

CHAPTER ONE: MULTICULTURALISM AS POLICY

This chapter begins with an official definition of Multiculturalism as policy legitimated by government. It then enters into a historical account of the origins of Multicultural policy with particular reference to Australian Immigration practice and policy since the Second World War. Multiculturalism is depicted as a response to the failure of government domestic policies of assimilation and integration. Sociological criticism of multiculturalism based on its epistemological dependence on a conceptual bifurcation between cultural pluralism and structural pluralism brings the Chapter to the need to analyse multiculturalism as theory.

Multiculturalism: An Official Definition

The 1990 Office of Multicultural Affairs' *National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia: The Year In Review* (OMA, 1990), defines multiculturalism in the following manner:

Multicultural is simply a term which describes the cultural and ethnic diversity of contemporary Australia. We are, and will remain, a multicultural society.

As a public policy, multiculturalism encompasses government measures designed to respond to that diversity. ... It is a policy for managing the consequences of cultural diversity and of society as a whole.

The Commonwealth Government has identified three dimensions of multicultural policy:

Cultural identity: the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion.

Social justice: the right of all Australians to equality of treatment and opportunity, and the removal of barriers of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, gender or place of birth.

Economic efficiency: the need to maintain, develop and use effectively the skills and talents of all Australians, regardless of background.

OMA, 1990:69.

The National Agenda, still very much in its original (1989) form, goes on to place certain limits on Australian multiculturalism.

Multicultural policies:

are based upon the premise that all Australians should have an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, to its interests and future, first and foremost;

require all Australians to accept the basic structures and principles of Australian society - the Constitution and the rule of law, tolerance and equality, Parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language and equality of the sexes; and

impose obligations as well as conferring rights: the right to express one's own culture and beliefs involves a reciprocal responsibility to accept the rights of others to express their views and values.

OMA, 1990:69

The policy thus clearly confers certain rights to all Australians from backgrounds which can be described as 'cultural' or 'ethnic', but in a context which is perhaps best understood as the reciprocal obligations of citizenship to which all Australians are beholden as members of a nation. In order to understand what this policy means for Australians, it is best to look at its historical context before examining its theoretical constitution.

Origins of the Policy

Multiculturalism as Federal Government policy in Australia was introduced for political reasons which sustain strong sociological analysis (see Sestito, 1982, reviewed in Atchison, 1993:22). Al Grassby, Minister for Immigration under the Whitlam Labor Government (1972-5), publicised the abolition of the Australia's longstanding White Australia Policy with the introduction of a non-discriminatory immigration policy under the banner of the 'Family of the Nation' - a slogan which implied recognition of the substantial ethnic diversification of Australia's population, particularly in the wake of post-

World War 2 immigration from Southern Europe (Atchison, 1993; Bullivant, 1983; Castles et al, 1990; Castles, 1992; Jakubowicz, 1984). Indeed, many sociologists point to political mobilisation amongst specific ethnic communities as one of the main stimuli for this government initiative (Birrell & Birrell, 1981:119; Jupp, 1984b:4; Di Nicola, 1984). This mobilisation seems aimed at redressing what were seen by these ethnic communities as structural disadvantages incurred by their members based on conditions directly associated with their minority status as migrants and ethnically differentiated peoples in the broader Australian community.

Di Nicola (1984), for instance, shows that while the Italian migrant population of the Sydney suburb of Leichhardt demonstrates a low political participation rate, politically active lobby groups based in the region lent significant electoral support to the Federal election bids by both Liberal and Labour parties at the end of 1972. Castles (1992:186) points to a strategic courtship of the 'migrant vote' by Labour in particular as an 'attributable' factor in its 1972 victory over the Liberal Party after 23 years out of office. Des Storer (1975) concludes, after a review of conflicting 1960s and early 1970s social research, that poor participation in Australian political processes by ethnic minorities was due to dominating socio-political structure and vested interest groups, but that this was very much on the

change.

Sociologists like Jean Martin (Martin, 1978; Jupp (1966), and Jakubowicz and Buckley (1975), during the later 1960s and early 70s painstakingly documented disadvantages in employment opportunities and access to social services and the law on the basis of ethnic and first language differences perpetuated by Australia's social institutions, such as the Department of Social Security, Community Welfare agencies and Employers. This disadvantaging was, and still is, widely attributed to a policy of assimilation held by government from the commencement of Australia's post-World War Two immigration programme under the authority of Australia's first Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, in 1945, up until the late 1960s (e.g. Burnley et al, 1985; CAAIP, 1988; Edgar, 1980; Foster & Stockley, 1984; Martin, 1978).

The sociology of this historical period in Australian immigration is well documented elsewhere (e.g. Atchison, 1993; Birrel and Birrell, 1981; Bottomley & De Lepervanche, 1984; Burnley et al, 1985; Castles et al, 1990; Foster & Stockley, 1984; Huber, R. 1977; Jakubowicz, 1984; Jupp, 1984a; Martin, 1978; Sherington, 1980). In brief, between 1947 and 1987 the population of Australia more than doubled, from 7.5 million to over 16

million. In excess of half of this population increase was due to immigration and births to immigrants in Australia (Castles et al, 1990:25). While preference was initially on migrants from the U.K. and Northern Europe, increasingly during the 1950s and 60s the catchment extended into Southern Europe and, in the 1970s and 80s, Asia. Immigration in the post-war period has effectively transformed the ethnic composition of Australian society beyond recognition.

Foster and Stockley in particular elevate assimilationist policy during the early post-war decades of this period to the cogency of an ideology, which 'has as its central tenet the notion that immigrants should assimilate as quickly as possible' (Foster & Stockley, 1984:47). In practice, this process demanded that:

... languages other than English should not be used (publicly at least), norms of behaviour in family life or in other institutional settings should conform to the Anglo-model and national loyalties and affiliations should be shed rapidly.

Foster & Stockley, 1984:47

In other words, migrants were expected to fit in with and adapt to the culture they found when they arrived in Australia as quickly as possible, and without any particular aid - apart from, perhaps, ad hoc community organisations such as the Good neighbour Councils (Atchison, 1993:15).

Foster and Stockley refer to 'the shift from an assimilationist to an integrationist position within the Department of Immigration in the early 1960s' (Foster & Stockley, 1984:32) as one of the 'early indicators' of a recognition in government circles of the failure of assimilation. Castles (1992) agrees, offering the first 1966 admissions of Asian immigrants as a concrete example of integrationist policy which led firmly onto the path to multiculturalism; a path that signified the end of a White Australia policy dating back to one of the earliest acts of Federation in 1901 (see Castles et al, 1990:7) and the Chinese immigration restriction acts that preceded it (Yuan, 1983; Bullivant, 1984:39-42).

Other sociologists, like Birrell and Birrell (1981), Castles et al (1990), Jupp (1984), Donald Edgar (1980) and Connell & Irving (1980), show how during the 1950s and 60s migrants were encouraged to settle in Australia specifically to expand Australia's manufacturing base. Except Birrell and Birrell (1981:47), these sociologists (e.g. Castles et al, 1990:23) argue that this motivation was high on the political agenda, even though the reason given out by government was population growth to improve Australia's defensibility against imagined attack from Eastern Asia - especially

the various "Yellow Perils" (Japan, and then Communist China) to Australia's immediate north.

