

III

XENOPHON, POROI

Written in the aftermath of the "Social War"¹, the Poroi² supports peace and proposes means to recover from the financial drain of war. It also favours non-intervention in unjust conflicts³. Nonetheless, this chapter will show that, while Xenophon promoted the cause of peace, he did not uphold a means to end war. Indeed, his proposals for the economic recovery of Athens are designed to benefit the state in peace and to protect and succour it in time of war. To this end, he advocates improvements to Attica's system of fortifications and he encourages the

¹ The Poroi was written in the aftermath of the "Social War", probably in 355/4. See P. Gauthier, "Le programme de Xenophon dans les Poroi", in Revue de Philologie, 58 (1984), pp. 181-199. See also n. 57 below.

² Xenophon's Poroi was not a speech delivered to an audience. It was a written document outlining Xenophon's proposals for rectifying Athens' finances in the wake of the "Social War". E.C. Marchant (ed.) Xenophon: Scripta Minora, vol. VII in LCL, London, 1968, p. xxvii, may be correct when he suggested that the Poroi might have been addressed to the Council of Five Hundred. Certainly, Xenophon's attention to agriculture and the cavalry and infantry suggests its appeal to the conservative element of Athenian society.

³ Jaeger argued that the Poroi upholds "pacifism" and is a political brochure for the policies of Eubulus, W. Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His Policy, Cambridge, 1938, p. 69f. See also E.M. Burke, "Eubulus, Olynthus and Euboea", in Transactions of the American Philological Association, 114 (1984), pp. 111-120. Burke (p. 113) follows Cawkwell ("Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 63, notes 89, 90 and 91) in the belief that Eubulus followed Xenophon's advice regarding silver mining and restoration of the Piraeus. This assumption that Eubulus followed Xenophon's economic proposals must remain doubtful for two reasons. Firstly, the Laurium mines and trade through the Piraeus were traditional sources of Athenian wealth (see Burke, p. 113, n. 12). Surely, Eubulus was perceptive enough to realize this without having to rely on Xenophon's advice. Secondly, Eubulus did not adopt Xenophon's key suggestion to increase mining revenue. Xenophon proposed that Athens engage state-owned slaves to work in the mines. Eubulus, however, opted for private investment. Accordingly, more caution should be used before we assume that Xenophon inspired Eubulus' economic reform.

citizens of Athens to make adequate preparation for war's eventuality. Such measures do not accord with the concept of pacifism. For Xenophon, war does not appear to have been something that could be overcome: war had to be prepared for with all the state's resources.

In the introduction to the discourse, Xenophon sets out his ambitious purpose. The Poroi was produced in an effort to offer not relief, but a solution to Athenian poverty⁴. It is claimed that this, in turn, will alleviate the suspicion of the Greek world, suspicion stemming from Athenian injustice towards the cities⁵:

"...some of the leading men at Athens have stated that they recognise justice as clearly as other men; 'but', they have said 'owing to the poverty of the masses, we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our treatment of the cities'. This set me thinking whether by any means the citizens might obtain food entirely from their own soil, which would be the fairest way. I felt that, were this so, they would be relieved of their poverty and also of the suspicion with which they are regarded by the Greek world."

(Xen., Poroi, I.1, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 193)

Clearly, Xenophon strives to outline not only an economic solution, but a political one as well. The unjust treatment mentioned here undoubtedly refers to the often rigorous means used to exact syntaxeis (supposedly voluntary contributions) from Athenian allies.

Xenophon's proposed solution is designed to alleviate Athenian

⁴ Xen., Poroi, I.1.

⁵ Unlike Isocrates, VIII.45ff., Xenophon does not blame the mercenaries hired by Athens for the unjust treatment of the cities. Indeed, the unjust treatment (Poroi, I.1) and his anti-mercenary rhetoric (Poroi, II.3f.) are not associated in the discourse. Xenophon rests the blame on the Athenians themselves. On the other hand, Isocrates, who sees the mercenaries as the perpetrators of this treatment, encourages the Athenians to accept the responsibility for the actions of their mercenaries.

poverty, particularly in times of war (when collection of syntaxeis became necessary in order to maintain the fleet) and in times of downturn in farm production⁶. The true value of the Attic soil, in Xenophon's view, however, lies not in agriculture or fishing, but in mining, both of marble and the greatest resource of all - silver. As he points out, Attica possesses natural advantages with which to exploit mined wealth. Foremost was the existing commerce that centred on Athens. In particular, he emphasizes the attractiveness of Athens as a commercial centre: excellent harbour facilities, favourable geographic location, the expertise of market officials and the city's general magnetic qualities, as indicated by the numbers of resident aliens who chose Athens as their base⁷.

Why does Xenophon go to all this trouble of mentioning what was before the eyes of every Athenian? Why, in particular, does he bother to begin his treatise with references to agriculture if his ultimate solution lies in mineral wealth? Such emphasis on agriculture cannot be explained simply as a means to provide literary conceit⁸; it serves a far more worldly purpose, namely to persuade those Athenians who still believed that the basis of the Athenian economy rested on agricultural production

⁶ Xen., Poroi, IV.9. Accordingly, at the beginning of the Poroi, stress is placed upon the potential agricultural productivity of Attica, the desired result being self-sufficiency. Hence, the exceptional Attic climate, the suitability of the area to the growth of numerous plant types and the productivity of the sea, all receive a mention (I.3).

⁷ Xen., Poroi, I.6-8; II.1; III.1ff. On the Athenian attitude to agriculture during the fourth century and the effects that this had on Attica's border defences, see J. Ober, Fortress Attica: Defence of the Athenian Land Frontier 404-322 B.C., Leiden, 1985, pp. 19-28.

⁸ It does allow him to indulge in a rather dry literary conceit, to the effect that plants are not the only things that can come from the land - stone (such as marble) and silver are other products of the soil: "...there is land that yields no fruit if sown and yet, when quarried, feeds many times the number it could support if it grew grain" (Xen., Poroi, I.5, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII. p. 195).

of the insecurity of that basis and of the need to establish a more dependable and far more profitable basis.

Outlining the advantages of exploitation of silver reserves, he claims that the greatest advantage of his scheme is that silver maintains its value, whatever the circumstances may be⁹. In times of war, it can remain there in the ground, easily defended, given a few improvisations in Attica's fortifications¹⁰. On the other hand, the reaping of agricultural benefits necessitated a state of peace¹¹. Athenian reliance on the navy and the difficulty with which Attica could be defended from the incursions of a hostile land force meant leaving crops at the mercy of the invader:

"In case any enemy came in force, he would, no doubt, seize any corn or wine or cattle that he found outside; but the silver ore, when he had got it, would be of as much use to him as a heap of stones."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.45, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 221)

The soldier in Xenophon, therefore, perceived that, if Athens was to be truly self-reliant, particularly in times of war, then reliance on agriculture and other traditional means of subsistence had to be replaced, preferably by an indigenous form of revenue that was at the same time easily defensible in wartime, very profitable and dependable and did not prove a source of financial drain on either her citizens¹² or her allies¹³.

Another advantage of Xenophon's proposed solution was that it was not a new idea - a point which he emphasizes. Silver had been mined in

⁹ Xen., Poroi, IV.10.

¹⁰ Xen., Poroi, IV.43-48.

¹¹ Xen., Poroi, IV.9.

¹² Xen., Poroi, IV.1.

¹³ Xen., Poroi, I.1; cf., IV.5,7.

Attica beyond living memory and had proved always its productivity¹⁴. Unexplored reserves greatly outnumbered both those exploited in the past and those currently mined, thus assuring the viability of his project well into the future¹⁵. Moreover, every economic suggestion that he makes in the Poroi is built around the idea of gradual exploitation and expansion of existing resources¹⁶, employing only current levels of expenditure¹⁷. Instead of necessitating an enormous outlay of private and state investment, emphasis is placed upon re-investment of a percentage of the profits¹⁸.

Surveys of Attic silver production suggest that, following a lapse in the early years of the fourth century, by the middle of the century at least, mining operations had risen¹⁹. Following the "Peloponnesian War", the Athenian state did not have at its disposal the sizeable revenue from the allies' tribute²⁰. This lack of finance was reflected in Athens' incapacity to support naval operations on several occasions prior to 355. Lack of finance was a repetitive source of concern.

Xenophon's basic proposals for financial recovery are vindicated. Not only did silver production increase by the 340's to the fifth century

¹⁴ Xen., Poroi, III.2; IV.14-15; cf., IV.17,25,31.

¹⁵ Xen., Poroi, III.2-3; IV.11,26-27.

¹⁶ Xen., Poroi, IV.34-38.

¹⁷ Xen., Poroi, IV.40.

¹⁸ Xen., Poroi, IV.18ff.,23f.,40.

¹⁹ The first known Athenian mining lease, dated to 367/6, refers to an older stele, thus implying a degree of activity in the 370's. For the mining leases, see M. Crosby, "The Leases of the Laureion Mines", in Hesperia, 19 (1950), pp. 189-312 and "More Fragments of Mining Leases from the Athenian Agora", in Hesperia, 26 (1957), pp. 1-23. See also R.J. Hopper, "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.", in BSA, 48 (1953), pp. 250-254. My discussion here of the silver mining activity is indebted to Ober, op. cit., p. 28f.

²⁰ Before the "Peloponnesian War" allied tribute totalled between 390 and 600 talents - a large percentage of Athens' revenue. See A. French, "The Tribute of the Allies", in Historia, 21 (1972), pp. 1-20.

levels, but there appears to have been an increase in the number of slaves. Hyperides claims that the slaves from the silver mines and elsewhere in Attica numbered more than 150,000²¹. Moreover, evidence suggests that silver mining was lucrative for the individual entrepreneurs involved²² and Hopper has estimated that in about 341/0, the state itself netted 160 talents from the leasing of the mines²³. How much this upsurge in mining activity was due to Xenophon's influence is unknown²⁴.

Certainly, the evidence does not suggest that Xenophon's plans for the leasing of state-owned slaves and merchant vessels were implemented. Seemingly, the Athenians were too sceptical of these schemes of public investment. The reasons for their reluctance is unclear, but one may surmise that private investors, cognisant of the state's recent problems with finance, were not prepared to have their funds invested in a state-run enterprise. Certainly, Eubulus did not implement a policy of leasing state-owned slaves and merchant vessels. Instead, he encouraged greater private investment - a more conservative policy as Burke points out. Burke rightly argues that Eubulus' policy avoided the problem of encumbering the state with large numbers of slaves. Burke also notes Demosthenes' accusation that Eubulus sought to increase his friends' profits (Dem. III.29). One should note that, according to (Dem.) VIII.45, the scheme benefited the state as well²⁵.

²¹ Hyper., Fr. 29. N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Oxford, 1967, p. 525, dates this fragment to 338. He suggests that Hyperides' figure may be inflated, but is not a wild exaggeration.

²² Hyper., IV.34 records that Philip and Nausicles had made money from unregistered mines. Current profitability of the mines is referred to by Xen., Poroi, IV.16.

²³ See Hopper, op. cit., pp. 237-239.

²⁴ As J.B. Bury and R. Meiggs commented, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, London, 1975, p. 494.

²⁵ E.M. Burke, "Eubulus, Olynthus and Euboea", in Transactions of the American Philological Association, 114 (1984), p. 113.

