincides with the arrival of that idealist generation of Muslims to adulthood. The latter dates of 1527 and 1535 are to be considered as further campaigns to destroy the remnants of the kingdom rather than the kraton itself.

Furthermore, Raffles\textsuperscript{35} was of the opinion that the older generation of Muslims, such as Nyai Ageng Pinatih and Sunan Ngampel of Surabaya were moderating influences and that the war could not commence until they had passed away. This view was expounded in an earlier chapter and seems to be reasonable. Their death dates will now be

\begin{itemize}
\item De Graaf: op.cit., pp133 and 132.
\item Raffles: op.cit., p124.
\end{itemize}
examined. Sunan Ngampel died, according to our babad, in the year of: "Pandhita Ngampel lena masjid" meaning "Holyman of Ngampel dies at Mosque" and having the value of 1397 A.J. or 1475 A.D. Nyai Ageng Pinatih's death occurred in: "Wiwara trus uningeng tokit" meaning "The door opens to union with God" and having the value of 1399 A.J. or 1477 A.D. Wiselius's version of the babad has a different sangkala but with the same date value. His version of the sangkala is intriguing. It seems to have a double-entendre which lends support to our wish to connect the death of Pinatih with the outbreak of war. Wiselius's version runs as follows: "Roedroning muka cesik toenggil". It has the meaning: "Angry face disturbs unity". It is an odd way of commemorating her death and one hopes that Wiselius is not mistaken here. The second meaning contained in the sangkala is in its first term, "Roedo", which is the other name for Siva, the Hindu God of destruction. Since we must identify Siva here with his incarnation, the King of Majapahit, the sangkala can be validly interpreted as "The face of Siva (the King of Majapahit) disturbs unity". If this argument holds, then the war begins in 1477 A.D. when the last moderate Muslim passes away.

A final doubt must however be aired regarding this date. The babad states that the Mosque was not built until 1485 A.D. and that the assassination attempt occurred after

36. BIG, p37.
37. BIG, p38.
this event and when Islam's influence had spread to "the coastal countries, Djapan, Djenggala, Kabuhlengkir..." which the babad dates at 1487 A.D.. We are thus forced to broaden the range of possibilities to cover the decade 1477 to 1487.

Sunan Giri lived to see the end of the war and the establishment of the first Sultanate at Demak. He is said by Raffles to have been born in 1355 A.J. (1433 A.D.) and to have lived for 63 years, dying therefore in 1496 A.D.. The babad puts the birthdate at 1443 A.D. and the death at 1428 A.J. or 1506 A.D., a life-span of 63 years. Wiselius's version provides some confirmation of our version of the babad. The date of 1506 A.D. is therefore the most likely date for the death of the first Sunan of Giri.

Sunan Dalem. Sunan Dalem Wetan assumed the position of his father in 1506 A.D.. The babad provides some few details of his background. He was the third child of the senior wife, the first being a male child known as "Pangeran Pasirbatang Seda Timur" and the second being a female named Nyai Ageng Kukusan. The reason for Dalem

40. BIG, p42: the sangkala is "Sarira lajer ing sagara rahmat" meaning "Body sails on sea of God's mercy". Wiselius's version has "Salira lajar lahoet luka" meaning "Body sails on sea of prayers" and has the same date, 1428 A.J. but converts this incorrectly to 1511 A.D.. Mackenzie's version has Sunan Giri (Paku) having a life-span of 63 years also but does not offer a date of birth or death.
41. BIG, p41.
attaining the position of Sunan instead of the eldest son, the Pangeran, is apparent from the name of the latter. It has the meaning: "corpse in sand, died young". The second child, Lady Kukusan, was passed over as a candidate because she was female. In Javanese culture a female will only be appointed as monarch if there is no male heir. In the case of the position of Sunan we have no way of knowing if the pattern was acceptable to Muslims since there was always a surfeit of males.\(^{42}\)

It is noteworthy that the first Sunan of Giri entitled all of his surviving sons with the term "Sunan".\(^{43}\) It would seem that, in his own mind, "Sunan" was not the equivalent of "Pope" of which there can only be one. Rather the title is seen as something more modest: an honourable person who follows the sunna (judgements)\(^{44}\) of Mahommed.

The name of Dalem Wetan means "east court" signifying that his residence was east of the Kedhaton and on the mountain Gunung Sari. His court or residence was in the village of Tambakbaya.

It is during Dalem's reign that the Portuguese arrived at Melaka in 1511. The seizure of Melaka by the Portuguese must have thrown into chaos the western archipelagan trade network. The economic side of these events will be

42. See Appendix B.
43. BIG, pp41-42.
44. From the Arabic.
examined in a later chapter. Suffice it here to say that Gresik's connection with the cloth trade from India, the luxury trade of the Arab world, the pepper trade of the east coast of Sumatra, especially that of Jambi, the spice export trade to these above-mentioned places and the rice export trade to Melaka itself were placed in jeopardy. It is not surprising then that an immediate counter-attack from Gresik and the other Javanese ports was forth-coming. Historians generally view this naval attack as proceeding from the various ports of the north coast of Java. In fact, however, it proceeded from the kingdom of Java, or to be more precise, the Sultanate of Demak which included the hinterland of Java and the coastal ports, though excluding the area of Sunda and its attendant ports in west Java, and also excluding the far eastern Javanese areas. In other words it was the kingdom of Java in nascent form which launched the war on the Portuguese. The results are described by Pires with wry humour as he did his tour of the ports of Java in 1516. The Javanese fleet, despite its size, was decimated and Java was humiliated.45 The Javanese were unprepared for the cannon-fire, and their merchant fleets, pressed into service as a naval fleet, were no match for the dedicated vessels of war of the Portuguese. Pires wrote of Pati Cucuf, the ruler of Gresik: "There used to be many junks and many cargo pangajavas in his port; now there are none."46

45. Pires: op.cit., pp195, 188.
The seizure of Melaka by the Portuguese, the loss of Javanese shipping, including Gresik's shipping and the loss of the trade to west Asia and to Melaka itself was severely disrupting to the Javanese ports. Of the ruler of Demak he says: "He could not live if he did not rely on Malacca." He further speculates that Demak must "beg Malacca in its mercy to make him its vassal and protect him, and to give him an outlet for his merchandise..." The head of the *kampong Arab* in Gresik, known by Pires as Pate Zeinall, was of the opinion that a peace treaty with Portuguese Melaka was in order and that the Portuguese should negotiate it with Demak since "...the lord of Demak stood for the whole of Java." It is apparent, then, that most of the ports of Java were looking to re-establish their trade connection with Melaka, and therefore were suing for a peace treaty. Why is it, then, that the Portuguese choose, in 1532, to sign a treaty with Gresik? It must be because the Portuguese have no need for the other ports; they only wished to use one which was "...the best in all Java...the jewel in Java of trading ports...where the ships at anchor are safe from the winds..."

47. Pires: ibid., p186.
48. ibid.
It is in this buoyant context of renewed trade with Melaka and the west of Asia that we find Sunan Dalem having to complete some unfinished business in regard to the old hinterland kingdom. Dalem finds himself having to defend Giri from the counter-attack organized by the last remaining provincial lord of Majapahit. The babad describes the head of this counter-revolution as Adipatih Sengguruh and says that he had been a "punggawa" (official, district commander) of the already destroyed kingdom of Majapahit. The babad is clear in its view that the heart of Majapahit had been destroyed already. It is Sengguruh, a province beyond the great mountains, in the south of Java, which orchestrates the revenge attack on Giri, bringing the army of Terung into its own army on the way.

The battle took place at Lamongan, about 25 kilometres west of Gresik. After an initial engagement Dalem returns to Giri to discuss strategy with the two chief merchants and heads of the respective trading groups in the port of Gresik, namely, Seh Kodja and Seh Grigis. They decide that a deceptive strategy is called for in order to preserve the younger troops, some of whom had not yet been circumcised and therefore could not expect to go to heaven if they were killed. Dalem returns to his troops at Lamongan and withdraws them from battle, allowing the enemy access to Giri, their main target.