Once thus ensconced in the workforce, language and recognised skills base militated against advancement of these migrants into other areas of employment - often despite qualifications gained in the country of origin. Migrants were in effect structurally herded into employment areas from which it was difficult for them to escape. Unionism within this workforce, oriented as it was to English speakers, especially of Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Celtic heritage, did little to represent these migrants except in enlisting their support in the intra-movement fight against/for Communism (Martin, 1978:157, 186-201).

This structural disadvantaging of post-war migrants to Australia is so well documented (e.g. Atchison, 1993; Birrel & Birrel, 1981; Bottomley & De Lepervanche, 1984; Burnley et al, 1985; Castles et al, 1990; Connell & Irving, 1980; Huber, R., 1977; Jakubowicz, 1984; Jupp, 1984a; Lewins, 1978; Sherington, 1980) that there is no need to document it in more detail here. Jupp alone, for instance, highlights a list of readily identifiable "migrant" issues of social equality outstanding at the inception of multiculturalist policy. These include 'the regulation of immigration, maintenance of non-English

culture, access to education and opportunities for social mobility', acceptance as legitimate members of Australian society, a 'relatively high level of poverty', 'a susceptibility to industrial injury and disease, the need for low-interest mortgages, cheap medical provision and protection against unemployment' (Jupp, 1984c:184).

Sociological Criticism of the Policy

Although Australia has a history of ethnically diverse immigration stretching back to White Settlement in 1788 (see Sherington, 1980; Castles et al, 1990; Atchison, 1993) and beyond, the sociological origins of an Australian policy of multiculturalism dating historically back to the commencement of Calwell's post-war migration programme can be taken as established. What is significant about the post-war period for the purposes of this thesis is that there also seems to be wide agreement that, in Jupp's words, at multiculturalism's inception in Australia all ethnic groups were 'peripheral to the exercise of power and in fact face "closure" on the part of those in control of all politically significant institutions' (Jupp, 1984b:5).

Katherine Betts (1988) goes on to detail, from an intensive media and opinion poll survey, the ideological

lobby of an intellectual elite behind immigration policy which lead to multiculturalism's institution as federal policy. Castles et al (1990:66) support this view, advancing multiculturalism of the 1970s as the result of an elite consensus, not changes in mass belief. Jakubowicz concurs, like Castles et al (1990:60), from a Marxist perspective (Jakubowicz, 1984:27). Castles et al (1990), however, qualify that multiculturalism under the Whitlam Labour Government (1972-1975) was more a formula for action than an ideology. Grassby's "Family of the Nation" speech, they claim, was actually quite vague except in recognition of cultural diversity and rejection of assimilation (Castles et al, 1990:59). It is not until the 1978 *Review of Post-Arrival Programmes and Services to Migrants* (the Galbally Report) adopted by the Fraser Liberal Government under Minister for Immigration John McKellar, that multiculturalism became a prescription as well as a description (Castles et al, 1990:68-69), thus attaining full ideological status (see also Foster, 1988:110).

In the act of thus becoming, Castles et al (1990) argue, multiculturalism is transformed from what began as pragmatic cultural radicalism, a set of policy measures aimed at instituting welfare-based reform for ethnic minorities, to a politically conservative institutionalisation of 'an "ethnicity model" of disadvantage in which questions of social structure were

ignored or mystified' (Castles et al, 1990:70). In other words, 'cultural pluralism' was instituted 'as a dominant ideology' (Castles et al, 1990:70).

Atchison (1993:21) would date this institutionalisation a year earlier, with the recommendation to Federal Government by Professor Jerzy Zubrzycki, Chair of the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council (AEAC) established in 1977, of three guiding principles for a multicultural Australia:

- . social cohesion
- . cultural identity
- . equality of opportunity and access

Point of inception notwithstanding, what is significant about the literature on the subject is that clearly Multiculturalism as government policy is regarded by Australian sociologists and social critics as an ideology that has structural implications for Australian society; an ideology that is indisputably politically motivated. Moreover, at its inception as such, the policy as ideology draws criticism for its distinction between a form of pluralism that is **structural** and a form of pluralism that is **cultural**, opting for the latter. The

problem with this lies in the notion broadly expounded by Jupp:

Most ethnic migrants were originally industrial workers as well as being aliens, and many of their needs could not be met simply by recognising the validity of their culture in a multi-cultural society.

Jupp, 1984:184

This is not just to say, as Castles et al imply above (1990:70), that there are **only** structural needs to be met. Lewins (1978, cited in Jupp, 1984b:5), for instance, unravels a link between social institutions that might be considered 'cultural', such as the Catholic Church, and the Democratic Labour Party, especially in relation to their active discouragement of participation by ethnic groups other than those of Anglo-Celtic (particularly the Celtic) origin. The interrelationship between issues of society that are deemed **structural** and issues of society that are deemed **cultural** requires deeper analysis, especially where matters of power in society, who wields it and how, are concerned.

An examination of why Multiculturalism fails to address the societal disadvantaging of migrants and their children lies, this thesis will argue, in the artificial nature of this division between structural and cultural pluralism; and, indeed, the division between social matters regarded as political and those regarded as

cultural. In order to understand these divisions it is necessary first to define Multiculturalism in theoretical terms: what **is** multiculturalism as an ideology? How does it differ from previous ideologies such as assimilation and integration? What is an ideology? What is pluralism? What is the difference between cultural and structural pluralism? How does it result in an 'ethnicity model' of disadvantage? What is ethnicity? What is structure in its sociological application? How does a Marxist perspective of structure differ from other sociological perspectives of it?

What needs to be accepted as fact at the outset, however, is that Australia is, as the OMA amongst others states (OMA, 1990), a culturally and ethnically diverse society. As Mary Kalantzis and colleagues wrote in 1990:

As well as about 150 extant Aboriginal languages, there are now over 100 immigrant ethnic groups, speaking about 80 different languages. Over 25 percent of the population in 1988 was of non-English speaking background (NESB). Of the two million Australians who reported in the 1986 census that they speak a language other than English at home, 20.6 percent spoke Italian, 13.6 Greek, 6.7 percent a Chinese language, 5.6 percent German and 5.4 percent Arabic; Spanish, the various Yugoslav languages, Polish, Dutch, Vietnamese, Maltese, French, Macedonian, Aboriginal languages, Turkish, Hungarian and Russian each scored between 1 and 5 percent; and a very large population of 14.4 percent were 'other' languages, each with less than 1 percent representation per language.

Kalantzis, M. et al. 1990:1

Castles et al add:

In August 1985, 1.7 million overseas-born persons were employed in Australia. The 622,000 migrant women made up 24 per cent of the total female labour force, while migrant men were 26 per cent of the total male labour force. ... If children of migrants were added, almost half the total labour force would be the result of the post-war migrations. The largest number of foreign-born workers are from the UK and Ireland (615,300), followed by Italy (153,400), New Zealand (111,700), Yugoslavia (83,800), Greece (81,100), Germany (66,000), Netherlands (54,700) and Vietnam (35,700). The vast majority are from Europe (72 per cent) followed by Asia (13.7 per cent).

Castles et al, 1990:25

It must be remembered that these figures do not represent the number of Southern European migrants (in particular) who are self-employed or 'hidden' in small businesses or family businesses. The time gap between the figures quoted above and that of writing has altered the context only inasmuch as the proportion of 'Asian' immigrants has increased significantly (Castles et al, 1990:170; Lawrence, 1991:26), especially from Hong Kong, Taiwan and China.

