

DEMOSTHENES, FOR THE MEGALOPOLITANS

As was shown in the last chapter, some scholars have held the view that the speeches delivered by Demosthenes in the late 350's were unsuccessful because the Athenian assembly was too overcome by pacifistic sentiment to engage in warlike entanglements. The failure of Demosthenes' speech For the Megalopolitans has been put down to this same reason: the Athenians wanted to avoid war at all costs.

Unfortunately, this view is too limited. Primarily it fails to take into account the contemporaneous military operations in which the Athenians were engaged. Notable among these were Athens' involvement in "The Sacred War" and intervention against Philip of Macedon. Moreover, renewed calls for the recovery of Oropus were extremely topical at the time Demosthenes' proposed aid for the Megalopolitans was rejected¹. These factors must be kept in mind when examining this speech for evidence of Athenian pacifism in the late 350's. This chapter will reveal that Demosthenes' proposed aid for the Megalopolitans was rejected, not because the Athenians were feeling particularly pacifistic at the time, but because intervention in the Peloponnesus was low on their list of military priorities.

¹ Such is clear from Demosthenes' treatment of the Oropus debate in this speech. See below, p. 147ff.

Delivered in 353/2², the speech For the Megalopolitans is an attempt by Demosthenes to persuade the Athenians to support the continued independence of the central Peloponnesian city-state of Megalopolis, against any effort by Sparta to reassert its former dominance over the Arcadian city and the rest of the Peloponnese. Prior to the delivery of the speech, Athens had received requests for assistance from both protagonists in the forthcoming conflict. Athenian opinion was divided, some favouring the Spartan cause, others the Megalopolitan³. Demosthenes supported the Megalopolitan plea, not only out of an altruistic desire to preserve the independence of the Megalopolitans but, more importantly, to protect Athenian interest by hindering any attempt by the Spartans to rebuild their control over Peloponnesian affairs⁴.

The policy which Demosthenes proposed is an important one for consideration in a thesis which examines the prevalence of pacifistic idealism in the works of the orators of the late 350's. As the following section will reveal, desire for peace is expressed to a limited degree in the speech. It is not merely by the expression of peaceful sentiment, however, that one should weigh the extent of this desire for peace. One must also take into account means proposed (if any) to achieve peace. In this regard,

² The date of the speech may be ascertained from Diodorus' account of hostilities between Sparta and Megalopolis. This account appears under the Attic year of 352/1 (Diod., XVI.39, 1f). Since it is clear from Demosthenes' speech that hostilities had not broken out as yet (see Dem., XVI. 7-8), one can assume safely that he delivered the speech beforehand - when the Athenians were debating the merits of involvement on one side or the other. Hence, Demosthenes opens this speech with the words, "Both sides seem to be in error, men of Athens, both those who have spoken in favour of the Arcadians (that is, the Megalopolitans), and those who have done the same for the Lacedaemonians" (Dem., XVI. 1).

³ Dem., XVI. 1f; 19.

⁴ Dem., XVI. 4-5, 8-10, 16-18, 20-22, 25, 28-31.

it should be noted how he proposes a policy which would have Athens set conditions on any support that she lent to Sparta or Megalopolis - a proposal of diplomatic confrontation:

"I say that we (Athenians) must at the same time call upon the Megalopolitans to destroy the pillars (that record their treaty with the Thebans) and upon the Lacedaemonians to keep the peace. If they refuse - whichever of the two it may be - then at once we side with those who consent!"

(Dem., XVI. 27, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 457)

Significantly, the desired effect of this confrontation towards Sparta and Megalopolis is not to promote lasting peace in the Peloponnese. Clearly, Demosthenes' intent is to promote Athenian interests to the detriment of Sparta and Thebes:

"Our duty...(Athenians)...is to take care lest the Lacedaemonians grow strong and formidable before the Thebans are weaker, and lest their increase of power should, unperceived by us, outbalance the diminution of the power of Thebes, which our interests demand. For this at least we should never admit, that we would sooner have the Lacedaemonians for our rivals than the Thebans, nor is that our serious aim, but rather to put it out of the power of either to do us harm, for in that way we shall enjoy the most complete security."

(Dem., XVI. 5, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 443)

One is left with the indelible impression from this speech that "the most complete security", which Demosthenes speaks of, is to be

attained through the use of force. Demosthenes wants the Athenians to intervene on behalf of the Megalopolitans. His proposed stipulations for the two protagonists read not like a genuine attempt to reconcile their differences, but an attempt to legitimise Athens' diplomatic support for Megalopolis. The oft repeated slurs on Sparta's ulterior motives in the Peloponnese⁵, reinforce this view beyond doubt.

In a speech which so clearly calls for Athens to commit herself in a Peloponnesian quarrel, it might seem surprising that peace is mentioned at all favourably. Indeed, ἡ εἰρήνη is used on five occasions and in the context of each instance, peace is looked upon favourably. Close examination, however, reveals that Demosthenes has manipulated these references to peace and its desirability in an artful fashion, in order to lend further credibility to his support for the Megalopolitans.

One of the main problems involved in the following discussion is whether ἡ εἰρήνη refers only to "peace" in the general sense of the word, or whether it also refers to the latest "Common Peace" (Koine Eirene) arrangement formulated in 362/1, following Thebes' victory over Sparta in the battle of Mantinea⁶. Specific reference to that "Common Peace"

⁵ He alleges that Sparta's motive is to regain its power by getting Arcadia into its hands and by destroying Megalopolis (4). No Athenian, he claims, would want to put it out of the power of both to do their city harm (5). Spartan ambition is not limited to the conquest of Megalopolis, Messene will follow (8). This allegedly held aggressive intent is labelled as unjust (9; cf., 13) because it involves the destruction of existing and established states (25). Spartan ambition must be resisted (21). Sparta's offer to help Athens recover Oropus is labelled as a thinly disguised excuse to assert their own territorial claims in the Peloponnese (16). As the Spartans' offer is weighted heavily in their favour, Athens would be disadvantaged if she aided them (18) because Athens' security would be threatened (22). In the past, Sparta has used her Peloponnesian dominance against Athens (29). Moreover, he insinuates that Sparta has laid false charges against Megalopolis in order to provide a pretext for hostilities (19).

⁶ See T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece, London, 1965, p. 94, where Ryder points out, quite rightly, that Demosthenes' efforts in this speech to have Athens represent herself as the defender of the freedom of weaker states, is connected with the "Common Peace" of 362/1. Moreover, as Ryder argues, Demosthenes seems more interested in the propaganda value of freedom fighting than proposing respect for the principles of that Peace.

is made. Having asked the Athenians at what point they will stand up against a Spartan act of injustice, Demosthenes exclaims:

"...with the defence of Megalopolis or with the defence of Messene? In the one case, you will show yourselves ready to help the Arcadians and eager to confirm the peace for which you faced danger on the field of battle. In the other case, everyone will see clearly that you wish to preserve Messene less for the sake of justice than for fear of the Lacedaemonians."

(Dem., XVI.10, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 445)

Demosthenes' attitude to the "Common Peace" of 362/1 is contradictory. On the basis of a passage from this speech (XVI.16), Ryder has put forward a strong argument. Following the battle of Mantinea, the signatories to the Peace had agreed that each state should retain the territory which it held at the time⁷. This meant that the Messenians would remain free. Demosthenes speaks in favour of Messene's independence because it counters the interests of Sparta (10). The same clause, however, permitted Thebes to retain the territory of Plataea, Orchomenus and Thespieae. Demosthenes opposes this and calls for the restoration of these cities (14, 25, 28). He also speaks against Thebes' continued retention of Oropus (11, 16, 18). Clearly, Demosthenes wished only to acknowledge that aspect of the "Common Peace" which suited Athenian interests. On the other hand, he voices his opposition to it when Thebes profited from the arrangement.

Certainly, it was consistent with past benefactions for Athens to uphold principles outlined in the latest affirmation of the "Common Peace", particularly the clause which ordained that the Messenians were to remain free. Athens had a reputation for supporting causes of oppressed, weaker

⁷ "Common Peace": Diod., XV.89.1; Plutarch, Agessilaus, 35.3-4; Polybius, IV.33.8-9. Ryder op. cit., pp. 84-86; for his discussion of this clause, see esp. pp. 140-141.

states. Demosthenes himself makes something of this when he refers to the Athenian tradition of supporting the cause of the weaker states against the stronger:

"...I do not think any one man would deny that Athens has saved the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans before them and the Euboeans recently and has afterwards made alliance with them, having always one and the same object in view. And what is that? To save the victims of injustice. If, then, this is so, it is not we who are inconsistent, but those who refuse to abide by the principles of justice (namely the Spartans); and it will be manifest that the circumstances are always changing, through the policy of ambitious men, but our city changes not."

(Dem., XVI.14f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I., p. 449)

When Demosthenes delivered this speech he faced the problem of how to counter support for Sparta. Athenians who favoured taking Sparta's side in the dispute evidently pointed to Athens' obligation to remain true to her existing alliance with Sparta⁸, rather than forsake Sparta and support the Megalopolitans, who were current allies of Athens' opponent in the "Sacred War" - Thebes. Such appeals to the bonds of alliance were persuasive to the Greeks⁹, particularly if the maintenance of these ties of alliance concurred with the interest of the state. In this case, support for Sparta offered the Athenians the opportunity to strengthen anti-Theban influence in the Peloponnese.

⁸ Dem., XVI.6: "...perhaps we...feel that it is monstrous to choose as our allies the men whose ranks we faced at Mantinea and even to help them against those with whom we shared the dangers of that battle". Note that even Demosthenes agrees that ties of alliance should be maintained, provided that "the others consent to do what is just".

⁹ For a detailed discussion of the importance associated with the bonds of alliance, see Karavites, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-99, esp. pp. 94-95.

Demosthenes, however, challenged this insular policy, because he rightly perceived that by aiding Sparta, ostensibly to counter Theban influence, Spartan power would be strengthened. No benefit would come the way of Athens in that event. Accordingly, he does not look at this impending conflict as an isolated Peloponnesian affair, but considers the detrimental effect that support for Sparta would have on Athens' image in the Greek world¹⁰. Hence, he counters the argument of those who support the Spartan alliance by maintaining that Athens has a far greater obligation to uphold the independence of oppressed states. He implies that it would be diplomatically expedient for Athens to side once again with the weaker state, since past experience had resulted in alliances with the beneficiaries¹¹. Hence, his proposal to support Megalopolis and thus keep the peace is a diplomatic tool, designed to boost the interests of Athens and deflate those of Sparta and Thebes. Sparta would be prevented from rebuilding its influence and power and Thebes would lose an ally in the Peloponnese.

Demosthenes is correct in his assertion that in the past Athens had acted as the benefactress of Sparta, Thebes and Euboea. In 362, the Athenians had stood by the side of the Spartans in the battle of Mantinea against Thebes¹²; in 378 they had stood by the Thebans when Sparta sought to oppress them¹³ and in 357 they had delivered Euboea from the

¹⁰ Dem., XVI.10.

¹¹ Dem., XVI.14f.: "...I do not think any one man would deny that Athens has saved the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans before them and the Euboeans recently and has afterwards made alliance with them, having always one and the same object in view. And what is that? To save the victims of injustice". Cf., Dem., XVI.10.

¹² Xen., Hell., VII.5.15,24; Diod., XV.84.4-87.

¹³ Xen., Hell., V.4.19, 34; Diod., XV.25.4,26-27.

encroachment of Thebes¹⁴. As to the alleged "object in view" - "to save the victims of injustice" - there is room for scepticism (14f.). On each occasion that Demosthenes cites, Athens stood to protect her own security by opposing the ambition of the aggressor. Nonetheless, these examples of past Athenian beneficence no doubt served as pertinent parallels to the defence of Megalopolis and Messene. As he says, protection of these two states would have been consistent¹⁵.

