

VII

EUBULUS AND ATHENIAN INTERVENTION IN THE LATE 350's

In the late 350's there were a number of occasions when Athens refused to engage in conflict. She refused to intervene in the dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta in 353/2 and the plea for assistance by the Rhodian democrats was rejected in 351. Moreover, even though Athens sided with the Phocians in the "Sacred War", her military support for Phocis was minimal, the only significant act of Athenian participation occurred in 352, when her forces blocked Philip's descent at Thermopylae. Athens' activity in the north was limited to the Chersonese which Chares secured in 353/2. In central Thrace, however, Athenian assistance for Cersebleptes against Philip was not given. Athens also refused aid to Mytilene (ps.-Dem., XIII.8) and later to Persia in 351/0 (Diod., XVI.44.1). Accordingly, the first section of this chapter will examine the occasions when Athenian intervention was either attempted or implemented¹. The last section of this chapter examines the arguments used by scholars that link Eubulus with the direction of Athenian policy in the late 350's. Did Eubulus, as some have claimed, hold such sway over the Athenians? In particular, the following discussion seeks to determine the nature of Athenian non-intervention in the late 350's. How extensive was it? Does this failure to intervene on each and every occasion suggest that certain

¹ Since the Athenian stance on the pleas of the Megalopolitans and the democratic Rhodians have been discussed, they have been omitted from the following discussion.

politicians (including Eubulus) were attempting to implement a policy of "pacifism" in this period?

Discussion of Athenian non-intervention must distinguish carefully between those occasions when the Athenians rejected pleas for assistance because they did not consider action to be viable. Into the later category fall the cases of Megalopolis and the Rhodian democrats. Moreover, there are further examples when no Athenian assistance was given to another state. There is a fleeting mention of Athens' refusal to aid Mytilene. The pseudo-Demosthenes claims the Athenians never stirred but remained entirely aloof while the demos of Mytilene lost its constitution (ps.-Dem., XIII.8). To the best of my knowledge, the date of the overthrow of the Mytilenean democracy is unknown. From the context of the passage, however, one may postulate that it occurred before the Rhodians lost their democracy in the late 350's². Since the pseudo-Demosthenes does not indicate whether or not Athens received a plea for help from the Mytilenean democrats³, one cannot assume that intervention was discussed in the Athenian assembly. If intervention was discussed, this would tend to reinforce my argument on Demosthenes' For the Liberty of the Rhodians that the Athenians were

² On the date of the oligarchic coup in Rhodes, see S. Hornblower, Mausolus, Oxford, 1982, p. 127. Hornblower suggests that it took place during the "Social War" on the basis of Aristotle, Politics, 1303b23 and a comment by a comic playwright, Luscius Lanuvinus (see Hornblower, Mausolus, Oxford, 1982, p. 212). Neither source, however, proves conclusive: Aristotle's reference to the Rhodian navy cannot be fixed with certainty to the mid 350's and the Latin comic was writing at a time which is quite removed from the time he described. Since a playwright's art does not require him to provide historical accuracy, one should not infer from his reference to Athens' war with Rhodes (as opposed to Athens' war with the rebels or Mausolus), a sign that Rhodes was led by an oligarchic government in the "Social War".

³ The Rhodian plea did not occur until 351, after the presumed date of 353 for pseudo-Demosthenes, On the Sytaxeis. Hence, the Rhodian plea is not mentioned in the speech.

not prepared to intervene in disputes purely to reinstate a former democracy.

Under the year 351/0, Diodorus claims that the Persians did send a request for Athens to join them in the campaign against the Egyptians. Diodorus clearly states, however, that the Athenians replied that "they continued to observe their friendship for the Persians, but were opposed to sending troops as allies" (XVI.44.1)⁴. Undoubtedly, if Athens had lent assistance it would have provided a much needed financial return. Nonetheless, Diodorus' phrasing suggests that the Athenians were concerned about the dispersal of their military strength to a far off land. No doubt, Philip's expedition to Thermopylae in the summer of 352 (Diod., XVI.38.1-2) provoked this reluctance to weaken their own defence. With the exception of Thermopylae, the Athenians had been unable to counter Philip's lightning forays on the Greek mainland. Demosthenes even asserts that they were unable to prevent Macedonian piracy against Lemnos, Imbros and even Geraistus (Dem., IV.34)⁵. The Persian request came to Athens at an inopportune moment.

In their effort to counter Philip's expansion prior to Thermopylae in 352, the Athenians did vote to send expeditions against him. Demosthenes

⁴ Diod., XVI.48.2; cf., H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Chicago, 1933 (1981 repr.), p. 165.

An Athenian commander named Diophantus did serve under the Egyptian king against the Persians at a later date, but since he was acting in a private capacity, this in no way suggests that the Athenians generally were inclined to war with Persia - certainly not in the late 350's.

⁵ In his First Philippic Demosthenes lists three occasions when Athens' navy had been unable to oppose Philip's piratical raids with any degree of success. Philip's fleets raided Lemnos and Imbros where Athenian citizens were seized as prisoners. The Athenian merchant fleet was also seized close to Attica at Geraistus and a sacred ship was stolen from Marathon (Dem., IV.34). These daring raids highlight Demosthenes' point that the Black Sea trade route and even the Attic coastline were extremely vulnerable to piracy. On the sacred ship, see P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford, 1981, p. 687f. See also Jacoby, FGrHist., vol. 3B, Suppl. 1, pp. 141, 328, Suppl. 2, p. 130 (with references to various scholia).

claims that expeditions were proposed to aid Methone, Pagasae and Potidaea, presumably to prevent their seizure by Philip (I.8-9). Demosthenes (IV.35) also contends that Athens' lack of preparation was such that these expeditions were behind the times: Philip, it would appear, had succeeded in seizing them before Athenian relief arrived. This can be inferred also from a subsequent passage, where Demosthenes alleges that while delays in organizing operations go on "the object of the naval operation, whatever it be, is already lost" (IV.37). This is clearly a general statement about Athens' inability to combat Philip, but in the context (of Dem., IV.35f.), it may well apply to Methone, Pagasae and Potidaea.

Why did Athens not lend assistance to Potidaea, Methone and Pagasae?⁶ Demosthenes implies that the Athenians lacked enthusiasm. One should be wary, however, of such claims by Demosthenes. In the First Olynthiac, delivered in late 349⁷, Demosthenes attacks the Athenians for having not supported Olynthus as yet. Referring to previous occasions when the Athenians were slow to react to the encroachments of Philip, he alleges that they lacked enthusiasm or lacked the will to fight Philip. Nonetheless, one must recognize the rhetorical purpose of these accusations in the Olynthiacs. Demosthenes directs his attacks against the personal honour of the Athenians, hoping by this means to spur them to action. He does not look for other circumstances, such as weather conditions, because that would weaken his attempt to encourage the participation of the Athenians in the expeditions. He wants them to feel guilty about lost opportunities. Indeed, it is contrary

⁶ Philip had taken Pydna and Potidaea in 356 and Methone in 354. Pagasae fell not long after Methone. See Diod., XVI.8.3-5, 31.6, 34.4-5; cf., N.G.L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357-352 B.C.", in JHS, 57 (1937), pp. 57-58, 67, 75.

⁷ See J.R. Ellis, "The Order of the Olynthiacs", in Historia, 16 (1967), pp. 108-112.

to his purpose to acknowledge a reason for inactivity that was beyond human control.

In the First Philippic, however, Demosthenes refers to such a reason. In this speech, Demosthenes unsuccessfully attempted to convince the Athenians that the only way to combat Philip was to establish a permanent force in northern Greece⁸. He recognized that Athens had, so far, failed to launch effective opposition to Philip because the remoteness of Athens always left the initiative for action in the hands of Philip:

"It seems to me that your deliberations about the war and about the entire military preparation would be made on a better basis if you were to bear in mind the position of the country against which you are waging war and if you were able to take into account the fact that Philip gains most of his successes by using the winds and the seasons of the year to forestall us. He watches out for the Etesian winds or the winter, then he makes his attempt when we cannot reach the place."

(Dem., IV.31, trans. by Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, p. 26)

Certainly, Philip may have taken Amphipolis⁹ at a time when Athens was prevented from sailing north by the adverse effect of the Etesian winds. He may have used the same tactic when he seized Pydna a short time later: Diodorus (XVI.8.3) puts the reduction of Pydna immediately after the fall of Amphipolis. In the same Attic year (357/6), Potidaea was forced to surrender to Philip, apparently with the aid of his new ally, Olynthus (Diod., XVI.8.3-5). No doubt, the speed of Philip's victories and his

⁸ His suggestion was rejected because it was not economically viable. See Dem., IV.28 and A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 1957, p. 31.

⁹ On the capture of Amphipolis see J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London, 1976, pp. 63-65 and on the Etesian winds, pp. 64, 99. Ellis (p. 64) dates Philip's attack on Amphipolis to the autumn or winter of 357.

alliance with Olynthus had caught the Athenians unprepared. They were unable to protect the cleruchy that they had established at Potidaea in 362.