CHAPTER TWO: MULTICULTURALISM AS THEORY

This Chapter analyses the sociological concept of pluralism, and its historical division into cultural pluralism and structural pluralism, amongst other forms of pluralism. The Chapter reviews this division from the point of view of two schools of sociology in particular - schools it defines as functional structuralism and conflict structuralism. The Chapter also defines common terms of usage such as 'society', 'structure', 'institution' and 'ideology'. The Chapter finds functional structuralism unable to define a working concept of ethnicity capable of sustaining or initiating change, especially of the political nature detailed in Chapter One. It finds that conflict structuralism deploys a concept of ethnicity and ethnic identity capable of sustaining and initiating change, but incapable of defining ethnicity in any terms other than this very capacity.

The concept of ethnicity upon which multicultural theory depends is thus shown to be in need of epistemological substantiation due to sociology's failure to come to terms with its cultural nature. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the need to pursue such substantiation, this being the need for a policy of Multiculturalism in the light of Australia's current move

towards economic and cultural integration with Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Pluralism

To produce any one definition of multiculturalism is no more problematic than to quote the Office of Multicultural Affairs *Year In Review*, as at the beginning of Chapter One. But, as Lois Foster points out, it is the 'multiple competing definitions of multiculturalism' that have marked the passage of the policy through time (Foster, 1988:183) that raise the question of **why** multiculturalism is officially defined as it is.

As suggested in Chapter One, the policy evolved in response to the failure of previous policies of post-arrival migrant settlement, assimilation and integration. Castles describes assimilationism as 'the doctrine that immigrants could be culturally and socially absorbed and rapidly become indistinguishable from the existing Anglo-Australian population' (1992:184-185). The institution of Good Neighbour Councils amongst the host or receiving communities and public propagation of the term 'New Australian' to describe post-war migrants are both examples of government attempts to facilitate this

process (Castles, 1992; Castles et al, 1990; Atchison, 1993).

When it became obvious to government that, despite such efforts, 'labour market segmentation and social segregation' (Castles, 1992:185) were the result, the doctrine of assimilationism was ameliorated to the less demanding integrationism. As Edgar (1980:281) frames it, integration modified the demand of eradication of culturally differentiating characteristics amongst migrants. Instead, it proposed the physical mixing of migrants with Australian-born residents, societally and geographically, without the immediate surrender of their cultural values and traits. As the architect of the policy, Liberal Minister for Immigration Billy Snedden put it, "We ask particularly of migrants that they be substantially Australians in the first generation and completely Australians in the second generation" (quoted in Castles et al, 1990:52).

In so saying, Snedden offered, as his context of reasoning, "Australia has no history of social pluralism", accepting that "it may develop gradually and to a limited extent" but "no nation in history has set out to develop a multi-racial society" (quoted in Castles et al, 1990:52). In introducing the concept of pluralism as a means of understanding the cultural and

ethnic diversity he was by implication addressing, Snedden foreshadowed the conceptual and factual elements that sociologists recognise as differentiating multiculturalism from previous government policies. These same elements, according to sociology, also characterise the theoretical construct upon which multiculturalism is based: pluralism, and the fact of ethnic diversity. The construction of multicultural theory around the concept of pluralism is thus subject to the same epistemological problems that pluralism itself is fraught with, as shall be demonstrated below.

Pluralism, according to Lois Foster, 'refers to the incorporation of different ethnic groups into a society' (Foster, 1988:205). Wilkie (1993) traces its usage in the social sciences, however, to American political science, in which it refers 'to a political system in which various interest groups compete openly in the political arena for support in furthering their interests' (Wilkie, 1993:73). The concept is applied to ethnic groups by Jamaican anthropologist M. G. Smith (cited by Wilkie, 1993:73), who according to Wilkie (1993) uncovered a 1945 analysis of colonial administration in Southeast Asia by J.S. Furnivall referring to European, Chinese and Indian communities co-existing with the native populations - 'a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit' (Furnivall, quoted in Wilkie, 1993:73).

There is immediately a problem with this conception of pluralism, because the ethnic groups referred to are defined in terms of their culture. As Wilkie explains:

Cultures and societies have tended in the literature to be coterminous. There are very many definitions of culture but they can mostly be reduced to considering culture as a way of life of a particular society, thus creating a problem in ... understanding multicultural societies. ... [F]irstly, if society and culture are coterminous then a multicultural society is an oxymoron, but what is more problematic is, secondly, the functionalist assumption that at the centre societies are held together ... because of their shared common values and understandings. This makes Furnivall's observation of *societies* 'where people mix but do not combine ... meeting only in the market place' rather puzzling.

Wilkie, 1993:74

No sooner has the concept of pluralism been applied to the study of ethnically diverse society, then, than does the intrinsic culturality of ethnicity present as problematic. What can it be about a pluralistic **society** that is common and shared if its culture is ethnically fragmented? According to Wilkie (1993), Smith addressed this problem by proposing three **varieties** of pluralism: structural, social and cultural.

Of these, the most extreme in terms of the social differentiation it implied he called **structural pluralism**. Structural pluralism entailed the social and cultural differentiation of cultural or ethnic groups in

all of their social arrangements such that 'their social relations were predominantly within their own group' (Wilkie, 1993:75).

Added to this was the structural position of at least one cultural group being institutionally privileged in relation to the others. ... people were differentially incorporated into the society, having fewer rights according to the structural position of their cultural section.

Wilkie, 1993:75.

Social pluralism described a society in which 'cultural groups followed a relatively separate way of life' such that 'the majority of their social relations and interactions took place within the group, but the groups were not unequal in status' (Wilkie, 1993:75). A federation, such as one finds more recently in Micronesia, Melanesia or Polynesia, is a good example of social pluralism as it was coined by Smith (see Linnekin & Poyer, 1990).

The third form of pluralism outlined by Smith, according to Wilkie (1993) was **cultural pluralism**, in which 'cultural variation was recognised by members' social interrelations extended beyond the cultural group' (Wilkie, 1993:75) and members were incorporated into society and its political organisation as equals, 'not as members of a cultural segment' (Wilkie, 1993:75).

In this situation, the range of cultural difference affected less a person's life. Cultural variation as expressed in family life, religious practice, language and cuisine became a matter of private life, and people participated in a common public arena, were educated in a common school system and worked in the single economy.

Wilkie, 1993:75

This last form of pluralism seems to describe Australian society, especially Australian society under the policy of multiculturalism, very well. In order to understand why Castles et al (1990) and others (Castles, 1992; Foster, 1988; Foster & Stockley, 1984; Jayasuria, 1990; Jayasuriya 1991; Lewins, 1981; Martin, 1978) criticise its institution over an alternative like structural pluralism, and point to the failure of multiculturalism as policy as a result, it is necessary to understand the terms of the debate. This means concepts such as society, institution, politics, status, cultural group and social groupings in general.

Foster defines a **society** as:

... an association of people with a particular goal and who, in pursuit of that goal, devise appropriate organisational arrangements. The society develops a system of recruitment, values and social control measures which must be transmitted from one generation to another. Individual members subordinate their individual and sectional interests to maintain their social world.