Consistency is essential to his argument because he had to counter the view that defence of the Megalopolitans would necessitate inconstancy towards the existing alliance with Sparta¹⁶. Note, however, that he does not want the Athenians to abandon the Spartan alliance¹⁷. Nor could he suggest such a thing since the power of Thebes was still strong in central Greece. A strong alliance between Athens and Sparta, therefore, was essential. The important question of whether support for Megalopolis would have jeopardised this alliance will be dealt with below. Let us first examine the idea of supporting the cause of weaker states.

Despite the moralistic sentiment associated with the protection of the weak, political expediency determined whether a state chose to intervene on behalf of the oppressed¹⁸. This concept of protecting the weak is not isolated to this speech in Demosthenes' writing. In his Second

¹⁴ Diod., XVI.7.2.

¹⁵ Dem., XVI.15: "...it is not we who are inconsistent, but those who refuse to abide by the principles of justice". See also Dem., XVI.26: "...it is a just and honourable policy not to allow ancient cities to be uprooted, but at the same time let us not abandon Megalopolis and Messene to their oppressors, nor allow the restoration of Plataea and Thespieae to blind us to the destruction of existing and established states".

¹⁶ Dem., XVI.11, 14.

¹⁷ See Dem., XVI.12-13.

¹⁸ Significantly, Demosthenes admits as much at XVI.10, when he exhorts the Athenians to "find out what is right and then do it, though at the same time we (sc. Athenians) must take care that what we do is expedient as well".

Philippic¹⁹, he accuses Philip of siding with Thebes because Athens - out of a sense of justice - would not sacrifice other Greek states to the Macedonian. The importance associated with Athens' rôle as benefactress can be identified clearly because funeral orations inevitably mentioned that Athens had fought always in the defence of the weak²⁰. Moreover, according to Thucydides' rendition of Pericles' funeral oration, the Athenians believed that "he who conferred favours was a surer friend than the recipient"²¹. Elsewhere, in a contrived speech by Diodotus, he asserts that the recipient had to show respect for benefactors²². There are also quite a number of references in the ancient sources which suggests that it was considered a serious offence not to repay a debt to one's benefactor²³.

Given the great importance associated with the protection of weaker states and the odium associated with those states who did not repay their benefactor with gratitude, Demosthenes was well in accord with Greek thinking to base his support for the Megalopolitans on the need for Athens to pose as their benefactor:

¹⁹ Dem., VI.7-8.

²⁰ Plato, Menex., 244D; Dem., IX.10-11; See also Andocides, On the Peace, 28; Plato, Menex., 244E; Dem., XX.3; Isoc., IV.52-3, 81.

²¹ Thuc., II.40.4.

²² Thuc., III.47.3ff.

²³ Isoc., VI.26f.; XIV.27-8; XII.70-72, 91, 93-4; VIII.97-8; Diod., XIII.65.3-4. In Thuc., III.59.1, the Plataean speaker reminds the Spartans that they will win no glory for killing the Plataeans - a people who have done the Spartans good service and by whom the Spartans have not been injured (cf., III.57.1). Similarly, Isoc., XIV.27-8: "It would be a laborious task to recount Thebes' treacheries in the past, but when the Corinthian war broke out...although the Thebans had been saved by you, they were so far from showing their gratitude for this service that, when you had put an end to the war, they abandoned you and entered into the alliance with the Lacedaemonians in attacking you, the saviours of their city. For this they were punished by the gods and after the Cadmea was captured, they were forced to take refuge here in Athens".

"...when all the Peloponnesians came to you (Athenians) and called on you to lead them against the Lacedaemonians, it was not by such arguments that these men persuaded you not to receive them - ... - but to contribute funds and risk your lives for the safety of the Lacedaemonians. Yet you would surely never have consented to save them, if they had announced to you that when saved they would owe you no thanks for your help, unless you allowed them as before to commit whatever act of injustice they chose. Moreover, even if our alliance with the Arcadians is a serious impediment to the designs of the Lacedaemonians, yet surely they ought to be more grateful for the safety that we won for them, when they were in the gravest peril, than angry because of the wrongs that they are now prevented from committing. How, then, can they refuse to help us at Oropus without proving themselves the basest of mankind? By heavens! I see no escape for them."

(Dem., XVI.12-13, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 447)

It was mentioned above that Demosthenes refers favourably to peace. Specifically, he wants Athens to intervene so that peace is maintained between Megalopolis and Sparta. We have seen that he wanted Athens to act as benefactress of the Megalopolitans in order to counter the aggressive moves of Sparta. This proposal was not motivated by some altruistic desire to preserve the independence of the Megalopolitans, even though he professes this to be adequate cause for Athenian involvement. Significantly, the preservation of existing, established states is not considered sufficient cause for Athenian involvement. Rather, his proposal is motivated by the desire to protect the interests of Athenian security, by preventing the regrowth of Spartan power and by hindering Theban influence in the Peloponnese.

What then has he to say about peace? Passage (10) has been discussed

above²⁴. Demosthenes declares that Athenian aid for the Megalopolitans will be unnecessary if all the powers (ἄπαντες) consent to keep peace (7). ἄπαντες must refer specifically to the Spartans, the Megalopolitans and the allies of the latter - the Thebans. Certainly, the Spartans are called upon to keep peace (27). This is significant because the Spartans had refused to agree to the terms dictated by the Thebans after the battle of Mantinea. Both Plutarch and Diodorus mention that the parties to the peace included the Messenians, thus recognizing the latter's independence from Sparta²⁵. As a result, the Spartans chose not to be a party to the peace²⁶.

In view of this, it is unlikely that the phrase "...to keep peace" ("εἰρήνην...ἄγειν"), refers to this specific peace treaty (Dem., XVI.7). Demosthenes could hardly suggest that Sparta keep a peace treaty that she was not and had not been a signatory to in the first place. "Εἰρήνην...ἄγειν", therefore, bears a general meaning, the preservation of the existing state of peace between Sparta and Megalopolis.

"If...all the powers consent to keep peace, we will not help the Megalopolitans, for it will be unnecessary, so that there will be no question of our opposing our comrades in arms; some of them, indeed, already profess to be our allies and the others will now come into line."

(Dem., XVI.7, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 443f.)

Demosthenes uses this argument to counter the proposal that Athens should support the Spartans because of the alliance existing between them and because the soldiers of both states had fought side by side in the battle

²⁴ See above, p. 129.

²⁵ Plutarch, Life of Agesilaus, 35; Diod., XV.89.1f.

²⁶ Loc. cit.

of Mantinea against the Thebans²⁷. To this, Demosthenes adds that Athens has a greater obligation than to support old allies, particularly when their motive for war is the enhancement of their own power. Such enhancement would only prove detrimental to Athens' future security. Accordingly, he does not oppose support for Sparta because he believes that the maintenance of peace is desirable in itself, but because the possibility of a Spartan victory ran contrary to Athenian interests:

"Our duty...is to take care lest the Lacedaemonians grow strong and formidable before the Thebans are weaker and lest their increase in power should, unperceived by us outbalance the diminution of the power of Thebes, which our interests demand. For this at least we should never admit, that we would sooner have the Lacedaemonians for our rivals than the Thebans, nor is that our serious aim, but rather to put it out of the power of either to do us harm, for in that way we shall enjoy the most complete security."

(Dem., XVI.5, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 443)

Complementary reference to peace is maintained in the last two usages of ἡ εἰρήνη in the speech. In context the desirable nature of peace is implied:

"If the Megalopolitans, though peace (εἰρήνης) is secured for them, still cling to the Theban alliance, it will of course be obvious to all that they prefer the ambition of Thebes to the claims of justice; or if, while the Megalopolitans join our alliance in all sincerity, the Lacedaemonians refuse to keep the peace (ἄγειν εἰρήνην), then it will be equally obvious that the object of their activities is not merely to restore Thespieae²⁸, but to

²⁷ Dem., XVI.7.

²⁸ Sparta proposed to restore Thespieae and a number of other towns in order to win support in their quest for Megalopolis and, as Demosthenes (XVI.8) suggests, the subsequent conquest of Messene.

subjugate the Peloponnese while the Thebans are engrossed
in the war²⁹

(Dem., XVI.28, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 457)

Firstly, it is regarded as desirable for the Megalopolitans to have the security of a state of peace. Secondly, should Sparta maintain peace, then her honourable intention to restore the independence of towns subjugated by Thebes, would be vindicated. Both conditions benefit Athens as well, if not more so. Peaceful settlement of the quarrel would hinder Sparta's opportunity to expand and nullify Thebes' opportunity to intervene on behalf of the Megalopolitans. Athens would thus be seen as the benefactor of Megalopolis and be seen to act in the prevention of war.

Demosthenes' attitude to peace is revealed also in his usage of ὁ πόλεμος and πολεμεῖν. There are only three passages where war is mentioned explicitly. Two of these look upon war unfavourably, by linking war with the Spartan injustice of attacking the Megalopolitans:

"...if the Lacedaemonians act unjustly and insist on making war... ."

(Dem., XVI.8, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 445)

The Spartans "...have not taken up war to avenge an injury, but to recover the power that once was theirs; and what their ambition was in the day of their power, you (Athenians) know perhaps better than I, and will distrust them accordingly."

(Dem., XVI.22, trans. J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 453)

Clearly, both passages describe the possibility of war in a distasteful manner. In the first passage Spartan insistence on war is looked upon unfavourably because it runs contrary to Athenian interest.

²⁹ The "war" referred to here is the "Sacred War". See Diod., XVI.23f., under the year 355/4.

It is not merely Sparta's desire to conquer Megalopolis which is considered questionable but, perhaps more importantly, a subsequent attack on Messene. Demosthenes envisages a Spartan recovery of Messene as the fulfilment of their ambition to reassert their supremacy, whereas the conquest of Megalopolis is but a stepping stone. Hence his support for Megalopolis represents an attempt to nip Spartan ambition in the bud.

In the second passage, blame for the oncoming conflict is put squarely on Sparta and rightly so. It is their lust for the recovery of past power that has provoked their hostile action against Megalopolis. Their cause is not one of avenging an injury, but one of self interest, which the Athenians will distrust on the basis of past experience during the "Peloponnesian War" and the subsequent period of Sparta's hegemony.

It is well to point out that, while Demosthenes denies Sparta the "right" to pursue its self interest, his own policy supports the furtherance of Athenian interests by obstructing Sparta and Thebes. Such a one-eyed stance may be excused if one considers that the interests of one's state legitimize such rhetorical hypocrisy. It does serve to remind us, however, that in practical politics the desirability of peace or war is determined by the perception of what is most advantageous to one's state and what is least advantageous to one's enemies. The use of moralizing catchwords, such as justice and injustice, serve only to justify the orator's position.

The second passage (22) contains two further features worthy of note. The first relates to Demosthenes' definition of what justifies war. Clearly, the desire to recover their former power " ὑπὲρ τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὴν πρότερον οὔσαν αὐτοῖς δύναμιν", does not justify Spartan aggression. This is a common enough assertion of Greek writers³⁰, who use it to lambast

³⁰ See P. Karavites, Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events, Gottingen, 1982, esp. pp. 102-106.

their foreign opponents. On the other hand, Demosthenes evidently upheld the belief that to redress an injury was sufficient pretext for war. Aggression could be justified if it was an act of vengeance. This too, is a belief commonly expressed in our sources³¹. Significantly, Demosthenes denies that the Spartans had any justifiable, ancestral claim over the territory of Messene and hegemony over Megalopolis. His denial results from his belief that the continued independence of these states is beneficial to Athenian security. Hence, he artfully claims that Sparta has no injury to redress and that their aggression is without justification.

