Chapter 1

Chapter 1. Introduction

Introduction

An asylum seeker is an individual who has arrived in another country and is seeking to gain international protection from their government, but whose claim for refugee status is yet to be determined. Individual countries are responsible for making this determination, which forms part of their international obligations embedded in relevant treaties and regional instruments (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nations General Assembly, 1951) is a fundamental multilateral treaty, which articulates the rights of asylum seekers and the responsibilities of countries that grant asylum.

Australia is one of the 147 signatories to the Convention, and has therefore agreed to provide protection to individuals seeking refugee status. Compared with other industrialised countries, Australia receives relatively few claims for asylum (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012). These claims have, however, had large political consequences, with successive governments' official stance becoming increasingly hostile and punitive (Haslam & Holland, 2012). The last decade has seen implementations of policies from both conservative and more liberal governments that have included: mandatory detention in remote, third countries; providing only temporary protection, with limited or no access to work and education; excising thousands of islands from Australia's migration zone to prevent applications from these locations; and most recently, permitting the Australian Navy to tow boats back to Indonesia.

These policies, despite being widely condemned by human rights advocates both within and outside Australia (e.g., Joint Media Statement, 2013), receive strong support and endorsement from large segments of the Australian community. Recent surveys showed that Australians ranked asylum seekers third on their list of important problems facing the

country, and their attitudes were overwhelmingly negative toward them (Markus, 2011). These judgements were made on the basis of inaccurate beliefs about asylum seekers, such as the number reaching Australia, and their motivations for making the journey (Markus, 2011). The importance of these false beliefs about asylum seekers in shaping public opinion have been well-established in previous studies (Croston & Pedersen, 2013; Pedersen, Attwell, & Heveli, 2005), and demonstrate the pervasiveness of perceptions of asylum seekers as 'queue jumpers' and 'illegals'. These myths can at times be matched with public statements from politicians (Pedersen, Watt, & Hansen, 2006), thus governments are at least partially responsible for these widespread negative attitudes.

Along with these inaccurate perceptions, a range of complex factors contributes to public sentiment toward asylum seekers. Demographics, such as being male, having less formal education, and holding conservative political beliefs, predict unfavourable attitudes (Pedersen et al., 2005). Social dominance (that is, an individual's preference for hierarchy between social groups rather than equality) is a strong predictor of prejudice toward low power groups, and particularly asylum seekers (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2007). Australians in rural and outer-metropolitan regions, and those who are struggling financially, also tend to be more antagonistic toward asylum seekers (Goot & Watson, 2005).

Actual or perceived social norms can play an important role in attitudes and behaviours toward asylum seekers. Those with very negative attitudes are those most likely to believe that their views are widely shared, thus overestimating community support for their beliefs and creating a 'false consensus'. Perceptions of holding majority opinions in turn lead to a disproportionate influence, and the greater sharing and advocacy of these beliefs (Pedersen, Griffiths, & Watt, 2008). Beliefs regarding this widespread support can also

influence activities and behaviours including signing petitions or protesting (Louis et al., 2007), thus these norms can result in poor outcomes for asylum seekers.

Along with beliefs that asylum seekers are financially well-off and cutting queues of 'genuine' refugees through arriving by boat (Pedersen et al., 2005), they are also perceived as threatening. These threats can relate to their often-Islamic background and perceived associations with terrorism (Pedersen et al., 2006), with greater fears of terrorism being linked with higher levels of negative attitudes (Pedersen, Watt, & Griffiths, 2007). Further, asylum seekers may be perceived as posing economic and social threats, and Australia's crime rates, job opportunities, economic outcomes, national security, health, and 'way of life' have all been linked with their resettlement (Goot & Watson, 2005; Louis et al., 2007). These perceptions of threat, and their accompanying fear, have guided much of the discourse surrounding the issue, with slogans of 'border protection' and 'stopping the boats' being used to court voters in the lead up to the last federal election in September 2013 (e.g., Liberal Party of Australia, 2013).

These negative perceptions of asylum seekers are not limited to Australia, but are pervasive and widespread across many industrialised countries where individuals may seek protection. After the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the accompanying fear that followed, the United States of America (U.S.A.) adopted similar policies to Australia, which aimed to restrict and deter asylum seekers and included the introduction of mandatory detention (Welch & Schuster, 2005). Similarly, research in Canada, the United Kingdom, and a number of other European countries report hostility and negative attitudes toward asylum seekers (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; Malloch & Stanley, 2005; Verkuyten, 2004). Therefore, developing a greater understanding of the determinants of these attitudes and perceptions is important, both in terms of reducing prejudice toward an extremely

vulnerable group, but also due to the increasing levels of conflict, unrest, and security concerns leading to increasing numbers of displaced persons worldwide (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012). Countries will face increasing challenges in their attempts to manage this complex issue.

While the factors outlined above describe some of the psychological underpinnings of negative attitudes toward asylum seekers, another important determinant of the treatment of outgroups is whether they are perceived as less human. Values, morals and emotions serve as important motivators of intergroup attitudes and behaviours, but relatively little is known about how the values and morals people hold, and the emotions they feel, relate to denials of asylum seekers' humanness. Humanness denial can have devastating consequences for outgroups; therefore, understanding how each of these factors may interrelate and predict prejudice toward asylum seekers is an important contribution to theory and research. These areas will be outlined within this introduction, and explored in greater depth throughout this thesis. That is, the theoretical basis underlying each of these factors is provided within this chapter, and will be followed by the overall aims and objectives of the present research. Finally, an outline of the research program and each study is provided, along with comment on the contribution of this thesis to the literature and our broader understanding of this topic.

Humanness denial

Throughout history, disadvantaged and excluded outgroups have been compared to animals. Jewish people have been likened to vermin, people of African descent compared to apes, and Tutsis in Rwanda have been described as cockroaches (Haslam, 2014). The phenomenon of humanness denial is complex, and can exist in a number of different forms. Haslam (2014) has recently conceptualised it along three important dimensions, in order to classify the varying forms of humanness denial. The first dimension considers the type of

humanness denied. Denying human uniqueness contrasts humans with animals; the outgroup is denied uniquely human characteristics, such as certain emotions, moral sensibilities, and civility, and is thus perceived as more animal-like. Alternatively, denying human nature contrasts humans with inanimate objects; the outgroup is perceived as robot- or machine-like, and their agency and experience is removed.

The second dimension considers the explicitness of the humanness denial. For example, whether an individual directly and consciously evaluates another individual or group as being less human; or, whether this denial is more subtle. In a robust line of research, Leyens and colleagues (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens et al., 2001) have focused on the attribution of uniquely human emotions, and have consistently shown that people attribute more 'secondary emotions' to their ingroup, while no distinction is made between groups regarding primary emotions (termed "infrahumanisation"). The former represent emotions that are uniquely experienced by humans, and are therefore associated with the concept of humanity. This provides a good example of subtle humanness denial, where the ingroup is unaware that they are potentially devaluing the outgroup.

Finally, denials of humanness may be absolute or relative; that is, whether the target is perceived to be less human in an absolute sense, or whether this perception is relative to the ingroup. Infrahumanisation, as outlined above, involves a comparison between the ingroup and outgroup. A similar form of humanness denial involves the outgroup being denied prosocial values relative to the ingroup (Esses et al., 2008; Schwartz & Struch, 1989). However, while infrahumanisation is subtle, the relative denial of humane values represents an explicit form of humanness denial, where the individual makes a direct evaluation of the outgroup as failing to uphold these values. In turn, the outgroup is perceived as more animal-like than the ingroup (Haslam, 2014).

Depictions of outgroup members as less than fully human can facilitate conduct that would otherwise be sanctioned, and serve to rationalise unfair and inhumane treatment (Hodson, MacInnis, & Costello, 2014). For example, humanness denial serves as an antecedent to a range of negative outcomes for targets, including reduced helping behaviours (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007), reduced forgiveness between groups (Tam et al., 2007), outright rejection (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), discrimination (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009), less feelings of guilt (Zebel, Zimmermann, Tendayi Viki, & Doosje, 2008), and moral exclusion (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996).

In the context of asylum seekers, they are often portrayed as a collective, faceless threat, with little consideration of their suffering or humanity (Haslam & Holland, 2012). Perceiving asylum seekers as less human may lead to the rationalisation of current hardline policies and poor responses (Hodson & Costello, 2007). Humanness denial can also serve to distance and protect oneself when responsibility for suffering may be attributed to the ingroup. A study by Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) demonstrated that a victimised outgroup is more likely to be infrahumanised by the responsible ingroup, in order to disengage from the group's suffering. Given the direct responsibility of the Australian government for the suffering of asylum seekers, and the Australian public's endorsement of these policies, dehumanisation may be especially likely in this context.

The promotion of humanness may be an important step in encouraging positive intergroup relations. Emphasising universalism values has been suggested as one method for achieving this, in order to emphasise concern for all human beings (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Indeed, an Australian study showed that individuals who identified more with humanity as a whole were more welcoming of asylum seekers (Nickerson & Louis, 2008). Quality contact can also promote an outgroup's humanness (R.

Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace, 2007), and this can extend to imagined intergroup contact (Vezzali, Capozza, Stathi, & Giovannini, 2012).

Despite the efficacy of the strategies, promoting asylum seekers' humanity may prove especially difficult with the restrictions placed on the media and the public's access to these people, and their likelihood of originating from countries that already face stereotypes of being backward and bestial (Haslam & Holland, 2012). Further, the media has been found to promote humanness denial through perpetuating metaphors and associating certain ethnicities or countries with animals such as snakes, elephants or apes (Leyens et al., 2007). Ape imagery, for example, has been found to be four times more likely in newspaper articles about the death penalty when referring to people of African descent than people of Caucasian descent (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008).

As outlined above, Haslam (2014) has categorised the attribution of fewer prosocial values as an explicit, relative, animal-type form of humanness denial. This categorisation is supported by several social psychological theories, which posit that depictions of other groups as immoral and unjust are important components in their dehumanisation that can lead to negative intergroup attitudes and behaviour (Alexander, Brewer, & Hermann, 1999; Schwartz & Struch, 1989). Struch and Schwartz (1989) described these prosocial values, such as considerateness and compassion, as indicative of the extent to which someone has developed moral sensibilities and transcended his or her prehuman origins, and is therefore distinguished from the lower forms of life. Perceptions of an outgroup as possessing fewer of these values can lead to their identification as immoral and less human.

Schwartz and Struch (1989) found that Israeli's perceptions of Germans as not upholding prosocial values related to beliefs of antagonistic social motives. Denial of prosocial values has also been highlighted as an important step between conflict and

aggression (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Esses et al. (2008) also explored the intergroup effects of perceiving an outgroup as not upholding these values, and found that refugees were assessed as upholding comparatively few. These assessments were indicative of perceptions of refugees as less human than Canadians, and predicted higher levels of contempt and negative attitudes toward them. Thus, beliefs that targets possess or uphold fewer of these values leads to perceptions that they are less than fully human, which can in turn lead to negative attitudes and prejudice.

Given these previous provocative findings, the current research sought to better understand the predictors of the dehumanisation of asylum seekers in Australia. Adopting Schwartz and Struch's (1989) conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a relative denial of prosocial values, we aimed to demonstrate some of the psychological processes and underlying mechanisms that lead people to dehumanise. We specifically focused on values, morals, and emotions, due to past research demonstrating their importance in attitudes and behaviours. Determining the factors that promote dehumanisation and moral exclusion is perhaps one of the most important steps in developing effective strategies to combat dehumanisation, and to promote positive intergroup relations.

Values

While perceptions of targets' values are important in subsequent attitudes towards them, an individual's own values also play an important role in attitudes and behaviours. Within social psychology, values are defined as abstract ideals that serve as guiding principles in our lives (Schwartz, 1992). They are cognitive, social representations of basic motivational goals, which express basic human needs and guide selection or appraisal of events and behaviour (Feather, 1995; Schwartz, 1992). An individual's values generally serve the ingroup and the individual (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), and are acquired from unique

experiences as well as learning from the ingroup (Schwartz, 1994). Commonly studied values that are consistently considered highly important include equality, freedom, and helpfulness, and people are internally and externally motivated to fulfill these values (Maio, 2010).