Perhaps Xenophon anticipated such reluctance, for he proposes that the state buy merchant vessels and hire them out for profit²⁶. This scheme, he claims, is not very different from the current practice, whereby the state supplied the navy with trireme hulls²⁷. Such an example, however, was hardly inspirational. The failure of the symmories to alleviate financial problems associated with naval operations would hardly encourage investors to speculate on a state-owned merchant fleet.

Despite his attention to the benefits that his mining scheme has in time of war, Xenophon makes it clear that greater profitability can be gained during peace time. For the present study, the most striking proposal is for the establishment of a board of "peace guardians" (εἰρηνοφύλακται). The purpose of the board is to promote Athens:

"If it seems clear that the state cannot obtain a full revenue from all sources unless she has peace, is it not worth while to set up a board of guardians of peace? Were such a board constituted, it would help to increase the popularity of the city and to make it more attractive and more densely thronged with visitors from all parts."

(Xen., Poroi, V.1, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 225)

Xenophon envisages that with peace the influx of visitors, created by the board's encouragement of tourism and trade, will increase the city's revenue, revenue which can be used to expand the silver mining industry²⁸.

Certainly, in this and subsequent passages, peace is regarded as being more beneficial than war. This is implied at various points where he

²⁶ Xen., Poroi, III.14 (merchant vessels); IV.18-26 (slaves for the silver mines).

²⁷ Xen., Poroi, III.14.

²⁸ G.L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 56, makes the interesting suggestion that the functions of Xenophon's proposed board of "peace guardians" were adopted by the theoric commission.

refers to the great expense that the state and private citizens incur during wartime. He mentions the "large sums contributed by the state when Lysistratus was in command and troops were sent to aid the Arcadians"²⁹ and again in the time of Hegesileus"³⁰. How much the state provided for these expeditions is unknown, but Athenian finances were placed under great pressure during wartime.

Xenophon refers also to naval expenditure, emphasizing the uncertainty of monetary return:

"I am also aware that large expenditure is frequently incurred to send warships abroad, though none can tell whether the venture will be for better or worse and the only thing certain is that the subscribers will never see their money back nor even enjoy any part of what they contribute."

(Xen., Poroi, III.8, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 201)

Furthermore, the profits to be gained from his proposed ventures are contrasted with the imposition of eisphorai during the "Social War":

"...if you think that the burdens (eisphorai) imposed during the late war make it impossible for you to contribute anything at all -- well, keep down the cost of administration during the next year to the amount that the taxes yielded before the peace; and invest the balances over and above that amount³¹, which you will

²⁹ Xen., Poroi, III.7. The date of this incident is uncertain. A Lysistratus was eponymous archon in 369 (see Harding, op. cit., p. 139), but this may not be the same man. Marchant dates the expedition to 366, possibly on the basis of Xen., Hell., VII.4.6. Xenophon, however, makes no reference to Lysistratus.

³⁰ Xen., Poroi, III.7. This probably refers to the 6,000 reinforcements led by Hegesileus in 362 at the battle of Mantinea. See Diod., XV.34.2.

³¹ Xenophon envisages investing the balance in state owned silver mining operations.

get with peace, with considerate treatment of resident aliens and merchants³², with the growth of imports and exports due to the concentration of a larger population³³ and with the expansion of harbour and market dues³⁴, so that the investment will bring in the largest revenue."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.40, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 219)³⁵

The clear implication is that greater returns are available in time of peace, because mercantile interests and their expansion are not under the debilitating influence of war.

Nonetheless, advantages gained in peace time can be exploited to the city's benefit during time of war. The influx of population is advantageous in wartime, for, as Xenophon claims, manpower is the most serviceable instrument of war:

"...if any fear that this scheme would prove worthless in the event of war breaking out, they should observe that, with this system at work, war becomes far more formidable to the aggressors than to the city. For what instrument is more serviceable for war than men? We should have enough of them to supply crews to many ships of the state; and many men available for service in the ranks as infantry could press the enemy hard, if they were treated with consideration."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.41-2, trans. by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, pp. 219-221)

This is an extremely important passage because it helps to clarify Xenophon's position on war and peace. Peace is clearly regarded as the

³² See Xen., Poroi, II.1-7, III.1-4, 11-13, for his proposals to attract more resident aliens and merchants to reside in Athens.

³³ See Xen., Poroi, III.5, II.6, IV.49-50, for the means he suggests to increase imports and exports.

³⁴ See Xen., Poroi, III.5.

³⁵ Cf., Xen., Poroi, V.12.

most beneficial climate in which to increase the prosperity of both state and individual. The possibility of war, however, seems to loom as a constant threat to peace. Indeed, Xenophon claims that his plans for using the silver resources will not damage Athens' prosperity even when war breaks out³⁶. It is important to note also that he is speaking here of Athens being forced by an invader to fight a defensive war in order to preserve its resources. Nonetheless, such suggestions reveal that, while Xenophon realised the advantages of making the most of peace after the "Social War", he maintained his strong conviction in the need for the state and its inhabitants to be prepared fully for a renewed outbreak of war. In no sense, then, can Xenophon's espousal of the benefits of peace be seen to represent a policy of pacifism.

Clearly, Xenophon found the idea of encouraging a greater influx of population enticing, because it would increase Athenian manpower in time of war. As Marchant suggests, slaves and not resident aliens are envisaged here as the resource to supplement naval and mercantile crews and the infantry³⁷. In view of an earlier passage in the Poroi, Marchant's interpretation must stand. Xenophon speaks of relieving the resident aliens of serving in the infantry, along with the citizens³⁸ and

³⁶ During the "Decelean War" (413-404) production of the silver mines was brought to a standstill because the Spartan force in Decelea prevented the Athenians from coming out from their city walls and mining. Xenophon, however, clearly supports the strategy of a border defence, reinforced by a series of tower fortifications on the silver fields. Such a plan effectively dismissed the strategy employed by Pericles during the "Peloponnesian War", whereby Athenian chora was abandoned to the invader. See Ober, op. cit., p. 35.

³⁷ Marchant (ed.), Xenophon: Scripta Minora, vol. VII, in the Loeb Classical Library edition, London, 1968, p. 221, n. 1.

³⁸ Xen., Poroi, II.2.

granting them the right to serve in the cavalry³⁹. Xenophon's suggested enrolment of slaves in the state's crews and particularly in the infantry is remarkable (IV.42). Armed service was by tradition reserved for Athenian citizens. Evidently, however, military service no longer maintained its honourable position in the eyes of many Athenians, hence Xenophon's reference to the current practice of enrolling resident aliens in the infantry. The implication of this is clear - Athenian citizens were not volunteering for service in sufficient numbers. Furthermore, judging by Xenophon's comment, even the elite cavalry was suffering from a shortage of recruits.

Besides the need to provide more men for military service, Xenophon deplored the current level of training for war. The following passage (IV.51) shows clearly that Xenophon was greatly interested in putting Athens on a firm "footing" for warfare⁴⁰. In particular, he envisages that prosperity of peace will enable the citizens to increase their military training:

"If the plans that I have put forward are carried out, I agree that, apart from the improvement in our financial position, we shall become a people more obedient, better disciplined and more efficient in war. For the classes undergoing physical training will take more pains in the gymnasium when they receive their maintenance in full than they take under the superintendants of the torch races; and the classes on garrison duty in a fortress, or serving as targeteers, or patrolling the country will show greater

³⁹ Xen., Poroi, II.5. See R.L. Sargent, "The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare", in Classical Philology, 22 (1927), p. 267. As Sargent suggested, "there is no reason to think that this random suggestion bore any more fruit than his other visionary schemes".

⁴⁰ Xenophon's interest in preparing Athens for war is none too surprising, given his military background.

alacrity in carrying out all these duties when the maintenance is duly supplied for the work done."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.51-2, trans by E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, pp. 223-225)

This is not advocacy for pacifism, since Xenophon is preparing for the eventuality of war. Even though he perceives that greater benefits can be attained through peace, he does not suggest means to end all war. Peace is a period in which the state and the individual can recoup the financial losses sustained in time of war. Peace is a time to prepare for war.

This passage also reveals that the failure of the state to provide sufficient maintenance was hindering the adequate defence of the state. The dissatisfaction of the citizens was being reflected in the performance of their defensive duties. Xenophon claims that the implementation of his proposals will enable the state to provide full and regular payments, thus heightening the enthusiasm of Athens' defence forces. Such an argument is hardly pacifistic, since it regards preparation for war (albeit defensive war) as desirable. Note also that obedience, discipline and efficiency in war are upheld as qualities which the Athenian people should strive for.

Even Xenophon's reference to a "lasting peace" in the following passage is undercut by his subsequent assertion that Athens should fight "just" wars⁴¹:

"If any are inclined to think that a lasting peace for our city will involve a loss of her power and glory and fame in Greece, they too, in my opinion, are out in their calculations. For I presume that those states are reckoned the happiest that enjoy the longest period of unbroken peace; and of all states Athens is by nature most suited to flourish in peace. For if the state is tranquil, what class of men will not heed her?"

⁴¹ Xen., Poroi, V.13.

Shipowners and merchants will head the list. Then there will be those rich in corn and wine and oil and cattle; men possessed of brains and money to invest; craftsmen and professors and philosophers; poets and the people who make use of their works; those to whom anything sacred or secular appeals that is worth seeing or hearing. Besides, where will those who want to buy or sell many things quickly meet with better success in their efforts than at Athens?"

(Xen., Poroi, V.2-4, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 225-227)

By pointing to the wide range of people whose cultural, religious or economic pursuits would benefit from Athens' prosperity, Xenophon clearly is trying to promote the cause of peace. It is peace, not war, that provides Athenian prosperity. He discounts the view that cessation of warlike ventures will cause Athens to lose power, glory and fame⁴². He urges the Athenians to accept that these qualities can be attained at far less risk and expense through the sponsorship of peaceful activities.

One should be careful, however, not to construe Xenophon's desire for 'lasting peace' as advocacy for pacifism. In the context of the discourse, the term 'lasting peace' does not express the desire to end all wars, because, as was shown above, he encourages the Athenians to be more meticulous in their preparations for war and, subsequently, he suggests means by which Athens' economy may be secured in wartime. There are, then, clear indications that Xenophon believed war to be inevitable. Consequently, the term "lasting peace" expresses his desire for Athens to enjoy the longest period of peace possible; a turn of phrase which he actually uses in the

⁴² Xenophon does not reveal the identity of those who believed that "a lasting peace" for Athens "will involve a loss of her power and glory and fame in Greece". The identity of those who opposed a "lasting peace" will be discussed in the last chapter.

same passage. Accordingly, while Xenophon clearly regarded peace as beneficial, it is wrong to suggest that he upheld pacifism as the means to achieve peace. The pursuit of economic activity is said to augur benefits for the recipients in time of peace, but this economic activity only sponsors a continuation of peace - it alone does not assure peace. Preparation for war helps the state to prevent the loss of prosperity, gained in time of peace, when a renewed outbreak of war occurs.

In the Poroi, Xenophon does not advocate all war - only defensive war. In the following passage he condemns vehemently the use of war for the sake of imperialistic ambition:

"...there are some who wish the state to recover her ascendancy and they may think that it is more likely to be won by war than by peace. Let such, in the first place, call to mind the Persian Wars. Was it by coercing the Greeks or by rendering services to them that we became leaders of the fleet and treasurers of the league funds? Further, after the state had been stripped of her empire through seeming to exercise her authority with excessive harshness, did not the islanders even then restore to us the presidency of the fleet by their own free will, when we refrained from acts of injustice?"

