

## INTRODUCTION

From the end of the "Social War", peace is advocated repeatedly by the contemporary literary sources. Between 357 and 355, Athens was at war with some of her former allies who, with the assistance of Mausolus of Caria, broke off their alliance and initiated conflict with Athens. From an Athenian viewpoint, the war was disastrous: not only did the rebels launch successful raids against Lemnos, Imbros and laid waste to Samos, but they succeeded in defeating the Athenians at sea. This defeat, the financial expense of her recent wars and rumours that the Persian King was threatening to intervene on the side of the rebels, prompted the Athenians to make peace with her former allies. Thereafter, there is a noticeable decline in Athenian military activity. They abstained from war with Persia and they rejected proposals to intervene in the Peloponnese and Rhodes. Contemporary sources repeatedly complain that the Athenians were reluctant to perform their duty by serving on expeditions.

Moreover, Isocrates and Xenophon espouse the benefits of peace in their discourses. Peace, they claim, promotes Athenian security and prosperity, whereas war only nurtures internal strife, hinders the advancement of Athens, alienates her allies and imposes financial burdens upon her wealthy citizens in the form of liturgies (state duties) and eisphora (war tax).

The contemporary sources also condemn Athenian participation in war. Isocrates calls for an end to the "Social War" and Athenian attempts to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese. Xenophon advocates a "lasting peace" and proposes a peace-making venture to end the "Sacred War".

Demosthenes urges the Athenians not to initiate immediate war with Persia.

Some scholars have viewed these points as signs that the Athenians were pursuing a pacifistic policy in the late 350's. Such a view, however, fails to take into account that Isocrates, Xenophon and Demosthenes all advocate war as well - even in the very same speeches where they uphold the virtues of peace. Indeed, it will be shown that Athens' policy of restricted intervention in the late 350's was not motivated by notions of pacifism. The word 'pacifism', according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary is "the doctrine that the abolition of war is both desirable and possible". Advocation of peace by writers in the Fourth Century B.C., however, should not be equated with 'pacifism'. To the best of my knowledge, neither Isocrates, nor Xenophon, nor Demosthenes call for the abolition of war. Pacifism is a modern term, which has a specific meaning in modern ideological debate. Moreover, when Athenian foreign policy in the late 350's is examined closely, there is no evidence to suggest that it was guided by what we might refer to as 'pacifism'. Although Athens refused to intervene in some disputes, expeditions were proposed to combat the expansion of Philip of Macedon and Athenian intervention is attested in the Chersonese, in central Greece and against Megara. Far from following a pacifistic policy, Athenian intervention in the late 350's was constrained by fear of Macedonian expansion and by Athens' inability to provide adequate financial support for her naval operations.

## I

### PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FINANCING OF ATHENIAN AND LEAGUE NAVAL OPERATIONS FROM 378 TO 355 B.C.

Any examination of Athenian reluctance to fight unnecessary wars in the late 350's must seek to determine the source of this reluctance. The extant literary sources contain sufficient references to maintain that the naval operations of Athens and the "Second Athenian League" were beset with financial problems from 378 to 355. This chapter will examine the sources which associate financial crises with the Athenian and League naval operations conducted in this period. It will be shown that want of finance did produce delays and shortages of funds for major naval operations, particularly in the early years of the League down to the "Peace of 371". Timotheus' circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus in 375 and the efforts of Timotheus and Iphicrates to organize relief for the beleaguered Corcyreans in 373 were hampered by inadequate finance. The shortage of recruits, prior to the battle of Naxos in 376, may also have been due to inadequate provision of pay for service.

The first sign that Athens had difficulty in raising a naval force appeared soon after the establishment of the "Second Athenian League"<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> On the establishment of the "Second Athenian League", see in particular F.H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy, Cambridge, 1905, pp. 14-22; A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, in The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. VI, esp. pp. 70-74; V. Ehrenberg, "Zum Zweiten Attischen Bund", in Hermes, 64 (1929), pp. 322ff.; A.P. Burnett, "Thebes and the Expansion of the Second Athenian Confederacy: IG II<sup>2</sup> 40 and IG II<sup>2</sup> 43", in Historia, 11 (1962), pp. 1-17; G.L. Cawkwell, "The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy", in Classical Quarterly, 23 (1973), pp. 47-60; R. Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C.", in Athenaeum, 52 (1974), pp. 45-49; J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?, Berkeley, 1981, esp. pp. 5-47; G.H.R. Horsley, "The Second Athenian Confederacy", in Hellenika: Essays on Greek Politics and History, Sydney, 1982, pp. 134-144; R.M. Kallet-Marx, "Athens, Thebes and the Foundation of the Second Athenian League", in Classical Antiquity, 4 (1985), pp. 127-151.

According to Xenophon, speakers at the "Peloponnesian League" Congress in about 377 commented that Sparta and her allies could man far more ships than were available to Athens. On this account, the speakers argued that Athens could be starved into submission if Sparta imposed a naval blockade. They also suggested that the same Spartan ships could transport an army across to Thebes by whichever route they preferred, either through Phocis or through Creusis. This strongly suggests that Athens and her allies had comparatively fewer ships. Xenophon then reports that the Spartans agreed with the proposal and proceeded to blockade Athens with only sixty triremes!<sup>2</sup>

Initially, it might seem hard to accept that Athens could be blockaded with such a mediocre contingent, when one recalls the size of the fleets available to Athens in the latter half of the fifth century<sup>3</sup>. The fleets of the fourth century League, however, never reached similar proportions (Table 1).

Clearly, the fleets raised during the fourth century did not compare with those raised during the "Peloponnesian War". Nevertheless, an inscription, IG II<sup>2</sup> 1604, dated to 377/6 (that is, about the time of the Spartan blockade) records that the total number of Athenian warships was

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<sup>2</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.60-1. Diodorus (XV.34.5) says the Spartan commander had sixty-five triremes in the battle of Naxos in 377/6. The discrepancy in numbers is of no real concern. Perhaps Xenophon's rounded figure of sixty applied to the vote at the League congress, while Diodorus' sixty-five applied to the League ships at Naxos. Xenophon may have generalized the number voted, or the Spartans later received a five ship reinforcement after the vote, but prior to the battle.

<sup>3</sup> About 300 in 431 (Thuc., II.13.8), 250 in 428/7 (Thuc., III.17) and 255 (?237? more) in 406 (Xen., Hell., I.5.14, 20; 6.22, 24). G.L. Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century", in Classical Quarterly<sup>2</sup>, 34 (1984), esp. p.334f. points out that the usual size of fleets sent out from Athens was a force of thirty ships in the late 350's and early 340's.

Table 1  
The Number of Athenian/Allied Warships Used on  
Campaign in the Fourth Century B.C.<sup>4</sup>

Date	No. of Ships	Commander	References
376 (Naxos)	83	Chabrias	Diod., XV.34.5.
375 (Corcyra)	60	Timotheus	Xen., <u>Hell.</u> , V.4.63,65.
	(50 <sup>5</sup> )		Isoc., XV.109.
(After Alyzia)	70		Xen., <u>Hell.</u> , V.4.66.
373	(60 voted)	Timotheus	Xen., <u>Hell.</u> , VI.2.11.
	(90 <sup>6</sup> )		Diod., XV.47.2.
	(130 <sup>6</sup> )		Diod., XV.47.3.
373/2 (Corcyra)	70	Iphicrates	Xen., <u>Hell.</u> , VI.2.14.
	90		Xen., <u>Hell.</u> , VI.2.38.
368/7	30	Autocles	Diod., XV.71.3.
365 (Samos)	30	Timotheus	Isoc., XV.111.
356 (Embata)	120	Chares/ Timotheus/ Iphicrates	Diod., XVI.21.1.
322	170		Diod., XVIII.15.8.

<sup>4</sup> This table lists, to the best of my knowledge, the numbers of ships used on Athenian and Allied expeditions from the foundation of the League to the end of the "Social War". The figure of 170 (for 322) was added because, as far as I have determined, this was the largest number of ships employed by Athens in any one campaign during the fourth century. Undoubtedly, the table is incomplete, insofar as the literary sources do not mention the numbers of ships used on minor campaigns. The bracketed numbers represent those which must be doubted (Isoc., XV.109) and those that were not actually used on campaign: for further details, see below.

<sup>5</sup> For discussion, see below, p. 7, n.10.

<sup>6</sup> Timotheus collected an additional thirty ships from the Aegean allies. This brought the total up to ninety. A further forty ships had been collected during his absence, giving a total of 130. Diodorus' account gives the impression that all 130 were used on the subsequent campaign. There is, however, sufficient reason to doubt this. Diodorus erroneously claims that Timotheus and Iphicrates were in joint command, but this contradicts Xenophon, who says Timotheus had been dismissed from the command because of the delay in giving aid to the Corcyreans. Moreover, Xenophon specifically says that Iphicrates had only 70 ships. Presumably, the additional sixty were not used on Iphicrates' campaign.

one hundred plus<sup>7</sup>. Hence, Athens had a decided advantage. Why, then, did the Spartans feel confident enough to blockade Athens with only sixty ships? It was one thing to have one hundred hulls, but quite a different matter to equip and man them. Close examination of Xenophon's account reveals the reason for the Athenians' initial failure to mount effective opposition to the blockade<sup>8</sup>. In response to the blockade:

"The Athenians saw that there was only one thing to do. They manned their ships themselves and under the command of Chabrias, fought a naval engagement with Pollis (the Spartan admiral). In this battle (Naxos) they were victorious and as a result grain could now be brought into Attica."

(Xen., Hell., V.4.61, trans. by R. Warner,

Penguin ed., p. 296f.)

One can infer from this passage that the Athenian problem had not been the provision of ships, but the provision of manpower. Hence, there is no discrepancy of evidence between the inscription and Xenophon. At the outset of the blockade, there had been insufficient rowers for the available ships. When the Spartan fleet continued to bar grain imports the Athenians decided to man the ships themselves. Thus, in the ensuing battle of Naxos,

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<sup>7</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1604 (passim).

<sup>8</sup> Xenophon (Hell., V.4.61) testifies that the Spartan plan to blockade Athens was successful: "Athens really was now in a state of siege. Her grain ships got as far as Geraistus, but could no longer sail on along the coast from there since the Spartan fleet was in the waters round Aegina, Ceos and Andros". Diodorus (XV.32-34.2) does not refer to the "Peloponnesian League" discussions and the blockade on Athens prior to the battle of Naxos. Diodorus concentrates entirely on the military engagements in Boeotia. XV.34.3 refers only to one unsuccessful attempt to block grain shipments into Athens. Nonetheless, there is no reason to disbelieve Xenophon's account, which provides far more detail of affairs at Athens prior to Naxos than that of Diodorus. Xenophon refers specifically to grain shipments being prevented passage past Geraistus and an effective concentration of the Spartan fleet off the southern and south-eastern shores of Attica. The blockade appears to have been successful until an Athenian convoy guided a shipment into the Piraeus (Diod., XV.34.3). Diodorus' account picks up at this point.

the Athenian fleet numbered eighty-three ships<sup>9</sup>. One should note, however, that this number still fell at least seventeen short of the available hulls recorded by the inscription.

Xenophon's reference to the Athenians being forced by circumstances to man the ships themselves suggests that Athens did not have sufficient finance to induce mercenary rowers into service. It is even possible that the Athenians recruited on this occasion served on a voluntary basis, for the honour of their state and not for pay.

Speculation aside, it will be shown below that problems with recruiting manpower on later occasions can be traced to the inadequate provision of pay for the rowers and troops. It is quite probable that the 377/6 manpower shortage arose from similar difficulties.

Timotheus' circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus in Spring 375 provides a more explicit example of Athens' failure to give adequate financial backing to her naval commanders. Unfortunately, nothing is said by Xenophon concerning the outfitting of the expedition; the only detail given is that sixty ships were manned<sup>10</sup>. Perhaps Xenophon perceived no extraordinary details. On the other hand, in the Antidosis, Isocrates mentions that

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<sup>9</sup> Diod., XV.34.5. At XV.34.4 Diodorus says that Chabrias sailed out to Naxos with "the whole navy": "...Χαβρίας μὲν ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναύαρχος μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς πλεύσας ἐπὶ τὴν Νάξον...". One should understand here "all available ships" since the eighty-three mentioned by Diodorus fell short of the one hundred plus recorded on IG II<sup>2</sup> 1604. For the date of the battle of Naxos, see Marshall, op. cit., p. 60 and Plutarch, Life of Phocion, 6. Note that, according to Plutarch, only Athenian ships were involved in the Battle of Naxos and not allied ships as well.

<sup>10</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.63,65. Isoc., XV.109 claims that Timotheus had fifty ships. Xenophon's figure should be preferred, since one may reasonably suspect that Isocrates has provided a low figure in order to glorify the success of his former pupil. See F.E. Robbins, "The Cost to Athens of Her Second Empire", in Classical Philology, 13 (1918), p. 382.

Timotheus was given only thirteen talents<sup>11</sup>. Comparison with a low estimate by Demosthenes for naval ration allowances indicates that the sum of thirteen talents was not great. Demosthenes calculates that bare monthly rations would cost twenty minai per ship. This estimate itself is extremely low. Demosthenes based his calculation on the daily pay rate of two obols per man. Indeed, the usual rate of pay was probably four obols a day per man, but Demosthenes is trying to convince his audience that his proposed intervention against Philip is attractive economically to Athenian purses<sup>12</sup>. Compare this with an entry in Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia, where it is said that four obols were given to young military trainees in the 330's<sup>13</sup>. Experienced soldiers would hardly receive less.

Accordingly, if one were to work on three obols as the minimum rate of ration maintenance per man - a conservative estimate<sup>14</sup> - one can see that thirteen talents was wholly insufficient for an extended campaign. With a fleet of sixty ships, Timotheus would have had to maintain approximately 12,000 men (that is, an average complement of two hundred per ship) on three obols each per day. One talent would have been expended each day. Thirteen talents, therefore, would have financed the expedition for only thirteen days.

Is there sufficient reason to doubt Isocrates' assertion that Timotheus received only thirteen talents? One can be excused for suspecting

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<sup>11</sup> Isoc., XV.109.