A seminal contribution to the study of values was Schwartz's (1992) circular model of universal values, which describes how different values relate to one another. Empirical support for this scheme has been found across a wide range of cultures and nations (Schwartz, 2004). Within this framework, the ten value types uncovered by Schwartz are arranged on two bipolar dimensions, reflecting their compatible or conflicting motivational goals. On one dimension, motives that promote the self (self-enhancement) are opposed with motives that transcend self-interest in favour of concern about the welfare of others (self-transcendence). This dimension comprises values that promote achievement and power, versus values that promote benevolence and universalism. The other dimension includes concerns about the status quo (conservation), opposed with the pursuit of personal interests (openness to change). This dimension comprises values that promote tradition, conformity and security versus values that promote self-direction and stimulation (see Figure 1.1).




Figure 1.1. The circular model of values (adapted from Schwartz, 1992)

Although building on earlier work describing and depicting values (e.g., Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; Rokeach, 1973), Schwartz's circular model was the first to predict how each of the values are likely to conflict, and why (Maio, 2010). His model provided a structure for how each of the values should usually correlate with the others. Those that are adjacent tend to show positive relationships, while opposing values tend to show negative relationships. Orthogonal values generally show smaller, or no relationships. These patterns of correlations have been found in over 70 countries (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), supporting the conflicts and compatibilities reflected in the model.

Values play an important role in prejudice toward outgroups, because they are an important influence on people's beliefs and attitudes (Feather & McKee, 2008). People's rankings and ratings of values predict a range of judgements and behaviours (Rokeach, 1973). Though, the relationships between values and value-congruent behaviour are stronger for some values than others (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Value expression has also been highlighted as an important function of some attitudes (Katz, 1960). When attitudes are explicitly viewed as connected to one's values, the ability of values to predict attitudes and behavioural intentions is significantly stronger (Maio & Olson, 1995). The instantiation of abstract values is also important in their subsequent application in specific situations; a particular situation has to be recognised as one where the value is applicable (Maio, Hahn, Frost, & Cheung, 2009), highlighting the important link between values, attitudes and behaviours.

Past research has shown that individuals who emphasise conservation values show less readiness for outgroup interaction (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). These findings were also consistent with Rokeach's (1973) research on attitudes toward African Americans when comparable values were classified into Schwartz's model. Emphasising conservation predicts

prejudice toward asylum seekers in Australia, as well as a greater likelihood of endorsing false beliefs about them (Greenhalgh, 2007), while conservation and self-enhancement values predict prejudice toward Indigenous Australians (Feather & McKee, 2008). Struch and Schwartz (1989) examined how perceptions of value dissimilarity can affect intergroup aggression, and found that differences in participants' rankings of values based on perceived importance to their ingroup and the outgroup predicted increased aggression towards the outgroup, while perceived value similarity predicted decreased hostility.

Relationships between between symbolic threat (differences in morals, values, norms, standards, beliefs and attitudes) and humanness denial have been found in a number of studies (Pereira et al., 2009; Viki, Zimmermann, Doosje, & Zebel, 2008), while similarity to the ingroup predicts the attribution of humanity (Delgado, 2008). These studies highlight that one's own values, as well as perceptions of the values of an outgroup, may be important predictors of negative attitudes toward asylum seekers and perceptions of them as less human. Further, both dissimilarity and similarity can lead to prejudice, depending on the different types of threat they promote. For example, perceiving dissimilarity in interpersonal traits, which threatens cultural norms, or perceiving similarity in work-related traits, which produces realistic threats to economic well-being, has been shown to lead to more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004).

Perceiving dissimilarities in values may threaten cultural norms, as values form an important part of an ingroup's structure and identity; however, it is unknown how perceiving differences in specific types of values (beyond prosocial values) may promote prejudice and dehumanisation. That is, perceiving differences in openness to change may not be as important or threatening when compared with differences in self-transcendence (which reflect uniquely human characteristics, and may therefore promote dehumanisation) or

differences in conservation (which reflect cultural norms, and may promote prejudice). We therefore sought to explore how these differences may uniquely promote prejudice and dehumanisation, and to extend literature investigating both the antecedents of negative attitudes toward and perceptions of asylum seekers. Further, the denial of humanness may be an important step between certain dissimilarities and prejudice, particularly if the differences are not perceived as threatening. Therefore, we also aimed to establish the significance of dehumanisation in the development of negative attitudes toward asylum seekers.

Morals

Moral judgements are ethical judgements about whether particular conduct is right or wrong. These judgements may be based on the consequences of the conduct for the self and others, or whether it violates or promotes our basic values (Maio, 2010). In the exercise of moral agency, and in the consideration of how to treat others, people generally refrain from conduct that would violate their moral standards. These types of violations can result in self-condemnation, and feelings of distress and guilt (Bandura et al., 1996). Within Bandura's (1986, 1991) social cognitive theory of moral agency, standards of right and wrong are adopted that serve as guides or deterrents for behaviour. Individuals monitor and self-regulate their conduct in relation to their moral standards and the potential consequences of a particular behaviour. Moral agency is therefore exercised through adhering to one's moral standards, and avoiding conduct that would violate them and result in negative self-sanctions.

However, these moral standards are not fixed internal regulators, and the self-regulatory mechanisms need to be activated in order to influence conduct. Bandura (1986) identified a number of mechanisms, which serve to selectively disengage moral self-sanctions from harmful conduct. These cognitive mechanisms provide an explanation for how people are able to engage in human atrocities without feeling distress or guilt, and maintain unethical

treatment of others. Termed moral disengagement, the victim's human essence is minimised, and their moral status is ignored. Through this process, the cognitive link is disabled between a transgressive behaviour and the self-sanctioning that should prevent it..

Moral disengagement comprises eight, inter-related cognitive mechanisms that allow unethical conduct. Moral justification, euphemistic labelling, and advantageous comparison cognitively restructure transgressive conduct, so its level of harm is minimised. *Moral justification* cognitively reframes unethical acts in terms of their worthy ends, while *euphemistic labelling* renders injurious conduct benign. For example, justifying Australian policies as being in place to discourage asylum seekers getting on 'leaky boats', or labelling their imprisonment as 'processing'. *Advantageous comparison* implies that the injurious conduct will prevent more human suffering than it causes. For example, that detention is preferable to the persecution and displacement that asylum seekers are fleeing.

The displacement and diffusion of responsibility minimise the moral agency of the aggressor. *Displacement of responsibility* attributes the acts to authority figures, while *diffusion of responsibility* disperses responsibility to the members of their group. In regards to asylum seekers, Australians may feel the issue is under the government's purview, which they have no control over. Similarly, they may feel that all Australians as a collective group hold responsibility, minimising their own role in endorsing the government and its policies.

The distress of the victim can also be minimised, through the distortion of consequences, dehumanisation, and the attribution of blame. *Distortion of consequences* allows the effects of the conduct to be minimised. An example is minimising the mental and physical health effects of long-term detention on asylum seekers. *Attribution of blame* involves assigning responsibility to the victims, and perceiving them as deserving of the treatment. People may believe that asylum seekers deserve their detention for 'skipping

queues' or taking the place of 'genuine refugees'. Finally, *dehumanisation* frames the victim as undeserving of humane treatment.

Bandura (1990) proposed that the perception of humanity in another activates empathy; thus, it is difficult to mistreat that person without experiencing distress or guilt. Therefore, minimising their humanness allows for injurious treatment. Goff, Eberhardt, Williams and Jackson (2008) demonstrated how priming participants with ape images allowed them to justify police beatings of African American, but not white, suspects. Castano and Giner-Sorolla's (2006) study, which showed the increased likelihood of infrahumanisation of an outgroup in response to the ingroup's responsibility for their suffering, led to suggestions that infrahumanisation may also serve to morally disengage from injurious conduct.

Morally disengaged reasoning has been shown to be important in explaining how individuals can engage in inhumane military and political violence (Bandura, 1990), or corporate corruption (Moore, Detert, Klebe Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012), without accompanying distress. It also offers a possible explanation for how large segments of the Australian community may be supporting and endorsing the current treatment of asylum seekers. In regards to how reasoning can affect subsequent moral judgements, rational theories of moral reasoning have traditionally dominated the ethical decision making literature, and suggest that individuals start with awareness, then move to making a deliberate judgement, to intentions, and finally to action (Rest, 1986).

Kohlberg's (1969) rationalist theory of moral reasoning is important at the point at which an individual decides what is right or wrong, and posits that moral judgements reflect an individual's evolving ideas about cooperation. The theory comprises three levels of cognitive moral development, and individuals progress through each stage as their moral

reasoning becomes more autonomous and sophisticated. The preconventional level focuses on one's own needs, and judgement is generally hedonistic and pragmatic (Rest, 1979). In the conventional level, behaviour is shaped by group norms and the status quo. In the postconventional level, moral reasoning depends on ethical and moral principles, and focuses on concepts such as equality, social justice, and utilitarianism (Campbell, 2005).

Postconventional moral reasoning predicts human rights support (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999), left-wing political ideologies (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983), and lower levels of prejudice (McFarland, 2010). Moral reasoning is also negatively related to the propensity to morally disengage, and this may be because individuals who reason at a higher, more principled, level would be more likely to make autonomous, ethical judgements based on moral principles such as justice and the greater good, and less likely to attribute responsibility to others (Moore et al., 2012).

However, despite the dominant role of moral reasoning in moral psychology for several decades, a recent meta-analysis has shown that moral reasoning, as based on Kohlberg's stages of cognitive moral development, only moderately predicts unethical decisions (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Klebe Treviño, 2010). Hence, sophisticated reasoning does not always lead to ethical behaviour (Rest, 1986). More recent research suggests that intuitive or impulsive models may better explain moral judgements, with reasoning serving as a post-hoc rationalisation (Haidt, 2001). That is, automatic flashes of emotion may play an important role in moral decision-making.

Emotions

The emotional basis of morality has received increasing attention over the past several decades. Moral emotions are an important factor in ethical behaviour; they are experienced in response to moral violations, and motivate moral conduct (Haidt, 2003). Contempt, anger and

disgust are three such moral emotions, which are felt in reaction to violations of morals by others. They relate to concerns regarding the social order, and are related but distinguishable from one another (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Together, these emotions form the 'hostile triad', and are often experienced concurrently in everyday life. They also all involve the experience of disapproval of others (Izard, 1977). Contempt relates to concerns regarding virtues such as respect, duty and hierarchy, while anger relates to concerns regarding individual freedoms and rights. Disgust is linked with the virtues of divinity and purity (Rozin et al., 1999).

Disgust is experienced in response to objects or behaviours that are perceived as impure. For example, feeling disgusted in response to moral violations of purity, such as unusual sexual practices, relates to stronger moral criticism of the conduct (Haidt & Hersh, 2001). Perceiving another's actions as unjust triggers anger, and higher levels of anger experienced in response to violations of justice relate to greater condemnation of the behaviour (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). Contempt is experienced in response to immoral actions relating to violations of one's duties and roles (Rozin et al., 1999). In exploring the relationship between attitudes, emotions, and media portrayals of refugees that minimise their humanity, Esses et al. (2008) found that participants experienced higher levels of contempt and lack of admiration when the media portrayed refugees as violating set procedures and as trying to cheat the system (thus, violating societal duties). This related to negative attitudes and lower levels of support for refugee policies.

Perceptions of asylum seekers as illegitimate and violating social standards of fairness and justice can also lead to anger, and in turn can generate negative attitudes towards them.