The second feature relates to the example which Demosthenes uses in this passage (22) to amplify distrust of Sparta. Here he tends to stress the tradition of Athenian distrust of Sparta, particularly his examples of the "Peloponnesian War" and the early years of the fourth century B.C. Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the extent of anti-Spartan feeling in the late 350's. When reading this speech, however, one is left with the impression that relations were fairly amicable. Sparta and Athens were allies against Thebes in the "Sacred War"³² and some Athenians at least were prepared to support Sparta's claims in the Peloponnese in order to counter Theban influence there³³. Even Demosthenes does not argue for the abandonment of the Spartan alliance. Indeed, he lends his support to it, provided that the Spartans do not press their claims against Megalopolis and Messene³⁴. Hence, his attempts to heighten distrust of Sparta are rhetorical ploys designed to lend additional credibility to

³¹ Loc. cit.

³² Diod., XVI.27.5, 29.1.

³³ Dem., XVI.1,19.

³⁴ Indeed, Demosthenes argues that support for Megalopolis would not jeopardise Athens' alliance with Sparta. The latter owes Athens a debt of gratitude for when the Athenians saved them (Dem., XVI.12-13).

the Megalopolitan cause³⁵.

The third and last usage of ὁ πόλεμος in the speech (Dem., XVI.28) does not have the unfavourable aspect of the previous two. Demosthenes refers to the underhand attempts of Sparta to subjugate the Peloponnesus while Thebes is engrossed in the war. The war referred to here is the "Sacred War" which began in the autumn of 355. Demosthenes does not commit himself to either a favourable or unfavourable comment on war in this fleeting reference. Instead, its mention has a neutral aspect because Spartan motives, rather than the "Sacred War", are his concern at this point.

In conclusion, peace is looked upon favourably and war unfavourably in For the Megalopolitans because opposition to renewed attempts by Sparta to assert her hegemony in the Peloponnese best suited Athenian interests. These interests, as outlined by Demosthenes, were to look to the future security of Athens by hindering the regrowth of Spartan power and also to promote a better image of Athens. This latter entailed supporting the causes of weaker states, such as Megalopolis and Messene, against the aggression of others. This examination has shown that Demosthenes' views cannot be labelled as pacifistic. His demand for Sparta to respect the "Common Peace" is no more than a piece of political propaganda because he never rules out the use of force in order to prevent a Spartan regrowth of power. The primary goal of this force is not to protect Megalopolis, but to promote Athenian influence in the Peloponnese. In spite of his high-sounding rhetoric about the preservation of Megalopolitan independence, Megalopolis is only a tool to achieve that goal.

³⁵ For references, see above page 128, n. 5.

There is nothing in this speech to support the view that the Athenians wanted to reject war on Sparta's behalf purely because they were exhausted by the "Social War". Significantly, economic considerations do not enter into Demosthenes' rebuttal of the Spartan overtures. The philosophical reason of supporting "just" causes is only a pretext for Athens' own attempt to boost her flagging prestige after the "Social War"; being seen to do what is just was intended to attract support for Athens and thus further bolster her security. The lack of economic considerations does not mean that Athens was no longer suffering the effects of the "Social War". One would hardly expect Demosthenes to mention a negative factor while attempting to encourage Athenian involvement. On the other hand, the loss of allies incurred as a result of the "Social War" was still a concern. Demosthenes reports the concern of his opponents who argued that refusal to aid the Spartans would make enemies of them and leave Athens without allies³⁶.

Demosthenes himself pays particular attention to this need to find allies. Indeed, his support for Megalopolis is based on the desire to have a staunch ally in the Peloponnese to counteract Sparta and Thebes. He points out how, in the past, Athens had made alliances with the victims of injustice, after she had come to their aid (14-15). Moreover, he berates those who would drive away the opportunity to make an alliance:

"...with regard to any acts which they say the Megalopolitans have committed for the sake of the Thebans somewhat against your interests, it is ridiculous to make these now the count of an indictment, but when they want to become friends and make you some reparation, to look askance at them and devise means of preventing this and not to realise that the more zealous they show themselves to have been in the cause of the Thebans, the more justly

³⁶ Dem., XVI.11.

would these very speakers incur your anger, if they deprived the city of such useful allies, when they came to you before applying to Thebes. But these, I take it, are the allegations of men who want once again to drive the Megalopolitans elsewhere for an alliance."

(Dem., XVI.19f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 451)

Rather than reject Megalopolis for its recent affinity with Thebes, Demosthenes thus points to its reliability as an ally - an attractive feature for an Athenian audience in the aftermath of the "Social War". Demosthenes' estimation of their worth is valid because the Megalopolitans had approached Athens before Thebes. In their desire to avoid conflict with Sparta, the Megalopolitans, no doubt, felt that Athenian support would provide the more passive path to their goal, given the hostility between Thebes and Sparta. This desire to avoid conflict was in itself attractive to Demosthenes, who recognized that Athens could not afford the abandonment of the alliance with Sparta. His assessment of the Megalopolitans as allies is vindicated further by his assertion that they were prepared to make Athens some reparation³⁷.

Furthermore, he points to the benefits of an ally in the Peloponnese:

"...if you accept them as allies, Megalopolis will indeed owe its immediate deliverance to you, but we must put on one side all calculation of risk and consider what will be the effect upon our relations with Thebes and Sparta. Now if the Thebans are finally beaten, as they deserve

³⁷ From Dem., XVI.19f. it would seem that the nature of this reparation had not been settled, dependent as it was on Athenian willingness to support their cause. Elsewhere Demosthenes suggests that they be required to pull down their pillars, upon which were inscribed the details of their alliance with Thebes (Dem., XVI.27). Such an action was designed to prove their trustworthiness as allies, but evidently the Megalopolitans were unreceptive to the idea. Demosthenes reports that "with them friendship is based, not on inscribed pillars, but on mutual advantage and they count as their allies those who are their helpers".

to be, there will be no undue increase in the power of the Lacedaemonians, because there are their neighbours, the Arcadians, to balance it; but if the Thebans after all recover and are saved, at any rate they will be the weaker because we shall have gained these allies, saved by our help. Therefore it is in every way expedient that the Arcadians should not be abandoned and that if they survive, they should not seem to owe their preservation to themselves or to any other people than you."

(Dem., XVI.30f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 457)

The question remains: if alliance with Megalopolis was as attractive as Demosthenes makes out, why did Athens not intervene on its behalf?

From Diodorus' account of the war between Sparta and Megalopolis in the years 352/1, it is clear from absence of mention that the Athenians did not participate³⁸. Demosthenes' For the Megalopolitans, which he delivered in the previous year, had been unsuccessful³⁹. Is this non-intervention evidence of pacifism in the Athenian assembly?

An interesting point can be raised about the Athenian decision not to intervene in the dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta. The Athenians, clearly, were far too distracted by events to the north of their city to divert military aid to either of the Peloponnesian plaintiffs. Their primary concerns were Thebes and Macedon.

Since 357, the power of Philip of Macedon had been expanding steadily over much of northern Greece, an area which many Athenians still regarded as the cradle of a maritime empire reborn. Earlier in 353, the

³⁸ Diod., XVI.1-9.

³⁹ N.G.L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War", in JHS, 57 (1937), esp. p. 68, deals very comprehensively with the severe criticism which has been levelled against Diodorus' chronology for this period. Dionysius dates Demosthenes, XVI to the year 353/2. This date is preferable to that of 352/1, proposed by P. Cloché, Démosthènes et la fin de la démocratie athénienne, Paris, 1937, pp. 48-55.

capture of Sestos⁴⁰, the subsequent alliance with the Thracian despot, Cersebleptes, and the acquisition of all the Chersonese, except Cardia⁴¹, were all efforts to re-establish Athenian power and influence in the north at the expense of Philip. These successes, however, were limited by the continued preponderance of Philip's stranglehold on northern Greece. Of the more important strategic points, he still held Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pherai and Pagasae⁴².

From the Athenian viewpoint, Philip's successes were infuriating, to say the least. Demosthenes (IV.35) taunts his fellow Athenians with their failure to send out the expeditions, approved by the Assembly, in sufficient time to relieve Methone, Pagasae and Potidaea. Quite rightly, Demosthenes blames these detrimental delays on the lack of Athenian preparation to deal successfully with Philip's lightning forays into southern Greece. Nonetheless, this point, no doubt, worked against Demosthenes when he delivered his speech For the Megalopolitans. Having been taken by surprise on so many occasions, the Athenians were loathe to commit any portion of their force to the Peloponnese. Instead they devoted their attention to the north, in which direction lay the immediate and more imposing threat of Philip. Accordingly, in the spring of 352, a large Athenian fleet under Chares is found sailing to support Athens' Phocian ally, Onomarchus, against Philip and the Thessalian League⁴³. Once again, the Athenian reaction was too slow. Philip launched a quick attack and defeated

⁴⁰ Diod., XVI.34.3.

⁴¹ Diod., XVI.34.4 under the year 353/2.

⁴² Amphipolis fell in 357 (Beloch, III.1.229, III.2.458; cf., Diod., XVI.8); Pydna and Potidaea in 356, Methone in 354 (Diod., XVI.31.6; 35.4-5); Pagasae in 354/3 (or perhaps 353/2); Pherae in 353/2 (Diod., XVI.35.1-6). See also J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London, 1976, pp. 63-89.

⁴³ Diod., XVI.35.5. Diodorus is wrong to say that Chares was sailing past "by chance". See Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War", in JHS, 57 (1937), pp. 67-68.

the Phocians at the so-called battle of "Crocus Field", before Chares arrived⁴⁴.

The event, however, which, in hindsight, must surely have justified to many Athenians the decision to avoid intervention in the Peloponnese, took place in midsummer, 352. Buoyed by his defeat of Onomarchus, Philip advanced on Thermopylae intending to make war on the Phocians. On this occasion, the Athenians did not dally, no doubt because free passage through the pass was the most blatant threat to Athens' security in the war with Philip up until this time. Athens sent a contingent of 400 cavalry and 5,000 hoplites by sea⁴⁵. Philip retreated once he saw the Phocian army bolstered by this and other allied contingents⁴⁶.

Accordingly, the Athenian refusal to indulge either the Spartans or Megalopolitans was not motivated by pacifistic sentiment in the Assembly. The contemporaneous involvement of Athens in the "Sacred War" - even if somewhat sporadic - reveals a warlike mood, a mood which was limited to countering the advance of Philip. Since their homeland was not as removed from Philip's encroachments as those of the Peloponnesian protagonists, the Athenians had far more to fear.

Moreover, the Athenians had to consider the position of Thebes. Throughout For the Megalopolitans, anti-Theban bias is expressed in the strongest terms. At one point, Demosthenes declares that the Thebans deserve to be beaten (30f.), referring to Thebes' encounter with Phocis in the "Sacred War". Demosthenes gives the impression that Thebes is too preoccupied with Phocis to intervene in the Peloponnese. This impression

⁴⁴ Diod., XVI.35.

⁴⁵ Diod., XVI.38.1-2; Just., VIII.2.8-12; Dem., XIX.84, XVIII.32, IV.17,41.

⁴⁶ Diod., XVI.38.2.

may be correct, given that the Megalopolitans appealed to Athens before they appealed to Thebes - their current ally. Nonetheless, the refusal to aid Megalopolis suggests that the majority of the Athenians was not convinced. Demosthenes' own demand, that the Megalopolitans formally renounce their alliance with Thebes (27), suggests that many Athenians still considered Thebes to be a serious threat.