<sup>12</sup> Dem., IV.28. See A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 1957, p. 135, n. 1 and J.R. Ellis and R.D. Milns, The Spectre of Philip, Sydney, 1970, p. 25, n. 43.

<sup>13</sup> Arist., Ath. Pol., 42.3.

<sup>14</sup> See in particular the article by M.M. Markle, "Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens", in CRUX, 1985, pp. 265ff; esp. pp. 277-281, in which he shows that in the fourth century a family of four could be fed on about 2½ obols per day.



that Isocrates exaggerated the lack of funding for his former pupil, Timotheus. The sum of thirteen talents comes from a speech which strives to defend Timotheus' military career and financial management. Nonetheless, three points tend to confirm that Timotheus did receive initially only thirteen talents for the 375 campaign. Firstly, the Isocratean figure is specific. Secondly, two years later, Timotheus collected only seven talents from his sixty trierarchs, according to the pseudo-Demosthenes<sup>15</sup>; thirteen talents was sizeable by comparison. The thirty-four talents collected by Satyrus in the early 350's as a result of an eisphora levy was not given to the current strategoi to spend during any subsequent campaign. Instead, it was used to equip the ships that were put into commission<sup>16</sup>. Finally, the rest of Xenophon's account of Timotheus' 375 voyage corroborates the existence of financial problems - problems that could have arisen only if the expedition was ill-funded from the beginning.

Xenophon's narrative alludes to the difficult task faced by Timotheus in maintaining his fleet abroad. After the naval battle of Alyzia in 374,

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<sup>15</sup> Ps.-Dem., XLIX.11.12. Great care must be exercised in the use of ps.-Dem., XLIX.9.21. The speech was delivered and perhaps written by Apollodorus - a slippery character. See L. Pearson, "Apollodorus", the Eleventh Attic Orator", in The Classic Tradition, Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan, 1966, 347-359. The two figures are comparable only insofar as they are the only known figures for these two campaigns of Timotheus. It must be remembered, however, that the thirteen talents was voted by the assembly, whereas the seven talents were borrowed by Timotheus from the other trierarchs. It cannot be merely assumed that the assembly voted no money for the later expedition. The move of Timotheus seems to have been a desperate measure to keep the fleet together, because (as formerly) the assembly had voted insufficient funds. Nonetheless, there is still no reason to doubt Isocrates' figure of thirteen talents: it is all we have and it is not unreasonable or unusual from what we know otherwise of Athenian naval finance in the fourth century.

I am indebted to Dr. M. Markle for pointing this out to me.

<sup>16</sup> Dem., XXII.63. The thirty-four talents given to Satyrus were the proceeds of an eisphora. Isocrates does not specify whether Timotheus' thirteen talents, voted to him by the ecclesia, were drawn from allied contributions, an eisphora, or some other source.

there is clear evidence that the League's funds were stretched. In spite of his marginal victory<sup>17</sup>, Timotheus was obliged to refit his ships. This he was able to do and the fleet was also reinforced with an unspecified number of ships from Corcyra<sup>18</sup>. Timotheus, however, was required to "...keep on sending to Athens for money. He needed a lot, since he had a lot of ships"<sup>19</sup>. Such a situation would have arisen only if the fleet had been funded badly from the outset.

Victory clearly did not provide sufficient financial recompense to cover the costs of fleet maintenance and pay for the crews. The shortfall in funds cannot be explained solely by the addition of the Corcyrean ships which, Xenophon informs us, brought Timotheus' fleet to "more than seventy"<sup>20</sup>. This overall addition of ten or so ships cannot account for Timotheus' persistent pleas for money. Xenophon's use of the imperfect (μετεπέμπετο) in the quotation (V.4.66) above may suggest that he had begun to make pleas for money even prior to the battle of Alyzia and the addition of the Corcyrean ships.

Clearly, Timotheus had been sent out with inadequate funds. If the Athenians expected him to cover the costs by the acquisition of funds in the field, his repeated calls for money suggest that he found this impossible to achieve. The Athenian response to his pleas is unknown:

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<sup>17</sup> Against S. Hornblower, The Greek World: 479-323 B.C., London, 1983, p. 215. It is clear from Xen., Hell., V.4.66 that Alyzia was not a decisive victory for the Athenians. The Spartans were able to recover sufficiently with the addition of six ships to offer battle with Timotheus again after they had been defeated.

<sup>18</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.66 unfortunately does not specify the number of Corcyrean ships added to raise the fleet to seventy. Nor does he mention how many had been irreparably damaged in the battle of Alyzia.

<sup>19</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.66. Xenophon does not record how much money Timotheus' pleas realised - if any. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume with Robbins, op. cit., p. 382 that Timotheus did receive funds.

<sup>20</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.66.

Xenophon, unfortunately, does not elucidate. Understandably, he is more concerned with Athenian attempts to secure a peace settlement with Sparta<sup>21</sup>. When the "Peace of 375"<sup>22</sup> was concluded, Timotheus was recalled<sup>23</sup>.

In spite of the deficiency in funding, the circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus had achieved the desired effect and more. The Spartans, threatened by the presence of Timotheus' fleet in the waters of western Greece, had desisted from their invasion of Theban territory and had launched a fleet to challenge Timotheus. Thebes, a member of the "Second Athenian League", was able to reassert control over her neighbouring cities in Boeotia, while Timotheus not only defeated the Spartans at Alyzia, but recruited new members for the League<sup>24</sup>. In effect, the campaign had put Athens in a sound bargaining position to make the "Peace of 375" with Sparta.

Finance was also a key issue in the Athenian decision to make peace with Sparta<sup>25</sup>. According to Xenophon, the Athenians had difficulty in collecting contributions from Thebes:

"...the Athenians...could see that owing to their help the power of Thebes was growing, yet no money came in to them from Thebes for the upkeep of their fleet and they themselves were being exhausted by eisphorai<sup>26</sup>, raids on their coast from Aegina and garrison duties throughout

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<sup>21</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.1f. Robbins reasonably calculates that Timotheus required 160 talents, see Robbins, op. cit., p. 382.

<sup>22</sup> For the date of the Peace, see Diod., XV.38.1-4 and G.L. Cawkwell, "Notes on the Peace of 375/4", in Historia, 12 (1963), pp. 84ff.

<sup>23</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.2.

<sup>24</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.63; VI.1.1.

<sup>25</sup> Since there is no evidence to suggest that members of the League defected when the "Peace of 375" was made with Sparta, one must accept that the Peace was considered desirable by the allies.

<sup>26</sup> See below, p. 31.

their country. With all this in mind they felt a desire to put an end to the war and they sent ambassadors to Sparta and there concluded a peace treaty."

(Xen., Hell., VI.2.1, trans. by R. Warner,  
Penguin ed., p. 308)

Thus, finance, according to Xenophon, was a decisive factor in Athenian dissatisfaction with Thebes and the "Peace of 375". One must be careful to note, however, that Xenophon's undeniable anti-Theban bias led him to put the blame largely on Thebes<sup>27</sup>. Thebes remained a member of the League and contributed ships in 373 at least<sup>28</sup>. Thebes was fulfilling this part of the obligation, if she did not fulfil the obligation to contribute money.

Nonetheless, Xenophon's statement reveals the dire need in which the Athenians found their finances in the mid-370's - a need consistent with the monetary shortfall evident during Timotheus' campaign.

The reference to financial problems in Xenophon's Hellenica (VI.2.1) is also consistent with a passage delineating the machinations of the Pheraean tyrant Jason against Athens. In a speech contrived by Xenophon, Jason is said to proclaim to a Thessalian audience:

"Financially, too, it seems clear that we shall be in the stronger position: we (Thessalians) do not look to wretched little islands for our revenues but can draw upon the races of a continent."

(Xen., Hell., VI.1.12, trans. by R. Warner,  
Penguin ed., p. 304f.)

The "wretched little islands" refers to the majority of allies in the "Second Athenian League". As a comparative assessment of the resources of Athens' Aegean allies and the combined resources of Thessaly, there

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<sup>27</sup> For Xenophon's anti-Theban bias, see G.L. Cawkwell's introduction to Xenophon, A History of My Times, Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 35-37.

<sup>28</sup> Ps.-Dem., XLIX.14,21,48ff; cf. C.I.A. II.789, e.g. l.80.

is sufficient room for doubt. The rebel members of the League and their allies in 357/6 were able to man one hundred ships<sup>29</sup>. This strongly suggests that their resources were hardly negligible. On the other hand, Jason reputedly had 8,000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites and countless peltasts, although these figures were probably exaggerated in order to support Jason's efforts to win Thessalian aid<sup>30</sup>. Nonetheless, in the Hellenica (VI.1.12), Xenophon suggests that states outside the League considered the financial stability of the "Second Athenian League" to be questionable, if not contemptible.

Financial problems are indicated further in Athens' alliance with Corcyra. The promise of financial and naval aid strongly influenced Athenian policy. The acquisition of Corcyra as an ally in 375 had been important<sup>31</sup>. According to Xenophon, only Athens could produce more ships and more money than Corcyra<sup>32</sup>. Corcyra's plea for assistance against Sparta in 373 was answered by Athens, largely out of consideration for the island's strategic position, as well as its capacity to provide ships and money. This seems to be echoed by Diodorus, who claims the Spartans "...were aware of the great importance that Corcyra had for the aspirants to sea power..."<sup>33</sup>. The aspirants were the Athenians.

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<sup>29</sup> Diod., XVI.21.2. Note, however, that it is feasible that Mausolus of Caria provided the money. See Dem., XV.3; Diod., XVI.7.3.

<sup>30</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.1.19. See N.G.L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C., Oxford, 1967, p. 491.

<sup>31</sup> Recently J. Cargill, op. cit., pp. 68ff., challenged the traditional view that Corcyra was a member of the League. His arguments are inadequate. See S. Hornblower's challenging comments in CR, 32 (1982), pp. 236-237.

<sup>32</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.9. Isoc., XV.109, claims that Corcyra had eighty triremes, a significant number.

<sup>33</sup> Diod., XV.46.1.

Significantly, the acquisition of strong, wealthy allies, such as Corcyra, appears to have had no effect on Athenian preparedness for war. Again, the League's financial and consequent naval weakness became evident. Athenian problems with attracting recruits for naval service and the provision of finance for military operations were revealed in the preparation for the relief of Corcyra in 373. According to the pseudo-Demosthenes the commander of the fleet, Timotheus, caused each of the trierarchs to advance seven minai to feed their crews, that is, a ration allowance of seven talents for the whole fleet<sup>34</sup>. Timotheus' wealth enabled him to cover the cost of his advance by mortgages on his estates<sup>35</sup>. The other, less wealthy trierarchs may have been less fortunate<sup>36</sup>.

Not only was there difficulty in financing the expedition initially, but Xenophon's account further reveals the troubles Athens faced in organizing relief for Corcyra. Sixty ships were voted to be sent out under Timotheus, but:

"...he found it impossible to find crews in Athens and sailed off to the islands to recruit men from there."

(Xen., Hell., VI.2.12, trans. by R. Warner,  
Penguin ed., p. 310)<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ps.-Dem., XLIX.11-12. Each of the sixty trierarchs advanced seven minai, providing a total of 420 minai, or seven talents.

<sup>35</sup> Ps.-Dem., XLIX.6-21.

<sup>36</sup> For example, see the case of Apollodorus, Dem., L.17,56.

<sup>37</sup> Diodorus (XV.47.2) does not explain why Timotheus went first to the Thracian region. He states only the result of the expedition: "...many cities (were summoned) to join the alliance and thirty triremes (were added) to his fleet". This confirms Xenophon's claim that Timotheus delayed his departure to Corcyra in order to make his fleet better equipped. Cf. Dem., VIII.24, who speaks of Athenian generals visiting places like Chios and Erythrae looking for money. See S. Hornblower, The Greek World: 479-323 B.C., London, 1983, p. 203.

Undoubtedly, the advance of seven talents by the trierarchs had been an incentive to attract the crews. Perhaps they hoped to show that the crews' ration allowance was available from the outset of the voyage. Clearly, the measure was unsuccessful. In order to provide his sixty ships with a full complement of men, Timotheus required 12 000<sup>38</sup>. One may reasonably speculate that Timotheus was able to recruit a number of men from Athens before sailing off to the islands, even though Xenophon's account literally asserts the contrary. Nonetheless, one should recognize the terseness of the account: it emphasizes the subsequent recruitment campaign in the islands. When he sailed off to the islands, however, Timotheus must have had sufficient - albeit skeleton - crews to sail the fleet in order to pick up the recruits from the islands. Unfortunately, it can hardly be speculated what percentage of the crews came from Athens: Xenophon's account strongly suggests that it was minimal.

What caused the shortage of recruits? Regrettably, Xenophon's narrative casts no light on the subject. Certainly, modern estimates of Athenian population figures suggest that there was no lack of citizens and metics<sup>39</sup>. Hence, the shortage can be attributed only to unwillingness on the part of Athenian citizens and metics to serve. Without doubt, that unwillingness was inspired by previous Athenian failure to secure consistent payments for troops and ship crews abroad.

One can appreciate the reluctance to serve. Seven minai, distributed among a crew of two hundred, at a rate of three obols per day, would

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<sup>38</sup> This is based on the calculation that each ship had a complement of two hundred men.

<sup>39</sup> See Jones, op. cit., s.v. "population".

have kept the men in rations for only seven days<sup>40</sup>. Presumably, Timotheus calculated that the total of seven talents advanced by the sixty trierarchs would provide rations for the outward voyage to Corcyra. It would have been insufficient for any protracted campaign and the return voyage to Athens. Moreover, in Demosthenes' First Philippic, delivered in 351/0<sup>41</sup>, Demosthenes calculates that twenty minai were required per ship per month for ration allowance alone<sup>42</sup>, which works out at a daily ration allowance of two obols per man<sup>43</sup>. This must have been the bare minimum because in this passage Demosthenes is trying to convince his Athenian audience that a force can be equipped and maintained at no great expense to Athens. Note that his calculation does not incorporate pay for the men. He appears to envisage a situation where the pay is provided from the campaign itself, without subsidies from home<sup>44</sup>. Thus, by comparing the seven minai available to each ship in 373 with Demosthenes' proposed twenty minai per month, one can easily perceive the financial stress that accompanied Timotheus' expedition.