As for the expedition to Pagasae, Diodorus records an account in 352 when Chares helped to pick up the survivors of Onomarchus' defeat on the Crocus Field (XVI.35.5). Diodorus asserts that "Chares was by chance sailing by with many triremes". As Beloch pointed out, however, it is unlikely that Chares had been sent by the Athenians to relieve Pagasae¹⁰.

An example of Athenian dalliance is deplored in Demosthenes' Third Olynthiac. In about November 352, Philip was laying siege to Heraion Teichos¹¹. Again, Demosthenes describes Athenian preparations in uncomplimentary terms:

"There were many speeches and much uproar in the assembly, and you decreed that forty triremes should be launched, that the citizens of up to forty-five years of age should embark in them and that an eisphora of sixty talents should be levied. Then this year passed by and the month Hekatombaion came, then Metageitnion and Boedromion (sc. about September 351). In this month you reluctantly dispatched Charidemus, after the celebration of the Mysteries, with ten empty triremes and five silver talents. For when the news reached you that Philip was ill or dead (both these reports came in), you thought there was no longer any occasion to send help and you dismissed the expedition."

(Dem., III.4-5, trans. by Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, p. 66)

It is unclear from these passages which expedition was dismissed - the one decreed in November 352, or the one dispatched in the following

¹⁰ Diod., XVI.31.6; 34.3; Beloch, III.1.476.

¹¹ For the date, see N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Oxford, 1967, p. 544.

September. Clearly, the terminus point of the expedition was the reported illness of Philip. Since the desired purpose of Charidemus was to oppose Philip in Thrace, then it must have been the second expedition that was dismissed. As Ellis points out, Charidemus could hardly go against Philip in September if the latter had fallen ill and left Thrace in the preceding November¹².

On this interpretation, the "first expedition" was never dispatched. The reference to the proposed levy of sixty talents and the subsequent statement that Charidemus was sent out with ten empty ships and five silver talents suggest that the expedition decreed in 352 had been deferred, due to the inability to raise the levy. As it was, Charidemus was sent out ten months later with a wholly inadequate force.

It is unclear what purpose Charidemus was expected to serve. Since November, 352, the expedition had been delayed through the campaigning months of spring and summer and only in September 351 was Charidemus sent out. Presumably, Philip had experienced a great deal of difficulty in taking Heraion Teichos. Nonetheless, the Etesian winds are still prevalent in September¹³ and, even if in September 351 the winds abated and permitted the fleet to sail north from Athens, further time would have been lost as Charidemus surely was expected to gather a full complement for his ships while he sailed north. Any delay of this nature would have incurred the additional risk of the fleet being caught in hostile waters during the onset of winter. As Adcock points out, sailing in winter was particularly

¹² Ellis & Milns, *The Spectre of Philip*, Sydney, 1970, p. 66, n. 9. See also G.L. Cawkwell, "The Defence of Olynthos", in *Classical Quarterly*, 12 (1962), p. 126.

¹³ *Hdt.*, II.20.

hazardous due to bad weather conditions¹⁴.

Perhaps the intention was for the fleet to use Lemnos, Thasos or Sciathos as a winter base (which Demosthenes suggests for his proposed permanent force in 351/0)¹⁵. At any rate, the five talents given to Charidemus would have lasted very little time. Assuming the ten ships each gained a complement of two hundred, a three obol daily ration allowance would have exhausted the five talents in thirty days. With winter fast approaching, one would assume that the prospect of living off the land would have dimmed previous enthusiasm for the expedition. It is little wonder that Charidemus left Athens with ten empty triremes, even though the citizens had voted originally to man forty triremes themselves¹⁶.

In spite of the initial uproar in 352, the Athenian reluctance, no doubt, had been stimulated by the failure to procure the levy of sixty talents, even after ten months. Who was responsible for the failure? Surely the Assembly had the power to punish those who failed to pay¹⁷. Sixty talents would have provided 8,000 men with bare ration allowance for ninety days. This comparison, with the ten ships eventually sent with only five talents, would have emphasized the punitive nature of the expedition. When rumours reached Athens that Philip was ill or dead, the Athenians were willing to accept that the expedition to support Heraion Teichos did not warrant their commitment for such paltry reimbursement.

Demosthenes, however, complains that this was precisely the time to strike at Philip:

¹⁴ F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, Berkeley, 1957, p. 38.

¹⁵ Dem., IV.32.

¹⁶ cf., Dem., II.28, where Demosthenes notes that one of the reasons why their commanders avoid war was the non-existence of pay for their troops.

¹⁷ I am indebted to Dr. M. Markle for pointing this out to me.

"..for if we had then sent help there as we had voted and done so with alacrity, Philip, having made his recovery, would not be bothering us now."

(Dem., IV.5, trans. by Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, p. 66)

With hindsight at his disposal, it was easy for Demosthenes to perceive the advantage of attacking Philip at that particular time. For the Athenian citizen in September 351, who was expected to perform his duty, that thought may not have arisen. Thus, Demosthenes' criticism of Athenian reluctance to serve¹⁸ has merit. Clearly, they had been willing to vote for an eisphora of sixty talents when the expedition was originally planned. The expedition, however, apparently was not sent. Understandably, they were unwilling to do so when it was not economically worth the risk to sail north in a depleted fleet with winter approaching.

Demosthenes, himself, was aware that the inability to ensure pay created reluctance on the part of the Athenians to serve. On each occasion that he calls upon the Athenians to serve, he emphasizes that obligations to perform trierarchies must be enforced upon those wealthy enough to do so and eisphora must be raised¹⁹.

The Athenian seizure of Sestos in 353²⁰ is not referred to by Demosthenes, presumably because it was a recent example when the Athenians

¹⁸ Dem., IV.7; II.13,24,27.

¹⁹ Dem., IV.7; II.13,24,27.

²⁰ M. Cary, in OCD², s.v. "Sestos", p. 98lf., asserts that Chares seized Sestos in 357. This is not feasible. I see no reason to separate the capture of Sestos and the establishment of cleruchies in the Chersonese. Diodorus does not do so. If the date of 357 is accepted, then the question arises: was Sestos left uninhabited for three or four years? It is highly unlikely that the Athenians would capture Sestos and then wait three or four years before they utilized their prize. IG II².228, lines 15f., confirms the existence of Athenian cleruchies in the Chersonese. N.G.L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357-352 B.C.", in JHS, 57 (1937), pp. 64-65, 69f., dates the incident to the early half of 353.

had shown themselves capable of decisive action. Unfortunately, nothing is known of the campaign apart from a brief comment from the late source, Diodorus Siculus:

"Chares the Athenian general sailed into the Hellespont, and having seized the city of Sestos, slew the young adults and reduced the others to utter slavery."²¹

(Diod., XVI.34.3, trans. by C.L. Sherman,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 333)

Perhaps, as Ellis suggests, Athenian intervention in this region was a harsh example, designed to force their wavering, Thracian ally, Cersebleptes, to oppose Philip²². The eastward expansion of Macedonian influence went against the interests of Athens who, no doubt, wished to protect the Black Sea trade route. Sestos' strategic position was a vital link for Athenian trade, since it possessed the best harbour facilities in the area (Isoc., XV.108 and Xen., Hell., IV.8.5) and commanded the chief crossing point to Abydos in Asia Minor. An agreement made between Athens and Cersebleptes in 357 had determined that the Greek cities of the Chersonese were to be "free and autonomous" (IG II² 126) but, clearly, Athens found the need to seize Sestos four years later.

Apart from the seizure of Sestos in 353, Athens' military activity in the late 350's proved successful only on two other occasions. In the summer of 352, an Athenian force of 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry assisted the Phocians and other allies to prevent the passage of Philip's army through

²¹ It is not known whether or not the massacre of the Sestians was a pre-meditated act either by Athens or by Chares. It is possible that Chares was unable to control his troops in the heat of battle, but perhaps Athens wished to use Sestos as an example to other states who sided with Philip. The removal of the Sestian population did leave the way open for Athens to establish a cleruchy in an established and strategically placed city (Diod., XVI.34.4).

²² J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London, 1976, p. 80.

the pass of Thermopylae²³. The decision to intervene shows clearly that when necessity demanded attention to their duty, the Athenians did not delay. It is significant, however, that Athens could field such a sizeable land force when required but was unable to launch naval operations with similar speed. Clearly, the more expensive naval campaigns imposed a financial burden that could not be alleviated with the desired speed.

The other successful act of intervention in the late 350's was directed against Megara. In his Third Olynthiac, Demosthenes criticizes the Athenians for becoming involved in quarrels with other Greek states, while they provide no effective opposition against Philip because they had no money:

"Surely it is not the part of intelligent or high-minded men to leave undone any of the operations of war because of lack of finance and to endure with equanimity the reproaches incurred by such conduct; nor is it their part to snatch up arms and march against Corinth and Megara, but to allow Philip to enslave Greek cities because they have no money for the provisioning of men on active service."