52. BIG, pp43.
53. The story of the battle of Lamongan is related in BIG, pp43-49.
Dalem withdraws north-east to the village of Gumena. It is from this story that De Graaf and Pigeaud draw the incorrect conclusion that Gumena was one half of the twin-city of Gresik.\textsuperscript{54} They argue from this that the ruler of Gumena, Kiai Kidangpalih, must be the ruler of that half of Gresik. But in fact the babad states clearly that Dalem withdrew from Lamongan in a north-easterly direction\textsuperscript{55} and Javanese maps clearly show a village called Gumena about 20 kilometres north-east of Lamongan and about the same distance north-west from Gresik. Gumena appears to be a ferry station for the crossing of the Solo river; Dalem would therefore be safe there, being able to take the ferry across to the other side and denying its use to any pursuing forces. At Giri, the infidel army of Sengguruh heads for the Kedhaton and the grave of Sunan Giri (Raden Paku) in order to desecrate it. Seh Grigis defends the grave with his life but Sengguruh's soldiers manage to open the grave. Upon opening the grave a swarm of head-bees swarm out of the grave and attack the army of Sengguruh. The story is related as a children's story, with the army being stung to death while Adipati Sengguruh is harassed until he cries out several times the greatness of God. The re-emergence of the bee symbolism again implies that the Kedhaton was defended by the santri since their characteristics most closely resemble that of the bee.

\textsuperscript{55}. BIG, p45.
Sengguruh and Terung, two of the main provinces of old Majapahit have now been disposed of. The implications of this are that there is no longer any obstacle to the claiming of the rich rice-fields of Majapahit up the Brantas river. It is Surabaya, however, which is well located to take advantage of this opportunity because these fields are immediately upriver. This idea will be developed further in a later chapter.

In the meantime, Dalem has decided that he "...liked very much the look of the land there..." at Gumena. The babad adds that: "A number of Bupatis (regional lords) expressed their loyalty, respect and devotion to Kangdjeng Sunan Dalem..." It would seem that Dalem was taking advantage of these events to further the authority of Gresik in neighbouring regions. It is probably taking this too far to say that Dalem was making a play for the position of Raja or Sultan. Rather he is merely expanding the area under the control of Gresik, but remaining within the authority of Demak. The battle of Lamongan occurred in the time of: "Giri prang kartining wong" meaning "Giri fights for the well-being of the people" and having a numerical value of 1457 A.J. or 1535 A.D.. The battle may have had a different outcome had not the problem of Portuguese Melaka been resolved three years earlier.

56. BIG, p48.
Some years after the end of the war with Sengguruh and Terung, it would appear that Dalem felt sufficiently confident in the integrity and strength of the new sultanate of Demak that he decided to launch a large scale campaign to spread Islam to the far east of Java and to bring this territory under the control of Demak. To be sure, the initial order to mobilize all of the forces of the ports of Java, including Banten, came from the King of Demak who, at that time was Sultan Trenggana. Indeed, our Portuguese source for these events, Ferdinand Mendez Pinto, observed the distinguished lady messenger arrive from Demak seeking the ruler of Banten. In his description of the war that followed he makes it clear that the campaign was begun at the request of the Sunan of Giri, that is, Sunan Dalem: "...and their Cacismoubana, the sovereign dignity amongst the Mahometans, by whose counsel the P angiueran was come thither."  

The war was meant to have begun with an attack on the fortified town of Pasuruan, just south of Surabaya, which town stood at the entrance to the far-east portion of Java. Surabaya, however, considered this region to be its own backyard and as a place for future expansion. This is

58. Haji Mahulana, meaning a Mullah who has been to Mecca. It is clear that he is referring to the Sunan of Giri because he was the sovereign dignity of the Muslims.
59. Pangeran, meaning Lord. Pinto uses this term, amongst others, to describe the King of Demak.
60. Pinto: op cit., p388.
not stated by Pinto but is apparent from the eruption of civil war amongst the Muslim camp. The Sultan of Demak, whilst in conference with his generals from the ports, is stabbed to death by the young son of the lord of Surabaya, apparently on the pretext that the Sultan had slighted him.\footnote{Pinto: op.cit., p386.} It is likely that this spontaneous attack was rather more deliberate than is here described. Surabaya, at this time had benefited greatly from the defeat of Sengguruh and Terung because it had opened up to nearby Surabaya the rich terrain of the former rice-fields of old Majapahit. Surabaya was on a rising curve at this time and had laid the foundations for establishing an agro-mercantile kingdom that could feasibly rival that of Demak. This change in circumstance for Surabaya will be discussed more fully in a later chapter. Here it suffices to say that the spontaneous altercation between the Sultan and the prince of Surabaya seems to have been "over-determined", that is to say, it was an event that was bound to happen.

After a fierce exchange of blows between the princes of Surabaya and Demak, which left the entire family of the former dead, as well as the Sultan of Demak, the combined forces of Demak decided to withdraw to their capital. It was during this withdrawal that the Pasuruans launched another attack which decimated the Demak forces. Amongst the prisoners taken was the "Cacismoubana, the sovereign
dignity amongst the Mahometans...".\(^6\) This event took place on the 9th February, 1546, according to Pinto.\(^6\)

The babad records the death of Sunan Dalem in 1467 A.J. or 1545 A.D. and makes no mention of the war.\(^6\) Wiselius' version gives the death date of Dalem as 1468 A.J. or 1546 A.D.\(^6\) The latter, therefore, is the more likely.

With the passing of the first two Sunan's of Giri it is convenient that we should now step out of the flow of chronology in order to take a more structural look at Gresik in the context of Javanese society and polity. This is the subject of the following three chapters.

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63. ibid.
64. BIG, p49.
65. Wiselius: op.cit., p482.
CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURE OF POWER IN JAVA

- HISTORIOGRAPHY.
Historians of Java, like other historians, use social theory to analyse and understand the social reality with which they are dealing. However they are not always aware of this fact and often use their theories without reflecting critically on them. Historians of Java have exhibited, over the period of this century, the signs of a firm commitment to the inter-related theories of Weber and Durkheim. These theories are concerned principally with the integration of the state. Like any theory they highlight certain aspects and processes in Javanese society but also limit our understanding of the nature and development of these societies in ways which will be demonstrated below.

Weber and the Historians of Java. The Dutch historian of Java, J.C. Van Leur follows the approach taken by Weber closely. He argues that the port states of Indonesia were essentially "patrimonial" social systems and that trade and the market was dominated by the ruler so that one could use the term "political capitalism". These terms acquire their specific meaning from Weber's theory of social organization.

2. Ibid., p115.
3. Ibid., p117.
Weber's science is delimited by the object which he calls "social action." It is this substance which is the object of theory. Social action is analysed according to a means and ends dichotomy, that is, social action can be either "rational" or "non-rational" (the latter meaning habitual or affective) in its employment of means to attain an end, while the end or aim of action may be goal-oriented or not. This analysis is a combinatory and therefore produces four ideal types of social action:

1. Goal-oriented employing rational means (instrumental rationality);
2. Goal-oriented employing non-rational means (traditional behaviour);
3. Non-goal orientation employing rational means (e.g. self-sacrifice);
4. Non-goal orientation employing non-rational means (affective behaviour).

These four modes of social action are then used to generate the forms of political system or domination which are possible. They are three in number. Since they are derived directly from the four types of behaviour it is an anomaly that there is not the same number of political forms. But this need not concern us here. These three types are:

1. The rational or "legal-bureaucratic" mode, corresponding to the modern western system. The essential

conditions for such a system are the centralization of administration and control (which involves the possession of a standing army controlled from the central government and a centrally administered taxation system, the latter implying monetisation of the economy), the centralization of legislative ability and the legitimate use of force (the lawmakers themselves are subject to the law), and finally the employment of a centrally controlled body of officials, both at the centre and in the provinces, who carry out the legislative enactments of the centre and who are paid from the store of funds at the centre.