From Diodorus' account, we learn also that Timotheus was forced to sail to the Thracian region in order to gather crews for the expedition

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<sup>40</sup> This is calculated on the presumed minimal naval pay rate of three obols per man per day. Cf., n. 43 below.

<sup>41</sup> For the date of the First Philippic, see J.R. Ellis, "The Date of Demosthenes' First Philippic", in REG, 79 (1966), pp. 636-639 and G.L. Cawkwell, "The Defence of Olynthos", in Classical Quarterly, 12 (1962), pp. 122-127.

<sup>42</sup> Dem., IV.28. Note that "bare rationing" is considered quite distinct from "full pay" (see Dem., IV.29).

<sup>43</sup> Note that Demosthenes (IV.28) works on the calculation that there are two hundred rowers per ship. Twenty minai divided among two hundred, works out at ten drachnai per man a month or two obols a day. This is the same ration allowance as that proposed for the soldiers. Nonetheless, this is extremely low. Even a public slave was given three obols per day. See Jones, op. cit., p. 32.

<sup>44</sup> Dem., IV.28; cf., Ellis and Milns, op. cit., p. 25, n. 46, who point out the "unduly optimistic" nature of Demosthenes' suggestion.



to Corcyra<sup>45</sup>. Clearly, Athenian financial backing was so low that an immediate naval response to Corcyra's plea was found impossible. Instead Ctesicles, with a force of 600 peltasts<sup>46</sup>, was sent out to cater for the immediate threat posed by internal disruption in Corcyra<sup>47</sup>. Accordingly, Timotheus' inability to respond immediately did not give the strategic advantage to the Spartans. Ctesicles was able to secure Corcyra for Athens. Moreover, there are no signs of hesitancy among Athenian allies and potential allies. Indeed, Timotheus was able to secure money, allies and ships for the expedition<sup>48</sup>.

Nonetheless, one can infer the cumulative damage that this incident and those of 377 and 375 were having on the League's prestige. In the speech On the Symmories, some twenty years later, Demosthenes was to say that Athens required a well-organized and well-financed fleet in order to respond to any opponent should the threat arise<sup>49</sup>. Timotheus' actions suggest that Athens did not have this capacity in 373.

The financial embarrassment of the League brought on the downfall of Timotheus. Despite his successful acquisition of ships and new members for the League, the Athenians could not forgive the delay<sup>50</sup>. His replacement, Iphicrates, overcame the manpower shortage by personal vigour and

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<sup>45</sup> Diod., XV.47.2. Although Xenophon does not specify that Timotheus went to Thrace, there is no substantial discrepancy here. Both sources claim that Timotheus had to find crews: Diodorus simply specifies the region in which he searched for them.

<sup>46</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.10; cf., Diod., XV.47.4 who says Ctesicles was sent with five hundred soldiers.

<sup>47</sup> See also Diod., XV.46.3.

<sup>48</sup> See Diod., XV.46-47.7.

<sup>49</sup> Dem., XIV.11 and *passim*.

<sup>50</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.13.

he "...saw to it that the trierarchs did their work too"<sup>51</sup>. Evidently, the trierarchs were not fulfilling their public duty to Iphicrates' satisfaction. Unfortunately, Xenophon does not mention the measures employed by Iphicrates, but F.H. Marshall<sup>52</sup> has suggested plausibly that the anecdote recorded by Polyaeus<sup>53</sup> belongs to this occasion. In order to relieve the financial strain, Iphicrates proposed that buildings which projected over public thoroughfares were to be pulled down or curtailed. The threatening proposal procured for Iphicrates the desired effect: the owners paid him off, rather than incur the additional expense and inconvenience of relocating their premises. Such proposals were hardly likely to endear the cause of expensive war to landowners. Nonetheless, Polyaeus' anecdote indicates the dire position of Athenian capacity to finance their expeditions.

According to Diodorus, the allied fleet did receive financial reimbursement during the 373 campaign. They captured nine Sicilian triremes with their crews: "By selling the captives as booty they collected more than sixty talents, with which they paid their forces"<sup>54</sup>. Even though Diodorus mistakenly identifies Timotheus as a joint commander with Iphicrates, one is not required to reject his entire account. The acquisition of booty is recorded also by Xenophon:

"...all the ships from Syracuse together with their crews were captured. Iphicrates cut off their beaks and towed the triremes into the harbour of Corcyra; as for the prisoners he came to an arrangement by which each man should pay a fixed sum as ransom, except for Crinippus who was in

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<sup>51</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.14.

<sup>52</sup> Marshall, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>53</sup> Polyaeus, III.9.30.

<sup>54</sup> Diod., XV.47.7.

command. He kept Crinippus under guard with a view to getting a very large ransom for him or else selling him as a slave; but Crinippus took things so badly that he died by his own hand. Iphicrates let the rest go after accepting Corcyreans as guarantors for the ransom money."

(Xen., Hell., VI.2.36, trans. by R. Warner,  
Penguin ed., p. 315f.)

Certainly, this passage suggests that the ransom money was not forthcoming immediately. One would imagine that some delay would be involved in order that Syracuse could be notified, the ransom collected from the various sources and then sent to Corcyra. Hence, if Diodorus is correct in his assertion that the ransom money covered the pay of the allied force, it was not immediate recompense.

This is supported by Xenophon, who records two means which Iphicrates employed to maintain his crews. Firstly, "he (Iphicrates) now maintained most of his sailors by letting them do work on the land of the Corcyreans"<sup>55</sup>. This appears to be the meaning behind Iphicrates' acceptance of the Corcyreans as guarantors of the ransom monies; he kept the sailors working on their farms till the ransom was paid. Secondly, Iphicrates "...took a fleet to Cephallenia where he raised money. Some of the contributions were voluntary, others enforced"<sup>56</sup>. Xenophon, unfortunately, does not mention how much money was raised from the Cephallenian cities: his purpose here is only to record ironically the Athenian use of force to acquire so-called "contributions". Both measures suggest the financial

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<sup>55</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.37.

<sup>56</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.38.

difficulties faced by Iphicrates. Accordingly, one can assume with confidence that the ransom of sixty talents was not received until some time later.

The financial problems of Iphicrates were clearly not overcome by his two measures and the ransom money. According to Xenophon, Iphicrates permitted his political opponent Callistratus to return to Athens in return for a promise: either "...to send more money for the fleet or else make arrangements for peace"<sup>57</sup>. Again, it was clear that allied naval operations could be threatened, even curtailed, due to want of finance<sup>58</sup>. This passage (VI.3.3) is the second explicit piece of evidence that League decisions on the viability of war and peace were influenced by financial considerations: more money would prolong the war, but no more money would necessitate peace with Sparta. Xenophon's emphasis here on lack of finance, as an explanation for Athenian readiness to sue for peace in 371, complements the other key considerations which Xenophon was careful to note: growing Athenian dissatisfaction with the Thebans' lack of financial commitment to League enterprises and Athenian fear of increasing Theban power<sup>59</sup>, fear heightened by the Theban destruction of Plataea in 373<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.3.3. Iphicrates' fleet had increased from the initial seventy ships (Xen., Hell., VI.2.14) to ninety (VI.2.38).

<sup>58</sup> Just as Timotheus' pleas for funds in 375 indicate that his campaign was threatened.

<sup>59</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.2.1 for 375 B.C. Xen., Hell., VI.3.1ff., 13ff. The Theban victory over the Spartans at Leuctra was not well received by the Athenian assembly. As the Athenians foresaw, the victory enabled Thebes to consolidate central Greece under its own authority. Theban expansion was no longer held in check by Spartan presence in the area. On the effects of Leuctra and the "Peace of 371" see J. Buckler, The Theban Hegemony 371-362 B.C., Cambridge (Mass.), 1980, esp. pp. 65-69.

<sup>60</sup> Xen., Hell., VI.3.1; see also Isoc., XIV. passim; cf., Diod., XV.45.4-6.

Although Iphicrates' campaign was plagued with financial problems, the situation was relieved by the expertise with which he dealt with them. Even if there was ill-feeling over the use of force employed to extract contributions from some Cephallenian cities<sup>61</sup>, the campaign was successful in that it re-established League naval presence in western Greece and ultimately left Athens and her loyal League allies in a position to secure a favourable peace with Sparta<sup>62</sup>. There is no reason to believe that Thebes and some Euboean members asserted their independence from the League as a result of either the League's flagging finances or the use of compulsion to extract "contributions" from some Cephallenian cities. The secessions were due to Thebes' ambition and influence: the terms of the "Peace of 371" simply contradicted Theban ambition<sup>63</sup>.

Signs of difficulty in financing Athenian naval operations are not evident again until about 365<sup>64</sup>. The Athenian commander, Timotheus, lent support to Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.

Ariobarzanes, in turn, rewarded Timotheus' relief of Sestos and Crithote

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<sup>61</sup> As far as I know there is no evidence to suggest that the allies felt any ill-feelings towards Athens as a result of Iphicrates' heavy handed dealings in Cephallenia. Nonetheless, ill-feeling must remain a possibility, even if it did not provide the precipitating cause of allied revolt at this time.

<sup>62</sup> Some allies did secede with Thebes. See Cargill, op. cit., p. 165f. I agree with Cargill's argument that the secessions of the late 360's were due to Theban influence.

<sup>63</sup> See Cargill, op. cit., p. 164ff.

<sup>64</sup> For the date, see Marshall, op. cit., p. 91ff. Marshall infers from Isoc., XV.111, that Timotheus received no funds from Athens for his expedition. Note, however, that the Isocratean passage literally applies only to the siege of Samos. It is quite possible that he received funds at the outset of the campaign and subsequently ran out of money. Isocrates' bias towards his former pupil, Timotheus, may have caused him to overlook an initial payment.

by presenting these two cities to the Athenians<sup>65</sup>. This is the first recorded instance in the history of the "Second Athenian League" of troops, ostensibly in Athenian employment, being paid by a foreign power<sup>66</sup>. It set a precedent for Chares, who hired his force out to Artabazus, a Persian general, during the "Social War"<sup>67</sup>.

From the mid-360's, there is further evidence that Athenian naval commanders were expected to conduct operations without drawing extensively upon the funds of Athens and the League. Timotheus' agreement with Ariobarzanes undoubtedly was designed to secure such financial independence from Athens.

Previously, Timotheus had shown his parsimonious ability in his conduct of the operation against Samos in about 366/5<sup>68</sup>. According to Isocrates, Timotheus:

"...led an expedition against Samos; and that city which Pericles, renowned above all others for his wisdom, his justice and his moderation, reduced with a fleet of two hundred ships and the expenditure of a thousand talents, Timotheus, without receiving from you (Athenians) or collecting from your allies any money whatsoever, captured after a siege of ten months with a force of eight thousand

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<sup>65</sup> Nepos, Timotheus, 1.2. The cities in turn were presented to Athens. Isoc., XV.112. See also Dem., XV.9-10 who claims Timotheus abandoned Ariobarzanes (when the latter openly revolted from the King) and went on to seize Samos.

<sup>66</sup> It is not known how many men Timotheus had under his command at this point in time, because casualties incurred during the siege of Samos are not recorded. In 374 Iphicrates did serve Pharnabazus in Egypt, but he seems to have been held in an advisory capacity without direct command of mercenaries. See H.W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, Chicago, 1981 (repr.), pp. 105-106.

<sup>67</sup> Diod., XVI.22.1.

<sup>68</sup> For the chronology surrounding the siege of Samos, see Beloch, Gr. Gesch., III<sup>2</sup>.2,245-6. Beloch has the siege begin in 366.

light armed troops and thirty triremes and he paid all these forces from the spoils of war."<sup>69</sup>

(Isoc., XV.111, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 247f.)

Calculations based on this passage give an idea of how much money was required to fund an expedition which was abroad for an extended period of time. Note, however, that not all commanders could expect to pay their troops from the spoils of war. In order to provide pay for a ten-month siege, Timotheus would have faced an enormous bill. Assuming each of his thirty triremes had a complement of two hundred men, his entire force would have been 14,000 strong. Pay for a force of this size, continually employed for ten months, would have amounted to seven hundred talents, if one calculates that each man received a drachma per day. Alternatively, if the daily rate was two drachmai per man, then the total payable would have been 1,400 talents<sup>70</sup>. Perhaps a proportion of the expense was defrayed by the troops living off the land, but this must have been minimal, since the siege lasted ten months. Food scavenged from the island must have been scarce by the end of the siege, particularly as it had to feed 14,000

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<sup>69</sup> See also Polyaeus, III.10.9 and Ps.-Arist., *Oec.*, II, p. 1350b. Unfortunately, neither Xenophon nor Diodorus even refers to the campaign against the Persian garrison on Samos. Polyaeus says Timotheus had 7,000 light troops.

<sup>70</sup> I have assumed again that each of the ships had a crew of two hundred. These 6,000 rowers, plus the 8,000 peltasts, provide the total of 14,000. Rates of military pay are not well documented. Indeed, one drachma daily per man is a rather conservative estimate, since it is based on the late fifth century Erechtheion accounts (IG I<sup>2</sup> 373-4). Undoubtedly, the daily rate by the mid-fourth century was two drachmai or more (IG II-III<sup>2</sup> 1672-3). Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 382, calculates that Timotheus required about 467 talents. Robbins, however, based this on the calculation that each man received only four obols daily. It was shown above, however, that this figure is more in line with ration allowance, which was distinct from pay, as Dem., IV.28 shows.

men. Indeed, despite the imposition of restrictions on the distribution of food, supplies still had to be imported. Timotheus even had to sell the harvests to the enemy in order to provide pay for his troops. It is also possible that additional booty was attained by ransoming the captives. Comparison with instances where commanders in the 370's were forced to send home pleas for more money proves that the majority of campaigns were not as lucrative as that of Samos in the mid-360's<sup>71</sup>.

Isocrates' Antidosis clearly indicates that a parsimonious commander was desirable for Athens and the League allies (111). Evidently, other Athenians were of the same opinion, since Timotheus was re-elected strategos, his dismissal over his delay in reinforcing Corcyra forgotten. Furthermore, since Isocrates chose to support Timotheus' defence with examples of his careful employment of funds, one can assert that the Athenians generally considered this an admirable ability for their commanders to have. Isocrates was hardly likely to defend Timotheus with observations of abilities that were not generally admired.