Xen., Poroi, V.5-6, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 227)

Xenophon sees in the trouble caused by Athens' fifth century imperialism a salutary lesson: hegemony (ascendancy, leadership) is won by the rendering of services, for the benefit of all concerned, not through the coercion of other Greek states. Athens must refrain from unjust acts. This is an indictment of Athens' treatment of her allies. The unjust treatment stemmed from Athens' inability to find sufficient funds to finance naval operations. As a result, over-zealous commanders were forced at times to use coercion in order to exact syntaxeis due. Xenophon argues that, if his proposals are implemented, then the

financial strain will not fall on Athens and, as a consequence, upon her allies. Even here, however, he does not condemn all war - only war in which the Athenian state is constrained by flagging finances to use imperialistic methods in order to conduct that war.

Active sponsorship of peace throughout Greece is upheld in the Poroi, supported by historical examples of Athenian beneficence:

"...did not the Thebans place themselves under the leadership of the Athenians in return for our good offices? Yet once again, it was not the effect of coercion on our part but of generous treatment, that the Lacedaemonians permitted the Athenians to arrange the leadership as they chose."⁴³

(Xen., Poroi, V.7, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 227)

This reference to the formation of the "Second Athenian League" is used to support Xenophon's call for a peace-making mission designed to put an end to the "Sacred War"⁴⁴:

"...owing to the confusion prevalent in Greece, an opportunity, I think, has fallen to the state (sc. Athens) to win back the Greeks without trouble, without danger and without expense. For she has it in her power to try to reconcile the warring states, she has it in her power to compose the factions contending in their midst. And were it apparent that you are striving to make the Delphic shrine independent, as it used to be, not by joining in war, but by sending embassies up and down Greece, I for my part should not be in the least surprised if you found the Greeks all of one

⁴³ This refers to Thebes joining the "Second Athenian League". The service rendered was the assistance given to refugees during the Spartan occupation of the Cadmea. See Xen., Hell., V.2.31; Diod., XV.20.2; Plut., Pelopidas, 5.3; Aelius Aristides, XIII.172. IG II² 43, 1.80, refers to Theban membership in the League.

⁴⁴ The "Sacred War" broke out in 355. See Diod., XVI.23.1. As G.L. Cawkwell ("Eubulus", in JHS, 83 (1963), p. 53) points out, Xen., Poroi, V.9 is a proposal to establish a "Common Peace".

mind, banded together by oath and united in alliance against any that attempted to seize the shrine in the event of the Phocians abandoning it. Were you to show that you are striving for peace in every land and on every sea, I do think that, next to the safety of their own country, all men would put the safety of Athens first in their prayers."

(Xen., Poroi, V.8-10, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, pp. 227-229)

This admirable proposal for a peace-keeping venture does reveal Xenophon's committed desire for an end to the "Sacred War". Furthermore, his opposition to Athens' support for Phocis in the dispute over the Delphic shrine is evident⁴⁵. He speaks of Athenian neutrality, reconciliation of the opposing factions and even an extension of peace to every land and sea. As Cawkwell has suggested⁴⁶, this passage amounts to a call for a renewed "Common Peace" between the Greek states.

The proposed venture, however, is not expanded beyond this embryonic stage. As a result, it is extremely naive. Athens, he asserts, will win back the Greeks without trouble and the rest of the Greeks will be receptive to the idea of a neutral shrine - claims which are clearly only postulations. His assertion that the Delphic shrine had once been independent is strictly correct, but the key protagonists in the current dispute, Phocis and the Delphians, had been disputing control of Delphi for centuries⁴⁷. Even if Delphi regained independence, the dispute would still prevail between the protagonists. Pressure from the more powerful

⁴⁵ Athens sided with Phocis during the "Sacred War": Diod., XVI.23.1; 27.3.

⁴⁶ See above, n. 44.

⁴⁷ "Sacred War" is a modern term given to the various struggles for control of the Delphic shrine in central Greece. The first war broke out in about 590 B.C., the second in 448 and this, the third, in 355. For a general description of these conflicts, see Bury & Meiggs, op. cit., pp. 110-111, 223, 420ff.

states might delay the recurrence of hostilities, but there was no means to ensure that the states would maintain their peace-keeping stance should a future outbreak occur. Xenophon claims that such outbreaks would be prevented by binding the Greeks together by oaths and alliance. This was hardly a new, untried concept. Greek peace settlements by tradition were formalized with oaths and, at times, strengthened by alliance - oaths and alliances such as those employed in the cases of Chios and Byzantium⁴⁸. The recent "Social War" saw Athens and these two states in conflict, in spite of these formal ties.

One should doubt also Xenophon's assertion that Athens had it in her power to reconcile the warring states and their internal factions. Following the "Social War", Athenian prestige was at a low ebb. Even Xenophon claims that Athens was regarded with suspicion by the Greek states⁴⁹, undoubtedly as a result of her attempts to coerce the rebels to remain in the League⁵⁰. Surely, such a peace-making venture as that proposed by Xenophon necessitated the goodwill of the Greeks. Accordingly, the impression given by Xenophon that this venture could be undertaken immediately - with instantaneous effect - is a gross exaggeration. The Greeks had witnessed evidence of a trend toward Athenian imperialism: Athens had established garrisons during the "Social War" on allied soil, cleruchies had been set up in the Aegean region in the territories of non-League members and Athenian generals had exerted excessive zealotry

⁴⁸ See IG II² 34 (Chios); IG II² 41 (Byzantium).

⁴⁹ Xen., Poroi, I.1; cf., VI.1.

⁵⁰ Diod., XVI.7.3f., 21-22.2.

in the collection of syntaxeis⁵¹. In view of this, it is very difficult to imagine how Greek suspicion - suspicion that had been growing, probably since the mid-360's - could be pushed out of mind almost instantaneously and replaced by the conviction that Athens genuinely desired a peace that would benefit all states and not just Athens.

At best, Xenophon's proposed mission of peace may have proved successful once Athens had shaken off Greek suspicion by active neutrality in the "Sacred War". Time, however, was needed to recoup her former prestige, particularly after her defeat in the "Social War" had brought into question her strength as a military power. An offer of peace at this stage therefore could be construed as a sign of weakness, rather than as a genuine attempt to end the "Sacred War".

Accordingly, it is not surprising to find no evidence that Athens implemented Xenophon's peace-making venture. On the contrary, the Athenians sided with the Phocians in the "Sacred War". Although their active participation in the conflict was practically non-existent in the late 350's⁵², the Athenians did not decline the gold offered to them by the Phocian warlords: gold that had been stripped from the Delphic shrine⁵³. Such a policy reveals that Athens could not rid herself of suspicion of Theban

⁵¹ Athenian cleruchies were established at Samos (365): Diod., XVIII. 18.9; cf., schol. on Aesch., I.53 records a reinforcement to the original cleruchy in the year 361/0. Potidaea also received a cleruchy in 362/1 at its own request: see esp. IG II² 114, lines 1 (date), 4-6 and 9-11; Dem., VI.20; (Dem.), VII.10. See also the discussion by J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?, Berkeley, 1981, p. 148f.

Garrisons and "governors" are attested from the early years of the League. See Cargill, op. cit., pp. 152-156.

⁵² The only notable intervention of Athens in the "Sacred War" took place in 352, when Athenian troops marched out and prevented Philip of Macedon from passing through the Pass of Thermopylae. This action was to preserve Athens itself, rather than purely to support Phocis. See Diod., XVI.37.3; 38.1; Justin, VIII.2.8-12; Dem., XIX.84.

⁵³ Diod., XVI.33.2; 37.2.

ambition in central Greece. This suspicion was well-founded because of Thebes' successful attempt to utilize the Amphictionic Council to its own advantage⁵⁴. As a result, alliance with Phocis and war with Thebes were deemed necessary. Athens benefited as well by not committing her military resources to the conflict needlessly. The Phocians bore the brunt of the conflict, while Athens' treasury benefited from the influx of gold. In the Poroi, Xenophon argues that "financially war was less profitable than peace"⁵⁵, but the Athenians found these means around the expense of war.

Xenophon, however, draws on Athens' experience during the "Social War":

"If...anyone supposes that financially war is more profitable to the state than peace, I really do not know how the truth of this can be tested better than by considering once more what has been the experience of our state in the past. He will find in the old days a very great amount of money was paid into the treasury in time of peace and that the whole of it was spent in time of war⁵⁶; he will conclude on consideration that in our own time the effect of the late war (sc. "Social War") on our revenues was that many of them ceased, while those that came in were exhausted by the multitude of expenses; whereas the cessation of war by sea has been followed by a rise in the revenues⁵⁷ and has allowed

⁵⁴ On which see Bury & Meiggs, op. cit., p. 420f.

⁵⁵ Xen., Poroi, V.11f.

⁵⁶ This refers to the situation during the "Peloponnesian War". Prior to that war, Athens had amassed 7,000 talents in her treasury. See Aesch., II.75.

⁵⁷ It has been suggested by R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 76, that the Poroi cannot be dated to 354 because it does not allow sufficient time for this recovery of revenues. One must note, however, that Xenophon does not specify that a large rise in revenues has become evident, only that a rise has taken place. Accordingly, the traditional date of 355/4 must stand. Any perceived rise, however small, was enough for Xenophon to utilize its mention in order to convince his readers of the benefits of peace.

the citizens to devote them to any purpose they choose."

(Xen., Poroi, V.11-12, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 229)

Finance for expeditions relied heavily upon burdensome impositions on private citizens. As a result, effective naval operations were incapacitated by shortfalls in the sum levied and by delays in the collecting process. War did drain the state treasury and the financial reserves of individuals. Xenophon's reference here to the financial benefits of peace, as opposed to the drain of war, is ably supported by his earlier comments on the promotion of commercial activity in peace time.

Nonetheless, Xenophon does not reject the necessity of "just" war:

"...Someone may ask me, 'Do you mean to say that, even if she is wronged, the state should remain at peace with the offender?' No, certainly not; but I do say that our vengeance would follow far more swiftly on our enemies if we provoked nobody by wrong-doing; for then they would look in vain for an ally."

(Xen., Poroi, V.13, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 229)

This advocacy of defensive war is in line with his earlier proposal to strengthen Attic fortifications in the mining district⁵⁸, a proposal designed to facilitate Athenian expulsion of any invading force. In view of such arguments, it is impossible to assert that Xenophon's Poroi supports any pacifistic policy.

Xenophon's desire to prepare Athens for war is clear from his remarks in the Poroi about mercenaries and the complacency of his

⁵⁸ Xen., Poroi, IV.43f.

contemporaries towards military service:

"Apart from the personal risk it is no small thing (sc. for resident aliens) to leave their trades and their private affairs. The state itself too would gain if the citizens armed in the ranks together and no longer found themselves in the same company with Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians and barbarians of all sorts, of whom a large part of our alien population consists. In addition to the advantage of dispensing with the services of these men, it would be an ornament to the state that the Athenians should be thought to rely on themselves rather than on the help of foreigners in fighting their battles."

(Xen., Poroi, II.2-4, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 197)

A recommendation for citizens to participate in battle instead of relying on hired help, does not accord with pacifism. Furthermore, Xenophon argues that the profits from slaves employed in the silver mines could be distributed among the populace⁵⁹. This, he claims, would ease the financial burden, enabling the Athenians to apply themselves more fully to the defence of the state⁶⁰.