2. The "traditional" mode which is derived from the "traditional" type of social action. This action is the subconscious reflex or habit of human subjects to take the status quo for granted, and in particular to accept the rule of those who have ruled from time immemorial. The perfect form of it is "Patriarchal" society where the ruler is kin and senior to his subjects, and it is a society where the question of appointments to outlying provinces does not arise because of the limited geographical scope of it. It is surpassed by two other forms of traditional society:

a. "Patrimonial" society arises when the patriarchal form expands to include non-kin groups living further from the centre thus raising the question of the mode of administering these outlying areas. If this question cannot be resolved by one group, then it will remain small.

and vulnerable to other patrimonial societies who have resolved it. The ruler inherits his position and the subjects accept this as being in accordance with the customary law. Government originates and emanates from the ruler's personal household and the officials of the ruler are chosen from his personal servants. Appointments to provinces are given either to the kin of the ruler (but more often they reside at court as ministers etc.) or to non-kin who are considered worthy. It is this connection between the centre and the periphery which interests Weber. The provincial governor has to be paid in terms of a grant of land or a number of households from which he is expected to support himself. Such a governor may be appointed to administer a port and thus be responsible for the collection of market taxes, custom duties and anchorage fees. The necessity for this disgorging of the payment function by the centre to the periphery arises from the material circumstances which are, according to Weber, always present in such a social form. These are the absence of a fully monetized economy such that it is impossible for the outlying regional administrators to be paid from the centre. In fact this material condition necessitates similar systems of payment even of the court officials.

Having such an independent financial base, it is easy for the provincial governors to exercise a considerable degree of autonomy, especially in the collection and despatching of revenue to the centre. This tendency is permitted to grow by the absence of transport and communication systems of
sufficient efficiency to enable the centre to maintain its control. Thus the necessity to appoint non-kin, the absence of sufficient money in circulation and the paucity of transport and communication all conspire to create certain problems typical of patrimonial systems. These problems are essentially to do with maintaining the loyalty of the provincial administrators, ensuring the continuous flow of revenue to the coffers of the central government, the military service usually required whenever the centre wished to expand the kingdom and protect it from others doing likewise, and to stop the amassing of power and wealth in the provinces which may be used to topple the central ruler. The spectacle of the King and his armed personal followers travelling the provincial circuit to collect revenue and discipline those of an independent inclination was a regular phenomenon in the patrimonial system.

One should also make mention of the segmented legal system of this social form; the justices of the King would rarely interfere with the administration of justice within the provinces unless the interests of state were concerned or if the matter required the arbitration of the central court to settle an inter-provincial dispute. The notion of the rule of law was absent and in its place was the notion of the use of law to rule, thus implying the non-applicability of the law to the highest status group. The law was simply a set of commands from the ruler.
In matters of trade the ruler and the port administrators both taxed it and provided funds to subjects with which to engage in trade in return for a fixed return. This is what Van Leur and Weber referred to as "political capitalism". Thus, the trading system itself suffers from lack of integration. Weber believed that the oriental world was dominated by this social form.

b. The "feudal" system was seen by Weber to arise out of the centrifugal tendency of the latter or out of the failure of the ruler to subdue entirely other local powers. Feudalism occurs when the outlying administrators are able to exert their power to the extent that they are able to extract from the central ruler the right to nominate their own successor, usually their son. This acquisition of the right of hereditary rule, the right to maintain armed forces, and the right to the produce of the fief in return for military service when needed, was the distinguishing characteristic of this form. The provincial lord was a free man and the relationship with the monarch was considered contractual, though within limits, unlike that of the patrimonial governor who was considered a personal dependant.

The material circumstances which determined the structure of the patrimonial system also determined the feudal system, that is, the absence of money and the paucity of communications. But in addition to these was the

requirement, on the part of the provincial lord, to maintain an army to defend the perimeter against invaders. This gave them greater independence. Weber argued that it was mainly in western Europe that this system evolved.

3. The "Charismatic" form of society is derived from that type of social action which Weber termed "affective", that is, having no goal and not employing a rational means. To Weber it was an apt description of a society in which the subjects were followers of a person who, because of his special qualities, usually of a magical nature, was able to enchant his fellows with his charisma. The leader would claim to have access to power of a supernatural kind, usually there would be signs in the natural environment indicating the arrival of a new leader. It is characteristic of this type of rule that the transfer of power is not necessarily by inheritance. This is because power derives from the supernatural and therefore is open to anyone who has the ability to open the door to that other realm. This of course entails a considerable degree of instability in the political system since there will always be others practising asceticism on the mountain, storing power, claiming to have married the goddess of the south seas and the like, and then after winning over numerous converts, setting up a rival centre of government.

Ricklefs shows the use to which the goddess of the southern ocean (Njai Lara Kidul) was put in the strengthening of the

Mataram state. The monarch is said to have married it, thus cementing his claim to rulership of the region. Hall also deploys the term "symbolic capital" to describe the charisma of the central ruler. It is this symbolic capital which is distributed to the lower ranks in the provinces which, it is argued, helps the surmounting of problems of lack of state integration. However, from Weber's point of view, it may be effective in the short term, but ultimately it can prove fatal for a patrimonial State because it implies the surrendering of the principle of inheritance as the source of political power, and elevates that other principle, charisma. The later does not necessarily recognise inherited kingship. Thus it can, in the long run, undermine dynastic power. The question of the effectiveness of the use of charismatic claims to authority depends on the type of "spiritual source" being invoked. If it is open to others outside the dynasty or not would seem to be an important element.

As regards the charismatic form of rule itself, it is typically plagued by the problems of succession since it cannot be assumed that the sons of the ruler have access to the realm of the supernatural.

The charismatic form is a form which the patrimonial system can easily lapse into if for example the ruling lineage has come to an end by failing to produce an heir, or if there are rival claims to the throne coming from the sons of junior wives. The story of Raden Patah is a notable example of the latter\(^{14}\), his mother being sent down from the royal palace and passed off onto the Adipati of Palembang even though she is pregnant by the King. He eventually destroys the Hindu kingdom of his father and creates the first Islamic state in Java. The origins of Sunan Giri are similar\(^{15}\); his mother was the princess of Blambangan (or so it is told) and he was cast out, like the baby Moses, into the Madura sea, where he was found by a merchant; later, as an adult, he seeks to attack Blambangan and Islamize it. In both cases their pedigree is exploited to enhance their claim, but their claim relies heavily on the charisma of Islam. The charismatic form is not to be considered an historical stage, according to Weber. It occurs after a collapse of the structure, and as part of a resurgence of the kingdom under new leadership. Hence for Weber, and for Javanese history, it is a phenomenon which is ever recurrent. Invariably the charismatic challenger passes on the reigns of power to his son, thus starting a new dynasty, hoping that the charisma will also pass on, or that the new principle of hereditary rulership will again take root. The

14. Babad Tanah Jawi, by Soewito Santoso, publisher unknown, no date, p96-7. (Henceforth BTJ.)
Sunan of Giri certainly succeeded in creating a new lineage, though it was a lineage of kingmakers rather than kings.\textsuperscript{16}

Van Leur describes the Javanese state in the Hindu and Islamic period as an unchanging "patrimonial bureaucratic" state: "...the Indian-Indonesian cultural heritage of the inland states was preserved in the patrimonial, bureaucratic structure of the administrative state."\textsuperscript{17} In the realm of economic affairs, the "...trade and transportation forms remained the same ..."\textsuperscript{18} This form entailed the dominance of trade by the political ruler as the "passive" investor. The system was segmented such that the active part was taken by a multitude of peddlers who were also permitted to engage in trade on their own account. The "passive" ruler not only dominated trade in this financial manner, by commenda, but also in other ways: he farmed out harbour and customs duty collection, imposed death duties on the wealth of merchants, insisted on the right of first purchase of goods entering the market (often at his own price), enforced the stapling of regional goods traffic at specified ports, conducted piracy if such stapling orders were not yet institutionalized and financed wars of plunder.\textsuperscript{19}

What Van Leur seems unaware of here is the argument that the patrimonial or feudal lords, who base themselves

\textsuperscript{16.} BIG, passim.  
\textsuperscript{17.} Van Leur, op.cit., p115.  
\textsuperscript{18.} Van Leur, ibid., p116.  
\textsuperscript{19.} Van Leur, ibid, p92.
economically on the provision of protection to their subjects or passing merchants, cannot long survive illiberal trade and taxation policies because they would drive away the traders who would seek protection under a more accommodating lord elsewhere; the illiberal lord would then suffer the fate of insolvency when pressed by his rivals in the region, thus resulting in his demise. It will be argued later that the north Javanese ports in general, and Gresik in particular were far more liberal than his model would suggest. It is only in areas where a lord can capture a trade route, by virtue of strategic location and lack of competition, that such a system can survive.