On the other hand, commanders who squandered money received criticism. Isocrates lauds Timotheus for seizing Potidaea, upon which he claims "Athens had in times past squandered 2,400 talents"<sup>72</sup>. Timotheus seized Potidaea in 364<sup>73</sup>, seemingly without funds from Athens. Isocrates claims that Timotheus "...met the expense from money which he himself provided and from contributions of the Thracians"<sup>74</sup>. As Marshall

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<sup>71</sup> Xen., Hell., V.4.66; VI.3.3. For accounts of Timotheus' measures to provide for his troops during the siege see Polyaeus, III.10.9f. and ps.-Arist., Oec., II. p. 1350b. See also Parke, op. cit., p. 108f.

<sup>72</sup> Isoc., XV.113; cf. Dinarchus, I.14; Polyaeus, III.10.15.

<sup>73</sup> For the date, see Diod., XV.81.6 and Marshall, op. cit., p. 93.

<sup>74</sup> Isoc., XV.113; cf., Polyaeus, III.10.4 and Ps.-Arist., Cec., II.23.



has suggested, Timotheus probably at this time received men and money from a certain Menelaus<sup>75</sup>, but there is no evidence to suggest that he was a member of the League. Unfortunately, Isocrates' reference to the Potidaean campaign does not specify whether the Thracians who contributed were League members. Nonetheless, such silence is no basis for the assumption that they were not. Accordingly, one can see that these League members at least were prepared to contribute funds for campaigns in their locale.

Isocrates' figure of 2,400 talents previously squandered cannot be verified, since we are not informed as to how many troops were involved or as to how long the siege of Potidaea lasted. One can make the observation, however, that not every commander could have afforded to pay part of the campaign expenses as Timotheus did on this occasion. Once again, this strongly indicates the insecure basis upon which rested the League's financial capacity for naval operations.

There remains only one incident prior to the "Social War" which may suggest that Athenian/League funds were stretched. The incident arose in 361/0, when the Athenian Chares was elected strategos for the campaign against Alexander of Pherae. Diodorus, the main source, describes the conduct of Chares in the following terms:

(The Athenians chose)... "Chares as general in command and giving him a fleet, they sent him out. But he spent his time avoiding the enemy and injuring the allies. For he sailed to Corcyra, an allied city and stirred up such

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<sup>75</sup> Dittenberger, Sylloge, I<sup>2</sup>.102. See Marshall, op. cit., p. 95, cf., Ellis and Milns, op. cit., p. 48, n. 20. A decree of 363/2 (Tod 143) records Athenian gratitude towards Menelaus for help rendered.

violent civil strife in it that many murders and seizures took place, with the result that the Athenian democracy was discredited in the eyes of the allies. So it turned out that Chares, who did many other such lawless acts, accomplished nothing good but brought his country into discredit."

(Diod., XV.95.3, trans. by C.L. Sherman, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 221)

The reason for Chares' presence in Corcyra is not explained. Diodorus simply uses the incident as an example of Chares' disreputable behaviour. It is unclear whether the seizures referred to applied to men, money, or both. Despite the lack of detail surrounding this episode, it is possible that Chares was facing difficulties in financing resistance to Alexander. A disturbance in Corcyra may have given him the opportunity to intervene and seize property in order to pay for the campaign.

It is important to note that Diodorus' account differs from that of the contemporary Aeneas Tacticus<sup>76</sup>:

"In Corcyra an uprising (the party) of the rich and oligarchic wished to accomplish against the demos - Chares the Athenian was staying there, having a garrison, who assisted in the uprising... ."

(Aen. Tact., XI.13-15, trans. by Cargill, op. cit., p. 172f.)

Aeneas Tacticus clearly has Chares in Corcyra before the oligarchical coup. Cargill takes this to support his view that Diodorus' date is incorrect and puts forward his own tentative date of the mid-360's<sup>77</sup>. There is, however, no sound reason for doing so: the seemingly divergent

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<sup>76</sup> For a brief biographical account of Aeneas, see OCD<sup>2</sup>, s.v. "Aeneas" (2), p. 14. Aeneas' extant work was written probably soon after 357.

<sup>77</sup> Cargill, op. cit., p. 174f.

testimonies of Diodorus and Aeneas Tacticus may be compatible. It is possible that Chares was, as Diodorus says, originally elected strategos to take the place of Leosthenes who had been condemned for failing to aid Peperethus<sup>78</sup>. News of trouble in Corcyra diverted his force there, where he installed a garrison. He then assisted the oligarchic coup. There is no reason to accept with Cargill that Aeneas Tacticus was Diodorus' original source for, as Cargill himself admits, Aeneas Tacticus' account gives no indication of when the event it describes took place<sup>79</sup>. Diodorus, therefore, must have had some other, perhaps more substantial source to date it after the condemnation of Leosthenes in 361/0. Nonetheless, it cannot be shown conclusively that Chares' intervention in Corcyra was motivated by financial duress. It is more probable that the reason was political and not simply financial.

Further financial embarrassment came the way of Athens during the "Social War". Having suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of the rebels in the siege of Chios<sup>80</sup>, Athens' resources were again under pressure. According to Diodorus, Chares, eager to relieve the Athenians of the fleet's expense, undertook a hazardous operation:

"Now Artabazus had revolted from the Persian King and with only a few soldiers was on the point of joining combat with the satraps who had more than seventy thousand. Chares with all his forces took part with Artabazus in a battle and defeated the King's army. And Artabazus, out of gratitude for his kindness, made him a present of a large sum of money, with which he was able to furnish his entire

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<sup>78</sup> Diod., XV.95.3. On Leosthenes' condemnation, see also Aesch., II.21, 124.

<sup>79</sup> Cargill, op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>80</sup> Diod., XVI.7.3-4.

army with supplies. The Athenians at first approved Chares' action... ."

(Diod., XVI.22.1f., trans. by C.L. Sherman, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 299)

The naval list for 357/6 reveals that Athens had 283 hulls<sup>81</sup>. Again, the vast majority of these were not employed during the "Social War". The number of ships with which Chares blockaded Chios in the opening stage of the conflict is not known<sup>82</sup>. In the following year, 356, however, Chares had only sixty ships to hold on to the Chersonese, while the rebels ravaged the Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros<sup>83</sup>. At the battle of Embata<sup>84</sup>, the Athenian strategoi had only 120 ships, or just over forty per cent of the ships recorded in the naval list<sup>85</sup>.

The quotation above from Diodorus suggests that the problem was financial. Having been defeated at Embata, the Athenian force under Chares entered mercenary service, presumably to secure sufficient funds for supplies. This is confirmed by a scholion on Demosthenes' First Philippic:

"When the king of the Persians sent orders to the coastal satraps to disband their mercenary armies on account of their excessive cost, the satraps discharged the soldiers, who were about ten thousand in number. They went to Chares, the Athenian general, who had a force of mercenaries and made him their leader. Artabazos, a Persian, who was in revolt from the King and at war with him, sent (a message) to Chares, inviting him to ship his army over into the King's territory. When the soldiers put pressure on Chares, saying that if he did not provide them with

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<sup>81</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1612, 1.227.

<sup>82</sup> Diodorus (XVI.7.3f) does not specify the number of Athenian ships.

<sup>83</sup> Diod., XVI.21.1f. The rebels had a fleet of one hundred ships.

<sup>84</sup> The battle took place in the autumn of 356; see Hammond, op. cit., p. 516.

<sup>85</sup> Diod., XVI.21.1.

maintenance they would go away to one who was offering (it) he (Chares) was constrained to ship the army over. He fell in with a Persian force of twenty thousand, most of them mounted, under the command of Tithraustes and defeated it in battle. And he even wrote (a letter) to the Athenians about the ten thousand, saying that he had won a victory that was the sister of Marathon. Some people bade Chares by letter to hire other (mercenaries) too."

(Schol. on Dem., IV.19, trans. by P. Harding, Translated Documents From Greece and Rome, vol. 2, p. 94)

The scholiast's account clearly suggests that Chares' decision was forced upon him by the failure to provide adequate supplies for his troops. Accordingly, he had to bow to pressure imposed on him by his mercenaries. The need to relieve Athens of the expense of these hired soldiers no doubt arose as a result of pressure from Athens. Certainly, Isocrates, in his Areopagiticus, accuses the Athenians of squandering more than 1,000 talents to no purpose on mercenary troops<sup>86</sup>.

Further confirmation of the financial crisis faced by Chares at this time comes from another scholion on Demosthenes. In his Third Olynthiac, Demosthenes claims:

"...you, the People, hamstrung and stripped of money and allies, have been reduced to the position of a servant and an appendage, pleased if these men (sc. Athenian politicians) give you a share of the Theoric monies or provide a procession at the Boedromia..."

Scholion

"Boidia. This is a reference to Chares. For having crossed over with his mercenary force into Asia to Artabazos, he sacked Lampsacus and Sigeum and sent oxen to the Athenians, which they distributed by tribes. Boidia. Boedromia, is

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<sup>86</sup> Isoc., VII.9.

a variant reading. For they say that, when Chares sent the booty, it was (the time of) the festival of the Boedromia."

(Schol. on Dem., III.31, trans. by P. Harding, *op. cit.*, p. 94f.)

Accordingly, a degree of financial relief was offered by the successful campaign, but as the comment from Demosthenes' Olynthiac reveals, such relief was only temporary, catering only for the immediate crisis.

This chapter has shown that Athenian and League naval operations suffered from debilitating shortages of funds from the early 370's, down to the end of the "Social War". Expeditions were sent out, grossly underfunded, while their commanders were expected to cover the expenses from the campaign operations. Little financial support was given to the commanders while they were abroad, or delays were involved. After the battle of Alyzia in 375, Timotheus had to keep on sending to Athens for money. In 373 he had to mortgage his estates in order to cover personally the costs of his trierarchs' advance of money. Iphicrates was forced to hire out his troops to work on Corcyrean farms and in 356, Chares bowed under the pressure exerted by his mercenaries and hired out his force in order to provide funds for its maintenance.

Problems associated with the financing of military operations in this period are reflected also in the strong reaction against the imposition of financial burdens upon the wealthy citizens of Athens. Isocrates, Xenophon and Demosthenes all object, in particular, to the imposition of eisphora (war tax). In each case, the necessity of paying eisphora is used in their attempts to dissuade the Athenians from voting for war<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>87</sup> Isoc., VIII.20, 124; Xen., Poroi, IV.40; III.7-8; V.11-12; Dem., XIV.27. The issue of Athenian eisphora is highly problematic. See, in particular, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Demosthenes' TIMHMA and the Athenian Eisphora in the Fourth Century B.C.", in Classica et Mediaevalia, 14 (1953), pp. 30-70; A.H.M. Jones, Athenian Democracy, Oxford, 1957, esp. pp. 23-29; R. Thomsen, Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens, Copenhagen, 1964; de Ste. Croix, "Eisphora", in CR, 16 (1966), pp. 90-93; P.J. Rhodes, "Problems in Athenian Eisphora and Liturgies", in AJAH, 7(1982), pp. 1-19.

One of the most difficult problems encountered when one discusses eisphora is the number of times it was levied. This problem arises partly because it was levied at irregular intervals, when the state was hard pressed to finance its military expeditions by other means in times of war. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive record of the occasions when such levies were made. For the mid to late 350's, one has to rely upon passing references which, with one exception<sup>89</sup>, do not permit precise calculation of the years in which the levies were implemented. This point has to be made clear in order to avoid such fanciful assessments as that made by Brun.

According to Brun's survey of the brief references in the contemporary sources, the Athenians levied "numerous, heavy" eisphorai during the "Social War". Indeed, he specifies this "numerous" number as three, levied in successive years: 357/6, 356/5 and 355/4<sup>90</sup>.

The imposition of eisphora during the "Social War" is reported in Xenophon's Poroi:

"...if you (sc. Athenians) think that the eisphorai imposed during the late war (... διὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ νῦν πολέμῳ γεγενημένας εἰσφορὰς ...) make it impossible for you to contribute anything at all - well, keep down the cost of administration during the next year to the amount that the taxes yielded before the peace... ."

(Xen., Poroi, IV.40, trans. adapted from E.C. Marchant, Loeb ed., vol. VII, p. 219)

In the phrase "... ἐν τῷ νῦν πολέμῳ...", νῦν must be translated as "recent"

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<sup>88</sup> By means such as the contributions of the allies, booty, contributions from individuals and taxes on imports.

<sup>89</sup> Xen., Poroi, IV.40.

<sup>90</sup> P. Brun, Eisphora - Syntaxis - Stratiotika, Paris, 1983, pp. 44-45.

or "late", rather than "present", since it is clear from the reference to the peace (τῆς εἰρήνης), that the "Social War" had been concluded. It is not clear, however, how many eisphorai were levied. Xenophon's use of the plural merely suggests that there was more than one.

By utilizing passages from Isocrates, Brun attempts to establish a precise number of eisphora levies. For the Attic year 357/6, he cites Isocrates' On the Peace:

"...we (sc. Athenians)...are always ready, without in the least advancing our own welfare, to man triremes, to levy eiphorai and to lend aid to the campaigns of others or wage war against them, as chance may determine, as if imperilling the interests, not of our own, but of a foreign state."

(Isoc., VIII.12, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 13)

It is a gross misrepresentation of the context to infer that the passage's mention of eisphorai should be equated with an eisphora levied in the year of the pamphlet's presumed publication in 356. This appears to be Brun's only reason for suggesting that an eisphora was levied in 357/6. Surely, however, one should take into account that the reference to eisphora is a general one and could well refer to any wartime situation in which the tax was levied. One should note also the use of the plural:

"...χρημάτων εἰσφορὰς ποιεῖσθαι". The plural does not suggest one levy, but several. The context suggests only Isocrates' aversion for the impositions (past, present and future) of eisphorai. One cannot assert with any degree of certainty from this passage alone that his aversion stemmed from an eisphora levied in 356.