An earlier passage in the Poroi reveals the mind of the old soldier, Xenophon, slipping back to thoughts of warlike pursuits. A strong demand for silver, he suggests, indicates that the state is prosperous, but it is significant to note how Xenophon expects this prosperity to be reflected in Athenian society:

"The men will spend more money on fine arms and good horses and magnificent houses and establishments and the women go in for expensive clothes and gold jewelry."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.8, trans. by E.C. Marchant,
Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 207)

⁵⁹ Xen., Poroi, IV.23ff.

⁶⁰ Xen., Poroi, IV.51-2.

Why does Xenophon direct his attention towards individual materialism? Clearly, it is a rhetorical ploy designed to boost the popularity of his proposal by clarifying the advantages to the individual which these proposals hold. One doubts, however, whether Xenophon has assessed accurately the advantages of prosperity that his contemporaries would have relished. Not all Athenian citizens could have afforded to spend money on "fine arms and good horses" and the luxury items mentioned by Xenophon⁶¹.

Moreover, there is reason to believe that, even if some could have afforded to outlay money on such items, they would not have been inclined to do so. From the Hipparchicus of Xenophon, it can be inferred that some of the Athenian cavalry commanders were too lax in the training and maintenance of their squads⁶², which suggests a reluctance among the wealthier citizens to indulge in adequate military preparations. Xenophon, therefore, relishes the prospect of prosperity, because it presented Athens with the opportunity to devote herself to the preparations for war. The acquisition of "fine arms and good horses" is envisaged as a means to boost Athenian performance in war, not merely to provide ornaments with which to parade around in peace time.

Nonetheless, even though Xenophon desires to prepare the state for war, by no means does he endorse war as a benefit to the state. In the very next section comes his most compelling indictment of war in the Poroi:

"If, on the other hand, states are diseased owing to failure of the harvest or war, the land goes out of cultivation and there is much more insistent demand for cash to pay for food and mercenaries."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.9, trans. adapted from E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 207)

⁶¹ See M.M. Markle, "Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens", in CRUX, 1985, p. 296f., for the annual incomes of Athenian workmen. Clearly, Xenophon is stressing the benefits which would accrue to his readership, the upper socio-economic group.

⁶² Xen., Hipparchicus, I.8-9, 22-23.

Xenophon is concerned particularly with the economic effects of crop failure and failure in war. Note how he sees the latter as having the detrimental effect of increasing the demand for mercenaries. His subsequent proposals to boost Athenian prosperity⁶³ are designed to relieve pressure in these times of crisis. Clearly, he implies that losses in war are detrimental, because Athens has to spend more on mercenary troops⁶⁴. On the other hand, victory in war is not condemned, presumably because with victory one could acquire booty.

It is also significant that the demand for mercenaries is described as a consequence of a diseased state. Failure in war produces this demand. By this, Xenophon appears to imply that failure in war results from the refusal of citizens to bear full responsibility for the defence of the state. Laxity in training and the lack of commitment to serve promote failure in war, so that mercenaries have to be hired to overcome this self-inflicted weakness. Such an indictment of citizen reluctance to serve is not without credibility⁶⁵ and, certainly, mercenary troops created problems when Athens could not provide their pay on time⁶⁶. Again, however, Xenophon implies that citizen troops would be less expensive to maintain than mercenary troops, but one strongly suspects that citizens would be just as insistent in their demands for pay as mercenaries. The only viable argument, then, that Xenophon puts forward for the preferment of citizen troops is the honourable option of being seen to serve in the defence of their own state.

⁶³ Xen., Poroi, IV.13ff.

⁶⁴ Xen., Poroi, IV.9.

⁶⁵ Referring to 362, Demosthenes claims that conscription had been used (Dem., I.6-7).

⁶⁶ See schol. on Dem., IV.19.

Nonetheless, in spite of these proposals for the means to fight a defensive war, Xenophon maintains that peace is far more profitable than war. He claims that implementation of his economic proposals would permit the Athenian people to be maintained in comfort and would relieve the rich of the expensive burdens of war⁶⁷. This reference to eisphorai would have appealed to those who were expected to pay the war tax. Accordingly, his recommendation to utilize profits from his proposed silver mining scheme may have fallen on receptive ears among the rich of Athens. The less well-to-do may have been impressed by the proposal to use part of the profits to provide maintenance for Athenian soldiers. Undoubtedly, both proposals were designed to overcome Athenian reluctance to commit themselves bodily and financially in the event of war.

Why, though, does Xenophon emphasize the need for Athenians to serve personally in the armed forces? It has been shown that he considered mercenaries an unnecessary expense, but he also considered that a matter of honour was at stake: "it would be an ornament to the state that the Athenians should be thought to rely on themselves rather than on the help of foreigners in fighting their battles⁶⁸". Perhaps he had taken note of a recent example of mercenary misconduct while in Athens' employ. In 355 an incident displayed the mercenary's lack of loyalty to his employer and his lack of discipline when payment was delayed. The incident is recorded by a scholion to Demosthenes:

"When the King of the Persians sent orders to the coastal satraps to disband their mercenary armies on account of their excessive cost, the satraps discharged the soldiers, who were about ten thousand in number. They went to Chares,

⁶⁷ Xen., Poroi, IV.40.

⁶⁸ Xen., Poroi, II.4.

the Athenian general, who had a force of mercenaries and made him their leader. Artabazus, a Persian, who was in revolt from the King and at war with him, sent (a message) to Chares, inviting him to ship his army over into the King's territory. When the soldiers put pressure on Chares, saying that if he did not provide them with maintenance they would go away to one who was offering (it), he (Chares) was constrained to ship the army over."⁶⁹

(Schol. on Dem., IV.19, trans. by P. Harding, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, vol. II, p. 72)

Such an incident would have horrified Xenophon, an ex-commander who expected from his subordinates both loyalty and discipline⁷⁰. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find Xenophon condemning reliance on mercenaries in the aftermath of the "Social War".

Xenophon's attitude towards peace and war, as expressed in the Poroi, may be summed up as follows. Of the two, peace was the most desirable, because it offered the opportunity for the growth of the state's prosperity. Both state and individuals benefited from the influx of population and the expansion of trade and industry. He is at pains to show that prosperity comes through peace and not through imperialistic designs. Peaceful activity is to be encouraged by the institution of a board of "peace guardians", who are to oversee the implementation of his proposals. Abroad, too, peace is to be encouraged by sending ambassadors to the Greek cities in an effort to bring an end to the "Sacred War".

Yet, in spite of its high praise of peace and its benefits, the Poroi does not expound pacifism. Xenophon's reference to "lasting peace"

⁶⁹ Cf., schol. on Dem., III.31. On the unreliability of mercenaries, see also Polyaeus, Strategemata, III.9.57, who records the defection of mercenaries supposedly in Athenian employ during the occupation of Corinth in 393-1.

⁷⁰ Xen., Hipparchicus, I.7f., 10, 24.

does not mean a desire to see an end to all war. Xenophon was far less optimistic. The term refers only to the desire for Athens to enjoy the longest period of peace possible. Xenophon lays bare his conviction that war is inevitable. Even though he supports a peace mission to end the "Sacred War" and condemns war for the sake of imperialistic ambition, Xenophon does not ask the Athenians to shun all war. "Just" war, when Athenian territory is threatened by the aggression of others, must be undertaken. To this end, he describes means to preserve Athenian prosperity in time of war: namely, by improving fortifications and encouraging citizens to take a more active rôle in the defence of the state. Moreover, his economic proposals not only sponsor prosperity in peace, but are aimed to relieve the state and individuals of financial burdens in time of war.

Accordingly, it is clear that the Poroi is not a brochure outlining the benefits of pacifism. Nor is it simply a collection of economic schemes designed to restore prosperity after the "Social War". It is a vivid outline of Xenophon's proposals for economic recovery and opposition to needless intervention in wars where Athens' interests are not directly concerned.

IV

DEMOSTHENES, ON THE SYMMORIES

Delivered in 355, the speech entitled On the Symmories represents an effort by Demosthenes to persuade the Athenians of the need for greater preparation for war, particularly in the areas of the navy boards (symmories) and the state's military finances. While the speech does oppose Athenian initiation of immediate war with Persia, Jaeger has misconstrued this to represent a "policy" of pacifism, which was intended to extend beyond the immediate crisis with Persia¹. He argues that Demosthenes was, at this time, associated with the prominent politician, Eubulus, and that Demosthenes' speech represented Eubulus' presumed "policy" of financial recovery - a recovery primarily sponsored by encouraging peace in Athens' foreign relations. Such efforts to identify the nature of Eubulus' programme will be discussed in full in the last chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether On the Symmories argues for peace beyond the immediate situation with Persia.

The contention that Demosthenes' aversion to war extended only to the proposed initiation of war against Persia and not to his own proposals to prepare for war in general, bears up under closer examination of the speech. Therein, Demosthenes employs the words πόλεμος and πολεμέω (to

¹ W. Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of his Policy, Cambridge, 1938, esp. pp. 69-70, 75f. and 77f. For a sound rebuttal of this view, see L. Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Chicago, 1981, p. 22f. and n. 37.

make war, go to war) on fourteen occasions². As Table 2 shows, in nearly every instance, the present proposal for war is opposed. Future wars, on the other hand, are looked upon favourably should the circumstances promote Athenian interests.

Table 2

Usages of πόλεμος and πολεμέω in Demosthenes, XIV

Reference	Attitude to Proposed War and War in General
XIV.3:	Negative reaction to proposal: Positive, if Athens has support of the other Greeks.
XIV.3:	Negative. Athens has to be careful that grounds for initiating conflict are equitable and just. At present these grounds are insufficient: One can infer favourable response in future if this condition is met.
XIV.4:	Negative. King's aims are still obscure: Once King has made clear his intention to invade, war viable.
XIV.5:	Negative reaction to the private wars of the Greeks which prevent united Greek opposition to the King. Not in itself a reference to the proposed war.
XIV.7	Negative. Athens has to be careful not to engage in war on unequal terms. An immediate initiation of war would fail to take into account the current inequality of resources. Again, one can infer a favourable reaction to war if equality can be achieved.
XIV.8	Negative reaction to the orators who are vehement in urging the Athenians to war, refers to proposed war.
XIV.9:	Negative. A war with the King would distress Athens. This must refer to any war with Persia and not simply the current proposal. Nonetheless, this statement does not reject a Persian war as untenable. It speaks of the difficulty it will inflict, particularly with reference to the strain on Athenian resources.
XIV.9:	Positive. Boastful claim that any action in the course of the war would be an easy affair. War here can refer to both the proposed war and any future war with Persia. Boast based on the alleged supremacy of the Athenian troops.
XIV.9:	Negative. Every war requires a fleet, money and posts. Current proposal ill-advised because the King has a greater abundance of these. Again, one can infer that if this inequality can be overcome, then war becomes acceptable.

² Dem., XIV: πόλεμος : 3 (twice), 5, 7, 9 (three times), 10, 27, 32, 40;
πολεμέω : 4, 8, 38.