As regards trade and markets Van Leur presented the stereotype view that the trade was a peddling one involving valuable small-goods such as spices, drugs, precious stones, bird-feathers, and small bundles of cloth, silken or otherwise. The markets were considered seasonal involving multitudes of petty traders peddling a variety of luxuries in a face to face situation, with prices varying greatly, and where the markets were barely in competition with each other. These are the characteristics of "political capitalism" according to Van Leur and Weber.

The works of de Graaf and Pigeaud on the north Javanese states in general, and Gresik in particular, are discussed below. Although these two historians avoid overt social

20. Van Leur, ibid., p133.
theorising, it can be shown that they adopt the view that Gresik is a patrimonial type of structure.

Before critically analysing this patrimonial/political capitalist model there is another different Weberian approach to the Javanese state taken by the more recent historians Moertono and Anderson. This is the view that the form of the Javanese state most closely approximates the "charismatic" form outlined by Weber. Though one should add here the qualification that with these historians the charismatic form can and does become not a mere passing state between two patrimonies, but rather takes on a life of its own.

The work of Moertono does not reveal his sociological sources but it is clear that he is using Weberian concepts from the text. According to Moertono, power in the Javanese context is derived from the cosmos, the King being the micro-cosmic representative of the macro-cosmos, the world of nature and the stellar regions. The world of the state and of politics, was seen as a reflection of cosmic, that is, seasonal, astrological and geological events. This reflection of the macro in the micro can be seen in the physical layout of the state: the core regions of the state are referred to as the "negaragung" or great regions, and

the villages arranged deliberately in a pattern ("mantjapat" or "mantjalima" pattern of 4 or 5 villages respectively). He also argues that the administrative structure was arranged according to a similar numerological pattern. Although this transcendental source of power is periodically overlaid with traditional forms, when the servant ("kawula") accepts without thinking the superiority of the master ("gusti"), thus approximating the "traditional" form of Weber, the transcendental connection is seen as constant: "It can be said that the basis of kingship lay in religion; the authority of the gods justified the authority of the king."  

However Moertono recognises the traditional problems of the charismatic form, that is, the problem of stability in the succession and of binding the centrifugal adipatis/bupatis of the outlying regions together. He follows Weber in arguing that these problems were suppressed by the employment of the notion that the initial charisma generating act of "semedi" or union with god (also seen as the collapsing together of the "kawula-gusti" categories), could be passed on by inheritance to the descendants. The babad literature is seen as an attempt to provide evidence of kinship to the sources of legitimate, that is, sacred authority, often by fabricating a lineage to

25. Moertono, ibid., p27.  
30. Moertono, ibid., p52.
a royal household. In this respect, the babad of Gresik is no exception. Prophecy is also pressed into service as in the case of the alleged prophecy of Sunan Giri in predicting the inevitable rise to power of the first ruler of Mataram. Holding together the periphery was an ever-present problem which could be solved by inter-marriage and the use of physical force, but in the long run it could only be secured by the constant attention that the ruler gave to the cultivation of his moral purity; in the earlier periods of Javanese history this is seen as accumulating kasektin (sakti) or power conceived of as a supernatural substance, but later, in the Islamic period it is seen as closeness to god and moral purity.

The changes in the system of domination and legitimation due to the arrival of Islam are seen by Moertono as changes in superficies only, not of substance. Charismatic claims to power were still valid and Moertono cites the example of the seizure of power by Demak from Majapahit. Quoting the Babad Tanah Djawi he relates the story of the sudden flash of lighting seen as "wahju" (being the substance of legitimate power) rise out of the ground of Majapahit and descend to the ground at Bintara (Demak). Nevertheless the King was no longer seen as an incarnation of a deity (generally Wisnu) himself, but rather as Caliph (Javanese: "kalipatullah") meaning God's representative on earth.

32. Moertono, ibid., p56-57.
33. Wisnu (Jav.) = Visnu.
34. Moertono, ibid., p28.
This meant a less august position for the King, though it did nothing to check the power of the absolute monarch. One wonders why the orthodox Muslims took such troubles assassinating the heretic Siti Djenar (Wali Lanang) who taught the unity of King with god if this was the case. It will be argued below that this position needs to be reconsidered for the regnum of Demak.

The new Islamic rulers employ a new term for their Kings. This is the term "Sunan" and its variations ("susuhunan" and "suhunan"). Moertono proposes that the term is Javanese and is a variation of the word "suwun" meaning "to bear on one's head", hence implying someone highly respected. In other interpretations "Sunan" is the ridge pole in the roof of a building which is upheld by the "tijang" or uprights (otherwise "tijang" means "people"). Other variants of this term are "sinuwun" which contains the infix "-in-" which makes the term passive, meaning "he who is honoured/carried on the head", and finally the same term in a more superlative form: "susuhunan", meaning the most honoured, therefore implying one who is higher than "Sunan". This form was adopted by Sultan Agung of Mataram in 1624 and was never employed by the Sunans of Giri. Is it possible that the reason why the Sunans of Giri chose this title is that, while it has the suggestion of rulership, it also was the

35. This story is related in various local chronicles including Tjarita Purwaka Tjaruban Nagari, trans. by Drs. Atja, Ikatan Karyawan Museum, 1972, vv243-246. In this chronicle he is known as Sjech Lemahabung. Moertono's account, op.cit., p28.
36. Moertono, op.cit., p34.
only word in Javanese which had the connotation of Sunna, the plural being Sunnan meaning the path (sayings, doings and judgements) of Mohammed. Actually the term does not denote "King" but simply one who is respected and supported above, like a King, but not necessarily so. It could mean some other figure who carried authority of a different sort such as the religio-legal or constitutional kind. If the Sunans were political animals, why did they not take the title of King and Kalipatullah? Moertono wants to say that it is unjavanese, but their whole religion was unjavanese. It will be argued later that they wished to create a new, separate institution in Javanese society; this was that of an autonomous religio-judicial or quasi constitutional body who would stand outside the world of politics and trade and confer or deny legitimacy to others who would be King. It is certainly easy to document the activities of these Sunans conferring legitimacy on would-be rulers and that the latter craved such conferral: Raden Patah, Sultan Padjang and Sultan Agung are examples. Zainal Abidin of Ternate (1486-1500) studied under Sunan Giri and he was probably made into a sultan by him also.

37. Kalipatullah = Allah's Caliph, a title which all the Kings of Mataram adopted.
38. The appointment of Raden Patah as Sultan by the Sunans of Java is described in Babad Demak, Reksapustaka, Surakarta, transcription no.31, p19. That of Raja Padjang is contained in BIG, p50. That of Sultan Agung is described in BIG, p51; though he is referred to as Panembahan Senapati the date would indicate that it is a later ruler of Mataram. It should be added here that the latter's acquisition of the title was probably obtained by force. Cf. account by M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, Macmillan, London, 1981, pp33-41.
If the Sunans are to be considered as rivals to political power, then how can we explain their co-existence next to the kedatons. Sunan Kudus' religious centre and Mosque is very close to that of the kedaton of the sultan of Demak. The duality is repeated elsewhere in Java: Giri is next to Gresik, Sunan Murya's centre is on the mountain of Murya overlooking Japara, and the religious centre on the hill near Cerebon also overlooks the port of Cerebon. We are confronted not by a group of patrimonial states (Demak, Gresik, Japara etc.) fighting it out with rival charismatic (religious) states, but rather with a separation of powers: political centres are being watched over by powerful religio-judicial and quasi-constitutional centres with their own bureaucracies and religious training centres (originally the school at Ngampel, later at Giri and other places.)