There was yet another reason why the Athenians were loathe to intervene in the Peloponnese on behalf of Megalopolis. Those who favoured maintenance of the Spartan alliance would have been unconvinced by Demosthenes' argument that the alliance would remain intact. His assertion that Athenian support for Megalopolis would be accepted - somewhat grudgingly by the Spartans - is unfounded. Demosthenes claims that the Spartans would be obliged by past Athenian benefactions to support Athens' efforts to recover Oropus (13), even though Athens was refusing to help Sparta take Megalopolis. In spite of the odium associated with the failure to support one's benefactor, there was no guarantee that the moral obligation would be fulfilled. Demosthenes himself indirectly provides an example in the speech of Thebes who had eschewed such obligations by seizing Oropus. Accordingly, it is quite likely that application of Demosthenes' proposed support for Megalopolis would have jeopardised Athens' alliance with Sparta. In view of the pressing threat of Philip and (to a lesser extent) Theban hostility in the "Sacred War", the majority of Athenians was not prepared to take the risk of substituting their existing ally (Sparta) with an ally of untried merit (Megalopolis).

Why, then, did Athens not intervene once the shadow of Philip had retreated from Thermopylae? Phocian confidence was such that they dispatched 3,000 infantry to aid Sparta against Megalopolis⁴⁷. If Phocis felt

⁴⁷ Diod., XVI.39.3.

secure from Philip - if only momentarily - did not Athens? The most likely explanation for the continued Athenian abstinence is inspired by one of Demosthenes' arguments in For the Megalopolitans; he argues that Athens should side with the Megalopolitans only if they agree to renounce their alliance with Thebes⁴⁸. The refusal of Athens to take their side in 353/2 left the Megalopolitans with the necessity to maintain their profitable alliance with Thebes. When Sparta initiated conflict in 352/1⁴⁹, the Thebans stood by their alliance with Megalopolis and their enmity with Sparta, sending 4,000 foot and 500 horse to their aid⁵⁰. It is clear that Athens' initial refusal of aid had lost the opportunity to drive the Megalopolitans away from Thebes. With no other advantage to be gained from assisting the Megalopolitans, the Athenians continued to stand aloof from the conflict. In the previous year, Demosthenes' arguments based on Spartan injustice had been insufficient to push Athens into involvement⁵¹. Intervention in 352/1 would not have weakened Theban influence in the Peloponnese since Thebes had shown already that she was prepared to defend the cause of her ally.

The issue of Oropus in For the Megalopolitans is important in this discussion of Athenian "pacifism" in the late 350's because it is clear from the speech that some Athenians, including Demosthenes, were prepared now to challenge one of the conditions of the "Common Peace" of 362/1, which had left Oropus under Theban control. While Demosthenes is opposed strongly to Athenian support for Sparta against Megalopolis, he does uphold that part of the Spartan plan which promotes the weakening of Theban control,

⁴⁸ Dem., XVI.27.

⁴⁹ Diod., XVI.39.1.

⁵⁰ Diod., XVI.39.2f.

⁵¹ Dem., XVI. passim.

particularly in Boeotia⁵². Orchomenus, Thespieae and Plataea should be refounded and Athens ought to recover Oropus⁵³. Theban possession of other people's territory is chastised severely⁵⁴. Demosthenes does not suggest diplomatic overtures be made to the Thebans. Quite to the contrary - the eventual use of armed force is not ruled out⁵⁵. This section will show that, far from being pacifistic, Demosthenes is bent on an Athenian recovery of Oropus⁵⁶.

The question of who had the more justifiable claim to Oropus is intriguing, not least of all because it was not an Attic town, either by virtue of its geographical position or by the dialectic ties of its original inhabitants⁵⁷. Oropus was situated in Boeotia astride the coast road on the Boeotian/Attic border⁵⁸. Its commanding strategic position⁵⁹, however, had made it a bone of contention between Athens and Thebes for nearly a century and a half. In the early years of the fifth century, it had been captured by Athens⁶⁰ and had served as an important base for Athenian mercantile and naval shipping during the "Peloponnesian War"⁶¹.

⁵² Dem., XVI.4-5, 25-26.

⁵³ Dem., XVI.25, in an argument against the inconsistency of those Athenians who would support the independence of these Boeotian states, because it is deemed just, while refusing to support Megalopolis and Messene.

⁵⁴ Dem., XVI.18, 26.

⁵⁵ Dem., XVI.11, 13.

⁵⁶ Dem., XVI.11, 13, 18.

⁵⁷ For the position of Oropus, see the map on p. 148. According to Bury & Meiggs, op. cit., p. 139, the Oropians spoke the dialect of Euboean Eretria by virtue of their association before the fifth century.


⁵⁸ For a map of the Attic road system, see J. Ober, Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404-322 B.C., Leiden, 1985, p. 109.

⁵⁹ For which see Thuc., IV.91, 96; VII.28 and esp. VIII.60 and J. Buckler, The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 B.C., Cambridge (Mass.), 1980, pp. 10, 164.

⁶⁰ C.W.J. Eliot, in OCD², p. 758, s.v. "Oropus".

⁶¹ Thuc., III.91; IV.96; VIII.60; VII.28.

THE GREEK MAINLAND



In the winter of 412/11, the Boeotians captured Oropus⁶² and again in 402⁶³. At some point in time after this the Athenians managed to recover it but, on this occasion, Athenian tenure was shortlived. In 366/5 Themison (tyrant of Eretria) helped an exiled party of Oropians to seize Oropus⁶⁴. Athens amassed a force, only to be beaten to the prize by the Thebans, who took Oropus from Themison for "safekeeping". Lacking allied support, the Athenian force was compelled to acquiesce in Theban possession. Athens demanded its return and withdrew its force pending a legal settlement⁶⁵. No such settlement was reached. As a consequence of this affair, Oropus remained an object of Athenian desire until 338, when it was returned to Athens by Philip of Macedon⁶⁶. From Demosthenes' speech, On the Peace, delivered in late 346, it is clear that the Athenians were still rueing the loss of Oropus⁶⁷ and Demosthenes asserts that a campaign to recover Oropus is worthy of contemplation⁶⁸.

The Athenian claim to Oropus, therefore, rested upon their long occupation of it during the fifth century. Oropus, however, had never enjoyed freedom and independence under Athens. There is reason to believe with Bury and Meiggs that Athenian citizenship was never bestowed upon its population⁶⁹. Indeed, during the fifth century, Oropus appears to

⁶² Thuc., VIII.60.

⁶³ Diod., XIV.17.1-3.

⁶⁴ Diod., XV.76.1; Xen., Hell., VII.4.1; Dem., XVIII.99; Aesch., II.164; III.85; see also Isoc., XIV.20. Buckler, op. cit., p. 19, suggests that Sparta may have detached Oropus from Boeotia and given it to Athens after the "King's Peace" of 386.

⁶⁵ Xen., Hell., 4.1. See also, Buckler, op. cit., pp. 193-195, 250f.

⁶⁶ Paus., I.34.1.

⁶⁷ Dem., V.10, 24.

⁶⁸ Dem., V.16.

⁶⁹ Bury and Meiggs, op. cit., p. 139f.

have been a subject state of Athens. Certainly, Thucydides speaks of Oropus as an Athenian possession⁷⁰.

Nor is there any evidence to suggest that it was blessed with freedom and independence during the shortlived fourth century occupation by Athens. Significantly, Demosthenes does not speak of restoring Oropus' freedom and independence which he does intimate when speaking of Orchomenus, Thespieae and Plataea. He, like his opponents, merely calls for the recovery of Oropus:

"Now my opponents argue that the recovery of Oropus is something that we ought to attempt, but that if we make enemies of those who would have helped us to recover it (that is, the Spartans), we shall have no allies. I too think that we ought to recover (κομίσασθαι) Oropus, but to say that the Lacedaemonians will be our enemies as soon as we make allies of those Arcadians who are willing to be our friends - I think the only men who have no right even to suggest that are the men who persuaded you to help the Lacedaemonians in their hour of danger."

(Dem., XVI.11, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 447)

The infinitive κομίσασθαι is used on one other occasion in the sense of recovering Oropus⁷¹ and on another occasion λαβεῖν (to take) is used⁷². On the other hand, with regard to Orchomenus, Thespieae and Plataea, Demosthenes speaks of refounding (οἰκισθεῖσθαι) or restoring

⁷⁰ Thuc., II.23. D. Whitehead, The Demes of Attica 508/7 - CA. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study, Princeton, 1986, p. 84 claims that Oropus was not a deme.

⁷¹ In speech XVI, Demosthenes mentions Oropus on seven occasions: at 11,11,13,16,18,18,18. The other three towns are mentioned variously at 4,25,25,28. The infinitive (κομίσασθαι) is used at Dem., XVI.18.

⁷² Dem., XVI.18.

(κατοικίζομαι) these towns⁷³. One passage in particular seems to depict Oropus, upon recovery, as being restored to its fifth century status of subjugation:

"For they (the Spartans) now say that Elis ought to receive parts of Triphylia and Phlius the district of Tricaranum and certain Arcadian tribes the land belonging to them and that we (Athenians) ought to have Oropus, not because they want to see each of us enjoying our own, far from it - ...but they want it to be generally supposed that they are cooperating with each state to recover the territory that it claims... ."

(Dem., XVI.16f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 449)

Demosthenes did not oppose an Athenian attempt to recover Oropus (11). He even suggests that the Spartans, in order to recompense Athens' past benefactions, will support their cause. This is rhetorical presumption. Demosthenes had no means to foresee the future in order to determine what the Spartans would do if Athens did not help them. One suspects that they would have replied "tit-for-tat": if the Athenians did not support them against Megalopolis, then they would not help them recover Oropus.

Demosthenes actually admits to this probability:

"But supposing...it should become clear to us that unless we let the Lacedaemonians subdue the whole of the Peloponnese, we shall not be able to take Oropus, then I think it the better policy...to let Oropus go, rather than sacrifice Messene and the rest of the Peloponnese to the power of Sparta. For I do not think

⁷³ Dem., XVI.4, 25 (twice), 28. These cities had been destroyed by Thebes and therefore required rebuilding. Nonetheless, Demosthenes envisages that they regain their independence. So much is clear from his claim that the refounding of these cities will weaken Thebes (4).

that Oropus would be the only subject of dispute between us, but also -⁷⁴."

(Dem., XVI.18, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 451)

Thus, Demosthenes is prepared to forsake the Athenian claim to Oropus if Athens refuses consistency with its own avowed rejection of unjust aggression. Given the strong desire among his Athenian audience for Oropus' recovery, it is doubtful whether this observation would have been well received. After all, the Athenians did not look upon Oropus as a lost ally, but as a part of Attica taken from them.

Demosthenes' vision of attracting other allies by acting as benefactor to weaker states clearly lacked sufficient appeal to an audience who had seen allies fall away from Athenian alliances during the "Social War". They were simply too demoralised to support Megalopolis in the tentative hope that this act of justice would increase Athens' prestige, attract additional allies, still keep Sparta on friendly terms, encourage the Megalopolitans to reject their alliance with Thebes and still leave them without Oropus. Demosthenes' plan, I believe, was too daring for them - it involved too much risk.

Demosthenes' desire to aid the Megalopolitans was not motivated by pacifism. He wished to confront Sparta and its policy of aggression and to confront Thebes and hinder its influence in the Peloponnese.

⁷⁴ Demosthenes seems to visualize a one-for-one deal between Athens and Sparta. If Athens helps Sparta to get Megalopolis, Sparta, in turn helps Athens recover Oropus. The problem for Demosthenes was where would such an arrangement end? Sparta would want Messene and would make an offer to help Athens recover another lost possession. Against Vince, *op. cit.*, p. 450, I do not think that Demosthenes is referring here to "a renewed attempt of Sparta...involving perhaps a second Peloponnesian war". I believe Demosthenes is implying that Athens might receive no assistance from Sparta to regain her other territorial claims. Perhaps he had Amphipolis in mind.