Verkuyten (2004) showed that in the Netherlands, individuals make a distinction between 'real refugees' who were forced to seek asylum, and who in turn elicited sympathy, and

'economic refugees' who chose to resettle in another country, and who elicited anger and resentment. Anger also predicted lower levels of support for pro-immigrant policies. Hostility can also arise from beliefs that asylum seekers receive more benefits and better treatment than they deserve (Haslam & Holland, 2012; Louis et al., 2007).

Differentiating it from anger and contempt, disgust has evolved to protect against potential danger or contamination, and therefore motivates a withdrawal or avoidance response (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). Disgust also promotes social conservatism, and relates to prejudice toward homosexuals (Terrizzi Jr, Shook, & Ventis, 2010). In exploring the predictive values of moral reasoning and moral emotions in attitudes toward homosexuals, Terrizi Jr. (2007) found that individuals with high disgust sensitivity and high moral reasoning were comparable in attitudes to those who reported low moral reasoning. Therefore, disgust sensitivity was found to overwhelm moral reasoning.

Disgust also appears to play an important role in perceptions of humanity, with experiences of disgust emphasising social hierarchies, and relating to perceptions of a higher level of purity and superiority than the elicitor. Extreme outgroups who are perceived as not being warm or competent, such as people with addictions or who are homeless, elicit high levels of disgust, and are perceived as less human (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Interpersonal disgust sensitivity, which relates to concerns about social order and protecting the soul, predicts the dehumanisation of foreign groups and immigrants, and negative attitudes toward them (Hodson & Costello, 2007). Disgust has been described as the guardian of the lower boundary of humanity; people who degrade themselves, or muddy the boundary between their humanity and animality, elicit disgust (Haidt, 2003). Asylum seekers may be particularly likely to elicit disgust. Media and public officials have promoted asylum seekers as likely carriers of infectious disease (Mares, 2002a), and immigrants have been historically

described as diseased organisms, who pose a threat to the integrity or "body" of the nation (O'Brien, 2003).

While contempt, anger and disgust focus on the moral conduct of others, another group of moral emotions focus on the self. Termed the self-conscious emotions (Lewis, 1993), shame, guilt and embarrassment involve self-evaluations of one's own moral worth and fit within a community. They motivate fitting in and the avoidance of causing harm, and inspire conduct that is culturally acceptable. These emotions reflect the internalising of social order (Rozin et al., 1999). Like the hostile triad, shame, guilt and embarrassment are interrelated, but distinguishable from each other (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Although shame and guilt both serve to regulate social conduct, they each lead to distinct outcomes. Guilt is a correlate of ethical behaviour (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), and creates a sense of personal responsibility for one's conduct. In contrast, shame involves a negative evaluation of one's self rather than one's behaviour (Tangney, 1991). So, while guilt predicts empathy and reparations, shame promotes anger and resentment, and motivates distancing and withdrawal (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Proneness to shame and guilt have been conceptualised as personality factors, born out of a general cognitive-affective style. They reflect a greater likelihood of experiencing these emotions in response to particular events (Mills et al., 2007).

Dispositional guilt, or the tendency to experience negative emotions in response to a self-evaluation of one's own actions as violating moral standards, has been found to negatively relate to the propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012). Moore et al. (2012) posited that this was because guilt reflects correctly working self-sanctions against unethical conduct, while morally disengaged reasoning weakens these self-sanctions.

Alternatively, the propensity to morally disengage was unrelated to dispositional shame,

perhaps because moral disengagement leads to behaviour being perceived as not reflective of the self.

Alternatively, it has been suggested that minimising an outgroup's humanity may be related to shame, rather than guilt. Castano and Giner-Sorolla's (2006) research exploring the relationship between an ingroup's responsibility for an outgroup's suffering, and the subsequent minimising of the outgroup's humanity, found no relationship between guilt and infrahumanisation. They suggested that two different psychological processes may occur in response to learning about the violence perpetrated by one's ingroup: while guilt can lead to reparations and positive feelings toward the outgroup, humanness denial can be used as a mechanism for reducing the distress that accompanies learning about one's ingroup's responsibility for an outgroup's inhumane treatment. This sense of responsibility may lead to feelings of shame, and humanness denial may be an unconscious route to reestablishing psychological equanimity, in response to these feelings.

Despite often being perceived as a moral issue in mainstream discourses, the factors outlined above have received relatively little attention in the literature on perceptions of asylum seekers. That is, the interplay between prejudice and the different facets of morality, such as moral emotions, moral reasoning, and moral disengagement, require further research in order to untangle their roles in negative perceptions of asylum seekers. We explored how aspects of morality may be important in predicting and rationalising the current harsh treatment of asylum seekers, and may serve as a strategy for distancing oneself from the reality of their situation. More broadly, we explored the antecedents of moral disengagement and dehumanisation, adding an important contribution to the literature on these areas.

Aims

Linking the objectives outlined above together, the present research had a number of aims, reflecting limitations and previously unaddressed factors in the literature exploring morals, values, and the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. These aims and their accompanying research questions are described in the remainder of this chapter. The first aim was to extend research examining the role of values and perceived dissimilarities in prejudice (Feather & McKee, 2008; Struch & Schwartz, 1989), by exploring how each of Schwartz's (1992) higher order values may uniquely predict the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. The second aim was to develop and validate a scale measuring Bandura's (1986) mechanisms of moral disengagement in the context of asylum seekers, to explore whether some Australians may be adopting these mechanisms in order to avoid the cognitive distress that may accompany endorsing harsh policies.

The third aim was to determine the role of morality more generally in the perceptions of asylum seekers. Specifically, moral reasoning and moral emotions as predictors of dehumanisation and moral disengagement were explored. Finally, the causal relationships between morals, values and dehumanisation were examined, in order to better understand how asylum seekers' humanity may be promoted. These studies used both survey and experimental methods to extend past research and better understand the determinants of the current treatment and perception of asylum seekers (see Appendices A through D for copies of materials), and aimed to deepen our understanding of the relationships between values, moral reasoning, moral emotions, moral disengagement, and dehumanisation.

Research questions and chapter outlines

Several specific research questions were born out of the broad aims outlined above, and the results are reported in chapters 2 through 5 in journal article format. Chapters 2 and 3 have been accepted for publication, while chapter 4 is in preparation.

Chapter 2. Perceptions of value dissimilarities in prejudice toward asylum seekers in Australia

The research reported in chapter 2 examined the role of values and value dissimilarities in the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. Specifically, chapter 2 explored the relationship between the ingroup's (Australians') value structure and their perceptions of asylum seekers as less human, as well as the ingroup's levels of negative attitudes. We also investigated whether perceived differences on particular values uniquely affected the dehumanisation of and prejudice toward asylum seekers. Extending Struch and Schwartz's (1989) work that looked at overall differences in perceived value hierarchies, perceived differences between the individual's and outgroup's values in each of the four higher-order dimensions was explored with the aim of uncovering whether such dissimilarities relate most strongly to dehumanisation when the values are indicative of moral sensibilities (that is, prosocial values).

Chapter 2 also explored the potential for preference for consistency (PFC) to moderate the relationship between perceived value dissimilarities and dehumanisation. PFC refers to an individual difference in the extent to which consistency and predictability in oneself and others is valued (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995), and higher levels of PFC have been found to motivate the re-establishing of consistency through attitude and behaviour shifts (Cialdini et al., 1995). The present study looked at how the reduction of humanness may be used to relieve the discomfort caused by perceiving differences in values; perceiving

an asylum seeker as emphasising different values would not cause discomfort if he or she were also perceived as less human.

To test these research questions, survey data from a community sample of Australians were collected. This chapter provides further understanding of factors that promote dehumanisation, and its relationship with prejudice. Findings aimed to demonstrate the importance of values and perceived differences in dehumanisation and prejudice, and the important role of perceptions of humanness in prejudice toward an outgroup.

Chapter 3. Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the endorsement of asylum seeker policies in Australia

Chapter 3 aimed to demonstrate how large segments of the Australian community, who may otherwise pride themselves on a sense of fairness and compassion, are seemingly able to disengage from, or actively endorse, punitive policies and harsh treatment of asylum seekers. Building on chapter 2, this chapter's key aim was to further explore the underlying psychological processes leading to the support and justification of current policies and perceptions of asylum seekers, and proposed that mechanisms of moral disengagement may be at play. In order to examine this research question, a moral disengagement scale was developed and validated.

This chapter reports two studies. Study 1 includes the preliminary scale development and Exploratory Factor Analysis in order to identify the number of factors to retain, and Confirmatory Factor Analysis to test the model's fit. Study 2 used a new round of data to again test the model's fit with an independent sample, and to provide support for the construct validity of the scale. The studies within chapter 3 are the first to consider the role of moral disengagement in the current treatment of asylum seekers in Australia, and aimed to

show how Australians are using moral disengagement in order to justify unethical attitudes and behaviours toward asylum seekers, that may otherwise be self-sanctioned.

Chapter 4. Moral reasoning and the moral emotions as predictors of dehumanisation and moral disengagement from asylum seekers

The role of morality in the treatment and perception of asylum seekers has been largely unexplored. Chapter 4 extended findings of chapter 3 by examining additional facets of morality, with the aim of exploring which variables would be most strongly related to the perception of asylum seekers as less human. In particular, moral reasoning and moral emotions were explored, as well as moral disengagement using the newly developed scale from chapter 3. These relationships were examined using survey data from an Australian community sample.

Several novel relationships regarding morality and the perception of asylum seekers were explored. Firstly, we aimed to explore how lower levels of moral reasoning could predict dehumanisation and moral disengagement from asylum seekers. Further, we reasoned that asylum seekers may be particularly likely to trigger the hostile triad (contempt, anger, and disgust) through concerns related to them (i.e. concerns about danger, role violations, and justice). Disgust can also lead to the emphasis of hierarchies (Hodson & Costello, 2007). Therefore, we sought to demonstrate that individuals who experience high levels of hostility would be more likely to dehumanise asylum seekers. Further, as the hostile triad has been linked with avoidance and withdrawal responses (Rozin et al., 1999), we aimed to show that experiencing these emotions in response to asylum seekers would promote moral disengagement from their treatment. As moral emotions have been shown to be a stronger predictor of prejudice than moral reasoning (Terrizzi Jr, 2007), we also compared these relationships.

The antecedents of moral disengagement have received very little exploration in the literature. Chapter 4 aimed to investigate Castano and Giner-Sorolla's (2006) theorising that humanness denial may serve as a moral disengagement strategy as a response to shame. Also extending work linking proneness to shame with anger and resentment (Tangney & Dearing, 2003), chapter 4 investigated whether proneness to shame related to greater experiences of negative moral emotions toward asylum seekers and dehumanisation, to avoid distressing self-evaluations that may accompany feelings of responsibility for their harsh treatment. Together, the exploration of these relationships contributes to our understanding of how morality may be applied or disengaged in considering the treatment of asylum seekers. Chapter 5. Values in the promotion of fairness and the perceived humanity of asylum

seekers

Although a large body of literature has examined them individually, the interplay between morals and values remains largely unexplored. Chapter 5 sought to extend and tie together the findings described in the preceding chapters by taking an experimental approach in order to explore how the activation of values may affect morals and dehumanisation. Specifically, the roles of self-transcendence values and moral foundations in dehumanisation were investigated, with the aim of demonstrating how values may be used to promote asylum seekers' humanity. We investigated whether activating the value of equality through exposure to a typical scenario could not only influence discrimination and egalitarian behaviours (Maio et al., 2009), but also the relevant moral foundation of fairness (Haidt & Graham, 2007) and dehumanisation. This study was conducted using a web-based recruitment site in the U.S.A., and participants in the sample were exposed to different versions of the instantiations in order to explore the effects of these manipulations on moral foundations and perceptions of humanness.

These studies investigated whether activating self-transcendence values is an effective means of promoting fairness and asylum seekers' humanity. The promotion of universalism has been suggested as a potential means of promoting humanness (Leyens et al., 2007) and the studies presented in chapter 5 aimed to test just that. Chapter 5 contributes to the limited research exploring how values and morals may relate to one another, and also to our understanding of whether shaping values and morals is an effective means of reducing dehumanisation.