Moertono then presents the argument that the Islamic kingdoms/principalities which sprang up in the 15th and 16th century were in fact responsible for an historical retrogression. This was the collapsing back into each other of the religious and the political so that they once again became part of the same institution, the deified state, with a King who once more took on the role of "Allah's warana" ("warana" implying "medium" though literally meaning "screen"), just as the former Hindu Kings presented themselves as incarnations of Wisnu. He argues: "With the assumption of this important...title, sacral and temporal power was gathered into one hand never to be released again,
and the clergy returned to being only a part of the King's administration." Here he is referring to Susuhunan Agung taking this title and power to himself. But it will be argued below that this social crisis, this collapse and refolding of one of the wings of social life, did not begin with the rise of the Sunans of the north coast, despite, on the face of it, some rather strong evidence which seems to favour this argument. The argument to be presented is that between the rise to prominence of Raden Paku, the first Sunan of Giri, in c. 1487, and the humiliation and reduction of Giri and Gresik by Mataram in 1613 and more significantly in 1625, the north coastal commercial states in general, and Gresik in particular, produced a unique phenomenon in archipelagian history, that being the separation of ideological power in the form of Islam, from the institution of the "state", and by so doing created one of the first pre-requisites of a modern state, the coexistence of a separate ideological power able to check the arbitrary power of the monarch by its deployment of incipient legal-judicial-constitutional principles derived from Islamic law and religion. This argument, though stated rather sharply here for the purposes of clarity, will be presented as a tendency deviating from the patrimonial-charismatic state-form offered above. The evidence for the traditional view must, however, be considered as a position of strength, as a worthy opponent, against which certain facts stand out in need of explanation. A similar argument

40. Moertono, op.cit., pp34-35.
41. BIG, p39. Calculated from the sangkala: "Trusing luhur dadi adji, 1409" by adding 78 years.
regarding the separation of the political and the economic will also be presented. It may appear that what is being presented here is that Gresik approximated the third form of Weber, that of the "legal-bureaucratic", but this takes the argument too far.

Amongst all the Weberian-based historians of the Javanese state it is Anderson who argues that it most closely resembles that of the charismatic form. Moreover, he presents the strongest case for taking the charismatic form, not as an unstable and temporary one, but as a discrete form in itself taking on a life of its own. He criticises Weber for arguing that charisma can emerge in any society when its institutions come under stress. For Anderson, this fails to reveal the essentially pre-rational nature of charisma. He sees charisma as a discrete form capable of existing in its own right because charisma believes in "Power", by which he means a magico-religious substance permeating the cosmos, homogeneous, concrete, constant in quantity and being the unquestionable source of legitimacy. He specifies the qualities of the charismatic leader as: his followers believe he has Power, and he exhibits the sign of Power, which in S.E. Asia is asceticism.

In Anderson's view, the Javanese state could never qualify for patrimonial status, but rather was through and through charismatic in that it located the source of power and

44. Anderson, ibid., p66.
legitimacy in Power, conceived supernaturally. Weberian historians point out that patrimonial structures always follow closely upon the emergence of a charismatic leader, with the establishing of bureaucratic forms of administration, and even more so with his death, which invariably entails the passing on of the reins of power to his descendants thus creating the traditional patrimonial state. But Anderson's reply is that: "Bureaucracy there was, but it drew its legitimacy and authority from the radiant centre, which was seen to suffuse the whole structure with its energy. In such a society, 'charisma' was not a temporary phenomenon of crisis, but the permanent, routine, organizing principle of the state." 45 He then argues that "in Old Java, all rule was charismatic insofar as it was based on the belief in Power." 46 Weberians would respond to this by pointing out the ease with which Power can become a taken-for-granted phenomenon precisely because it is impressive and that the traditional-patrimonial form, being founded on habitual or customary obedience, can easily follow on from the charismatic form in the way that Weber describes.

As regards the effect on the Javanese state of the Islamic trading states of the north coast, Anderson argues that because Islam arrived by way of trade rather than conquest, it failed to transform the traditional state. It was eventually absorbed as a subordinate element into the old

form, and had little effect on the basic intellectual framework of traditional political thought. This view is grossly at variance with the historical facts, however. The old kingdom of Majapahit was destroyed in a holy war and was replaced by the Islamic state of Demak.

This traditional form of Islam is contrasted with the modernist movements of the 20th century. But Anderson offers little evidence that the qualities he ascribes to the modern form does not equally apply to its 15th and 16th century forms as well. These qualities are the notion of a God sharply separated from the world with a monopoly of power while man is merely his creature. All humans are equal in God’s eyes. The problem arises as to how society should decide who is to be the legitimate lawmaker, and how to judge the validity of laws. The solution of the first problem was that the legitimate ruler was he who spoke for God, whose will is expressed in the Koran; it is the religious scholar who understands best the teachings of the prophet. As for law, it is to be judged worthless if it is not in accordance with God’s prescriptions to the faithful, transmitted through the person of the prophet. It is unreasonable to dismiss the applicability of these principles to the early forms of Islam, without the slightest argument. It would make the warfare between Majapahit and the Islamic states meaningless. These qualities are not a sophisticated form of Islam, but rather

47. Anderson, ibid., p58.
nothing more than its most basic elements. They must therefore be applicable to the early form of Islam.

To be certain, though, it should be admitted that the babad of Gresik contains many instances of prophecy, signs of power, visions and miracles and these can easily be incorporated into a charismatic interpretation. Indeed, the meditations on the mountain of Batang\textsuperscript{60}, in the cave, could be considered as the instance when Raden Paku takes in the kasektin which carries him to political power. But how does this square itself with the argument that the Sunans did not seek political power but rather acted as guardians of Islamic law and dispensers of legitimate authority which they always conferred upon other secular individuals who were given the title of Sultan. It could be argued that they were acting like the medieval papacy, trying to build a supra-monarchical empire. But there are several such Sunans each with the same status, though usually acknowledging the eldest as the (marginally) greater. Why did not the Sunans of Kudus and Murya act as Sunan Giri's local monarchs thus displacing the lords (sultans) of those respective regions. It is because it was never in their brief. They were men who served God and sought only to ensure that Kings behaved themselves. Such a sentiment as this is expressed in the Tjarita Purwaka Tjaruban Nagari where a religious pupil from Java, studying in Mesir (Arabia), is offered rulership in Java, but he declines, asking that it be given to his

younger brother; "...as for me, I am utterly devoted to religion..."\footnote{1}

This theory of Weber's and the use to which it is put by his followers in the field of Javanese history, will be examined further below. The other major theoretical influence on these historians has been that of Durkheim,\footnote{2} to whose influence we will now turn.

\textit{Durkheim and the Historians of Java.} The difference between Weber and Durkheim at the level of first principles is great, the former starting with the individual's motivation, and analysis of social action in terms of this motivation, while the latter begins with the notion of a collective conscience (beliefs and sentiments) which transcends the individuals who pass their lives within it, seeing "individuals" as being a recent emergence due to developments in the social system. Primitive society is seen not as a state of individualist savagery but a society of people with common sentiments and beliefs and consequently exhibiting little differentiation and thus little individualism. But let us pass over the differences in fundamentals, because the end result of both theories is the remarkable similarity or rather compatibility in the final

\footnote{1} Tjarita Purwaka Tjaruban Nagari, trans. by Atja into Indonesian, Seri Monografi Museum No. 5, Djakarta, 1972, vv99-100.
typology and in the concern for social integration, especially in the realm of the state.

The collective conscience is the basis of Durkheim's notion of social solidarity which has a life of its own transcending that of the constituent individuals. This solidarity is the social system itself, and Durkheim asks the question as to how this solidarity is achieved. In answering this question he produces a typology of social types, each type based on a different way of producing solidarity.

The first type corresponds to earlier forms of society in which all the elements or constituent parts are similar if not the same. Thus there is little division of labour within the society, each segment (whether family, hunting group, horde etc.) is relatively self-sufficient and finds little need to communicate to others outside. At the level of the individual one finds similarity of sentiment, belief and personality. In general there is homogeneity, similarity and sameness in the parts of the social system. The question arises then as to how such a society made up of many such parts can integrate itself. Even more, how can a society unite other clans and tribes in its neighbourhood; failure to do so exposes one to takeover from other more successful societies nearby. Durkheim's answer is clear: it is only by force that one group can integrate a multitude of groups who have no reason to communicate or exchange with others. If there is no division of labour, then there can be no natural
or internal reason for exchange/communication/unification.
This type of society which is united by force alone is
termed a society of "mechanical solidarity". Its legal
system, according to Durkheim, is distinguished by a
repressive quality, exhibiting the elements of violence and
revenge directed against its deviants. Needless to say, it
is a state that is brittle and easily smashed. This notion
is implicit in the work of a recent historian53 of the
conquest of Melaka by the Portuguese; he presents a picture
of Melaka with an ostensibly formidable array of arms
confronted by a very small number of Portuguese who manage
to shatter this state in the space of a few days, due to the
differences in the relative strength of the two systems of
social organization.54

The other social type is therefore one which has a high
degree of social differentiation, a complex division of
labour, and hence few component parts having a similar
character. Since the parts are different from each other,
then they must exchange or communicate with each other.