For the year 356/5, Brun cites another passage from Isocrates (VII.51). This passage is even less pertinent to Brun's claim that numerous, heavy eisphorai were levied during the "Social War". In this



passage Isocrates compares Athens of the fourth century unfavourably with Athens of the fifth. One should always treat such comparisons by Isocrates with caution, particularly when he claims that the Athenians have turned away from the moral virtues of their forefathers. In the passage in question, Isocrates asserts that, while the Areopagus maintained its authority:

"...Athens was not rife with law-suits, or accusations, or eisphorai, or poverty, or war; on the contrary, her citizens lived in accord with each other and at peace with mankind, enjoying the goodwill of the Hellenes and inspiring fear in the barbarians."

(Isoc., VII.51, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 137)

The pervading exaggeration in this passage is all too evident. Isocrates has utilized his rhetorical art in order to describe the Areopagus and fifth century Athens in the most glowing terms<sup>91</sup>. Moreover, no specific year is given as to when these eisphorai were levied. Isocrates implies that lawsuits, accusations, poverty, war and eisphorai, became prevalent after the power of the Areopagus waned over a century before his treatise was published<sup>92</sup>. Clearly, he was speaking generally. Accordingly, this passage cannot be used to assert, as Brun does, that an eisphora was levied in 356/5. Once again, the plural (εἰσφορῶν) is employed and not the singular. In the context of the unfavourable comparison of fifth and fourth century Athens, it makes more sense to interpret

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<sup>91</sup> For modern appraisals of rhetorical exaggeration and the comparison of fifth and fourth century Athens, see L. Pearson, "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators", in Classical Philology, 36 (1941), pp. 209-229 and J.T. Chambers, "The Fourth-Century Athenians' View of their Fifth-Century Empire", in La Parola del Passato, 30 (1975), pp. 177-191.

<sup>92</sup> For the decline of the Areopagus, see C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution, London, 1952, s.v. "Areopagos", esp. pp. 198 ff.; cf. pp. 13f., 147f. and 217.

the signs of moral and social decay as those allegedly evident since the demise of the Areopagus' power and specifically, in the case of the eisphorai, one should understand all eisphorai levied since the introduction of the tax<sup>93</sup>.

Brun cites another passage from Isocrates (XV.108) to support his claim that an eisphora was levied in 355/4. Again, the plural is used instead of a precise reference to one eisphora levy and, again, the reference to eisphora is general and does not specify the years, let alone any particular year, in which they were levied. The passage in question provides summary praise of the military successes of Timotheus, the Athenian general:

"For who does not know that Corcyra has the best strategic position among the cities in the neighbourhood of the Peloponnese; Samos, among the cities of Ionia; Sestos and Crithote, among those in the Hellespont; and Potidaea and Torone among the cities in Thrace?"<sup>94</sup>

(Isoc., XV.108, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 245f.)

The most likely dates for the seizures of these cities are 376/5, 366/5, 365/4 and 364/3 respectively<sup>95</sup>. The force of Isocrates' praise is clear from the rest of the passage:

"All these cities he (sc. Timotheus) has taken and presented to you (sc. Athenians), with no great outlay of money, without imposing burdens upon your present allies and without forcing you to pay many eisphora into the treasury."

(Isoc., XV.108, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 247)

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<sup>93</sup> It would appear from Thucydides, (III.19.1) that eisphora was first levied in 428/7. Cf., IG I<sup>2</sup> 92 for a possible earlier date.

<sup>94</sup> Cf., Isoc., XV.109-113.

<sup>95</sup> F.H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy, Cambridge, 1905, pp. 124ff.

There is no explicit reference here to eisphorai being levied in the 350's. As was noted above, the last of the cities mentioned was seized in 364/3. Accordingly, the absence of eisphorai applies only to the enumerated military successes of Timotheus. It places too much importance on the imprecise language of the passage to assert that Isocrates refers to eisphorai levied after the final dismissal of Timotheus as an Athenian commander, following the Athenian defeat at Embata in 356.

The only passage from Isocrates left to be considered comes from On the Peace (20)<sup>96</sup>. Strangely, Brun entirely omits reference to this passage in his discussion. Strangely indeed, because it is probably Isocrates' clearest reference to eisphorai levied during the "Social War". Interpreting the context in which the word is used, however, is exceedingly problematic. It is not clear whether Isocrates is speaking generally of war at this particular point, or whether he is referring to the "Social War":

"...if we (sc. Athenians) make peace and demean ourselves as our common covenants command us to do, then we shall dwell in our city in great security, delivered from wars and perils and the turmoil in which we are now (vov) involved amongst ourselves and we shall advance day by day in prosperity, relieved of paying eisphorai, of fitting out triremes and of discharging the other burdens which are imposed by war, without fear cultivating our lands and sailing the seas and engaging in those other

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<sup>96</sup> The word eisphora occurs twice in the Trapeziticus (XVII.41, 41), a treatise written by Isocrates in about 393. This early date, therefore, makes these references irrelevant to this discussion. Eisphorai are mentioned in the Antidosis (XV.156), in relation to the lack of liability of Gorgias of Leontini for the tax. Since Gorgias died in the mid-370's, this reference is also too early for this discussion.

occupations which now, because of the war (αἱ νῦν διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελοίπασιν ), have entirely come to an end."

(Isoc., VIII.20, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 19f.)

The reference to making peace refers to his previous plea for the Athenians to make peace, not only with the "Social War" rebels, but "with all mankind" (VIII.16). Isocrates wants Athens delivered from wars so that Athenian prosperity shall advance. The plural form (πολέμων) no doubt refers to Athenian participation in the "Social War" and the "Sacred War". Certainly, his use of the singular (τὸν πόλεμον) suggests that he is speaking in general terms about war. Nonetheless, the use of the temporal adverb, νῦν, suggests that current wars are meant.

Accordingly, only this passage from Isocrates (VIII.20) supports Xenophon's reference to eisphorai levied during the "Social War". Neither source, however, elaborates on the number of eisphorai and the years of their imposition<sup>97</sup>.

Clearly, Xenophon and Isocrates were concerned about the burden of the war-tax. Their concern is shared also by Demosthenes in On the Symmories (27), where he asserts that the Athenians would not subject themselves to an excessive levy. Not all Athenians, however, were liable to pay the levy. Jones suggests that only the wealthiest third of Athenian citizens were called upon to pay the tax<sup>98</sup> - that is, 6,000 citizens.

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<sup>97</sup> Brun, op. cit., p. 45, also cites Dem., XLVII.54 to support his view that eisphorai were levied during the "Social War". In this passage, a tax-payer, pleading before the tribunal in 355, bitterly recalls the diminution of his fortune caused by his expenses for the state. One is not compelled by this passage to believe that the fortune of Demosthenes' client was diminished solely by recent eisphorai. The liturgies which he mentions as well would probably have been much more costly than the eisphorai. Moreover, the impositions held to be responsible for the loss of his fortune may well have included those of the 370's and 360's.

<sup>98</sup> Jones, op. cit., p. 28 and pp. 83-84.

Such a figure, however, appears to be too high. As Rhodes has argued, it is possible that the timena of 6,000 talents could have been achieved by about 2,000 men<sup>99</sup>. It is quite probable that the willingness of the ecclesia to levy an eisphora was influenced by the number of citizens who had to pay. Enthusiasm for war, no doubt, would have been dampened by those liable to pay the tax<sup>100</sup>. It will be shown in the following chapters that the complaints about the high cost of war and the burdens of tax levies were utilized to counter arguments for war. Isocrates, Xenophon and Demosthenes use the necessity of paying eisphora to dissuade the Athenians from voting for war.

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<sup>99</sup> P.J. Rhodes, "Problems in Athenian Eisphora and Liturgies", AJAH, 7 (1982), pp. 1-19, esp. pp. 5-11.

<sup>100</sup> The burden of eisphorai would have fallen heavily on those whose property was at 2,500 drachmas - the lowest assessable rate for the imposition of the eisphorai. Their burden would have been difficult to bear, particularly if they relied on farming for their income. M.M. Markle, "Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens", in CRUX, 1985, p. 295, has calculated that land valued at 2,000 drachmas would have produced an income of about 240 drachmas per annum. Markle also calculates that daily necessities cost 2½ obols per day, which is almost equivalent to 148 drachmas per annum. Based on these figures, a 1% levy on property assessed at 2,500 drachmas would have produced 25 drachmas, about 27% of the farmer's savings for the year.

For an assessment of the burden of eisphora and the nature of the levy, see Jones, op. cit., p. 23ff.

## II

### ISOCRATES, ON THE PEACE

The following chapter seeks to examine Isocrates' On the Peace in an effort to determine his attitude towards war and peace in this discourse. Some scholars have argued that this pamphlet condemns all war<sup>1</sup>. Closer examination, however, will reveal that Isocrates' views are not so clear cut. Isocrates actually attacks both sides: those who rush headlong into (the) war and those who, while desirous of peace with the rebels in the "Social War", do not seek means to maintain it. Isocrates opposes strongly any desire to continue the "Social War". He even proposes that Athens make peace with her other enemies as well. Indeed, throughout the discourse, peace is upheld as the means to promote Athenian security, prosperity, an end to internal strife and as a means to raise Athenian prestige among the Greeks. Athens, he argues, had been deprived of these benefits by

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<sup>1</sup> R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 77, even goes so far as to assert that Isocrates stood "for pacifism on any and every occasion". K. Bringmann, Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates, Gottingen, 1965, claims that Isocrates was always the advocate of peace...among the Greeks. See R. Seager, CR, 16 (1966), p. 405. Such a view ignores Isocrates' Archidamus. See P. Harding, "The Purpose of Isokrates' Archidamos and on the Peace", in California Studies in Classical Antiquity, 6 (1973), pp. 137-149. Cf., R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates' On the Peace. Rhetorical Exercise or Political Advice?" in AJAH, 7 (1982), pp. 118-127.

the "Social War". Accordingly, war that is nurtured by imperialistic ambition is criticized severely. Nonetheless, he does not oppose the concept of "just" war.

Since Athens did make peace with the rebels, it is clear that the majority of Athenians was in agreement as far as the need to end the "Social War" was concerned. It would be unwise, however, to assert that Athens' agreement to peace terms with the rebels was due to the influence of Isocrates. Isocrates was not a practising politician and one cannot dismiss the view that this discourse was a rhetorical exercise; it certainly was not delivered before the assembly<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, the Athenian decision to make peace was prompted largely by rumours that the Persian King had threatened to intervene on the side of the rebels if the Athenians did not recall Chares from Asia Minor and agree to a peace settlement with her former allies<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the Athenians ever implemented, in the late 350's, Isocrates' naïve proposal to make peace with all mankind (VIII.16) by adhering to the principles of the "Common Peace".

War and the "Social War" in particular are condemned for a number of reasons in the discourse. War threatens the security of the state (51) because it involves Athens in many perils<sup>4</sup>. In the past, war has caused the grievous loss of large numbers of Athenians (88) and current conflicts have placed a heavy financial burden upon individuals<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, war prevents the Athenians from utilizing peace to raise the level of the

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<sup>2</sup> See G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton, 1963, p. 174. J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?, Berkeley, 1981, p. 176, nonetheless, states that the "speech" was "delivered".

<sup>3</sup> Diod., XVI.22.1-2.

<sup>4</sup> Isoc., VIII.20; *cf.*, 97.

<sup>5</sup> Isoc., VIII.20, 124.

state's prosperity (20).

In spite of these disadvantages, Isocrates argues that war still remains prevalent because it is seen as a means to recover lost empire (ἀρχή). To this end, paid sycophants encourage the rest of the state to indulge in war. While Athens suffers from the perils of war, the sycophants line their own pockets<sup>6</sup>. As a result, Isocrates condemns those who desire war, as being too rash in their decision (8); their decision, he asserts, is based upon their unfounded confidence in victory (12). Isocrates also counters the proponents of war by arguing that Athens cannot become hegemon of the Greeks<sup>7</sup> and recover lost territory (22) by indulging in war. Such a policy, he claims, inspires only the hatred of the Greeks<sup>8</sup>. Athens did not become hegemon in the past by fighting Greeks (37f.). On the contrary, the desire to achieve ἀρχή by force has caused both Athens and Sparta to lose their positions of pre-eminence (91-119). Accordingly, the desire to continue this indulgence in war has no purpose (142), other than to cause hardship for Athens and its inhabitants. Moreover, he remarks sarcastically that, in spite of this desire to recover past glory, the Athenians are not prepared to go to war themselves, but are content to indulge in the financial burden of hiring mercenaries (44).

Before one can evaluate Isocrates' opposition to war, one must determine when he is referring to war in general and when only the "Social War" is meant. Does he oppose only the "Social War" or does his opposition extend to all war? The word ὁ πόλεμος is used on twenty-one occasions in the discourse<sup>9</sup>. The majority of these refer only to war

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<sup>6</sup> Isoc., VIII.36,51,124.

<sup>7</sup> Isoc., VIII.24,29,97,142; cf., 37f.

<sup>8</sup> Isoc., VIII.29; cf., VII.81.

<sup>9</sup> Isoc., VIII.2,5,8,12,20 (four times), 22,24,29,36,37,44,51 (twice), 82,88,97,124,142.



in a general sense, without specific reference to the "Social War"<sup>10</sup>.

It is clear, however, that the dramatic setting which Isocrates has chosen for this pamphlet is a debate in the Athenian assembly. The purpose of this debate is to decide whether or not Athens should bring an end to (the) war:

"...we (sc. Athenians) are assembled here to deliberate about war and peace, which exercise the greatest power over the life of man, and regarding which those who are correctly advised must of necessity fare better than the rest of the world. Such, then, is the magnitude of the question which we have come together to decide."

(Isoc., VIII.2, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 7)

In the above passage πόλεμος could be both a particular and a general reference. Nonetheless, the passage below refers to resolutions concerning a peace settlement which have "now" (νῦν) been made regarding the peace:

"...I have come before you, not to seek your favour nor to solicit your votes, but to make known the views I hold, first regarding the proposals which have been put before you by the Prytaneis and second, regarding the other interests of the state; for no good will come of the resolutions which have been made regarding the peace (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος ἔσται τῶν νῦν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης γνωσθέντων) unless we are well advised also with regard to what remains to be done."