Significance of research

The present research program provides a greater understanding of the psychological processes that contribute to dehumanisation, and extends social psychological work regarding values, morals, emotions, and perceptions of humanness. A number of important gaps in the literature have been identified and addressed, such as how values and morality relate to these perceptions, and to one another. Understanding these processes is important, both in terms of their contribution to the relevant theory, but also their practical application for understanding and addressing prejudice toward asylum seekers, who have been steadily increasing in numbers over the past few years (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012). Governments and individuals may therefore face a larger struggle to manage and appropriately address this complex issue. Consequently, understanding the ways in which asylum seekers' humanity may be minimised or highlighted is an important determinant of their subsequent treatment, and is therefore a worthwhile and important program of research.



Chapter 2. Preference for consistency and value dissimilarities in dehumanisation and prejudice toward asylum seekers in Australia.

Greenhalgh, E. M., & Watt, S. E. (in press). Preference for consistency and value dissimilarities in dehumanization and prejudice toward asylum seekers in Australia. *European Journal of Social Psychology*.



Chapter 4: Moral reasoning and the moral emotions as predictors of dehumanisation and moral disengagement from asylum seekers

Elizabeth M. Greenhalgh and Susan E. Watt
University of New England, Australia

Greenhalgh, E.M. & Watt, S.E. (2014). Moral reasoning and the moral emotions as predictors of dehumanisation and moral disengagement from asylum seekers.

Manuscript in preparation.



Chapter 5: Values in the Promotion of Fairness and the Perceived Humanity of
Asylum Seekers

Greenhalgh, E.M., Maio, G.R. & Watt, S.E. (2014). Values in the Promotion of Fairness and the Perceived Humanity of Asylum Seekers. Unpublished manuscript.

Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusion

Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusions

The research program reported in the previous chapters systematically investigated the roles of values and morals in the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers face unique forms of prejudice and negative attitudes in industrialised countries, and are frequently viewed with suspicion and hostility. Perceptions of asylum seekers as amoral and uncivilised can also lead to perceptions that they are less than fully human (Esses et al., 2008; Haslam & Holland, 2012). This minimisation of their humanity can lead to a range of negative outcomes, such as the rationalisation of poor treatment and hard-line policies (Hodson & Costello, 2007), and a lack of concern or disengagement from their suffering (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006).

To address the issue of how an individual's values or morals may relate or lead to these perceptions of asylum seekers as less human, the present research drew on a range of well-established theories in these areas, for example, Schwartz's (1992) circumplex model of values and Kohlberg's (1969) model of cognitive moral development, and investigated their predictive value within Australian community samples. It also developed and validated a scale to explore how Bandura's (1991) mechanisms of moral disengagement may be adopted by Australians in their consideration of the treatment of asylum seekers. Finally, the present research experimentally manipulated morals and values, to explore whether this could increase the perceived humanity of asylum seekers.

The set of studies presented throughout this thesis provide compelling evidence of the importance of morals and values in the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. Notably, our findings showed that values share meaningful relationships with attitudes toward and dehumanisation of asylum seekers. Perceived differences

between one's own and asylum seekers' values also predicted perceptions of less humanness. Similarly, we demonstrated the important roles of different aspects of morality in dehumanisation, such as moral reasoning, moral emotions, and moral foundations, and showed how dehumanisation can lead to prejudice and moral exclusion. Another contribution of this project was the development of a valid and reliable measure of moral disengagement from the treatment of asylum seekers, with results from this scale revealing that some Australians adopt morally disengaged reasoning in this context. Finally, we presented findings showing the important role of values in moral foundations, though the efficacy of activating self-transcendence values and increasing fairness in promoting asylum seekers' humanness was unsupported.

This final chapter will revisit the broad aims, specific research questions, and key findings of the present research program. The theoretical implications of these results for the fields of values and morals will be considered, as well as future research in these areas and implications for practice. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a broader discussion of the contributions and importance of the present research, and how it may be usefully applied to prejudice and discrimination more broadly.

Aims and Key Findings

The first aim of the present research, carried out in study 1, was to explore the role of values, and perceived differences in values, in the dehumanisation of asylum seekers. This study was the first to consider how perceptions of dissimilarities within each of the higher-order values can predict the minimisation of humanness of an outgroup, as well as how one's own values can be important predictors of these perceptions. The second aim was to measure and explore Australians' adoption of

Bandura's (1986) mechanisms of moral disengagement in the context of asylum seekers, which required the development and validation of a new instrument. The third aim was to examine the importance of different facets of morality, such as the moral emotions and moral reasoning, in perceptions of asylum seekers, and to compare the predictive value of the moral emotions and moral reasoning in the process of moral disengagement. Finally, this research tested whether an experimental manipulation of values that has previously been shown to affect intergroup behaviour can also successfully influence morals and dehumanisation. A number of specific research questions stemmed from these broad aims, and the results were reported in chapters 2 through 5 in journal article format. The key findings of these studies are summarised below.

The results in chapter 2 demonstrated a strong relationship between dehumanisation and prejudice. Individuals with stronger conservation and self-enhancement values, and greater perceived dissimilarity to asylum seekers on self-transcendence – self-enhancement values, dehumanised asylum seekers more and were more prejudiced towards them. Path analysis using SEM showed that the relationships between perceived self-transcendence – self-enhancement dissimilarities and prejudice were mediated by dehumanisation.

A multigroup approach in SEM showed that PFC moderated the relationship between conservation value differences and dehumanisation. However, the results did not support the prediction that high–PFC participants who perceived greater value differences would dehumanise more. Instead, in participants with low PFC, dehumanisation was high when perceived differences in conservation values were low.

The studies presented in chapter 3 were the first to consider the role of moral disengagement in the current context of the treatment and perceptions of asylum seekers in Australia, and proposed that the newly developed scale is a valid and reliable measure of moral disengagement in this context. Using EFA and CFA, it was also the first to find a two-factor model of moral disengagement, where avoiding responsibility for one's own role in the treatment of asylum seekers was conceptually distinct from mechanisms that serve to justify the harmful conduct or policy support. That is, the first factor saw participants denying personal accountability for policy decisions regarding asylum seekers, while the second encompassed mechanisms that cognitively reframe transgressive conduct and minimise the distress of the victim.

The results reported in chapter 4 revealed that moral reasoning and moral emotions are important predictors of dehumanisation of and moral disengagement from asylum seekers. SEM analysis showed that moral reasoning had significant, negative relationships with the hostile triad (anger, contempt and disgust), dehumanisation, and moral disengagement. The hostile triad positively predicted dehumanisation and moral disengagement, while dehumanisation and moral disengagement also shared a significant, positive relationship.

Dehumanisation mediated the relationships between the hostile triad and moral disengagement and between moral reasoning and moral disengagement, providing further support for the important role of perceptions of humanness in the justification of asylum seekers' current treatment. The results also showed that moral emotions were stronger predictors of moral disengagement than moral reasoning. These interactions suggested that moral reasoning particularly affects moral disengagement when levels of hostility are low; high levels of both moral reasoning

and moral emotions predicted levels of moral disengagement comparable to those low in moral reasoning.

Finally, chapter 5 reported the results of two studies, which aimed to promote asylum seekers' humanity either indirectly via the promotion of the moral foundation of fairness or directly via exposure to a typical instantiation of equality. Results following the instantiations were mixed. In the first of the two studies, participants' importance of equality increased following exposure to either instantiation (typical or atypical). There was an increase in the relevant moral foundation (fairness) following exposure to the atypical instantiation, which was mediated by the increase in importance of equality; but there was no effect on levels of dehumanisation. In the second study, there was no direct effect found of the instantiations on dehumanisation. Together, these two studies suggest that the activation of equality may not be an effective means of promoting perceptions of humanness, and that dehumanisation may be relevant to values other than equality, such as tradition and security.

Implications for Theory

The series of complementary studies presented in this research program reveal the importance of morals and values in the prediction of the dehumanisation of asylum seekers and, in the process, make a number of important contributions to the literature. Our first main contribution was showing that individuals whose values emphasised law and order and wealth and authority (that is, conservation and self-enhancement values) were more likely to dehumanise asylum seekers. Similarly, individuals who relied on the moral foundations of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity perceived asylum seekers as less human. Importantly, these results show that dehumanisation may be elicited by perceptions of asylum seekers as

threatening to these values or morals, i.e., to a country's safety and security, sense of order and structure, or to its resources.

Perceptions of asylum seekers as threatening have been well established in previous studies (Goot & Watson, 2005; Louis et al., 2007; Pedersen et al., 2006). The present research showed that the dehumanisation of asylum seekers was predicted by self-enhancement values that would be activated when there is threatening competition to hierarchy and power, and conservation values that would be activated under conditions of threat to peace and safety. Participants were more likely to deny asylum seekers' humanness when they placed greater value on social status and supremacy, and safety and security for individuals and society. Previously, threats to these values have been highlighted as important predictors of negative attitudes and prejudice toward outgroups (Feather & McKee, 2008; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). The present research extends these findings by providing a new understanding of how the different value types relate to dehumanisation, and how the arrival of asylum seekers may be perceived as particularly threatening to these values. Depictions of asylum seekers as amoral individuals who are opportunistic and disrespectful to a country's law and order may play an important role in perceptions of asylum seekers as less than fully human, particularly when values and morals that emphasise group membership, conservatism, and the status quo are important to an individual.

Our second main contribution was showing the strong relationships between anger, contempt and disgust, and moral disengagement and dehumanisation, thus showing that moral emotions are important antecedents in processes that serve to morally exclude asylum seekers. These results provide evidence that, along with the emphasis of certain values and moral foundations, experiencing hostile moral emotions in response to moral violations of others (i.e., asylum seekers' violations of

moral virtues) promote disapproval and separation (Izard, 1977). Together, these results extend what is known regarding the antecedents of humanness denial, and provide new information about how the dehumanisation of asylum seekers is related to different aspects of morality and specific value types; an individual's values and moral foundations, or their experience of negative moral emotions directed toward asylum seekers, can predict subsequent dehumanisation. The present findings also support and extend past research demonstrating that individuals are more likely to express higher levels of prejudice when they emphasise self-enhancing or conservation values (Feather & McKee, 2008), or experience greater levels of hostility (Esses et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2004). We showed that these same values and emotions serve as important predictors of dehumanisation.

Further, a robust line of research has shown that symbolic threat (including perceived differences in values and morals) is an important predictor of prejudice, and provides a justification for discrimination (Pereira et al., 2009). We extended these findings and previous work positing that dissimilarity between groups is a key factor in promoting dehumanisation (Delgado, 2008) and aggression towards outgroups (Struch & Schwartz, 1989) by demonstrating that perceived differences in the self-transcendence – self-enhancement value dimensions were directly related to dehumanisation. Thus, the results show that specific differences in the emphasis one places on pro- or antisocial values play an important role in the attribution of humanness in another, rather than differences in values more generally.

This is a notable finding in regards to the circumstances under which differences may promote dehumanisation, and also provides a deeper understanding of how symbolic threat may predict the minimisation of another's humanity. That is, because symbolic threat can be an important indicator of danger, it can in turn provide

justification for the rejection of an outgroup (Pereira et al., 2009). Perceiving asylum seekers as failing to place the same level of importance on self-enhancement or self-transcendence values may justify and elicit their exclusion from a shared humanity.

The present research also showed that an individual's preference for consistency (PFC) can be an important factor in relation to perceptions of differences. Those high in PFC tended to minimise value differences, which perhaps served to avoid the discomfort that would be more salient in these individuals. Unexpectedly, individuals low in PFC, who also reported fewer differences in values, dehumanised more. We speculated that this may serve to create inconsistency in response to perceived similarities, as low-PFC individuals can seek differences and unpredictability (Guadagno et al., 2001). Although individuals high in PFC tend to be more prejudiced (Heitland & Bohner, 2010), we showed that under certain conditions, individuals with low PFC can be more likely to dehumanise an outgroup. Further, although differences in values would typically promote symbolic threat and prejudice (Zarate et al., 2004), the present results show that for low-PFC individuals, these differences led to greater perceptions of humanness. Therefore, our study highlights PFC as an important individual difference that can predict fewer perceptions of differences, and also moderate these perceptions and dehumanisation.