(Dem., III.20, trans. by Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, p. 71)

The Athenian action against Megara is referred to as well by the pseudo-Demosthenes (XIII.32), who states that the Athenians passed decrees against the "accursed Megarians". The Athenians charged the Megarians with cultivating sacred ground and they voted to march out and prevent it. The pseudo-Demosthenes argues that this was a just intention, one worthy of Athens. Clearly, however, the decree was not acted upon at this time.

²³ Diod., XVI.38.1-2; 37.3.

because he criticizes the Athenians for failing to execute a single undertaking (ps.-Dem., XIII.32f.).

An inscription dated to 352/1 sheds light on the background to this incident. In that year an Athenian commission was sent to Delphi in order to seek advice as to whether this sacred land should be leased out for agricultural purposes, or whether it should be left alone, dedicated to the Twin Goddesses²⁴. A fragment from Philochorus reveals that Delphi advised against the use of the land. It is uncertain, however, whether the decision to march out against the Megarians, mentioned by the pseudo-Demosthenes, preceded or followed the commission to Delphi in 352/1²⁵.

Two fragments from minor orators reveal that Athenian force was used in 350/49. Both Philochorus and Androtion refer to the Athenian action in this year. According to Philochorus²⁶, Athens sent out a force under the strategos Ephialtes and marked out the boundaries of the holy meadow land. Evidently, the Megarians had failed to acquiesce. Perhaps as Jacoby suggested²⁷, the Megarians had felt the Athenians were trying to extend the sacred boundaries, thus depriving them of land for cultivation. Nonetheless, the Athenian act of intimidation proved effective because the Megarians were forced to comply. According to Philochorus, the Athenians

²⁴ IG II² 204, lines 7-8, 25-30, see SEG, 25.64.

²⁵ This issue hinges on the dating of the speech by the pseudo-Demosthenes, On the Syntaxeis. Estimates range from 353/2 to 348 (see Montgomery, op. cit., p. 42). L. Pearson, in The Art of Demosthenes, Chicago, 1981 (repr.), p. 135 and p. 122, dates the speech to 350 or 349 because Philochorus dates Ephialtes' expedition to 350/49. This cannot be, because the author of On the Syntaxeis strongly implies (ps.-Dem., XIII.32f.) that the proposed expedition had not been implemented. It follows that the speech should be dated before 350/49 and, possibly, before the commission to Delphi in 352/1. See also G.L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 48, n. 9. Cawkwell dates the speech to 353/2.

²⁶ Didymus in Demosthenes, XIII.7, col. 13.42, Philochorus, FGrHist., 328F155; Androtion, F.30.

²⁷ Jacoby, IIIB.1.425.

also established as sacred the estates bordering the sacred land, since permission to do so had been granted by Delphi²⁸.

Demosthenes, however, was clearly frustrated by Athens' willingness to involve herself in conflict with Megara because it diverted her attention away from Philip (Dem., III.20). His criticism is valid to an extent. In the "Sacred War", the Athenians allied themselves with Phocis, not for religious reasons, but to oppose Thebes. The Athenians were even prepared to accept bribes from the Phocian commanders. Accordingly, it appears hypocritical that the Athenians opposed the Megarians over the Orgas district. The religious grounds for the dispute were used by Athens to prevent Megarian exploitation of the surrounding area. Thus, the dispute served to damage Megara economically, rather than to establish Athens' reputation for the firmness of her religious conviction²⁹. As Ellis notes, it is significant that the dispute still provoked anti-Athenian feeling in Megara as late as 343, when Philip was able to gather support easily³⁰. In effect, Athens' heavy-handed conduct in this affair served to divide potential resistance to Philip.

Indeed, Athenian participation in the "Sacred War" was minimal. In 355/4 Athens made an alliance with the Phocians (Diod., XVI.27.5). For the next three years, their military commitment to this alliance was practically non-existent. This was in spite of Diodorus' claim that "the Athenians, Lacedaemonians and some others arranged the alliance with Philomelus (sc. the Phocian general) and promised assistance" (XVI.27.5).

²⁸ Philochorus, FGrHist., 328F155.

²⁹ Certainly, Corinth, who supported Megara on this issue, banned Athenian presence at the Isthmian Games (Aelius Aristeides, Panathenaicus, I.311).

³⁰ Dem., IX.17-18; XIX.87,204, 294-5, 326, 334; XVIII.71, 295. Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, Sydney, 1970, p. 96.

The nature of this "promised assistance" is impossible to determine: Diodorus is too vague on this point. One can presume only that Athens promised support to Phocis in the event of Phocis being attacked. This promise, however, does not appear to have been fulfilled until after the death of Onomarchus in the summer of 352, when the tide turned against Phocis in the war with Philip and Thebes. Before this time, the lack of reference to Athenian involvement in the war suggests that Athens was content to let Phocis and its mercenaries bear the brunt of the fighting. The distribution of funds taken from the Delphic shrine enabled the Phocians to build up a strong and imposing collection of mercenaries³¹. While the mercenary armies of Phocis were successful, Athens seemingly did not engage her own forces and financial resources.

One suspects that the lack of such financial resources was a key reason for this non-intervention of Athens. Demosthenes, Aeschines and Isocrates all bewail the waste of financial reserves on mercenaries in recent wars³². The state of Athenian finances after the "Social War" may be revealed in a passage from Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic, delivered in the late 340's³³. Referring vaguely to a time not long ago, Demosthenes claims that Athens' revenues amounted to only 130 talents (Dem., X.37). A second passage appears to verify that Demosthenes was referring to the years just after the "Social War". Speaking in 352, Demosthenes claims that the Athenians "have not enough money laid aside for a single day's expenditure and when something must be done, you are at once without

³¹ Diod., XVI.37.2f.; 33.2.

³² Dem., III.28 (1,500 talents); Aesch., II.70 (1,500 talents); Isoc., VII.10 (more than a thousand talents). See H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Chicago, 1981, reprint, p. 145.

³³ For the date of the speech, see H. Montgomery, The Way to Chaeronea, Bergen, 1983, p. 48.

the means of doing it" (Dem., XXIII.209). This seems to refer to the surplus previously directed to the military fund, being retained in the theorikon thus depriving Athens of funds for her expeditions in an emergency. Accordingly, it is not surprising to learn from Diodorus that Athens accepted "bribes" from the Phocian commanders³⁴. From a financial point of view, abstention from conflict in the "Sacred War" not only preserved Athens' ailing finances, but helped to increase them.

From a military point of view, Athenian intervention did not become a necessity until 352. Prior to spring 352³⁵, the Athenians had been content to leave the fighting in the "Sacred War" to their ally, Phocis. Particularly under the generalship of Onomarchus, the Phocians had more than held their own against Thebes and Philip. Onomarchus bribed the Thessalians to maintain peace and in the spring of 353, he invaded Locris, stormed Thronion, forced Amphissa to submit, sacked the cities of the Dorians and ravaged their territory. He then invaded Boeotia, captured Orchomenus, only to fail in his attempt to take Chaeronea (Diod., XVI.33.2-4). After a Phocian defeat at the hands of Philip in summer 353, Onomarchus marched north and twice defeated Philip in battle, slaying many of the Macedonians. Philip was faced with desertion from his army and, subsequently, was forced to withdraw to Macedonia (Diod., XVI.35.2). In spring 352 Onomarchus invaded Boeotia once again, defeated the depleted Boeotian army (Diod., XVI.34.1-2) and captured Coroneia (XVI.35.3). The turning point for Athens,

³⁴ Diod., XVI.37.2f. (352); cf., XVI.33.2 (for 353). Diodorus' insinuation that Athenian support for Phocis depended on bribery reflects his use of an anti-Athenian source. It is a very biased way to explain why an ally sends aid.

³⁵ For the date, see N.G.L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological problems of 357-352 B.C.", in JHS, 57 (1937), p.56.

however, came when Onomarchus was defeated by Philip and killed in battle³⁶. It is significant that the first reference by Diodorus to Athens committing armed support to her Phocian allies (XVI.37.3) follows his accounts of Onomarchus' death and the succession of Phayllus to the command of the Phocians (XVI.36.1, 37.1). Phayllus had been distributing funds in order to gather "a large body of mercenaries and he persuaded not a few allies to cooperate in renewing the war" (XVI.37.2). Clearly, the Spartans, Achaeans and Athenians were concerned by the magnitude of Onomarchus' defeat. Not only had this previously successful general been killed, but nine thousand Phocians and their mercenaries had been lost³⁷. Little wonder that Diodorus claims that their affairs were at a low ebb (XVI.37.1).

The size of the Athenian contingent reveals that the Athenians were aware of the weakness of their position without a strong ally in central Greece to counter Philip and Thebes. Athens dispatched 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry to Thermopylae under the command of Nausicles. The Athenians did not delay their commitment: Demosthenes praises them for rousing themselves from their "excessive negligence"³⁸. Certainly, no private expense was spared, because Demosthenes attests that the campaign of 352 would have cost "over two hundred talents, including the private expenditure of the men serving" (Dem., XIX.84).

The preceding discussion has revealed that in the late 350's, Athens engaged in conflict with Philip and attempted to engage him in others. Athens also seized Sestos and indulged in hostilities with Megara. Apart from these occasions, however, she did not intervene in other conflicts,

³⁶ Diod., XVI.35.3-6. For Onomarchus' death, see also Diod., XVI.61.2.