Application of his proposals would have pushed Athens into an active rôle in Peloponnesian affairs. Was such advice ill-conceived? There is reason to believe not. If Athens had supported Megalopolis, a valuable ally would have been gained. Megalopolitan aid would have been beneficial in the early years of confrontation with Philip. By clinging to the faint hope of Spartan support, Athens' opposition to Philip stagnated because the Peloponnesian states were too embroiled in their petty squabbles to divert their attention to the north. By making a stand over Megalopolis, Athens could have shown the other Greek states that she was being consistent with her chagrin over Thebes' act of oppression. Such a display of integrity would have done much to restore her prestige.

By rejecting Demosthenes' plea for the Megalopolitans, the Athenians lost the opportunity to display consistency. As Demosthenes teased them, how could they still claim Oropus and not help weaker states such as Megalopolis and Messene against unjust aggression? After all, they claimed that Oropus had been taken and held by Thebes as a result of unjust aggression. The Athenians, however, rejected his advice. They did not adhere to the policy of non-intervention in the dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis because they desired peace for the sake of peace, but because they were afraid. They were afraid to lose Spartan support against Thebes and they were afraid to support Sparta because of the odium associated with its aggression against Megalopolis. Non-intervention was less troublesome: it excused Athens from involvement in a theatre where her involvement was not required by necessity; it spared her the squandering of her limited resources and it prevented the precedent of Athens stepping into every quarrel where unjust aggression was alleged. Non-intervention was the

easy way out, but it did not solve the problem of the increasing threat to Athenian security - it merely avoided the issue and let the opportunity slip to attain what Athens needed desperately - allies.

According to J.H. Vince, Jaeger and Bury and Meiggs⁷⁵, Eubulus recommended non-intervention in the impending conflict between Sparta and Megalopolis. Unfortunately, evidence for such a view is nowhere to be found in our source material. These scholars have accredited this proposal to Eubulus because it has been fashionable to link to Eubulus any decision of the Athenian Assembly in the late 350's that hints of pacifism. More attention will be paid in the last chapter to Eubulus' influence at this time. Suffice to say now that the meagre, passing references to Eubulus' career in the 350's do not in themselves suggest that the man had reached a position of political dominance. Certainly, he was in control of the Theoric Fund in the late 350's and the law regulating the use of τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως seems to have been in use by 353/2⁷⁶. Both pieces of evidence suggest that Eubulus had reached a position of prominence by the late 350's, but they do not support the belief that he was the sole or even dominant arbiter of Athenian foreign policy in this period. Moreover, as was shown in an earlier chapter, the belief based on a scholion to Demosthenes (III.28) that Eubulus was responsible for the establishment of peace after the "Social War" is dubious in the extreme⁷⁷.

⁷⁵ J.H. Vince, Demosthenes, vol. I, LCL, p. 438; W. Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, Cambridge, 1938, p. 83; J.B. Bury & R. Meiggs, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, (Fourth Ed.), London, 1975, p. 425.

⁷⁶ See G.L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 48f.

⁷⁷ See R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), esp. p. 75f., for a rebuttal of this view, held by A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, in CAH, vol. VI, p. 223f.

Accordingly, when Demosthenes delivered For the Megalopolitans, a proposal (or, quite possibly, proposals) for non-intervention won the debate. Speculation as to the proposer or originator of this view proves fruitless: Demosthenes is silent. Perhaps a group of influential men, including Eubulus, did support non-intervention, but the final decision of the Assembly against intervention reveals at any rate that the majority of Athenians did not wish to be involved in a Peloponnesian conflict.

VI

DEMOSTHENES, FOR THE LIBERTY OF THE RHODIANS

Intervention on behalf of the weak is once again the course of action proposed by Demosthenes in a speech which urges immediate Athenian involvement in a dispute in the eastern Mediterranean. In the aftermath of the "Social War"¹, the island of Rhodes was seized and an oligarchical government installed with the assistance of the Carian dynasts². For the Liberty of the Rhodians was delivered by Demosthenes in about 351³ when exiled Rhodian democrats arrived in Athens requesting assistance⁴. Demosthenes was eager for Athens to restore her prestige in the Greek world which had suffered greatly as a result of the "Social War"⁵. This, he claims, could be achieved only if Athens supported justice and acted upon it. Idle prattle about supporting "justice" he considers hypocritical without action. The action he speaks of is, in fact, to intervene in Rhodes and restore its

¹ The precise year in which Rhodes was seized is unknown, but it must have occurred after the end of the "Social War" (in 355) and before the death of Mausolus in 353. Dem., XV.3 says Mausolus deprived the Rhodians of their liberty.

² References to the installation of an oligarchical government are contained in Demosthenes' speech: see Dem., XV.3.9 and esp. 19; cf., 28; cf., also Dem., V.25.

³ The date of Demosthenes' speech has been disputed. Jaeger, op. cit., p. 90, n. 41, dates it to 352, while R. Sealey, "Dionysios of Halicarnassos and Some Demosthenic Dates", in REC, 68 (1955), p. 118 dates it to 351/0. J.R. Ellis & R.D. Milns, The Spectre of Philip, Sydney, 1970, p. 114, date it to 351.

⁴ Dem., XV.2.

⁵ For the loss of Athenian prestige as a result of the "Social War", see above, Chapter II, pp. 54-57.

democratic exiles. In this manner, Athens will become the defender of the weak, who have been oppressed by the enemies of all Greece. Athens will be lauded as the defender of democracies and Greek liberty.

The validity of such arguments will be discussed below, with particular attention being paid to his description of the merits of peace and war. Since this thesis is concerned with the prevalence of pacifism in the late 350's, it is essential to recognise from the outset, however, that Demosthenes' advice was rejected by the Athenian ecclesia. The Athenians did not intervene in the Rhodian dispute. Clearly the proponents of non-intervention prevailed. The reasons for this decision are the major concern of this chapter. Demosthenes' arguments will assist in this assessment, because he had to combat them, using whatever rhetorical skill he had at his disposal.

Nonetheless, once again our sole evidence for this debate comes from the losing side. Non-intervention and its proponents are criticized severely in For the Liberty of the Rhodians and Demosthenes' condemnation of Athenian interaction is far stronger than in his previous two public speeches. Unfortunately, the arguments of his opponents can be gauged only through these scathing comments. Accordingly, one must be cautious in the extreme when assessing the nature of the arguments for non-intervention.

Let us first consider the definition of non-intervention: "the principle or practice of keeping aloof from others' disputes"⁶. Non-intervention in itself does not equate with pacifism. There is certainly nothing in the speech to suggest that Demosthenes' opponents supported

⁶ This definition was taken from The Concise Oxford Dictionary, (sixth edition), Oxford, 1976, p. 741, s.v. "non-intervention".

an end to war or that they proposed arbitration to promote peace between the hostile Rhodian factions. On the contrary, if the evidence suggests that the Athenians rejected the Rhodian plea out of spite for their participation in the "Social War" rebellion⁷, then the case for pacifism is weakened considerably. If spite was responsible or partly responsible for Athenian non-intervention, then the latter can hardly be described as pacifism: "the doctrine that the abolition of war is both desirable and possible"⁸. Indeed, as will become evident in later discussion, there is implicit evidence that the non-interventionists were not promoting peace, but a conserving delay in Athens' military activity.

Peace (ἡ εἰρήνη) is used only once in this speech (18).

Demosthenes claims, without qualification, that the Athenian democracy cannot trust oligarchical states because these are forever plotting the overthrow of Athens. In wars with other democracies, the motives for war are unsettled private disputes, a question of territory or boundaries, rivalry or claim to leadership. In wars with oligarchies, on the other hand, Demosthenes claims there is a far more pressing motive for war - Athens has to fight to preserve its constitution and liberty⁹. Accordingly, he states that peace with oligarchies is impermanent.

"...I should not hesitate to say that I think it a greater advantage that all the Greeks should be your enemies under democracy than your friends under oligarchy. For with free men I did not think that you would have any difficulty in making peace (... ἂν εἰρήνην ὑμᾶς ποιήσασθαι ...) whenever you wished, but with an oligarchical state I do not believe that even friendly relations could be permanent, for the few (that is, the oligarchs) can never be well disposed to

⁷ See below, p. 157.

⁸ The Concise Oxford Dictionary, op. cit., p. 790, s.v. "pacifism".

⁹ Dem., XV.17.

the many, nor those who covet power to those who have chosen a life of equal privileges."

(Dem., XV.18, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 423)

This idea that it was easier for Athens to make peace more permanent with other democracies than with oligarchies is intriguing! It suits Demosthenes' case for the demos of Rhodes to allege that ties with other democracies are preferable. He hopes to persuade his audience of the greater benefit which support of beleaguered democracies will afford Athens. Such an argument, however, is specious and the failure of the Rhodians to win Athenian support suggests that the Athenians similarly were unconvinced. For the Athenians it was difficult (and, as it turned out - impossible) to forget that the Rhodians had rebelled against them during the "Social War"¹⁰. Treachery was difficult to forgive, whether it be at the hands of a democrat or oligarch. Clearly, his Athenian audience did not agree that it was easier to make peace with the Rhodian democrats than to remain at peace with Caria and the Persian King.

Even if their orators drew distinctions on the basis of political partisanship as to who was preferable as an ally, in practice the Athenians looked for expediency. They might well have preferred to have another democracy as an ally, but they were certainly not averse to alliances with states of other political persuasions if they were of benefit to the Athenian state. One only has to look below at the list of alliances contracted in the 350's to see this (Table 3).

With the exception of the alliance made with the Euboean cities (Carystus, Eretria, Chalcis and Histiaea), Table 3 lists the alliances

¹⁰ Even Demosthenes presents a hostile picture of Rhodian reliability: see Dem., XV.14-16 in particular.

Table 3
Athenian Alliances Contracted in the 350's¹¹

References	Date	Ally	Type of Government
Harpocration, Lexicon, s.v. Dem., II.6; Scholion on Dem., II.6	359/8	Philip of Macedon (so-called secret alliance)	Monarchy
IG II ² 126 (Tod 151); cf., Diod., XVI.34.4	357	Three Thracian Kings	Monarchies
IG II ² 127 (Tod 157); cf., Diod., XVI.22.3	356	Cetriporis the Thracian and his brothers Lyppeios the Paionian Grabos the Illyrian	Monarchy Monarchy Monarchy
Diod., XVI. 27.5, 29.1	355/4	Philomelus of Phocis	Military despotism
See also Dem., XIX.61; cf., XXXVI.3.			

¹¹ Apart from the exception noted in the text, this table records the extent of the alliances contracted by Athens in the 350's to the best of my knowledge. I know of no other alliances that can be dated to this decade. In 357, the Olynthians attempted to offer the Athenians an alliance against the encroachment of Macedon. The Athenians rejected the offer and the Olynthians made an alliance with Philip in 357/6 (Tod 158; cf., Diod., XVI.8.3; Dem., II.7,14; VI.20; XXIII.107f.; Libanius, Hypothesis to Dem., I.2).

made by Athens in the early 350's¹². Clearly, alliances were made on the basis of expediency and political affiliation was not the criterion for that expediency. Undoubtedly, the Athenians desired permanency in their peaceful relationships with these states, but peace did not assure expediency and, as the "Social War" had shown all too clearly, alliances, even with fellow democracies, could be broken.