Foster, 1988:205

Australia's post-war programme of immigration is an example of a system of recruitment, while its domestic policies of assimilation and multiculturalism can be seen as measures of social control. If Australia were to be characterised as a society with any one overall goal - and this author does not suggest that it is necessarily prudent to reduce the aspirations of all members of a society, in terms of their individual understandings of their membership, to any one particular goal - then perhaps Castles et al (1990) suggest what it might be. Castles et al (1990) label Australia 'the first completely modern nation' (Castles et al, 1990:4), the white colonisation that marks its inception commencing just one year after the constitution of the United States of America in 1778. As such, then, the goal Australians commonly pursue could be said to be nationhood: the state of being a nation, or a nation-state.

American sociologist Talcott Parsons defines a nation-state as 'a politically organized society which has historically enjoyed a legitimate claim to independent existence' (Parsons, 1975:53). The notion of **political** organisation adds an element to Foster's definition of society, for it introduces the concept of **power**. Power 'refers to the degree to which individuals or groups can impose their will on others' (Haralambos, 1985:24), with or without their consent. **Politics** occurs when there are differentials of power (Haralambos,

1985:98); in a society, this would mean that some individuals or groups within it have more of an ability to impose their will than others.

Even without the concepts of politics and power, sociologists do not see the organisation of association into systems referred to by Foster as occurring on an ad hoc, spontaneous and arbitrary basis. It is factually observable in 'stable and recurrent patterns of action and interaction' both 'within specific communities' constituting the society as well as 'within the society at large' (Gamage, 1993:57). Such patterns are known amongst sociologists, and other social scientists, as **structure**.

Over time, certain sets of social relations may become accepted by society 'as legitimate ways of controlling and ordering social action in a particular field' (Edgar, 1980:92)- as, in Foster's terms, systems of organisation and association which are given value and the capacity for social control. Such sets of relations are known by sociologists as **institutions**. An institution 'may be a group or organization of practice which endures and has continuing significance' (Edgar, 1980:92), but some institutions reveal more about the structure of a society than others, in the sense that they have a capacity to control and organise values and social

relations that are more central to the workings of a society's structure than others. Examples of such institutions are government, parliament, the economy, religion, health and welfare, education, law and law enforcement, defence, education, and family, and as a collectivity they are known in sociology as the **institutional structure** (Gamage, 1993:57).

Edgar makes two important points that relate to this institutional structure. Firstly, such institutions are:

... not just the outcome of dispassionate power conflicts , or negotiations, or mere mechanical exchange processes. Our interests determine what is relevant and thus important to us. Our social actions are directed towards satisfying needs and serving interests, and the bonds we share with others who help us meet those ends become highly value-charged.

Edgar, 1980:94

The values thus enshrined in institutional structure are not arbitrarily installed; they are attributed bonding power by those individuals collectively accepting them as legitimate, to the extent that 'people defend rituals, resist change and criticise new norms' (Edgar, 1980:94) on behalf of them and it.

The other important point Edgar makes is that this institutional structure can be seen as:

... a function of the knowledge groups have of the institutional order. Lack of knowledge means lack of power to influence what happens.

Edgar, 1980:96

Clearly, a knowledge of institutional order does not mean merely the mechanical ordering of social relations and values therein. Knowledge also implies understanding the reasoning or thinking behind such ordering; ideas related together in such a way as to give such ordering its sense of acceptability or legitimacy. Sociology calls such an ordering of ideas **ideology**.

Structural Approaches

Bullivant quotes Gould to define ideology as:

..."a pattern of beliefs and concepts both factual and normative which purport to explain complex social phenomena with a view to directing and simplifying socio-political choices facing individuals and groups" ...

Bullivant, 1984:28.

In sociology there are broadly two approaches to the way in which ideology manifests itself in the process of social ordering. As will become clearer in Chapters Three and Four, this thesis finds neither approach particularly useful in merging the concept of ethnic diversity with the notion of a pluralistic society. Nevertheless, they must be understood in order for analysis to proceed.

In the approach of Talcott Parsons and his precursor, Robert Parks (as examined by Banton, 1983:78-86), ideologies are more of a resource pool for ideas and idea-structurings that individuals and groups can draw upon to serve their interests, attain goals and satisfy needs. One paramount interest is that of social integration, and one paramount need individuals seek to satisfy is freedom from disruption to the equilibrium of social integration, the stability and unity of society. Institutional structure represents the process whereby such stability is maintained at the same time as allowing legitimate goals to be pursued.

Mutual interest and reciprocal responsibility, then, are the driving forces of such a society. The society is maintained over time by two forms of transmission. The first of these is the transmission of societal values and norms of behaviour through the prescriptive (normative) power of social institutions. The second is the process by which such values and norms are exposed to the newborn and young through family and education - a process known as **socialisation**. Values and norms in such a society change as individuals and groups reciprocally adjust to change in other individuals and groups. Such change may perhaps be initiated in response to environmental, circumstantial or economic changes

influenced by competition for resources, much as animals and plants adapt in nature under the Darwinian theory of evolution (for a more detailed examination of Parks' ideas, see Banton, 1983:78-86; Haralambos, 1985:526-530; Mills, 1970:31-41).

Politics, in such a society, is viewed as the natural working out of differing interests under the aegis of common interest. Power is vested functionally as an organisational necessity by individual and group assent. Effort is rewarded by the attainment of goals, either in the form of material well being or status gains within institutional hierarchies. Groups, whether characterised by ethnic, cultural, political or some other criterion of membership, are maintained and recognised from within and from the outside by the maintenance of boundaries, which are indicated by social markers such as behaviour, dress, language use and the like (see Barth, 1969).

Such an approach has been called variously **structural-functionalism** (Banton, 1983:84) and **functional structuralism** (Edgar, 1980:43), and within its ambit pluralism is simply 'the coexistence of two or more ethnic, racial or cultural groups within the same national boundaries' (Birrel & Birrel, 1981:168). The degree of 'heterogeneity' Australia can sustain as an

ethnically plural society is cause for concern for functionalist sociologists like Birrel and Birrel, but any conflict is seen as essentially over 'status rewards' and resolvable through 'the equalization of occupational access' and 'the reassessment of cultural values' (Birrel & Birrel, 1981:176). Similarly, the policy of assimilation which preceded multiculturalism can be seen in terms of 'a homogenising process' of 'boundary reduction and re-socialisation' (Gamage, 1993:60).

But if such solutions and processes are so readily apprehensible to functionalist sociologists, why do they fail in practice? Why did the policy of assimilation fail to have its culturally homogenising effect, as documented above? Even if a policy of multiculturalism is seen as a natural evolution of assimilation, in that ethnic groups naturally take their own interests to the political system which naturally adjusts other components of the institutional structure accordingly, why is multiculturalism now seen as failing? Moreover, what is it about the ethnicity of groups that drives them to the political process, as has been overwhelmingly shown above, when they are supposedly groups of a so-called 'cultural' nature in a functionalist society? Why isn't Australian social structure hearing as much from people who want to express their group membership in terms of the aesthetics of making more money, or who want to pursue their life-commitment to computers, or who are in

favour of the expansion of concrete-and-glass towers beyond city CBDs? Even if functionalist sociologists were to argue, as they might after Parsons, that such issues are not as central to the individual's, and therefore the society's, identity as is ethnicity, there is the unexamined question of what **makes** ethnicity more essential to the individual's identity than other social influences?