53. R.W. McRoberts, Melaka, 1391-1511, A Study of the State
vide chap.11.
54. This portrayal of Melaka is dubious however considering
the fact that both the Sejarah Melayu (trans. C.C. Brown,
O.U.P., 1970, p182) and R.J. Wilkinson ("Fall of Malacca",
J.M.B.R.A.S., 1935, p68) cast doubt on the existence of such
cannon; more likely is the demonstration effect of the
humiliation of Pasai prior to the attack on Melaka, such
attack demonstrating the vulnerability of ports like Pasai
and Melaka to naval bombardment. Pasai was abandoned as a
result and its population shifted north to found the port of
Aceh which as D. Lombard (Le Sultanate d'Atjeh, E.F.E.O.,
Paris, 1967, p41-44) has shown, was impenetrable to any
shipping without a local pilot to guide them, because of the
sandbanks and reefs.
Durkheim sees this exchange at the level of the constituent parts as an integrating force which acts in a natural or organic manner. Thus these social organizations are termed societies of "organic solidarity". The modern industrial society is seen as the typical example. Its legal system is different from the mechanical one in that it is not based on the principle of revenge, nor is it so violent towards its deviants, but rather seeks to restore order only; the commercial branch of modern law is seen as the typical form with its emphasis on compensation rather than revenge.

We are thus presented with two types of social formation to which a society can approximate, the "mechanical" and the "organic". The "mechanical" form is constituted by similar parts and has little division of labour, so that integration can only occur by way of political force and repressive law, resulting in a society which is brittle. This is contrasted with the "organic" form which consists of heterogeneous parts which are integrated in a complex division of labour and which requires little external political force to maintain itself, thus having the characteristic of political unity and strength. The form and degree of integrity of the state is determined by the degree of complexity of the division of labour and hence the extent of exchange.

Both Weber and Durkheim are concerned with the forms of state integration and the ways in which this is achieved. However, it is in the work of the latter that the integrity of the state is linked clearly to the division of labour,
whereas in the former exchange and monetisation are factors less integrated into the theory. In other words, it is in Durkheim that one finds the more complete theory, though with only two ideal types instead of the three presented by Weber. This paucity of types in both theories is a serious inadequacy since it means we will have to settle for a very crude categorization of empirical social formations: the Soviet state and the capitalist democracies would both have to be placed in the same category vis-a-vis primitive agrarian or hunting communities. Historians are in need of a system of categorization which can cope with the extant diversity of social forms. This need is of long standing.

The Durkheimian approach is adopted by Schreike and K. Hall in their respective works on the Javanese and Achenese states.

Schrieke’s theory of the development of human society is in fact a development of Weber’s university lectures which latter were intriguing but barely thought out; what we are offered by Schrieke in "The Native Rulers" is a far more coherent version of Weber’s notion of the gradual penetration of exchange into society but also one which incorporates the Durkheimian emphasis on the dependence of state integration on the division of labour which is determined by the growth of exchange.

This theory first postulates a "communal" social form at the beginning of history which is essentially a "genealogical" group (i.e. a kinship group) with an agrarian economy and which is constituted by autonomous equals imposing self discipline, the group spirit, upon its members, and making decisions by consultation. Authority here is not Durkheim's mechanical force but rather a natural group spirit binding people together. Durkheim does not have this category so at this point there is difference. However, when the group becomes large enough it cannot hold itself together and so break-away groups emerge. This is where the Durkheimian perspective is employed. Mechanical force, domination, is brought into play to subdue the separatists. It is this which leads to the second form of human society.

The "Kingdom" is just such a union of heterogeneous groups held together by mechanical force or by "a group spirit of a higher order". Here society is compartmentalized into groups, with a ruling group dominating various subordinate groups whose wills are subjected to that of the ruler. In this social form, of which Java in this period is a prime case, the conflict between the King and the local notables marks its entire history. Within this type there are variant forms. One type is the "primus inter pares" system in which conquest is not followed by occupation but rather allows the local elite to continue to exercise its privileges. The other form is one which is based on actual

57. Schrieke, ibid., p170-173.
occupation of the lands of the conquered group such that the local elite disappears or is absorbed into the ruling elite from which it derives its power. But geographical conditions limit contact between the King and the nobles so that local institutions survive or re-emerge. Obligations are limited to the paying of homage, offering tribute and sometimes military service.

The schisms of this type can be countered by the following actions of the ruler: a. If the locals retain their position, then they can be tied in to the centre by marriage alliances; b. If the local elite is displaced, then the centre can appoint local governors. But they tend to drift toward independence also, especially since they are not salaried and so must be given the right to the taxes of so many villages, etc; c. The King can reduce his dependence on his vassals by creating a hired guard or standing army at the centre. But they also seek their own power. He concludes that this type of society has an insuperable centrifugal tendency which can only be permanently overcome by the creation of the third form of society, which is the "State". His writings on the history of Java are an illustration of this form and its dynamics.

The "State" arises because the King has managed to forge an alliance with the merchant class against the provincial notables. (This, however arouses the political ambitions of the merchants.) The essential conditions of a state is the creation of a salaried officialdom to replace the local
provincial elites who derived their independence from the fact that they had their own economic base; secondly, the state must take direct control of the local tax collection function, thus cutting out the local elite again; and lastly, the employment of a standing army under centralized command, thus removing the centre's dependence upon the local elite. But these factors are themselves determined in large degree by the extent to which the state can overcome the chronic problems of transport and communication due to geographical conditions, and also by the extent to which the economy has become monetized. If the economy is monetized, only then can the state afford to pay a salaried administrative class, and only then can it obtain direct control over the collection of taxes from the outlying regions. Schrieke could continue this argument along Durkheimian lines and argue that the state achieves greatest security from centrifugal forces when the compartmentalization of the society and economy is completely broken down by, not only monetisation, which gives partial integration, but by division of labour and specialization such that the constituent regions trade with each other. If this happens then the integrative forces take on an "organic" character. Even so, we can see the similarity to Durkheim's theory above in the attention given to the use of mechanical force as a problematic in state integration, and its dependence on the division of labour (to the extent that monetisation implies such division).
Schrieke then argues, in "Ruler and Realm"\textsuperscript{58}, that the Javanese State in both the Mataram and Majapahit period had the same structure, and suffered the same weaknesses: a goods economy, an inadequate system of roads and primitive military techniques all of which ensured that the "inevitable fate of the realm would be to fall apart"\textsuperscript{59}. He continues: "In order to counteract such a tendency towards disintegration, the rulers of Majapahit placed their most important regions — Tumapel, Kadiri, Pajang, and so forth — under the authority of the closest relatives of the royal family, while the landed nobility were by means of marriages with members of the royal family presumably kept under surveillance. But this method, too, proved insufficient... The natural process of disintegration was not to be halted."\textsuperscript{60} Even the kingdom of Mataram, under the rule of Mangkurat I, feared this "natural tendency" despite having instituted a radically new policy of compulsory attendance at court by the regional princes and the administration of the regions, including the ports, by appointed officials.\textsuperscript{61}

It seems that even monetisation and the appointment of officials from the centre is insufficient to counter-act the over-riding effect of poor communications. He concludes that: "What we have found taking place during the reign of Sultan Agung can be expected just as well during the reign of an Ayam-Waruk, a Krtanagara, a Jayabhaya, an Erlangga, or

\begin{itemize}
\item 59. Schrieke, ibid., p217.
\item 60. Schrieke, ibid., p218.
\item 61. Schrieke, ibid., pp218-219.
\end{itemize}
a Sindok." Schrieke, ibid., p221.  
63. Schrieke, ibid., p221.

The traditions of Majapahit were "honoured in Muslim Mataram." Thus Islam introduced little new in the way in which the kingdom was structured and was incapable of overcoming the inherent weaknesses of the kingdom as a social form.