"War" and words related to it are used on twelve occasions in For the Liberty of the Rhodians¹³. In a speech designed to persuade the Athenians to aid the Rhodians, it is intriguing to note that war is not always looked upon in a favourable light. Even more than in his previous two public speeches, Demosthenes draws careful distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars. For example, Demosthenes warns the Athenians that they have to consider the motives for war:

"You may also observe, Athenians, that you have been engaged in many wars (πολλοὺς ὑμεῖς πολέμους πεπολεμήκατε) both with democracies and with oligarchies. You do not need to be told that; but perhaps none of you considers what are your motives for war with either. What, then, are those motives? With democracies, either private quarrels, when they could not be adjusted by the State, or

¹² The type of governments in these four Euboean cities is difficult to determine. Aeschines relates that once Athens had gained control of Euboea (in 357) they restored the cities and their constitutions to those who had entrusted them to Athens (Aesch., III.85). Some help in identification comes from IG II² 124. This inscription records Athens' alliance with the Euboean cities in 357/6. Unfortunately, there is a lacuna in the text at this point, but a suggested modern reconstruction is that it records a commendation which is to be given to the demos of Carystus: "...commendation shall be given (to the People of Carystus and (the) ambassadors of the Carystians...", trans. and edited by P. Harding, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1985, p. 87. Accordingly, one can safely identify the government of Carystus as being a democracy. Due to the lack of specification, however, to the other three cities named on the inscription, one cannot adequately maintain what their respective forms of government were.

¹³ Dem., XV. 2,3,7,8,10 (three times), 17 (three times), 18,22.

a question of territory or boundaries, or else rivalry or the claim to leadership with oligarchies you fight for none of these things, but for your constitution and your liberty."

(Dem., XV.17, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 421f.)

The desirability of war is not considered in this passage; past wars are looked upon as faits accomplis. One is given the impression that Demosthenes regards war as inevitable and, as such, only the motives for war are called into question, but not war itself.

Demosthenes provides a very superficial overview of the motives for war, considered purely from an Athenian point of view. Motives for war are said to differ with democracies and oligarchies, but one suspects this to be merely special pleading on the part of an orator who is trying to bolster the cause of the Rhodian democrats. The Athenians themselves were not averse to overthrowing democrats and supporting an oligarchical regime if it suited their interests. A good case in point is the "violent civil strife" stirred up by the Athenian strategos, Chares, in democratic Corcyra. This took place in 361/0 and at the time Corcyra was allied to Athens¹⁴. It was invalid, therefore, for Demosthenes to assert that Athens' motives for war depended on the political affiliation of her opponents. Demosthenes is trying to divert the Athenians' memories away from the Rhodian participation in the "Social War" by playing on the fear

¹⁴ Diod., XV.95.3. For Chares, consult R.A. Moysey, "Chares and Athenian Foreign Policy", in Classical Journal, 80 (1985), pp. 221-227. This article deals with the part played by Chares in joining the revolt of Artabazus during the "Social War". Certainly, the Athenians did not object to the financial rewards offered by the chance to side with Artabazus. See also R.A. Moysey, "Isocrates and Chares: A Study in the Political Spectrum of Mid-Fourth Century Athens", in Ancient World, 15 (1987), esp. pp. 84-86.

of Athens losing its democracy¹⁵. The same rhetorical ploy is used at (18), where he asserts that it would be to Athens' greater advantage if all the democratic Greek states were at war with her than if the oligarchic states were her friends. Again, this is blatant exaggeration, which he fails to substantiate with even one example. Both passages fail to provide adequate discussion of the motivations for war. All they provide is high sounding rhetoric, designed to persuade the Athenians that, if they go to war, then they should concentrate their efforts against oligarchies and fight to preserve fellow democrats. His only justification for such a view is that the Athenians "would have no difficulty in making peace with free men whenever they wished"¹⁶, but it has been shown above that the Athenians did not simplify their motives for alliance on the grounds of the political persuasion of the other state.

Does Demosthenes, then, consider the motives for war purely from a moralistic viewpoint, or, as in For the Megalopolitans, is he trying to convince the Athenians to do what is "just" and expedient as well? The latter is clearly the case. He claims that it is easier for the Athenians to make peace with free men, whereas with oligarchies even friendship lacks permanency because "...the few can never be well-disposed to the many, nor those who covet power to those who have chosen a life of

¹⁵ Dem., XV.13,17-18 and esp. 19: "Seeing that Chios and Mytilene are ruled by oligarchs, and that Rhodes and, I might almost say, all the world are now being seduced into this form of slavery, I am surprised that none of you conceives that our constitution too is in danger, nor draws the conclusion that if all other states are organized on oligarchical principles, it is impossible that they should leave your democracy alone. For they know that none but you will bring freedom back again and, of course, they want to destroy the source from which they are expecting ruin to themselves" (trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 423).

¹⁶ Dem., XV.18.

equal privileges" (XV.17f). Clearly, Demosthenes here is arguing the expediency of his case for the Rhodian democrats.

Interestingly, there is a negative aspect to his claim that it is easier to make peace with fellow democracies. He does not even speculate that it is easier to avoid war with democracies. Thus, peace with democracies is depicted merely as a safety valve, to be released when the pressures of war become too great. On the other hand, peace with oligarchies is regarded even more negatively - "friendship", the basis of a peaceful relationship, is impermanent.

It is implicit also that it is expedient for Athens to support the Rhodian democrats because friendship with democracies is more permanent than friendship with oligarchies. It is difficult to imagine that the Athenians would have accepted Demosthenes' viewpoint. His generalized praise of democracy no doubt fell upon receptive ears, but it did not naturally follow that an alliance with the Rhodian democrats could guarantee either permanency of that alliance, or greater ease in peacemaking ventures in the future. Even Demosthenes has to concede that Rhodes had abandoned Athens in the past, but he tries to cover up their responsibility by laying the blame on the Carian despot, Mausolus¹⁷.

For the Liberty of the Rhodians strongly urges the view that a defensive war against oligarchies is both expedient and "just". In passage (7), Demosthenes asserts that, if the occasion arose, he would advise the Persian King:

"...to defend his own subjects, if any of the Greeks made war against them, but to claim no sovereignty over those who owed him no allegiance."

(Dem., XV.7, adapted from trans. by J.H. Vince,
Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 415)

¹⁷ Dem., XV.3. See S. Hornblower, Mausolus, Oxford, 1982, p. 210.

Condemnation of unjust war follows - where aggression is used to achieve power. Again, the emphasis is on avoiding unjust initiation of conflict. Significantly, it is regarded as acceptable to respond to provocation and use aggression to quell those who seek unjust power. Certain guidelines had to be adhered to in responding to aggression. The attack did not have to be against Athens itself or against her current allies. Any application made to Athens for aid against aggression afforded sufficient justification for Athenian involvement - provided that there was advantage in it for Athens. The parallel with the Megalopolitans' case is striking. Neither Rhodes nor Megalopolis had a current alliance with Athens, but Demosthenes insists in both speeches that Athenian involvement was justifiable.

In the last chapter, it was shown how Demosthenes professed that, even if the Athenians stood up for the Megalopolitans, there would be little likelihood of war with Sparta¹⁸. Likewise, in For the Liberty of the Rhodians, Demosthenes asserts that it is extremely unlikely that either Caria or the Persian King would commit themselves to conflict with Athens for the sake of Rhodes¹⁹. The validity of this assertion will be discussed below, but it is necessary to discuss first Demosthenes' arguments for war.

The initiation of war is described in moralistic overtones. As in For the Megalopolitans, the use of underhand tactics by the aggressor is found deplorable²⁰. Demosthenes suggests to the Athenians that it would be morally unjust "to abandon to the King all places that he has

¹⁸ Dem., XVI.12-13.

¹⁹ Dem., XV.11-13.

²⁰ In speech XVI, Demosthenes chastises the Spartans for their underhand tactic of offering various states territories which they claimed, in order to purchase support for their desired conquests of Megalopolis and Messene.

got into his power by surprise or by deceiving some of the inhabitants"²¹. Similar condemnation is levelled at the Rhodians for their participation in the "Social War". The Rhodians, he claims, made war on Athens "in the wantonness of their pride"²². Athens, however, afforded no provocation for this unjust attack. The rebels were out to fulfil their own selfish motives and were deceived by Mausolus into breaking their alliance with Athens²³.

The Rhodians and the other rebels must have had more substantial reasons for their rebellion²⁴. On this point, Demosthenes is vague in the extreme, adding only that the Rhodians put forward Athenian plotting as their justification for war:

"For we (Athenians) were charged by the Chians, Byzantines and Rhodians with plotting against them and that was why they concerted the last war against us; but we shall be able to prove that whereas Mausolus, the prime mover and instigator in the business, while calling himself the friend of the Rhodians, has robbed them of their liberty and whereas the Chians and Byzantines, who posed as their allies, never helped them in distress, it is to you, whom they dreaded, to you alone of all the states that they owe their deliverance."

(Dem., XV.3f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, pp. 413-415)

Demosthenes makes no attempt to elaborate on either the alleged Athenian plotting or the alleged rôle of Mausolus in the instigation of

²¹ Dem., XV.8.

²² Dem., XV.2.

²³ Dem., XV.3.

²⁴ See S. Hornblower, The Greek World: 479-323 B.C., London, 1983, p. 242.

the "Social War"²⁵. With regard to the first, it was impolitic to do so. Demosthenes could hardly strengthen his case if he dwelt upon past Rhodian hostility to Athens. This reminder here serves only to inform his audience that the Rhodian plaintiffs made a mistake in the past. Indeed, the emphasis of this passage is to point out that the Rhodians did participate in concerning the war, trusted Mausolus and, accordingly, lost their liberty - once the victimizers, they have become the victims of their own actions. Athens' rôle now is to forgive and forget by liberating the Rhodians:

"By making this clear to all, you will teach the democrats in every state to consider friendship with you as the pledge of their safety and no greater advantage could you have than to win from all men their voluntary and unsuspecting 'goodwill' (eunoia)."

(Dem., XV.4, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 415)

In the appendix, I discuss in detail Demosthenes' summary of the causes of the "Social War", concluding that he blames Mausolus in order to divert responsibility for the rebellion away from Athens and away from the Rhodians. Clearly, it serves his rhetorical purpose to contrast the scheming, ambitious despot with the innocence of democratic Athens and the victimization of the friendless Rhodian democrats.

The defence of the Rhodian democrats, therefore, is depicted as a "just" war because Athens is helping them against unjust aggression. Moreover, Athenian aid is depicted as expedient because it will attract other democratic states to shelter under Athens' protective wing. Athens benefits by strengthening her alliance with the states of the same political persuasion, states who have put at Athens' disposal "their voluntary and

²⁵ The reference to the alleged rôle of Mausolus is intriguing, as it is the only reference to Mausolus' participation that is fairly contemporaneous with the outbreak of the "Social War". See appendix.

unsuspecting 'goodwill' (οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμῖν γένοιτ' ἀγαθόν ἢ παρὰ πάντων ἐκόντων ἀνυπόπτου τυχεῖν εὐνοίας)"26.

Why does Demosthenes emphasize the need to acquire eunoia? As de Romilly stated in her article, the Greek word eunoia "...is something more than goodwill: it means approval, sympathy and readiness to help"27. In his early political speeches Demosthenes rarely uses the term. Indeed, For the Liberty of the Rhodians is the first speech on foreign policy where it is used. Besides passage 4, quoted above, the term is employed again at (11), where he alleges that support for the Rhodians would be met with no effective opposition because no eunoia exists between Caria and the Persian King:

"...if the King's designs in Egypt were meeting with any success, Artensia would make a big effort to secure Rhodes for him, not from any eunoia towards him, but because, while he is in her neighbourhood, she would like to put him under a great obligation, so that he may give her as cordial a recognition as possible. But if the reports are true and he has failed in all his attempts, she must argue that this island would be of no use to him at present - which is true enough - but might serve as a fortress to overawe Caria and check any move on her part. Therefore, I think she would rather that you (Athenians) had the island, if not too obviously surrendered by her, than that he should get it."