As well as being a consequence of certain values, morals, and emotions, we showed that dehumanisation plays an important role in moral exclusion and the development of prejudice. Across the different studies, dehumanisation mediated the relationships between certain value differences and negative attitudes toward asylum seekers; between the hostile triad and moral disengagement; and between moral reasoning and moral disengagement. Therefore, our research showed that perceiving an outgroup as less human may be a necessary step in developing prejudiced attitudes

and excluding them from moral concern. This demonstrated the potency of dehumanisation in subsequent considerations of asylum seekers, and highlighted the importance of perceptions of humanness in positive intergroup relations.

The present results also have important implications for traditional theorising regarding moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969), and more recent theorising regarding moral emotions (Haidt, 2001) as the cause of subsequent moral judgements.

Supporting past research positing that operating at higher levels of moral reasoning promotes consideration of ethical, moral principles when making judgements (McFarland, 2010), present findings showed that higher levels of moral reasoning predicted lower levels of hostility, moral disengagement, and dehumanisation.

Importantly, our results showed that Haidt's (2001) intuitionist model of moral judgement appears to be most relevant to moral disengagement in individuals who reason at a higher level. When feelings of hostility toward asylum seekers were high, levels of moral disengagement were similar for both high and low moral reasoning. For individuals who operated at lower levels of moral reasoning, feelings of hostility toward asylum seekers were not as predictive of moral disengagement, which remained fairly similar (and high) across different levels of reported hostility.

These results are an important addition to the morality literature, and most notably provide evidence of the importance of moral emotions in moral judgements. That is, when hostility is high, it overwhelms the role of moral reasoning, such that individuals who are either high or low in moral reasoning morally disengage to similar degrees. Historically, the roles of moral reasoning and moral emotions have been divided, and the literature has generally supported one or the other as the cause of moral judgement. The present results extend and support past research (Terrizzi Jr, 2007) and provide important evidence for the complex interplay between them in

subsequent attitudes and decisions. Moral reasoning appears to exert a more identifiable effect on subsequent moral judgements when levels of negative moral emotions are low.

Another major contribution of this project was the development and validation of a useful and easily administered measure of moral disengagement from asylum seekers, which practitioners and scholars may use to gain a deeper understanding of these processes and be better equipped to reduce them. Our findings indicated that Bandura's (1991) mechanisms of moral disengagement provide a useful and strong framework for predicting and understanding the endorsement of harsh policies and poor treatment of asylum seekers, which provides a foundation for better understanding the cognitive means by which individuals may be thwarting their selfregulatory processes in this context. This extended previous work on the role of moral disengagement in transgressive conduct (Bandura et al., 1996) and considered these mechanisms in the current context of asylum seekers in Australia. The two-factor model and the scale as a whole provide a valuable framework for exploring how Australians may be disabling the self-sanctions that would otherwise prevent unethical conduct. Our findings showed that mechanisms of moral disengagement are adopted in the consideration of policies and reactions to asylum seekers, and those individuals who support harsh policies (through their political alignment) are also those most likely to morally disengage. These results provide evidence that Australians may use moral disengagement as a means of rationalising attitudes and behaviours in the context of asylum seekers that may otherwise be self-sanctioned, illuminating the importance of this construct.

Tying together the previous findings, the most favourable outcomes for asylum seekers were predicted by values that emphasise self-transcendence, a reliance

on the moral foundation of fairness, and low levels of hostility. The final studies presented in this research program hoped to promote asylum seekers' humanity by increasing universalism and fairness, thereby demonstrating a causal relationship between them. We provided the first evidence for the potential role of the value of equality in endorsement of the fairness/reciprocity foundation, though as these results were unexpected and not repeated in study two, further research is needed to examine their robustness. When the importance of this value was increased following exposure to an instantiation of equality in study one, this foundation was subsequently increased. Although it was predicted that typical instantiation would cause the increase in fairness, the atypical example (a person with a disability facing discrimination) appeared to be more relevant to the foundation it affected (relating to fair treatment). This is an interesting addition to the value instantiation literature, which has previously only shown effects following typical instantiations (Maio et al., 2009). The present findings suggest that the relevance of the instantiation to the subsequent attitudes may also be important, in addition to the typicality/atypicality of it.

However, the instantiation manipulation had no effects on dehumanisation, either indirectly via moral foundations, or directly. These results are interesting, as promoting universalism has been posited as a potentially effective method in promoting shared humanity (Leyens et al., 2007). Although these values are effective in predicting lower levels of dehumanisation (Greenhalgh & Watt, in press), the present results suggest that dehumanisation may be more than a value-relevant attitude, or that the issue of asylum seekers is not perceived as relevant to the value of equality in prejudiced individuals. Similarly, although the promotion of fairness has been shown to improve intergroup relations (Does et al., 2011) and increase positive

feelings toward non-normative groups (Luguri et al., 2012), the present results suggest that its relationship with dehumanisation may be more complex. A manipulation that emphasises fair and equal treatment for all human beings may not logically extend to a group that has been denied their humanness.

This research program has provided information regarding the psychological processes that may underlie dehumanisation. Deepening our understanding of the predictors and consequences of dehumanisation, particularly in the context of asylum seekers, is an important goal, as deprivations of humanity can lead to moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990). The current treatment of asylum seekers, particularly in an Australian context, provides an example of how perceptions of another as amoral (particularly when these perceptions are endorsed by the government) can lead to a lack of concern regarding, or even an endorsement of, hard-line policy responses. The present research demonstrated the important role of dehumanisation in prejudice toward asylum seekers, and contributed to theory in this area by establishing the predictive value of morals and values to the perception of asylum seekers as not fully human.

Implications for Research

The results of this research program suggest a number of promising directions for future research in the areas of morals, values, and dehumanisation. The relationships found between an individual's value structure and perceiving asylum seekers as human support the robustness of this model in predicting prejudice and attitudes toward outgroups (Feather & McKee, 2008; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). However, the lack of efficacy of activating equality and fairness in reducing dehumanisation suggests that it may be beneficial for future research to explore how other values may be perceived as more relevant to the issue of asylum seekers.

Further, research exploring imagined intergroup contact has shown promise in promoting the attribution of humanness in an outgroup (Vezzali et al., 2012), and this may be a worthwhile addition to studies that aim to extend the increase or activation of universalism to dehumanised groups (since universalism emphasises care for all human beings). Similarly, the present results showing that perceiving differences in certain values can promote dehumanisation suggests that a useful avenue for future research would be to explore how emphasising similarities in these values might promote humanness.

The different functions dehumanisation serves would also be an interesting area to explore. The present research has suggested that it serves as an important and unique step in moral disengagement, and works to switch off self-sanctions in ethical decision-making. Further, its importance in negative attitudes toward asylum seekers was highlighted, thus it may serve an important role in the development of prejudiced attitudes. Further examination of the circumstances under which dehumanisation may be used to rationalise or justify prejudice, or alternatively serve as an antecedent of negative attitudes or moral exclusion, would provide support for the present results, and also clarify the functional purposes of why some people perceive asylum seekers as less than fully human.

The importance of atypical instantiations in subsequent attitudes and behaviours is also largely undiscovered. Maio et al. (2009) suggest that it is plausible that values may, in some circumstances, be encompassed by an atypical instantiation, and in turn serve as guiding principles. This may be particularly relevant to less typical forms of discrimination (e.g., against obese individuals). The present results were the first to find evidence for this kind of mechanism, where atypical instantiations had an effect on subsequent morals that could potentially be perceived

as more relevant to the atypical manipulation. Further research is needed to clarify whether atypical instantiations function in this way, and the ways in which a particular ideal can be incorporated or perceived as relevant. That is, future studies may consider the contemplation of values across a range of different situations, in order to clarify how the typicality of the instantiation may or may not correspond with, or be perceived as relevant to, diverse situations.

The newly developed scale of moral disengagement, suggesting the role of both a two- and single-factor model, provide support for Bandura's (1991) theorising regarding how the mechanisms may serve to disengage self-sanctions in response to perceived ethical transgressions. Bandura (2002) has also described moral disengagement as the result of the continued reciprocal interaction between the individual, behaviour, and the environment. The present research has added to the limited literature exploring the antecedents of moral disengagement, and has provided support for the roles of moral reasoning, moral emotions, and dehumanisation in moral disengagement from the treatment of asylum seekers. Future research may continue exploring the antecedents of moral disengagement in this context, perhaps by studying additional situational and dispositional influences that can trigger these mechanisms, and how they may interact with one another. Further exploration of this interaction between the individual and the situation on morally disengaged reasoning would align with Bandura's (2002) theorising that these reciprocal interactions define our moral selves.

Implications for Practice

The research presented throughout this PhD may provide helpful information to human rights and asylum seeker advocates, both in terms of how current depictions of asylum seekers may be shaping prejudice and dehumanisation, and how they may

be combated. Regarding values, it may be fruitful for campaigns to present asylum seekers in ways that do not threaten particular values. Conservation and self-enhancement values predicted dehumanisation and negative attitudes, and it was posited that this was due to the threats to these values that the arrival of asylum seekers may pose. Thus, alternative portrayals that highlight that asylum seekers are not violating social norms, and not posing threats to Australia's security or economy, would align with these values, and potentially prevent prejudices from forming. For example, many of these perceptions of threat are shaped by false beliefs (Croston & Pedersen, 2013; Pedersen et al., 2005), and providing more accurate and realistic information to the general public regarding the legality and necessity of seeking asylum may serve to alleviate concerns in individuals who emphasise conservation or self-enhancement.

Similarly, feelings of hostility and moral disengagement may be triggered by perceived moral violations by others. Portrayals of asylum seekers as 'skipping queues' or taking the place of other, more deserving refugees emphasises perceptions that they are committing ethical violations, thus serve as antecedents to these emotions and psychological processes. Therefore, the widespread provision of more truthful information regarding the process of seeking asylum may serve to prevent beliefs regarding the immorality of these people's journeys. Ways of preventing these kinds of perceptions forming in the first place would be a beneficial endeavour, by minimising or counteracting mainstream portrayals of asylum seekers as calculating and dangerous, who do not uphold prosocial values or morals (Esses et al., 2008; Haslam & Holland, 2012).

Finally, the direct promotion of asylum seekers' humanity is a worthy endeavour. To date, their individuality and unique struggles have been downplayed in

favour of depictions of them as a collective, faceless threat. One such strategy for humanising asylum seekers may be to depict their individual, day-to-day lives. Or, by highlighting the hardships and struggles that they each face in seeking asylum, respect and admiration may be elicited in the place of hostility or fear (Esses et al., 2008). Depictions of asylum seekers upholding prosocial values, such as by raising their children to be ethical and humane, or by featuring stories of their compassion or kindness, may also be efficacious in the acknowledgement of their full humanity.

Conclusion

By understanding the basis of perceptions of asylum seekers as less than fully human, we are better equipped to counteract these depictions and their consequences. The research presented throughout this thesis has helped to untangle the roles that morals and values may play in these perceptions, and has suggested how understanding these relationships may be helpful in reducing the minimisation of asylum seekers' humanity. Just as importantly, it has provided evidence that dehumanisation may be different from a value-relevant attitude, and perhaps require different or more complex manipulations to be effectively minimised. Finally, the development and validation of a scale to specifically measure moral disengagement is an important addition to our understanding of how individuals may be endorsing current policies and treatment, and contributes to the morality literature more generally.