³⁷ Diod., XVI.35.6. Six thousand were killed in battle, three thousand were executed by Philip.

³⁸ Dem., IV.17; cf., 41, where Demosthenes uses Thermopylae as an example of Athens responding always to Philip's movements.

most noticeably in the Peloponnese and the island of Rhodes. The question remains: was any one individual or group responsible for Athenian military activity in the late 350's?

Opinion is divided as to the nature of Eubulus' rôle in the defence of the Athenian state. Hammond and Griffith assert that Eubulus was responsible for these selective efforts against Philip and non-intervention elsewhere. This view is based on the belief that Eubulus' ability as a director of the state's revenues enabled him to influence the direction of Athenian foreign policy after the "Social War". According to Hammond and Griffith, "Eubulus and his group" were responsible for "the really essential operations" against Philip in the late 350's: the seizure of Sestos, the defence of Thermopylae and the proposed expedition to relieve Heraion Teichos³⁹. No evidence is supplied to support this view, a view which appears to be based on the contention that Athenian foreign policy had been guided by Eubulus and his associates since 355⁴⁰. Similarly, Ober asserts that:

"between 355 and the mid 340's, Euboulos, as controller of the theoric fund, directed much of the Athenian policy. Euboulos consistently opposed Demosthenes' calls for pre-emptive strikes against Philip, preferring to maintain Athenian power by protecting Athenian interests in central Greece, stimulating the growth of the local economy and

³⁹ N.G.L. Hammond & G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. II., Oxford, 1979, p. 284.

⁴⁰ Loc. cit.

building up the navy."⁴¹

Cawkwell's view of the rôle of Eubulus in the late 350's must be preferred here. What little information that we have available to us concerning Eubulus, deals largely with his financial administration of Athens but, even on this point, as Cawkwell has noted, it is difficult to determine what Eubulus was responsible for in the late 350's. His financial activities are referred to in the year 355/4 (Dem., XX.137) and he is associated with the practice of making public distributions from the Theoric Fund (Schol. Aesch., III.24). Yet, as Cawkwell suggests, neither of these points compels one to accept that Eubulus had become a dominant force in Athenian politics as early as 355/4⁴².

One can safely assume that Eubulus' skill as an administrator was noted by his contemporaries as early as the late 350's - how otherwise would he have obtained the position of making public distributions? In the depressed economic times following the "Social War", efforts to restore Athens' financial fortunes would have earned much respect. In turn, this respect undoubtedly gave Eubulus an influential voice on matters of foreign policy. Nonetheless, as Cawkwell argues, Eubulus' influence as a financier did not give him any official position through which he could direct Athenian

⁴¹ J. Ober, Fortress Attika: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404-322 B.C., Leiden, 1985, p. 215. Ober refers to Cawkwell's article, but Cawkwell is much more cautious about the extent of Eubulus' influence in the late 350's. See G.L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 48. Cawkwell (on p. 56) suggests that "perhaps as elsewhere in the Revenues what Xenophon proposed, Eubulus enacted". On p. 63, however, he claims that "it would be absurd to suppose that every proposal of Xenophon was acted on by the politician (sc. Eubulus)".

⁴² Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 48.

foreign policy⁴³.

Since Eubulus' influence is attested in the 340's⁴⁴, there is a distinct possibility that our sources, particularly the scholia to the orators, present a misconceived notion that Eubulus had attained a position of eminence at an earlier date. A scholion on Demosthenes for instance, has been used to assert that Eubulus was responsible for making peace with the rebels⁴⁵. Sealey, however, has presented a strong case for rejecting this view⁴⁶. In his Third Olynthiac, Demosthenes (III.28) remarks:

"...and those whom during the war we acquired as allies, these (sc. politicians) have lost in peace-time."

Scholion:

"In the 'Social War' the Chians and Rhodians and Byzantines and some others revolted from them. So, by fighting against them they gained back some, but others they could not; then they made peace on the condition that they would allow all the others (to be) autonomous. So he (sc. Demosthenes) means by this statement that even those whom we brought over

⁴³ Eubulus' political influence is attested for the 340's, particularly for the years 349-346. See Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), pp. 48-49 and Plut., Phocion, 12.1. Eubulus was responsible for Athenian intervention in Euboea in 349/8. See E.M. Burke, "Eubulus, Olynthus and Euboea", in Transactions of the American Philological Association, 114 (1984), pp. 111, 119-120.

⁴⁴ See G.L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 49ff.

⁴⁵ A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, in CAH, vol. VI, p. 233. The connection with Eubulus is supported by the context of Dem., III.28. In III.29 Demosthenes goes on to describe funds spent on city repairs. Clearly, Demosthenes blames Eubulus for losing allies and for spending money on the city instead of her military operations. Nonetheless, Demosthenes does not say Eubulus made peace with the allies.

⁴⁶ R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 75.

to our side in the war we have lost on account of the peace. Euboulos was responsible for the peace being the kind that it was, by administering affairs as he did."

(schol. on Dem., III.28, trans. by P. Harding, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2, pp. 93-94)

The scholion's remarks must be treated with suspicion. Demosthenes refers to a state of peace (εἰρήνης οὔσης) and not to a peace settlement. Moreover, Demosthenes appears to be speaking about Athens' war with Philip and not the "Social War". His reference to the deprivation of territory and the expenditure on unnecessary objectives (III.28) are linked elsewhere with Athens' attempts to recover Amphipolis⁴⁷. As Ellis points out, Demosthenes presumably would not consider the expenditure on the "Social War" to be "unnecessary"⁴⁸. Furthermore, as Sealey observes, the scholiast does not say that Eubulus made the peace with the rebels. Instead, he asserts that the character of the peace was influenced by Eubulus' administration (τοῦ δὲ τοιαύτην γενέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην αἴτιος Εὐβουλος οὔτω διοικῶν τὰ πράγματα). Nor does the scholion specify what he means by Eubulus' administration of affairs. Is he referring to Eubulus' association with financial administration or to affairs surrounding the peace negotiations with the rebels? As Sealey suggests, one cannot assume that the scholion was relying on an independent source (other than Dem., III.28) for the association of Eubulus with the peace settlement with the rebels. It is possible that he merely relied upon his general knowledge of the period⁴⁹.

Eubulus was associated with the distribution of the surplus revenues of Athenian administration (τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως) by a scholion to Demosthenes (I.1):

⁴⁷ Aesch., II.70-1; cf., Isoc., VII.9.

⁴⁸ J.R. Ellis & R.D. Milns, The Spectre of Philip, Sydney, 1970, p. 73, n. 14.

⁴⁹ R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), pp. 75-76.

"I think, men of Athens, that you would choose in place of a large amount of money that it should become apparent that the future will turn out well for the city in the matters you are now considering.

Scholion:

"...The Athenians had funds reserved for military purposes (stratitotika), but just recently they have made these for festival use (theorika)...It should be known that these public funds were originally transferred to festival use by Perikles...who proposed that the City's revenues become festival money for all the citizens. Then when a certain Apollodoros attempted to make them military again, Euboulos the politician, who was a demagogue, out of a desire to draw more of the people's goodwill to himself, proposed a law that ordained the death penalty for anyone who should attempt to change the festival money to military. Wherefore as many times as Demosthenes refers to these funds in his Philippics, he only advises that the law be repealed, but does not make a (formal) motion in writing (concerning it), for that was dangerous."⁵⁰

(schol. on Dem., I.1, trans. by P. Harding, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2, p. 98)

It is not certain, however, when Eubulus made the distribution. Certainly, he did not hold an office equivalent to "Finance Minister": it is likely that he held a position as one of the theoric commissioners, a group responsible for the distributions. As Cawkwell argues, this board did not officiate for a four year period but was elected annually⁵¹. Aeschines would hardly emphasize Eubulus' association with the theorikon

⁵⁰ Cf., schol. on Aesch., III.24, Harpocration, Lexicon, s.v. "Eubulus", (Theopompus, FGrHist., 115F99. Caution must be used when considering the scholiast's chronology. See M.H. Hansen, "The Theoric Fund and the Graphe Paranomen Against Apollodoros", in Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 17 (1976), p. 239.

⁵¹ G.L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 54.

if Eubulus had not held a position on it:

"In earlier times... the city (sc. Athens) used to elect a Comptroller of the Treasury, who every prytany made to the people a report of the revenues. But because of the trust which you placed in Eubulus, those who were elected Superintendents of the Theorikon held (until the law of Hegemon was passed) the office of Comptroller of the Treasury and the office of Receiver of Moneys; they also controlled the dockyards, had charge of the naval arsenal that was building, and were Superintendents of Streets; almost the whole administration of the state was in their hands⁵²."