(Dem., XV.11-12, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, pp. 417-419)

Eunoia between allies clearly is lauded in glowing terms.

Significantly, he does not provide substantial evidence that the eunoia

26 Dem., XV.4.

27 J. de Romilly, "Eunoia in Isokrates or the Political Importance of Creating Goodwill", in JHS, 78 (1958), p.92ff.

between Artemisia, Mausolus' wife and successor²⁸ and the Persian King is lacking. Perhaps his audience was in a better situation to judge the validity of Demosthenes' comment, but we are dependent purely on this gloating and, undoubtedly, biased description. Significantly, however, much of Demosthenes' argument here is based on speculation; notably uncomplimentary reports of the King's failure in Egypt. Speculation is hardly a sound means to calculate the effectiveness of presumed opposition to Athenian intervention in Rhodes, particularly as the speculation is not supported by a logistical assessment of either side! Moreover, the eunoia between Athens and Rhodes at that time could hardly be described as satisfactory. Accordingly, as far as eunoia was concerned, Athens had no more advantage than Caria and the King. Demosthenes clearly is aware of this because he speaks of the eunoia that will come Athens' way after she intervenes in Rhodes. Nonetheless, one imagines that the cautious Athenians in his audience would have been more mindful of their current lack of eunoia than speculative claims of its acquisition in the future. As a result, they preferred not to support the Rhodian democrats.

The term eunoia appears only on four other occasions in speeches of Demosthenes, dated to the 350's²⁹. In the speech Against Aristocrates³⁰,

²⁸ The date of Mausolus' death is not certain, perhaps not long after the end of the "Social War" and the oligarchical coup in Rhodes. These passages in Demosthenes suggest that Artemisia had not been long established as the new dynast of Caria and still required the King's recognition. Seemingly, the Rhodian democrats had taken advantage of Mausolus' death and were now seeking Athenian aid to overthrow the ruling oligarchy.

²⁹ Dem., XX.52, 152; XXIII.47, 174; cf., also XV.22 (εὐνοικῶς).

³⁰ Although Demosthenes wrote this speech, he did not deliver it. It was written for Euthycles, on which see the comments by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. III, p. 213.

Demosthenes advises against believing Charidemus'³¹ claims of friendship on the grounds that his "goodwill" towards Athens is questionable:

"When you (Athenians) see that he is your friend only on inducement and that his estimate of your strength is the measure of his eunoia, do you really think it your duty to allow him to be powerful - and powerful through you?"

(Dem., XXIII.174, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. III, p. 335)

This concept that the extent of eunoia could be gauged by the willingness of each party to support each other on a voluntary, unsuspecting basis is further emphasized by a passage from his speech Against Leptines. Demosthenes praises individuals who, in the past, helped Athens in an hour of need. He claims that these people were treated unjustly by Athens' enemies for their selfless actions because, as a result of their eunoia towards Athens, they were exiled from their own cities³². Again, in the same speech³³, eunoia is used in the sense of loyalty to the state and is described aptly as one of the humbler duties of the citizen worthy of reward and emulation.

Demosthenes, therefore, encourages the Athenians to have at their disposal the "voluntary and unsuspecting eunoia" of people like the democratic Rhodians³⁴ because it is the best means to ensure loyalty, particularly their willingness to proffer aid when required.

It is surprising to note that eunoia is not a term used in For

³¹ Charidemus was a mercenary commander who in the past had helped Athens establish her interests in northern Greece on a better footing. For a review of his career, see H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, Chicago, 1981 (repr.), pp. 125-132.

³² Dem., XXIII.51-52.

³³ Dem., XXIII.122.

³⁴ Dem., XV.4.

the Megalopolitans. One would expect that "goodwill" would have been a point in the Megalopolitans' favour. Perhaps Demosthenes omitted references to obtaining it from the Megalopolitans because it would have instantly reminded his audience that any attachment to the Megalopolitans would jeopardize any eunoia existing between Athens and her current ally, Sparta.

It has been shown above that Demosthenes upholds a "just" war on behalf of the Rhodians. Other passages further reveal this view. At one point, Demosthenes artfully suggests that the Athenians are bound to go to war and face the consequences:

"...if you make it a general principle, men of Athens, to abandon to the King all places that he has got into his power, whether by surprising or by deceiving some of the inhabitants, then your principle is, I think, a wrong one; but if you feel that in the cause of justice you are bound to go to war (... ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμεῖν ...) and face the consequences, then, in the first place, the more you are determined on such action, the less frequently will it be necessary and secondly, you will be showing the proper spirit."

(Dem., XV.8, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, pp. 415-417)

The phrase "... ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμεῖν ..." does not refer to any bonds of alliance. Rather, it is merely a rhetorical ploy, suggesting that Athens has a moral obligation to preserve the victims of aggrandisement. Demosthenes' opponents, no doubt, could have retorted that the Rhodians' past disloyalty and the current lack of eunoia between the two states meant that there was no obligation - moral or otherwise. Perhaps Demosthenes foresaw such a challenge on the issue of Athenian obligation. It is significant how he phrases the paragraph quoted above. The obligation is not to defend the Rhodians, but to prevent the King from putting these

Greek states under his power. This subtle difference is important to Demosthenes' design. It depicts Athens as the protector of all Greek states and not just Rhodes. In this manner, he cleverly directs Athenian resentment away from the Rhodians and towards the King.

This broadening of the issue to the aggrandisement of Caria and the King is only partially successful. Throughout the speech, Demosthenes plays down the rôle of the Rhodians in the "Social War" and, as we have seen, he depicts the Rhodians as repentent victims. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Athenians were convinced of Rhodian innocence. Nonetheless, one should not accept the notion that the Athenians disagreed with his condemnation of war for the sake of aggrandisement.

War for the sake of aggrandisement is castigated again (10) where Demosthenes cites a precedent, set in 366³⁵, to support the proposed defence of the Rhodians. He refers to the Athenian action of sending Timotheus to help the Phrygian satrap Ariobarzanes, who was in revolt from the King³⁶. Timotheus abandoned his intention of helping the satrap and used his force to liberate the island of Samos³⁷. Clearly, Demosthenes wants Athenian policy to revert to that of the late 360's, one of the last occasions of successful Athenian intervention against Persian held territory. It is significant to note that he did not use the success of Chares against Persia during the "Social War" as his precedent. No doubt that general's recall (and the subsequent humiliation of being forced to concede peace to the rebels) was too ignominious to serve as a precedent for action against

³⁵ For the date of Timotheus' Samian campaign, see N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Oxford, 1967, pp. 502-503 and p. 503, n. 1.

³⁶ Dem., XV.9.

³⁷ For Timotheus' campaign, see also Isoc., XV.111; Din., I.14.

Persia. Moreover, Demosthenes' speech, Against Aristocrates (delivered in 352³⁸), is extremely hostile towards Chares, so it is quite understandable that he did not wish to commend Chares' expedition:

"You are the men, Athenians, who once sent Timotheus to the help of Ariobarzanes, adding this clause to your instructions, 'provided that he does not violate our treaty with the King'. Timotheus, seeing that Ariobarzanes was in open revolt from the King and that Samos was garrisoned by Cyprothemis, who had been stationed there by Tigranes, the King's viceroy, abandoned his intention of helping the satrap, but invested the island and used his force to liberate it; and to this very day you have not been involved in war on those grounds (καὶ μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐ γέγονε πόλεμος διὰ ταῦθ' ὑμῖν). For no one would go to war as readily for aggrandisement as for the defence of his own possessions; but while all men fight desperately to keep what they are in danger of losing, it is not so with aggrandisement; men make it, indeed, their aim, but if prevented, they do not feel that they suffered any injustice from their opponents."

(Dem., XV.9-10, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 417)

Demosthenes' support here for a defensive war, aimed at aiding the victims of aggression, echoes sentiment expressed in his previous two speeches on foreign policy. In On the Symmories he claimed that the Athenians had to be careful that their grounds for entering on war were equitable and just³⁹ and in For the Megalopolitans he argued that the Athenians had to be ready "to save the victims of injustice"⁴⁰ and that it was expedient

³⁸ On the date of the speech, see J.H. Vince, Demosthenes, in the Loeb Classical Library, vol. III. p. 213.

³⁹ Dem., XIV.3.

⁴⁰ Dem., XVI.14f.

to oppose Spartan aggression⁴¹. Hence, all three speeches support war against the aggression of other powers.

Inconsistency arises, however, on the issue of the timing of the initiation of conflict. In On the Symmories, Demosthenes argued against an immediate initiation of war because Athens could not engage in war with Persia on equal terms⁴². Equality of resources, particularly financial reserves was necessary⁴³. Economic considerations are not taken into account in For the Megalopolitans and in For the Liberty of the Rhodians the resources available to the King and his ability to oppose Athens are played down. Demosthenes alleges that there was a lack of eunoia between Artemisia and the King. With this and the reference to the King's reported failure in Egypt⁴⁴, Demosthenes intended to reinforce his later suppositions that aid for the Rhodians would meet with little or no effective opposition. It is significant, however, that he emphasizes the need to know the King's intentions:

"...as to the King, I should not like to say that I know what he is actually going to do, but that it is to our advantage that he should at once make it clear whether he is going to claim Rhodes or not - that I should maintain positively. For when he does claim it, you will have to take counsel, not for the Rhodians only, but for yourselves and all the Greeks."

(Dem., XV.13, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 419)

This is not intended to deter the Athenians from helping the Rhodians, but it is a caution against taking the King too lightly. Another passage (24) also contains an admission of the King's formidability. These vague

⁴¹ Dem., XVI.5.

⁴² Dem., XIV.7.

⁴³ Dem., XIV.7,9,27.

⁴⁴ Dem., XV.11f.

appraisals of the King's strength, however, are as close as Demosthenes goes in this speech to assessing the viability of war with Persia. There is also praise of Athenian superiority on the battlefield⁴⁵, but this is no more than rhetorical boasting:

"...would it not be discreditable, men of Athens, if when the commons of Argos feared not the authority of the Lacedaemonians in the day of their might, you, who are Athenians, should fear a man who is a barbarian and that woman (that is, the King and Artemisia)?"

(Dem., XV.23, trans. adapted from J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 425)

The validity of war is not, therefore, seriously questioned in this speech and perhaps its greatest failing is the lack of a thorough assessment of the resources available to Athens or even a brief outline of strategy to be employed.

Intervention on behalf of the Rhodians is encouraged also on the grounds of Athenian pride. Demosthenes relates the story of how the Argives showed their eunoia towards Athens by standing up to the Spartans when Athens was under the rule of "The Thirty". He claims that it would be discreditable for Athens not to provide similar benefactions for the Rhodians, when the Athenians prided themselves on their superiority among the Greek peoples and their past dominance over Persia on the field of battle:

"...I should be sorry if you (Athenians), who are renowned for rescuing the unfortunate, should prove yourselves in this instance worse men than the Argives. ...the Argives might have pleaded that they had often been defeated by the Lacedaemonians, but you have beaten the King again and again and have never been beaten either by his slaves or by their master himself; for if ever the King has gained

⁴⁵ Dem., XVI.23.

some slight advantage over our city, he has done it by bribing the most worthless of the Greeks, the traitors to their cause and never in any other way... . So he has never beaten us in the field, nor have his intrigues gained him advantage. I observe that some of you are wont to dismiss Philip as a person of no account, but to speak with awe of the King as formidable to those whom he marks as his enemies. If we are not to stand up to the one because he is contemptible and if we yield to the other because he is formidable, against whom, Athenians, shall we ever marshal our forces?"