With its emphasis on socialisation, functionalism might argue that ethnicity is passed on from parent and school to child as being centrally important. But then what is this ethnicity? How is it so trenchantly constituted when, as Gamage and Mahon (1993:127) observe, there is no single Australian identity, let alone any single Ethnic Identity in Australia? As Castles et al argue (1990:10-11, 102-103), there is no historically pure ethnic grouping in the industrialised societies of the "modern" world. So what is "ethnic" in identity that leads to such cogent political organisation about interests that, as has been shown above, are historically structural?

Structural functionalism, or **functional structuralism** as Edgar (1980:43) calls it, seems not to have the answers to such questions - or no answers, at least, which do not entail a detailed examination of

ethnic identity, socialisation and the capacity of both to motivate political action of the scale described above in the emergence of multicultural policy. The second approach to sociology, which Edgar differentiates as **conflict structuralism** (Edgar, 1980:46), does offer an explanation of the importance of structural pluralism. And it does so by placing a different emphasis on ideology and its role in the political organisation of society. It would argue, for instance, that the above examples of alternative cultural interest groups to ethnic groupings have no **need** to present their case to the institutional structure. Their position is already legitimated by that structure as in the same interests as the institutional structure; in line with the dominant ideology, as maintained by the dominant group.

Conflict structuralism can be seen in terms defined above, as differing from functional structuralism in its fundamental view of power and the manifestation of power within society. Conflict structuralism sees conflicting interests within society as far more the driving force than mutual interests. It sees change, rather than equilibrium, as the key to social structure, and sees politics as the medium of mediating the resolution of interest-based conflict, rather than interest-based exchange.

This approach is best exemplified by Marxism, which has influenced most sociological thought of this kind. In examining the historical advent of industrialisation, Marx induced that it was very much a product of history. As understood from Worsley (1982), the rise of the capitalists from the merchant class and bourgeoisie of the Middle Ages and Renaissance went hand in hand with the introduction of technology that made mass production possible, and with the availability of former serfs and artisans prepared to surrender control over their means of production in return for a wage; they sold their labour. The profit made by capitalist-industrialists from the sale of commodities thus produced, however, came to more than the sum of materials and cost of labour. The difference, called surplus value by Marx (Worsley, 1982:44), and its consequent distribution to capitalists, rather than to the workers whose labour produced it, resulted in a strong material division between those who controlled the means of production, the capitalist-industrialists, and those who did the producing - the workers.

This differentiation in not only material well-being but also in the capacity to control its production led to a differential distribution of what we have defined above as power which led to an antagonism between those tied to their labour and those exploiting labour (Worsley, 1982:44). This antagonism formed the basis of

an entrenched conflict between two classes within the same society - the workers and employer-capitalists, the exploited and their exploiters. And the fate of the working class was in the hands not of God or history but economics, and economics was in the hands of the capitalist class (Worsley, 1982:50).

According to Worsley (1982), the Marxist view of true class consciousness thus seems to be an awareness by the working class of the actual nature of its condition. It is what results in the mobilisation of the working class in struggle against the unequal power distribution to which they are subject. A class, as understood in Marxist terms, can thus be seen as active, rather than passive - the working class engage in the struggle to obtain their share of power and profits; the ruling (capitalist) class, to maintain their position of dominance.

The ideology which pervaded society at that time, that of the ruling class, perpetuated the "rightness" of capitalist dominance by presenting its ideas as common to all (Donald and Hall, 1986:14), and was thus seen by Marx as "false consciousness" (Donald and Hall, 1986:14). This evaluation of ideology was modified by Gramsci in the 1920s. Gramsci analysed the manner in which power was maintained institutionally by the ruling class through

the manipulation of ideology, and developed the political concept of **hegemony** to explain why true class consciousness does not naturally emerge due to the pervasive nature of ruling class ideology (see Milner, 1991:56-59; Connell & Irving, 1980:22).

... hegemony can be seen as a situation where the subordinate class lives its daily life in forms created by, or consistent with the interests of, the dominant class, and through its daily life acquires beliefs, motives and ways of thinking that serve to perpetuate class structure.

Connell & Irving, 1980:22.

This concept of hegemonic dominance becomes important for sociologists attempting to come to terms with class mobilisation on the basis of ethnicity, especially when incorporated into another modification to Marxist theory made by Max Weber. Weber, as summarised by some writers (see Edgar, 1980; Milner, 1991; Brand, 1987; Parkin, 1982), stresses the importance of status groups in society as a major influence on social action which worked across class interests. Status groups are best exemplified by bureaucracies, especially when attempting to understand the institutional nature of society.

By placing its emphasis on the rational ordering of policy handed down by the ruling classes, bureaucracy seeks to effect an equal distribution and impartial

administration of policy through rigorous internal rules and procedures. Motivation in such structuring is not by apportionment of material well-being or by control of means of production but by status: the merit obtained within hierarchic institutional bureaucracies by dint of length of impartial, dutiful service. It is easy to see how hegemonic dominance and Weberian bureaucracy combine: the hegemony can virtually ensure its dominance if it can depend upon a status-motivated, impartial bureaucracy to not only hand-down but maintain its ideological imperatives.

Rex (1986; 1982; Rex & Tomlinson, 1979) thus comprehensively documents Marxist sociology's application of hegemonic theory to colonial pluralism. Colonial administrators from imperialist countries like Britain, France, Holland and Portugal were able to co-opt labour in colonial outposts, throughout Southeast Asia for instance, not only from native groups but also from labour imported by capitalist merchants and industrialists under colonialist protection. Enrolled into the capitalist exchange of labour for the means to sustain material well-being (through the purchase - or in the colonial case, simply supply of commodities), natives and migrants brought in as a labour supply were automatically brought into a situation of ideological subordination and then of social class formation (or **stratification**, as it is known amongst sociologists).

Skillful manipulation of the differential class formation of immigrant and natives often set ethnic groups under colonial domination in class opposition to each other, especially as colonial administrations came to an end and post-colonial nationhood was sought by those left behind. In Southeast Asia the Chinese historically provide a good example of an imported labour or migrant merchant grouping who formed the new middle class buffer between subordinated native groupings and their colonial exploiters, and who then became the target of class opposition during post-colonial transition (see Chen, 1976; Esman, 1975; Ibrahim, 1989; Nagata, 1982; Rin, 1974; Wang, 1981).

It is in such colonial administrations that Marxist sociology finds the plural societies defined by Furnival and Smith above. As such, then, the difference between cultural pluralism and structural pluralism as defined above is, in Marxist terms, a difference of equality. A colonial administration that propagates a condition of cultural pluralism perpetuates class differences in the process, permitting the exploitation of native and imported labour for the profit of the ruling capitalist class. In Marxist terms, structural pluralism is preferable because it enables the exploited class to approach relations with the ruling class in terms of social equality rather than simply cultural survival, especially in the transition from colony to post-colonial

nationhood such as Rex (1986; 1982; Rex & Tomlinson, 1979) and others (Cushman & Wang, 1988; David & Kadirgamar, 1989; Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Keyes, 1982; Linnekin & Poyer, 1990; Wang, 1991) document for Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

As Rex (1982) points out, in the absence of the coercive force that usually legitimates hegemonic domination within a society - the military strength that these colonial nations could command back home - the ideological aspect of colonial domination was all the more important (Rex, 1982:218). It is easy to see how essential ideological hegemony is to the management of pluralism in Rex's second area of analysis, that of industrialised nations sustaining labour-demand-based immigration such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and much of Northern Europe. For such countries usually subscribe their sense of nationhood to an ideology of democracy - an ideology which has as one its central tenets the principle of equality (Jayasuriya, 1991:83); and that means equality for all, rather than a few, or for one class and not another.