(Isoc., VIII.15, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 17)

The very next passage makes clear that the resolutions concerning the peace refer to a proposal to end the "Social War":

"I maintain, then, that we should make peace, not only with the Chians, the Rhodians, the Byzantines (and the Coans),

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<sup>10</sup> It is difficult to determine when ὁ πόλεμος refers only to the "Social War" - certainly Isoc., VIII.15 does when taken in the context of VIII.16. The other occasions are less clear and perhaps we should allow for the double meaning.

but with all mankind, and that we should adopt, not the covenants of peace which certain parties have recently drawn up, but those which we have entered into with the King of Persia and with the Lacedaemonians, which ordain that the Hellenes be independent, that the alien garrisons be removed from the several states and that each people retain its own territory. For we shall not find terms of peace more just than these nor more expedient for our city."

(Isoc., VIII.16, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 17)

From this, we may gather that Isocrates did not believe that the resolutions for peace were far-reaching enough<sup>11</sup>. Instead of simply bringing an end to the "Social War" with the rebel allies, Isocrates wants this peace-making venture extended to incorporate Greece in a general state of peace. He envisages the re-establishment of the "King's Peace"<sup>12</sup>.

The identity of these unnamed Athenians who drew up the covenants of peace (αἱ συνθήκαι), designed to end the "Social War", will be discussed in the last chapter. For the moment, let us consider Isocrates'

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<sup>11</sup> Unfortunately, Isocrates does not specify the nature of the proposals. Little is known of the actual peace settlement between Athens and the rebels. See F.H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy, Cambridge, 1905, p.113.

<sup>12</sup> Modern scholars have disputed which treaty Isocrates was referring to. T.T.B. Ryder, Koine Eirene: General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece, London, 1965, p. 91, suggests the possibility that Isocrates' reference to the removal of garrisons (VIII.16), indicates that he had in mind the Treaty of 375, a renewal of the "King's Peace". The terms of the renewed peace settlement of 375 were favourable to Athens. See esp. Isoc., XV.109; cf., Xen., Hell., VI.2.1; Didymus, Demosthenes, col. 7.62-71 (on Dem., X.34) (Philochorus, FGrHist, 328F151); Diod., XV.38; Nepos, Timotheus, 2.2. Ryder's suggestion, however, has been challenged by W.E. Thompson, "Isocrates on the Peace Treaties", in Classical Quarterly, 33 (1983), pp. 75-80. Thompson argues quite convincingly that Isocrates was referring to the "Peace of Antalcidas" of 386. He points out that the use of the verb, εἶλον, (Isoc. VIII.67f) refers to a time when Sparta held archē on the sea. The peace of 386 is therefore preferable since Sparta had been recently defeated at sea.

proposed adherence to the principles of a "Common Peace". In an earlier pamphlet, the Panegyricus, Isocrates strongly condemned the "Peace of Antalchidas" (387/6 B.C.), primarily because the peace settlement had been arranged by the King of Persia. Indeed, he calls for the Greeks to unite against Persia in order to wreak "a common vengeance" against the King for daring to interfere in Greek affairs<sup>13</sup>. He even alleges that the Peace had not guaranteed autonomy of the Greek States (IV.115f.), nor had it settled territorial disputes (IV.177). Furthermore, he complains that treaties of peace do not settle the wars of the Greeks, but only postpone them; peace treaties permit the Greeks time to rebuild their strength so that they may inflict some irreparable disaster upon each other (IV.172). Treacherous designs among the Greeks can be alleviated only by joining in a war against Persia. Concord (δμόνοια) can be achieved only if the Greeks wrest the material advantage from one and the same source and they wage their wars against one and the same enemy - namely Persia (IV.173).

Such pessimism towards peace treaties contrasts starkly with the optimistic view of the re-establishment of a "Common Peace", expressed in On the Peace (16). The proposed campaign against Persia, so prevalent in other Isocratean discourses<sup>14</sup>, is not expounded in On the Peace. This cannot mean that Isocrates had lost his conviction that war with Persia would settle the differences between the Greeks, because he reintroduces this scheme in a subsequent pamphlet<sup>15</sup>. One cannot expect Isocrates

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<sup>13</sup> Isoc., IV.182; cf., 15-17,131,133,187-188; cf., also Xen., Hell., VI.1.12; Isoc., Epist. I, esp. 7,8; Epist. IX, esp. 17-19. His vision of the Greeks united against the Persians is also stated after the "Social War": Isoc., V. esp. 9,16,30,55,95-7,104,119-123; also (if genuine) Epist. III, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Isoc., IV. esp. 15-17,131,133,187-188; Epist. I, esp. 7,8; Epist. IX, esp. 17-19.

<sup>15</sup> Isoc., V. esp. 16,30,95-97, 104, 119-123.

to maintain consistent opposition to Persia. After all, his observation of Athenian politics extended over a seventy-year period<sup>16</sup>. Even though he himself was not a practising politician, he was aware of the need for the state to follow an expedient course of action, when circumstances demanded<sup>17</sup>.

The circumstance which prevented his proposed war against Persia was Athens' poor performance in the "Social War". One may gather from On the Peace that Isocrates' distaste for the "Social War" was motivated partly out of economic considerations. Although some consideration is given to the plight of the Athenian poor, it is evident that Isocrates takes particular exception to the financial burden of war, which he and other wealthy Athenians were called upon to bear. It will be argued that this discourse is directed specifically at those wealthy Athenians who had the most to gain by seeing an end to unprofitable and costly war and by sponsoring profitable peace.

Isocrates himself was one of these wealthy Athenians who was held liable for the payment of eisphorai (war taxes) and the performance of the trierarchy. In the Antidosis, Isocrates reveals that he and his adopted son, Aphareos, were enrolled among the 1,200 "who pay the war taxes and bear the liturgies" (XV.145). It is also claimed that he discharged the duties of trierarch on three occasions with Aphareos<sup>18</sup>. He even boasts that he "performed the other services more generously and handsomely than the laws require"<sup>19</sup>. The pseudo-Plutarch also reports that Isocrates performed the choregia - the most expensive of the non-military

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<sup>16</sup> For a good discussion of Isocrates' career and his literary works, see G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton, 1963, pp. 174-203.

<sup>17</sup> Isoc., VIII.16; cf., 18,20,25-26,71.

<sup>18</sup> Isoc., XV.145; cf., Ps.-Plut., Moralia, IV. s.v. "Isocrates", 838A, 839C.

<sup>19</sup> Isoc., XV.145; cf., 5 where he claims that he bore the expense in a dignified fashion.

liturgies<sup>20</sup>. All this information suggests that Isocrates was a man of substantial means - a fact which Lysimachus did not overlook in his court challenge concerning an exchange of property, in connection with the trierarchy. Isocrates lost the case and performed the trierarchy<sup>21</sup>, possibly in 354/3<sup>22</sup>.

Isocrates' On the Peace gives the impression that the financial burden of the "Social War" produced a serious decline in the city's prosperity. He argues that if the Athenians make peace, not only with the rebels, but with all mankind and demean themselves before the common covenants:

"...we (sc. Athenians) shall see the city enjoying twice the revenues which she now receives and thronged with merchants and foreigners and resident aliens, by whom she is now deserted."

(Isoc., VIII.21, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 21)

Evidently, Isocrates envisaged that the attraction of foreign trade would result from signs of internal confidence in the Athenian economy. The "Social War", in his opinion, did not inspire such confidence; it was a burden upon the citizens of Athens, particularly the rich among them. Did the "Social War" produce a decline in trade as Isocrates suggests? The available literary evidence would suggest that it did. In the Poroi, Xenophon proposes a means to utilize existing Athenian resources in order to promote a growth in trade<sup>23</sup>. Moreover, Isocrates' assertion that peace

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<sup>20</sup> Ps.-Plut., Moralia, IV. s.v. "Isocrates", 836E.

<sup>21</sup> Ps.-Plut., Moralia, IV. s.v. "Isocrates", 839C. Isocrates' wealth is attested also at 836E, 837C, 838A. In the Antidosis, Isocrates claims that his wealth was misrepresented and used against him: see, for example, XV.4f., 31, 39f.

<sup>22</sup> The Antidosis is set when Isocrates was eighty-two years old (XV.9). On this basis, we can assume that the antidosis concerning Isocrates' obligation to perform the trierarchy was implemented in 354/3. See G. Norlin, Isocrates, Loeb Classical Library, vol. II, p. 183.

<sup>23</sup> Xen., Poroi, esp. I.4-5; III.1-14.

brings prosperity is supported by Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic. Therein, Demosthenes claims that Athens' revenues before the peace with the allies amounted to 130 talents; after the peace revenue increased to 400 talents (Dem., X.37,38)<sup>24</sup>.

Among the signs of prosperity, derived from peace, Isocrates lists first relief from paying eisphorai and fitting out triremes and discharging the other liturgies which are imposed by war<sup>25</sup>. Isocrates is also careful to note other ill-effects of war:

"...if we (sc. Athenians) make peace and demean ourselves as our common covenants command us to do, then we shall dwell in our city in great security, delivered from wars and perils and the turmoil in which we are now involved amongst ourselves and we shall advance day by day in prosperity, relieved of paying eisphorai, of fitting out triremes and of discharging the other burdens which are imposed by war, without fear cultivating our lands and sailing the seas and engaging in those other occupations which now, because of the war, have entirely come to an end."

(Isoc., VIII.20, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, pp. 19-21).

In this passage, Isocrates shows concern for the rich and poor alike. While the rich paid eisphorai and performed trierarchies in times of war the poor, as well as the rich, suffered from the effects of any interruption

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<sup>24</sup> The authenticity of Demosthenes' Fourth Philippic has been disputed in the past, but such suspicions appear to have been quelled. See L. Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Michigan, 1981 (repr.), p. 155f, H. Montgomery, The Way to Chaeronea: Foreign Policy, Decision Making and Political Influence in Demosthenes' Speeches, Bergen, 1983, p. 46, but cf., R.D. Milns, "Hermias of Atarneus and the Fourth Philippic Speech", in Filologia e Forme Letterarie: Studi Offerti a Francesco della Corte, Urbino, 1987, vol. I, pp. 287-302.

<sup>25</sup> Isocrates does not make clear at this point what he means by the other wartime liturgies. Undoubtedly, he had in mind the proeisphora and the trierarchical symmories. See G.E.M. de Ste Croix, "Demosthenes' TIMHMA and the Athenian Eisphora", in Class. et Med., 14 (1953), esp. pp. 56ff.

to agricultural production<sup>26</sup>.

It is interesting that Isocrates refers to the effects that (the) war has on agriculture. There is no evidence whatsoever that Attica was attacked during the "Social War". This is not the point, however, which Isocrates wished to make. The emphasis is on "without fear". It is quite possible that during the "Social War" Athenians did fear that the cultivation of their lands would be curtailed by rebel raids. Certainly, the rebel attacks against Lemnos, Imbros and Samos could have provoked such a fear. Diodorus reports that Lemnos and Imbros were sacked and that the lands of Samos were ravaged by the rebels<sup>27</sup>.

Athenian poverty is referred to at several points in the discourse<sup>28</sup>, but one seriously doubts whether Isocrates is very concerned with the plight of the poor Athenian who did not qualify for the performance of the state liturgies. He does berate the employment of mercenaries when the Athenians are in need of daily necessities (46), but he is more concerned at this point with his attack on mercenaries. Poverty of the Athenians is used as an emotive argument against their employment:

"we (sc. Athenians) are so enamoured of these mercenaries that while we would not willingly assume the responsibility for the acts of our own children if they offended against anyone, yet for the brigandage, the violence and the lawlessness of these men, the blame for which is bound to be laid at our door, not only do we feel no regret, but we actually rejoice whenever we hear that they have perpetrated any such atrocity. And we have reached such a degree of imbecility that, although we are ourselves in need of the

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<sup>26</sup> See J. Ober, Fortress Attika: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404-322 B.C., Leiden, 1985, pp. 18-23.

<sup>27</sup> Diod., XVI.21.2.

<sup>28</sup> Isoc., VIII.19,46,69,128.

necessities of daily existence we have undertaken to support mercenary troops and we do violence to our own allies and extort money from them in order to provide pay for the common enemies of all mankind."

(Isoc., VIII.45-46, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 37)

As Fuks has shown, Isocrates objected to the employment of mercenaries, not so much because they were expensive to maintain, but because of their landless status; they represented for Isocrates a threat to the propertied classes of the Greek city-states<sup>29</sup>.

Furthermore, his assertion that "we Athenians" are in need of daily necessities must surely be an exaggeration. Isocrates himself was considered wealthy enough to bear the financial duties of a trierarch. Accordingly, his self-styled identification with those who were less well off is a rhetorical ploy designed to show his sympathy for the Athenian poor.

Isocrates' lack of understanding of the plight of the poor citizen is clearly evident in a later passage: "Not one of our citizens", he claims, "is able to live with pleasure or at ease; on the contrary, Athens is rife with lamentations" (127). The audience towards which Isocrates directs his discourse is revealed starkly. Not all Athenian citizens could have afforded to live with pleasure and at ease; some had to work hard for a

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<sup>29</sup> A. Fuks, "Isocrates and the Social-Economic Situation in Greece", in Ancient Society, 3 (1972), pp. 17-44; see also Fuks, "Patterns and Types of Social-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.", in Ancient Society, 5 (1974), pp. 64-65. Isocrates' dislike for mercenaries is also revealed in the following passages: IV.115,146,168; V.55,96,120-122; VII.9,54; VIII.24,79; Epist. II. 19; Epist. IX. 8-10. Cf., Dem., XXIII.139. See also P. Harding, "The Purpose of Isokrates' Archidamos and On the Peace", in Californian Studies in Classical Antiquity, 6 (1973), pp. 146-147. Cf., R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates' On the Peace. Rhetorical Exercise or Political Advice?", in AJAH, 7 (1982), p. 121f. who aptly refutes Hardings' claim that Isocrates' attitude to mercenaries in the Archidamos and On the Peace is inconsistent. Moysey argues that both speeches have merit and were not designed by Isocrates merely as pieces of rhetorical artistry.



living, merely to feed their families, whether war or peace was prevalent at the time<sup>30</sup>. Isocrates seems to take exception to the inability of anyone to live with pleasure and at ease. Pleasure and a life of ease implies not a respite from work but the lack of the necessity to work - the requisite of the rich. On the Peace, therefore, is directed towards those who were accustomed to such a life. The imposition of liturgies and the expense of the trierarchy imposed on that pleasure and ease:

"...our people...are in such straits that not one of our citizens is able to live with pleasure or at ease; on the contrary, Athens is rife with lamentations. For some are driven to rehearse and bewail amongst themselves their poverty and privation while others deplore the multitude of duties enjoined upon them by the state - the liturgies and all the nuisances connected with the symmories and with exchanges of property; for these are so annoying that those who have means find life more burdensome than those who are continually in want."