(Aesch., III.23, trans. by C.D. Adams, Loeb ed., p. 329)

Accordingly, if the assumption is correct that Eubulus held a position as a theoretic commissioner in the late 350's, this is the only sense in which Eubulus' "position" can be described. Significantly, a certain Diophantus is associated with the festival distributions as well⁵³. As Cawkwell points out, this Diophantus appears to have been a prominent figure in the late 350's. Eubulus' association with the distribution of festival money from the theorikon may suggest that he was responsible for increasing the administrative duties of the board⁵⁴. Given the popularity of the festival distributions, this undoubtedly increased his influence - influence which he could exert, even when he did not hold the post of commissioner. This, however, is mere speculation. As we shall see, there is little direct

⁵² cf., P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule, Oxford, 1972, pp. 235-240.

⁵³ Schol. on Aesch., III.24.

⁵⁴ For Eubulus' association with the theorikon see Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 53ff. See also J.J. Buchanan, Theorika: A Study of Monetary Distributions to the Athenian Citizenry During the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C., Locust Valley (New York), 1962, pp. 53-60. This is the only monograph in English on the theorikon. Its limitations were pointed out in a review by G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, CR², 14 (1964), pp. 190-192.

evidence to indicate that Eubulus exerted influence in the late 350's.

The theorikon's area of control clearly extended beyond the distribution of funds for a festival allowance (Aesch., III.25). Accordingly, the effect of the theorikon on Athenian policy cannot be judged without examination of these other areas of finance. Did the theorikon tie up up funds which could have been used to finance military expeditions?

In an apparent reference to the end of the "Social War"⁵⁵, Demosthenes asserts that the annual revenue of Athens had dropped to 130 talents (X.37). Since Chares was forced by his mercenaries' demands to serve Artabazus in 355 (schol. on Dem., IV.19), it is clear why Athens had such difficulty in financing her expeditions. Demosthenes, Aeschines and Isocrates all castigate the wasteful expense incurred by Athens during this period⁵⁶. Moreover, Demosthenes' speech, Against Androtion, reveals the desperate lengths to which the Athenians went to recover arrears of eisphora⁵⁷. Furthermore, in 352⁵⁸, Demosthenes remarks that the Athenians "have not enough money laid by for a single day's expenditure" (Dem., XXIII.209). As Demosthenes blames the current administrators for this lack of funds, it is possible that Demosthenes has minimized the amount of funds available. Two points, however, tend to confirm his statement. Firstly, referring to the same year, Demosthenes calculates that the expedition to Thermopylae would have incurred an expense account of two hundred talents. Nonetheless, since the expedition was made up of hoplites and

⁵⁵ See Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 61f., n. 85.

⁵⁶ Dem., III.28; Aesch., II.71; Isoc., VII.9.

⁵⁷ Dem., XXII.1,42,44,48ff; cf., Dem., XXIV.8,11,160-175,197.

⁵⁸ For the date of this speech, see J.H. Vince, Demosthenes, vol. III, in the Loeb Classical Library, p. 213. Caution must be exercised in dealing with the criticisms of Demosthenes. He is, after all, the aspiring politician who must make his way by criticism.

cavalry, the state did not bear the entire expense. Demosthenes states that this included a calculation of private expenditure (Dem., XIX.84). Secondly, the subsequent expedition to Heraion Teichos was sent out with only five talents. Clearly then, Athens' ability to finance military operations in the late 350's was highly inadequate.

Did the work of the theoric commissioners help to build Athenian finances in the late 350's? Clearly, it did. After the "Social War", metics were granted tenure of more land and vacant houses⁵⁹. Perhaps Eubulus or his associates were responsible. Eubulus is linked with the provision of dockyards and a public building programme (Din., I.96). Demosthenes (III.29) indicates that such measures were in force in the early 340's and since Athenian annual revenue had recovered to four hundred talents by 346 (Theopompus, FGrHist., 115F166), one can assume that these enterprises assisted that recovery. Accordingly, it is possible that some, if not all, were begun in the late 350's.

In a hostile attack upon Demosthenes, Dinarchus also credits Eubulus with a trireme building programme and improvements to the cavalry:

Where are the triremes which Demosthenes, like Eubulus in his time, has supplied to the city? Where are the dockyards built under his administration? When did he improve the cavalry either by decree or law? Despite such opportunities as were offered after the battle of Chaeronea did he raise a single force either for land or sea?"⁶⁰

(Din., I.96, trans. by J.O. Burtt, Minor Attic Orators,
(Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 243)

⁵⁹ Cawkwell, "Eubulus" in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 64f. and n. 95. As Dr. Markle has pointed out to me, this may have been done more frequently on an individual basis, but metics as such would not have been granted the right to own land and houses in Athens.

⁶⁰ In passing, it should be noted that Dinarchus' criticism of Demosthenes seems unfounded. See Dem., XVIII.248, Aesch., III.27, pseudo-Plutarch, 851A, cf., B. Note too Din., I.78.

Expansion of Athens' reserve of triremes is attested for the late 350's: in 357/6 Athens had 283 ships (IG II² 1611,1.9) and 349 in 353/2 (IG II² 1613,1.302), an addition of at least 66⁶¹. Since Demosthenes alleges that no trireme hulls were constructed during the tenure of the Council for 356/5 (Dem., XXII.8), the average rate of construction for the other four Attic years was over sixteen hulls per annum - a significant increase⁶². Such a buildup of the navy implies a strong desire to improve the state's defence. It is worth noting, however, that the city could produce ever so many hulls, but precious little good was derived from them if the far more costly naval pay was not forthcoming⁶³.

It is not necessary to portray Eubulus as the man using his so-called "power" to increase Athenian naval construction as Cawkwell does⁶⁴. Undoubtedly, the defeat at Eubata provided sufficient impetus to the Athenian effort. Moreover, it is not clear that Dinarchus is referring to Eubulus' efforts in the 350's. Dinarchus (I.96) does appear to give credit to Eubulus for a reconstruction programme. Clearly Dinarchus intended to draw a parallel between the achievements of Eubulus and the failure of Demosthenes. Dinarchus, however, is not very helpful when one seeks to determine the period of Eubulus' dominance. Literally, it says only that it took place

⁶¹ One must allow for the possibility that some vessels were removed from service due to the defeat at Embata or to unseaworthiness. P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia, Oxford, 1981, p. 546 has rightly pointed out that these figures from the naval lists do not tell us how many old and lost ships had to be replaced.

⁶² F.E. Robbins, "The Cost to Athens of her Second Empire", in Classical Philology, 13 (1918), pp. 367-370, calculated that the Council was expected to oversee the construction of ten hulls during its term of office. For the Council's responsibility, see Aristotle, Ath. Pol., 46.1, with P.J. Rhodes, op. cit., pp. 545-548. For the ship-building responsibility of the boule, see Rhodes, The Athenian Boule, Oxford, 1972, pp. 115-116.

⁶³ Again, I am indebted to Dr. M. Markle for this point.

⁶⁴ Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), pp. 65.

in his time (of influence): " ποῖαι γὰρ τριῆρεις εἰσὶ κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Εὐβούλου, τῆ πόλει;". Certainly, Eubulus may have supported the ship building programme by utilizing his influence as a commissioner (or ex-commissioner) of the theorikon. The inscription from the late 330's, which refers to shipbuilding timber left over "from what Eubulus bought"⁶⁵, suggests that Eubulus took an active interest in state shipbuilding at some stage in his career, but there is no firm evidence to place this interest in the late 350's.

As to Eubulus' alleged association with reform of the cavalry, even Cawkwell admits that there is no evidence to affirm that this took place in the late 350's⁶⁶. Demosthenes, however, does condemn Eubulus and his associates for their public works expenditure. He claims that Athenian resources are being squandered on "unnecessary objectives" and that the Athenian effort against Philip suffers from complacency:

"...we have made Philip the powerful enemy that he is. If this is not so, let someone come forward and tell us from what other source than ourselves Philip has derived his strength. But my dear sir, comes the objection, if these things are in a poor state, our domestic affairs are at least in better shape. Yes, and what could we mention to support this? The battlements that we cover in plaster, the roads that we repair, the water supplies and such idiocies? Look, if you please, at the authors of these pieces of statemanship! Some of them have become rich men after being beggars, others have risen from obscurity to prominence and some have provided themselves with private houses on a more magnificent scale than the State buildings. The more the fortunes of the city have

⁶⁵ IG II² 1627, lines 352-354.

⁶⁶ Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 66.

decreased, the more their own have increased."

(Dem., III.28-9, trans. by Ellis & Milns, The Spectre of Philip, p.73f.)⁶⁷

Demosthenes' derisive allegations concerning the self-interest of his political opponents should make us wary of his assessment of their public works programme⁶⁸. In the Poroi, Xenophon insinuates that the walls and docks were in need of repair (VI.1). Moreover, a passage from Demosthenes' speech, Against Aristocrates, suggests that expenditure on the city's beautification was not great:

"...as for the public buildings that you put up and white-wash, I am ashamed to say how mean and shabby they are."

(Dem., XXIII.208, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. III, p. 359)

Accordingly, if we cast aside Demosthenes' bias (in Dem., III.28-9), one can observe that the public works were designed to serve practical purposes. The reference to covering the battlements in plaster insinuates that the purpose was to beautify the city, rather than to bolster its defences. Nevertheless, in view of the passage quoted above (Dem., XXIII.208), one may suggest that this is an exaggeration made by Demosthenes to further belittle his opponents.