In analysing such societies, class analysis becomes modified to dominant group-minority group analysis (Gamage, 1993:67) because ethnic groups resulting from labour-based migration, such as has been documented for

Australia above, do not form ethnic *classes* as such. They fall into existing class structures which, as sociologists like Castles et al (1990), Jupp (1984a) and Jayasuriya (1991; 1992) show, places them structurally in situations of group inequality because of the dual conditions of 'labour market segmentation and social segregation' outlined in Chapter One above. At the same time, they also form their own internal class structures as groups, with emerging middle classes from whom it is easy for the ruling class of the host community - in Australia's case, the government - to co-opt middle class 'leaders'. Ideological hegemony in such circumstances is modified to become 'the ideological legitimization or justification of the differential power relationships between majority and minority groups' (Bullivant, 1984:47), and can be distinguished (not necessarily exclusively) from socio-economic hegemony, in which the majority group exercise 'actual control ... over the minority group's ... access to an equitable share of socio-economic rewards and resources, possibilities to realise their potential for self-actualisation and satisfaction' (Bullivant, 1984:47).

Structural Approaches and the Australian Analysis

A nation like Australia, by adopting a policy of cultural pluralism such as multiculturalism currently is,

can thus also seem to be offering structural pluralism by co-opting such ethnic leaders into government process, and processes of economic production at management level and so forth - the very approach taken by the Fraser Government which implemented multicultural policy at an ideological level (see Atchison, 1993; Castles et al, 1990; Foster & Stockley, 1984; Jupp, 1984a; Jupp, 1984b). Under the cloak of an ideological hegemony, then, the government get away with enacting socio-economic hegemony.

This practice under the Fraser Government was so transparent that even conservative sociologists like Birrell and Birrell (1981) criticised the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, for instance, as an 'immigration lobby' (Birrell & Birrell, 1981:231), its enhanced role under the Galbally Report of 1978 giving it funding influence over education and the subsidisation of ethnic organisations.

Castles et al (1990) and Foster (1988) argue structural inequalities experienced by ethnic groups in Australia such as differential access to employment, to dominant group (or **mainstream**) political processes and educational opportunities still persist despite two decades of multicultural policy and the affirmative results (in part) of multicultural policy such as the

Equal Employment Opportunities (Commonwealth Authorities) Act 1987. The Hawke Labour Government (1983-1991), for instance, actually attempted in 1986 to scale down structural commitments to multiculturalism such as English as a Second Language (ESL) programs, the Adult Migrant Education Programme, the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs (the Government agency of ethnic class co-option), National Professional Development programmes and the Special Broadcasting Service (created especially to represent ethnic media interests other than those of the dominant Anglo-Celtic Australian ethnic group) (Castles et al, 1990:75).

A concerted turnaround by the Hawke Government followed with the launching of a National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia in 1989 (Castles et al, 1990:180). This addressed amongst other things overseas skills recognition, ESL programs and access and equity issues at the institutional structure level. Castles et al (1990:159-163), however, argue cogently that the global internationalisation of capital and therefore capitalist economies places Australia in a position that will perpetuate existing structural inequities in the labour market and standards of living rather than improve them, perpetuating the structural inequalities experiences by ethnic groupings in the process.

Clearly, the bottom line for the Marxist analysis of ethnic pluralism is that, in a country that espouses democratic principles, a policy that perpetuates any form of institutionalised structural inequality is anathema; and multiculturalism, serving as it does the hegemonic interests of government through the OMA, seems very much such a policy as it currently stands. In a country like Australia, which so prides itself historically on principles of equality and egalitarianism (Castles, 1992:195; Horne, 1968; Thompson, 1994), the structural hypocrisy is all the more pertinent.

Jayasuriya's solution to this anachronism is to theorise a third form of pluralism which, in terms of our definitions above, replaces Smith's social pluralism. **Democratic pluralism** (Jayasuriya, 1990; Bullivant, 1984:100) recognises ethnic diversity as does cultural pluralism, but also actively 'facilitates democratic participation in a pluralistic political community' (Jayasuriya, 1990:50). Such a pluralism redresses what Jayasuriya, amongst others, sees as the 'hidden assumption' of multiculturalism as policy that in the end, ethnic groups 'will disappear through a process of assimilation, absorption or incorporation' (Jayasuriya, 1990:54) anyway, so no structural accommodation is necessary. Jayasuriya differentiates between the **expressive** and **instrumental** dimensions of ethnicity, assigning cultural pluralism to the former and stating

that democratic pluralism marks a move towards the latter. 'It serves the *public* (life chances) rather than the *private* (life styles) interests of settlers', writes Jayasuriya (1990:57), 'and offers a blueprint for ethnic relations and ethnic affairs policy' which emphasises 'the *rights* which accrue with citizenship in a democratic society' (Jayasuriya, 1990:59) rather than the *duties* and *obligations* of citizenship.

Jayasuria's democratic pluralism can thus be seen as a 'Rights' model of multiculturalism (Jaysuriya, 1990:60), as opposed to the "ethnicity model" of disadvantage (Castles et al, 1990:70) based on 'identity politics' (Jaysuriya, 1990:50) that currently constitutes Australian multiculturalism. It clearly differs from structural pluralism as defined by Wilkie above in that the national unity consonant with our definition of a society is maintained; there are no separate societies within societies, each with its own institutional structure.

The problem with democratic pluralism, and with the conflict structuralist approach to ethnic diversity in industrial democracies like Australia, can be found in Jayasuriya's differentiation of expressive and instrumental dimensions to ethnicity. As Jayasuriya himself observes, the 'concept of ethnicity' is 'a

critical element' (Jayasuriya, 1990:52) of multiculturalism as theory, policy and practice. But in order to emphasise the instrumental aspects of ethnicity, Jayasuriya finds it necessary to devalue the expressive dimension - 'the subjective or affective aspects of ethnic group membership' which highlight 'the need, actual or symbolic, for group continuity and belonging on the part of its members' (Jayasuriya, 1990:52). Ethnic identity, in his conception, should be 'viewed as a negotiated outcome in specific sociocultural conditions' (Jayasuriya, 1991:94) which takes account of 'conflict and hegemonic control' (Jayasuriya, 1991:95), and allows social and ethnic identities to co-exist under the ambit of an overarching national identity within the individual (Jayasuriya, 1991:95).

In such an understanding of ethnicity, however, ethnic identity is either 'externally perceived or internally defined', but not necessarily the 'rigid primordialist conception' (Jayasuriya, 1991:95) of group belonging, continuity and affective bonding - the very bonding Edgar defined above as integral to the value-laden nature of membership commitment to institutions (Edgar, 1980:94); institutions of which multiculturalism, as we have seen argued above for Australian society, is one.

If ethnic collective bonding in a multicultural Australia is not the motivating force behind ethnic identity, then what is? Jayasuriya claims ethnicity is more 'a resource which can be mobilised for political advantage' (Jayasuriya, 1991:93). Yet, as Castles (1992:199) implies, political mobilisation based on ethnic identity has yet to emerge in Australia, and will not do so until the 'cultural identity' centre to the current multiculturalist agenda fails to gain acceptance.