Table 2 (continued)

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- XIV.10: Negative. Athens should not begin the war (the proposed war), though the Athenians should be prepared for action against their existing enemies and Persia if the latter attempts to injure Athens. War, therefore, looked upon as a positive form of retribution.
- XIV.27: Negative. An eisphora levied to finance the current proposal would provide insufficient money. Should wait until the King makes his intention to invade clear. Finance will then be available and, consequently, war will be viable.
- XIV.32: Neutral. Everything at stake in a war with Persia. This general reference is designed to quell fears that Greek mercenaries would be willing to fight on the King's behalf.
- XIV.38: Negative. Declaration of war which Athens cannot wage would betray the weaknesses of the Greeks. Again, one can infer a favourable response if the proposed war was made at a time when the Greeks are united against the hostile forces of the King.
- XIV.40: Positive. Past wars between Athens and Persia made Athens great. This is used to argue the view that the King would not dare to invade anyway, because he fears that Athens will triumph again.
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Table 2 shows clearly that whenever Demosthenes refers specifically to the proposed initiation of immediate war with Persia, his opinion is consistently negative. However, when regarded in their proper contexts, several of these usages also imply that his opposition is dictated purely by current circumstance. There always seems to be an underlying condition that if these unfavourable circumstances can be alleviated, then war with Persia will be a justifiable proposition. Moreover, the necessity to fight Athens' existing enemies is never rejected. Accordingly, the following discussion will concentrate on these passages, which have this conditional emphasis.

Referring to the proposed war with the King, Demosthenes claims that there are those Athenians who are "overdaring in urging Athens to war"³. Clearly, this negative reaction applies only to the current proposal and not to war in general. The same cannot be said of (7), where

³ Dem., XIV.8.

he warns the Athenians not to engage themselves in the war upon unequal terms. In the context ὁ πόλεμος refers to the proposed war. As far as that proposal goes, Demosthenes subsequently argues that Athens cannot fight the King on equal terms at present⁴. His estimation of inequality of capacity to fight war successfully is based on two essential criteria: diplomacy and military resources. As such, Demosthenes' opposition to the proposed war is well based.

Firstly, on the matter of diplomacy, Demosthenes advises the Athenians not to go to war with the King without the support of the Greeks⁵. Secondly, he claims that it is in the interests of the Athenians to be careful that their grounds for entering into war are equitable and just⁶. These two references to war are intended, no doubt, as general advice on all wars that Athens might care to engage in. Nonetheless, it is clear that they also have particular reference to the present proposal for war. In its context, it is only this proposal - not all wars - that attracts Demosthenes' negative reaction. Note how he goes on to point out that, at present, the Athenians do not enjoy the support of the Greeks and that

⁴ Dem., XIV.9f.

⁵ Dem., XIV.3.

⁶ Dem., XIV.3.

their grounds for war, it is implied, are neither equitable nor just⁷. Neither statement, however, denies the acceptability of war once these conditions are met. The same, too, can be said of Demosthenes' subsequent explanation:

"...if there were clear and unmistakable signs of the King's hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us..., but if we force on war, while his aims are still obscure... we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect."

(Dem., XIV.4f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 385)

The usage of conditional clauses, such as these, has a decided rhetorical ploy behind it. By stating his opposition to the proposed war with conditional overtones, Demosthenes can declare his opposition without rejecting the desirability of future war with Persia. In the last section of this chapter, it is argued that anti-Persian sentiment was rife in Athens when Demosthenes delivered this speech. Consequently, when stating his opposition to the current proposal, he has to be wary lest he give the

⁷ See esp. Dem., XIV.4-6. Given the current situation, Demosthenes was correct to oppose an Athenian initiation of war with Persia. His claim that the Greeks are by no means common friends of one another is something of an understatement. Two years previously, Athens had been involved in a conflict with Thebes in Euboea (Aesch., III.85; Dem., XXI.174; Diod., XVI.7.2). Athens had also been at war with Philip II of Macedon since 356 (Aesch., II.70: "we went to war in the first place over the question of Amphipolis". Cf., 21. See also Aesch., III.54, Isoc., V.2 and IG II² 127 (πόλεμος πρὸς Φίλιππον) of the year 356. This date is upheld by J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London, 1976, p. 66) and the "Social War", between Athens and her disaffected allies, by now had entered its second year (Diod., XVI.21.1ff). If Athens was to engage herself in yet another war, it was reasonable for Demosthenes to assume that little support would be gained from Athens' existing enemies. Certainly, the rebellious states of the Confederacy were prepared to accept the aid of Mausolus of Caria in the "Social War" (Diod., XVI.7.3). Hence, Demosthenes again was correct in asserting that certain Greek states repose more confidence in the King, who was an ally of Mausolus. The divisiveness of the Greek states was clearly emphasized by the "Sacred War" which, according to Diod., XVI.23.1, began in 355/4.

impression that he sympathizes with Persia.

Thus, when we find him advising the Athenians not to issue a summons which the Greeks will not obey and declare a war the Athenians cannot wage⁸, these negative observations are countermanded by positive projections for some future time. He strongly implies, for instance, that an open display of hostile intentions by the King would provide Athens with the necessary equitable and just grounds for war⁹. Once Athens had undertaken all preparations to fight on equal terms, war would become equitable, not only because Athens' forces would be logistically on a par with the Persian force, but because a strong military force has a perceived diplomatic advantage - it attracts allies.

If, on the other hand, Athens instigated war when she did not possess the forces to fight on equal terms, the result would be disastrous diplomatically. The Athenians would be forced to fight other Greeks or, as he puts it, to let Greeks fall under the power of the King by driving them to side against Athens¹⁰.

This argument of Demosthenes' would prove farcical if we take it that he considered it immoral for Athens to fight other Greeks, irrespective of circumstance when, in recent years, the Athenians had fought Thebans in Euboea and currently were fighting some of their former allies in the "Social War". There is, however, no basis for the charge of hypocrisy in his own moral opposition. He clearly states that Athens should use her forces against her existing enemies¹¹ and, as the rebel Greek states

⁸ Dem., XIV.38.

⁹ Dem., XIV.4, 11, 37; cf., 35.

¹⁰ Dem., XIV.6.

¹¹ Dem., XIV.11.

were among these unnamed enemies, his moral opposition was governed by circumstance. In particular, he did not wish Athens to bear the responsibility for initiating a war that would involve other Greek states. Accordingly, Demosthenes' reaction to the proposed war with Persia is clearly negative: "My advice...is that we should by no means begin the war, though for action we ought to be fully prepared" (10). His opposition extends only as far as an Athenian initiation of war: it clearly does not exclude preparation for war or participation in a war that Athens does not initiate.

The proposed war with Persia also draws Demosthenes' disapproval on the grounds of the lack of organized Athenian resources. His comment that "the war with the King would distress Athens"¹², draws attention to the disparity between the current availability of resources. Although, in the context, this refers to the proposed war, the use of the definite article can also allow for a more general reference to any war with the King. In effect, he is stating that any war with the King, present or future, would distress Athens. Certainly, one cannot take it to mean that he is against any future war with the King. It is merely a frank, realistic assessment of the consequences of Athenian involvement in a Persian war. As such, it recognizes the strain that would be placed upon Athenian resources.

The same is true of his subsequent comment: "Every war", he claims, "necessarily requires a fleet and money and posts; and of all these things I perceive that he has a greater abundance than ourselves"¹³. Although all wars with Persia are referred to, the usage of πόλεμος has particular reference to the proposed war. As such, it is designed to quash fervour

¹² Dem., XIV.9.

¹³ Dem., XIV.9.

for it alone, but it does not reject the idea of a future war, once equality of these material requirements of war has been met.

Specifically on the issue of finance, Demosthenes comes out strongly against the proposed war, because the King has a decided advantage. This advantage provides him, not only with a more readily available supply of ships and men¹⁴, but it enables him also to increase his existing advantage in the game of diplomacy. Given the current Greek hostility towards Athens, the King can enlist their support by distributing money and offers of friendship to them¹⁵. He mentions also that the King possesses a train of twelve hundred camels laden with gold¹⁶. Doubtless, he intends reference to this rumour as a means to excite a feeling of trepidation towards any belligerent proposal. However fanciful the rumour might have been, it helps Demosthenes to promote awareness of the disparity between the financial resources of the two states.

In order to promote this trepidation further, Demosthenes emphasizes that the financial reserves for war are not available immediately¹⁷. He

¹⁴ Dem., XIV.31f., actually rejects this advantage of wealth, but one strongly suspects this to be a ploy to assuage fears of the King's ability to attract Greek mercenaries. It is ridiculous to assume that a prospective mercenary would appreciate Demosthenes' moral indignation when confronted with an employer who paid handsomely to fight other Greek states.

¹⁵ Dem., XIV.5.

¹⁶ Dem., XIV.27.

¹⁷ Dem., XIV.24-28. The attempt by Androtion in 357 to collect arrears of eisphora to the value of 14 talents suggests that the collection system was far from satisfactory. A system to prevent non-payments to the state was in existence, perhaps since 378/7. The proeisphora was designed to speed up the process of eisphora collection. The three richest men of each of the one hundred eisphora symmories contributed the full sum of the eisphora levy. They were later reimbursed by the members of their symmory. There is no evidence, however, that the proeisphora was used before 362. Presumably, Androtion's task was to collect dues incurred prior to 362. For the proeisphora and the historical problems associated with it, see G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Demosthenes' TIMHMA and the Athenian Eisphora in the Fourth Century B.C.", in Class. et Med., 14 (1953), esp. pp. 56-62.

claims that, if the Athenians did pay the eisphora, the money would be insufficient for the war¹⁸. This assertion is an attempt to offset any notion of proposing a new levy. When Demosthenes speaks against new levies, he is showing concern for his own finances and those of his fellow taxpayers. Nonetheless, he does make a couple of valid points. Firstly, the collection of the levy appears to have been a slow, laborious process. This is indicated by Demosthenes' claim that the money is not readily available. Secondly, there may be truth in his claim that an eisphora would not cover the cost of war. In the passage quoted below, Demosthenes speaks of an eight and a third per cent levy, as if its imposition was not only unprecedented, but highly unthinkable:

"...will anyone propose an eisphora of one per cent now? Then we get sixty talents. Or double it and make it two per cent? Still only a hundred and twenty talents. And what is that to the twelve hundred camels laden, as our friends here tell us, with the King's treasure? Then would you have me assume that we shall contribute a twelfth of your wealth, or five hundred talents? But you would not submit to such a tax, nor if you paid up, would the money be sufficient for the war."

(Dem., XIV.27, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 399)

Hence, these passages do reveal that Demosthenes was opposed adamantly to the immediate initiation of war with Persia. On the grounds of diplomacy and the availability of resources, both military and, particularly, financial, Athens was ill-prepared for a further war. Nonetheless, the usages of πόλεμος and πολεμέω discussed so far, clearly do not reject the initiation of war under more favourable circumstances. On the Symmories, however, cannot be regarded simply as a negative reaction to the proposed

¹⁸ Dem., XIV.27.

war. It offers a policy that does seek to provide a positive promotion of Athenian interests.

Up to this point, examination has shown that, where the words πόλεμος and πολεμέω are used in On the Symmories, there is a strong negative reaction against war with Persia - for the present. Demosthenes also advises the Athenians that although they should by no means begin the war, they should be fully prepared for action:

"If indeed there was one description for defence against Persians and another for defence against Greeks, then we might reasonably be suspected of marshalling ourselves against the King: but when all preparation for war is on the same lines and the main objects of an armed force are the same - to be strong enough to repel the enemy, to assist one's allies, and to preserve one's own possessions - why, having open enemies enough, must we be looking out for another? Let us rather make our preparations against them, and then we shall defend ourselves against him too, if he ventures to molest us."

(Dem., XIV.10-11, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 387f.)