This argument by Schrieke will later be questioned in regard to the period of the earliest Islamic states on the north coast in the period of 1475 to 1625, during which time a "confederation" of coastal states was formed in opposition to the hinterland kingdom, and which came under a different system of rule. At this stage, it can be pointed out that the aims of this research program in looking for tendencies towards the formation of a unified state seems misguided insofar as it ignores the fact that when it does occur in the Mataram period, it involved the crushing to death of the commercial states on the coast, together with the downfall of the merchant class and the loss of trade. There is no secret in the fact that the historians we are dealing with here are concerned with measuring Java's progress against that of western Europe. But it is a serious oversight to advance a theory of state integration as the measuring rod and then to bemoan the death of the merchant class when that unified state finally emerges. The theory is obviously inadequate in this respect and needs to incorporate a theory of the emergence of the economy as an autonomous system and the free merchant class.
To get development along western lines one cannot simply look for order, because it ignores the other requirement of the emergence of a realm of commercial freedom. A period of disorder and revolution may be necessary so that the merchant class can make its presence felt in the struggle between the monarch and the regional powers. This we do get in the latter half of the 15th century with the rise of Gresik, then Demak, as independent trading states; this must then be followed by a re-integration of the various states under the supremacy of one of the commercial states; but this will not work if the ruler is still involved in the economy in a way that dominates and monopolizes it; the state must surrender its economic privileges and allow the Orang Kaya autonomy in the pursuit of its economic goals, and also it must allow the market to set price levels. The pressure on the state to do this comes from two directions: firstly from the Orang Kaya themselves who wish to pursue their own material self-interest without fear of arbitrary confiscations by the monarch. This they can do by exploiting the weaknesses in the old state - the struggle between the monarch and the nobles. Secondly, it requires a new ideological system, such as orthodox Islam, with its legal and judicial principles which are derived from a source which is completely independent of the monarch. This latter ideological system, conceived of as an organized power within society, can then serve both as a check on the power of the monarch, imposing upon him the rule of laws derived from a source above even himself, but also as a unifying
force in the formation of the state. It is this tendency which can be observed in the data regarding the period from 1475 to 1625, during which time the Sunans of the mountain overlooking Gresik cast their influence, not as new charismatic leaders (a view which one must admit has some strong points) but as centres of *shariah* and of legitimacy which they bestow on others who have learnt the ways of the Prophet. For this there is evidence. It is remarkable how the historians mentioned above, including Moertono, pass over this period in Javanese history with such alacrity, homologising it with the Weberian or Durkheimian formula and with the rest of Javanese history, which then takes on the appearance of a continuum.

At this point it is worth digressing from our study of Java for a moment to compare the above with the study of Aceh by Reid. This article is an interesting exploration of the problem and goes beyond the Durkheimian approach in important respects. It looks at the horizontal aspects of state integration between the merchant class and the ruler, showing the achievements of the orang kaya in gaining a measure of political power and of depoliticizing the economic world of the market and of trade while gradually enforcing upon the ruler the notion of the separation of the

65. The theoretical influence here is British political thought which is concerned with integration through the checks and balances provided by other branches of power which have separated out from the power of the absolute monarch.
office from the person of the ruler and imposing a degree of limitation on monarchical power, as well as looking at the vertical aspects of state integration between the city and the hinterland groups. It is the latter developments which spelt death for the merchant class in Java with the integration under Mataram in the early 17th century, and they met a similar fate in Aceh under Iskandar Muda during the same period. It is in Aceh, according to Reid, that a new settlement in the struggle between the ruler and the orang kaya emerges with the appearance of the virgin Queens after 1641.67

The use of virgin Queens as a kind of emasculated monarchy subordinate to the merchant class will be discussed below in relation to Gresik. What is more interesting about Reid's study is the struggle for power between the ruler and the merchants, a struggle which takes on an extremely violent form, before reaching a series of settlements. We should ask of this study: what are the conditions for such an event as this? It must involve, at least, the flourishing of trade and the consequent increase in the wealth and power of the merchant class. A further condition is cited by Reid: in Aceh the Hindu state tradition was never firmly established due to the early influence of Islam.

If we take these two conditions and look at the state of Gresik at the time of the arrival of Pires, it must be

67. Reid, op.cit., p52.
68. Reid, op.cit., p46.
agreed that we have both of these conditions. We have, to state the argument very briefly, a well established trading system centred on Gresik, a rich orang kaya group, and an Islamic influence from the very beginning of Gresik's history. After the death of Pinatih, we have the emergence of a Muslim saint occupying the kedaton. Is not a saint much like a virgin Queen in that, though the saint starts to produce a new lineage of rulers, he is a figure who, as the babad shows, sees himself as being above and beyond both the world of trade and of politics, just as the Acehnese Queen is kept out of the realm of the details of state affairs. He in fact only rules as representative of the Sultan of Demak, which Sultan derives his legitimate authority from the saint himself.

The views of De Graaf and Pigeaud need to be examined before the above argument can be established since they imply that Gresik, insofar as it became an autonomous state, was a traditional patrimonial type. Their views will be discussed at a later stage. At this point it suffices to indicate that their views on the type of social system in Gresik are stated in very untheorized terms but reference could be made to the following data as being pertinent: Raden Paku takes the title of Prabhu (King), he builds a kedhaton (seat of government and residence of the ruler), produces a new lineage of Sunans and that he adopts all the

69. His control over the Kebungson, however, though indirect, compromised this attitude.
airs of a Javanese monarch, for example the building of a pleasure garden complete with pools or lakes with even an floating hall in the middle of the lake. These details need to be discussed in more detail. However we can dismiss the pleasure garden with the floating hall as topographically impossible; nor is there any mystery about their location - the babad gives their location as being on the hill of the kedhaton. They are in fact ablution tubs made of brick for the cleansing of arms and feet of the faithful before entering the "kedhaton" to pray; perhaps one or more of them were used for drinking purposes too since water had to be got from somewhere on top of that hill.

The last historian adopting the Durkheimian approach who must be discussed is K.R. Hall. His early articles71 on Indonesian trade and state formation are an examination of the transition to the Durkheimian "mechanical" system of integration from a situation where two societies first come into contact with each other, in the concrete historical circumstances of the coast of Sumatra and other places. The elements of his model, which is derived from Bronson's abstract model72, are the existence of rival river-mouth princes on the coastline exchanging goods extracted out of hinterland peoples, who live upriver (and who are effectively trapped by the controller of the river-mouth in

so far as they wish to buy foreign goods), for goods from overseas traders. The dynamics of this system are such that conflict occurs both between the river-mouth princes who are interested in subordinating their rivals, and thus capturing the trade of their upstream peoples, and between the river-mouth prince and the hinterland peoples.

There are several stages to this process. The initial stage is one in which the hinterland is engaged in a rather loose political relationship, centred on exchange of hinterland goods for overseas goods, with the river-mouth prince; this relationship begins with exchange between two separate political entities, but soon involves an ever-increasing closeness, such as the use of alliances expressed in terms of religio-mystical loyalty to the prince on the coast.\footnote{Hall, "Trade", op.cit., p46.}

The example he has in mind here is that of Srivijaya. It is superseded by a new state form tying together the hinterland peoples with that of the coastal prince more closely. While Samudra-Pasai represent intermediate stages, the powerful states of Aceh and Melaka represent its most developed form. In the latter, rival princes of other river-mouths are conquered and relatives of the King are appointed as local collectors of upriver produce, though denied the right to act as an entrepot or re-export centre, such right being preserved for the central river-mouth port. But this type also involves the military subordination and centrally controlled administration of the hinterland by the King. It
therefore involves coercion\textsuperscript{74} and represents the "mechanical" type of state integration. Both Hall and Reid are aware of the inclusion of hinterland chiefs into the state structure, altering significantly the balance of power\textsuperscript{75}; presumably this represents a kind of compromise or alternative route to integration, but how does it affect the argument regarding coercion as being the tool of integration?