As Stephen Fitzgerald and the Committee to Advise on Australian Immigration Policies found in 1988, multiculturalism has already failed to gain broad acceptance within Australian society (CAAIP, 1988:xii, xiii, 3, 9, 58-59). Castles (1992:200) adduces submissions to the 1989-90 National Inquiry into Racist Violence of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission reveals continuing harassment of southern European and Asian immigrants, while the much publicised 'Blainey Debate' and 'One Australia' debates on Asian immigration in 1984 and 1988 respectively revealed, according to Castles (1992:200), a strong working class antipathy to multiculturalism. The conditions should thus have been right for an ethnic mobilisation of a Marxist, class action nature theorised by Castles for some time.

Castles goes on to argue that a 'mainstreaming' approach like Jayasuriya's democratic pluralism remains intergrationist in essence (Castles, 1992:194-196). Castles et al (1990) claim that as an integrationist ideology multiculturalism 'does not question the need to define the nation and to draw boundaries of inclusion and exclusion' (Castles et al, 1990:13). We need to join the transnational community of the world, they claim. They offer the globalisation of capital, and the displacement of national governments in the process, to support their position.

For Castles et al also, then, the cultural component of ethnicity is almost irrelevant to the main, structural game. 'Shared heritage and culture', they argue, is 'not for Australia a viable ideology of the nation' (Castles et al , 1990:144). Ethnic identity is almost a temporary aberration (or instrument) in the ongoing structural process of class/group struggle.

Although it thus provides a theory capable of accounting for the active and political and dynamic nature of ethnicity and ethnic identity in Australia as demonstrated above, where functional structuralism does not, conflict structuralism in fact does away with ethnic identity in the process. For conflict structuralism, ethnic identity becomes nothing but a temporary medium

for political mobilisation which, it seems, disappears into a an ideological and socio-economic hegemonic homogenisation of a global economic culture. It is a temporary construction. Conflict structuralism, then, as a theoretical approach to multiculturalism, simply does away with itself, and the need for multiculturalism in the process, by theorising out of existence the basis of its analysis: ethnic identity.

To return to a more rigorous Marxist class analysis for a moment, Connell & Irving remind us that hegemony occurs when those in power through conscious policy or institutional arrangements 'resist the process of class formation' and 'especially resist the formation of class consciousness' (Connell & Irving, 1980:23). As Milner (1991:57) points out, following British culturalist Marxist Raymond Williams, hegemony is as such is as much a **culture** as it is the political experience of class domination/subordination.

Similarly, definitions of ethnic identity within the Marxist ambit seem to depend upon the cultural nature of ethnic identity. It does seem to require a capacity to motivate individuals with a cogency beyond ideology that enables them to take on or develop ideology for their own purposes - in the way, for instance, shown above that ethnic groups motivated the ideological response of

multiculturalism from the dominant group in Australia. Jayasuriya, for instance, quotes Jean Martin to acknowledge that without ethnic groups there is no ethnic culture (Jayasuriya, 1991:96) i.e. ethnicity. A sense of ethnic identity is the starting point for their group formation at least as much as the political interests they then go on to pursue. Rex (1986) may attempt to avoid conceptual dependence on ethnic identity by defining ethnicity and ethnic interests in terms of ethnic groups, and group theory as outlined above under the ambit of functionalist analysis. In the end, however, he accepts that ethnic differentiation is more on the cultural basis of behaviour than on that of physical difference, and that ethnicity 'has its own dynamic independently of other elements in the political process' (Rex, 1986:27) - that dynamic Jayasuriya has referred to above as 'primordial'.

And where Marxist analysis fails to account for the integral role of ethnic identity as a cultural, rather than a structural, phenomenon, it is because it avoids defining ethnic identity altogether. Castles et al (1990), for instance, acknowledge a psycho-social and symbolic aspect to ethnicity, but basically their position (Castles et al, 1990:126-128) is that ethnic identity, and culture in general, are merely instruments of ideology in the dynamic of social structuring. They devote an entire chapter to the construction of ethnicity

in Australia between 1972 and 1978 without defining it once, except in relation to ethnic interests, group solidarity and group mobilisation.

Multiculturalism - Do We Need It?

There is, then, what might be called a *problem of knowledge* with multicultural theory as it has been analysed above. This is due to the way in which the two schools of thought examined - functionalist structuralism and conflict structuralism - both theorise ethnic pluralism as the conceptual substance of multiculturalism, and divide that pluralism into two main types, structural pluralism and cultural pluralism.

Functionalist structuralism opts for cultural pluralism as the stuff of ethnic analysis, and in doing so - as the examination of cultural pluralism's effectiveness in Australian politics above shows - fails to account for ethnic political response to structural inequities. Indeed, it fails to account for the emergence of structural inequities at all. In fact, it fails to account for the reality of ethnic change, and only loosely theorises the method of ethnic transmission from generation to generation - socialisation. As such, it

does not explain ethnic diversity, ethnic mobilisation or ethnic identity adequately.

Conflict structuralism, as typified by Marxist analysis, by opting for structural pluralism as its main conceptual instrument for understanding ethnicity, does account for ethnic mobilisation and ethnic change, particularly by theorising ideology as a major feature of ethnic identity. But ideology for conflict structuralism remains a phenomenon within the structural domain. As such, ethnicity and ethnic identity are instruments of it. Conflict structuralism is forced to acknowledge the relevance of the cultural aspect of ethnicity and ethnic identity - the symbolic solidarity and sense of belongingness or primordiality referred to above - but fails to resolve the bifurcation between these aspects and structural concerns. In short, conflict structuralism fails to theorise ethnicity and ethnic identity outside the political context of ethnic mobilisation. It also fails to theorise the transmission of ethnicity from generation to generation beyond the loose terms already established by functional structuralism - socialisation.

As outlined above, then, multicultural theory fails to adequately examine the object of its theorising - ethnicity and ethnic identity. Instead, it seems to conceptually bat the object to and fro between two

opposing methods of understanding pluralism, the cultural and the structural. What is needed, then, for the purposes of this thesis, is an adequate theoretical approach to ethnicity and ethnic identity which can account both for the cultural nature of ethnicity and its capacity for transmission. A theory that could also account for ethnic identity's capacity for change outside the context of political mobilisation might also prove useful.

It might be questioned: do we need a theory of multiculturalism at all? In New South Wales, the Ethnic Affairs Commission has, after all, already replaced the term with "cultural diversity" because of the political difficulties in multiculturalism's public perception (Stepan Kerkyaskarian, Chair, Ethnic Affairs Commission of NSW on *Lateline*, ABC, August 1994). To which it might equally be answered that surely one of the reasons why multiculturalism has, as demonstrated above, failed to gain public acceptance in Australia as a policy might be that it actually doesn't make sense: no sociological theory of what multiculturalism actually **is** seems to be forthcoming. An immediate interpretation of why many are not in favour of multiculturalism, then, is that they can't understand it; it's logic does not sustain it.

The policy, however, is perhaps more important to Australia's future than seems to be currently understood.

As Castles says:

Multiculturalism is likely to be a central element of Australian public policy for the foreseeable future, but it has yet to reach a stable and coherent form. ... Considerable work is still needed before multiculturalism can provide a satisfactory framework for social policy and for national identity in a period when Australia needs both to reshape its internal economic and social structures and to re-orient its international relations.

Castles, 1992:201.