This passage, perhaps more than any other in the speech, clearly reveals that, although Demosthenes spoke against the initiation of immediate war with Persia, he recognized the need for Athens to be prepared fully for military action in present and future wars. This is not a speech urging pacifism, nor is it correct to infer that he did not want to promote war with Persia at any time in the future. There is no talk of ending existing conflicts with Greeks - at least not without the preparation and use of armed force.

The basis of his proposed policy is attention to defence. He points out that Athens already has professed enemies¹⁹. A means has to be devised

¹⁹ Dem., XIV.11.

in order to provide greater security for Athens: to resist her enemies, to succour Athenian allies, to preserve Athenian possessions. Accordingly, the rejection of the proposed initiation of war with Persia can be regarded only as a policy of armed deterrence - not pacifism - towards Persia and the Greek enemies of Athens. The purpose of his own proposals for military preparation is belligerence. In the short term, the deterrent value of preparation is to preserve the existing peace with Persia, but, in the event that Athenian interests are challenged by the aggression of others, this same preparation is to be used against Athens' existing enemies and against the King "...if he attempts to injure us"²⁰.

The concept of armed deterrence is given fuller attention in a later passage. Demosthenes, having expounded his proposals for the best and quickest means to prepare Athens' forces, claims:

"These proposals are...fit to be reported of you to the King and calculated to inspire him with no little alarm. He knows that with two hundred triremes, of which we provided one hundred, our ancestors destroyed a thousand of his ships and he will hear that we have three hundred of our own ready for sea, so that even if he were raving mad, he would scarcely think it a light thing to incur the hostility of our city. But indeed, if he bases his confidence on his wealth, he will find this too a less sure foundation than yours. He is bringing, they say, gold in plenty. But if he disburses it, he will look in vain for more; for even springs and wells have a way of failing, if one draws from them constantly and lavishly. But he will hear that our resources consist of the ratable value of our country, and how we can fight in defence of it against invaders from his land, those ancestors of his who fought at Marathon best know; but as long as we are

²⁰ Dem., XIV.11.

victorious, there is surely no prospect of money failing us."
(Dem., XIV.28-30, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 399f.)

The greatest weapon in the arsenal of a policy of deterrence is thus presented - the inspiration of fear in one's potential opponent. Would such a policy inspire the King to quake in his Persian sandals? In the short term, it would not. Since it is used to oppose immediate war, it does, in effect, back down in the face of the King's embassy²¹. Even though it does not admit to the responsibility of the Athenian state for the anti-Persian expedition of its strategos, Chares, it does not prevent the Athenians from losing prestige. Any act other than a declaration of war would look like an admission of Athenian weakness. Hence, the espousal of a policy of deterrence and action - should the King choose to invade at some future date - would hardly send him skulking away, dreading Demosthenes' measures of deterrence.

Demosthenes, in the speech, On the Symmories, never argues against war by expressing a desire to have peace for its own sake. His proposals sponsor deterrence, rather than pacifism. Those scholars who regard this speech as representative of pacifism fail to draw a vital distinction between the desire to have peace in the short term (due to adverse conditions) and the desire to create conditions and attitudes which make a lasting peace possible. Only the latter is indicative of pacifism. The former has peace as a transient goal. It accepts future war as not only probable, but promotes it as desirable and propagates its impending occurrence by sponsoring military preparation.

Demosthenes tackles the proposals before the assembly - to send ambassadors to other Greek states in order to gather support against Persia

²¹ Diod., XVI.22.2.

and to initiate immediate war with Persia²² - by concentrating almost entirely on negative aspects of these proposals; namely, the current ill-feeling between the Greeks and Athens and the lack of Athenian preparedness for war. In particular, he contends that Athens does not possess, at present, the necessary equitable and just grounds for initiating war against Persia²³. One struggles to find even an allusion to the positive benefits of peace²⁴: benefits which one finds clearly expressed in the contemporary treatises of Isocrates and Xenophon²⁵. Demosthenes' opposition to the proposal for war with Persia is clearly stated:

"I admit that he (the King) is the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet I would not on that account advise you to undertake a war against him by yourselves apart from the rest, for I observe that the Greeks themselves are by no means common friends of one another, but that certain of them repose more confidence in the King than in some of their neighbours. From this state of things I conclude that it is to your interest to be careful that your grounds for entering on war shall be equitable and just, but to proceed with all the necessary preparations, making that the foundation of your policy."

(Dem., XIV.3, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 383f.)

This passage puts the issue beyond doubt; Demosthenes means to implore his audience not to engage in a war with Persia, but only for the present

²² The broad nature of the proposals can be gathered only from a couple of fleeting references in the speech itself: Dem., XIV.1ff. The date of the speech is best suited to the debate referred to by Diodorus Siculus (XVI.22.2) after the King's ultimatum. For the problem of identifying the assembly's agenda, see Hugo Montgomery, The Way to Chaeronea, Bergen, 1983, p. 48f.

²³ Dem., XIV.3-6.

²⁴ Namely, the acquisition of the goodwill of the Greeks. Note, however, that the only perceived benefit of this goodwill, once acquired, is to use it in a war against Persia.

²⁵ Isoc., VIII.21,20,22-3; Xen., Poroi, IV.40, V.5-13.

time. This passage contains two important qualifications upon which he bases his opposition: the lack of goodwill between the Greek states and the need for the Athenians to possess "equitable and just" grounds for the initiation of war. Neither of these factors rejects the notion of war with Persia at a time when these current obstructions have been surmounted.

It is intriguing, however, that there is no explicit reference to the rebels at this point (nor, for that matter, anywhere else in the speech). Possibly, Demosthenes chose not to mention them by name, lest his Athenian audience be reminded of their bellicose attitude at the very time when he is attempting to placate them with regard to the King. It is also feasible that Demosthenes was trying to create a deeper, more sinister effect than could be gained through explicit reference. He wanted his audience to understand that dependable allies were required in a war against Persia. There were other Greek states besides the rebels upon whom Athens could not rely on for support. He could have mentioned that Athens was also at war with Philip of Macedon, or that relations between Athens and Thebes had been strained severely during the recent confrontation in Euboea. Instead, he prefers his audience to list for themselves enemies of Athens, so that they may determine personally how diplomatically inopportune a Persian war would be for Athens at the present time:

"...why, having open enemies enough, must we be looking out for another? Let us rather make our preparations against them and then we shall defend ourselves against him too, if he ventures to molest us."

(Dem., XIV.11, trans. by J.H. Vince., Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 389)

Clearly, Demosthenes was opposed to the proposed war with Persia because Athens lacked the necessary support of the other Greek states. Some of

these states were professed enemies of Athens, others were more disposed toward Persia. Hence, Demosthenes calls for a concerted effort against Athens' existing enemies and a deferral of the proposed war against Persia until such time as the King ventures to injure Athens.

It was noted above that Demosthenes also opposed the proposed war because Athens lacked "equitable and just" grounds. According to Demosthenes, success in war depends upon the possession of such grounds²⁶. Much of the speech, however, is devoted to arguments which urge the Athenians to accept that they do not possess the means to face Persia on equal terms at present. His case is convincing. The concession to the superior fighting spirit of the Athenians and their allies is the only area where Demosthenes gives credit to Athenian supremacy²⁷. Persia, on the other hand, is credited with a vastly superior current financial reserve. The importance of providing an adequate financial reserve to build ships, equip and man them on campaign, would not have been lost on Demosthenes' audience. Athens had repeated problems in financing her naval expeditions throughout the history of the "Second Athenian Naval League".

Why does Demosthenes insist on the need for "just" cause? The oft made appeal of Greek writers for the need to have justice as the basis of any declaration of war invariably is nothing more than a call for a justifiable pretext for war. The appeal to some higher justice ordained by the gods might provide the theoretical basis for maintaining traditional rites in the declaration of war. In practice, justice was an interpretation - not some idealistic theory - of what suited the state's best interests. Religious omens, portending success or failure of the given enterprise, were contrived to support the chosen path. For, when it came to a debate

²⁶ Dem., XIV., esp. 3-9.

²⁷ Dem., XIV.9.

on war or peace, the interest of the state was determined primarily in terms of the state's security and continued prosperity. In practical terms, attention to traditional rites, such as the possession of a justifiable pretext for war, was often a necessary factor in the attraction of allied support for the ensuing conflict²⁸.

The issue of justice, as outlined in On the Symmories, centres on the initiation of conflict. Demosthenes alleges that the Athenians would lack just cause until the King had made clear his intention to invade. In other words, Demosthenes believed it would be more profitable, from an Athenian viewpoint, if the King was seen by the other Greeks as the aggressor - the instigator of war. Once Persian aggression became self-evident, states currently hostile to Athens would help her to fight the King - the common enemy of all Greeks" (XVI.36ff.).

Can one dismiss Demosthenes' appeal for the need to have "just cause" as rhetorical nonsense? The answer to this must be "no". Not only does it form a substantial part of his opposition to current war with Persia, but it is clearly part of rhetorical tradition for speakers to argue their "just cause" for war or peace. Book I of Thucydides' history of the "Peloponnesian War" has as one of its most vital themes the efforts of the Athenians, Corinthians, Corcyreans and Spartans to justify their involvement in war and, in particular, their espousal of "just cause" for initiating war. In his speech On the Peace, set in the year 356, Isocrates advises the Athenians that:

"...if...you will prove yourselves warlike by training and preparing for war but peaceful by doing nothing contrary

²⁸ See P. Karavites, Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events, Gottingen, 1982, pp. 102-106.

to justice, you will render not only this city but all the Hellenes happy and prosperous."

(Isoc., VIII.136, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,
vol. II, p. 93)

Demosthenes, a practising orator, wants his Athenian audience to recognize that they do not possess "just cause" for entering war with Persia.

Demosthenes supports a similar appeal for military preparation and abstention from unjust action²⁹. Like Isocrates, he not only rejects unjust aggression, but also upholds the view that the cause of justice will prove expedient for Athens³⁰.

The acquisition of the goodwill of other Greek states is the concern of Demosthenes as well. In his view, Athens has a key rôle to play in the preservation of Greek freedom³¹. He portrays Athens as a watch-dog over the affairs of the Greeks, a position, he claims, that would be put into serious jeopardy if Athens was to force on war with the King³². It is doubtful whether the other Greek states, such as Thebes and the rebels, would have shared this image of the Athenian rôle in Greek affairs. Such words, however, would have met with favourable response from his Athenian

²⁹ Dem., XIV.36: "...let us do him no wrong either, both in our own interests and in view of the unrest and disloyalty of the other Greeks". Cf., Isoc., VIII.137-140.

³⁰ Dem., XIV.35: "...the cause of justice and those who defend it will prove stronger than the traitors and the barbarians against all opposition". Cf., Dem., XIV.7f.

³¹ Dem., XIV.6: "Into such a welter of confusion and folly I beseech you not to plunge our country. For indeed, as regards your policy towards the King, I see that you are by no means on the same footing as the other Greeks; for many of them it is, I suppose, possible to pursue their private interests and abandon the cause of their countrymen, but for you, even when wronged by them, it would not be honourable to punish the offenders in such a way as to let any of them fall under the power of the barbarian."

³² Dem., XIV.13, 35, 37f.

audience, particularly the references to Athens' rôle as benefactor³³.