Eubulus has been connected with the expedition to Thermopylae in 352. Sealey believes "the Eubulus-group was responsible for the expedition of Nausicles"⁶⁹. This view rests on two points: firstly, in 343/2 Nausicles and Eubulus went to court to plead on behalf of Aeschines⁷⁰; secondly, a friend of Eubulus, Diophantus, proposed a decree of thanksgiving

⁶⁷ Cf., Dem., XIII.30.

⁶⁸ See Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 63.

⁶⁹ R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City-States, ca. 700-338 B.C., Berkeley, 1976, p. 448.

⁷⁰ Aesch., II.184.

for Nausicles' successful expedition to Thermopylae⁷¹. Neither point shows conclusively that Eubulus, or a group with whom he was associated, was responsible for the expedition to Thermopylae. In view of Philip's significant victory over the Phocians at the Crocus Field, it is difficult to imagine that any Athenian who opposed Macedon's entry into southern Greece would have been against resistance in 352. Even if, perchance, Eubulus or one of his associates did propose such a motion, one should not hold that individual or group "responsible" for the expedition. Responsibility rested with the Athenian assembly when they voted in favour of the expedition. The association of Eubulus' friend, Diophantus, with Nausicles may suggest no more than an attempt by Diophantus (and perhaps Eubulus) to increase his prestige by rubbing shoulders with the hero of the moment. Since no previous association is attested, one should be wary in the extreme of the implication that Eubulus and his friends influenced the choice of Nausicles as general. As to the subsequent defence of Aeschines by Eubulus and Nausicles, this took place a decade after Thermopylae. Since the vote of thanks does not prove that the so-called "Eubulus-group" was responsible for Nausicles' expedition, this later association loses its significance. It may well be that the two were associated on occasion from the time of Nausicles' return from Thermopylae, but this does not indicate that they were political allies beforehand.

Can the views expressed in Xenophon's Poroi and Isocrates' On the Peace be linked to an economic programme of Eubulus for the recovery of Athens? Attempts to do so are based largely on circumstantial evidence. Was Eubulus simply concerned with peace and wholly unwilling to involve

⁷¹ Dem., XIX.86 with scholion.

Athens in war during the late 350's? Burke says that Eubulus clearly "responded cautiously" to certain of Xenophon's recommendations to attract non-citizens who engaged in commerce to reside in Athens. The rise of the metic population by the end of the fourth century⁷², however, can hardly be due to Eubulus' actions alone; his period of ascendancy appears to have been the late 350's and especially the 340's. His policies would undoubtedly have helped to attract people to Athens. References to metics by Demosthenes⁷³ may indicate that their commercial activities began again after the "Social War" but, again, it is difficult to accept that this was due solely to Eubulus' policies. The end of the "Social War" and the relative inactivity of the Athenian military for the rest of the decade would have promoted a resurgence of commerce. Perhaps the reform to have commercial suits heard monthly (Dem., X.37) was inspired by Eubulus. According to Dinarchus (I.96-98), Eubulus was also responsible for increased expenditure on facilities in the market place and on living conditions in the Piraeus. He is also linked with the construction of new docks (Din., I.96).

One can accept Burke's view that Eubulus was responsible for some of these economic reforms; perhaps he had a hand in others as well⁷⁴. These policies helped to restore Athenian revenue to 400 talents by 341⁷⁵. It is, however, quite another matter to infer, from what little we know

⁷² Burke, "Eubulus, Clynthus and Euboea", in Transactions of the American Philological Association, 114 (1984), p. 173. For the rise of the metic population, see Athenaeus, 6.272C.

⁷³ Dem., XXIII.23, XXI.163, LVII.48, XXII.68, XXIV.166.

⁷⁴ For instance, the increase in Athenian triremes and the suppression of piracy. For triremes, see IG II² 1611.5-9, IG II² 1613-302. For piracy, see (Dem.), LVIII.53 and Burke, op. cit., p. 115 and n. 24.

⁷⁵ (Dem.), X.37-39; Theopompus, FGrHist., 115F166. This was a marked improvement over the post "Social War" figure of 130 talents in 354. See (Dem.), X.37.

of his economic policy, that Eubulus directed Athenian foreign policy in the late 350's. There is simply no explicit evidence indicating that Eubulus was responsible for the enactment of the state's foreign policy in this period. As was shown in previous chapters, there is no evidence to suggest that Eubulus urged Athenian non-intervention in the disputes between Megalopolis and Sparta and between Rhodes and Persia. Eubulus' attitude to intervention in the Chersonese, Megara and Egypt is also unknown. As for the expedition to send a force to Thermopylae against Philip, it is probable that Eubulus raised no objection. After all, the state's security was severely threatened by Philip. On the other hand, as we have seen, the sources do link Eubulus with economic matters and expansion of the navy. The extent of Eubulus' influence in the late 350's, however is unclear: it is difficult to differentiate between reforms enacted or begun in the 350's and those implemented in the 340's, when he was highly influential.

Since Eubulus' rôle in the late 350's is so unclear, speculation about his influence over Xenophon and Isocrates cannot be substantiated. Xenophon's recall from exile is reported to have been the responsibility of a certain Eubulus, but, as Sealey has pointed out, it cannot be determined whether this is the same Eubulus⁷⁶. Furthermore, I would suggest that Xenophon's calls for economic and military reforms do not reflect the views of Eubulus alone. Assuredly, the sources link Eubulus to the implementation of some of the schemes referred to by

⁷⁶ Diog. Laert., II.59. See R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 76.

Xenophon, but that alone does not mean that Xenophon was merely a pamphleteer for the reforms of Eubulus. Surely, Xenophon was pointing out matters which were readily apparent to those concerned with the polis. In view of the disastrous "Social War" and Athens' subsequent incapacity to launch naval expeditions when required, it is entirely conceivable that desire for restraint in taxation was a view frequently expressed in the late 350's.

It is also clear that Athens' restricted policy of intervention does not reflect an air of prevailing "pacifism". Even if they did not all arrive on time, expeditions were sent out to oppose Philip. Moreover, the Athenians engaged in a petty dispute with Megara at the end of the decade, in spite of the need to promote unity against Philip. The extensive ship building programme and the defence of Thermopylae indicate that the Athenians had belligerent thoughts in mind and could intervene in person when a speedy naval expedition was not required. Sestos was seized and cleruchies were established on the Chersonese in order to satisfy Athens' long-dreamed of goal of securing that territory. Certainly, Athenian imperialism was evident in the late 350's. Even if Athenian control of the Chersonese is viewed as an attempt to hinder Philip's expansion in eastern Thrace, the Athenian treatment of the Sestians is indicative of the worst sign of imperialism - to attain control of territory and take whatever steps necessary to prevent others from having it.

The inaccurate assessment that the Athenians were being influenced by pacifistic policies in the late 350's fails to take into adequate consideration the number of times that Athenian belligerence was expressed in this period. Too much attention has been given to the occasions when Athens did not intervene. This attention is due almost entirely to a quirk of historical fate - two of Demosthenes' calls for intervention on behalf

of the Megalopolitans and the democratic Rhodians were rejected by the Athenians because greater pressure was being exerted on Athenian resources in the form of Philip's expansion. If Eubulus sponsored this policy of non-intervention where opposition to Philip was not concerned, then his service to the city was immeasurable. Nonetheless, the tendency to see the shadowy figure of Eubulus behind every act of non-intervention must be overcome. Indeed, the dispute with Megara shows that Athenian policy of intervention was not uniform: Megara does not appear to have been aligned with Philip in the late 350's.

CONCLUSION

Financial problems were not limited to the late 350's. Examination of the extant literary sources reveals that Athenian and League naval operations were beset with difficulties from the time of the League's foundation in 378. Want of finance not only produced delays and shortages of funds for major naval operations, but, on occasion, prompted shortages of recruits to serve on these expeditions. Athenian commanders were sent out with insufficient funds and were forced to gather crews for their fleets before the campaigns could be initiated. Such delays were embarrassing and had a detrimental effect on Athenian prestige. Nonetheless, the Athenians were extremely harsh on commanders who were unable to succeed. As a result, the commanders had to rely on personal contributions and booty collected on campaign to meet shortfalls in finance. On occasion, they were forced to hire their troops out, or exact contributions from reluctant allies.

The inability of Athens to provide sufficient finance for her naval operations had a decisive influence upon Isocrates, Xenophon and Demosthenes. In the late 350's, each expounds dissatisfaction with the reliance upon the wealthy Athenians to bear the financial burden of Athens' wars. In particular, they object to the war-time liturgies - such as the expensive trierarchy - and the imposition of war tax (eisphora).

Their concern for Athens' inability to finance her wars prompted their espousal of the benefits of peace. In particular, they stress that peace promoted Athenian security and prosperity, whereas war only nurtured internal strife and hindered the advancement of Athens. Peace, they claim,

will enable the Athenians to make better preparations for the eventuality of war.