In sum, the research reported in the previous chapters has extended what is known about the antecedents and predictors of dehumanisation and moral disengagement. These findings carry implications for values and morality theory and research, but also provide a more sound understanding of how to combat these processes for those practicing in human rights and refugee and asylum seeker fields,

who may be actively working to overcome the current high levels of negative rhetoric and pervasive beliefs about asylum seekers. This understanding will lead to more effective strategies in the promotion of positive perceptions of asylum seekers, who are particularly vulnerable to denial of their humanity.

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Appendices

Appendices

Appendix A – Chapter 2 Materials

University of New England HREC Approval No. HE11/190

Demographic information

Instructions. First, we would like to find out a little about you in general, in order to compare how different people feel about the issues we are exploring. Please place a tick in the box that most resembles you. And remember, all the information you provide is confidential – your anonymity will be upheld. What is your age? (in years) _____ What is your gender? O Male O Female What is your education level? O Did not complete secondary school O Completed secondary school O Vocational training (part or completed) O Diploma (part or completed) O Bachelor's degree (part or completed) O Higher degree (eg. Masters or PhD) How would you describe your political orientation on most social issues? Please tick the one that comes closest to your view. 'Right-wing' views involve a conservative political viewpoint; 'left-wing' the opposite. O Strongly left O Somewhat left O Centre O Somewhat right O Strongly right O Don't care

Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005)

Instructions. What follows is a series of statements that describe different people. For each statement, place a tick in the box that corresponds to how much the person being described **is or is not like you.**

	Very much like me	Like me	Some what like me	A little like me	Not like me	Not like me at all
Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him/her. He/She likes to do things in his/her own original way.	O	•	O	0	0	•
It is important to him/her to be rich. He/She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things	O	O	O	O	O	O
He/She thinks it is important that every person should be treated equally. He/She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	O	O	O	O	O	•
It's important to him/her to show his/her abilities. He/She wants people to admire what he/she does.	•	O	•	O	O	O
It is important for him/her to live in secure surroundings. He/She avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety.	O	O	O	O	O	O
He/She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He/She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.	O	•	•	•	•	O
He/She believes that people should do what they're told. He/She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching	O	•	•	O	•	•
It is important to him/her to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them.	O	O	O	O	O	•
It is important to him/her to be humble and modest. He/She tries not to draw attention to him/herself.	O	O	O	•	O	O

Having a good time is important to him/her. He/She likes to "spoil" him/herself.	•	•	•	•	O	0
It is important to him to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. He/She likes to be free and not depend on others.	•	O	O	0	O	O
It's very important to help the people around him/her. He/She wants to care for their well-being.	O	•	O	O	O	O
Being very successful is important to him/her. He/She hopes people will recognize his/her achievements.	•	O	O	O	O	•
It is important to him/her that the government ensures his/her safety against all threats. He/She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	O	O	O	O	O	O
He/She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/She wants to have an exciting life.	O	•	•	O	O	•
It is important to him/her to always behave properly. He/She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	O	O	O	•	O	O
It is important to him/her to get respect from others. He/She wants people to do what he/she says.	O	•	O	O	O	O
It is important to him/her to be loyal to his/her friends. He/She wants to devote him/herself to people close to him/her.	•	•	•	O	O	O
He/She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him/her.	•	•	•	O	O	O
Tradition is important to him/her. He/She tries to follow the customs handed down by his/her religion or his/her family.	•	•	O	O	O	0
He/She seeks every chance he/she can to have fun. It is important to him/her to do things that give him/her pleasure.	•	•	O	O	•	O

Portrait Values Questionnaire - Perceptions of Asylum Seekers' Values

Instructions. What follows is a series of statements that describe different people. For each statement, place a tick in the box that corresponds to how much the person being described is or is not like an asylum seeker.

	Very much like an asylum seeker	Like an asylum seeker	Some what like an asylum seeker	A little like an asylum seeker	Not like an asylum seeker	Not like an asylum seeker at all
Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him/her. He/She likes to do things in his/her own original way.	•	•	O	•	•	•
It is important to him/her to be rich. He/She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things	O	O	O	O	O	O
He/She thinks it is important that every person should be treated equally. He/She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	O	•	O	O	O	O
It's important to him/her to show his/her abilities. He/She wants people to admire what he/she does.	O	O	O	O	O	O
It is important for him/her to live in secure surroundings. He/She avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety.	O	•	•	O	•	•
He/She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He/She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.	•	•	•	•	•	•
He/She believes that people should do what they're told. He/She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching	•	•	•	•	•	•
It is important to him/her to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them.	O	•	•	O	•	•
It is important to him/her to be humble and modest. He/She tries not to draw	O	•	•	O	•	•

attention to him/herself.						
Having a good time is important to him/her. He/She likes to "spoil" him/herself.	•	O	O	O	O	O
It is important to him to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. He/She likes to be free and not depend on others.	O	O	O	O	O	O
It's very important to help the people around him/her. He/She wants to care for their well-being.	•	O	O	O	O	O
Being very successful is important to him/her. He/She hopes people will recognize his/her achievements.	•	O	O	O	O	•
It is important to him/her that the government ensures his/her safety against all threats. He/She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	•	O	O	O	O	O
He/She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/She wants to have an exciting life.	•	O	O	O	O	O
It is important to him/her to always behave properly. He/She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	O	•	•	O	•	O
It is important to him/her to get respect from others. He/She wants people to do what he/she says.	•	O	O	O	O	O
It is important to him/her to be loyal to his/her friends. He/She wants to devote him/herself to people close to him/her.	•	O	O	O	O	•
He/She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him/her.	•	O	O	O	O	•
Tradition is important to him/her. He/She tries to follow the customs handed down by his/her religion or his/her family.	O	•	•	O	O	O
He/She seeks every chance he/she can to have fun. It is important to him/her to do things that give him/her pleasure.	•	O	O	O	O	O

Dehumanisation (Esses et al., 2008; Struch & Schwartz, 1989)

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Australians are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	0
Australians show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	•
Australians raise their children to be humane.	O	O	O	•

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Asylum seekers are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	O
Asylum seekers show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	O
Asylum seekers raise their children to be humane.	O	•	O	•

Preference for Consistency Scale (brief version; Cialdini et al., 1995)

Instructions. For each item below, please choose the number: 1 if you strongly disagree, 2 if you disagree, 3 if you somewhat disagree, 4 if you slightly disagree, 5 if you neither agree nor disagree, 6 if you slightly agree, 7 if you somewhat agree, 8 if you agree, or 9 if you strongly agree. Please answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can, but don't spend too much time thinking about each answer.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world.	•	0	•	0	•	0	0	0	0
An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I typically prefer to do things the same way	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I want my close friends to be predictable.	0	0	O	O	0	0	0	0	0
It is important to me that others view me as a stable person.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I make an effort to appear consistent to others.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	O

Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers. (Pedersen et al., 2005).

Instructions. The following section contains a number of statements about asylum seekers which respondents from previous studies have made. Using the 1 - 7 scale below, please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each item by writing the appropriate number on the line next to that item.

7 = strongly <u>agree</u>, 6 = moderately agree, 5 = slightly agree, 4 = <u>neither</u> agree nor disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 1 = strongly <u>disagree</u>

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Asylum seekers are holding Australia to ransom by resorting to violence such as rioting.	0	0	0	O	O	O	O
If asylum seekers need refuge, they should be granted refuge	0	0	•	O	O	O	O
Asylum seekers are being dealt with appropriately by the government	0	0	•	O	O	O	O
Separating asylum seekers like they are alien species dehumanises us all	0	0	0	O	O	O	O
Asylum seekers are ungrateful by protesting in the manner that they do	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
I sympathise with the situation of asylum seekers	O	O	O	O	0	0	0
Asylum seekers are justified in hunger striking to attract attention to their situation	0	0	•	O	O	O	O
The government's policy on asylum seekers is justified	O	O	O	O	0	0	O
Asylum seekers are being unfairly detained	0	O	O	O	O	O	O
Asylum seekers are manipulative in the way that they engage in self-harm protesting such as self-mutilation	0	0	O	0	0	0	0
Asylum seekers don't attempt to be part of Australian society	0	0	O	0	0	0	0
Asylum seekers are innocent victims of bad government policy	0	0	0	O	0	O	O
Asylum seekers are legitimate refugees and should be	0	O	O	O	O	O	O

welcomed							
So-called asylum seekers are people fleeing the chaos of war and the cruelties of monstrous regimes	0	0	0	O	0	O	0
Asylum seekers who mutilate themselves would not make model citizens	0	0	0	O	0	0	0
Asylum seekers breed hatred	O	O	O	O	O	O	0
If asylum seekers are not happy, send them home	O	\mathbf{O}	\mathbf{O}	O	\mathbf{O}	0	0
Asylum seekers would be better off in self-sufficient communities rather than in detention.	O	O	O	O	O	O	0

^{*}Reversed items

Appendix B – Chapter 3 Materials

University of New England HREC Approval No. HE12/066

Table B1. Factor loadings of MDAS items based on principle axis factoring with promax rotation

Item	Mechanism	Factor 1	Factor 2
To solve the issue of asylum seekers, we	Euphemistic		
should simply 'turn the boats around'.^	labelling	0.82	-0.03
Asylum seekers do not deserve to be locked	Attribution of blame		
up simply for coming by boat.^		0.80	-0.09
To discourage more arrivals, boat people	Euphemistic		
should be processed in offshore facilities.	labelling	0.78	0.03
How Australia treats asylum seekers is	· ·		
unreasonable, even when you consider their	Advantageous		
treatment in some other countries*.	comparison	0.77	0.06
Asylum seekers are immoral ^	Dehumanisation	0.73	-0.24
Asylum seekers have done nothing to deserve	Attribution of blame		**-
mandatory detention.	1100110 0001011 01 0100110	0.72	-0.18
It is wrong to place asylum seekers in		· · · -	0.10
detention long-term while we assess if they			
are genuinely in need of protection*.	Moral justification	0.72	-0.03
Compared to how asylum seekers might be	Word Justification	0.72	-0.03
treated in their home country, mandatory	Advantageous		
detention isn't so bad.^	comparison	0.71	0.02
We need mandatory detention to protect	Companson	0.71	0.02
•	Manal instification	0.71	0.02
Australia from potential terrorists.^	Moral justification	0.71	0.02
'Border protection' from asylum seekers is	Euphemistic	0.60	0.00
crucial.	labelling	0.68	0.03
Australia should resettle far greater numbers			
of asylum seekers, as there are so many in			
need*.	Moral justification	0.68	0.09
Asylum seekers should be held in 'secure	Euphemistic		
facilities' while they are processed.	labelling	0.67	0.03
The best response to the asylum seeker	Euphemistic		
problem would be to 'stop the boats'.^	labelling	0.66	-0.02
It is okay to treat asylum seekers harshly if			
they behave like animals.^	Dehumanisation	0.66	-0.11
Australia needs to strictly limit numbers of			
asylum seekers, to prevent racial tensions and			
conflicts between groups.	Moral justification	0.66	0.10
Mandatory detention is inhumane, even when			
considering the human rights violations	Advantageous		
committed in some countries of origin*.	comparison	0.65	0.08
	Companison	0.03	0.00
Numbers of asylum seekers granted refugee	companson	0.05	0.08