In the following passage, Demosthenes, like Isocrates, denigrates aggression where no just cause exists:

"...if we force on a war, while (the King's) aims are still obscure, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect. For the King, suspending his designs - if he really intends to invade Greece - will distribute money among them and tempt them with offers of friendship, while they, anxious to bring their private wars to a successful issue and keeping that object in view, will overlook the common safety of all."

(Dem., XIV.4-5, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 385)

Why has Demosthenes emphasized the importance of the King's obscure aims? As Karavites has suggested, stringent attention was paid to the moral and diplomatic implications of bearing the responsibility for initiating war. Moral opprobrium was associated with any act of aggression, particularly if that act lacked sufficient "just cause", such as the lack of undue provocation, or failure to resort to arbitration beforehand³⁴. Hence, we find Demosthenes here, placing emphasis on the lack of manifest evidence that the King intends to invade³⁵. While the King's aims remained obscure, Athens could not justify an initiation of war because she would commit

³³ On the importance of being the benefactor to other Greeks, see the comments of P. Karavites, Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events, Gottingen, 1982, pp. 114-117.

³⁴ Karavites, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

³⁵ Although Demosthenes refers to rumours of the King's military buildup, he speaks of them almost flippantly, in an effort to cast them as idle gossip. See Dem., XIV.4,5,7,13,24,25f., 27,30.

thereby the first act of aggression³⁶. This act would drive some Greeks disposed to the King to support him in war against Athens and, thus, Athens would have to fight not only the King but also other Greeks.

This argument is significant. The initiation of war against the King is unjust, only because Athens would fight Greeks as well. Under circumstances where the Greeks presented a united front against the King, the initiation of war would be justified. The sole "just cause" given is that the King "...is the common enemy of all Greeks". No further justification is given, nor is adequate explanation provided as to why the King is the common enemy:

"If indeed we could attack him with unanimity, all banded against one, I should not count it wrong in us to do him wrong. But since this is impossible, I suggest that we ought to be careful not to give the King an opportunity to pose as the champion of the other Greeks; for as long as you remain quiet, any such action on his part would excite suspicion."

(Dem., XIV.37, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 405)

Does Demosthenes' representation of "just cause" have the interests of the Greeks genuinely at heart? To a degree, Demosthenes repeatedly assigns to Athens the rôle of benefactress of Greeks in his speeches on foreign policy³⁷. Nonetheless, in On the Symmories, one cannot escape the notion that justice, while still an exalted ideal, is moulded to suit what

³⁶ Dem., XIV.37f.

³⁷ See the following chapters on speeches XV and XVI.

is expedient for Athens. It is significant that his arguments for "just cause" rest on upholding Athens' image and prestige in the eyes of the Greeks. Consider, in particular, his comment that an Athenian initiation of war would reveal to the King the weakness of the Greeks: weakness refers to the disunity caused by internecine conflict:

"...if you are the aggressors, he will seem naturally anxious to befriend the rest, because they are hostile to you. Do not, then, expose the weakness of the Greeks by issuing a summons which they will not obey and declaring a war which you cannot wage... ."

(Dem., XIV.37f., trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 405)

One gets the distinct impression that Demosthenes realized that the issue at stake was not so much how to avoid revealing Greek disunity, but revealing the weakness of Athens - in particular, her inability to attract Greek support against Persia. However compelling, or moving, Demosthenes' identification of the preservation of Greek liberty with "just cause" might be, the rhetorical ploy used here must not escape attention. Demosthenes has to provide his audience with a justifiable pretext for avoiding war with Persia. This pretext had to be seen as an honourable course of action, one where Athens would not be viewed as shying away from the King. In this regard, he is aided by the fact that the King had not as yet committed any act of aggression. Accordingly, he rests his case for "just cause" on the avoidance of aggression by Athens. Athenian weakness, however, stimulated his interpretation of "justice".

Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against the misrepresentation of On the Symmories as a speech urging an enduring peace against Persia is the extent of anti-Persian comment therein. Demosthenes never argues against the war by expressing a desire to have peace for its own sake.

This is a strange omission indeed, if one accepts with Jaeger³⁸ that Demosthenes is trying to imbue the Athenians with the desire to possess lasting peace with Persia. It is even stranger to read the speech and consider Demosthenes a pro-Persian when so many of his comments about the King are so hostile.

Before we turn to discussion of Demosthenes' expressed hostility, let us first consider the mood of the Athenian assembly. An embassy has just arrived from the Persian King, deploring Chares' participation in the Satraps' revolt. At first, the Athenians had been pleased with reports of the financial rewards of the expedition, but now the mood has changed with the arrival of the Persian ambassadors and rumours that the King is preparing a force against Athens³⁹. What reasons, then, prompted the Athenians to maintain peace with Persia?

Demosthenes' speech is the sole source for the content of the debate. Unfortunately for our understanding of the motivations for peace, there is a factor that must be considered. Plutarch reports that the first of Demosthenes' public speeches was unsuccessful⁴⁰. It is quite feasible that On the Symmories was the speech in question. We know that Demosthenes' proposals for the re-organization of the trierarchic "symmories" were never implemented⁴¹. It will be argued below, however, that there

³⁸ Jaeger, op. cit., p. 74, where he says, "Presumably the new fleet would never be used against the 'Persian menace'". And p. 77: "...it is incontestable that in the speech On the Symmories Demosthenes is against any bellicose entanglement with Persia".

³⁹ Diod., XVI.22.2.

⁴⁰ Plut., Demosthenes, 6. Montgomery, op. cit., pp. 15, 20, states confidently that this was Demosthenes' first speech in the ecclesia. The more cautious view of L. Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Chicago, 1981, p. 22, is preferable.

⁴¹ Dem., XIV.16ff. Demosthenes proposed another reform of the trierarchy in 340 which was accepted. See Dem., XVIII.102-108; Aesch., III.222.

is reason to believe that Demosthenes does present a representative appraisal of the general Athenian mood. Certainly, his own anti-Persian sentiment is self-evident.

When this speech is used, however, one has to remember the obvious - that it was delivered before the outcome was known. Hence, indications of the Athenian mood are the result of Demosthenes' prediction and assessment of the mood and not necessarily the reasons for the maintenance of peace themselves. Nonetheless, this does not detract from the value of the speech as far as it assesses the current mood towards the proposed war and Persia⁴². One can safely assume that Demosthenes went out of his way to pin-point the mood of his audience, particularly as this was perhaps his first speech on foreign policy. It is my belief that Demosthenes does provide an accurate appraisal of the general feeling, with regard to the extent and nature of the current attitude toward both Persia and war. That is, the Athenians were strongly hostile toward Persia, but were not, at this stage, prepared to initiate war. On the other hand, the failure of Demosthenes' proposals for the re-organization of the symmory system, indicates that the Athenians were not convinced of the merit of his proposals⁴³.

⁴² Note, in particular, Demosthenes' comment (XV.6): "Some of you, I suppose, remember that when you were discussing Persian affairs, I was the first to come forward with advice, and I believe I was the only speaker, or perhaps one out of two, to say that I should think it prudent in you not to make your hostility to the King the pretext for your preparations, but while equipping yourselves against your existing enemies, to defend yourselves against him too, if he attempted to do you wrong. Nor did I fail to convince you that I was right, but you, too, approved of my suggestion" (trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 415). While this passage of self-praise indicates Demosthenes' successful presentation against a Persian war in On the Symmories, it says nothing of the failure of his proposals for the re-organization of the trierarchic symmories. He chose to remind his audience of his success and not his failure. Nonetheless, if taken at face value, this passage indicates that Demosthenes had anticipated correctly the Athenian mood toward a Persian war when On the Symmories was delivered.

⁴³ See A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 1957, p. 28 for an assessment of Demosthenes' proposed reform of the symmories.

With regard to the Athenian attitude towards Persia, one can assert with confidence that they felt intimidated by the King's denunciation of their strategos, Chares⁴⁴. Rumours that the King had also promised Athens' enemies that he would join them in their war against the Athenians with three hundred ships also would have provoked the feeling of intimidation, even fear⁴⁵.

The opportunity is taken here to point out an erroneous assumption of modern scholarship. There is no evidence for the oft made statement that the Persian King sent an ultimatum to Athens, threatening intervention in the "Social War"⁴⁶. The existence of such an ultimatum is based purely on references in the sources to rumours about the King either promising aid or actually marshalling his forces against Athens. Neither Diodorus nor Demosthenes mention an ultimatum. Diodorus refers only to the sending of a Persian embassy to remonstrate with the Athenians over the actions of Chares. It would stretch a very terse reference too far to infer from this an accompanying ultimatum⁴⁷.

According to Demosthenes, current rumours suggested that the King

⁴⁴ Diod., XVI.22.2.

⁴⁵ Diod., XVI.22.2. See also Dem., XIV.2.

⁴⁶ J.R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism, London, 1986, p. 73: "...on the orders of the Persian King, Athens' Social War ended". Cf., N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Oxford, 1967, p. 516: "Artaxerxes Ochus demanded the withdrawal of Athens' forces from Asia; if his demand was rejected, the Phoenician fleet would enter the Aegean in support of Mausolus and his allies". See also S. Hornblower, The Greek World 479-323 B.C., London, 1983, p. 243.

⁴⁷ Diod., XVI.22.2: "The Athenians at first approved Chares' action, but later, when the King sent ambassadors and denounced Chares, they changed their minds; for word had been spread abroad that the King had promised Athens' enemies that he would join them in their war against the Athenians with three hundred ships. The assembly, accordingly, taking a cautious attitude, decided to bring to a close the war against their revolted allies, and finding that they, too, desired peace they easily came to terms with them."

was preparing vast amounts of his resources to use against Athens⁴⁸. The origin and veracity of such rumours are impossible to determine. Perhaps there was substance to the rumours, but it is idle to speculate how the King could raise such a force when both sources refer only to rumour. The word itself suggests the Athenians themselves were uncertain of the King's plans⁴⁹. It is equally possible that zealous Athenian proponents of peace circulated them in order to promote fear and, thus, a vote for peace. Or, perhaps fear itself prompted exaggerated, or even unfounded, stories to play upon nervous Athenian ears.

One feeling, however is stressed repeatedly in On the Symmories - anti-Persian sentiment. At several points, Demosthenes refers to past, present and future rivalry between Persia and the Athenians. In each case, Athenian pride in past victories is indulged, as too is the avowal that Athenian fighting spirit can and will continue to carry all before it on the field of battle. The following section shows this clearly.

The following three quotations glorify Athenian success should war break out. The first two quotations refer to the Greek naval victories of the "Persian Wars". Demosthenes claims that the present Persian King:

"...knows that with two hundred triremes, of which we (Athenians) provided one hundred, our ancestors destroyed a thousand of his ships, and he will hear that we have three hundred of our own ready for sea, so that even if he were raving mad, he would scarcely think it a light thing to incur the hostility of our city."

(Dem., XIV.29, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 399)

⁴⁸ Dem., XIV.27, 30; cf., 4,5,7,13,25-26, where the rumoured invasion or intention to invade is played down by the use of conditional clauses, or the sarcastic implication that supposition is no basis for the decision for war.

⁴⁹ Dem., XIV.25,27.

"(The King)...knows that the wars we fought against his ancestors have made our city prosperous and powerful... ."