None of the contemporary sources, however, espouse a policy of pacifism. Isocrates' On the Peace does not condemn all war. Even though he opposes strongly any desire to continue the "Social War" and suggests that Athens makes peace with her other enemies as well, he upholds vehemently Athenian involvement in "just" wars. The proposed campaign against Persia, so prevalent in other Isocratean discourses, is not expounded in On the Peace. Since he reintroduces such a proposal in treatises to Philip, Isocrates clearly only laid aside for the moment his conviction that war with Persia would settle the differences between the Greeks. Moreover, one can infer that he did not believe Athens was in a position to lead such a campaign. On the Peace shows clearly that he was aware of the need for the state to follow an expedient course of action when circumstances demanded. Athens' poor performance in the "Social War" was partly responsible for this view, but Isocrates also objected strongly to the financial burden of war, which he and other wealthy Athenians were called upon to bear. Athenian poverty is deplored at several points in the discourse, but one seriously doubts whether Isocrates was greatly concerned with the plight of the poor Athenian who did not qualify for the performance of the state liturgies and payment of eisphora. He was more concerned that such impositions prevented wealthy Athenians from living with pleasure and ease.

Isocrates' distaste for war extended only to the "Social War" and the war for the recovery of Amphipolis and the Chersonese. On the other hand, he encourages the Athenians to be more conscientious in their training and preparation for war. Like Xenophon, Isocrates considered mercenaries to be an unnecessary expense. Both writers urge the Athenians to perform their duty by serving in the armed forces. Nevertheless, neither

Isocrates nor Xenophon outlines to any satisfactory degree why they considered citizens to be more reliable troops than mercenaries.

One can infer that the Athenian citizenry was reluctant to serve because past experience had shown that regular and adequate payment for services rendered could not be guaranteed. It is illogical, however, to assume that citizens would have been less insistent than mercenaries in their demands for pay. Xenophon, at least, proposes means to ensure the regular payment of troops, but Isocrates only makes vague calls for the return of prosperity through peace. Although he urges preparation for war in time of peace, he fails to address himself to the problem of financing such preparation.

Xenophon's advocacy of prosperity through peace does not support the view that he upheld pacifism. The Poroi does support peace and proposes means to recover from the financial drain of war. Moreover, like Isocrates, Xenophon favours non-intervention in unjust conflicts. Clearly, however, his proposals for the economic recovery of Athens are designed to benefit the state in peace and to protect and succour it in time of war. To this end, he advocates improvements to Attica's system of fortifications and he encourages the citizens of Athens to make adequate preparation for war's eventuality. Such measures do not accord with the concept of pacifism.

Xenophon perceived that, if Athens was to be self-reliant, particularly in war time, then dependence on agriculture and other traditional means of subsistence had to be replaced by exploitation of Attic silver reserves. He emphasizes the profitable and dependable nature of such a scheme by pointing out that it would not drain the financial reserves of her citizens and allies and, in time of war, the mines could be defended easily. Furthermore, he argues that an increase in state revenues gained in peace time can be exploited whenever defence of the state becomes

necessary. Increased trade would promote an influx of population which could be used to supply Athens' need of man-power in war time. He even suggests that implementation of his proposals for economic recovery will enable the state to provide full and regular payments to its armed forces, thus encouraging their enthusiasm for the defence of the state. In addition, he asserts that Athens' recovery of her financial reserves will no longer cause Athenian commanders to treat her allies unjustly, namely, through the use of coercion to exact allied contributions.

Xenophon's advocacy of "lasting peace" is indicative only of his desire to see Athens enjoy the longest period of peace possible, so that such economic benefits could be secured. His proposed peacemaking venture reveals his desire to end the "Sacred War": clearly, he opposed Athenian support for Phocis in that conflict. Nonetheless, this proposal failed to take into adequate account the lack of goodwill that the Greeks had towards Athens. It is difficult to imagine how Greek suspicion - suspicion which had been growing, probably since the mid 360's, could be pushed out of mind almost instantaneously and replaced by the conviction that Athens genuinely desired a peace that would benefit all states and not just Athens.

Even though Xenophon proposes such a mission, he does not ask the Athenians to shun all war. "Just" war, when Athenian territory is threatened by the aggression of others, must be undertaken. He condemns war for the sake of imperialistic ambition and opposes needless intervention in wars where Athens' interests are not directly concerned.

One seriously doubts, however, that Isocrates and Xenophon were able to exert much influence in this period. Neither was a practising politician and their bias towards protecting the interests of the wealthier Athenians is evident. Certainly, the establishment of Athenian cleruchies on the Chersonese conflicted with their condemnation of imperialistic ambition. Athens' decision to make peace with the "Social War" rebels

cannot be attributed to the acceptance of Isocrates' pamphlet. The Athenian defeat at Embata and the rumours that the Persian king was threatening to intervene on the side of the rebels were sufficient to convince the Athenians of the need for peace. Xenophon's naïve scheme to end the "Sacred War" was not implemented, partly because Athens derived financial benefit from Phocian bribery¹, but primarily because Phocis served to oppose Macedonian expansion. Some of his schemes for the financial recovery of Athens may have been implemented by politicians, such as Eubulus, but the lack of sufficient evidence regarding that recovery does not permit one to ascertain with certainty whether Xenophon alone inspired any reforms. It is quite possible that his views were shared by many Athenians who were discontented with Athens' inadequate finances and consequent inability to fund her naval operations.

Demosthenes' On the Symmories also attempts to persuade the Athenians of the need for greater preparation for war, particularly in the areas of the symmories and the state's military finances. The speech opposes Athenian initiation of immediate war with Persia, but it does not oppose all wars that Athens might have to fight in future - or, for that matter - at the present time. He argues against the initiation of war without just cause, but for the present alone. This was an apt observation because Athens did not possess sufficient allied support to embark on such a campaign. Although the Athenians did not go to war with Persia, it is doubtful whether their decision was influenced significantly by Demosthenes. Athens' financial problems and her inability to defeat the rebels revealed

¹ This "bribery" may have amounted to no more than money being made available to pay Athenian mercenaries so that they would serve in the employ of Phocis.

all too clearly the deplorable state of Athenian military capacity. Moreover, Demosthenes' proposed reforms of the symmories were not undertaken, though years later he carried an utterly different reform of the trierarchy². His proposal to expand the trierarchical symmories from 1,200 to 2,000 contributors was ill-conceived because, as Jones points out, the distribution of the burden would only have placed more of the population under financial duress³.

Demosthenes does not argue against war by expressing a desire to have peace for its own sake. His proposals urge deterrence, rather than pacifism. Unlike Isocrates and Xenophon, he concentrates almost entirely on the negative aspects of war without paying attention to the positive advantages of peace. The speech, however, does reflect the hostile mood of the Athenians towards Persia at the end of the "Social War". Nonetheless, it is unlikely that anyone, who had the security of the state at heart, would have entertained seriously the notion of war with Persia at this particular time. Athens simply did not possess the financial resources or allies to challenge Persia.

In similar fashion, Demosthenes' subsequent speeches failed to win support from the Athenians. It is not difficult to see why Demosthenes' proposed intervention on behalf of the Megalopolitans and the Rhodian democrats was not accepted. Although he seeks to re-establish Athens' prestige in the Greek world, he does little else in these two speeches. He avoids explanation as to how such intervention can be undertaken when the necessary funds were unavailable (Dem., XIV.24-28). Indeed, intervention on behalf of the Rhodian democrats is treated purely as a necessary, but

² Demosthenes' reform in 340/39 made liability proportionate to wealth. See Dem., XVIII.102-108; Aesch., III.222; Din., I.42.

³ A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 1957, p. 33.

noble, act affording Athenian democracy security from the encroachment of oligarchical forces. While the Athenians may have preferred to deal with fellow democrats, it is clear that they did not object to alliances with kings and military despots if the Athenian state derived some benefit from such alignments. In addition, it can be inferred that their hostility towards the Rhodians for their participation in the "Social War" had not abated. Demosthenes was unable to overcome Athenian spite.

Demosthenes' desire to aid the Megalopolitans was not motivated by pacifism. He wished to confront Sparta and its policy of aggression and to confront Thebes and hinder its influence in the Peloponnese. If the Athenians had taken Demosthenes' advice, a valuable ally in the Peloponnese would have been gained. Megalopolitan aid would have been beneficial in the early years of confrontation with Philip. By clinging to the faint hope of Spartan support, Athens' opposition to Philip stagnated because the Peloponnesian states were too embroiled in their petty squabbles to divert attention to the north. By making a stand over Megalopolis, Athens could have shown the other Greek states that she was being consistent with her chagrin over Thebes' repression of Boeotia. Such a display of integrity would have done much to restore her prestige.

By rejecting Demosthenes' plea for the Megalopolitans, the Athenians lost the opportunity to display consistency. While they continued to assert their claim for the restoration of Oropus, they maintained a neutral position, while Sparta sought to oppress Megalopolis and Messene. The Athenians, however, did not pursue this course of non-intervention because they desired peace for the sake of peace. They were afraid. They were afraid to lose Spartan support against Thebes and they were afraid to be associated with the Spartan aggression in the Peloponnese. Non-intervention was more trouble free: it excused Athens from involvement in a theatre where her involvement

was not required; it spared her limited resources and it prevented the establishment of a precedent, whereby Athens intervened in every quarrel where unjust aggression was alleged.