This model is open to certain criticisms. It is doubtful whether the rivers of Southeast Asia were ever that significant in serving as a means of transport and communication between the coast and the interior. Raffles cites the use of the two very large rivers of the Solo and the Brantas as useful for trade\textsuperscript{76}, but most other rivers were too fast and shallow, or as Raffles states\textsuperscript{77}, blocked at the mouth by mud banks, to be employed as much as the slow moving rivers of Africa were. He goes on to say that it is the ox, the horse and the shoulders of people which are the common forms of transport for goods in Java\textsuperscript{78}; the ox rarely gets bogged in the mud and is therefore suitable all year round. Supporting this view is that of Pires who states in 1516: "And all the merchandise is carried all over the

74. Hall, ibid., p33.  
76. T.S. Raffles, The History of Java, O.U.P., Oxford, 1978, vol.1, pp18, 196-197. Here Raffles discusses the traffic down the Solo river to the port of Gresik, but the relationship is far removed from that of a port bottling up a hinterland people. The river was no doubt of great advantage because of the great distance involved. In most cases, however, a buffalo would suffice.  
77. Raffles, ibid., pp196-7.  
78. Raffles, ibid.
island of Java in ox-carts."\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, a river was a disadvantage if the interior contained not a weak collection of tribal peoples, but a highly organized and militarily strong kingdom such as Majapahit. But, more to the point, the two cases cited by Hall as the best examples of centralized and integrated states are those of Aceh and Melaka. Although both have rivers running through them, neither seem to be employed as means for controlling hinterland peoples. Certainly Melaka's wealth was not derived from its sparsely populated hinterland. Its agricultural hinterland was in fact quite inadequate to feed the cities population. Its wealth and power came from its strategic location in that it could control the Melakan straits and the traffic which had to use it. Its hinterland produce, mainly tin, was not as significant as a source of wealth as the entrepot trade. Aceh was chosen as a suitable location for a port because it had good natural defences\textsuperscript{80}, whereas river-mouth ports were vulnerable to naval attack, and like Melaka, it could exercise a good deal of control over the entry to the straits. Furthermore, the alliance that Pramesvara forged with the local Celates is not comparable to an alliance with hinterland peoples because the Celates were not hinterland people but sea-people, living by fishing, trading and piracy; just the sort of people who could be of use in establishing a lurk in the narrowest part of the straits. The expansion of the Melakan state and its wars against other riverine states up the

\textsuperscript{79} Pires, op.cit., pp177-178.

\textsuperscript{80} Lombard, loc.cit.
coast are to be explained, not just by the hinterland produce that could be captured, but by the suppression of rival ports which could take control of the straits and its international traffic. It should be admitted however that, in the case of Aceh, the bottling up of the hinterland pepper crop and its channelling through Aceh, was vital to the ports wealth and power; but is there any evidence that it came down to the coast by river?

In Hall's more recent publication on this subject of trade and state formation, he delimits the application of the riverine model to areas where there is no rice-plain kingdom, thus explicitly excluding its application to the rice-plain kingdoms of Java. In such places he uses a different model, the rice-plain model. This model has a political and an economic aspect. The economic aspect is described in his introduction: at the base of the trading network there are clusters of villages called wanua each of which has a market or pken at its centre; there is a cycle of markets such that on any particular day there will be a market at a nearby wanua; the trade route from the villages to the higher order market (port or royal centre) is highly compartmentalized such that the local village trade is handled by the adwal or apikul (peddlers), the larger trade between the wanua and the intermediate centres is handled by large-scale traders called adagang; the traders at the intermediate centres usually have permanent shops and are

82. Hall, ibid., pp15-19.
called abakul; these latter obtain their goods from brokers who are called banyaga bantal who in turn buy from the large port-based merchants or banyaga. It is a two-way trade between the villages and the port. Hall has little to say about this trade network and one wonders whether he considers it to be problematic or not. It seems to be highly compartmentalized and hence problematic vis-a-vis state integration. Doubtless it is determined by the distance a trader can travel in a reasonable length of time, hence it is limited by the adequacy of means of transportation.

Regarding the political aspect, it is not necessary, here, to cover Hall's history of Java from the beginning. Suffice it to say that the country has, according to Hall, both rice-plain kingdoms in the interior which go through various stages of development under the influence of Hinduism, Buddhism and Indic conceptions of statecraft, as well as riverine type systems on the north Javanese coast. With the shift of the centre of power from central Java to east Java by the 10th century, the hinterland state had managed to enhance its wealth and power by integrating its wet-rice plain economy with the riverine economic systems on the coast. It led to a higher level of integration with the ruler presenting himself as maharaja and the parts of the kingdom were held to the centre by "ceremonially defined tributary relationships". Whereas the central Javanese kingdom located on the Kedu plain was too distant from the

83. Hall, ibid., p135.
84. Hall, ibid., p233.
trade centres on the coastline. The growth of trade after
the 11th century leads to a further development in state and
economy in the kingdom of Majapahit, which Hall takes as the
highest form of statecraft in Southeast Asia prior to the
arrival of the Dutch. This development involved the passing
away of the ceremonial-tributary system and its replacement
by "direct central collection of local specialities and
local surpluses".  

The new system entailed the under-cutting of the power of
the local landed elite by the central ruler who abolished
"tax farming" (eg. of the ferry crossings) and replaced it
with a tax of fixed amounts to be paid in kind or cash (the
pamuja tax) with the new collectors having the right to deal
directly with the royal court instead of the local ruler.
They were thus more closely integrated into the state. The
taxation system was becoming more monetized, and the
outlying regions came to be taxed by people who took on the
character of state officials rather than that of an
autonomous elite with all their inherent centrifugal
tendencies. 86 The economy of Majapahit also was stimulated
by this development because the tax was fixed and therefore
allowed the local producer to produce and accumulate a
surplus larger than if he was under the system whereby all
surplus was taken from him. 87 Hall claims that this new
system became standard form for the Majapahit state. If this
is so it would provide a new view of port administration,

85. Hall, ibid., p233.
86. Hall, ibid., pp236-242.
87. Hall, ibid., p243.
whereby the local pati or ruler would also have suffered a loss of tax collecting power to particular shipping agents or merchants. Unfortunately he has precious little to say regarding the ports. He suggests however that: "Some of these sources considered Javanese merchants active in the international spice trade to be the monarch's "trade agents".\footnote{88. Hall, ibid., p245.}

The Durkheimian project thus can be said to have reached its highest form in this study of Hall's. It is a work whose theme is the development of the state from at first a mere aggregate of separate political units in the most primitive riverine systems, through the emergence of states which are "mechanically" integrated by the use of coercion but which are undermined by non-monetization and lack of division of labour, to the pinnacle represented by Majapahit in the 14th century in which the articulations and compartmentalizations of the former kingdoms are replaced by a more centralized form of administration involving the employment of revenue-collectors by the monarch collecting a tax which is in part in monetary form.

It can be seen from the above exposition of the historiography of Java that the problematic which informs historians of Java is that of Weber and Durkheim, namely the concern for understanding the integrity and continuity of its political institutions. Despite the fact that the two social theories begin at opposite ends of the methodological
spectrum, at the result end of their theories one finds remarkable compatibility, and historians have felt free to move from one to another and to accept the other's works.

There are problems, however, with these theories which have had repercussions for the works of historians of Java. It is possible to begin a critique of these theories at their base. Weber's notion of social action is blind to certain events which must happen in social interaction. These events are not subjective however and therefore do not enter into analysis for Weber. These events are the elements of control, conceptualization of the relationship (between self and others) as well as the utility or purpose of the interaction. These elements could be termed differently, as the political, the ideological and the economic functions, which characterise all social relationships. The Weberian approach voluntarily surrenders the objective aspect of analysis of action, and thus ends up with a purely subjective basis for categorization of types of social structure. A further problem with the Weberian approach is that he does not try to account for the emergence of the economy as a separate institution, he simply applies his analysis based on type of individual motivation to classify it. Thus one can apply his analysis to the political and the economic and classify it accordingly. But he does not explain the emergence of the economy from the realm of political-economy which often precedes it. We cannot assume that all societies have an economy, though economic functions are being carried out in all societies. The mirror
image of this argument is that we cannot assume the existence of a state or discrete political sphere, since it too may still be enmeshed in economic functions. This same deficiency occurs in the theory of Durkheim, where, although we are presented with the division of labour as a determining factor in state development, we still lack a theory of the economy as a separate institution, and its historical emergence.

Just as the economic and the political can appear as separate or fused together, one could argue that so too can the ideological be separate or fused with one or both of the other functions. However, one cannot develop new social theories in a work on the history of Gresik since such theories require a global perspective if they are to have universal applicability. Notwithstanding this injunction however, one can reasonably argue that the use of the notions above are acceptable without seriously advancing a new theory of human society. Their acceptability is obvious to us because the three functions are visibly separate in western type societies: we are confronted by an autonomous economic system, a separate and specialized political realm known as the state, and we have a separate ideological realm which provide the philosophical underpinnings of the legal system and the constitution. The categories are common sense notions which will serve our limited purposes here.

In relation to Gresik, it was suggested above that this port was in the process of transformation and development,
undergoing the process of specialization and the separating out of its elementary functions. In the next chapter this idea will be elaborated more fully.