(Dem., XIV.40, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 405)

Both quotations appear in sections where Demosthenes attempts to sway his audience to the view that if peace is maintained, the King will not attack. In the following passage, however, this does not prevent Demosthenes from denigrating the King and passing favourable comment on the Athenian prowess of arms. This passage refers to any war between Athens and Persia in the future:

"I believe, men of Athens, that the war with the King is a difficult undertaking for our city, though any conflict which the war involved might prove easy enough. Why so? Because the first requisites for every war are necessarily, I suppose, fleets and money and strong positions, and I find that the King is more fully supplied with these than we are; but for the actual conflict I observe that nothing is needed so much as brave soldiers, and of these we and those who share the danger with us have the better supply."

(Dem., XIV.9, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 387)

Praise of Athens' current capacity to succeed in war seems fallacious to the modern reader and, perhaps, it may not have rung true to some who listened to Demosthenes at the time, because such claims of Athenian prowess contrast markedly with the current failure to deal with the rebels. Nonetheless, in each of these three passages, the praise of Athenian skill on the field of battle has a clear rhetorical purpose: to prompt the self-indulgence of the Athenian audience. This praise was designed in part for a self-seeking purpose. By toadying to this Athenian self-image, Demosthenes hoped to promote confidence in, and acceptance of, himself as an aspiring orator and, thereby, his proposals.

Even though On the Symmories calls for the maintenance of the existing peace with Persia, the repetition of anti-Persian sentiment is indicative of Demosthenes' perception of the feeling current in Athens. Hence, the King is referred to as "the common enemy of all Greeks"⁵⁰. This phrase is clearly designed to let the audience know that he, too, hates the King just as much as they do. Interestingly, this opening description of the King is undercut subsequently; Demosthenes makes the observation that the Greeks are not common friends to one another: "On the contrary, some have more confidence in him than in certain of their own people"⁵¹. The implication of this contradiction is that those Greeks disposed towards the King are deceived or more concerned with the prosecution of their own selfish interests than the protection of the common safety of Greece⁵².

The nature of the King's relations with the Greeks is criticized severely. As we have seen, Demosthenes advises the Athenians to avoid initiating war with the King without "just and equitable grounds" because the diplomatic advantage would thereby fall to the King. It is with his portrayal of what would happen to Greek states, if Athens initiated war at this time, that we find Demosthenes providing his most denigrating description of the King. It is insinuated that the King is responsible for nurturing the private wars of the Greeks:

"...if there were clear and unmistakable signs of the King's hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us and would be deeply grateful to those who would stand up for them and with them against his attacks; but if we force on a war,

⁵⁰ Dem., XIV.3, cf., 36.

⁵¹ Dem., XIV.3.

⁵² Dem., XIV.5-6.

while his aims are still obscure, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect. For the King, suspending his designs - if he really intends to invade Greece - will distribute money among them and tempt them with offers of friendship, while they, anxious to bring their private wars to a successful issue and keeping that object in view, will overlook the common safety of all."

(Dem., XIV.4-5, trans. adapted from J.H. Vince,
Loeb ed., vol. I, p. 385)

Demosthenes' outline of the King's means of maintaining influence over the Greeks bears a heavy connotation. Demosthenes does not say that the King will be a friend to the Greeks, but that he will promise friendship. Subsequently, Demosthenes makes a derogatory assertion about the King's intentions:

"...as regards your policy towards the King, I see that you (sc. Athenians) are by no means on the same footing as the other Greeks, for many of them it is, I suppose possible to pursue their private interests and abandon the cause of their countrymen, but for you even when wronged by them, it would not be honourable to extract such a penalty from the wrongdoers as to leave any of them under the heel of the barbarian."⁵³

(Dem., XIV.6, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 385f.)

Demosthenes also warns the Athenians not to allow the King to gain the credit of appearing the friend of the Greeks⁵⁴. Hostility toward

⁵³ As was pointed out in the previous section, Demosthenes claims that it is the moral duty of Athens to protect other Greek states, to be their benefactor, by upholding "just cause". Demosthenes argues here that an initiation of war would be unjust because Athens would neglect thereby this perceived duty. In fact, this moral duty is a pretext for maintaining peace.

The wrong suffered by Athens was the revolt of the rebel members of the Confederacy (see Dem., XV.3).

⁵⁴ Dem., XIV.7; cf., 36.

Persia is further evident in this comment:

"If indeed there were one kind of force suitable for defence against the Persians and another for defence against Greeks, then we might reasonably be suspected of marshalling ourselves against the King."

(Dem., XIV.10, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 387f.)

The implication again is that Persia is the source of all the Athenians' troubles.

There can be no doubt that in the speech On the Symmories, Demosthenes presents an opinion that is blatantly hostile to the King. It has been noted also that Demosthenes deliberately sought to play down suggestions that the King intended to invade⁵⁵. Nonetheless, the anti-Persian sentiment that pervades this speech must be indicative surely of the attitude among the majority of the Athenians. There can be no other explanation as to why a man, who opposes the immediate initiation of war, should attack the character and ultimate aims of the state with which he is trying to promote the maintenance of peace.

In this regard, Demosthenes shows himself vehemently opposed to Persia and explains away his promotion of peace by declaring that an Athenian initiation of war would betray the rest of the Greeks into the greedy clutches of the King. Athens, he claims, is morally bound not to attack, because they would be fighting not just the King, but the very people whom they are minded to protect - the Greeks.

⁵⁵ By playing down suggestions and fears of an imminent invasion by the King, Demosthenes clearly attempts to promote a calm appraisal of the situation and, of course, a vote for the maintenance of peace. His implication is that since the rumours are unsubstantiated, Athens has no justified ground for the declaration of war. Athens must act on the basis of the King's precipitating action and not on rumours of the King's intentions.

"If indeed we (sc. Greeks) could attack him with unanimity, all banded against one, I should not count it wrong in us to do him wrong. But since this is impossible, I suggest that we ought to be careful not to give the King an opportunity to pose as the champion of the other Greeks; for as long as you remain quiet, any such action on his part would excite suspicion, but if you are the aggressors, he will seem naturally anxious to befriend the rest, because they are hostile to you."

(Dem., XIV.37, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 403f.)

It has been suggested that, while Demosthenes shows hostility toward the King and supports a deferral of war (until Athens could recoup her resources and unite the Greeks against Persia), he did not seriously contemplate a future time when the Greeks, banded together as one, could initiate war with Persia⁵⁶. Such an argument can be permitted only if one accepts the existence of ambiguity in the clause "since this is impossible..." (XIV.37). Does this mean that Demosthenes believed it impossible to unite against the King and initiate war against him in the future? Or does he mean that it is only impossible at the present time? In the context of the speech as a whole, the second alternative is consistent, whereas the first is not. The first is acceptable only if one believes that Demosthenes is being particularly devious along lines something to this effect. For the greater part of the speech, he opposes immediate war and calls for a deferral until Athens is in the position to fight on equal terms. Then,

⁵⁶ Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-77, variously states that the new fleet proposed by Demosthenes would never be used against the 'Persian menace'; that Demosthenes is "against any bellicose entanglement with Persia" and that he urges the Athenians "to avoid any open war of aggression". Demosthenes, however, opposes immediate war with Persia because he wants the proposed peace to be maintained and not because he was against any and every future war with Persia.

towards the end of the speech, he drops in an ambiguous comment that could suggest his view that war against Persia would be viable at no future time.

What could he hope to gain by being so devious? His purpose is to prevent the Athenians from declaring immediate war on the King. Given the hostility of the Athenians to Persia at the time, any suggestion, however remote, to abandon for eternity the idea of initiating conflict with Persia would be tantamount to political suicide. Hence, the overwhelming emphasis upon deferral of conflict. Furthermore, it seems more realistic to believe that Demosthenes did conceive of a time when the Greeks were sufficiently strong to engage the King. He is not being vague as to when this conflict can occur. One can hardly expect him to provide a specific date. What he does, in fact, offer is more reasonable - a future reference by which Athenian readiness for a Persian war could be gauged: when Athens possessed just and equitable grounds for war, but more particularly when his proposals for the re-organization of the symmories and Athens' financial resources had been carried out.

There is no doubt that On the Symmories supports the maintenance of the existing peace between Athens and Persia⁵⁷. To this end, Demosthenes attempts to dissuade the Athenians from immediate initiation of war⁵⁸. He even goes so far as to suggest that it would be against the city's interests to send ambassadors to other Greek states in an effort

⁵⁷ There is no reason to disbelieve that the "King's Peace" of 387/6 and its subsequent ratifications still applied to the peaceful relations between Persia and Athens in 355. This speech does reveal that, from an Athenian viewpoint, the King's embassy (Diod., XVI.22.2) had brought into question the maintenance of that peaceful arrangement. For a detailed discussion of the nature of the various "King's Peace" arrangements, see T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene, London, 1965. See esp. p. 94, where Ryder correctly notes that Demosthenes did not mention the "King's Peace" as the basis of relations between Athens and Persia. It would have been hardly tactful.

⁵⁸ Dem., XIV.3-6, 10-13, 24-28, 35-38.

to gain their alliance for war against Persia⁵⁹. On these points alone, the speech may be regarded as presenting a "pacifistic" message to the Athenian assembly. In this section, however, it has been shown that Athens might have to fight in the future, or - for that matter - at the present time.

Beyond the speech's message for the immediate situation against Persia, any suggestion that Demosthenes is laying the ground for a policy of pacifism is belied indelibly by the speech itself. Advice given against a proposed war does not reveal necessarily a pacifist, particularly in this case, since Demosthenes calls for military preparation for present and future wars⁶⁰.

Upon close examination, the speech does not argue for a long term peace with Persia. Rather, it argues against the initiation of war⁶¹ without just and equitable cause, but for the present alone. Indeed, a general policy of pacifism is far from Demosthenes' intent - expressed or otherwise. In his assessment of Athenian relations with Persia, both for the present and for the future, pacifism does not figure in the interests of Athens, whereas preparation of a force for war does:

"...if someone...could come forward and point out convincingly the nature and size of the force that will be serviceable to the city and show how it is to be provided, all our present fears will be relieved."

(Dem., XIV.2, trans. by J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.,
vol. I, p. 383)

This is not some idle, sarcastic challenge to his fellow orators; he is quite serious, for he takes up the challenge himself. He suggests

⁵⁹ Dem., XIV.12, 38.

⁶⁰ Dem., XIV. 2 (twice), 3,7,10, 11 (twice), 13,14,28,29,38 and 41.

⁶¹ Dem., XIV.4.

further that the foundation of Athenian policy should be to proceed with "all the necessary preparations"⁶². By this he means that the Athenians should provide themselves with sufficient military strength and willing allies to combat both their present enemies and the King, should he take the offensive⁶³. He claims that the main objects of an armed force are to possess sufficient strength to repel the enemy, to assist one's allies and to preserve one's own possessions (11). Clearly, he is prescribing a defensive, rather than offensive, use of armed force. Nonetheless, this cannot be construed as support for pacifism. The main purpose of his speech, he continues, is to reveal his plan - "...the best and the speediest - for getting your forces ready"⁶⁴.

The expression of such anti-Persian sentiment and the hope of future war with the King undoubtedly met with appreciation from an Athenian audience who were intimidated by the King's embassy and rumours of planned invasion. Clearly, Demosthenes' speech was not designed for the emotive purpose of inspiring among his listeners an attitude of everlasting pacifism towards Persia. It was designed to propose a means for Athens to deal with her current wars with the Greeks, to deal with Persia or any other opponent who threatened her interests in the future.

⁶² Dem., XIV.3.

⁶³ Dem., XIV.11.

⁶⁴ Dem., XIV.14.