While Demosthenes' desire to collect allies is commendable, he fails to substantiate the means to achieve this goal. He claims that the Athenians can prove that they are the champions of Greek liberty by supporting the Megalopolitans and the democratic Rhodians. Unfortunately, his proposals are weakened by his failure to outline the financial and military resources required to indulge in such intervention. His vague references to making military preparations do not specify the nature and size of the forces needed. Not only does Demosthenes work upon the assumption that allied support will be a consequence of intervention, rather than as a co-requisite, but he treats the position of potential enemies with utter disdain. He implies that the Spartans, Thebans, Caria and Persia will either give way to Athens' bold action because Athens upholds justice and they consequently dare not offer opposition, or Athenian intervention will be an easy affair. Such arguments did not convince the Athenians.

Athenian intervention in the late 350's was selective. Although they were unable to fulfil their desire to recover Amphipolis and Oropus, the Athenians did manage to seize another former possession - Sestos. The abhorrent treatment of the Sestians is indicative of the worst feature of Athenian lust for the recovery of her fifth century possessions.

Athens' policy of restricted intervention was due in part to their failure to mount effective opposition to Philip. Even though proposals were made to relieve Potidaea, Methone and Pagasae and later to Heraion Teichos, the cause of the expeditions was lost before the Athenians were able to launch them. In part, this was due to Philip's tactic of deploying his forces when the Athenians were unable to resist as a result of the

adverse effects of the Etesian winds. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Athenians had difficulty in raising the necessary funds to launch their naval operations. Charidemus was dispatched in 351 with ten empty triremes. Evidently, the Athenians were reluctant once more to serve when pay could not be guaranteed for an extended naval campaign.

Nonetheless, Athenian inactivity in the "Sacred War", prior to 352, had enabled them to conserve their forces and, at the same time, benefit from the funds derived from the Phocian sacrilege committed against the Delphic shrine. Moreover, it enabled them to concentrate their efforts on securing control of the Chersonese. Athenian involvement in the "Sacred War" was not necessitated until after the Phocian defeat at the Crocus Field.

The inaccurate assessment that the Athenians were being influenced by pacifistic policies in the late 350's fails to take into adequate consideration the number of times that Athenian belligerence was expressed in this period. Abstention from commitment of her forces in the early years of the "Sacred War" and her refusal to intervene in the Peloponnese and in the Rhodian dispute, must be balanced against Athens' naval rearmament, her activity in the Chersonese, her attempted expeditions against Philip, the expeditions to Thermopylae and Heraion Teichos and the dispute with Megara. Too much attention has been paid by modern commentators to the contemporary works of Isocrates and Xenophon and to the occasions when Athens did not intervene in foreign disputes. Examination of Isocrates' On the Peace and Xenophon's Poroi has shown that neither urges the implementation of pacifistic policy. The occasions when Athens did abstain from intervention reflect the troubled state of her finances and her unwillingness to divert her forces away from the growing threat posed by Philip. Athenian non-intervention in the late 350's does not demonstrate that the Athenians were influenced by notions of pacifism.

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APPENDIX

THE RHETORICAL RÔLE OF MAUSOLUS IN DEMOSTHENES'

FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS

In his speech, For the Liberty of the Rhodians, Demosthenes asserts that the Carian dynast Mausolus instigated the "Social War". With the exception of Hornblower¹, modern scholars have been content to accept Demosthenes' allegation². One should keep in mind, however, that it suited Demosthenes' defence of the Rhodian democrats to minimize the part played by Rhodes in the rebellion against Athens.

Demosthenes makes one pointed accusation against Mausolus in this speech which clearly links Mausolus to the initiation of the war: Demosthenes claims that it is the duty of the Athenians to give a favourable response to the plea for assistance from the Rhodian democrats. Athens must uphold the cause of democracy in the face of oligarchical suppression. Although the Rhodians dishonoured their alliance with Athens by going to war with her, they have paid the price of their wanton pride (Dem., XV.2) by falling under the dominion of Caria:

"...we (sc. Athenians) were charged by the Chians, Byzantines and Rhodians with plotting against them and that was why they concerted the last war against us; but we shall be able to prove that whereas Mausolus, the

¹ S. Hornblower, The Greek World: 479-323 B.C., London, 1983, p. 242. See also Hornblower, Mausolus, Oxford, 1982, p. 210.

² See, for instance, J.B. Bury & R. Meiggs, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander The Great, London, 1975, p. 418.

prime mover and instigator in the business, while calling himself the friend of the Rhodians, has robbed them of their liberty and whereas the Chians and Byzantines, who posed as their allies, never helped them in distress, it is to you, whom they dreaded, to you alone of all the states that they owe their deliverance. By making this clear to all, you will teach the democrats in every state to consider friendship with you as the pledge of their safety and no greater advantage could you have than to win from all men their voluntary and unsuspecting goodwill."

(Dem., XV.3-4, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 413f.)

Demosthenes had every motive to minimize the culpability of Athens for the war. Moreover, it suited his purpose to depict the Rhodians as misguided people, who now repent their past mistake. The success of Demosthenes' case depended on his ability to alleviate Athenian ill-will and suspicion towards Rhodes. One can well imagine the hostile reception given to the Rhodian representatives in the Athenian assembly as the Athenians listened to their plea. Foremost in the Athenians' minds must have been the grating memory of the major rôle played by the Rhodians in the outbreak of hostilities and their part in the course of the war (Diod., XVI.7.3, 21.1-2). Even Demosthenes disassociates himself from the Rhodian participation in the "Social War" by asserting that the Rhodians received their just reward when they lost their liberty to Mausolus (Dem., XV.2). He distances himself further by making clear that he is not the proxenos of the Rhodian democrats, nor even a friend to any of them (Dem., XV.15). His plea for the Rhodians hinges on his argument for the preservation of all democracies (17ff.) and he depicts the Rhodians as if they were errant and rather dull children, who have been taught a salutary lesson (16).

Hornblower clearly is aware that Demosthenes' association of Mausolus with the cause of the "Social War" may be suspect, but he supports Demosthenes with Diodorus' account and the presence of Carian coinage on Rhodes and Chios:

"Demosthenes is...helpful on the precipitating cause (of the "Social War") which he identifies as the intriguing and incitement of the Persian satrap Mausolus. ...Demosthenes' evidence is up to a point suspect in that the political context of the Rhodian speech...gave him every motive to minimize Athens' own culpability for the war and to magnify that of the scapegoat satrap, who had no votes in the Ekklesia; but fortunately there is external evidence to corroborate him: Diodorus (i.e. Ephorus) attests concrete naval help given by Mausolus to the rebel allies, and recently published coins of Rhodes and Chios prove that Mausolan or Hekatomnid influence on those islands was strong."³

Naval aid to the rebels does not, in itself, suggest that Mausolus inspired the revolt. Not once in his brief outline of the "Social War" (XVI.7.3, 21-22.2) does Diodorus acknowledge the circumstances which caused Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium and their allies to revolt from Athens:

"...the Athenians, who had suffered the revolt of Chios, Rhodes, and Cos and, moreover, of Byzantium, became involved in the war called the Social War which lasted three years. The Athenians chose Chares and Chabrias as generals and dispatched them with an army. The two generals on sailing into Chios found that allies had arrived to assist the Chians from Byzantium, Rhodes, and Cos, and also from Mausolus, the tyrant of Caria."

(Diod., XVI.7.3, trans. by C.L. Sherman, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 255f.)

³ Hornblower, The Greek World: 479-323 B.C., London, 1983, p. 242.

Far from implicating him in the plot, Diodorus seems to envisage Mausolus as responding to a rebel plea for aid, once it was apparent that Athenian force would be used to voice disapproval of allied secession.

The presence of Carian coins on Chios and Rhodes certainly does not signify that Mausolus precipitated the "Social War"⁴. Such a suggestion is tantamount to the ridiculous notion that the extant coins were precisely those which Mausolus used to buy off the loyalty of the Greek islands. All that can be said with any degree of certainty is that the coins signify the existence of trade between Caria and the islands at about this time.

In conclusion, Demosthenes' assertion that Mausolus was responsible for provoking the rebels to war with Athens must be treated with caution. It suited Demosthenes' rhetorical purpose to divert the ill-feeling of the Athenians away from the Rhodians and encourage the view that the Rhodians and other rebels were misled by the scheming Mausolus. Demosthenes' suggestion had two advantages. Firstly, Mausolus' forces participated in the first confrontation with the Athenians in the "Social War" (Diod., XVI.7.3). Secondly, Mausolus' subsequent seizure of Rhodes made it easy for Demosthenes to insinuate that this was part of a previously devised plan: Mausolus played on the islanders' dislike of Athenian oppression (Dem., XV.3) and prompted them to revolt, so that he could later subjugate the islands once they were no longer allies of Athens.

⁴ Hornblower, Mausolus, Oxford, 1982, plate 36 and p. 129.