Castles' collocation of Australia's internal, domestic policy on multiculturalism and its international relations cannot be understated. In 1988, the Fitzgerald Report called for two clear responses from government: a sharper economic focus for a mainstreamed immigration policy and programme (CAAIP, 1988:8, 13-15), and the enunciation of a public rationale that resolves a severe dissonance in the public mind between immigration and the national interest (CAAIP, 1988:xi) - a dissonance often confused with the policy of multiculturalism. Fitzgerald pays considerable attention to the Immigration ('Blainey') Debate of the period, both in parliament and in the media, w.r.t. intake from Asia (CAAIP, 1988: 6,7,8,15,27,30,34), and links the failure of multiculturalism as a public policy to public opposition to immigration from Asia (CAAIP, 1988:6,7,18,27; Goot 1988: 2,5,6,11,29) and immigration in general (CAAIP, 1988: 24,66).

Katharine Betts (1988) substantiates the Fitzgerald findings with an extensive review of surveys and opinion polls from 1948 to 1988 (Betts, 1988:66-82). Opposition to immigration has increased steadily from the Hammond surveys of 1948 to 1988, and opposition to Asian immigration in particular from 1971. In an Age Poll of this year, the highest proportional opposition to any one race was against admitting Chinese migrants (41%). The nearest unwelcome race was Negroes (34%) followed by the Japanese (25%) (Betts, 1988:71).

Yet the Fitzgerald Report specifically names Asian trade as one of the major features of the long term international economic environment in which Australia's domestic economy will operate (CAAIP, 1988:27), clearly demonstrating Australia's almost complete inversion of its Europe-Asia trade dependence. Trade with Europe dropped from 70% in 1946 to around 20% in 1981, while exports to Asia grew from 20% and less in the late 1940s to 60% in 1981 (CAAIP, 1988:84).

Castles et al (1990:168) point to the A\$1018 million export earnings in funds transfer at the time of visa issue under the Business Migration Scheme in 1987-88. This author (Lawrance, 1991) reported in 1991 that Business Migration from Hong Kong alone accounted for 30% of Australia's business migrant intake for 1990 and 14%

of its total global immigration. Trade between Hong Kong and Australia in 1989 was worth A\$3.3 billion and business migrants accounted for about half of that (AUSTRADE, January 1991). In the 1990/91 financial year Business Migrants through Hong Kong were worth a minimum A\$1.5 billion (Lawrance, 1992) - immigration and banking authorities estimate the figure to be much higher in reality (Lawrance, 1991). And while the replacement of the Business Migration Programme with the Business Skills Migration Scheme in 1992, and the removal of minimum capital transfer requirements, may seem like a retreat from the sharper economic focus called for by Fitzgerald (it certainly caused a temporary reduction in Hong Kong applicants - see Lawrance, 1992), in fact Australian Consulate spokespeople interviewed by this author in Hong Kong (Lawrance, 1992) explained that the mandatory establishment of a business required for successful application under the new scheme will have the same effect in terms of both capital transfer and trade links.

In 1989, then Prime Minister Bob Hawke proposed the formation of a Pacific Nations Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, based on the Pacific Economic Co-operative Conference of 1985 vintage (Viviani, 1990; Castles et al, 1990). November of that year saw the result, the first Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting - an ongoing standing conference that has been driven by the Australian Government ever since.

At a press conference in Hong Kong held by the first full Joint-Parliamentary Delegation ever to visit that colony, both Labour Member of Parliament Alan Morris and National Party M.P., the Hon. Ian Sinclair acknowledged that the trade links with Hong Kong established through business migration were as important as the skills and capital transfer to Australia. The relationship between developing trade links with Asia and business migration was publicly acknowledged as early as 1987 by the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (see Foster, 1988:100).

With economic trade blocs forming in the European Community and the Americas, Australian government is not only acknowledging the importance of economic integration with Asia but, subsequent to the handing down of the Garnaud Report on *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy* (Castles et al, 1990:173), actively pursuing it (e.g. see Greg Sheridan, *Weekend Australian* April 9-10, 1994:19; Viviani, 1990). On 15 November 1994 at Bogor in Indonesia a meeting of APEC leaders announced an historic trade agreement to create a free trade bloc across the Pacific by the year 2020 - an agreement Prime Minister Paul Keating hailed as a triumph for Australia, worth financially more than double the General Agreement on Terms of Trade (GATT) in the long term (*The Australian*, 16/11/94). But the perception of Australia as a racist, anti-Asian country, documented by this author

not only in Australia and Hong Kong but as far afield as Canada (Lawrance, 1991; Lawrance, 1993b). is a little-researched but nevertheless potent impediment to that integration.

In 1991, for instance, Australian Consul General, Geoff Bentley, told an Australia Day luncheon at the Australian Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong that Australia has "produced a generally tolerant, pluralistic society" in which "lethal animosities in other places have been cooled down" (Australian Consulate Press Release, 1991); that eight of Australia's ten largest markets are in Asia and the Pacific Rim; that, with both Hong Kong and Australia enjoying around 60% of their trade in this region, it is Hong Kong that is "still going to have to decide whether it is going to throw in its lot with Asia" because Australia is already "the odd one in" (Australian Consulate Press Release, Hong Kong, 1991). At the same time, on the other side of the globe, Hong Kong Chairman of Prudential Asia Investment, Dr Victor Fung, was preparing to inform the 1991 World Economic Summit in Switzerland that Australia is regarded in Asia as maintaining a White Australia Policy, a 1% Asian immigration rate, and a reluctance to commit itself to Asian economic integration (*South China Morning Post*, 4.2.91). And it's Fung who makes it into the Hong Kong print media.

Australia needs multiculturalism, then, because it's domestic policy on ethnic diversity is well understood throughout Southeast Asia, but far from accurately or consistently. Just as Australia's immigration policy is linked, in the mind of Australians, to its ethnic diversity management policy (multiculturalism), so is the same link made in the minds of members of Southeast Asian nations. But, more importantly, if Australia is to break the Southeast Asian view of Australia as a racist, anti-Asian nation, then Australia needs to develop a domestic policy of multiculturalism capable of communicating a coherent, logical position on ethnic diversity not only to members of Australian society but to members of the Southeast Asian societies with whom we seek economic integration.

Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating acknowledges as much himself when he calls for an Australian culture that, by the turn of the century, is shaped by and shapes the cultures of its near neighbours (26/10/94, reported on *Lateline*, ABC, 7/11/94). Author of the CAAIP report and now Chair of the Asia-Australia Institute, Stephen Fitzgerald and former Professor of Sociology at the ANU, now Vice Chancellor of the Hong Kong University, Wang Gungwu, both agree that Keating is signalling a recognition at government level that economic exchange

with Southeast Asia will also entail cultural exchange, and that this cultural exchange will require a meeting of potentially conflicting values (*Lateline*, ABC, 7/11/94).

A domestic policy of multiculturalism can be seen as of interest to all of the Southeast Asian nations with which Australia seeks such integration, moreover, because they are also in the process of dealing with their own pluralist conditions of ethnic diversity as post-colonial nations (David & Kadirgamar, 1989; Chen, 1976; Esman, 1975; Ibrahim, 1989; Linnekin & Poyer, 1990; Nagata, 1982; Rin, 1974; Wang, 1981).

To this end this thesis will seek, in subsequent chapters, a coherent and cohesive theory of multiculturalism which can accommodate a concept of ethnic identity and ethnicity that sustains analysis, that is capable of sustaining change, and capable of cultural transmission.