(Dem., XV.22-24, trans. adapted from J.H. Vince,
Loeb ed., vol. I, pp. 425-427)

In conclusion, intervention on behalf of the Rhodians is depicted as the honourable choice because it will demonstrate once again the tradition of Athenian benefactions. It is honourable also because the Rhodians are the victims of the unjust and underhand aggression of others. Support for Rhodes would be beneficial to Athens, since she would be preserving a democracy, thus strengthening the security of all democracies, including her own, against the encroachment of oligarchies. Other democratic allies would be attracted by this display of beneficence. War itself is looked upon favourably where it is a response to the unjust aggression of another, whereas war for the sake of aggrandisement is castigated severely. Peace is not seen as an alternative to confrontation in this speech, since permanent friendly relations with oligarchies are said to be impossible.

If one wished to carry Demosthenes' point a step further, that the question of war or peace depended on whether the opponent was an oligarch or a democrat, then the ridiculous notion arises that permanent peace is made impossible only by discrepancy in political alignment. This view is urged particularly in the case of the Persian King, whom Demosthenes

describes with utter disdain. Traditional Athenian suspicion of Persia is used as a tool to promote intervention on behalf of the Rhodians. Pacifism cannot be associated with Demosthenes' arguments in this speech.

The vital question remains - did the Athenians reject the idea of supporting the Rhodian democrats because they were feeling pacifistic? Once again, one must be careful with the term pacifism - the doctrine that the abolition of war is both desirable and possible.

Jaeger believes that the Athenians rejected Demosthenes' advice because they were swayed by the influential non-interventionists led by Eubulus. According to Jaeger, these non-interventionists regarded the campaign against Persia as too risky; they believed that the risk did not warrant an end to Athens' "enforced passivity"⁴⁶. The identity of these non-interventionists will be discussed fully in the last chapter, with particular attention being paid to the alleged influence of Eubulus in the late 350's. For the moment, one should note the contradiction in Jaeger's phrase "enforced passivity". If pacifism was the motivating desire behind Athenian polity, then it can hardly be "enforced". To my mind, this adjective suggests that there was no pacifistic sentiment, just desire for a temporary delay to war. Pacifism does not mean postponing war for whatever reason; it means the desire to cancel it altogether. Jaeger overlooks this, for he clearly means that the Athenians were compelled, by their fear of Persia and uncertainty as to their own strength, to refuse aid to the Rhodian democrats. Such motives are in accord with non-interventionism, but not pacifism.

⁴⁶ W. Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, Cambridge, 1938, p. 91f. See also Bury & Meiggs, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander The Great, London, 1975, p. 420, where it is claimed that the Rhodian appeal was refused under "the influence of the wise and pacific statesmen who controlled the assembly".

Pacifism, furthermore, cannot be perceived as the underlying motive for the Athenian refusal to aid the Rhodian democrats because the Athenians did engage in war during the late 350's. Since Athens intervened in some conflicts and initiated others⁴⁷, then the conflicts where they did not intervene do not equate with pacifism. Such non-interventionism is aptly described as selective warfare. Accordingly, the question still remains: why did the Athenians not intervene on behalf of the Rhodian democrats?

The concept of justice and the rights of the individual and the state play a significant rôle in For the Liberty of the Rhodians. Demosthenes asserts that it is the duty of Athens to forgive the Rhodians as they have been led astray by schemers. None of the Athenians would admit responsibility for the misdeeds of others and expect to pay the penalty⁴⁸. Why, then, should the Rhodians pay the price? The notion is suggested that it is necessary for the Athenians to go to war and suffer whatever consequences eventuate for the sake of justice⁴⁹. It is just that the Athenians "...living under a democracy, should show the same sympathy for democracies in distress" as they "would expect others to show for" them if ever they "were in the same plight"⁵⁰. He even concedes that it is possible to say that the Rhodians are served right for their bad faith⁵¹, but rejoins with the claim that this is not a time to gloat over them. Those communities fortunate enough to be free of oligarchical oppression should consider the best interests of those states who unfortunately find themselves under oligarchic domination⁵². Moreover, he rails

⁴⁷ See below, Chapter VII.

⁴⁸ Dem., XV.16.

⁴⁹ Dem., XV.8.

⁵⁰ Dem., XV.21.

⁵¹ Dem., XV.21.

⁵² Dem., XV.21.

against those Athenians (unnamed) who are most clever at pleading the rights of others against Athens, yet neglect to say anything about Athens' rights against others. Accordingly, it is not right for Demosthenes' opponents to lecture Athenians about justice when they "are not doing right"⁵³.

Demosthenes stretches his point for "just" cause further:

"In my opinion it is right to restore the Rhodian democracy; yet even if it were not right, I should feel justified in urging you to restore it, when I observe what these people (that is, the Byzantines and Carian dynasts)⁵⁴ are doing. Why so? Because, men of Athens, if every state were bent on doing right, it would be disgraceful if we alone refused, but when the others, without exception, are preparing the means to do wrong, for us alone to make profession of right, without engaging in any enterprise, seems to me not love of right but want of courage."

(Dem., XV.28, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 429)

This is an extremely interesting passage, because it contains a call for military preparations with or without just cause. Since everyone else fails to adhere to just action, why should Athens refuse to engage in military preparations and profess instead to uphold justice? Clearly,

⁵³ Dem., XV.25. Clearly, this passage condemns those orators who spoke against intervention. Undoubtedly, they would have emphasized the "injustice" of the Rhodian participation in the "Social War" (unjust from an Athenian point of view). They may have claimed also that the oligarchical take-over of Rhodes was a just reward for their rebellion. One can assume that they suggested, as well, that Athens could not justify war against the oligarchical government of Rhodes, nor against Caria or Persia. Despite Demosthenes' claims of "just" grounds, there were none to justify sufficiently an Athenian initiation of conflict. No *oδium* would rest, therefore, on Athens. Such arguments would have been far less contrived than those of Demosthenes, who had to hinge his "just" cause on the specious reason that the preservation of Athenian democracy necessitated the preservation of all other democracies, even if their past record afforded inadequate recommendation of their reliability.

⁵⁴ See Dem., XV.27.

justice itself is not belittled; on the other hand, Demosthenes regards it with scepticism if everyone else is failing to abide by it. In particular, Demosthenes is striking out at the non-interventionists, who deter action with the excuse of insufficient "just" cause.

This practice of resorting to "just" cause is denigrated further in the following passage, where Demosthenes describes "rights" in a very forthright manner. He observes that:

"...all men have their rights conceded to them in proportion to the power at their disposal."

"ὁρῶ γὰρ ἅπαντας πρὸς τὴν παρούσαν δύναμιν τῶν δικαίων ἀξιουμένους."

(Dem., XV.29, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 429)

Demosthenes' observation is descriptive rather than prescriptive. He is not suggesting that "might is right", but urging the Athenians to accept that they have a moral duty to preserve the rights of others. Indeed, the relationship between power (ἡ δύναμις) and rights (αἱ δίκαι) is repeated in a comparative reference to two Greek treaties with the King⁵⁵:

"The Greeks have two treaties with the King, one made by our city and commended by all and the later one made by the Lacedaemonians, which is of course condemned by all; and in these two treaties rights are diversely defined. Of private rights within a state, the laws of that state grant an equal and impartial share to all, weak and strong

⁵⁵ The first treaty referred to is probably the so-called "Peace of Callias" and the second, the "Peace of Antalcidas". The date and nature of the first has been much debated in modern times. In classical times, these two treaties were much compared, just as they are here by Demosthenes.

alike; but the international rights of Greek states are defined by the strong for the weak."

(Dem., XV.29, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 429)

In effect, Demosthenes is arguing that the rights of individuals and the Athenian state can be assured only if Athens intervenes on behalf of the Rhodian democrats. Athens has to make a show of her power to ensure her security. Justice, it seems, comes the way of those who work for it. War is described as a tool to achieve justice.

According to Demosthenes, the Athenians in his audience had already made up their minds to perform just actions. He warns, however, that care must be taken to ensure that it is in their power to fulfil their purpose. Such means will be at their disposal if they are accepted "as the common champions of Greek liberty"⁵⁶. The upholding of justice is, therefore, commended as long as it is supported by action. Clearly, Demosthenes recognizes that justice is not clear-cut, that claims of justice can be made to suit the goals of opposing sides. Justice has degrees, which must be settled on the issue of which just cause is most expedient for the state. His just cause, he claims, has the best interests of the state at heart, because it sponsors the return to the tradition of Athens supporting democracies and being the champion of Greek liberty⁵⁷. He rejects the notion that his opponents' just cause is most expedient for the state, suggesting instead that his rivals arrived at their view recklessly. Playing on the democratic fervour of his audience, he accuses them also of being paid sycophants who have adopted oligarchic principles. He even alleges that their policy of non-intervention towards those who deprived the Rhodians

⁵⁶ Dem., XV.30.

⁵⁷ Dem., XV.30.

of their liberty is an act which shows that they are in league with the enemies of the state⁵⁸.

None of these charges can be taken seriously and must be regarded as rhetorical ploys. Nonetheless, these charges reveal that Demosthenes did not feel confident enough to rest his case purely on arguments of justice, freedom of the Greeks and the championship of democracies and weaker oppressed states. Condemnation of his opponents is used to support the cause of the Rhodians.

No detailed explanation is given as to how the Athenians are going to be accepted as the champions of Greek liberty⁵⁹. Seemingly, one is expected to recall his previous claim that defence of democratic Rhodians will attract other democrats to Athens' side. A similar method of collecting allies after the event is made in For the Megalopolitans⁶⁰ but, in both speeches, Demosthenes fails to define how this image of Greek liberator is to be achieved. No attention is paid to outlining resources needed and available to support these proposals of intervention. Indeed, in view of the stringent economic restraints on military expenditure in the late 350's, one wonders why Demosthenes did not focus his attention on increasing expenditure. His vague reference to making military preparations fail to specify the nature and size of the forces needed. Allied support is looked upon as a consequence of action, rather than as a co-requisite. Moreover, the position of potential enemies is treated disparagingly to the point of gross neglect. The Spartans, Thebans, Caria and Persia will either give way to Athens' bold action because Athens upholds justice and they, consequently, dare not offer opposition, or

⁵⁸ Dem., XV.32-3.

⁵⁹ Dem., XV.30.

⁶⁰ Dem., XVI.19f., 30f.

Athenian intervention against her opponents will be an easy affair.

In view of such specious arguments, it is not difficult to determine why the Athenians did not accept Demosthenes' proposals for intervention on behalf of the Megalopolitans and the Rhodians. Although he sets the goal of re-establishing Athens' prestige in the Greek world, he does little else in these two speeches. The goal lacks specific direction without a plan of action. His timetable of immediate intervention on behalf of the Megalopolitans and democratic Rhodians is proffered without counting the tools to success - namely resources available. Nor is the goal of gaining prestige sufficient. There is no effort to outline concrete advantage for the Athenians, such as the acquisition of booty from successful campaigns. Intervention in war is treated purely as a necessary, but noble act affording Athenian democracy security from the encroachment of oligarchical forces. Even on this point, Demosthenes fails to press home how the fate of some Rhodian exiles is linked with a threat to Athenian democracy. Undoubtedly, at the beginning of the "Social War", many Athenians would have felt threatened by the revolt of Rhodes. So, only a few years later, when some Rhodians trooping democratic colours came asking for help, the Athenians remembered and could see no advantage - only risk. The risk of supporting a proven liability.

Nonetheless, although one can assume that Athenian animosity towards the Rhodians was a significant factor in their rejection of Demosthenes' appeal, animosity was only a secondary factor. One may speculate that Athens' previous failures to finance her naval campaigns caused the majority of Athenians to vote in favour of non-intervention. Campaigns abroad had to be selected on the basis of what would best serve Athenian interests. In the following chapter it will be shown that in the late 350's the Athenians largely chose to protect their interests to the north.