status should be strictly limited to protect			
Australian culture and our way of life.^	Moral justification	0.65	0.13
Australia needs strong border protection			
policies, to prevent it being overrun with			
asylum seekers.	Moral justification	0.65	0.12
Mandatory detention does long-term damage	Minimization of		
to asylum seekers*.	consequence	0.64	0.06
If asylum seekers behave like animals, they			
should be treated as such.	Dehumanisation	0.63	-0.08
Both past and present government policies			
regarding the mandatory detention of asylum	Minimization of		
seekers are harmful to the detainees*.	consequences	0.63	0.12
Asylum seekers are caring and compassionate			
for others*.	Dehumanisation	0.63	-0.10
Mandatory detention does not really hurt	Minimization of		
anyone.^	consequences	0.62	0.02
Mandatory detention teaches asylum seekers	Euphemistic		
a lesson.	labelling	0.60	-0.10
Asylum seekers should not be treated like			
animals*.	Dehumanisation	0.59	-0.13
Asylum seekers suffer psychologically as a	Minimization of		
result of being placed in detention*^.	consequences	0.57	0.03
Considering the torture and trauma asylum			
seekers may be fleeing, Australia's detention	Advantageous		
policies are humane.^	comparison	0.55	0.09
If asylum seekers choose to come by boat it is	Attribution of blame		
their fault that they are detained.^		0.55	0.11
Disincentives are an important part of asylum	Euphemistic		
seekers policies.	labelling	0.55	-0.05
Australia is at fault for mandatory detention,			
regardless of how asylum seekers arrive*.	Attribution of blame	0.54	0.16
Asylum seekers do not mind being placed in			
detention because it means their claims are	Minimization of		
being processed.	consequences	0.54	-0.04
Australia has every right to detain asylum	Attribution of blame		
seekers who arrive unauthorized.		0.49	0.04
Asylum seekers show concern for the welfare			
of all of society's members*.	Dehumanisation	0.46	-0.03
It is unfair to blame individual Australians for			
asylum seeker policy, when they only play a	Diffusion of		
small part in the decision-making.	responsibility	-0.21	0.73
I should not be blamed for government policy	Displacement of		
decisions regarding asylum seekers.^	responsibility	-0.16	0.68
Australians should be held responsible for	- -		
Government policies, since they voted the	Displacement of		
Government in*.	responsibility	0.001	0.66
Australians should not be held individually	_ •	0.08	0.63
-			

responsible for the hard-line responses to			
asylum seekers, which are promoted by the	Displacement of		
government.	responsibility		
Individual Australians cannot be blamed for			
endorsing mandatory detention if the majority	Displacement of		
do	responsibility	0.12	0.62
Since so many people support each political			
party, an individual voter is not accountable	Diffusion of		
for policies regarding asylum seekers.^	responsibility	-0.01	0.61
Every Australian who supports mandatory			
detention is partially responsible for its	Diffusion of		
effects*.^	responsibility	-0.06	0.60
Policy decisions regarding asylum seekers are	Displacement of		
the responsibility of all Australians*.^	responsibility	-0.15	0.53
The acts of government regarding asylum			
seekers policies are not only the responsibility			
of such governments, but the people who vote	Diffusion of		
them in*.	responsibility	-0.03	0.50
Australians should be blamed for supporting			
inhumane policies even if they are endorsed	Displacement of		
by the Government*.	responsibility	0.20	0.48

Note. Responses scored on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Major loadings for each item are in bold. *Denotes reverse-scored items. ^Denotes final scale items.

Table B.2

Correlations between factors for PCA and PAF

	Principle components analysis	Principle axis factoring with promax
	with promax rotation	rotation
	Factor 1	Factor 1
Factor 2	.381	.408

Propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012)

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

 $7 = \text{strongly } \underline{\text{agree}}, 6 = \text{moderately agree}, 5 = \text{slightly agree}, 4 = \underline{\text{neither}} \text{ agree}$ nor disagree, $3 = \text{slightly disagree}, 2 = \text{moderately disagree}, 1 = \text{strongly } \underline{\text{disagree}}$

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about.	0	0	0	O	O	O	0
Taking something without the owner's permission is okay as long as you're just borrowing it.	O	O	O	•	•	•	•
Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it's hardly a sin to inflate your own credentials a bit.	O	O	O	O	0	•	•
People shouldn't be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just doing what an authority figure told them to do.	O	O	O	O	O	0	•
People can't be blamed for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too.	O	O	O	•	•	•	•
Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal.	•	•	•	O	O	O	•
Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt.	O	•	•	0	•	O	O
People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves.	•	•	•	0	0	0	•

Dehumanisation (Esses et al., 2008; Struch & Schwartz, 1989)

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Australians are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	0
Australians show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	0
Australians raise their children to be humane.	0	O	O	•

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Asylum seekers are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	0
Asylum seekers show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	0
Asylum seekers raise their children to be humane.	O	O	O	•

Anger (Fredrickson et al., 2003; Izard, 1977)

Instructions. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount that you have ever experienced the following emotion toward asylum seekers:

	Not at all	A little bit	Moderately	Quite a bit	Extremely
Angry, irritated, or annoyed	O	O	O	O	O

Demographic information

What is your age? (in years)
What is your gender?
O Male
O Female
What is your education level?
O Did not complete secondary school
O Completed secondary school
O Vocational training (part or completed)
O Diploma (part or completed)
O Bachelor's degree (part or completed)
O Higher degree (eg. Masters or PhD)
How would you describe your political orientation on most social issues? Please tick
the one that comes closest to your view. 'Right-wing' views involve a conservative
political viewpoint; 'left-wing' the opposite.
O Strongly left
O Somewhat left
O Centre
O Somewhat right
O Strongly right
O Don't care

Appendix C – Chapter 4 Materials

University of New England HREC Approval No. HE13/231

Dehumanisation (Esses et al., 2008; Struch & Schwartz, 1989)

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Australians are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	0
Australians show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	•
Australians raise their children to be humane.	O	O	•	•

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Asylum seekers are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	O
Asylum seekers show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	O
Asylum seekers raise their children to be humane.	O	O	•	O

Moral Emotions. (Fredrickson et al., 2003; Izard, 1977)

Instructions. Using the scale below, please indicate the greatest amount that you have ever experienced each of the following feelings toward asylum seekers:

	Not at all	A little bit	Moderately	Quite a bit	Extremely
Angry, irritated, or annoyed	O	O	O	•	•
Grateful, appreciative, or thankful	O	O	O	O	O
Sympathy, concern, or compassion	O	O	O	O	O
Sad, downhearted, or unhappy	O	O	O	O	O
Interested, alert, or curious	O	•	O	•	•
Surprised, amazed, or astonished	O	O	O	O	O
Scared, fearful, or afraid	•	•	O	O	O
Love, closeness, or trust	O	•	•	O	•
Disgust, distaste, or revulsion	O	O	O	O	O
Amused, fun-loving, or silly	O	O	O	O	O
Contemptuous, scornful, or disdainful	O	O	O	O	O
Glad, happy, or joyful	•	•	O	O	•
Embarrassed, self-conscious, or blushing	O	O	O	O	O
Hopeful, optimistic, or encouraged	O	O	O	O	O
Repentant, guilty, or blameworthy	O	O	O	O	O
Sexual, desiring, or flirtatious	O	O	O	O	O
Ashamed, humiliated, or disgraced	O	O	O	O	O
Proud, confident, or self-assured	O	O	•	O	O
Content, serene, or peaceful	O	O	O	O	O
Awe, wonder, or amazement	O	O	O	0	•

Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney & Dearing, 2003)

Instructions. Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react different ways at different times. Please do not skip any items - rate all responses

You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o'clock, you realise you stood your friend up.

	Not Likely	2	3	4	Very Likely
You would think: "I'm inconsiderate." ¹	O	O	O	O	O
You would think: "Well, my friend will understand."	O	0	O	O	O
You'd think you should make it up to your friend as soon as possible. ²	O	O	O	O	O
You would think: "My boss distracted me just before lunch."	O	O	•	O	0

You break something at work and then hide it

	Not likely	2	3	4	Very likely
You would think: "This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it or get someone else to." ²	•	•	•	O	O
You would think about quitting.1	•	O	O	O	•
You would think: "A lot of things aren't made very well these days."	•	•	O	O	O
You would think: "It was only an accident."	•	O	O	•	•

At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a	project, a	nd it tu	ırns ou	ıt badly	<i>7</i> .
	Not likely	2	3	4	Very likely
You would feel incompetent. ¹	O	O	0	O	C
You would think: "There are never enough hours in the day"	•	O	O	O	•
You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the project." ²	•	O	O	O	O
You would think: "What's done is done."	O	•	0	•	O
You make a mistake at work and find out a cowo	rker is b	lamed f	for the	error.	
	Not likely		3	4	Very likely
You would think the company did not like the coworker.	O	O	O	O	O
You would think: "Life is not fair."	O	O	O	O	O
You would keep quiet and avoid the coworker. 1	O	O	O	O	O
You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation. ²	O	0	O	O	O
While playing around, you throw a ball and it hit	s your fr	end in	the fac	ce.	
	Not likel		3	4	Very likely
You would feel inadequate that you can't even throw a ball. ¹	0	O	•	C	•
You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching.	O	O	•	O	•
You would think: "It was just an accident."	O	0	O	O	O
You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better. ²	O	0	O	•	O

You are driving down the road, and you hit a smal	l animal.				
	Not likely	2	3	4	Very likely
You would think the animal shouldn't have been on the road.	•	0	O	O	O
You would think: "I'm terrible."1	O	O	O	0	O
You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."	0	O	O	0	O
You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert driving down the road. ²	•	O	•	•	•
You walk out of an exam thinking you did extreme poorly.	Not likely	Then 2	you f	ind ou	Very likely
You would think: "Well, it's just a test."	<u>O</u>	·	·	•	O
You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."	•	•	•	O	O
You would think: "I should have studied harder." ²	O	0	O	0	O
You would feel stupid. ¹	O	O	O	O	O
While out with a group of friends, you make fun o	f a friend Not likely	d who	o's not	there.	Very likely
You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless."	O	•	•	•	O
You would feel small like a rat. 1	O	O	O	\mathbf{C}	O
You would think that perhaps that friend should have been there to defend him/herself.	•	O	•	0	O
You would apologize and talk about that person's good points. ²	•	O	•	0	O

You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on you, and your boss criticises you.

	Not likely	2	3	4	Very likely
You would think your boss should have been more clear about what was expected of you.	O	•	0	•	0
You would feel like you wanted to hide. ¹	O	O	O	0	O
You would think: "I should have recognized the problem and done a better job." ²	O	•	0	O	O
You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."	O	O	O	O	O

You are taking care of your friend's dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog runs away.

	Not likely	2	3	4	Very likely
You would think, "I am irresponsible and incompetent."	•	0	•	O	O
You would think your friend must not take very good care of the dog or it wouldn't have run away.	•	•	•	O	•
You would vow to be more careful next time. ²	O	O	O	O	O
You would think your friend could just get a new dog.	O	O	O	O	•

You attend your coworker's housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new cream-coloured carpet, but you think no one notices.

	Not likely	2	3	4	Very likely
You think your coworker should have expected some accidents at such a big party.	O	•	0	0	•
You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the party. ²	O	•	O	0	•
You would wish you were anywhere but at the party. ¹	O	O	O	O	•
You would wonder why your coworker chose to serve red wine with the new light carpet.	O	O	O	O	O

Note. ¹Proneness to shame items ² Proneness to guilt items

Moral disengagement from the treatment of asylum seekers scale (MDAS; Greenhalgh et al., in press).

Instructions. What follows is a set of statements about the issue of asylum seekers in Australia. Please consider the statements below, and indicate how much you agree or disagree with them. 7 = strongly agree, 6 = moderately agree, 5 = slightly agree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 1 = strongly disagree

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
O	0	•	•	•	O	0
O	•	•	0	0	0	0
•	•	•	•	0	0	0
•	•	•	•	•	0	•
O	O	0	•	•	•	O
O	0	0	•	•	•	O
•	•	•	•	O	0	•
•	O	O	O	O	O	•
O	O	0	0	•	O	•
O	O	0	0	•	O	•
O	•	•	•	•	•	O
O	O	•	•	•	•	O
•	•	•	•	0	0	0
O	O	O	•	•	•	O
0	O	O	O	O	\mathbf{C}	O
•	•	O	0	O	O	•

^{*} Denotes reverse scored items. Presentation of items randomly ordered.

Defining Issues Test – short version (short version; Rest et al., 1999).