(Isoc., VIII.127-8, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p. 89)

Isocrates' assertion that the financial duties of war borne by the wealthy were more burdensome than the poverty of the poor is surely an exaggeration, an exaggeration that hardly would have met with agreement from any who were poor.

Isocrates does recognize that poverty and privation prevented the poor from enjoying a life of pleasure and ease (128). Earlier passages reveal that he was concerned particularly with the landless poor.

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<sup>30</sup> M.M. Markle, "Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens", in CRUX, 1985, pp. 267-270, argues that the Greek words πενία ("poor") and ἀπορία ("poverty") do not mean destitution (see Arist., Pol., 1217b, 18-20), but the lack of many possessions. Specifically the terms refer to those whose lack of sufficient property forced them to work and thereby live life without leisure. On the need for the less "well-off" Athenians to work, see Markle, op. cit., pp. 293-297.

Certainly, his suggested settlement of Thrace is directed specifically at the landless poor of Athens and Greece (24). His plans for Thracian settlement are designed to alleviate the plight of the landless and the burden which they force the city-states of Greece to bear. Nonetheless, the means he suggests to implement his scheme make it wholly unviable. He claims, rather naively, that only through peace with "all mankind" (16) could Athens hope to secure her claim to possessions in the north Aegean - specifically the Chersonese and Amphipolis (22). He refers to the futile and expensive efforts of the Athenians to assert their claim by force:

"...what we are now unable to obtain through war and great outlay of money we shall readily secure for ourselves through peaceful embassies. For do not think that Cersobleptes will wage war with us over the Chersonese, or Philip over Amphipolis, when they see that we do not covet any of the possessions of other peoples. It is true that as things are now they have good reason to be afraid to make Athens a near neighbour to their dominions; for they see that we are not content with what we have but are always reaching out for more. If, however, we change our ways and gain a better reputation, they will not only withdraw from our territory but will give us besides territory of their own. For it will be to their advantage to cherish and support the power of Athens and so be secure in the possession of their own kingdoms."

(Isoc., VIII.22-3, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, pp. 21-23)

Athenian interest in Amphipolis was long-standing. It was established in 436 by Athens<sup>31</sup>. During the "Peloponnesian War", the Spartans seized Amphipolis and, despite Athenian attempts at its recovery, it remained practically independent until 357 when it was occupied by Philip II

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<sup>31</sup> Thuc., IV.102.3; 106.1.

of Macedon<sup>32</sup>. In the fourth century, Athens reasserted her claim to Amphipolis<sup>33</sup>. The Macedonian king of the day, Amyntas II, gave his consent<sup>34</sup>, but the Athenians did not recover Amphipolis. Several military operations were undertaken between 360 and 358<sup>35</sup>, but they proved unsuccessful.

Similar Athenian attempts were made to gain control of the Chersonese. Repeated expeditions in the Hellespontine region met with failure from 360 to 358<sup>36</sup>. In 357 Athens made an agreement with three Thracian kings, including Cersebleptes, whereby the Greek cities in the Chersonese - except Cardia - who were already Athenian allies, could pay tribute to the Thracian kings as well as contributions to Athens<sup>37</sup>. Soon afterwards, however, Cersebleptes dishonoured the agreement<sup>38</sup>.

Isocrates' assertion that Philip and Cersebleptes would give Athens territory is preposterous (23). It is extremely unlikely that the Athenians would have been convinced by such an argument. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in 353/2, the Athenian general, Chares, did use

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<sup>32</sup> Captured by the Spartan general, Brasidas, in 424 (Thuc., IV.102-116); Cleon attempted to recapture Amphipolis in 422 (Thuc., V.2-11); Amphipolis captured by Philip of Macedon (Diod., XVI.8.2; Dem., I.8).

<sup>33</sup> Athens reasserted her claim to Amphipolis at the time of the renewal of the "King's Peace" in 371, or shortly thereafter. See Aesch., II.32.

<sup>34</sup> Aesch., II.32.

<sup>35</sup> Schol. on Aesch., II.31; Polyaeus, III.10.8, Callisthenes was put to death for his failure (Aesch., II.30). Athenian efforts to recover Amphipolis are also referred to at Dem., XXIII.149f., Diod., XVI.2.6, 3.3.

<sup>36</sup> Cephisodotus: Dem., XXIII.167; Aesch., III.51f.; Chabrias: Dem., XXIII.171,176ff.

<sup>37</sup> For the agreement with the Thracian kings, see IG II<sup>2</sup> 126. On the exception of Cardia, see Dem., XXIII.181-3.

<sup>38</sup> Dem., XXIII.10,179. Invariably, the literary sources spell his name thus: Cersobleptes. The epigraphic sources have Cersebleptes. See P. Harding (ed.), Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2, Cambridge, 1985, p. 100.

force to recover the town of Sestos on the Chersonese<sup>39</sup>. The Athenians consolidated Chares' victory by establishing cleruchies<sup>40</sup>. This tends to suggest that, unlike Isocrates, the Athenians believed that armed force would enable them to recover lost territory and that they could not rely on the "goodwill" of others.

Why, then, did Isocrates propose such a naïve scheme to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese? Clearly, he wanted to show the Athenians that their imperialistic ambitions need not rely upon war. These ambitions, he claims, could be achieved through peaceful means. As we have seen, Isocrates' aversion to war was motivated by his desire to relieve the rich Athenians of financial burdens. In particular, his scheme to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese by peaceful means was designed to alleviate the burden which the landless poor of Greece placed upon the Greek city-states. The landless poor represented, in Isocrates' mind, a challenge to the security and prosperity of Greece. By relocating the poor of Athens, Isocrates, no doubt, hoped that the financial burden on the state would be decreased. He certainly objected to the distribution of pay for the performance of public duties, while rich men like himself were expected to bear the cost of trierarchies, other liturgies and eisphora. Perhaps he envisaged that resettlement of the poor would result in smaller distributions of state funds, thus freeing those funds for duties currently performed by the wealthier men of Athens.

Apart from the financial burden, Isocrates objects to war for another reason - the pressure which it placed upon Athens' relationship with her allies. Throughout On the Peace, Isocrates attempts to dissuade

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<sup>39</sup> Diod., XVI.34.3.

<sup>40</sup> Diod., XVI.34.4; IG II<sup>2</sup> 228, lines 15f.

the Athenians from imperialistic ambitions<sup>41</sup>. Having surveyed the geography of the Aegean<sup>42</sup> and the plight of Athenian financial reserves<sup>43</sup>, Isocrates asserts that it would be impossible for Athens to acquire territory in the Aegean without impinging upon the independence of other Greek states. According to Isocrates, Athenian allies and potential allies were led to fear encroachments upon their own territory when Athenian aggression was directed against their neighbours<sup>44</sup>. Athenian attempts to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese, no doubt, prompted these fears.

Isocrates, however, makes some other damning claims against Athens. He asserts that the allies were at the mercy of Athenian generals, who were free to do "what they pleased"<sup>45</sup>. Allies were "compelled" to pay contributions and send their representatives to Athens (21,29). Furthermore he alleges that money was extorted from the allies to support mercenaries employed by Athens, men who were not adverse to committing acts of "...brigandage, violence and lawlessness" upon Athenian allies (45)<sup>46</sup>.

It is essential to examine Isocrates' depiction of Athens' relationship with her allies for two reasons. Firstly, one must ascertain the accuracy of Isocrates' charges against Athens. Are his charges exaggerated in order to strengthen his case for peace? Secondly, Athenian maltreatment of her allies is one of his main arguments for peace: peace, he claims, is necessary because Athens is regarded with suspicion.

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<sup>41</sup> Isoc., VIII.64,66,70,74,89,136,142,144.

<sup>42</sup> Isoc., VIII.12f.,19,22,144.

<sup>43</sup> Isoc., VIII.19,29,46,69,75,127ff.,131; cf., Isoc., VII.9; Dem., XX.24; Dem., XXIII.209.

<sup>44</sup> Isoc., VIII.22.

<sup>45</sup> Isoc., VIII.134; cf., 55f.,50,52.

<sup>46</sup> See also Isoc., VIII.46,115,125.

Isocrates claims that the Athenians actually revelled in the news of such exploits against their allies (45). He also asserts that when the allies came to Athens, they found the allied funds flaunted publicly in an indecorous theatrical display (82). His final reference to the current relationship between Athens and her allies is in the same damning vein. One of the ways, he asserts, to improve the condition of Athens is:

"...to be willing to treat our allies just as we would our friends and not to grant them independence in words, while in fact giving them over to our generals to do with as they please and not to exercise our leadership as masters but as helpers, since we have learned the lesson that while we are stronger than any single state we are weaker than all Hellas."

(Isoc., VIII.134, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 91)

It is not surprising to find that such a hostile view of Athens' relationship with her allies, has, as its dramatic setting, the closing stages of the "Social War". The Athenian defeat at Embata, at the hands of the rebels and Mausolus' reinforcements<sup>47</sup>, was a severe blow to Athenian prestige. The gravity with which the Athenians viewed the situation is revealed in their condemnation of Timotheus for his responsibility for the defeat<sup>48</sup> and their willingness to agree to peace with

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<sup>47</sup> Diod., XVI.21.3; Mausolus' support for the rebels is attested at Diod., XVI.7.3, where he is listed as an ally of the Chians, during the siege of Chios. Presumably, his contingent remained a part of the rebel force during the following year (see Diod., XVI.21.2f.).

<sup>48</sup> Following the defeat at Embata, Chares accused his fellow generals, Iphicrates, Menestheus, and Timotheus of treason and corruption. Iphicrates and Menestheus were acquitted, but Timotheus was convicted and was fined 100 talents. For the trial of the generals, see Isoc., XV.129; Nepos, Timotheus, 3.5; Iphicrates, 3.3; Polyaeus, III.9.29; Dinarchus, I.14.

the rebels<sup>49</sup>.

According to Cargill, the abuses referred to in On the Peace apply only to the "Social War" years (357-355). Cargill draws this conclusion from a number of passages, which he lists without discussion<sup>50</sup>. One passage so listed may not simply refer to abuses committed during the "Social War":

"...Let me ask...whether we (sc. Athenians) should be satisfied if we could dwell in our city secure from danger, if we could be provided more abundantly with the necessities of life, if we could be of one mind amongst ourselves, and if we could enjoy the high esteem of the Hellenes. I, for my part, hold that, with these blessings assured us, Athens would be completely happy. Now it is the war which has robbed us of all the good things which I have mentioned; for it has made us poorer; it has compelled many of us to endure perils; it has given us a bad name among the Hellenes; and it has in every way overwhelmed us with misfortune."

(Isoc., VIII.19, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, p.19)

Apparently, Cargill has taken the phrase  $\delta \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{o}\iota\upsilon\upsilon\nu \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$  as a reference to the "Social War". This is possible, in view of Isocrates' preceding plea for the Athenians to make peace with the rebels (16). On the other hand, the phrase may have a general meaning as well. Isocrates calls upon the Athenians to make peace, not only with the rebels, but with all mankind (16). Subsequently, he claims that Cersebleptes and Philip will not wage war with Athens (22). Accordingly, the term  $\delta \acute{\omicron} \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$  (19) does not necessarily refer solely to the "Social War". Thus, the abuses

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<sup>49</sup> Diod., XVI.22.2.

<sup>50</sup> J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?, Berkeley, 1981, pp. 176-177.

mentioned therein may well have a pre-"Social War" date<sup>51</sup>.

Cargill also points out that Isocrates' references to Athenian abuse of the allies are vague. This is a fair assessment: Isocrates does not provide examples of particular allies being abused. Thus, it is unclear whether those abused allies were members of the League, or bilateral allies of Athens.

Nonetheless, Isocrates' general allusions to Athenian maltreatment of allies are confirmed by Demosthenes and Xenophon. Demosthenes mentions the rebels' accusation that Athens was plotting against them (Dem., XV.3). Allied resentment, he asserts, was due to Athenian attempts to recover what belongs to the Athenians (XV.15). As Cawkwell suggests, Demosthenes may be referring to Athenian attempts to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese<sup>52</sup>. Certainly, Demosthenes appears to refer to these northern territories in this context in other speeches<sup>53</sup>. Xenophon is also enlightening. He claims that leading Athenians admitted that "owing to the poverty of the masses, we are forced to be somewhat unjust in our treatment of the cities"<sup>54</sup>.

References to misconduct of Athenian generals toward allied cities are reported in sources other than Isocrates. Syntaxeis seem to have been collected for particular campaigns and Plutarch (Phocion, 7, 11), like Isocrates (XV.123), reports that reluctant states were compelled to supply their contributions. Certainly, one may gather from Diodorus' account that the intervention of Chares in Corcyra in 361/0 discredited Athens in the eyes of her allies (Diod., XV.95.3).

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<sup>51</sup> As G.L. Cawkwell pointed out, "Notes on the Failure of the Second Athenian Confederacy", in JHS, 101 (1981), p. 54.

<sup>52</sup> Cawkwell, op. cit., p. 53.

<sup>53</sup> Dem., XXIII.14,153,156,158,161; II.28. See also Cawkwell, op. cit., p. 53, n. 50.

<sup>54</sup> Xen., Poroi, I.1.



Accordingly, even though Isocrates' On the Peace does not provide specific examples of Athenian abuses against allied states, these vague references could well allude to abuses committed from the late 360's. By isolating the abuses to the "Social War" period (357-355), as Cargill does, one fails to provide adequate explanation for the outbreak of the "Social War"<sup>55</sup>.

Thus, we have seen that Athenian maltreatment of her allies is used repeatedly to boost Isocrates' case for peace. Nonetheless, one seriously doubts whether his proposed adherence to the principles of "Common Peace" would have alleviated Greek suspicion. Even in this discourse, Isocrates himself encourages Athenian preparation for war.

There is reason to believe that Isocrates' distaste for war extended only to the "Social War" and the war for the recovery of Amphipolis and the Chersonese. In On the Peace, he does not argue for an end to all war, because he encourages the Athenians to be more conscientious in their training and preparation for war. In particular, he charges the Athenians with relying too heavily on mercenaries:

"...although we (sc. Athenians) undertake to wage war upon, one might almost say, the whole world, we do not train ourselves for war but employ instead vagabonds, deserters and fugitives who have thronged together here in consequence of other misdemeanours, who, whenever others offer them higher pay, will follow their leadership against us."

(Isoc., VIII.44, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed.,  
vol. II, pp. 35-37)

A later passage issues the same challenge to the citizens of Athens:

"If...you (sc. Athenians) will prove yourselves warlike by training and preparing for war but peaceful by doing nothing

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<sup>55</sup> See S. Hornblower, CR, 32 (1982), pp. 235-239; Cawkwell, op. cit., pp. 40-55.

contrary to justice, you will render not only this city but all the Hellenes happy and prosperous."

(Isoc., VIII.136, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 93)

From these two passages pertinent observations may be made concerning Isocrates' attitude to war in this discourse. Firstly, the encouragement offered to his fellow Athenians (to take an active rôle in preparation and training for war), indicates that Isocrates believed that Athens would have to wage war at some future stage. Secondly, it is clear that Isocrates does not oppose "just" war (136). He opposes only unjust conflict, such as the "Social War" when Athens fought her former allies and wars such as those designed to recover Amphipolis and the Chersonese.

The third observation that may be made is that Isocrates expresses hostility towards the hiring of mercenaries (44). Xenophon's contemporary work, the Poroi also contains reference to Athenian reluctance to serve in the ranks and Xenophon, too, criticizes the employment of mercenaries<sup>56</sup>. Both authors consider mercenaries to be an unnecessary expense for the state, claiming that armed service is the duty of the citizens<sup>57</sup>. Isocrates claims that the Athenians currently:

"...use mercenaries as heavy-armed troops but compel citizens to row the ships, with the result that when they land in hostile territory these men, who claim the right to rule over the Hellenes, disembark with their cushions under their arms, while the men who are of the character which I have just described<sup>58</sup>, take the field with shield and spear!"

(Isoc., VIII.48, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 99)

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<sup>56</sup> Xen., Poroi, II.2-4.

<sup>57</sup> Xen., Poroi, II.2-4.

<sup>58</sup> That is, men who are like the Athenians in the fifth century.

The reference to citizens being compelled to row in the ships indicates that conscription was enforced before the mid-350's. Conscription is mentioned in our sources by Demosthenes (L. 6-7) for the year 362.

Apollodorus claims that he preferred to hire the best rowers rather than man his ship with conscripts (L.6-7). His action was unsuccessful, however, since he later complains that his ship was affected by desertions (L.14-16,23,65). These professional rowers preferred steady payment elsewhere (L.14), or merely preferred to stay with their families rather than face the rigours of a campaign (L.11). Perhaps they doubted the capacity of the state to provide their pay. Certainly, Apollodorus asserts that, during his seventeen month term as trierarch, the state provided his crew with pay for only two months. For the other months only ration money was supplied (L.10).

If the account accredited to Apollodorus can be trusted, this would vindicate to some extent the belief of both Isocrates and Xenophon that citizens were more reliable troops than mercenaries. One must be wary, however, when using this speech to assert that the Athenians were shirking their duties in the late 360's. The speaker is deliberately emphasizing the trouble he went to over his trierarchy<sup>59</sup>.

From these contemporary accounts, it is evident that the Athenians were showing reluctance to serve in the mid-350's, but neither Isocrates nor Xenophon outlines to any satisfactory degree why they considered citizens to be more reliable troops than mercenaries<sup>60</sup>. As far as

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<sup>59</sup> G.L. Cawkwell, "Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century", in Classical Quarterly<sup>2</sup>, 34 (1984), p. 336ff.

<sup>60</sup> Isoc., VII.82-3: "...we (sc. Athenians) have so neglected the business of war that we do not deign to attend reviews unless we are paid money for doing so." Clearly, Isocrates opposed the idea of even citizens being paid to train for war. On the other hand, it is clear also that the Athenians expected to be paid.

Isocrates was concerned, mercenary troops were an untrustworthy group of money-hungry vagabonds; it was dishonourable for Athenian citizens to let them do the fighting.

One can infer that the Athenian citizenry was reluctant to serve because past experience had shown that regular and adequate payment, for services rendered, could not be guaranteed. It is illogical, however, to assume that citizens would have been less insistent than mercenaries in their demands for pay. As we shall see in the following chapter, Xenophon at least proposed means to ensure the regular payment of troops, but Isocrates only makes vague calls for the return of prosperity through peace. Nonetheless, although peace would have put less financial stress upon state and individual citizens, Athens would still need to provide pay for the troops guarding the frontiers of Attica. Furthermore, maintenance work on the state's triremes would still have to be carried out, even in peace time. Unlike Xenophon, Isocrates does not address himself to financing preparation for war in time of peace, even though he urges such preparation.

Isocrates gives the impression in this discourse that there were some Athenians who were opposed to the idea of peace with the rebels (36, 51). He refers to these so-called proponents of war in uncomplimentary terms and at several points, calls them sycophants. He contrasts those citizens who "have been stripped of their patrimony because of 'the war' and of the disorders which these sycophants have caused", with the sycophants, who "from being penniless, have become rich" (124). In the context of previous passages (121ff.) τὸν πόλεμον (at 124) may refer to conditions during the "Peloponnesian War" and not the "Social War". Either alternative is suggestive of Isocrates' bias and the reason why he should

choose to defend those who have lost their patrimony through "the war". The loss of patrimony is used as an example of the depravity of the post-Periclean demagogues<sup>61</sup>, including those of the "Social War" period. Isocrates himself could well afford to sympathize with those who had lost their patrimony through war. In the Antidosis, Isocrates claims that he lost his inheritance during the "Peloponnesian War" (XV.161).

"Sycophants" is a derogatory term used to describe false accusers, slanderers, and professional blackmailers. Identification of these so-called sycophants is not an easy task, since Isocrates does not mention any by name in this discourse. Certainly, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the prominent Athenian, Aristophon, was among those who supported a continuation of the war with the rebels. Pickard-Cambridge, however, has attributed to Aristophon an "imperialistic and militant" viewpoint and that "he fought the disaffected allies, instead of meeting their suspicions in more peaceable ways"<sup>62</sup>.

There are, however, insufficient grounds for believing that Aristophon stood for war with the allies. As Sealey has pointed out, there is no reason to suppose that there was any alternative to fighting when the "Social War" broke out<sup>63</sup>. Athens could hardly fail to act when the rebels initiated their campaign season of 356/5 by sacking Imbros and Lemnos and ravaging the territory of Samos<sup>64</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> Isoc., VIII.124.

<sup>62</sup> A.W. Pickard-Cambridge, in CAH, vol. VI, p. 221.  
According to Aristotle ("Art" of Rhetoric, III.17.10), Isocrates was attacking Chares in the discourse. Although Isocrates does not mention Chares by name, there may be a reference to him (VIII.55). The work by J.O. Lofberg, Sycophancy in Athens, Chicago, 1988 (repr.) would have been useful here but I was unable to obtain it prior to the submission of the thesis.

<sup>63</sup> R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 75.

<sup>64</sup> Diod., XVI.22.2.

Two arguments are used to support the view that Aristophon represented the cause for war. The first is his prosecution of the three generals following the Athenian defeat at Embata. Iphicrates, Menestheus and Timotheus were sent out to support Chares against the rebels<sup>65</sup>. Chares, however, quarrelled with them and they failed to support him in the subsequent battle of Embata. Chares blamed them for the defeat and so they were brought to trial. Iphicrates and Menestheus were acquitted, while Timotheus was condemned to pay a fine and went into exile<sup>66</sup>.

The pseudo-Plutarch informs us that the prosecutor in this trial was Aristophon<sup>67</sup>. Accordingly, Aristophon played a significant rôle in the downfall of Timotheus, the former pupil of Isocrates<sup>68</sup>. His rôle as prosecutor indicates that he objected to Timotheus' responsibility for the defeat at Embata; it does not prove that he was opposed to the peace negotiations with the rebels after Embata.

Aristophon is connected also with the prosecution in 362 of some of the trierarchs under Leosthenes<sup>69</sup> (who was condemned to death for his defeat by Alexander of Pherae<sup>70</sup>). Since Chares succeeded Leosthenes to the command in 362, there appears to be some association between Chares

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<sup>65</sup> Diod., XVI.21.1. For Chares see R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates and Chares: a study in the political spectrum of Mid-Fourth Century Athens", in Ancient World, 15 (1987), pp. 84-85. See also Moysey, "Chares and Athenian Foreign Policy", in Classical Journal, 80 (1985), p. 225.

<sup>66</sup> Din., I.14; Nepos, Timotheus, 3.5; Isoc., XV.129.

<sup>67</sup> Ps.-Plut., Moralia, IV.801f.

<sup>68</sup> For evidence that Timotheus was the former pupil of Isocrates, see Ps.-Plut., Moralia, IV.837C. See R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates and Chares: a study in the political spectrum of Mid-Fourth Century Athens", in Ancient World, 15 (1987), pp. 83-85.

<sup>69</sup> Dem., LI.8-9.

<sup>70</sup> Diod., XV.95.1-3; Hyperides (IV.1) claims that Leosthenes went into voluntary exile prior to the trial, but see also Aesch., II.124.

and Aristophon at this point in time<sup>71</sup>.

Thus, we have two isolated instances where the careers of Aristophon and Chares overlap. There is no sound reason to accept, however, that his association with Chares signifies that Aristophon wanted to continue the fighting against the rebels in 356/5.

The second argument used to suggest that Aristophon opposed peace with the rebels is based upon references to hostility between Aristophon and Eubulus<sup>72</sup>. Since Eubulus has been associated with the peace settlement with the rebels<sup>73</sup>, it is assumed that Aristophon opposed him. Sealey, however, has argued quite convincingly that the evidence associating Eubulus with the peace settlement is insubstantial<sup>74</sup>. Moreover, it would be surprising not to see evidence of opposing views between leading political figures on certain issues. Nonetheless, there is no reason to accept that they disagreed on each and every issue. With regard to the peace with the rebels, the naval disaster at Embata would have been sufficient cause for any self-respecting political figure to doubt the viability of continuing the war. Since the Athenians had been unable to defeat the rebels, the possibility of having to fight the Persians as well<sup>75</sup> made peace with the rebels the only practical alternative. During the "Social War", problems associated with the financing of Athenian naval operations had arisen once

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<sup>71</sup> Diod., XV.95.3.

<sup>72</sup> Dem., XVIII.162; ct., XIX.291; XXI.28 and schol. ad. loc. Aristophon in 346 was one of the Athenian leaders opposed to peace with Philip, though this later position would not necessarily identify him as a "hawk" in 355.

<sup>73</sup> Eubulus has been associated with the peace settlement with the rebels largely on the basis of the scholion to Dem., III.28. See R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 75.

<sup>74</sup> Sealey, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>75</sup> Diod., XVI.22.2.

more. If the war was prolonged, further Athenian defeats would have seemed likely.

Accordingly, the evidence used to show that Aristophon was in favour of a continuation of the "Social War" is purely circumstantial. Certainly, the evidence does not permit one to identify Aristophon as one of the sycophants referred to by Isocrates. In the Antidosis, Isocrates does not link Aristophon's prosecution of Timotheus with an antagonistic policy towards the rebels. He does condemn the orators who stirred the city to anger against Timotheus (XV.139); Aristophon must be one of the orators to whom Isocrates refers. Nonetheless, there is no explicit reference that links Aristophon's prosecution of Timotheus with a desire to continue the "Social War". Isocrates blames Timotheus himself for his condemnation because Timotheus did not attempt to gain the support of the orators (XV.132ff.). Clearly, Isocrates does not accredit Timotheus' downfall to pro-war sentiment of the orators.

Some scholars have also misinterpreted Isocrates' proposed peace with all mankind as an expression of opposition to Athens' quest for the hegemony of Greece<sup>76</sup>. This view is based on the confusion of hegemony with Isocrates' expressed opposition to tyrannical rule. Isocrates clearly distinguishes between the two, condemning arché and supporting hegemony:

"...if we (sc. Athenians) really wish to clear away the prejudice in which we are held at the present time, we must cease from the wars which are waged to no purpose and so gain for our city the hegemony for all time; we must abhor all despotic rule and imperial power,

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<sup>76</sup> M.L.W. Laistner, A History of the Greek World from 479 to 323 B.C., London, 1957, p. 230.



reflecting upon the disasters which have sprung up from them."

(Isoc., VIII.142, trans. by G. Norlin, Loeb ed., vol. II, p. 95)<sup>77</sup>

Isocrates objected in particular to the "Social War" and the struggle for Amphipolis and the Chersonese. They were fought "to no purpose" because they did not prove beneficial to Athens. Instead, they had proved to be unsuccessful and expensive exercises for the Athenians. In particular, Isocrates objected to the expense that the wealthier citizens of Athens (including himself) were obliged to bear. He claims that Athens could achieve hegemony without resorting to such wars. Accordingly, he proposes that Athens adopt a moral stance, by indulging only in "just" causes. Nonetheless, even though his proposed moral stance entailed making peace with all mankind (16), Isocrates did not discount the possibility that Athens might have to engage in some future war. To this end, he encourages warlike preparation. Certainly, Isocrates' On the Peace, does not indicate that he stood for "pacifism on any and every occasion"<sup>78</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup> See also, Isoc., VIII.21-24, 134-140, 144. See also Isocrates' Panegyricus, passim and J. de Romilly, "Eunoia in Isocrates or the political importance of creating goodwill", in JHS, 78 (1958), p. 98; G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton, 1963, p. 189 and D. Gillis, "Isocrates' Panegyricus: the Rhetorical Texture", in Wiener Studien, n.s. 5 (1971), pp. 52-73. R.A. Moysey, "Isokrates' On the Peace. Rhetorical Exercise or Political Advice?", in AJAH, 7 (1982), p. 123f. also points out that Isocrates distinguishes between hegemonia and arché.

<sup>78</sup> R. Sealey, "Athens After the Social War", in JHS, 75 (1955), p. 77.