Instructions. This questionnaire is concerned with how you define the issues in a social problem. Several stories about social problems will be described. After each story, there will be a list of questions. The questions that follow each story represent different issues that might be raised by the problem. In other words, the questions/issues raise different ways of judging what is important in making a decision about the social problem. You will be asked to rate and rank the questions in terms of how important each one seems to you. In this questionnaire you will be asked to read a story and then to place marks on the answer sheet. In order to illustrate how we would like you to do this, consider the following story:

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realised that there were a lot of questions to consider. For instance, should he buy a larger used car or a smaller new car for about the same amount of money? Other questions occur to him.

We note that this is not really a social problem, but it will illustrate our instructions. After you read a story you will then turn to the question section that corresponds to the story. But in this sample story, we present the questions below. First, on the question section for each story you will be asked to indicate your recommendation for what a person should do. If you tend to favour one action or another (even if you are not completely sure), indicate which one. If you do not favour either action, mark the circle by "can't decide."

Second, read each of the items numbered 1 to 12. Think of the issue that the item is raising. If that issue is not important or doesn't make sense to you, mark "no." If the issue is relevant but not critical, mark "much," "some," or "little" depending on how much importance that issue has in your opinion. You may mark several items as "great" or any other level of importance there is no fixed number of items that must be marked at any one level.

Third, after you have selected your response along the right hand side of each of the 12 items, then at the bottom you will be asked to choose the item that is the most important consideration out of all the items printed there. Pick from among the items provided even if you think that none of the items are of "great" importance. Of the items that are presented there, pick one as the most important (relative to the others), then the second most important, third, and fourth most important.

What should Frank do?

- O Buy new car
- O Can't decide
- O Buy used car

Rate the following issues in terms of importance.

The time time is not the product of the personner.					
	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives.	O	O	O	0	•
2. Would a used car be more economical in the long run than a new car.	O	O	O	O	O
3. Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.	O	O	O	O	•
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200.	O	O	O	O	•
5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.	O	O	O	O	•
6. Whether the front connibilies were differential.	•	•	O	O	•

Some items may seem irrelevant or not make sense (as in item #6). In that case, rate the item as "NO". After you rate all of the items you will be asked to RANK the top four items in terms of importance. Note that it makes sense that the items you RATE as most important should be RANKED as well. So if you only rated item 2 as having great importance you should rank it as most important.

Consider the 5 issues above and rank which issues are the most important.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Most important item	O	0	O	O	O	C
Second most important item	O	0	\mathbf{C}	\mathbf{C}	\mathbf{C}	O
Third most important item	O	0	\mathbf{C}	\mathbf{C}	\mathbf{C}	O
Fourth most important item	O	0	0	0	O	O

Again, remember to consider all of the items before you rank the four most important items and be sure that you only rank items that you found important. Note also that before you begin to rate and rank items you will be asked to state your preference for what action to take in story.

Thank you and you may begin the questionnaire!

Story 1. Here is the first story for your consideration. In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz steal the drug?

What should Heinz do?

- O Should steal
- O Can't decide
- O Should not steal

Rate the following issues in terms of importance.

	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.	•	•	•	•	•
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?	O	O	O	O	O
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?	•	•	•	•	O
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers.	0	0	0	•	O
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else.	•	•	•	•	•
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected.	•	•	•	•	•
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.	0	0	0	•	O
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other.	O	O	•	•	O
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow.	•	•	•	•	O
10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society.	•	•	•	•	O
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel.	•	O	•	•	O
12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not.	•	•	•	•	•
13. Please select answer choice "Much"	O	O	O	•	O

Canaidantha	10:0000		1	1-:-1-		ama 41aa		
Consider the	12 issues	s above and	ı rank	wnich	issues	are the	most importa	ince.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Most important item	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Second most important item	O	0	O	O	0	O	0	0	O	\mathbf{O}	O	O
Third most important item	O	0	O	O	0	O	0	0	O	\mathbf{O}	O	O
Fourth most important item	O	0	0	O	O	0	0	0	0	\mathbf{O}	\mathbf{C}	O

Story 2. A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name Thompson. For eight years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison eight years before,

and whom the police had been looking for. Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson

What should she do?

to the police and have him sent back to prison.

- O Should report him
- O Can't decide
- Should not report him

Rate the following issues in terms of importance.

	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person?	•	•	•	•	0
2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime?	•	•	O	O	O
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal system?	O	O	O	O	•
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society?	O	O	O	O	•
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect?	O	O	O	O	•
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for a charitable man?	O	O	O	O	•
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison?	•	O	O	•	•
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off?	O	•	O	O	•
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson?	•	O	O	•	•
10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances?	O	•	O	O	•
11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be served?	•	O	O	O	•
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody?	•	O	O	O	O

Consider the 12 issues you rated above and rank which issues are the most important.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Most important item	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	0	O	O
Second most important item	O	0	0	O	0	0	0	0	0	\mathbf{O}	\mathbf{C}	O
Third most important item	O	O	O	O	O	O	0	O	O	\mathbf{O}	O	O
Fourth most important item	O	0	0	O	O	0	0	0	0	O	O	O

Story 3. Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the use of the military in international disputes and to speak out against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair. When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be alright if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks. But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organise protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school. Should the principal stop the newspaper?

Should the principal stop the paper?

- O Should stop it
- O Can't decide
- Should not stop it

Rate the following issues in terms of importance.

	Great	Much	Some	Little	No
1. Is the principal more responsible to students or to parents?	•	•	•	O	O
2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper could be published for a long time, or did he just promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time?	O	O	O	•	O
3. Would the students start protesting even more if the principal stopped the newspaper?	O	O	O	O	O
4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal have the right to give orders to students?	•	•	•	O	O
5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say "no" in this case?	O	O	O	O	O
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be preventing full discussion of important problems?	•	•	•	O	O
7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose faith in the principal.	O	O	O	O	O
8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and patriotic to his country.	O	•	•	•	O
9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the student's education in critical thinking and judgment?	O	•	•	O	O
10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing his own opinions.	O	O	O	O	O
11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some angry parents when it is the principal that knows best what is going on in the school.	O	O	O	O	O
12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent.	0	•	•	0	O

|--|

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Most important item	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O
Second most important item	O	0	O	O	0	O	0	0	O	\mathbf{O}	O	O
Third most important item	O	0	O	O	0	O	0	0	O	\mathbf{O}	O	O
Fourth most important item	O	0	0	O	O	0	0	0	0	\mathbf{O}	\mathbf{C}	O

De	mographic information
Wh	nat is your age? (in years)
Wh	nat is your gender?
	Male Female
Wh	nat is your education level?
0000	Did not complete secondary school Completed secondary school Vocational training (part or completed) Diploma (part or completed) Bachelor's degree (part or completed) Higher degree (eg. Masters or PhD)
the	w would you describe your political orientation on most social issues? Please tick one that comes closest to your view. 'Right-wing' views involve a conservative itical viewpoint; 'left-wing' the opposite.
O O O	Strongly left Somewhat left Centre Somewhat right Strongly right Don't care

Appendix D – Chapter 5 Materials

Cardiff University HREC Approval No. EC.13.09.10.3508A

Value Instantiations (Maio et al., 2009)

Typical condition instructions. Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. As part of my PhD, I am interested in the perception of the involvement of social values in various different situations. For this research, you will be presented with a situation and then asked to complete some scales about a value involved in that situation. The situation is described below, please read it through twice before moving on.

A well known multi-national company recently held interviews for the position of executive vice-president. A vast number of people applied, but the interview board managed to narrow the choice down to eight candidates who were all asked to attend a second formal interview and give a talk on their ideas for the future of the company. Because of the large number of people on the interview panel and the recent good weather, the board decided to hold the presentations at a local café that they hired for the occasion. After giving their half hour presentations, the candidates attended a formal interview where they were asked questions by all members of the interview panel.

Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited experience with people from ethnic minorities and were nervous about appearing uncomfortable or biased. The black applicant picked up on their nervousness, which affected his confidence and made him answer questions more tentatively. As a result, the white applicants made better impressions on the interview panel.

Atypical condition instructions. Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. As part of my PhD, I am interested in the perception of the involvement of social values in various different situations. For this research, you will be presented with a situation and then asked to complete some scales about a value involved in that situation. The situation is described below, please read it through twice before moving on.

A well known multi-national company recently held interviews for the position of executive vice-president. A vast number of people applied, but the interview board managed to narrow the choice down to eight candidates who were all asked to attend a second formal interview and give a talk on their ideas for the future of the company. Because of the large number of people on the interview panel and the recent good weather, the board decided to hold the presentations at a local café that they hired for the occasion. After giving their half hour presentations, the candidates attended a formal interview where they were asked questions by all members of the interview panel.

Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited experience of people with disabilities and were nervous about appearing uncomfortable or biased. The applicant with an eye patch picked up on their nervousness, which affected his confidence and made him answer questions more tentatively. As a result, the other applicants made better impressions on the interview panel.

Control condition instructions. Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. As part of my PhD, I am interested in social values. For this first survey, you will be presented with two questions about one social value that has been randomly selected.

Importance of equality (Schwartz, 1992)

Instructions. People vary tremendously in their ratings of the relative a

importance of social values. Please rate how important the value below is to you, as
guiding principle in your life.
EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
 Opposed to my values (-1) Not important (0) 1 2 Moderately important (3) 4 5 Very important (6) Extremely important (7)
Centrality of equality (Verplanken & Holland, 2002)
Instructions. To what extent does the concept of equality describe you and your
concerns?
O Not at all
O 2
O 3
O 4
45
O 5
5678
 5 6 7 8 9
5678

Dehumanisation (Esses et al., 2008; Struch & Schwartz, 1989)

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Australians are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	0
Australians show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	•
Australians raise their children to be humane.	0	0	•	•

Instructions. Please consider the below statements, and indicate how much you agree with them.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Asylum seekers are considerate and compassionate for others.	•	•	0	0
Asylum seekers show concern for the welfare of all of society's members.	•	•	•	•
Asylum seekers raise their children to be humane.	O	O	•	O

Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham, et al., 2011)

Appendix D

Instructions. For this survey, please consider the following: When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?

	Not at all relevant	Not very relevant	Slightly relevant	Somewhat relevant	Very relevant	Extremely relevant
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally. ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others. ²	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country. ³	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority. ⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency. ⁵	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable. ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone acted unfairly. ²	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group. ³	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society. ⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone did something disgusting. ⁵	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone was cruel. ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights. ²	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty. ³	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder. ⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God would approve of. ⁵	0	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix D

Instructions. Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement:

	Strongly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Moderately Agree	Strongly Agree
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.	0	0	0	0	0	0
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. ²	0	0	0	0	0	0
I am proud of my country's history. ³	0	0	0	0	0	0
Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. ⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed. ⁵	0	0	0	0	0	0
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal. ¹	0	0	0	0	0	0
Justice is the most important requirement for a society. ²	0	0	0	0	0	0
People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong. ³	0	0	0	0	0	0
Men and women each have different roles to play in society. ⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural. ⁵	0	0	0	0	0	0
It can never be right to kill a human being. 1	0	0	0	0	0	0
I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing. ²	0	0	0	0	0	0
It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself. ³	0	0	0	0	0	0
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty. ⁴	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. ⁵	0	0	0	0	0	0
Note. ¹ Harm/care ² Fairness/reciprocity ³ Ingroup/loyalty ⁴ Authority/respect ⁵ Purity/sanctity	Purity/sancti	Ęż				

Demographic information What is your age? (in years) What is your gender? O Male O Female What is your education level? O Did not complete high school • Completed high school O College (part or completed) O Graduate school (part or completed) How would you describe your political orientation on most social issues? Please tick the one that comes closest to your view. 'Right-wing' views involve a conservative political viewpoint; 'left-wing' a liberal viewpoint. • Extremely liberal (left-wing) O Quite liberal O Slightly liberal O Centre O Slightly conservative • Quite conservative O Extremely conservative (right-wing) How would you describe your race/ethnicity? O White • African American O Asian American O Native American O Latino American O Other: