

**An Islamic Conception of Conflict Transformation for the  
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan-Through An  
Examination of the Historical Discourses of West-Islam Relations  
and the Framework of Peace Pathways**

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## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my aunt Ms. Khurshid Aziz and my father Mr. Mahabat Khan Orakzai who taught me the value of education at a time when education for women was not so acceptable in the Pakhtun society. It is also dedicated to my mother Mrs. Raana Bano who has prayed for my success and supported me in all my endeavours.

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## PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM THIS THESIS

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## ABSTRACT


A fundamental problem in the analysis of the 'war on terror' is a general predisposition in the West towards reflecting on violence as cause and violence as solution. In other words, a militant version of political Islam is treated as the problem, and a war to eliminate it is viewed as the appropriate response. My approach, which suggests a different way, breaks down the problem into two parts. Firstly, I investigate the history of West-Islam relations in order to gauge the impact of Western discourses on the development of political Islam and its causal impact on the 'war on terror'. Secondly, I extend this approach to examine the conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan for an indepth analysis of the intractable and protracted nature of this conflict in that setting and a new way to deal with it.

The thesis argues that the construction of 'otherness' in the Christian-Western discourses played a critical part in the defining of Muslim identity, and resulted in a dehumanising and demonising tradition of viewing Muslims down the ages and reacting to them. It further argues that Muslim responses to these discourses produced movements and organisations whose worldviews were influenced by the West itself. The emergence of reformists, revivalists, fundamentalists, Islamists, radicals, extremists and Jihadists all, in varying degrees, took note not only of the long history of encounter between the West and Islam but also the way that those encounters were framed.

Cultivating a new approach, this study develops an Islamic concept of conflict transformation to break the pattern of these responses. This provides the basis for changing the imagery of Muslims at the global level and encouraging a transformation of Muslim societies at the grassroots level. In this thesis, a framework for transformation and 'peace pathways' is posited for FATA based on local religious-cultural resources. The study concludes that attempts at social change which foster the cycle of violence through wars and militancy do not contribute towards peace in the world. What is required is an approach that has the potentiality to transform the conflict and to offer a realistic prospect of peace. Discovering such an approach is the leitmotif of this study.

I certify that the substance of this thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not currently being submitted for any other degree or qualification.

I certify that any help received in preparing this thesis and all sources used have been acknowledged in this thesis.



.....

**Saira Bano Orakzai**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>AfPak</b>	Afghanistan, Pakistan Policy of USA
<b>AH</b>	After Hijra
<b>ANP</b>	Awami National Party
<b>CAMP</b>	Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>ETIM</b>	Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement
<b>FATA</b>	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
<b>FCR</b>	Federal Crimes Regulations
<b>GWOT</b>	Global War on Terror
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IMU</b>	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
<b>ISI</b>	Inter Services Intelligence
<b>JuD</b>	Jam'at ud Da'awah
<b>Ji</b>	Jama'at-i- Islami
<b>JUI</b>	Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam
<b>JEM</b>	Jaish-e-Muhammad
<b>KPK</b>	Khyber Pakhtunkhawa
<b>LeI</b>	Lashkar-e-Islami
<b>LeK</b>	Lashkar-e-Khorasan
<b>NWFP</b>	North West Frontier Province
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<b>OIC</b>	Organisation of Islamic Conference
<b>PPP</b>	Pakistan People's Party
<b>SAFRON</b>	States and Frontier Regions
<b>SDP</b>	Sustainable Development Plan
<b>TJ</b>	Tablighi Jama'at
<b>TNSM</b>	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e Shariat-e-Muhammadi
<b>TTP</b>	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
<b>U.S.A</b>	United States of America
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNOCAL</b>	Union Oil Company of California

## ARABIC GLOSSARY

<b>Adl</b>	Justice
<b>Afu</b>	Forgiveness
<b>Amir ul Momineen</b>	Leader or Ruler of Believers
<b>Ammana</b>	Trust
<b>Assalam-u-Alakum</b>	May Peace Be on You
<b>Ayah</b>	Verse
<b>Badalna</b>	Change
<b>Bara</b>	Otherness
<b>Dar ul Islam</b>	House of Islam
<b>Dar-el Sulh-</b>	House of Peace
<b>Dar-ul-Harb</b>	House of War
<b>Dawah</b>	Propagation
<b>Dawla</b>	State
<b>Dhimmi</b>	Protected Status given to the People of Book (Christians and Jews) in an Islamic State under Islamic law
<b>Din</b>	Way or Code of Life
<b>Fard-e-Ain</b>	Individual Responsibility
<b>Fard-e-Kafaya</b>	Collective Responsibility
<b>Fasad</b>	Discord
<b>Fateh</b>	Opening, Victory
<b>Fatwa</b>	Religious Edict
<b>Fiqh</b>	Jurisprudence
<b>Fitna</b>	Mischief
<b>Fitrah</b>	Human Nature
<b>Fuqaha</b>	Jurists
<b>Ghazwa</b>	Raids
<b>Hadith</b>	Sayings or Act ascribed to Prophet Muhammad
<b>Hajj</b>	Annual Pilgrimage
<b>Haq</b>	Right
<b>Harb</b>	War
<b>Hijab</b>	Veil
<b>Hijrat</b>	Migration
<b>Hilm</b>	Mild, Gentle
<b>Hirabah</b>	War or Fighting Between Two Parties
<b>Husn</b>	Good/ Beautiful
<b>Ibtilla</b>	Test
<b>Ihsan</b>	Doing Good and Being Fair
<b>Ijma</b>	Consensus of Opinion of Jurists



<b>Ijtihad</b>	Independent Reasoning
<b>Ikhtalaaf</b>	Difference of Opinion
<b>Iman</b>	Belief
<b>Imran</b>	Civilization
<b>Irhab or Irahabi</b>	Terrorism or Terrorist
<b>Irjaf</b>	Subversion or Scaremongering
<b>Islam</b>	Submission
<b>Istikhlaaf</b>	Vicegerent
<b>Istaqama</b>	Perseverance
<b>Istishhad</b>	Giving Evidence As An Eye Witness
<b>Istislah</b>	Public Interest
<b>Jahiliyya</b>	Ignorance
<b>Jaza</b>	Reward
<b>Jihad</b>	Strive or Struggle
<b>Jizya</b>	Religious Tax on Non- Muslims in an Islamic State
<b>Khalifah</b>	Caliph
<b>Kharijites</b>	Rebel Group in the Early Muslim History
<b>Khayr</b>	Good
<b>Khisam</b>	Argument
<b>Kufar</b>	Rejection, Unbelief
<b>Latif</b>	Kindness
<b>Lisan</b>	Tongue
<b>Ma'aruf</b>	Doing Good
<b>Madrassah</b>	Religious Seminaries
<b>Meezan</b>	Balance
<b>Misaaq</b>	Covenant
<b>Mohsin</b>	Doer of Good
<b>Muharib</b>	Combatant or Fighter
<b>Muharjareen</b>	Those Who Migrate in the Cause of Allah
<b>Mujahedeen</b>	Those who Strive in the Cause of Allah
<b>Mumin</b>	Believer
<b>Muminun</b>	Plural of Mumin
<b>Munkar</b>	Forbidding Evil
<b>Musalaha</b>	Common Good or Public Interest
<b>Muslim</b>	Who Submit
<b>Muslimun</b>	Plural of Muslim
<b>Nafs-al Mutmainna</b>	Soul at Peace
<b>Naskh</b>	Abrogation
<b>Qalm</b>	Pen
<b>Qatl</b>	Killing
<b>Qaul</b>	Word, Speech.

<b>Qist</b>	Equity
<b>Qital</b>	Fighting
<b>Qubah</b>	Bad
<b>Qulub</b>	Plural of Qalb or Heart
<b>Qur'an</b>	Holy book of Muslims
<b>Rajafa</b>	To Quake or Tremble
<b>Rehma</b>	Mercy
<b>Sabeel</b>	Road
<b>Sabr</b>	Patience
<b>Saif</b>	Sword
<b>Sakeena</b>	Tranquility
<b>Salaam</b>	Peace/Submission
<b>Sara</b>	To Become
<b>Salah</b>	Prayers
<b>Sawm</b>	Fast
<b>Sayrura</b>	Becoming or Transformation
<b>Shahada</b>	Witness to Oneness of God
<b>Shaheed</b>	Witness
<b>Shariah</b>	Islamic law
<b>Sharr</b>	Evil
<b>Shiqaaq</b>	Tearing Apart
<b>Silm</b>	Peace
<b>Sirah</b>	Life of Prophet Muhammad
<b>Subal</b>	Plural of Sabeel: Road or Way
<b>Sulh</b>	Reconciling
<b>Ta'aruf</b>	Knowing
<b>Tadafu</b>	To Check Mutual Rivalry
<b>Tahqiq</b>	Knowledge, Research
<b>Takfir</b>	Practice of Declaring other Muslims as Kafir (unbelievers)
<b>Taleef</b>	Joining
<b>Taqiyya</b>	Self Preservation
<b>Tawhid</b>	Unity or Oneness
<b>Tazkiya</b>	Purification
<b>Ulema</b>	Clerics, Religious Scholars
<b>Wala</b>	Likeness
<b>Yatrib</b>	Medina
<b>Yuhawalo</b>	Transform from One Form to Another
<b>Zakat</b>	Religious Charity Tax

## PAKHTO GLOSSARY

<b>Badal</b>	Revenge, Retaliation
<b>Brekhna</b>	Thunder
<b>Ghayrat or Nang</b>	Chivalry or Bravery Honour
<b>Hamsaya</b>	Who Shares the Same Shadow
<b>Hujra</b>	Guest Room in Traditional Pakhtun Society
<b>Imandari</b>	Righteousness
<b>Isteqamat</b>	Persistence
<b>Jirga</b>	Tribal Council of Elders
<b>Kashar</b>	Younger
<b>Khasadars</b>	Irregular Forces from Different tribes
<b>Khel</b>	Sub-tribe
<b>Khudai Khidmatgar</b>	Servants of God
<b>Lashkar</b>	Militant Tribal Grouping
<b>Lungi</b>	Lower in Status than Malak
<b>Malak</b>	Tribal Elder or Chief
<b>Mashar</b>	Elder
<b>Melmastia</b>	Hospitality
<b>Mullah</b>	Religious leader
<b>Namoos</b>	Gender Boundaries
<b>Nanawati</b>	Forgiveness
<b>Pakhto</b>	Language of Pakhtuns
<b>Pakhtun</b>	An Ethnic Group Living in Afghanistan and North of Pakistan
<b>Pakhtunwali</b>	The Cultural Code of Pakhtuns
<b>Pir</b>	Sufi Saints
<b>Purdah</b>	Veil
<b>Por</b>	Compensation
<b>Qawm</b>	Tribe
<b>Riwaj</b>	Custom
<b>Sabat</b>	Steadfastness
<b>Sayyed</b>	Belonging to Prophet Muhammad's Family
<b>Taliban</b>	Plural of Talib, Means Student
<b>Tureh</b>	Bravery
<b>Zalzala</b>	Earthquake

## CHAPTER ONE

# INTRODUCTION

*The conflict between communism and the 'West' lasted seventy years, or at the most two hundred, from Babeuf to Gorbachev. That between Islamic movements and the West has been going on for nearly fourteen hundred years, and continues. The wall of Berlin fell after 28 years, that of Avila [in Spain], built in the fourteenth century to defend the city against the Arab forces, still stands (Fred Halliday).<sup>1</sup>*

The Global War on Terror is an ambiguous war with undefined objectives. It has variously been termed as a war over historical narratives,<sup>2</sup> a war of memories,<sup>3</sup> a cosmic war,<sup>4</sup> a religious war,<sup>5</sup> an ideological war<sup>6</sup>, and a war over natural resources.<sup>7</sup> The word 'war' itself denotes the reliance on military means to deal with this conflict. This suggests that, if peace is achieved at the end of this conflict, it will merely be a 'negative peace', indicating an absence of war or violence as a condition for the maintenance of peace.<sup>8</sup> This thesis argues that the post-9/11 conflict including the 'war on terror' is embedded in and complicated by the discourses of West-Islam historical encounters. The conflict in

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<sup>1</sup> Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, "Islam and the West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation," *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 9, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 2004 ): pp. 1-2. Accessed 28 April, 2012. [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9\\_1/Funk&Said\\_91IJPS.pdf](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9_1/Funk&Said_91IJPS.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam: World Politics and Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Reza Aslan, *How to Win a Cosmic War: God, Globalization and the End of War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2009), p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Statement of General William Boykin, "About the Religious Nature of War on Terror," in Crispin Sartwell, "Our Religious War," Accessed 20 May, 2012. <http://www.crispinsartwell.com/religiouswar.htm>

<sup>6</sup> Aldis Anne and Graeme P.Herd, ed. *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

<sup>7</sup> Gerard Ungerman and Audrey Brohy, "The Oil Factor Behind The War on Terror," (2005). <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIFOm5wOv1E>, Accessed 25 October, 2012,

<sup>8</sup> Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996), p. 3.

the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)<sup>9</sup> of Pakistan in the post-9/11 era is a product of these discourses, and resultant policies of the West towards the Muslim states.

The transformation of the conflict in FATA will involve not only examining the discourses that informs it, but also exploring its impact on militant tendencies within political Islam, which are resulting in the emergence of organisations like al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) within Muslim societies. In this thesis, it will be further argued that the conflict-generating tendencies within the conflict in tribal areas can be addressed through formulating a concept of transformation within Islam and developing a framework for transformation and peacebuilding for this area informed by indigenous religious-cultural resources.

The thesis will contribute to existing scholarship, firstly, by documenting and contextualising Christian and Western images of Muslims and Islam over the course of their entire history of interactions, not just focussing on a single period. Secondly, it will pay particular attention to the gradual replacement and shift of religious images of the medieval era to the secular images of the eras of Enlightenment and modernity, and the emergence of new categories of identification of Muslims and Islam. Thirdly, this study attempts to show how this history still matters today, with particular focus on the 'war on terror' and its impact on the tribal areas of Pakistan. Fourth and finally, an Islamic concept of conflict transformation will be developed, taking into account the historical analysis of West-Islam relations targeting the categories of identification of Islam and Muslims. This will then be applied to the challenge of peacebuilding and transformation of the conflict in FATA.

## **1.1 Aims of the Study**

The goal of this study is not to provide a chronology of events, but rather to position the emergence of different themes in West-Islam discourses. My argument rests on the premise that in order to analyse the conflict in FATA, one must examine the root cause of the conflictive ethos and the culture of violence within the *Pakhtun* society, and then

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<sup>9</sup> This thesis will use the terms FATA and tribal areas interchangeably.

pinpoint the factors responsible for triggering the conflict. I aim to delineate a set of categories from the two chapters of historical analysis in order to gain a wider perspective on the framework of the West-Islam discourses and its influence not just on the intellectual discourses, but on the violent conflicts as well. Thus, the major contribution of this study lies in the development of a concept of conflict transformation within Islamic settings and the formulation of a peacebuilding framework for the case study using this concept. Ultimately, this study has one goal, which is to examine the possibility of envisioning Islam as a functional code of peace and transformation.

The need to study this aspect is even more imperative after the killing of thousands of civilians on both sides. This has raised numerous questions about the relationship between violence and peace in Islam in order to examine the functional applicability of Islam and its relation to the modern world. Important debates have also surfaced regarding the historical relations between the West and Muslims, and many other factors that are not easily discussed academically due to the question of sacredness connected to Islam.

Writing on the concept of peace and conflict transformation in Islam is a very difficult subject due to numerous interpretations within Islam itself and the media-bashing and stereotyping of Muslims and Islam that occurs in the wake of violent events. Moreover, Islam is not merely a religion in a spiritual sense, but is a complete prescription for life with political, social, ethical and practical dimensions, which have to be considered before answering such questions. The blasphemous movie "Innocence of Muslims" (July 2012), which ridiculed the Prophet of Islam, and the violent reaction of the Muslims to it, which the western media passes off as a manifestation of "Islamic or Muslim rage"<sup>10</sup> has again marred the peaceful face of Islam, while ignoring the root cause of this behaviour.

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<sup>10</sup> Timothy Lynch, "Islamic rage against US overlooks history of common goals," *The Sydney Morning Herald* (18 September, 2012), Accessed 19 September, 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/islamic-rage-against-us-overlooks-history-of-common-goals-20120917-262dq.html>; Ayaan Hirsi Ali, "Muslim Rage: How I survived it, How we can end it," *Newsweek*, 14 September, 2012.

## 1.2 Scope and Significance

This thesis will involve a theoretical examination of the historical perceptions, narratives, and stereotypes embedded in the Western discourses on Islam, and will analyse the 'war on terror' in the light of historical narratives and resultant policy choices. Furthermore, it will use FATA as a case study to understand the impacts of these narratives and linguistic choices of framing the conflict. It then integrates this analysis with the theory of conflict transformation to generate an Islamic perspective and how to deal with it. One of the important aspects of the conflict, post-9/11, is the different levels on which it is operating. It involves global, regional, and local levels, which are all interconnected. The engagement of all these levels is imperative in order to generate effective transformation strategies. This study also examines the possibilities and limitations of a conflict transformation approach within Islamic settings and agrees with the observation of George Irani and Nathan C. Funk that any such conflict intervention method should be culturally competent.

[i]ndigenous as well as non indigenous peacemakers need to draw upon local cultural resources and harmonise their practices with [Arab] Islamic culture and relevant subcultures.<sup>11</sup>

An important part of this study focuses on the gap in research in this field. Most studies have taken the Orientalist or 'clash of civilizations' approach, while others have focused simply on an historical approach, with emphasis on the construction of new narratives, or on a peacebuilding approach, or highlighting peace and conflict transformation approaches. The present research fills this gap by following a multiplex approach which is:

[a] systematic inquiry into the multiple, simultaneous and often contradictory knowledge claims made by all conflicting parties to a violent human conflict.<sup>12</sup>

Distinctively, it also provides a framework of analysis of this conflict and proposes a conflict transformation concept based on Islamic precepts to realistically address it. The

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<sup>11</sup> George E. Irani and Nathan C. Funk, "Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1998): pp. 13-14.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Boudreau, "Intergroup Conflict Reduction Through Identity Affirmation: Overcoming the Image of the Ethnic or Enemy Other," *Peace and Conflict Studies* 10 (2003): p. 101.

results of this study are significant, as they will add a fresh dimension to the examination of the historical events, perceptions, and images concerning Islam and the West.

This will involve tackling a number of issues that theorists have so far not attempted. These are: the historical encounters between Muslims and Christians, the genesis of narratives, imagery and perceptions from the early encounters to the present, the analysis of statements of al Qaeda, and Tehreek-e-Taliban of Pakistan in order to measure the impact of historical discourses and the emergence of new trends in political Islam, the development of a concept of conflict transformation in Islam and the subsequent formulation of a framework for peacebuilding and transformation for the tribal areas of Pakistan. These elements have not been brought together in any single study.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The main research questions which inform this thesis are:

- What is the nature of the conflict between Muslims and the Western world?
- What role does the historical interpretation of events play in the construction of narratives and the development of negative imagery and perceptions?

More specifically, a number of supplementary questions also suggest themselves:

- Does Islam envisage conflict as a positive phenomenon that can lead to a constructive change in society? What is the transformational view of conflict in Islam?
- How can the negativity surrounding the conflict between Islam and the West be reduced?
- What are the possibilities of developing research strategies and a framework that might be used to construct a persuasive and well-integrated synthesis of historical events?
- What types of responses emerge from an Islamic concept of conflict transformation in a conflict situation that can be applied to the case study?



- Is this approach embedded in a broader pattern or does it take conflict in isolation?

Most existing studies of Western images of Muslims and Islam cover only one particular epoch, and the few histories of FATA either do not focus on the resolution or transformation of conflict or give it too brief a consideration. In recent times, attempts have been made to examine the civilizational nature of the conflict between the West and Muslims. Numerous studies have been conducted to examine this conflict from historical, cultural, economic, and political perspectives.

An analysis of the conflict in West-Islam relations through the transformation of narratives has been conducted by Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk. They examined conflict in the post-9/11 period using the theories of narratives of compatibility and confrontation, and they argue that there is a need for creating a third theory of complementarity in order to create a new narrative of transformation of this conflict.<sup>13</sup> Their study is focused on the Middle East and the 'terrorism versus moderation' frame of analysis by the West for this region. They have searched for peace paradigms or approaches within Islam which incorporate the following aspects: 'peace through coercion', 'peace through equity', 'peace through conciliation', 'peace through nonviolence', and 'peace through universalism'.<sup>14</sup> Based on this exploration they recommend a change of policy for the United States and the Middle Eastern governments to tackle the troubled nature of historical relations between Muslims and the West.

In an earlier study, Said, Funk and Kadayifci focused on Sufism as the major 'paradigm' for peacemaking in Islam whilst also examining the possibility that conflict resolution and transformation was embodied within Islam.<sup>15</sup> Abdul Karim Bangura in a study on Islamic peace paradigms also suggested peace approaches based on nonviolence, love

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<sup>13</sup> Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, *Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Nathan C. Funk , Abdul Aziz Said and S. Ayse Kadayifci, *Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precepts and Practices* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2001).

and dialogues as the basis of peace in Islam.<sup>16</sup> The focus of the recommendations proffered by Said and Funk is the need to transform public discourses of conflict and promote intercultural understanding in order to foster a change from within the Middle East by including religious peacemaking within the process of conflict resolution. Said and Funk argues that:

[t]he path to peace in the Middle East and in the broader context of Islamic-Western relations is a path that runs through – and not around – Islam.<sup>17</sup>

While their study is a major contribution to Islamic peacemaking and transformation of the narrative of conflict between Islam and the West at the global level, it falls short of suggesting a transformation approach within the Islamic framework. This thesis uses their approach to the narrative construction of historical events in Chapter three, while their concept of peace is used throughout this study.

Transformation as an approach for securing peace suggests a long-term process for dealing with conflicts that involve meta-narratives and which are of an intractable nature. Conflict resolution, for example, has been suggested by S. Ayse Kadayici-Orellana through the use of *Musalaha* (common good) as a form of Islamic reconciliation to deal with competing narratives in the context of the Palestinian-Israel conflict.<sup>18</sup> Her study discusses the Palestinian conflict in the light of the Islamic narratives of war and peace, and suggests a conflict resolution method for dealing with the competing narratives of Israelis and Palestinians; she offers *Musalaha* as a reconciliation method. She uses Islamic sources (*Qur'an*, *Hadith* and *Sunnah*) and local customs to do this. The study involves:

[H]ermeneutically engaging with these [Palestinian, Israeli] groups within a conflict resolution framework, and including an analysis of religious texts, myths, symbols and traditions, together with various institutions that legitimise or delegitimize violence.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Abdul Karim Bangura, *Islamic Peace Paradigms* (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 2005).

<sup>17</sup> Funk and Said, *Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East*, p. 276.

<sup>18</sup> S.Ayşe Kadayıfçı Orellana, *Standing on an Isthmus: Islamic Narratives on War and Peace in Palestinian Territories* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6.

One of the shortcomings of the study, which the author mentions herself, is her predominant focus on the current dynamics in the Palestine-Israel conflict rather than fostering a culture of peace for long-term transformation. My thesis seeks to fill this gap by suggesting not only a long-term transformation aspect within Islam but also using this to develop a framework for peacebuilding to address the current situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

On the other hand, Bassam Tibi proposes 'bridging' as a conflict resolution method for dealing with the cross-civilizational conflict between Muslims and the West, and argues that good communication through interfaith dialogue can open avenues for the successful bridging of relations.<sup>20</sup> He rejects the 'clash of civilizations' as a theory and considers that the international inter-civilisational conflict between Islam and the West is based on different value systems, different perspectives of world order and different concepts of law that underpin them. This is opposed to an earlier study by Salmi, Adib and Tanham, which frames the relations between Islam and Western societies in conflictual terms while underlining the conflict resolution practices within Islam based on the *Qur'an*, the traditions of Prophet Muhammad and traditional Middle Eastern methods.<sup>21</sup>

Tibi points out that in contrast to the notion of civilizational clash, conflict on a smaller scale is capable of being resolved as it falls short of the kind of massive cultural 'fault lines' that Huntington essentialises.<sup>22</sup> What is happening, he believes, is a conflict of values over the remaking of world order; but this does not constitute "a war of religions".<sup>23</sup> While I am in broad agreement with this position, it is one of the arguments of this thesis that the current conflict does have a religious dimension. Certainly, if the religious terminology applied to the remaking of world order by al Qaeda and other Islamists groups, and the implicit use of biblical references by the administration of President George W. Bush (2001-2009) are anything to go by, religion cannot entirely be

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<sup>20</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging* (London: Routledge, 2012).

<sup>21</sup> Cesar Adib Majul, George K. Tanham and Ralph Salmi, *Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

taken out of the reckoning. The use of conflict resolution techniques within the Islamic framework has also been employed by Muhammed Abu Nimer for examining the Palestinian conflict and addressing it through an Islamic framework of conflict resolution based on universal principles of Islam and traditional Middle Eastern techniques for resolving conflict.<sup>24</sup> He believes that:

Islam as a religion is conducive to nonviolent and peacebuilding methods through its various rituals and traditions.<sup>25</sup>

In another study, Abu Nimer and Muhammad Shafiq gives the guidelines of interfaith dialogue for Muslims based on the Qur'anic perspective of conducting dialogue and dealing with non-Muslims, as revealed in the *Sirah* (life of the Prophet Muhammad) and Muslim history.<sup>26</sup> One of the challenges Abu Nimer mentions is designing and implementing strategies and interventions for any effective implementation of Islamic peacebuilding approaches. His focus, however, is on the Palestinian Intifada, the religious character of this movement, and suggested nonviolent peacebuilding strategies based on localised rituals and religious symbols.

In contrast to Islamic values and principles as a resource for peacebuilding, Esposito and Yilmaz argue that to develop a concept of peacebuilding within Islam, it is imperative to understand the compatibility of Islam with the concept of civil society, tolerance and pluralism. According to their view, pluralism will lead to accommodation rather than conflict since diversity and tolerance of differences are the core principles of peacebuilding which pluralism enhances. They suggest the Fethullah Gulen model of synthesizing modernity, religion and science for Islamic peacebuilding. This model is based on two important principles: a bottom-up approach of social change, and forgiveness to deal with the three important enemies of humanity: ignorance, poverty and disunity.<sup>27</sup> One of the important contributions of this study is to base Islamic

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<sup>24</sup> Mohammad Abu Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 83.

<sup>26</sup> Muhammad Shafiq and Muhammed Abu Nimer, *Interfaith Dialogue: A Guide for Muslims* (Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007).

<sup>27</sup> John L. Esposito and Ihsan Yilmaz, eds. *Islam and Peacebuilding: Gulen Movement Initiative* (New York: Blue Dome, 2010), pp. 10-12.

peacebuilding on Gulen's new interpretation of Islamic resources which counters Islamist discourses promoting exclusion, violence and intolerance.<sup>28</sup>

Qamar ul Huda *et al.* similarly examined the possibility of nonviolence and peacebuilding approaches within an Islamic framework.<sup>29</sup> The recommendations in this work were based on developing and fostering a culture of peace, multidimensional peacebuilding, problem-solving skills, and training for peacebuilders within Islamic settings. Huda calls for a 'proper information approach' which is:

[b]uilt on the assumption that historical accuracy and a greater understanding of the past can counteract extremist ideology; it is hopeful that, once the interpretation is disseminated, Muslim extremists can be convinced of its validity and converted to peacemaking.<sup>30</sup>

This prompt for better understanding the nature of discourses and its relations to militant tendencies is followed in this thesis.

Within the conflict transformation framework, John Paul Lederach considers conflict to be an expressive, dynamic and dialectical process that is not static but emerges due to the perceptions and meanings assigned by humans to events in a conflict situation. Lederach contends that the events of 9/11 are embedded in a cycle of history that he terms "actions, reactions, and counteractions".<sup>31</sup> He believes that the response of the U.S. and its allies has not increased domestic and international security but rather they have succeeded in "fostering the cycle" of violence and conflict.<sup>32</sup>

For Lederach, conflict transformation is:

[t]o envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflicts as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence,

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<sup>28</sup> Esposito and Yilmaz, eds. *Islam and Peacebuilding*, p. 54.

<sup>29</sup> Qamar ul Huda, ed. *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution In Islam* (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Press , 2010).

<sup>30</sup> Qamar ul Huda, "Enhancing Skills and Capacity Building in Islamic Peacemaking," In *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar ul Huda (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), pp. 207-08.

<sup>31</sup> John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 25.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

increase justice in direct interaction with social structures and respond to real life problems in human relationships.<sup>33</sup>

The integrated framework that he suggests has five steps, and each one is vital for peacebuilding in war-torn societies. It consists of:

1) A structural analysis of root causes; 2) crisis management; 3) crisis prevention; 4) long-term vision or generational perspective; and finally 5) transformation.

The core of his approach is a process of transformative social change through the development of an infrastructure for peacebuilding as 'process structure' to transform a war system into a 'peace system'. The main emphasis in this process is not on ending conflict, but rather on "building relationships with new patterns, processes, and structures".<sup>34</sup>

In contrast, Johan Galtung proffers the concept of a conflict triangle focussing on attitude, behaviour and contradictions. Attitude refers to negative and aggressive perceptions or misperceptions; behaviour includes aggression, collaboration, and coercion, while contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation. He considers conflict to be a non-linear cyclic process which will bring up conflict again and again if it is not dealt with properly. What he adds to peace theory is the concept of negative and positive peace.<sup>35</sup>

Galtung sees 'transformation' as transcendence "which presupposes hope, and hope is located in a vision of a positive, constructive future, not in rehashing a traumatic past".<sup>36</sup> He uses the term 'creative conflict transformation', which includes using innovative ideas to address conflict. As he sees it, current resolution methods for ending conflict are inadequate and require new ideas to transform conflict into mutually beneficial outcomes for all the parties involved. He points out that conflict transformation involves overcoming structural violence in order to build more positive relationships. Ultimately,

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<sup>33</sup> John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation* (PA: Good Books, 2003), p. 14.

<sup>34</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 84.

<sup>35</sup> Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, p. 72.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, p. 124.

this transcendence will lead to transformation and the creation of peace. This thesis will use the theories of Lederach and Galtung to examine the case study of the tribal areas of Pakistan and to formulate a peacebuilding and transformation framework for it.

Conflict analysis of the conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) is a central aspect of this study. It draws on the work of Farhat Taj who has examined the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan by conducting interviews with more than 2000 respondents.<sup>37</sup> Her study details the different myths surrounding FATA, and addresses the issue of *Pakhtunwali* (the *Paktun* cultural code) and its relation to giving refuge to the al Qaeda leadership in FATA. She deconstructs the myth of the autonomous nature of the status of FATA and weak state control within the federation of Pakistan. She considers FATA to be fully under the Federal government's control, through political agents and the Federal Crime Regulations (FCR), 1901.

Her interview-based study has opened new avenues of research for the study of the Taliban in Pakistan. She argues that the Taliban are not a *Pakhtun*-based group but rather the proxies of Pakistan's intelligence agencies. These include mostly Punjabi Taliban and foreign fighters. She provides examples of several organisations from Punjab as belonging to the Taliban. Her thesis is still contested by several authors like Zahid Hussain<sup>38</sup> and Christiana Fair<sup>39</sup> who both believe that the Taliban are indeed *Pakhtuns*, despite having links with Pakistan's intelligence agencies, and developing their own identity over a period of time.

Farhat Taj contends that the people in the tribal areas actually support drone strikes as an effective counter-militancy measure. This raises several issues. Firstly, a public opinion poll conducted in the area does not support this argument, as almost 80% of the people oppose drones.<sup>40</sup> Secondly, the creation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007 and the high level of recruitment in it were after the drone attack on a *Madrassah* in

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<sup>37</sup> Farhat Taj, *Taliban and Anti Taliban* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011).

<sup>38</sup> Zahid Hussain, *The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan -And How it Threatens America* (New York: Free Press, 2010).

<sup>39</sup> Christine Fair and Jacod N. Shapiro, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter, 2009).

<sup>40</sup> "Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Region," New American Foundation, " Accessed 15 May, 2012, <http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/FATApoll.pdf>.

Bajur in 2006 in which more than 80 children below the age of 12 died. Thirdly, it raises the issue of attacking one part of Pakistan to the exclusion of others, which raises numerous questions at the national level. Although there is general discontent against the Taliban in the area, anti-Americanism is also present which to a large extent neutralises this argument completely.

Taj's study is a major contribution to the literature on critical analysis of conflict in the tribal areas, to understanding its social-cultural codes, and to the examination of tribal agencies. Nonetheless, it does not go beyond an analysis of recent historical, political and socio-economic causes of the conflict. It neither takes into account the detailed historical examination of discourses, nor offers any prescription for the long-term solution of the conflict.

Ahmed Rashid is another leading scholar who has also examined the recent historical development of the conflict in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan in the wake of the 'war on terror'. His 2001 and 2009 studies on the Taliban offer an in depth analysis of the rise of this movement in Afghanistan, Pakistan and its impact on south, central and west Asia.<sup>41</sup> Rashid calls for efforts to be made at the regional and international level for reshaping the crisis on a long term basis but does not offer any concrete framework for its resolution or transformation. He observes that anti-Americanism can be traced to terms like "why do they hate us?", which ignores the root causes of terrorism embedded in Western policies towards the Muslim world. This blindness serves to create a culture of fear among the American public and hatred of the West among Muslims. The present study emphasizes Rashid's argument that it was the intellectual shortcomings of the Taliban that led them to accept al Qaeda's Global Jihad Philosophy. He contends that the Taliban had a micro or localised perspective of restoring law and order in Afghanistan and forming an Islamic government. They had no macro or global perspective of political Islam and uncritically embraced the ideology that al Qaeda proffered them.

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<sup>41</sup>Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* (London: Pan Books, 2001).



Rashid believes that changes in FATA can be brought about by giving political freedom and choice to the people and by changing their political status. But the government and army refused to allow this, which resulted in al Qaeda and the Taliban taking the political initiative by renaming the region, the “Islamic Emirates of Waziristan”.<sup>42</sup> Not only did this undermine the role of political agents in FATA, the entire administrative system of FATA has been destroyed, with tribesmen losing faith in the government. He points out that though historically this area was never a part of West-Islam rivalry, the ideology of al Qaeda inculcated the antagonistic pattern of West-Islam relations in the area.<sup>43</sup>

The approach that I adopt in my thesis differs from those of the existing studies mainly in the following ways.

- a. Primarily, it attempts to define the concepts of conflict and transformation within an Islamic frame of reference that can transform the narratives of conflict and hence conflict itself. Thus conflict transformation can avoid the traps associated with peacemaking and conflict resolution.
- b. This study treats Islam not as a monolithic religion and culture but sees diversity as its essence. A practical framework of transformation takes into account the reality of indigenous approaches, which inform the religious understanding, rather than pursuing a Middle Eastern form of Islam.
- c. What is involved is a detailed and in-depth analysis of the conflict in a specific regional location in order to gauge the development and influence of Islam versus Western discourses with their conflict-generating tendencies.
- d. As the conflict involves the Sunni sect of Islam, the transformation and peacebuilding approach is also based on Sunni sources of Islam, particularly of the reformist school. I will use the Qur’anic interpretations of Muhammad Shahrur and Mahmud Mohammad Taha in particular.

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<sup>42</sup> Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 273.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 275.

- e. The thesis replaces 'peacebuilding with 'peace pathways'-an Islamic concept-as a more realistic transformation approach to conflict.

#### **1.4 The Dilemma of Terminology: Islam-West or West-Islam**

The study departs from the prevalent use of the term 'Islam and the West', as used by E.R. Gibb, Bernard Lewis, Norman Daniel, Samuel P. Huntington and other scholars, and instead opts for 'the West and Islam' as a suitable term. It does not accept the term 'Islam-West' because it puts Islam at the forefront of the issues and conflict-generating narratives. Instead, this thesis argues that the Western discourses and policies are the primary trigger of conflictual tendencies.

The West, which was previously called Christendom before the Reformation and Enlightenment period, is the only civilization in the world identified by a compass direction and not by the name of any particular people, religion or geographical area. It includes countries in Europe, the Americas, and the Pacific - in particular Australia and New Zealand. Historically, Western civilization is equated with European civilization, but with the rise of the United States and the establishment of British colonies in Australia and New Zealand, that narrow definition has become ill-fitting. Vast differences exist between the United States, Europe and the rest of the West, just as Muslim countries have different versions of Islam. As Akhavi observes, it is wrong to consider both terms (Islam and the West) as monolithic units of analysis, as both have distinct traditions and experiences, and these terms are also too abstract to be helpful markers of division.<sup>44</sup>

The term 'Islam' has been used in this study as the collective subject, rather than 'Muslims' who subscribe to it, because it has been Islam as a system of religious beliefs and practice that has become the focal point of analysis. It is also due to the fact that Islam's holy text, its selective interpretation and Islam's overall role in shaping Muslim society and culture is critical. The major civilization that challenged Islam and considered it heretical from the outset was Christianity due to the geographical

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<sup>44</sup> Shahrough Akhavi, "Islam and the West in World History," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2003) : p. 545. Accessed 12 May, 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993385>

proximity of the Christian Byzantine Empire and the presence of Christians in the state of Medina (*Yatrib*) and across the Red Sea. The resulting theological disputes between Muslims and Christians led to territorial problems and the emergence of conflicts. As for the West, this came to replace Christendom as the geo-political-cultural term used to describe the collectivity of European nations following the Enlightenment and their embrace of a new secular ethos. As Prof. Nadia Mostafa commented that “this terminology reflects the historical legacy”.<sup>45</sup> Richard Fletcher opposes the use of both terms ‘Islam’ and ‘Christendom’ since in his view Islam is a faith while Christendom is a territory or culture or society which might be compared with *Dar ul Islam* (house of peace) but not with Islam itself.<sup>46</sup>

The terms Islam and the West portray a monolithic frame in characterising the two civilizations. They ignore or play down their internal diversity and the degree of cultural and ethnic differences within them. This thesis changes the usual Islam-West juxtaposition by reversing the order and taking a West-Islam approach as the prevalent form of discourse for examining the history of relations between them. Asma Barlas points out that it is important to free Islam from the transfiguring approach of associating it with the geographical entities of East or West. As essentially a religion, Islam cannot be separated from or compared with the West as a completely different and separated world. Islam, after all, has not an insignificant presence in the West. By the same token globalisation has taken the West out of the narrow confines of geographical/spatial definition.

Although, the term Islam-West has sometimes been used, certainly since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-West response to the attacks of 9/11 usefully shifted the adversarial emphasis to the West and its long history of incursive encounters with Muslims. In so far as those encounters created tensions, these can be traced for the most part to what the West was doing. Fred Halliday observes that there were three periods of conflict between the non-Islamic and the Islamic worlds. The first occurred with the rise of Islam

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<sup>45</sup> Interview: Prof. Nadia Mostafa, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Dialogue Among Civilizations, Cairo University, Egypt, 18 April, 2010.

<sup>46</sup> Richard Fletcher, Introduction to *The Cross and The Crescent :The Dramatic Story of the Earliest Encounters Between Christians and Muslims* (London: Penguin Books, 2004) , p. xv.

in the 7<sup>th</sup> Century and the extension of its empire to Sicily and France. The second was inaugurated by the Crusades and the Christian attempt to gain control of the Holy Lands. This period ended with the halting of Muslim forces at Vienna in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century and the gradual decline of Ottoman power thereafter. The third conflict and the most disruptive began with the colonial subjugation of Muslims in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century and their political and economic domination by Europeans and Americans throughout most of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>47</sup> According to Akbar S. Ahmed, much of this recent history was an ‘unmitigated disaster’ for Muslims.<sup>48</sup>

This thesis, then, examines against the backdrop of these European-Muslim encounters, not only the historical discourses explaining them, but also, in the form they were constructed, their conflict generating tendencies. These will be tested with specific reference to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

### **1.5 Political Islam and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA)**

The role of Islam in politics has been much debated since the use of oil as a political weapon by the Arab states in 1973 and since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Although Islam has always historically played a role in politics since its emergence in the Arabian Peninsula in the 7<sup>th</sup> Century, the debate about the role of religion in public life began with the downplaying of religion in the socio-political affairs of the West, when it was relegated to the private domain in the Reformation and post-Renaissance periods. The role of Islam in creating movements for political and social change during the 1970s and 1980s has transformed international politics, especially in the post-Cold War era. This has been partly attributed to the failure of such secular ideologies as liberalism, capitalism and communism to gain much hold within Muslim society.

Political Islam emerged as a reaction to these ideologies and their inability to satisfy the demands and needs of Muslim societies. In its militant form, political Islam sought not only to ‘purify’ Muslim society of Western influences, but also to take the fight to the

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<sup>47</sup> Fred Halliday, “Islam is in Danger: Authority, Rushdie and the Struggle for the Migrant Soul,” In *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam*, eds. Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg (London: Pluto Press, 1995), p. 71.

<sup>48</sup> Akbar. S. Ahmed, “Islam: The Roots of Misperception,” *History Today*, 41, no.4 (1991), p. 30.

West itself. Hence, the events of 9/11. The thesis argues that this transnational form of political Islam or 'Islamism' is the product of European colonialism in the Muslim world and its impact on the religious, socio-cultural, educational, economic and political aspects of Muslim life.

The dynamics of the conflict, as a consequence of the 'war on terror', have opened up a number of fronts at global, regional and local levels. At the global level, these involve notions of Muslim victimhood and humiliation, which are connected to the meta-narrative of West-Islam relations, the phenomenon of global Jihadism, 'clash of civilizations' theories and the legacy of Orientalism perspectives. At the regional level, conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir play a part, as does the meta-narrative of West-Islam conflict. At the local level, the definition of victimhood draws sustenance not only from the meta-narrative coupled with but also and more poignantly from physical destruction and so-called collateral damage on the ground. The focus in this thesis is conflict at the local level with global ramifications. Issues of victimhood, grievances and humiliation will be discussed in Chapter Two with particular reference to the way they have contributed to the intractable nature of the conflict in the FATA region.

The conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan may be regional in character, but it is global in impact. This area can be termed a 'conflict attracter'<sup>49</sup> due to historical, social, religious and political residues of the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89. Although the 'war on terror' formally began after the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the conflict itself has deep roots in the history of Western-Muslim relations. The attacks were the trigger for the war itself, but the prolonged duration of the conflict has added a further dimension to its intractable nature. For a full understanding of the situation, it is imperative to factor in the severe, protracted and complex nature of cross-civilizational conflict.

My analysis involves an examination of the conflict in FATA with particular emphasis on the narratives of occupation as well as historical grievances, terrorism, developmental

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<sup>49</sup> Raymond Ibrahim, Larry S. Liebovitch, Robin Vallacher, Andrzej Nowak, Andrea Bartoli, Peter Coleman and Lan Bui-Wrzosinska, "Intractable Conflict as a Dynamic System," Accessed 24 April, 2012, <http://necsi.edu/events/iccs7/papers/712171923f5c0087fe29a1fb110c.pdf>.

discrimination, identity crisis and terrorism, all of which have helped perpetuate the conflict. With the shifting of the al-Qaeda leadership from Afghanistan to the tribal areas of Pakistan after the U.S. led war on Afghanistan in October 2001, meta-narratives have been employed by them to advance local grievances. My explorations will address the dynamics of tribal society coupled with the sense of victimization and humiliation that Muslims feel in general about the conflict. It is argued that the intractable nature of the conflict also owes something to the political culture that has been inculcated over the course of many years because of the unending conflict, the media coverage and the educational system. The Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989 was crucial to this story. While the conflict that is the subject of this thesis started after 9/11, its roots are deep and its nature is protracted and complex.

This study posits that a transformation concept within Islamic and cultural frameworks at the local level is needed because the conflict in the tribal areas has had such a destructive impact on Pakistani society in general. Drone strikes, suicide bombings, and fissures in the social fabric of the tribal society have produced negative effects at both the regional and international levels. Transforming the conflict will address the meta-narrative of the clash, the challenge of Jihadism on one hand and the Bush administration's referral to evil 'Islamic extremism' versus good Islam. Transformation strategies that target only al-Qaeda and the Taliban will not suffice.

## **1.6 Thesis Outline**

A complete examination of all Christian and European writings on Islam and Muslims, together with numerous interpretations of Islam, is beyond the scope of any single study. The literature pertaining to the West-Islam relations, the conflict situation arising out of them and their possible resolution is vast. While I touch on some studies having generalist applications in this Introduction, specific works will be dealt on a chapter-by-chapter basis

Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework and methodology of the study. The thesis makes use of a multidisciplinary approach. It includes sociology, linguistic analysis and theories of narrative formation. It draws on and utilises theories of conflict

by analysing these within a specific historical context. Accordingly, victimhood, humiliation and emotions in conflict, together with the dichotomies of 'self' and 'other' will be addressed.

Chapter Three constitutes a broad survey of the Christian narratives of Muslims that arise from the period that stretches from the emergence of Islam in the 7<sup>th</sup> Century Arabia to the decline of Muslim power and the rise of European powers in the 16<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Through the textual and historical analysis of the changing meta-narratives of this period, the major images of the Muslim 'other' and the corresponding images of the Christian 'self' will be identified. These are mostly derived from biblical descriptions. Different images of Muslims appeared, from categories of 'Anti-Christ', 'God's scourge' and heretics, to images of pagans, barbarians, and apocalyptic images.

The ventures of the Crusades in the 11<sup>th</sup> Century imbued Christianity with a new sense of mission. The Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which followed, introduced notions of Islamic irrationality into West-Islam discourse. The European incursions into the Middle East and the Orientalist images of Islam and Muslims that were produced in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries then began telling a story of backwardness, depravity, cruelty and incompetence. The decline of Turkish power in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century rendered the former Ottoman menace the 'Sick Man of Europe' that was badly in need of Europe's recuperative medicine.

Chapter Four argues that the construction of the discourses on Muslims from religious to political-social categories—from fanatical followers of a false religion - to hapless victims of tyrannical rulers—informed the 'Muslim other' in the West's treatment and critically influenced the form of Muslim responses. This chapter goes on to argue that the political responses, which the Muslim world and in particular Muslim radical organisations are resorting to in the post-9/11 period, derive much of their impetus from these Western historical discourses. The emergence of Islamic reformism, political Islam, and global Jihadism are the products of these discourses and the policies adopted by the West in the post second world war period. The construction of the enemy in the Cold War era draws noticeably on the imagery that was conjured up during the first encounters of Muslims

and Christians. This was particularly true of the rhetoric adopted by both President Bush and the al Qaeda leadership. This chapter also examines the events that brought notions of religious sacredness and values of human freedom into conflict.

Chapters Five and Six are based on a multi-dimensional analysis of conflict in FATA, which includes historical, political, socio-economic-gender, religious and cultural dimensions. It argues that these enduring discourses, which were adopted into policy by the Bush administration was one of the triggers of the events of 9/11, and also had an influence over the conflict in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Although historically not one of S.P. Huntington's civilisational 'fault lines', this area became a conflict zone in the wake of the U.S. led war on Afghanistan in October 2001. The relocation of the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership to FATA not only shifted the organisational structure, but also the ideology of 'civilizational clash' that formed part of the al Qaeda's discourse.

Chapter Six examines transnational dimensions of the conflict in FATA. It also examines the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, its ideology and the predominant themes in its statements which connects it to the meta-narrative of West-Islam relations from past to present. This analysis of conflict in a regional setting is required in order to formulate both a concept of conflict transformation within an Islamic framework, and a peacebuilding and transformation framework for the case study.

Chapter Seven explores the concepts of peace and conflict that are inherent within Islam while contextualizing the meaning of conflict within an Islamic framework. It reformulates an approach to conflict on the basis of alternative interpretations of the *Qur'an* provided by religious scholars who include Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, Mohammed Shahrur and Tahir ul Qadri. Moreover, it explores the concepts of transformation within an Islamic frame of reference. It argues that *Jihad* and patience can be turned into a concept of transformation within Islam. On these grounds it suggests transformation strategies for Muslim societies.

Chapter Eight provides a framework of transformation and peacebuilding based on the Islamic concept of conflict transformation mentioned above. It formulates 'peace



pathways' as compared to 'peacebuilding' as an alternative within Islamic settings. This also utilizes Abdul Ghaffar Khan's philosophy of non-violence, *Pakhtunwali* (the *Pakhtun* code of culture) along with Abu Nimer's and John Paul Lederach's theories of conflict intervention. Strategies of transformation and peacebuilding arise in a synthesis of all these approaches.

Lastly, the thesis concludes by revisiting the meta-narratives at the heart of West-Islam tensions. It argues that conflict analysis of an in-depth nature is a prerequisite for understanding the nature and dynamics of this conflict and for suggesting a framework for peacebuilding and transformation.

## CHAPTER TWO

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the theoretical framework guiding the study which forms the basis of analysis. The theoretical framework provides both structure and a conceptual apparatus for the historical examination of Western discourses on Islam and for envisaging the transformation of the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan. To this end, it draws on scholarly work in international relations, sociology, social psychology, history, peace studies and conflict theory. The ideas introduced here are informed by work on social constructivism, sociology, role/identity theory, structuralist theories of narratives and conflict transformation theories. These theories have been examined not for their applications to history but only as an aid in the deconstruction of historical narratives and formulation of a framework for peacebuilding and transformation. The chapter has three sections. The first explains the theoretical concepts relevant to narratives and identity construction. The second section describes the concept of intractable conflict and the theory of conflict transformation. The third and the last section describes the methodology and framework of analysis.

### 2.2 Constructivism, Identity and Narratives

This thesis situates the debates on West-Islam relations and the development of an Islamic framework of conflict transformation within the theory of constructivism. Constructivism involves three dimensions: the construction of social reality where

religious and cultural beliefs make sense of the world, the construction of social identity on the dichotomy of 'self' and the 'other' and narrative formation both as 'speech acts'<sup>1</sup> and narration of history.

Constructivism(or social constructivism), although a relatively-new theoretical approach to the discipline of international relations and politics, has provided a different perspective to the neo-realism. Constructivism, when compared with neo-realism, does not consider power, competition, security dilemmas, war and chaos as inevitable factors in international politics but relies instead on the idea that interaction in a particular way changes the perception of enemies by enabling them to be seen as friends, which makes a very different outcome possible. These social interactions are influenced by identity formation processes which result in producing particular identities.<sup>2</sup>

Andrew Bradley Phillips explains constructivists,

[b]y their emphasis on the socially constructed character of actors, interests and identities, and by their concomitant faith in the susceptibility to change of even the most seemingly immutable practices and institutions in world politics.<sup>3</sup>

He points out that the emphasis of constructivists is mainly on the non-material factors in international relations. They consider transformative international change while postmodern constructivists are concerned with the nexus between power and knowledge to determine the construction of 'truth regimes' in international politics which latter makes alternative discourses seem unimaginable.<sup>4</sup>

The process of construction of social reality, as produced by interactions, is dependent on the spoken and written word, which involves interpretation and ascribing meaning to them. This involves the study of hermeneutics to determine the meaning assigned to the language used, thus impacting on how meaning can collectively be given to words, objects and actions. This produces its own social reality. Together with identity

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<sup>1</sup> The theory of "speech act", advocated by English philosopher John L. Austin concerns with the idea that human beings do things with words and a particular use of language may involve different acts.

<sup>2</sup> Jennifer Sterling Folker, "Constructivism," In *Making Sense Of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2006), pp. 116-17.

<sup>3</sup> Andrew Bradley Phillips, "Constructivism," In *International Relations for the Twenty First Century*, ed. Martin Griffiths (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, pp. 60-1, 64.

formation, culture is also an important part of constructivism for the promotion of structural changes. This kind of structural change is influenced by collective understanding and can help to bring changes at a systemic level.

Narrative formation is another important part of identity construction: since it also helps to create social reality. This also involves discourse analysis for examining narratives within the bounds of constructivism. Discourse analysis helps to assist the validity of claims made in particular speeches to justify particular policies or actions. This study stops short of applying critical discourse analysis of texts and discourses as an approach, because the study covers a long period, from the emergence of Islam to the post 9/11 era. Rather, this study is confined to the construction of Islam as an 'other' in Western discourses and the impact of this on the conflict in tribal areas of Pakistan. This is where constructivism comes into play. Despite differences of emphasis within constructivism, there is a shared scholarly commitment to the logic of transformation based on the construction of social reality, via words, actions and interactions which can be transformed by changing the nature of these interactions.

The construction of social reality in a culture is critical in the context of a conflict situation. An analysis of conflict exposes multiple realities and frames in which people live and it is the interactional connection among these multiple worlds that creates their *raison d'être*. David W. Augsburger explains this:

Conflict is, at essence, the construction of a special type of reality. Most of the time we assume and take for granted that we share a single reality with others, but we do not. We simultaneously live in multiple realities.<sup>5</sup>

He further says,

Social reality is constructed of networks of subjective realities; it may be defined as collective shared meaning. It is created by the interplay of consensus and conflict. As consensus breaks down, conflict emerges; as the conflict is resolved, a new consensus containing and reframing the old social reality emerges. The evolution of a culture's social reality, and each member's

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<sup>5</sup> David W. Augsburger, *Conflict Mediation Across Cultures: Pathways and Patterns* (Westminister: John Knox Press, 1992), p. 17.

experience of it, unfolds through ongoing cycle of consensus, confusion, conflict and clarification.<sup>6</sup>

My primary argument in this thesis is based on the construction of religious world views as the central problem in West-Islam relations, involving a definition of the two terms of the West and Islam. The position of religion in the West led to many years of religious wars in Europe, until it eventually took religion out of the political sphere and confined it to the private sphere of human life. Clifford Geertz defined religion emerging from the Enlightenment as a system of symbols that formulates a conception of the general order of existence and affords it an aspect of reality.<sup>7</sup> Bruce Lincoln terms the Western model of religion as a kind of division of labour in Western modernity, which removed the role of religion as a hegemon over truth and put secular arts and sciences in its place. Moreover, he goes on to state that Immanuel Kant ended the European dialogue between the sacred and the profane by confining religion to the realm of engagement of metaphysical ideals only. Thus, emerged the division between the secular and religious domains of life in the West.<sup>8</sup> I would argue that this definition of religion is a product of a culturally-historical discursive process that cannot normally be termed as universal.

Secondly, I shall formulate my argument within the concept of the intractability of conflicts with religious dimensions, because people build 'walls of religion' around them and attempt to defend their beliefs at all costs, which makes conflict more intractable and difficult to resolve or transform.<sup>9</sup> This hinders the conflict intervener's ability to intervene, resolve, or transform the conflict, because although the conflicting parties' needs and interests may be negotiable, their values and beliefs are not. Nonetheless, the term 'religious conflict' may be misleading, as "it implies that religion somehow is the cause of the conflict".<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Augsburg, *Conflict Mediation Across Cultures*, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 90.

<sup>8</sup> Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> Richard E. Wentz, *Why People Do Bad Things In the Name of Religion* (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1993), p. 25.

<sup>10</sup> Jeffrey R. Seul, "Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1999): p. 564.

In the post-Cold War era, the traditional state-centric focus of international relations has been replaced by the emergence of non-state networks, such as al Qaeda, which have undermined the “Weberian assumptions of statehood that have traditionally informed the international relations theories”.<sup>11</sup> Religion has been considered an important factor in the construction of communal identities in the post-Cold War era, because this form of identity has played an important role in many regional and international conflicts. The Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict (1991-1999) in former Yugoslavia, for example, arose between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats on the basis of religious identity. Conflicts involving religious dimensions tend to evolve as intractable conflicts “due to the non-bargainable nature of the motivation behind them”.<sup>12</sup> Although conflicts motivated by ethnicity and nationalism may also be termed intractable, when conflict involves religion rather than power or political interests, the chances of a compromise are less likely: faith and personal beliefs cannot be compromised easily.

The so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT) which provides much of the important context for this thesis cannot be termed a religious conflict; however, it has religious dimensions. It is an asymmetrical conflict with differences in power, resources, prestige, influences and support structure between the parties. The GWOT fits into the realist paradigm category in international politics that defines the conflict as an inevitable phenomenon in human society. The excessive use of power, military might, and war to decide the outcome of a conflict obscures the definition of conflict as an opportunity to improve the structure of the relationship between the parties to it. On the other hand, the definition of conflict as an opportunity to improve relations emphasizes international politics with the goal of collective security, cooperation, and peaceful relations.

The asymmetrical nature of the conflict is demonstrated by the US-NATO coalition forces, which include extremely powerful, technologically advanced industrial nations with the backing of international organisations on the one side, and al Qaeda-Taliban, which are technologically and materially weak and scattered, with limited access to

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<sup>11</sup> Phillips, "Constructivism", p. 71.

<sup>12</sup> Jonathan Fox, "Religion and State Failure: An Examination of the Extent and Magnitude of Religious Conflict from 1950 to 1996", *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 1 (January 2004), p. 58.

powerful weaponry or support of states or international organisations on the other side. Despite the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, the narratives of both parties have distinct similarities. The predominant narrative construction of this conflict is based on the notion of 'faith' versus 'civilization'. The Bush Administration (2001-2009) constructed the narrative that Islamic extremists hated the values of Western civilization, while the narrative of al Qaeda-Taliban talks in terms of an historical 'clash of civilizations', revenge, victimhood, and humiliation.

This study will analyse the narrative constructed by the use of history and its application in the contemporary West-Islam conflict in the post-9/11 era. The study of narratives started historically with the study of languages, which later on included poetics and semantics. This study employs the socio-linguistic and anthropological model of Martin Cortazzi,<sup>13</sup> of examining narratives, and the narrative construction of studying West-Islam relations put forth by Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk. The former model describes the way in which stories arise and the construction of terminologies, while the latter is concerned with how stories develop across cultures. Said and Funk suggest that the construction of a new narrative within a conflict transformation framework will provide the conflict with a new perspective.<sup>14</sup>

Deeply embedded narrative structures within a society constitute and convey patterns of meanings.<sup>15</sup> Alessandro Duranti emphasised that discourse and narrative construction are a part of a narrator's socio-cultural reality and thus offer a perspective to understanding discourse within a specific cultural context.<sup>16</sup> Allen D. Grimshaw suggests four different types of narrative data, which can be used by researchers. These are:

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<sup>13</sup> Martin Cortazzi, *Narrative Analysis* (Washington D.C: Falmer Press, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, "Islam and The West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation," *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 9, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 2004). Accessed 28 April, 2012. [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9\\_1/Funk&Said\\_91IJPS.pdf](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9_1/Funk&Said_91IJPS.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> Linda M. Johnston, "Narrative Analysis," In *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*, ed. Daniel Druckman (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 281.

<sup>16</sup> Alessandro Duranti, ed. *Ethnography of Speaking: Towards a Linguistic of the Praxis*, In *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey, Language: The Socio-Cultural Context*, vol. 6. ed. by F. J. Newmyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Speech observed in natural settings, speech observed in contrived settings, elicited speech in response to direct inquiry and historical and/or literary material.<sup>17</sup>

This thesis analyses historical narratives in the light of the current conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It examines, compares and contrasts foundational narratives that existed prior to the conflict, contextual narratives that arose from tangential conflicts related to contextual narratives, and resultant narratives that emerged from the conflict.<sup>18</sup> Said and Funk believe that for a narrative approach to be successful in the West-Islam context, it must shift from stories concentrating on conflict to stories that lead to the formation of new relations, seeking convergence between the narratives in what they call a macro-cultural relationship. They point out that in order to avoid being “trapped inside the story”,<sup>19</sup> it is important to critically examine the polarising narratives and to concentrate on intercultural compatibility and complementarity.

The meta-narratives were given legitimacy and authority within the post-colonial discourse that influenced West-Islam relations and the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Postcolonial studies, which emerged during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, developed as a discourse that dealt with the relations between Europe and other parts of the world. The primary medium of relational difference was inequality and the division of the world on racial grounds. The West has been promoted as having a superior culture, a perspective that anthropological studies of race and culture tended to reinforce.<sup>20</sup>

Compared to postcolonial discourse, one of the more important contributions of post-modern studies is the reliance they place on cultural as well as on political and economic analysis. While postcolonial ideas legitimized the grand or meta-narrative, postmodernism challenged that legitimacy.<sup>21</sup> It criticised grand narratives for their emphasis on monolithic simplicity and celebrated heterogeneity, contradiction,

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<sup>17</sup> Allen Day Grimshaw, ed. *Data and Data Use in An Analysis of Communication Events: Exploration Of Ethnography of Speaking* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 283.

<sup>18</sup> Johnston, "Narrative Analysis," p. 290.

<sup>19</sup> Funk and Said, "Islam and The West," p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), p. 57.

<sup>21</sup> Ranjit Das Gupta, "Significance of Non-Subaltern Mediation," In *Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning and the Globalization of South Asia*, ed. David Ludden (London: Anthem Press, 2002); Bryan. S Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism* (London: Routledge, 1994).



differences and local resources of knowledge. This had a profound impact on the way Islam came to be presented as monolithic rather than part of a diverse and complex culture. During the period following World War I, Islam was portrayed as a 'grand narrative' which gave uniform ideas about the religion and cultural aspects of Muslim societies and made it a global oppositional force. Postmodernism has changed this Orientalist image of Islam as a diverse culture by accepting and appreciating its complexity.<sup>22</sup> According to colonial and postcolonial studies, the attitude of the West towards Islam is often considered to be embedded in pre-modern perspectives, which is the basis of the modern stereotypes of Islam.<sup>23</sup>

Edward Said, in his landmark book *Orientalism*, exposed and challenged these meta-narratives of the postcolonial era, which described the West as peaceful, law abiding, and rational, and the Orient as the complete opposite - warlike, anarchic and irrational.<sup>24</sup> The meta-narratives made Muslims not only victims of colonial invasions but also of Orientalist discourse. Michael Foucault's hypothesis of knowledge and power<sup>25</sup> influenced how Said examined the way identity-making occurred and how the construction of 'self' and 'other' created diametrically-opposite identities. The Orientalist discourse imposed a particular kind of 'otherness' on Islam and the Muslims in order to fit them into the West's world view of a pre-eminent, advanced and civilised West. The contemporary dichotomy between Islamic moderates and radicals which the West generated has likewise manufactured identities that distort the reality of the situation.

The case study of tribal areas will be analysed through the dimensions-of-conflict approach of Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, which breaks conflict into

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<sup>22</sup> Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, pp. 11-12.

<sup>23</sup> David R. Blanks, "Western Views of Islam in the Pre-Modern Period: A Brief History of Past Approaches," In *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, eds. Michael Frassetto and David R. Blanks (New York: St Martin Press, 1999), p. 14.

<sup>24</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 329-33.

<sup>25</sup> Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).

structural, relational and cultural dimensions.<sup>26</sup> It is an enhanced case study which is both analytical and interpretive. As Daniel Druckman puts it,

By viewing the case through the lens of an interpretive framework or particular concepts, the researcher provides a broader understanding of what happened. ... Generally, two approaches have been used. One consists of using a multidimensional framework as a lens through which a case is understood. Another uses a few key concepts as the basis for interpreting a case.<sup>27</sup>

The case study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan will be examined from the perspective of how historical encounters and misperception between West and Islam, and Western discourses defining the trends within political Islam have contributed to the escalation of conflict and violence in this region. I will use Louis Kriesberg's six phases of intractability to examine the level of intractability in the conflict of tribal areas of Pakistan in Chapter Seven.<sup>28</sup>

With respect to the transformation aspect within the Islamic and cultural context of the case study, this will be investigated via a combination of both emic and etic approaches; One important aspect of conflict is to understand it within its own context, and every conflict is thus unique. In the emic approach, an issue cannot be understood without an indigenous perspective or natives view, and in the etic approach; intentions of the observer is the main issue because a social phenomenon cannot be understood without invoking some sort of intentionality or contamination by the researcher. The emic approach uses an actor centred understanding which depicts the native views, terms and institution for the description and analysis of conflict while the etic approach employs analyst understanding which systematises data collected from emic approach for the construction of categories.<sup>29</sup> Integrating both emic and etic approaches into the study of Islam and peacebuilding is the best way to understand the diversity and complexity of

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<sup>26</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).

<sup>27</sup> Daniel Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc, 2005), p. 167.

<sup>28</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability," In *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Causes of Intractable Conflict*, eds. Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), pp. 65-98.

<sup>29</sup> Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution* (Washington D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 60-1.

violent and nonviolent micro and macro responses to conflict in a Muslim community. This will also be helpful in formulating a conflict transformation theory within an Islamic context.

The difference between the emic and etic approaches lies in the former's reliance on "thick description and rich context"<sup>30</sup> of the socio-cultural institutions and practices and in the latter for using cross cultural categories for reducing cultural diversity to a manageable dimension of analysis of the conflict. A significant aspect of the emic approach, used in this study includes meanings, which are assigned by the individuals in the conflict as it is this meaning that generates perceptions, whether positive or negative, and which are then passed on to future generations, leading to conflict or cooperation. This will be done through an analysis of public statements by the leaders of al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Because of the prevailing security situation in Pakistan, it was not possible to conduct direct interviews with the leaders of TTP or informed people in the area due to strict control by the intelligence agencies and the risks involved for the researcher. The University of New England rules also prohibit students from conducting field work in Red Zones declared by the Australian government. For the purpose of formulating a framework for transformation and peacebuilding, secondary data, statements and reports have had to suffice.

As part of the project of developing a peacebuilding framework for the case study, this thesis also examines the *Khudai Khidmatgar* (God's Servant) movement led by Abdul Gaffar Khan, and looks at his philosophy of nonviolence. Both will be studied from a 'subaltern' perspective, as the author herself is a native of the FATA. It will be shown that the stereotypes that were generated for depicting *Pakhtuns* in Orientalist discourse have influenced and continue to exert an influence over *Pakhtun* society.

While colonial theory deals primarily with élites and their perspectives, the alternative postcolonial theory looks at the world from 'the subaltern' perspective of ordinary people and subordinate classes. One of the problems concerning subaltern studies is the removal of élites from the subaltern realm which is defined "rather relationally, as that

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<sup>30</sup> Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, p. 68

which is not elite".<sup>31</sup> Yet one of the most important aspects of subaltern studies is that it must be situated within the structure of power and culture in order to have a better understanding of the contexts and processes that constitute a particular event.

The development of the historical stereotype of Islam had a tremendous influence on the depiction of the *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement that emerged in 1929 from the Northwest Frontier region of the British Empire in India, and adjacent tribal areas. In line with the Orientalist discourse, Islam's historiography can also be interpreted as an elite history with no account taken of the roles of everyday people in the historical process. The *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement represents a departure from the elite history of Islam since its study gives importance to the role of individuals in the transformation of society, cultural codes, and religious understanding. The study of this movement is important as "it explains the long period of non-violence which broke out within a society notorious for its violence."<sup>32</sup>

This study will also use the indigenous cultural resources of *Pakhtunwali* (the cultural code of *Pakhuns*) and Abdul Gaffar Khan's philosophy of nonviolence to help formulate the framework for peacebuilding and transformation for the case study area. Although Khan's philosophy is generally considered to be secular in nature, his heavy use of religious terms and principles depicts his recognition of the religiously-conservative nature of *Pakhtun* society and how to respond to it. In the FATA region, both religion and culture generate a sense of identity among the *Pakhtun* people.

Subaltern studies provide a useful framework through which to better understand this movement. The conception of 'self' and 'other' is an important part of identity construction in a cultural context. Culture is also helpful in creating a framework through which the behaviour of the 'other' is interpreted. Elements of culture have provided a basis for mobilisation for conflict;<sup>33</sup> but cultural resources can nonetheless be utilized to generate strategies for peace and conflict resolution or transformation. Kevin

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<sup>31</sup> Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed*, p. 11.

<sup>33</sup> Erik A. Gartzke and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (2006), p. 55.

Avruch defines culture as not a homogenous or a uniform 'trait list' which is timeless and stable but which is diverse and subject to change.<sup>34</sup>

The mere presence of cultural differences does not mean conflict will automatically arise, although culture is mostly the lens through which conflict is viewed and passed on to following generations. Mahmoud Mamdani, however, argues that placing culture as central in conflict analysis is problematic because it discounts history and other relevant issues, and also "de-historicizes the construction of political identities".<sup>35</sup>

Another significant form of identity used by a large group of people to demonstrate their sense of belonging and togetherness is that of 'civilization'. Numerous factors form the basis of this identity, including beliefs, practices, places, values, culture, language, social institutions, and religion. This is a form of mega-identity at the macro-level of grouping through which people identify themselves. S.P. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' hypothesis, which he first announced in 1992 following the ending of the Cold War, helped inform the tone of West-Islam relations, thus impacting on many regional conflicts. Earlier, Bernard Lewis had predicted the 'clash of civilizations', particularly referring to Muslims and the West, saying,

There is no less than a clash of civilizations - the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.<sup>36</sup>

Huntington contended that,

A civilizational paradigm thus sets forth a relatively simple but not too simple map for understanding what is going on in the world as the Twentieth Century ends.<sup>37</sup>

He defined civilizations as mega-identity groups of Africans, Confucian, Islamic, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and Western without considering

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<sup>34</sup> Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, p. 105.

<sup>35</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism," *American Anthropologist New Series* 104, no. 3 (2002), pp. 61-2.

<sup>36</sup> Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic Online*, September 1990 . Accessed 20 January, 2011. <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/199009/muslim-rage?x=37&y=8>

<sup>37</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Touchstone, 1996), p. 37.

their internal diversity. He argues that in the post-Cold War period, the factor that will be predominant in the construction of identities will be culture, and he predicts that future conflict will occur between broad-based civilisations, rather than between nation states as in the past.

One of the critiques of Huntington's civilisational model is that his definition of civilisation lacks clarity and fails to take into account factors such as ethnicity and language which cut across civilisational battles. Despite acknowledging the presence of other civilisational markers, Huntington gives primary importance to that of religion, contending that "people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other".<sup>38</sup> Huntington's definition presents civilisation as a homogenous fixed unit and plays down the possibility of diversity within each civilisation. Edward Said calls this form of hypothesis "The Clash of Ignorance", as it downplays the diversity within both Western and Islamic civilisations.<sup>39</sup>

Howard V. Brasted and Adeel Khan argue that media representation of Islam as a religion of violence, together with Muslims' sense of grievances and victimhood, and the historical misrepresentation of Islam by the West, has brought Islam within the civilisational clash theory. This is achieved through the 'metaphorical simplicity' of a stereotypical image of Islam as a monotheist faith in clash with Western liberal values.<sup>40</sup> The present thesis builds on this argument and formulates the peacebuilding and transformation framework using a religious-cultural approach to the conflict settings of FATA which depicts the internal diversity within Islam. It will also establish the reasons for the failure of Western peacebuilding which is defined as 'liberal peace projects', and a constitutive of a 'matrix of war' by Vivienne Jabri.<sup>41</sup> This will establish the grounds for opting for Islamic and indigenous approaches to the conflict in the tribal areas.

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<sup>38</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, p. 42.

<sup>39</sup> Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," 22 October, 2001, Accessed 24 September, 2012. [www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said](http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said)

<sup>40</sup> Howard V. Brasted and Adeel Khan, "Islam and 'the Clash of Civilizations'?: An Historical Perspective," In *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 275.

<sup>41</sup> Vivienne Jabri, "War, Government, Politics: A Critical Response to the Hegemony of the Liberal Peace," in *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 54.

In the discussion of 'self' and 'other' as forms of identity construction in historical-cultural contexts, this thesis argues that in a conflict where religion and religious identity plays important roles, it is imperative to deconstruct the perception of the 'other' in a historical context and to explore the formation of new relationships between conflicting parties. Historical narratives are the product of a construction of reality in a way that describes events that are not free from socio-political or religious inputs. Thus, Ignacio Bresco describes the events of 9/11 in terms of the motivations of those who planned and perpetuated this horrendous event.<sup>42</sup>

I argue that this goes only half-way. While the sense of victimhood, recognition and the premise of grievances are important markers of cultural identity, it is necessary to look more widely at both aspects of the civilizational divide. This concept of recognition is important for analyses of the 'self' and 'other', and is closely connected to the concept of 'otherness' when examining the West-Islam relations. This involves analyses of the 'self' and 'other', when examining West-Islam relations. The existence of the 'other' is important for positioning the 'self'. Otherwise, as Thomas McCarthy points out, the 'other' will end up not represented "as a competent partner in dialogue. ... but as an object of a monologue that disqualifies them in certain key respects."<sup>43</sup>

Drawing on Said's theory of Orientalism, my discussion will focus on the binary dichotomy of the 'self' and the 'other' as the primary framework of analysis in West-Islam discourses. It further argues that although the imagery, narratives, and stereotypes are generated by Western discourses on Islam, they also influence al-Qaeda and the Taliban. These organisations, although initially targeting Western societies, have turned inward and are especially targeting their own societies due to Muslim government policies and support by the West to them. The resulting violence, terrorism, and suicide bombings require a mechanism that can transform this conflict through Islamic principles and values. To date, Western principles have failed to bring about transformation or change in the West-Islam relationship.

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<sup>42</sup> Ignacio Brescó, "Giving National Form to the Content of the Past: A Study of the Narrative Construction of Historical Events," *Psychology and Society* 1, no. 1 (2008), p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Thomas McCarthy, "Doing The Right Thing in Cross Cultural Representation," *Ethics* 102, no. 3 (1992), p. 642. Accessed 15 July, 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381842>

As this conflict has a historical dimension, which has influenced the structure of the relationship, the existing techniques for the management or resolution of conflict have not been effective. The West-Islam conflict in FATA region of Pakistan is one not primarily based on interests, needs, or resources, as is commonly the case where conflicts arise. Thus a transformational approach is suggested to break the intractable nature of this conflict, involving as it does the standard meta-narrative of the West-Islam conflict but with some modifications for the context.

The role of perception is critical in defining the 'other' and the 'self' for it establishes a definite frame for judging all social, political, economic, and cultural issues. For centuries, the Western and Muslim worlds have served as each's 'other'. This difference in turn is not confined to religion alone, but also encompasses political, strategic, and economic considerations. Initially, the Christian West was ignored by Muslims, whose interests lay mostly in Mediterranean region and Asia when they constituted the hegemonic power in the world. As the West gained more authority in world politics, it began to employ the categories of identification that Islamic societies had adopted for it, emphasizing the superiority of Western culture and dismissing all other cultures as lacking the ability to progress.

Tariq Ramadan points to the phenomenon of victimhood and fear narratives by Muslims who began to consider themselves as perpetual victims of Western aggression, as a result of this global power shift. At the same time, the West based its narrative on the fear that Muslims wanted to destroy their values and way of life. He calls both global terrorism and 'war on terror' as "the global ideology of fear".<sup>44</sup> This effectively blocked any attempt to understand the reasons behind such convictions and inhibited any movements towards reconciliation.<sup>45</sup> The victimhood, hegemony and fear narratives can be viewed as the legacy of the colonial period. In the reconstruction of the past by Europe in the wake of renaissance and enlightenment, a period of 200 years or so and

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<sup>44</sup> Tariq Ramadan, "The Global Ideology of Fear," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 21, no 1 (Spring 2006), p. 12. Accessed 9 May, 2011. [www.digitalnpq.org/archieve/2006\\_winter/ramadan.html](http://www.digitalnpq.org/archieve/2006_winter/ramadan.html)

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, pp. 14-15.



during the Colonial era provided an historical framework for understanding West-Islam relations primarily in terms of Europe's colonial needs and interests.

The shift of colonial power and hegemonic influence from Western Europe to the U.S. in the 1950s did not so much change this situation in the Middle East as reinforce it. It resulted in a more violent period in the Middle East, as the U.S. in a very heavy-handed way exerted its power. This became a major cause of violence and antagonism in the Muslim world. It resulted in a more violent period in the Middle Eastern world, as the form of the cultural exchange practiced during the colonial era produced Western economic domination and politically infused ideologies and support to tyrannical rule by despots and dictators, which became a major cause of violence and antagonism in the Muslim world. The legacies of the British and French colonial interests, particularly during the mandate period with the continued support for Israel specifically by UK and support to despotic regimes in the Middle East were simply continued by the U.S. after 1948.

It is incumbent to factor in the protracted and complex legacy of Western powers in the Muslim world in order to comprehend the forces at work in post-9/11 image-making. For an informed understanding of the West-Islam relationship, the continuity of such image-making must be broken. Of course, the ideological notion of the 'other' is a hurdle to overcome. So is the renewed emphasis on terrorism and the supposed tendencies towards violence in Islam. These are old depictions centring on the concept of *Jihad*.

### **2.3 Intractable Conflict and the Theory of Conflict Transformation**

The construction of social reality through identity and narrative formation can be transformed through the adoption or transformation of different modes of interaction between 'self' and 'other'. Conflict transformation theory provides an avenue through which to examine the possibility of constructing such a reality by the transforming identity, narrative and policy perspectives of the conflict. The section dealing with the tribal areas of Pakistan will examine the concept of conflict intractability and the explanation of the identity, victimhood, humiliation and emotional factors associated with the world-wide conflict of 'war on terror'.

The classical concept of conflict emerged with the writings of Lewis Coser and George Simmel, who argued that conflict is a deeply intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change, and exerts a long-lasting impact on society and human development.<sup>46</sup> This was in sharp contrast to the prevailing 'realist' approach that termed peace as merely an absence of war, and conflict as an inevitable aspect of human life. Since conflicts arise from differences in interests, values and beliefs, the way people deal with it is often habitual, along the lines of defending one's own interests, which may lead to either compromise or violence .

Conflict can be 'symmetrical' or 'asymmetrical' depending on the balance of power and capabilities between the parties to the conflict. In symmetrical conflict, capabilities and power are equal. In asymmetrical conflicts, the issues between parties lie,

[i]n the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. It may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict.<sup>47</sup>

The chances of compromise in asymmetrical conflict are remote, as the path to resolution is through change that is not in the interests of the dominant party. Different theories of conflict depict the nature and types of conflict interventions (management, prevention, resolution or transformation) and the paradigms ('realist', 'idealist' or 'constructivist' etc) they use for conflict analysis. The pragmatist-realist paradigm for conflict analysis considers conflict to be inherent to the human condition which involves the pursuit of incompatible goals and a system governed by the principle of self-help.<sup>48</sup> This gave rise to the theories about the sources of conflict at the international level such as security dilemmas, balance of power theories, hierarchical equilibrium theory, liberal economic theories of trade, mutually assured destruction and the game theory.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 16, 22.

<sup>47</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 12.

<sup>48</sup> Kenneth Boulding, "Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies", In *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, eds. John W. Burton and Frank Dukes (New York: St. Martin Press, 1990), p. 37.

<sup>49</sup> Jack S. Levy, "Contending Theories of International Conflict: A Levels of Analysis Approach," In *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 4-5.

At the individual level, socio-psychological aspects of behaviour are deemed to determine the responses to conflict. There is the 'frustration aggression' theory, which attributes civil strife, riots, and revolutions to psycho-social factors.<sup>50</sup> This theory sees human nature as the main reason behind such conflicts, which has been explained by a subset: the theory of human needs.<sup>51</sup> According to this theory, all conflicts emerge due to some unfulfilled need or deprivation. Abraham Maslow divides basic needs into five categories: safety, psychological, belonging or love, esteem and self-actualization.<sup>52</sup> John Burton added that needs give satisfaction, not happiness, to individuals. If needs are not met, conflict inevitably arises. This is true especially of the needs of identity and security. Any refusal to recognise values or to satisfy basic human needs, whatever these are, is a recipe for conflict intervention process to fail.<sup>53</sup>

At the group level, group identity theories explain particular conflicts that result in the mobilization of movements involving nationalism, ethnicity and religion.<sup>54</sup> The basic impulse of group identity draws on binary dichotomy of 'us' versus 'them', leading to the assertion of demands for change to meet the needs of the group. Numerous factors influence this behaviour, from the physical to the psychological. At a systemic level, structural theories explain conflict in terms of the rational calculation of the contending parties.

Among relevant theories, conflict transformation is a new field of study, with important contributions by John Paul Lederach, Johan Galtung, Adam Curl, Raimo Vayrynen, and Kumar Rupesinghe. It has been defined as follows.

Conflict transformation is a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. Constructive conflict is seen as a vital agent or catalyst for change.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Leonard Berkowitz, "The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis," In *Roots of Aggression*, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

<sup>51</sup> John Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

<sup>52</sup> Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50, no. 4 (1943).

<sup>53</sup> John W. Burton, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (London: The MacMillian Press Ltd, 1990), p. 358.

<sup>54</sup> Jay Rothman, *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict: In Nations, Organisations and Communities* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), p. 179.

<sup>55</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 21.

As an emerging field in conflict studies, it arose as an alternative to the paradigms of conflict management, prevention and resolution. Conflict management concerns the positive handling of conflict to stop the escalation of violence, while resolution calls not only for the cessation of hostilities but also an agreement between the parties in that conflict to address the deep roots of a conflict.<sup>56</sup> The problem solving approach in conflict prevention, management, and resolution is based on addressing the needs, values, motives, interests, and tactics used by the protagonists in the conflict.<sup>57</sup> Burton uses the term 'provention' instead of 'prevention' to describe the process of identifying the sources of conflict and removing them.<sup>58</sup> Conflict prevention and resolution is supported by peacemaking efforts that include multi-level negotiations and third party mediation and conclude with the formation of agreements.

Peacekeeping is a part of peacemaking and is maintained through an international peace force set up to establish and maintain a ceasefire while peacebuilding addresses structural and longer term issues between conflict parties.<sup>59</sup> Transformation, which is an important part of the peacebuilding process, deals with all phases of the conflict, and providing a comprehensive framework for addressing it. It transforms unjust social relations by addressing issues of structural violence, culture and identity at the deepest level. Thus conflict transformation involves effective change of an intrinsic kind in the process of dealing with conflicts.<sup>60</sup>

Conflict transformation emphasizes the underlying causes that trigger the conflict and the structural environment that allows violence to continue. Scholars and practitioners have established various levels at which conflict can be addressed. Adam Curle, for instance, suggested that through communication, information, cooperative negotiation and development, an unbalanced and asymmetrical relationship can be transformed.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 21.

<sup>57</sup> John W. Burton, *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict* (Landham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 23-4.

<sup>58</sup> John W. Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*.

<sup>59</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 22.

<sup>60</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995).

<sup>61</sup> Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971).

Elise Boulding introduces the concept of “imaging the future” as a step towards constructing world peace.<sup>62</sup>

Adam Curle went on to argue that the transformation of asymmetrical relationships can be made through creating collaborative development opportunities as a way of constituting the basis of positive peace, lessening the chances of any recurrence of conflict.<sup>63</sup> On the other hand, Lederach observed that,

First, we must understand and feel the landscape of protracted violence and why it poses such deep-rooted challenges to constructive change. In other words, we must set our feet deeply into the geographies and realities of what destructive relationships produce, what legacies they leave, and what breaking their violent patterns will require.<sup>64</sup>

This same approach and argument can be used as a means for the deep analysis of conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan, my case study, in order to gauge the impact of colonial discourses and patterns of violence on the entire region. Overall, dealing successfully with the intractable conflict involves bringing positive social change through transformation.<sup>65</sup>

Intractable conflicts are normatively protracted with cyclical patterns of violence and calm. They are destructive in nature with deep physical and emotional consequences and are difficult to resolve or transform. Intractable conflicts have two key characteristics. First, they have win-lose elements, which involve deep-rooted moral differences between the protagonists that cannot be compromised, often relating to a question of scarce resources or disputes over social hierarchy. Win-win solutions (where both parties are satisfied with the outcome) are very difficult in such cases. Second, the stakes are very high in such conflicts, which reduce the possibility of finding straightforward solutions.<sup>66</sup> In the conflict transformation process, conflict is usually viewed as

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<sup>62</sup> Elise Boulding, *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990).

<sup>63</sup> Adam Curle, *Tools for Transformation* (London: Hawthorne Press, 1991).

<sup>64</sup> Lederach, *The Moral Imagination*, p. 5.

<sup>65</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), pp. 8-9.

<sup>66</sup> Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess, "Constructive Confrontation: A Transformative Approach to Intractable Conflicts," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (1996), p. 314.

opportunities for peace. Lederach used the term 'peacebuilding',<sup>67</sup> which along with truth, justice and mercy forms the long-term perspective of transformation. Fischer and Ropers consider the final outcome of transformation as a 'just peace'.<sup>68</sup>

One of the problems facing conflict transformation is a lack of adequate conflict analysis and policy recommendations for effective implementation. To be effective, conflict transformation needs in-depth conflict analysis, contextual knowledge about the conflict and its background, and adequate tools to deal with it. Conflict transformation deals with the structural conditions of the conflict, of which there are two: the relational and the substantive. These are considered more fundamental than just eradicating the violence in the conflict. The relational is based on perceptions and impressions of current and past interactions, while the substantive dimension rests on dealing with social, political, and economic problems between the conflict parties.<sup>69</sup> The relational dimension depends on human interaction (peaceful or destructive) and in the transformation approach this is stressed more than in the substantive approach, which regards interests and needs as the key elements. Both approaches will be discussed in the case study in order to develop a framework for peacebuilding.

One of the important aspects of conflict transformation is that it utilises and promotes human and cultural resources from within a culture, rather than importing solutions from other conflict settings. As Lederach pointed out, conflict transformation creates a new set of lenses, through which one does not view people as the problem and outsiders as having the answer. Its long-term goal is building on the resources *within* a conflict setting.<sup>70</sup> It will be argued in the case study that religious-cultural resources within *Pakhtun* culture in the case study are adequate for developing a viable peacebuilding framework.

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<sup>67</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*.

<sup>68</sup> Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, "Introduction," In *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict. The Berghof Handbook*, eds. Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004) p.13. Accessed 24 May, 2012.

<http://www.berghofhandbook.net/articles/preface-introduction/>

<sup>69</sup> Vincent Chetail, ed. *Post-Conflict Peace Building: A Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 94-5.

<sup>70</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace*, pp. 81-3.

Different scholars have suggested different frameworks for dealing with the process of transformation. Lederach, for example, has advanced a pyramid perspective of societies, in which interaction occurs at different levels (elite, middle level and grassroots) and over different time periods (short, mid and long-term). Lederach built his framework for peacebuilding and transformation on three pillars:

- Development of the short-term and long-term view of the conflict
- The construction of an adequate language to describe the conflict, involving the use of terminology recognised by all parties to the conflict.
- An understanding of the values and paradoxes in the peacemaking endeavour which result in irreconcilable contradictions. This includes paradoxes of personal and systematic change, justice and mercy, empowerment and interdependence, and process and outcome.<sup>71</sup>

His framework of conflict transformation suggests that these steps are a necessary and mutually interdependent prerequisite for establishing justice and peaceful relations within a conflict zone.<sup>72</sup> Lederach preferred conflict transformation to conflict resolution. He pointed out, if the resolution or management process does not result in increased justice because the structural root causes of the conflict are not addressed, then it is important to change the way the conflict is envisioned and expressed.<sup>73</sup>

Raimo Vayrynen suggested that there are four ways in which transformation can be effective. Actors' transformation (parties to the conflict), issues' transformation (changes in goals and agenda of conflict), rules' transformation (rules which affect the relationship) and structural transformation (changes in the nature of the conflict).<sup>74</sup> Ramsbotham et al. added two other aspects through which transformation can be effective, through context transformation (changes in the international and regional context of the conflict), and personal or elite transformation (change of leadership, will or

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<sup>71</sup> Lederach, *Preparing for Peace*, p. 12.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>74</sup> Raimo Vayrynen, *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation* (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1991).

perspective on the conflict).<sup>75</sup> Kumar Rupesinghe emphasised the grassroots level for conflict transformation.<sup>76</sup> The transformation view which will be followed in FATA case study will be based on all these levels.

## 2.4 Conflict Framing

Since most conflicts, according to Charles Taylor, are the product of competing narratives and identity-making processes, their resolution and transformation involves reframing these factors. Framing the way a conflict has been expressed is used as a strategic tool to make sense of a complex situation to rationalize self-interest, or to promote a preferred outcome.<sup>77</sup> Framing involves taking into consideration not only the difference in beliefs, values, interests and needs, but also the way a conflict is perceived at different levels of society. However, reframing does not necessarily lead to conflict de-escalation, but is designed to help find ways towards a solution and to understand an adversary's position.

There are different kinds of frames that are used to perceive a conflict. 'Identity' frames are about self-other conceptions; 'characterisation' frames are about negative and positive depictions of group or individual concept of power; and other important frames include 'risk' and 'information' frames, 'loss/gain' frames, and frames relating to 'social control' and 'conflict management'.<sup>78</sup>

In the tribal areas, the way conflict has been framed - fitting into a 'clash of civilizations' scenario with a presentation of historical grievances including the feelings of victimhood and humiliation - has had a deep impact on the conflict itself and makes it an intractable one. In intractable conflicts, framing is usually reinforcing and persistent. Burgess observed that,

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<sup>75</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 177.

<sup>76</sup> Kumar Rupesinghe, ed. *Conflict Transformation* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

<sup>77</sup> Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," In *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992).

<sup>78</sup> Deborah Shmueli, Michael Elliott and Sanda Kaufman, "Frame Changes and the Management of Intractable Conflicts," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (Winter 2006), pp. 4-6.



Framing in an intractable conflict by the parties is a complex and often muddled process in which vague but intense feelings of frustration are transformed into passionate crusades for particular positions.<sup>79</sup>

The conflict in FATA can be analysed in zero-sum framing (a 'no win' situation) and identity framing of 'self and 'other' in which the parties incorrectly assume that all aspects of the conflict have an irreducible win-lose character, when in fact they do not.

## 2.5 Social Construction of Identity and Transformation

Social construction of identity is one important aspect of intractable conflict. In this form of conflict, social categories of caste, race, and religion are created which contribute towards the construction of identities. These are based on 'self'-'other' relations contributing to the understanding of the source of conflict.<sup>80</sup> In this regard, the 'core construct' plays a critical role in constructing identities, a concept developed by George Kelly in 1955. Core constructs are useful in analysing intractable conflicts because they are based on the factors that promote a sense of identity.<sup>81</sup> Threat perception emanates from being constantly aware of membership in a particular group and imagining a threat to the collective identity, which leads to a protective response.<sup>82</sup>

The core constructs become a threat when the real basis of identity revolves around a 'self'- 'other' dichotomy where these are defined only by constructing an 'other'.<sup>83</sup> In short, differences in the setting of intractable conflict can mostly be understood in terms of threats to the 'self'. Moreover, the 'other' is a constitutive part of the 'self' as threat emanates from it, and through that identity is established.<sup>84</sup> The concept of the 'self' which is defined in terms of threats from 'others' leads to boundary creation within the

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<sup>79</sup> Heidi Burgess, "Constructive Confrontation," p. 309.

<sup>80</sup> Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence. Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 51.

<sup>81</sup> George Kelly, *The Psychology of Personal Constructs : Volumes 1 & 2* (New York: Norton, 1955), p. 482.

<sup>82</sup> Terrell A. Northrup, "The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict," In *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation*, eds. Liouis Kriesberg , Terrell A. Northrup and Stuart J. Thorson (Syracuse, N.Y : Syracuse Universty Press, 1989), p. 66.

<sup>83</sup> Nikki Slocum-Bradley, "Introduction: Borders of the Mind," In *Promoting Conflict or Peace through Identity*, ed. Nikki Slocum-Bradley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p. 12.

<sup>84</sup> Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, "Introduction: Constructing Insecurity," In *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey ,Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 11.

identity construction process, separating the in-group and out-group in the conflict situation. This concept is very important in understanding the threat perception in Western and Muslim societies towards each other. The core constructs in the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan are based on religiously-identified categories derived from historical encounters, colonisation and victimhood/grievances, together with political and social issues arising out of the conflict. The early Christian discourses of creating an identity by considering Islam as an 'other' had a deep impact on relations between the two, together with its impact on trends within political Islam that defined 'self' based on insecurity to its identity.

## **2.6 Recognition, Victimhood, Humiliation and Emotions**

Recognition is one of the underlying concepts for long-term peaceful relations. Charles Taylor argued that identities are shaped and became meaningful only through recognition of each other and relating to each other.<sup>85</sup> The concept of recognition is significant while dealing with intractable conflicts. This process of recognition is dependent on 'self' and 'other' transformation by recognising each other's key elements of identity. The recognition of victimhood, grief and suffering leads to validation, which can pave the way for a better relationship.<sup>86</sup> The aim of recognition is not the assimilation or amalgamation of narratives or the constructing of a joint identity, but acknowledging the differences and building a new relationship based on that recognition. This involves constructing counter-narratives based on remembering the past differently, leading to permeable boundaries between identity and difference, which are not viewed as inherently flawed. History which challenges beliefs is difficult to transform.

A sense of victimhood is a well-developed theme in studies of intractable conflict as it contributes to legitimising claims of the parties involved in the conflict while delegitimising the other. Lily et al. define victimhood as,

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<sup>85</sup> Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," p. 32.

<sup>86</sup> Vamik Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc, 1994), p.172.

A lasting psychological state of mind that involves beliefs, attitudes, emotions and behavioural tendencies. This results on the one hand from direct or indirect experience of victimization, and on the other from its maintenance in the personal repertoire.<sup>87</sup>

For developing a sense of victimhood, it is important to perceive harm as undeserved, immoral and unjust, which could not be prevented by the victim. Victimhood can be experienced in tangible and intangible terms. Tangible victimhood involves violation of rights, territory, murder and physical injury, while the intangible includes identity damage, psychological trauma, and loss of old 'self' or loss of sense of security.<sup>88</sup>

In a collective sense, victimhood is seen as a factor contributing to the continuation of conflict and is an inhibitor in any peace process.<sup>89</sup> Just like individuals, groups can also develop a sense of collective victimhood on the basis of shared in-group victimisation.<sup>90</sup> One of the important aspects of victimhood is that it creates powerful cultural narratives by a gradual process of internalising past harm.<sup>91</sup> Liu Yongtao believes that collective memories are shaped by culture according to historical affordance by preserving narratives which are functional and useful for maintaining collective memories.<sup>92</sup> Bernard Lewis defined Muslim victimhood and grievances due to the three-stage sense of the defeat of Muslims: first, the loss of its domination of the world; second, was the loss of its authority within its own countries and lastly, the emergence of emancipated women and society which challenged its traditional norms. Lew describes it as follows,

Rage against these alien, infidel, and incomprehensible forces that had diverted his dominance, disrupted his society, and finally violated the sanctuary of his home was inevitable. It was also natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy and should draw its strength from ancient beliefs and loyalties.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal, Lily Chernyak-Hai, Noa Schori and Ayelet Gunder, "A Sense of Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts," *International Review of Red Cross* 91, no. 874 (2009), p. 231.

<sup>88</sup> Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori and Gunder, "A Sense of Self-Perceived Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts," p. 232.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 230.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, p. 235.

<sup>91</sup> Antonius C.G.M. Robben and Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco, *Culture under Siege: Collective Violence and Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 23.

<sup>92</sup> Liu Yongtao, "Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Rhetoric of 'Axis of Evil' As a Case," *Confines* 6, no. 11 (2010), p. 98.

<sup>93</sup> Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," p. 3.

The basic dynamics of intractable conflict constitute emotions and socio-psychological perceptions. The emotional experience of humiliation, anger and rage can motivate terrorist activity. For example, the *New York Times* on 12 May, 2004, reported the beheading of an American captive Nicholas Berg where a masked terrorist referred to photos showing the humiliation of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, and read a statement saying:

The shameful photos are evil humiliation for Muslim men and women in the Abu Ghraib prison," the masked man says. "Where is the sense of honor, where is the rage? Where is the anger for God's religion? Where is the sense of veneration for Muslims, and where is the sense of vengeance for the honor of Muslim men and women in the Crusaders prison?"<sup>94</sup>

Emotions are central to intractable conflicts. They not only drive them but also produce consequences for escalating violence in response to the conflict. A significant emotion that plays an important part in intractable conflict is humiliation, which usually occurs in asymmetrical conflict where the powerful party has control over the victim.<sup>95</sup> Humiliation, although a public emotion, is formative in nature as it has a significant impact on forming identity processes.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, it has a hybrid nature, as shame is self-blame while anger is related to the blaming of another. These emotions are in contrast with humiliation, which is 'self'-'other' focused. One very important action tendency of humiliation, like all other emotions, is aggression and retaliation.<sup>97</sup> In a speech in October 2003, President Mahatir Mohamad of Malaysia talked about the humiliation suffered by Muslims and a sense of victimhood that caused this factor.

I will not enumerate the instances of our humiliation. ... We are all oppressed. We are all being humiliated. ... Today we, the whole Muslim (community), are treated with contempt and dishonour. ... There is a feeling of hopelessness among Muslim countries and their

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<sup>94</sup> Douglas Jehl, Eric Lichtblau and Carl Hulse, "Iraq Videotape Show the Decapitation of an American," *New York Times*, Wednesday, May 12, 2004. Accessed 30 April, 2010.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/12/world/struggle-for-iraq-revenge-killing-iraq-tape-shows-decapitation-american.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

<sup>95</sup> Jennifer S. Goldman and Peter T. Coleman, "A Theoretical Understanding of How Emotions Fuel Intractable Conflict: A Case of Humiliation," Accessed 25 Septemebr, 2012.

<http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/GoldmanNY05meetingRT2.pdf>

<sup>96</sup> Avishai Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 130

<sup>97</sup> Jonathan Lear, "Anger Management," *New York Times* 2003, Sunday, February 9, Section 7, p. 22.

people. They feel they can do nothing right. ... Our only reaction is to become more and more angry. Angry people cannot think properly.<sup>98</sup>

## 2.7 Methodology and Framework of Analysis

The issues addressed in this thesis, can be seen to encompass multiple disciplines and theoretical frameworks, including historical, political, sociological, cultural and religious concepts, thus requiring the adoption of a multi-layered analysis. The approach is primarily literature-based, especially in Chapter three and four on the historical background that provide the contextual platform for this thesis. This research will use a multidisciplinary or, more specifically, a multiplex methodology. That is, “[a] systematic inquiry into the multiple, simultaneous and often contradictory knowledge claims made by all conflicting parties to a violent human conflict”.<sup>99</sup>

Daniel Druckman suggested that in conflict studies an ‘agnostic stance’ is necessary in order to promote an unbiased approach when interrogating theory, research and practice.<sup>100</sup>

### 2.7.1 Data and Analysis

Data has been generated from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included in-depth interviews with selected participants for narrative analysis and developing a framework for transformation and peacebuilding. Secondary sources mainly covered historical literature, such as books, journals, and newspaper articles, reports and statements concerning the construction of narratives based on misperceptions, stereotypes and images. In addition, the writings and public statements of the leaders of al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been analysed. Semi-structured interviews with 15 respondents have been primarily used in Chapter VI to contextualise the historical narratives and to prepare the ground for Islamic conflict transformation and peacebuilding.

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<sup>98</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, "The Humiliation Factor," *New York Times* 2003, Sunday, November 9, Section 4: p. 11.

<sup>99</sup> Thomas Boudreau, "Intergroup Conflict Reduction through Identity Affirmation," p. 101.

<sup>100</sup> Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*, p. 13.

This case study of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan has been selected due to its importance in the 'war on terror' as a result of the leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban taking refuge there in the post-9/11 era. Moreover, the rise of local militancy with its spill over effect into neighbouring areas places a premium on looking at transformation approaches and possibilities with respect to this conflict. It follows that in order to trace the possibilities of transformation in such an intractable conflict, it is necessary to understand its root causes, which is one of the main objectives of this thesis.

The main techniques used in this study were semi-structured, in-depth interviews, and analysis of secondary sources. Semi-structured, open-ended questions for this study were used to satisfy the University of New England's ethics committee requirements for objective research. Unstructured interviews ran the risk of turning into long, generalised and directionless conversations without any focal point.

For the purposes of the study, two interview tools were constructed. The first was based on the construction of narratives in West-Islam relations, while the second was based on history, peace and transformation concepts within Islam, and the post-9/11 era relations between the West and Islam, and their impacts. This framework was derived from a study by Jeans S. Phinney and Mona Devich-Navarro, which permitted participants to define issues from their own perspectives.<sup>101</sup>

A total of 15 interviews were conducted with scholars and theologians mainly in Egypt due to UNE restriction on doing field work in the Red zones as explained earlier. The interviewees were chosen for their relevance to the conceptual questions. Interviews were conducted in English, but some interviewees chose to reply in French or Arabic. For the purpose of this thesis, the Arabic interviews were translated by the researcher herself, while French responses were translated by an appropriate professional translator.

All interviews were transcribed in Word format in English, and notes were also taken during the fieldwork. The information gathered from these interviews was subjective,

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<sup>101</sup> Jean. S Phinney and Mona Devich-Navarro, "Variations in Bicultural Identification among African American and Mexican American Adolescents," *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 7, no.1 (1997).

and interview transcripts and written notes were analysed systematically through repeated readings to get an in-depth understanding of each interviewee's viewpoint.

### **2.7.2 Framework for Analysis**

Frameworks in a research design are devices for organizing, identifying and relating elements of structure, interactive processes and dynamics; they also help in the conceptualizing, analysing and interpretation of data.<sup>102</sup> The framework of research developed in this study will involve three stages: conceptualizing a problem, collecting data pertinent to it, analysing the data interpretation and suggesting a peacebuilding and transformation framework based on the interpretation.<sup>103</sup>

The framework in this study will be constructed as follows, encompassing a number of stages:

1. Historical analysis of narratives is based on frames for explaining and analysing the historical literature and the construction of the concept of the 'other' in West-Islam relations.
2. Existing approaches to conflict transformation by Lederach and Galtung are reviewed, as are the Islamic peacebuilding and transformation approaches of Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk, and Abu Nimer, in order to identify the factors underpinning the historical narratives.
3. Casual factors of the conflict are identified.
4. These are applied to the dimensional analysis of the conflict of FATA.
5. This procedure covers the multilayered factors that need to be taken into account in proposing a concept of Islamic conflict transformation and a framework for peacebuilding, especially with respect to the case study.

## **2.8 Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework and methodology to be used for the selection and interpretation of data. It has also explained the approaches for the analysis

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<sup>102</sup> Druckman, *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*, p. 30.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

of historical material and the case study, both of which provide the basis for developing a framework for peacebuilding and transformation. The research design explains what approaches I have decided to employ. The framework will be helpful in analysing the construction of those narratives that influenced the case study of FATA, so as to devise approaches within an Islamic context to bring about conflict transformation. In the next two chapters on historical analysis, West-Islam relations will be analysed based on the thematic frames that will set the context for the case study of the tribal areas of Pakistan.



## CHAPTER THREE

# HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY- I

## The History of West-Islam Relations: An Overview of Narratives, Images And Stereotypes Of The Muslim 'Other'

*Indeed, it can be reasonably argued that Christian self-identity was forged in part by its sense that it was always on the verge of being overwhelmed by the 'other' of Islam (Philip Almond).<sup>1</sup>*

### 3.1 Introduction

Religion is borne out of a collision between sacred and temporal history, and is not just faith, but is rather a story of faith. Faith not only provides a common language of understanding but also provides a common transcendental experience shared by a community or group of people.<sup>2</sup> This story of faith produces different narratives, which are translated by different communities according to their changing circumstances. The issues that initially emerged between Muslims and Christians came from the story of faith. The interpretations, dogmas, and prophetic claims of these two monotheistic religions depicted two different versions of the same story.

This chapter provides the context for analyzing the West-Islam encounters and their consequent relations. It examines the narratives, perceptions, and stereotypes of Islam in Christian/Western discourse. It covers the historical era from the rise of Islam to the

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Almond, "Western Images of Islam, 1700-1900," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 49, no. 3 (2003): p. 416.

<sup>2</sup> Reza Aslan, Introduction to *No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks), p. xxv.

defeat of the Byzantine Empire, the Crusades, the emergence of colonialism in Muslim territories and the decline of the Muslim Ottoman Empire. This chapter constitutes a broad survey of Christian images of Muslims, outlining the prevailing historical meta-narrative. Thus, it identifies major images of the Muslim 'other' and Christian 'self' in different eras and how each influenced the meta-narrative. Because of its particular focus on Christian/Western images of Islam and Muslims, this chapter does not examine Muslims images of the Christian West - a task in its own right.

The importance of this chapter lies in deconstructing the sources of narratives that are being used in the post-9/11 period, specifically those which influenced the case study FATA where these narratives have been considerably utilised. In short, it provides an overall context for understanding the process of West-Islam relations and encounters, which is helpful in identifying the categories for developing the framework of conflict transformation and peacebuilding in Islam. This chapter does not offer a critical discourse analysis of the works of different Christian/Western authors, but is confined to the history and processes of the construction of adversarial forms of Christian/Western imagery of Islam. It is argued in this thesis that these narratives and the imagery they created affected on fundamentalist Muslim discourses and fueled militant Jihadism of al Qaeda and the Taliban in FATA.

### **3.2 Historical Narratives**

Construction of history and narrative plays an important role in fixing identities, and connecting the present with past narratives. According to Paul Ricoeur, all types of identities, from individual to collective, are created through narratives of history.<sup>3</sup> The common modes of channeling historical narrative are ritual celebration, speech, word of mouth, newspapers, articles, books, and speeches. The grand or master narratives are channeled through the memory institutions of the state, through textbooks, educational institutions, and the writings of the theologians and scholars of that era.

Master narratives are protected through commemorative narratives (that express a particular version of the past) which oppose qualifications that might pose a challenge to

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<sup>3</sup> Paul Ricoeur. *Time and Narrative*. vol .1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 241-42.

the master narrative.<sup>4</sup> Postmodern theories consider that the development of grand or master narratives is essentially the interplay of language. Lee Peterson contends that narratives which may be considered universal, transcendental and primordial are in reality historically-constituted and therefore alterable.<sup>5</sup> In order to interpret the present, it is important to have an understanding of the past, which is mostly accomplished through the memory process. Collective memory is institutionalised or disseminated through the media or scholars who help to constitute the master narrative as a source of collective identity.<sup>6</sup>

Narratives are stories which depict the intentions, needs, and beliefs of a group; they are produced in a particular context. This view, which is influenced by postmodern thinking, sees conflict, for example, being explained in terms of collective or group discourses. In other words, the way conflict unfolds and the behavior it unleashes, are directly related to the narrative describing and rationalising it.<sup>7</sup> Within these narratives are embedded stereotypes that typify the 'other' in simplified form, providing the 'other' with an identity that is easily understandable in comparison with the discourse of 'self'.<sup>8</sup> Important aspects of the construction of stereotypes are the lack of observation, the negativity attached to the image, and the development of prisms that reveal or identify the 'other' in ways that are easily comprehensible to ordinary people and scholars alike. Stereotypes usually emerge when there is lack of interaction, despite a need for it, thus leading to the creation of boxed images of each other.

Although stereotyping is an identity-defining process, it also generates counter-identities in the same group. For example, Muslims are identified as Saracens, Hagarenes, Turks, Moors, violent, turban-clad barbarians, veiled women and so on, and each of the images

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<sup>4</sup> Yaakov Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 5-7.

<sup>5</sup> Lee Patterson, "On the Margin: Postmodernism, Ironic History, and Medieval Studies," *Speculum* 65, no.1 (1990): pp. 88-91.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Ned. Lebow, "The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe," In *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, eds. Richard Ned. Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): pp. 4-8.

<sup>7</sup> John Winslade and Gerald Monk, *Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000), pp. 3-5.

<sup>8</sup> Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), pp. 31-2.

depicts identities based on different reframe points: tribal, ethnic, religious and so on. The boxed imagery of Muslims and its stereotypical usage complicates the issue and has conflict-generating tendencies. In this regard, social constructivism is an important factor, as all narratives and stereotypes are socially constructed based on the memory, language and meanings attached to them.

The story of West-Islam relations is also a story of perceptions, founded or unfounded, which created narratives and stereotypes. Salancik and Pfeffer point out that,

[i]ndividuals use their own behavior to construct reality. ... [p]erception is a retrospective process though the (emotional) experience is immediate; it derives from recall and reconstruction.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said consider retrospective and prospective approaches, preferring the prospective approach for dealing with West-Islam relations.<sup>10</sup> The retrospective approach calls for bringing to focus 'what was' and 'is' rather than 'what might be,' while the prospective approach is based on 'where we might go next.'<sup>11</sup> This chapter takes a retrospective approach to examining the history of stereotyping.

S. P. Huntington argues that the antagonistic narratives prevailing in West-Islam relations take the line of religious-cultural conflict,<sup>12</sup> although the empirical studies by Pippa Norris and Roland Inglehart do not support this.<sup>13</sup> In a study that tests the 'clash of civilizations' thesis by looking at how it applies to seventy societies around the world between 1995-2001, they concluded that any black-and-white cultural 'clash' between Islamic and Western societies was too simplistic a 'clash'. According to them, not

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<sup>9</sup> Gerald R. Salancik and Jeffrey Pfeffer, "A Social Information Processing Approach to Job Attitude and Task Design," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 23, no.2 (1978): p. 228.

<sup>10</sup> Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, "Islam and The West: Narratives of Conflict and Conflict Transformation," *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 9, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 2004 ): p. 2. Accessed 28 April, 2012. [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9\\_1/Funk&Said\\_91IJPS.pdf](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol9_1/Funk&Said_91IJPS.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996); David Levering Lewis, *God's Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570-1215* (New York : W. W. Norton, 2008); Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003).

<sup>13</sup> Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "Muslims and the West: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis'," *Comparative Sociology* 1, no. 3-4 (2003).

political liberalism or democracy or Western values but rather gender issues and sexual liberalisation were the central issues.

On the other hand, Gilles Kepel analyses the use of grand narratives of the 'war on terror' and *Jihad* for winning the minds and hearts of Muslims and Westerners. He examines the events of 9/11 in the light of narratives of good vs. evil, good vs. bad Muslims, *Jihad* as a holy war, and democracy vs. totalitarianism. Kepel compares the meta-narratives of al Qaeda leadership (Bin Laden, al Zawahiri) and the neoconservatives in George W. Bush's administration and concludes that both failed. In effect they constituted 'transformative fictions'. He sketches a third narrative based on a framework of sustainable prosperity and economic dynamism for building an integrated civilization from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. Kepel contends that this will meet the stability requirements of the U.S., Israel and the Palestinian state and will transcend the narratives of terror and martyrdom.<sup>14</sup>

The narratives that rest on confrontation, power, and competing interests tend to be based on historical memories and perceptions that are derived from the geopolitical and cultural legacies of the past. As such, they form a collective imagination that is influential in forming collective responses that can lead to conflicts. The binary dichotomies of 'us vs. them' and 'our values and their values' define realities in terms of 'existential otherness' and 'existential self'; this is itself influential in constructing 'actual history vs. remembered history'.<sup>15</sup> Although, as Said and Funk argue while proposing a third new story of complementarity,<sup>16</sup> there have been stories of confrontation or incompatibility and stories of cooperation and compatibility, this chapter mainly discusses the stories and events which had conflict-generating tendencies and which have impacted on the relations between Muslims and the West in contemporary times.

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<sup>14</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East*, Trans. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).

<sup>15</sup> Funk and Said, "Islam and The West," pp. 6-8.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

### 3.3 Narratives, Images, and Stereotypes During the Early Period of Islam

At the core of the problem between Islam and Christianity at the time Islam emerged were theological issues.<sup>17</sup> Two main issues stood out. The first involved the place of Islam as a religion, which from the Muslim perspective concerned the nature of the relations with the 'people of the book'. The second issue dealt with an assessment of Jesus and Muhammad, comparing not only their Prophethood but also their personal lives and their roles in the spiritual and temporal worlds.<sup>18</sup> Both issues are still central to West-Islam relations, pitting Islam against modernity and associating depictions of the Prophet with blasphemy. Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, and movies such as *Submission* and *Innocence of Muslims* have served to bring the values of Islam and modernity into collision, producing violent Muslim responses all over the world.

The comparison of theologies and prophets during the early period of Islam occurred at two different levels. The Christian view (or at least that of the Eastern Orthodoxy) was predicated on the basis that Islam was an offshoot of Christianity, which centered on the divinity of Christ, while the Islamic view was based on the relationship with Christians as the 'people of the book: Christians and Jews', emphasising the centrality of the *Qur'an*.<sup>19</sup> With the advent of Islam in the 7<sup>th</sup> Century, the main problem for Muslims over the next thirteen years was the Arab idol worshippers and non-believers in Mecca. After the Muslims established their rule in *Yathrib* (Medina) in 622 C.E., mostly inhabited by Christians and Jews, the relationship among these three communities came to the forefront.<sup>20</sup>

Although relations with Jews became fractious, relations with Christians were cordial. This was based on the story of the cousin of *Khadija* (the Prophet Muhammad's first wife), named *Warqa Ibn Nawfal* (a convert to Christianity) and *Bahriya* (a Nestorian

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<sup>17</sup> Richard William Southern, *Western Views of Islam In the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Frederick Quinn, *The Sum of All Heresies: The Image of Islam in Western Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>19</sup> Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of An Image* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, Ltd., 1993); Southern, *Western Views of Islam In the Middle Ages*.

<sup>20</sup> Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), pp. 9, 12.

monk), who confirmed the prophetic signs in the young Muhammad, and on the acceptance by Christians of Muhammad's role as a mediator in *Yathrib*.<sup>21</sup> After the death of Muhammad in 632 C.E., and with the expansion of the Muslim Empire, the question of Muslim-Christian relations took on a different character. With the expansion of the Muslim Empire in the east and the conquest of the Byzantine provinces in the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Century; the issue of the theological character of both religions took on a new importance because of the conversion of Christians to Islam and the *Dhimmi* status<sup>22</sup> given to the unconverted Christians under Muslim rule. During the initial encounter, there were few attempts by Byzantine Christian theologians to form an adverse opinion about Islam as a religion.

Daniel Norman contends that "Scripture was the framework of all medieval thought. ... The Old Testament would always seem to be the primary source of such knowledge, and therefore in practice the Old Testament was used to refute the *Qur'an*".<sup>23</sup> The writers and scholars during the early period received information about Islam from the Byzantium Empire, they soon acquired negative images of Islam when they began to view it through the lenses of biblical history and of the apocalyptic visions it contained. This trend was visible both in Carolingian scholarly writings and Spanish writings of the time.

Later, in the aftermath of the first Crusade in the 11<sup>th</sup> Century, stories brought back by the Crusaders continued this trend. R. W. Southern believes that much of the fiction about Islam was created after that. The *Songs of Roland*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, *Chansons de Geste*, *Tervigant and Apollo*, and *Le Cycle de Guillaume* are a few examples of such fictional degeneration.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History*, p. 4.

<sup>22</sup> *Dhimmi* literally means protected. Under Islamic Law, *Dhimmi* status was given to people of The Book (Jews and Christians) and a religious tax (*Jizya*) was imposed on them. Though it remained a controversial topic in Muslim history, the impact of *Dhimmi* on Muslim-Christian relations remained.

<sup>23</sup> Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 253.

<sup>24</sup> Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, p. 14.

Daniel points out that the modern attitude towards Islam goes back to Middle Ages, the Age of Romantics, and the Enlightenment.<sup>25</sup> He tried to construct a better understanding of Islam by demonstrating that the evil image of Islam and its Prophet arose from ignorance and false imagery. Similarly, Carl H. Becker considers Christology (the way Christianity has been described in the *Qur'an*) to be the root cause of hostility in Christian-Muslim relations; he uses the term 'Christian polemics' to describe the anti-Muslim position adopted by the Christian fathers, which was not due to the occasional utterances of Christian historians.<sup>26</sup> He believes that the earliest Christian responses to Islam go back to the 8<sup>th</sup> Century during the Abbasid period, and he mentions John of Damascus (700-750 C.E.) and Theodore Abu Qarrah (720-820 C.E.) as the first Christian fathers to think about Islam and its Prophet. He believes that the story of Christian-Muslim negative polemics goes back to that era.

John of Damascus (676-749 C.E.) or *Yuhanna-ed-Dimashqi* in Arabic, set the benchmark for Christianity's perspective of Islam.<sup>27</sup> He termed Islam a Christian heresy in his book *Des Haeresibus*. His work is of great importance, as he is considered to be the last of the great fathers of Eastern Christianity, equal to the West's Thomas Aquinas not only as a systematic theologian but also for his influence on Christian attitudes towards Islam in the years to come. Chapter 100 and 101 of John of Damascus book *Des Haeresibus* is titled, 'The Heresy of the Ishmaelites,' and starts with the sentence:

There is also the still prevailing deceptive superstition of the Ishmaelite, the forerunner of the Anti-Christ.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 315.

<sup>26</sup> Carl Heinrich Becker, "Christian Polemics and the Formations of Islamic Dogma," In *Muslim and Others in Early Islamic Society: The Formation of Classical Islamic World*. ed. Robert Hoyland (Burlington: Ashgate Variorum, 2004), p. 242.

<sup>27</sup> John of Damascus's original name was Ibn Mansur (named after his grandfather). He worked as a tax collector in Syria, which was under the control of Umayyad at that time. His grandfather and father played an important role in handing Damascus over to Muslim rulers. He then left the job of chief advisor to the Caliph Hisham and joined a monastery, where he wrote books about Christian theology. It was during this time that he wrote a chapter on Islam as a Christian heresy. This might be a result of the influence of Iconoclastic Synod in 754, in which he was subjected to four anathemas: he has a bad and dirty name, Mansur, he is of Saracen opinions, insulter of Christ, and conspirator against Christ. It was for this reason that he defended icon-worshipping while Synod opposed it. He was also termed a Christian apostate to Islam because of his opposition to icons, which was considered Muslim influence.

<sup>28</sup> Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam*, pp. 132-33.



This has two important aspects. First, Islam was considered to be both heresy and a superstition. Although he did not particularly name Muhammad as the anti-Christ, the religion as such was termed anti-Christ. Muslims were given names of Hagarenes, Saracens, and Ishmaelites, while there is no mention of the term 'Muslim' to describe them; this only came into usage in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Islam was termed an idol-worshipping heresy (worshippers of the star *Kouber*) and Muhammad was described as a false prophet who borrowed texts from the Old and New Testaments. Over the years to come, this book became one of the strongest influences on Christian attitudes towards Muslims.<sup>29</sup>

Richard Fletcher offers an explanation for why Christians called Islam a heresy and Muhammad a false prophet during the early period of Islam. According to him, during this time, the Christian and Roman authorities were dealing with the issues of the institutional authority of the Church, biblical exposition, and establishing a religious core in the Roman world. The idea of religious pluralism was absent. Christianity was considered the only true word of God, which pagans, Zoroastrians and Jews had rejected. In this period, Christian authorities dealt with those sects who chose their own ways by establishing different orders within Christianity. Accordingly, Islam was also termed a 'heresy' (which literally means to choose). Because the *Qur'an* incorporates stories from the Old Testament, Muhammad was considered to be someone who challenged the authority of the Christian Church itself.<sup>30</sup>

John of Damascus's disciple, Theodore Abu Qurrah (750-823 C.E.), one of the many fathers of the Greek Church who knew Arabic, developed John's argument in a rather less polemical fashion. He is considered to have written the *Disputation Between A Saracen and A Christian*,<sup>31</sup> in which he discussed the theological questions between Muslims and Christians based on what he heard from John of Damascus. The questions of polygamy, idol worshipping, prophecy, and women are discussed in detail.

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<sup>29</sup> Quinn, *The Sum of All Heresies*; Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam* ; Daniel, *Islam and the West*.

<sup>30</sup> Richard Fletcher, *The Cross and The Crescent: The Dramatic Story of the Earliest Encounters Between Christians and Muslims* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), pp.17-29.

<sup>31</sup> Theodore Abu Qurrah, *Library of the Christian East*, vol. 1 (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005).

Bede was the first theologian to carry forward this imagery to Western Christendom, having a lasting impression on the image of Islam in the West. The Venerable Bede (672/673-735 C.E.), a monk and biblical scholar, wrote his biblical commentary in English and introduced Saracens to the West. In his *Ecclesiastical History*, he describes *Saracens* as a plague who had destroyed peace by their raids on the territories of Byzantium and Jerusalem.<sup>32</sup> Together, the writings of John of Damascus, Abu Qurrah and Bede strongly influenced the image of Islam and the developing narratives about Islam and its Prophet in the years to come. Although their polemics were solely based on theology, in later years, when Muslims came to be seen as a military and not just a theological threat, their narrative gained more popularity.

### 3.4 Narratives, Images, Stereotypes During the Middle Ages

The popular narratives that engulfed West-Islam relations in medieval times revolved around the narratives developed earlier. Jo Ann Hoepfner believes that there was a general tendency at the time to understand the 'Middle Ages' through a universality perspective that became "uniformly hostile".<sup>33</sup> This owes something to the capture of Byzantine lands by the Muslim army and the questions concerning the conversion of Christians to Islam and their status within Muslim state after the death of Muhammad in 632 C.E.<sup>34</sup>

Although the conversion of Christians to Islam was not widespread during the initial years, the fear of conversions and the status of non-convert Christians as *Dhimmi* (protected) within the Muslim Empire resulted in an increase in anti-Muslim writings. This helped reframe the biblical perspective, now that Islam needed to be met militarily. The images and stereotypes that developed in the early period of Islam were based on biblical referencing which was used to justify the emergence of Islam as a sign of the world ending and the coming of the *Messiah* to save it from the Muslim anti-Christ. This

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<sup>32</sup> J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, *Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People: A Historical Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 60-75.

<sup>33</sup> Jo Ann Hoepfner, "Popular Attitude Towards Islam in Medieval Europe," In *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, eds. David Blanks and Michael Frassetto (New York: St Martin Press, 1999), p. 55.

<sup>34</sup> Kaegi Emil Walter, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquest* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 210.

perception was accentuated because of the threat of Muslim advances into the Byzantine territories.

At the time of the emergence of Islam and establishment of the state of Medina in 622 C.E., the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius was engaged in war with the Sassanian Empire, which resulted in victory over Chosroes II Pervez in 628 C.E.<sup>35</sup> The Byzantine Empire, which lost its power and glory during this era due to centuries of wars with the Persian Empire, tried to deal with the new Muslim enemy on its borders first through theological encounters and later by appealing to Western Christianity for help in rescuing them from this situation. The first Muslim-Byzantine encounter happened in 629 C.E. at Muta, resulting in a Muslim defeat. This was followed by another encounter, at Tabuk in 630 C.E., which resulted in a treaty arrangement between Muslims, local bishops and leaders in the Byzantine territories. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim incursions into Byzantine territories continued, leading to the battle of Yarmuk in 636 C.E. This resulted in the capture of Syria and, ultimately, the fall of Jerusalem and the occupation of Byzantine territories in Egypt and Mesopotamia.<sup>36</sup>

Christians explained these initial Muslim victories as being motivated by booty or plundering and resulting from the cleverness, deceit, and stealth of the invaders. Religion and faith were discounted as contributing factors to the sudden Muslim victories. Byzantine rulers referred to them as Arab rather than Muslim conquests, thus reducing the impact of Islam. Christian writers often chose tribal and ethnic terms to describe Islam and Muslims. This was a reductionist approach that is closely visible in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century Spanish Chronicle, which clearly says,

Saracens, influenced by their leader Muhammad, conquered and devastated Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia more by stealth than by manliness and not so much by open invasions as by persisting in stealthy raids.<sup>37</sup>

This chronicle clearly draws on biblical clues by first minimizing the enemy threat, and secondly rejecting Muhammad's Prophethood, terming him a kind of magician. This was followed by the 'theory of divine wrath' which 'explained' the loss of Byzantine

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<sup>35</sup> Walter, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquest*, p. 31.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 66-7.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, p. 206.

Christian territories to Muslims. Patriarch Sophronius' speech on the eve of the handing over of Jerusalem to Caliph Umar in 634 C.E. illustrates this:

Whence occur wars against us? Whence multiply barbarian invasions? Whence rise up the ranks of Saracens against us? ... The defiled would not have achieved or gained such strength to be able to do and to utter such things, if we had not first insulted the gift and if we had not defiled the purification and by this we injured the gift giving Christ and impelled wrath against us. ... Saracens had risen up unexpectedly against us because of our sins and ravaged everything with violent and beastly impulse and with impious and ungodly boldness.<sup>38</sup>

After the conquest of Jerusalem in 634 C.E., the Muslim threat took on added importance, and two important consequences for the image of Muslims followed. Firstly, Islam became associated closely with the 'sword', a metaphor for the way the religion spread, and secondly, that expansion came to be viewed as 'ungodly'. Another term commonly applied to Arabs or Muslims was 'barbarian,' an ancient Greek term. Maximus the Confessor wrote about the Muslim conquest thus:

What could be more dire than the present evil now encompassing the civilized world? To see a barbarous nation of the desert overrunning another land as if it were their own, to see our civilization laid waste by wild and untamed beasts who have merely the shape of human form.<sup>39</sup>

An echo of this viewpoint can be found in the post-9/11 era when the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was termed by President George W. Bush a murderous attack on not just Western civilization but civilization itself.

One of the important aspects of the medieval era was the use of religious, tribal or ethnic terms to describe Muslims. Saracens, Hagarenes and Ishmaelites at first were used to describe Muslims, and later, in the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries, this changed to Arabs, Turks, and Moors.<sup>40</sup> David Blanks observes that it was not until 1613 in England and 1687 in France that the word 'Islam' replaced the earlier depiction of Islam as

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<sup>38</sup> Walter, *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquest*, pp. 210-11.

<sup>39</sup> John V. Tolan, *Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 43.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, p. xv.

'Mohammedanism' in the European consciousness.<sup>41</sup> This was largely because Islam was considered a heresy rather than a genuine religion. The Renaissance period began to change the image of Islam, as Europe began to move away from its Christian identity.

To sum up this section, the medieval Christian attitude towards Islam was shaped by its earlier encounters with 'pagans' and Jews. The categories and images that were employed to deal with them were recycled.<sup>42</sup> Before their conversion to Christianity, Visigoths and Romans were termed 'pagan', the scourge of God, but after their conversion, they were glorified in history. The biblical schema of history that was applied to them was later applied to Muslims. Similarly, the depiction of the first heretic, Simon Magus, as a false prophet subject to sexual lust whose miracles were inspired by demons and whose death and defeat were ordained by God, was transferred to Muslims and Muhammad.<sup>43</sup> Muhammad too came to be seen as a false prophet controlled by demons and sexual lust. The apocalyptic role of Islam became a prominent image after Muslims became a dominant power in the world and Christians faced the prospect of a lesser, even subservient role.

### **3.5 Iberian Peninsula: Muslim-Christian Narratives, Images and Stereotypes in Al-Andalus**

While, for Eastern Christianity, Islam was first a spiritual challenge that later became a military challenge, for Christians in the Iberian Peninsula, Islam was first a military challenge that later became a spiritual and religious challenge as a result of the Muslim conquest and *Dhimmi* status and conversions in 'al Andalus.'<sup>44</sup> With the rise of the Muslim Umayyad Empire and Muslim presence in Spain from 711 to 1492, Islam entered the European continent and made a lasting impact on its culture and civilization.

In Spain, a composite Muslim-Christian-Jewish civilization flourished, and a new form of culture of coexistence developed which was distinct from the Arab Empire of the east.

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<sup>41</sup> David R. Blanks, "Western Views of Islam in the Pre Modern Period: A Brief History of Past Approaches," In *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, eds. Michael Frassetto and David Blanks (New York: St Martin Press, 1999), p. 14.

<sup>42</sup> Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 16-20

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, pp.16-20.

<sup>44</sup> Muslim or Moorish Spain's Arabic name or Hispania: the Latin name of the Iberian Peninsula.

Despite this coexistence, the overarching theological–military threat remained. In Spain, Paul Alvarus (9<sup>th</sup> C.E.) and Saint Eulogius (Bishop of Toledo, d. 859) wrote about the perception of the threat, which played an important role in the Spanish Christian uprising against Muslim rulers through the Martyrs’ movement in 850 C.E.<sup>45</sup> This movement aimed to stop Christian conversions to Islam, terming Muhammad as the anti-Christ and focusing on his alleged lust and violence. Eulogius’ martyrdom in 859 C.E. ended the movement, but it brought lasting images that would be spread throughout Europe in later years. One of the important aspects of this movement was that Muslims were metaphorically described as beasts, dogs, savages, barbarians and so on.

Medieval Christian historiography explains the way Muslims and Islam were imagined within the Christian worldview. It is a linear depiction stretching from the creation to the end of the world, and explaining everything within this period as God’s plan for the final success of Christianity over all other religions and cults. It follows a binary dichotomy between good and evil, God and Satan, Christ and antichrist, in order to point up the epic nature of this struggle. Whoever challenged this mode of thinking was placed in the evil category of Antichrist. This type of literature was termed ‘apocalyptic’ as it,

[s]trove to inject order and meaning into the past to elaborate a conception of history that would explain the traumatic situation in which they found themselves and so provide a model of hope for the future, extending the promise of deliverance to those who stood firm.<sup>46</sup>

Constructing the image of Muslims within God’s plan at the end of time, as provided in the Bible and apocalyptic literature, was a way for medieval Christians to deal with Muslim victories in the Byzantine territories and the Iberian Peninsula while preserving hope that such victories would not threaten the ultimate destiny of Christianity and Christendom. The primary function this served was to solidify Christian identity against the Muslim ‘other’. It was initially hoped that Muslims, like other heretics, would return to the fold of Christianity. Once medieval Christians, however, realized that Islam was there to stay as a religion, exclusivist terms of identity such as God’s wrath, pagans,

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<sup>45</sup> Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 78-86.

<sup>46</sup> Andrew Palmer, Introduction to *The Seventh Century in the West Syrian Chronicles* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993), p. xxvi.

barbarians, Antichrist and good/evil were then applied to Muslims. This exclusiveness of identity served to protect the integrity of Christianity, which was affected by *Dhimmi* status, conversions to Islam and the Muslim conquest of Christian lands.

The dehumanising stereotypes employed against Muslims during medieval times helped to create an 'other' which left no room for assimilation. Previously, terms used to depict Islam were tribal or ethnic in origin, terms which were themselves socially constructed in order to give Muslims a distinctive label. The apocalyptic prophecy of the four beasts in Daniel 7 offers no prospects of assimilation:

The fourth beast was awesome and dreadful with teeth of iron and claws of copper. It would eat and devour then stomped the residue with its feet. This fourth emerged from the south and represents the Ishmaelite kingdom. As the chief of the angels said: the fourth beast will come to possess a kingdom greater than any kingdom, and will devour the entire world and ten kings will arise but after them yet another shall arise who in wickedness will surpass all the previous ones.<sup>47</sup>

### **3.6 Latin Christianity: Narrative, Images and Stereotypes of Islam**

Latin Christianity, territorially identified with the Holy Roman Empire, developed a range of images and perceptions about Muslims based on concepts borrowed from Eastern Christianity and Spanish encounters with Islam. Although Latin Christianity was not directly threatened by Muslims militarily, the overthrow of the pagan Visigothic kingdom in Spain raised alarms in Europe about the impending Muslim threat. This led to the development of narratives that were similar to but also different from those of Eastern Christianity.

The most important impact was to end the pacifist approach in dealing with the 'other'. This followed the establishment of Christianity as a state religion by Emperor Constantine in 391 C.E. In the wake of frequent exchanges with pagans and Muslim maritime raiders, Latin Europe abandoned pacifism for the defense of Rome and the Papacy. The Crusades signified a new Christian militancy. The dispatch by the Pope Urban II of crusading armies in 1095 C.E. to help Alexius I Comnenus (1048-1118), the

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<sup>47</sup> Southern, *Western Views of Islam In The Middle Ages*, p. 23: *Sebeos, History of Heraclius* (American Historical Sources of the 5-15th Centuries 1985), Accessed 25 April, 2010. <http://rbedrosian.com/seb1.htm>.

Byzantine Emperor, became a watershed event in the rise of Latin Christianity to the mantle of leadership of the Christian world. The narrative and stereotypes they used against Muslims depicted their own historical experiences along with those borrowed from Eastern Christianity.

During the Crusades, the pagan image of Muslims was invoked specifically to convince the masses that the fight was for a worthy cause. John of Damascus, when declaring Islam a Christian heresy, had explained the nature of this heresy as being rooted in the worship of the morning star *Kouber*. The crusading image had three dimensions. First, Western Christians fought pagans and missionary activities and converted them to Christianity. Second, before the advent of Islam, Arabs were classified as idol-worshippers or pagans. Third, the Christians had to fight pagans before the conversion of Romans to Christianity. The pagan images from the earlier Christian encounters with Jews were simply recycled against Muslims.

Pope Urban II in his 1095 Clermont address said,

Christian warriors. ... go fight against the barbarians. .... If you must have blood, bathe your hands in the blood of the infidels ... and whoever dies in the battle against the pagans shall have immediate remission of the sins.<sup>48</sup>

The call to martyrdom against pagan and barbarian Muslims was also influenced by the Martyrs' movement in 9<sup>th</sup> Century Spain. The movement began by stating blasphemous things against Prophet Mohammad, which led to the death of Christian priests, Eulogius among them.<sup>49</sup> While it ended with his martyrdom, it had a lasting impact on the culture of Christian martyrdom, blasphemy against the Prophet, and associating Muslims with pagans.

Europe at the time of the Crusades was emerging from the so-called 'Dark Ages'. By then Christianity had become the dominant religion of Europe, giving Christians self-confidence and an aggressive assurance when facing Islam. Moreover, the leadership of the Christian world was decisively shifting from east to the west as a result of the

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<sup>48</sup> Ovey N. Muhammed, *Muslim-Christian Relations: Past, Present, Future* (New York: Orbis Books, 1999), p. 35.

<sup>49</sup> Southern, *Western Views of Islam In the Middle Ages*, p. 22.



dwindling power of the Eastern Byzantine Empire. The Crusades (from the 11<sup>th</sup> to the 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries) owe their origins to numerous factors unrelated to Muslims, and were generally used to bolster Christian identity through the concept of the 'enemy as other'. The schism between the Greek and Latin Churches in 1054 C.E. affected the relationship between the Eastern and Western Christians. The Crusades helped to bridge that gap and forged a common Christian identity.

The success of the First Crusade at the end of the 11<sup>th</sup> Century led to the capture of cities like Jerusalem, Antioch, Tyre, and Acre, where Muslim and Christians lived together, which improved interaction and understanding among them. This resulted in the construction of new images that developed side-by-side with the rise of Seljuk Turkish power. This changed the image of Muslims as pagans to Muslims as heretics, as had been popular during the time of Islam's emergence. Nonetheless, according to Isaac Taylor,

[t]he crusades poured a feculent deluge ... upon the afflicted Palestine. The dregs, the scum, and the cream of the Western world—its nobility and its rabble, in promiscuous rout, flowed towards the sepulcher at the foot of Calvary.<sup>50</sup>

He likened the Christian attitude during the Crusades to religious fanaticism. Again, as in the past, the themes of Islam's and the Prophet's sexual appetites were emphasized. Against the biblical frame of Jesus as the archetype of piety and chastity, attention was drawn more to the four wives that Muslims were permitted and the eleven that the Prophet had. Thus, the levels of piety in Christianity and in Islam were differentiated. The exception to this negativity was the positive image from the Crusades of Saladin (1138-1193)<sup>51</sup>, who was depicted as a hero, a chivalrous knight and a romantic figure in European literature.

In the years following the Crusades, Islam was represented in literary works which again brought Islam and its Prophet to the popular imagination with negative connotations. The most important among these works were the French *Chanson de Roland* (1095), a collection of poems and tales of Muslim defeat and the victory of the French King

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<sup>50</sup> Isaac Taylor, *Fanaticism*, Revised Edition (New York: Bell and Daldy, 1866), p. 207.

<sup>51</sup> Founder of Ayyubid Dynasty of Egypt and Syria who captured Jerusalem in 1187.

Charlemagne, *The Divine Comedy* (1306-1321) by Dante Alighieri, and Voltaire's novel and play *Le Fanatisme, ou Mahomet le Prophete* (Fanaticism, or Mahomet the Prophet, 1736), which depicted the religion Islam and Prophet Muhammad as a fanatic and manipulative person, as an example for explaining widespread corruption by Christian religious authorities.

Important steps towards understanding Muslims, however, were taken by Peter the Venerable, Roger Bacon (1214-1294), and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Peter, abbot of the Benedictine abbey of Cluny (1092-1156) in the 12<sup>th</sup> Century, studied Islam based on its own resources. He commissioned a translation of the *Qur'an*, which was completed by Robert of Ketton, an English monk, in 1143. This translation became standard for understanding Islam, as Robert of Ketton knew Arabic and the translation is in elevated Latin. Peter also wrote polemical texts refuting Islam's theology by using Islamic sources, portraying it as a Christian heresy close to paganism.

The main target communities for these texts were not only Christians but also Muslims, with the aim of converting them and addressing their supposed heretical tendencies. Roger Bacon (1214-1294), an Englishman, opposed the use of religion in wars. He was especially opposed to Crusades and stressed an understanding of other religions, which led him to read the Arabic manuscripts, and to advocate missionary activities instead of war as the way to win converts. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), often regarded as one of the fathers of Western Christianity and an equal of Eastern Christianity's John of Damascus, did not present a very favorable account of Islam and its Prophet, but was prepared to use the methodologies developed by Muslim philosophers to explain religious doctrines.<sup>52</sup>

### **3.7 'Turk' as a Historical 'Other' and the Construction of Images: Renaissance and Enlightenment Periods**

The rise of the 'Turk' as an 'other' in Latin or Western Christianity owes its origin to the rise of Turkish power in the 13<sup>th</sup> Century and the loss of Constantinople, the ancient seat of Christianity, on 29 May, 1453. The military power of the Turks became more evident

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<sup>52</sup> Quinn, *The Sum of All Heresies*, p. 42.

during the reigns of Sultan Murat II (r.1421-1451), Mehmet II (r.1451-1481), and Suleiman the Magnificent (r.1520-1566). The fall of Constantinople in 1453 ended the Byzantine Empire, making Latin Christianity the religion's sole representative.<sup>53</sup> The same old stereotypes and images of Muslims were then used to define Turks. As Tolan remarks, "the solutions of the Thirteenth Century were recycled: Popes and publicists urged princes to crusade against the Turk."<sup>54</sup> In 1342, Pope Clement VI declared Turks to be,

[t]hose unbelieving pagans, called in the vernacular the Turks, who thirst for the blood of Christian people and seek the destruction of Catholic faith.<sup>55</sup>

This image was exacerbated with the sacking of Constantinople and the conquests in the east of Europe, which easily fueled the image of the Turks' killing, ransacking and brutality. Historically, these images recalled and were based on the fall of Rome in 410 C.E. to Germanic barbarians, and they were supported by images of sex and violence.

The construction of anti-Muslim images continued apace during the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation. The tussle between Protestants and Catholics and the drive towards secularism, along with the problems arising between different sects, might be expected to have had an impact on the Christians' imagining of Muslims. However, the writers and reformers of the Renaissance presented the same medieval image of Islam and Muslims. The military might of the Ottomans under Suleiman in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century had a deep impact on the way Renaissance scholars presented the Turks. Fathers of the Church, or the Pope, called for military power to save Christianity and the lands of Christians from the powerful Ottomans. The siege of Vienna in 1521, intrusions into Austria in 1532, and the conquest of Hungary in 1540 by Suleiman sent tremors across Europe, with regular prayer days against the Turkish

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<sup>53</sup> Muslims laid siege to Constantinople three times under the Umayyad. First was in 669 under the leadership of the crown prince Yazid, second was in the Seven Year War from 674-80, and the last siege was 716-717. In 782, Harun, son of Caliph Mehdi, made treaty arrangements with Empress Irene, which saved the Byzantine capital until the Turks captured it in 1453. On the other hand, Musa Bin Nusayr, the celebrated governor of North Africa, sent his lieutenant Tariq Bin Ziyid to cross to Gibraltar (the mighty rock named after him) in 710, thus laying the groundwork for Muslim entry into Europe by conquering the entire Iberian Peninsula.

<sup>54</sup> Tolan, Introduction to *Saracens*, pp. xvii-xix.

<sup>55</sup> Norman Housley, ed. *Documents on the Later Crusade 1274-1580* (New York: St Martin Press, 1996), p. 78.

invaders performed in Germany, and many European capitals made vehement calls for another Crusade against Turks.<sup>56</sup>

Most of the Renaissance humanists compared the Turkish threat to the destruction of ancient Rome by the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards, and projected pagan general Julius Caesar as an example for Christians to follow. One of the earlier humanists who significantly impacted on the Western imagination of Islam was Petrarch, the father of humanism. He redirected the Christian imagination to the heroes of the Roman Empire, which had an impact on the notion of holy war.<sup>57</sup> This new interpretation provided grounds for secular thinkers to move from religious to secular concepts, targeting Islam on political and cultural rather than religious grounds. Petrarch describes Muslim civilisation in terms of being barbarian like the pagan Romans, making no advance to civilisation. As the Turks were the main military threat during this era, images of barbarianism depict them and Islam as essentially warlike.<sup>58</sup>

Defining the Turks as barbarians (which can be traced to their destruction of Constantinople) had a tremendous influence on later Western colonial thinking in which Islam was viewed as a threat to learning and cultural development and the reason for the supposed decadence of Muslim societies. This helped rationalize the efforts by the colonial powers to secularize Muslim societies to expose them to European learning and knowledge.<sup>59</sup>

As with the image of the barbarian Turk, the image of Muslim cruelty and lustfulness also had its origin in the killing and raping in Constantinople, Asia Minor, and the Balkans. The work of Coluccio Salutati, the Chancellor of Florence (1331-1406), and

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<sup>56</sup> Jan Slomp, ed. "Calvin and the Turks," In *Christian-Muslim Relations*. eds. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Wadi Z. Haddad (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1995) , p. 127.

<sup>57</sup> Nancy Bisaha, "New Barbarians" or Worthy Adversary? Humanist Constructs of the Ottoman Turks in Fifteenth Century Italy," In *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, eds. David Blanks and Michael Frassetto (New York: St Martin Press, 1999) , p. 186.

<sup>58</sup> Nancy Bisaha, "Petrarch's Vision of the Muslim and Byzantine East," *Speculum* 76, no 2 (April, 2004), Accessed June 12, 2010. <http://www.jstore.org/stable/2903448>

<sup>59</sup> Bisaha, "New Barbarians" or Worthy Adversary?," pp. 189-91.

Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1513) tried to improve the image of the Turks, admiring their military genius and the organisation of Turkish courts, but to no avail.<sup>60</sup>

As Nancy Bisaha points out,

[s]ome of these humanist ideas played a role in forming negative cultural stereotypes of the Turks - images that have survived into the modern era.<sup>61</sup>

Although no major crusade was actually begun against the Turks, Pope Eugebius (1431-47) and Pope Leo X (1512-1521) did in fact unsuccessfully call for a crusade. Nonetheless, Crusades remained a popular cultural and religious concept in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century until the Protestant Reformation, when the importance of crusading as a religious duty receded.<sup>62</sup> During the Renaissance period, humanists played an important role in changing perceptions of Islam and Muslims. According to Bisaha, humanists' rhetoric represented the "first major challenge to medieval perceptions of the Turks and Islam",<sup>63</sup> which had generally been religious in tone, and marked a shift toward modern secular attitudes and constructs. Thus Bisaha argues,

As such, humanist's discourse significantly shaped the way modern westerners imagined and discussed the Muslim east. This humanist discourse is similar to Said's Orientalist discourse in that it involves a group of intellectuals who were at once sharing in and creating learned, political, and to an extent, popular, images of the Other. Although, Renaissance Europeans had not yet imposed physical power upon the Near East, humanists were beginning to assert a sense of European intellectual power and authority over Muslim societies.<sup>64</sup>

### 3.8 Western Narratives, Images and Stereotypes: 16th to 19th Century

Power played a very important role in the development of new categories for the imagery of Islam during the 16<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries. New images began to appeal, though carrying traces of the old. The echoes of the medieval image of Islam can be heard from Richard Knolles, an English writer, in his book *The Generall Historie of the Turkes*,<sup>65</sup> where

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<sup>60</sup> Bisaha, "New Barbarians" or Worthy Adversary?," p. 198.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Housley, *The Later Crusades* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) , pp. 376-420.

<sup>63</sup> Bisaha, "New Barbarians or Worthy Adversary?," p. 198.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 187.

<sup>65</sup> Richard Knolles, *The Generall Historie of the Turkes: The Lives of Othoman Kings and Emperors* (London: Adam Islip, 1603, reprinted 1610-1701).

Turks are mentioned as the scourge of God and terror of the world. The Archbishop of Canterbury also drew on the same medieval imagery while commenting on the lifting of the Turkish siege of Malta in 1565, along with offering thanksgiving and calling Mohammad a wicked monster. Turks in general were seen as deadly enemies and infidels.<sup>66</sup>

The fear of Islamic expansionism and increasing Turkish intrusions into Europe shaped this perception. However, Turkish power was mostly used against Catholic Europe, and Protestants understood it as God's plan to wipe out the power and pride of the Pope. This scenario was the same as in the medieval era when the non-Catholic Christians living under Muslim rule - the Monophysites and Jacobites - preferred Muslim rule to tyrannical Byzantine rule. Protestant-Catholic relations during the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Centuries influenced the way Christians dealt with Islam and the Ottomans. Martin Luther in his 'War Sermons' called Turks the 'Wrath of God' against the papal powers, and punishment for the sins of Christians. Luther likened fighting against the Turks to fighting against the divine will to remove the papal power.<sup>67</sup> He called for a repeal of the ban on the publication of the *Qur'an* in Germany - a ban imposed by the Pope, and he translated the *Qur'an* into German.

However, Luther's translation contained the same medieval representations since the main source of his translation was Robert Keaton's *Qur'an*. Luther's was a scholarly refutation of Islam.<sup>68</sup> It was only when Turkish power started threatening the Germans and the English that Luther's attitude changed. He began to describe both the Pope and Turks as 'Anti-Christ' and the 'Scourge of God.'<sup>69</sup> Luther's translation was edited by Theodor Bibliander in 1543 and consisted of three parts. The first part was the *Qur'an*, the second had a refutation of the *Qur'an* by different scholars, and the third part

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<sup>66</sup> Daniel J. Vitkus, "Early Modern Orientalism: Representations of Islam in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Europe," In *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, eds. David Blanks and Michael Frassetto (New York: St Martin Press, 1999), p. 210.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 212.

<sup>68</sup> Emidio Campi, "Early Protestant Reformed Attitude Towards Islam," pp.6-7. Accessed 6 July, 2010. <http://www.presbyteriancollege.ca/Reformers%20and%20Islam.pdf>

<sup>69</sup> Cited in Vitkus, "Early Modern Orientalism: Representations of Islam in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Europe," p. 212.

comprised a history of Islam with a focus on the Ottoman Empire that was at that time a major threat to Europe.<sup>70</sup>

The 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries played an important role in Europe's understanding of Islam because of the increased interaction of Turks with Europeans who had started developing commercial interests in the Middle East and India. Although narratives denigrating Muhammad, the *Qur'an*, and Islam as a religion of violence and lust were still prevalent, admiration of Muslim culture and intellectual achievements began opening avenues for increased awareness. It was during this time that,

[t]he construction of Islam, along with Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism, as one of the great religions reflected the development of a secular view of history, and signaled the decline of Christian sacred history.<sup>71</sup>

During this period, Islam began to be called 'Mohammadanism' or 'Mohmetism'. While Turkish power dwindled, the personality of Mohammad remained central to the European understanding of Islam. Islam began to be measured against the rise of Europe and its embrace of science, rationalism and secular values. George Sale's 1734 translation of the *Qur'an* clearly depicts this:

It is certainly one of the most convincing proofs that Mohammadanism was no other than a human invention, that it owed its progress and establishment to the sword; and it is one of the strongest demonstrations of the divine original of Christianity that it prevailed against all the forces and powers of the world by the mere dint of its own truth.<sup>72</sup>

By contrast with the image of Islam as a religion of force, Christians saw their religion's basic purpose as the promotion of peace and harmony in the world, and this purpose was itself based on a Christian understanding of peace. The gradual decline of the political threat of the Turks helped change European understanding of Islam. The confident self-identity of colonial Europeans and their closer interaction with Muslims began to change the narrative. An 'Orientalist' image developed of Islam as the main

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<sup>70</sup> Emidio Campi, "Early Protestant Reformed Attitude Towards Islam," <http://www.presbyteriancollege.ca/Reformers%20and%20Islam.pdf>, pp. 6-7.

<sup>71</sup> Almond, "Western Images of Islam, 1700-1900," p. 412.

<sup>72</sup> George Sale, *The Koran, Commonly Called, The AlCoran of Muhammad* (London: L.Hawes, W. Clarke, 1836), p. 38.

source for the stagnation of Muslim cultural and intellectual life. This laid the ground for the West's influence on Muslim discourses.

What Europe began to notice and emphasize were the lack of democracy in Muslim lands, the absence of freedom within Muslim society, the subordination and treatment of women, and the 'failure' of the Muslim education system that was based on the study of *Qur'an* and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. These categories of identification confronted 20<sup>th</sup> Century Muslims head on. In responding, they had to come to terms with the fact that their age of international dominance had come to an end. And reformist Islam, led by Jamal ud din Afgani, Muhammad Abdul, Rashid Rida and Muhammad Iqbal, responded.

During the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, Europeans had begun to accept Islam as an authentic religion, not just a mere heresy. The image of Mohammad as an 'impostor' nevertheless remained as such. Humphrey Prideaux's work *The True Nature of Imposture Fully Displayed in the Life of Mohomet* (1697), Henri Boulainvilliers's *The Life of Mahomet* (1731), Nathan and Thomas Alcock's *The Rise of Mohomet, Accounted for on Natural and Civil Principles* (1796), and Washington Irving's *Life of Mohomet* (1850) all advanced the image of the past, declaring Mohammad an 'Anti-Christ' and 'impostor' even as their tone shifted slightly towards accepting the sincerity of his cause and mission. As George Sale wrote,

One thing which may probably be urged against the enthusiasm of this prophet of the Arabs, is the wise conduct and great prudence he all along showed in pursuing his design, which seem inconsistent with the wild notions of a hot brained religionist.<sup>73</sup>

Although this referent had changed by the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the question of violence and Islam still preoccupied scholars with a negative image of Islam. William Muir, an Islamic scholar, maintained that, "the use of sword is abjured by the Gospel, while it is commanded by Coran [*Qur'an*]." <sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Sale, *The Koran, Commonly Called ...*, p. 30.

<sup>74</sup> William Muir, "Islam and Christianity," *The Leisure Hour* 4(1855): pp. 133-4.



Norman Daniel confirms that this image of Islam as a religion spread by the sword remained throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. But as he points out,

Islam, the religion of force, was beginning to be dominated by the greater force of Europe; the old enemy was becoming a subject, or, if not a subject, he was being compelled to accept Western influence as a result of Western prosperity.<sup>75</sup>

Even so, a number of writers such as Godfrey Higgins in 1829,<sup>76</sup> Johann Moehler in 1847,<sup>77</sup> Isaac Taylor in 1868,<sup>78</sup> and R. Bosworth Smith in 1875<sup>79</sup> began to see Islam as a different kind of religion that did not distinguish between public and private spheres. The old stereotypes began to wean them. This was certainly a time when the Muhammad of Christian legend began to be replaced by the Muhammad of professional historians.

### 3.9 Conclusion

In conclusion, a broad analysis of the relations with and construction of images of the Muslim 'other' by the West shows that changes in the images and perceptions of Muslims were influenced by the external factor of the Muslim threat and the internal factor of changing Christian and European ways of thought. The biblical frame and apocalyptic vision provided a lens through which Christianity saw Islam as a heresy that needed refutation, but did not feel threatening. With the rise of Muslim power and the capture of Christian lands, along with the *Dhimmi* status of Christians, the theological and military threat of Islam assumed prime importance.

This chapter established three important points for this study. Firstly, the biblical frame and apocalyptic traditions played an important role in the depiction of Islam and Muslims as enemies. Secondly, the change in the theological and philosophical orientation of Europe towards secularism impacted on its imagery of Islam. Thirdly, although the ages of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment altered this, Europe could

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<sup>75</sup> Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 240.

<sup>76</sup> Godfrey Higgins, *An Apology for the Life and Character of the Celebrated Prophet of Arabia Called Mohammad or The Illustrious* (London: G. Smallfield Hackney, 1829).

<sup>77</sup> Johann A. Moehler, *Relation of Islam to The Gospel* (Calcutta: J. C. Sherrife, 1847).

<sup>78</sup> Taylor, *Fanaticism*.

<sup>79</sup> Johann A. Moehler, *Relation of Islam to The Gospel*; R Bosworth Smith, *Mohammed and Mohammedanism* (1875) (San Diego: The Book Tree, 2002).

not completely dissociate itself from the medieval legacy. This was because Protestants started using the same language to describe the papacy as had been used to describe the Ottoman Empire. Ignorance of Islam remained at the heart of representation of Muslims. During the period of European colonialism, a new taxonomy of vilification was developed to describe Muslims that emphasized the backwardness of their civilization as compared to Europe's. As will be seen, this phase of 'Orientalist' representation left its mark on Muslim responses and began to color the meta-narratives of not only reformist but also militant Muslims.

The importance of this chapter lies in establishing the context of West-Islam relations, which influenced both political Islam and the neo-conservative factions in successive U.S. administration. The context also influenced Christian and Western responses to the events of 9/11 in terms of identifying Islam as evil, which recalled and repeated the imagery of encounter between Muslims and Christians in medieval ages. The story, which began with fear of Muslims in the Christian-European mind, then turned into a fear of colonial Europe in the Muslim mind. The next chapter will examine the impact of this fear of the West and the resulting responses of Muslims to it.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STUDY- II

## Western Discourses and Its Influence on The Development Of Different Trends Within Political Islam

*[Political Islam] Islamism is an interpretation of Islam, which emphasizes its social and political import. It is not a replacement of Islam. ... The challenge presented by contemporary Islamist movements goes beyond 'panics' about terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, for what Islamism points to is the end of 'the age of the West' and thus limits Westernisation as the future of the world.... The political turn of Islam cannot be understood outside the very complex ways in which it relates to the project of Western hegemony (Salman Sayyid).<sup>1</sup>*

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the influence of Western discourses on the historical encounters of the West with Islam, which impacted on the different trends within political Islam. It argues that political Islam as a movement has been shaped by Western policies and discourses amounting in Bassam Tibi's view to be no less than 'epistemological imperialism'.<sup>2</sup> Political Islam or Islamism currently holds centre stage with the rise of democratic movements across the Arab world known as the 'Arab Spring' which began with the Tunisian Revolution in 2011. The rise of democratic revolutions in the Arab world itself, which seemed to have taken everyone by surprise, has something the Bush administration envisaged as a stratagem to tackle extremist Jihadism in the Muslim

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<sup>1</sup> Salman Sayyid. *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocenterism and The Emergence Of Islamism* (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2003), pp. xxi-ii.

<sup>2</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam: World Politics and Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 17.

world. The 'peacebuilding' or 'state building' by the West particularly in countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, is an extension of the definition of peacebuilding under liberalism which assumes presence of human rights, good governance, institution building, and a free market economy as a part of the Western liberal peace approach. It is seen as an integral aspect of epistemological imperialism transforming these societies on the basis of the liberal peace approach.

The rise of democratic Islamists seemed to outdistance the global Jihadism that 9/11 exemplified. Nonetheless, Jihadism lay behind the killing of American ambassador Chris Stevens in Libya on 11 September, 2012 apparently in retaliation for the blasphemous video ridiculing Prophet Muhammad. This video triggered a series of protests throughout the Muslim world and served to fuel violent and conflict-generating tendencies in the ongoing conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The analysis provided in this chapter seeks to spotlight the root causes of militancy and Jihadism within political Islam and to map the impact of Western discourses giving them momentum. This analysis facilitates the development of the framework for peacebuilding and transformation for the case study of tribal areas by examining the causes of militant Jihadism and the failure of peacebuilding and reconstruction informed by the liberal peace approach of the West in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This chapter is divided into six parts. The first part examines the influence of 'Orientalist' discourse on Muslim societies. The second part examines the rise of political Islam as an ideology influenced by this discourse, an ideology which helped produced a violent form of Jihadism which was used as a policy tool against communism in the post-Cold War. The third and fourth part investigates the Cold War and post-Cold War construction of the enemy and threat perceptions within US foreign policy, and the use of religion as a political tool. This resulted in a change in the course of political Islam from an ideology of social transformation to one of radicalism and violence as a means of breaking the circle U.S. hegemony. Fifthly, it examines the rhetoric of fear employed by both al Qaeda and the U.S. leadership that has established the tone of West-Islam relations post-9/11 and influenced the emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Lastly, it examines the impact of epistemological imperialism on

former colonial states following the 'war on terror' and its impact on the pursuit of peacebuilding and transformation within Muslim societies.

Robin Wright posits a number of phases of political Islam in her recent study of the return of the Islamist in the Arab world.<sup>3</sup> According to her, politicised Islam or Islamism emerged as a trend within Muslim societies as a reaction to the end of the Caliphate in the Ottoman Empire in 1924, while modern Islamism began in 1928 led by Egyptian ideologue Hasan al Banna: the latter was originally, envisaged as a social and religious movement. The first phase of modern political Islam was in 1973 with Egypt's attack on Israel, and the Arab oil embargo, while the Iranian Revolution of 1979 ushered in a new era spreading the message of revolution internationally based on radical Islam. The Iranian Revolution, together with the seizure of Grand Mosque at Mecca in 1980, influenced regional politics immensely. The second phase, which started in the 1980s, and saw the rise of suicide extremism and mass violence which in her view was influenced by the Shiite revolution in Iran. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic *Jihad* and Hamas in Palestine all based their politics on violence and militancy.

The third phase of modern political Islam started with the emergence of Islamist political parties in the 1990s with the Islamic Salvation Front, which won the elections in Algeria in 1991 but was denied office by the army. Then, in 1992, Hezbollah participated in elections in Lebanon, and the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood and Jordan's Islamic Action Front participated in the general elections during the same decade. The fourth phase of modern political Islam began with al Qaeda's attacks on Western targets and the rise of Global Jihadism within Islam. Wright believes that the Arab Spring based on civil disobedience is the latest phase.

According to Wright, there are three main categories of political Islam. The classical Islamists with the goal of implementing *Shariah* (Islamic law) throughout the Muslim world, the neo-Islamists who view the same in the context of the clash of civilizational

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<sup>3</sup> Robin Wright, "The Middle East: They Have Arrived," In *The Islamists Have Arrived.: Who They Really Are.* ed. Robin Wright, pp. 1-12 (Washington D.C: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 2012).

values and the post-Islamists who separate religious and political discourse, although they are not secularist.

#### **4.2 Colonialism and Orientalism and Their Impact on the Trends of Political Islam**

To understand these changes, it is necessary to go back to the period of colonialism and the Europe's incursion into the Middle East during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Centuries, which led to a dramatic interaction between Muslims and Europeans. This interaction was different to that during the Crusades. This time, the Muslims were no longer powerful, and their cities lacked the grandeur of the great civilizations that once stood there. European's now regarded Islam as a fallen civilisation.

The mission to civilise the 'other' was considered as the 'White Man's Burden' as Rudyard Kipling called it, forming part of the rationale of Western imperialism.<sup>4</sup> Orientalism, as a way of describing Muslims, involved a transformation. Where earlier Islam itself was a subject of mystery and fear, the focus now was on its credentials as a civilisation. And it was held accountable for everything that was deemed wrong with Muslim society: its supposed lack of a work ethic, lack of progress and general stagnation. The body of literature that emerged from such a mind set was termed by Edward Said as 'Orientalism', although he was not the first to coin this term.<sup>5</sup> In his seminal work, Said decodes the way that the Orient had been described and essentialised as an imaginary and unchanging region with fixed identities, while Europe had been described as rational, progressing, powerful, and scientific. This resulted in a dichotomous projection of two contrasting identities based on power, knowledge, and racial theory.

Orientalism, as a constructed Western discourse, has a system of 'flawed' knowledge which penetrated Western consciousness and gradually became embedded in Western culture.<sup>6</sup> This discourse was intricately linked to Europe's attempt to assert economic and political power over the Orient. In effect, according to Said, Orientalism, which was

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<sup>4</sup> Jackie Assayag, "East and West: Orientalism, War and the Colonial Past," *Ethnografica* 11, no. 1 (May 2007): p. 254.

<sup>5</sup> Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1995).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6.

collectively purveyed by writers, journalists, and state officials, provided a rationale for imperialist tendencies into the Muslim world by presenting an Orient that badly needed Europe's civilising hand.<sup>7</sup>

It followed that the imagery of Islam that was produced during the colonial era had negative connotations of lasciviousness, moral laxity, unbridled corruption and a general malaise affecting the Orient.<sup>8</sup> Two separate attitudes towards Islam and Muslims emerged. One concerned Islam as a religion and Muhammad as prophet, while the second one positioned Muslims near the bottom of the European ladder of civilisation. Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838), J.Von Hammer Purgstall (1774-1856), Ernest Renan (1823-1892), Ignaz Goldzihar (1850-1921), Liouis Masigon (1883-1962), Sir Hamilton A.R.Gibb (1885-1971), and many other writers produced work along these lines.

While commenting on the work produced by Orientalist writers, Ibrahim Kalin observes that,

Orientalists showed little interest in overcoming the limitation of studying another culture with categories that were patently Western. It was within this framework that the perennial search for 'correspondences', homogenous structures, and orthodoxies in the Islamic tradition became a hallmark of the Orientalist tradition.<sup>9</sup>

The 'Orientalist' project of the European, according to Said, transformed Islam into 'other' as a 'very epitome of an outsider'. This adversarial depiction was made in the form of 'knowledge-power' discourse.<sup>10</sup> While the construction of a binary 'self' and 'other' as well as the discourse embodying, it is not exclusive to Europeans, the basic purpose was to achieve hegemony. Said observes that there has been no period of European or American history since the Middle Ages, "in which Islam was generally

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<sup>7</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p. 49.

<sup>9</sup> Ibrahim Kalin, "Roots of Misconception: Euro-American Perceptions Of Islam before and after September 11," In *Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays of the Western Muslim Scholars*. ed. Joseph E.B Lumbard (New Delhi: Third Eye, 2005), p. 163.

<sup>10</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, p. 70.

discussed or thought about outside a framework created by passion, prejudice and political interests".<sup>11</sup>

This 'Orientalist' construction has had a powerful impact on the way political Islam was viewed.<sup>12</sup> As Said observes:

For the first time in history (for the first time, that is, on such a scale) the Islamic world may be said to be learning about itself by means of images, histories, and information manufactured in the West.<sup>13</sup>

Salman Sayyid goes further in arguing that Orientalism not only distorts the reality of the Orient, but that the 'Orient' itself is really the fictitious creation of Orientalism itself. This knowledge/power relationship in Edward Said's description of Orientalism is the main key for understanding West-Islam relations and the representation of Muslims in the West. And it profoundly influenced the way Muslims responded to the discourse which centred on religion as a stagnant force in the society. The projection of Islam is visible in terms such as political Islam, radical Islam, Islamism, and Jihadism, which imply that religion is responsible for the radical and extremist tendencies of Muslims, rather than the influence of social, political, and economic conditions.<sup>14</sup>

The 'Orientalist' depiction of Islam has continued to form the basis of relations between Muslims and the West since the World War II. The end of the Turkish Caliphate in 1924 represented a complete Eurocenterism of world politics. The period between the First and the Second World Wars can be categorised as a period of re-emergence of Islam as a political entity within the context provided by Europe. The emergence of newly independent states within the Muslim world on the basis of new nationalist identities and the penetration of the ideas of modernity have forced Muslims to reconsider their destiny against the paradigm of Islam.

Oliver Roy points out that Muslim responses to the 'Orientalist discourse' can be divided into three impulses: Firstly, nostalgia for the greatness that once was Islamic civilization,

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<sup>11</sup> Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, Vintage Book Edition (New York: Vintage Books 1997), p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 163-4.



secondly the rejection of Western values as superior, and thirdly, the manifestation of an apologetic form of Islam that considers Islam as the best religion and the solution to all the world's problems involving those of Muslim society.<sup>15</sup> In the opinion of Bryan Turner, the situation demands a complete overhaul of outlook and belief on both sides. Turner contends that:

The end of Orientalism requires a radical reformulation of perspectives and paradigms, but this reconstitution of knowledge can only take place in the context of major shift in political relations between Orient and Occident, because the transformation of discourse also requires a transformation of power.

Thus, new 'identities' and transformation of the West-Islam relationship went hand in hand.

#### **4.3 Political Islam: the Re-Emergence of Religious/ Political Categories**

The role of identity politics among Muslims became more prominent in the wake of the colonial incursions in the Muslim lands, starting from the Napoleon invasion of Egypt in 1798. The decline of religion in the social-political sphere of Europe and the success of the scientific rationalist project resulted in viewing all religions with the same yardstick. However, the successful colonial incursions of the Middle East, India, and other Muslim-inhabited territories by Europeans opened Islam's religious beliefs to scrutiny. Among them, the questions of authority in Islam, and the legitimacy of religious authorities, were scrutinised<sup>16</sup>

The need to reform Islam was demanded since it was blamed for the stagnation of Muslim society. This had happened earlier with Christianity, when challenges to the authority of the Pope were seen as a solution to everything following the Reformation and the spread of scientific rational thought in Europe. During the colonial period, an important development was the emergence of anti-colonial trends within the Muslim communities that were based on reforms, conformism, and apologetic forms of response,

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<sup>15</sup> Said, *Covering Islam*, p. 11.

<sup>16</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), p. 8

which Clifford Geertz calls the 'ideologization' of Islam.<sup>17</sup> In addition, *Jihad* also appeared as an anti-colonial struggle with the call of Jamal ud Din Afghani (1838-1897) for *Jihad* against colonialism. It was no coincidence that traditionalism and reformism constituted Muslim reactions to this era.

Islam as a political entity has appeared in different forms over the course of time. In the colonial period, it appeared as a reformist trend among Muslims to remove the shackles of religious authority, through the writings of Jamal ud Din Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Oliver Roy refers to this intellectual movement as 'Salafist Reformism' <sup>18</sup> while Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) and Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) in South Asia, looked for reforms within the education system. During the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, these reformists were a force behind nationalist tendencies to gain independence from the colonial powers. Later, Hassan al Banna (1906-1949), Abu al Alla Maududi (1903-1979) and Syed Qutb (1906-1966) began promoting a political form of Islam as a solution, or Islamism which Roy terms as "along the lines and break from the *Salafiyya*".<sup>19</sup> The attempted nationalisation of resources followed, with Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh's 1953 nationalisation in Iran, Nassar's seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956, and OPEC's oil embargo of 1973.

However, in the 1970-1980s, political Islam completely changed its form. Through reformist-nationalist tendencies, it reverted back to Islam (as a religion) as the solution to all problems. This was Ayatollah Khomeini's message to Muslims and the West in 1979. It was seen as a reaction to the modernity and Westernisation imposed on Muslims and occurred in response to neo-imperialism and the U.S. support given to Israel, U.S. policies in the Middle East and the support that the U.S. gave to dictatorships in the Muslim world. Mohammad Ayoob suggests that some of the major independent variables in the development of political Islam have been international factors, which not

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<sup>17</sup> Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

<sup>18</sup> Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, p. 35.

only determined its goals and strategies, but also the adoption of violence as a method of assertion.<sup>20</sup>

The Shiite revolution in Iran in 1979 was mainly a reaction to the U.S. backed regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi and his modernisation plan to reform Iranian society. The Iranian anti-Americanism can be traced back to the CIA backed overthrow of the Mossadeqh Government in 1953 and his failure to nationalise oil. From this point onwards, political Islam came out of the reformist group, returning to the fold of radical religious authorities who based their Islam on anti-Americanism and anti imperialism.

In 1979, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan changed the entire spectrum of political Islam. The difference between trends in political Islam before and after 1979 lies in the discourse of Islamism before 1979, which was particularly secular in nature, because it was mainly concerned with political and social issues and placed little emphasis on the spiritual aspect or active militancy. This was partly true for the writings of Hassan al Banna and Syed Qutb who had emphasised political and social change via Jihadism. In the end, however, global militant Jihadism was not pursued.

In the post-1979 era, the Iranian revolution and the use of the Salafi/Wahabi version of Islam (reverting back to the Caliphate's [Rashideen's] era for the perfect model) to confront the communist threat depict a new trend that had a lasting impact on international politics. 'Salafiyya Reformism', this time retracted from and adopted Wahabi approach of returning to a pristine Islam. Muhammad Ayoob claimed that the argument about the 'decline of Muslims' is the result of abandoning Qur'anic principles to the Salafist, who seek to recreate the golden age of Islam and the state of Medina.<sup>21</sup> This led to a change of leadership within political Islam from radical intellectuals to *Ulema* or clerics. For Mamdani, the difference between moderate and radical Islam is that

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<sup>20</sup> Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, p. 152.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6

the former has attempted to achieve social reform without revolution, which the latter believes that this with only came about with the overthrow of state.<sup>22</sup>

Bassam Tibi argues that the post bi-polar 'revolt against the west' was not only against Western hegemony, but also secular Western values and the rational worldview underlying them, which formed the basis of the Enlightenment on which Western identity rests.<sup>23</sup> He points out that "the message of political Islam to Europe is conveyed in an Islamist expression of the new 'revolt against the West' bringing history back to the fore".<sup>24</sup> Mahmood Mamdani rejects the idea that the rise of political Islam cannot be described in conspiratorial terms as a product of American strategy to counter communism in the Middle East. It is a domestic product, but resulted due to encounters with Western powers. However, it was developed during the colonial period and did not produce any terrorist movement until the end of the Cold War.<sup>25</sup> Tibi also rejects the notion of the invention of political Islam by the CIA or Mossad to create a substitute enemy<sup>26</sup>.

This study argues that just as the colonial powers helped shape the trends of political Islam during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, so the neo-imperial powers of Europe and America have shaped the new trend of political Islam, and continue to do so. This study does not describe the rise of political Islam as a Western strategy or conspiracy but as a phenomenon which is influenced by the long history of West-Islam discourse and the Western subjugation of Muslim lands and imposition of Western policies.

In the concept of Jihadism, the influence of the West is manifest. As Jackie Assayag observes, its genealogy can be traced back to the support of the *Mujahedeen* by the United States against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a deferred effect of the Cold war.<sup>27</sup> Certainly, the Jihadi curriculum for training of *Mujahedeen* during the Afghan Jihad was

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<sup>22</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslims, Bad Muslims: American , the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004) , p. 58.

<sup>23</sup> Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Tibi, *Political Islam: World Politics and Europe*, p. 4.

<sup>25</sup> Mamdani, *Good Muslims, Bad Muslims* , p. 14.

<sup>26</sup> Tibi, *Political Islam: World Politics and Europe*, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Assayag, "East and West": p. 264.

developed at the University of Nebraska with the help of USAID and Saudi funding. Although the curriculum was prepared by the West, its circulation in the refugee camps was entirely left to the religious leaders of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The resulting Jihadism was based on the Wahabi-Deobandi version of strict Islam practice.<sup>28</sup>

In his book *A Fundamental Fear*, which links the emergence of Islamism with Eurocenterism Salman Sayyid sees Islamism as an attempt to create transnational social transformation. He believes that Islamists are motivated by the goal of returning to an all inclusive Ummatic culture and developing a counter-hegemonic discourse to globalisation. As Islamists offer a theological reading of their history, they are not able to make this history a resource for the future.<sup>29</sup> Islamism sought de-centring the West<sup>30</sup> and its cultural formation but the 'war on terror' has served to re-centre it. However, Western cultural formation still faces challenges and resistance, which has been termed as 'Westernisation' in Muslim societies. Sayyid defines the 'war on terror' as a crusade against Islamism, as West has failed to legitimise its hegemony over Islamic *Ummah* and control of its lands together with its failure to pass on its culture and values to the Muslim world as universal values.<sup>31</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh explains Islamism as a modern day ideology which,

[i]mposes a normative framework on society in a blatant attempt to make society fit into its mould. This makes Islamists active agents of change. ... Islamism has defined itself as a reaction to a set of perceived failures.<sup>32</sup>

The post-Cold War era saw the emergence of this kind of Jihadism within political Islam that was directed against the West and the U.S. itself. The collapse of one super power (U.S.S.R.) renewed the lost confidence of the Islamists, who began to believe that they could successfully bring about the demise of the power of West itself.

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<sup>28</sup> "The Story of *Jihadi* Curriculum in Pakistan," In *Research Report* (Islamabad: Centre for Research and Security studies). Accessed 21 March, 2009. <http://crss.pk/downloads/Reports/Research-Reports/Story-of-Jihadi-Curriculum-in-Pakistan.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Sayyid, Introduction to *A Fundamental Fear*, pp. xiii- xv.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. xv.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. xvii.

<sup>32</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam* (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 1.

The rise of the Islamic threat in the post-Cold War era was a direct consequence of Cold War politics. This threat reflected different trends, such as fundamentalism, extremism, militancy, radicalism and the Jihadism of al Qaeda. 9/11 not only revived the centuries old rivalry, but also placed the stereotypes, metaphors, and meta-narratives back onto the international stage. The conversion of this Jihadist ideology to terrorism by the non state actors as a political tool in order to achieve their objectives initiated, a new trend in Islamic *Jihad* philosophy itself. Previously regular warfare had been instituted by the orders of Imam or Caliph.

Reza Aslan defines Islamism as a fusion of religion and nationalism built upon an Islamic moral framework. He argues that Hassan al Banna's Muslim Brotherhood (began in 1928) was an alternative form of Muslim spirituality distinct from Al Azhar's traditional Islam, while Syed Qutb transformed Islam into a revolutionary force. Although Oliver Roy and Gilles Kepel declared political Islam to be a dead force by the end of 1990s, the emergence of Jihadism gave a new life to political Islam. Aslan termed Islamism and Jihadism as cousins split into two opposing rival movements: religious nationalism and religious transnationalism. He points out that Jihadism rejects the very concept of nationalism and is more of an anti-nationalist movement than a transnationalist movement. He defines global Jihadism as a social movement that uses symbols to forge collective identities beyond the borders of nation states. Its historical roots go back to anti-colonial struggle and do not look back to the *Qur'an* or the Prophet, but rather to Ibn Taymiyyah. Jihadism, he argues, rejects the nation state and is opposed to Islamism.<sup>33</sup>

Although, the threat of internationalisation of Islam started with the Shiite revolution in Iran in 1979, the emergence of Sunni Jihadist ideology demonstrates its broader spread. It is based on the fact that the majority of Muslims share anti-globalisation feelings and are strongly opposed to the Westernisation of their societies. The *Jihad* to safeguard Muslim societies against Western cultural onslaught shows similarities with the anti-colonialist *Jihad* in the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century. However, this is not to say that the West is the

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<sup>33</sup> Reza Aslan, *Beyond Fundamentalism: Confronting Religious Extremism in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2010), pp. 23-32.

cause of all forms of political Islam from the 19<sup>th</sup> Century onwards. These movements were triggered by a range of factors including poverty, a lack of education, an inability to develop and progress, problems in the Middle East, and failures against Israel

U.S. policies in the Middle East and its support for Israel and the Muslim dictators in the region are germane to the rise of militancy, suicide bombings, and terrorist activities. So also is the feeling that the Muslim civilisation has failed to regain the hegemonic position in the international political scene which it once had during the time of the Abbasid and Ottoman Empires. Political Islam is noted for its desire to regain this lost hegemony.

#### **4.4 Cold War Politics, Communism and Islam: Ideological/ Religious Categories**

The emergence of Cold War politics in the post-Second World War era transformed the United States into a superpower.<sup>34</sup> The Iron Curtain speech of Winston Churchill in March 1946 ushered in a new era in international politics. The Soviet Union and the U.S., allies in the Second World War against militant nationalism, became enemies due to strategic competition, clash of ideologies, and world power desires. John Lewis Gaddis describes the nature of the coalition in World War II, which led to the emergence of the Cold War, thus, “the war had been won by a coalition whose principal members were already at war – ideologically and geopolitically if not militarily- with one another.”<sup>35</sup> An important aspect that emerged during Cold War politics was the use of metaphors, stereotypes, and narratives from history. The question of threat and militarisation did not come up in American policies until the emergence of situations such as the Berlin Blockade of 1948, the Soviet detonation of an atomic device in 1949, the Chinese Revolution in 1949, and the Korean war in 1950, which compelled the U.S., “to review its grand strategy in order to confront what was now universally regarded as a serious threat to its interests around the world”.<sup>36</sup>

The communist threat also brought the Christian Right into U.S. politics, with Republicans using this platform to regain the presidency after two decades of

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<sup>34</sup> Michael Cox, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission?* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), p. 38.

<sup>35</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> Cox, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 39.

Democratic rule. The primary metaphors and narrative used in this era were taken from Christian theology and an anti-communist crusade launched by the Christian Right.<sup>37</sup> The Cold War period showed the same kind of demonization of the U.S.S.R. by the West that had influenced the Orientalist discourse during the colonial period. Although the rise and resurgence of religion has been deemed a phenomenon that appeared during post-Cold War politics, there was considerable use of religion, which included both Christian Right-wing theological trends and *Jihad*, as a tool used by the U.S. administration against communism during the Soviet-Afghan war 1979-89.

The Cold War has been defined as an ideological battle between capitalist/liberal ideology and communism, but the language employed by the West resorted to religious terminology. The metaphors of good vs. evil, dark vs. light, Western values vs. Atheist values, and others clearly depict this trend. President Dwight D. Eisenhower made particular reference to this at his inauguration in 1953:

We sense with all our faculties that forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history. This fact defines the meaning of this day.<sup>38</sup>

Robert L. Ivie observed that Americans are accustomed to 'depersonalizing and decivilizing', as done by Joseph McCarthy, who depicted Communists in terms of 'forces of darkness' and called American liberals 'Fifth-Amendment Communists'.<sup>39</sup> This was followed by a portrayal of the enemy as a barbarian whose goal is the destruction of American freedom.<sup>40</sup> Phillip Wander calls this 'prophetic dualism', which,

[D]ivided the world into two camps. Between them there is conflict. One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other. Since no guarantee exist that good will triumph, there is no middle ground. Hence neutrality may be treated as a delusion, compromise appeasement, and negotiation a call for surrender.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Robert L. Ivie, Martin J. Medhurst, Philip Wander, and Rober L. Scott, eds. *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1997).

<sup>38</sup> *Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 294.

<sup>39</sup> Ivie et.al, *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, p. 75.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p.157.



Wander further argues that during the two World Wars, Puritanism, guided by a mission for moral and spiritual superiority, became the law and the norm that increased during the Eisenhower administration due to its coalition with the Republican Party, termed as a Protestant Establishment. This concept of prophetic dualism became a “sophisticated ideological apparatus for coping with a ideological aspect of ‘communist menace’ at home and abroad”.<sup>42</sup> During the days of the Eisenhower administration, American civilization was occasionally termed as a,

[r]eligious civilization to deal with the communist menace or to steep on peace as a vital value to be pursued as a religious cause for entering into negotiations with the forces of evil.<sup>43</sup>

The prophetic dualism of Eisenhower was changed to Kennedy’s ‘technocratic realism’ with its emphasis on realism, reason, and American interests.<sup>44</sup> This era also witnessed the rise of the Republican Party in the U.S. The inclusion of the Christian right in the Republican party proved to be important not only during the Cold War era against the assumed communist threat, but also in post-Cold War politics as depicted in the rise of neo conservatives in the administration of President George Bush Sr in the 1990s.

Michael Northcott points out that, in modern America, ‘premillennial dispensationalism’, that is significant in the Southern ‘Bible Belt’, has become a powerful cultural and religious force that has eroded the puritan belief of equality of all before God. The ‘premillennial dispensantionalist’ divide humanity into the wicked and true believers.<sup>45</sup> The apocalyptic culture that this tends to sponsor dates back to the American Revolution, the American Civil War, and the economic depressions of the 1870s and 1930s. Another, reason for this culture was fear of nuclear annihilation and the end of the world, fear in general, use of religious language, and apocalyptic movies of Armageddon.<sup>46</sup> According to Northcott,

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<sup>42</sup> Ivie et.al, *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, p.158.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 164.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, pp. 164-6.

<sup>45</sup> Michael Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm: Apocalyptic Religion and American Empire* (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 68.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, pp. 9-10

The American apocalyptic lives off fear: fear of the outsider, fear of the slave who became citizen, fear of the communist, fear of corporations and the military, fear of aliens, fear of criminals and the fear of federal government.<sup>47</sup>

The use of apocalyptic language, such as 'rid the world of evil' and 'crusade against wickedness' that President Bush Jnr used in his 20 September, 2001 address to the nation gave credence to Osama Bin Laden's *Jihad* against the 'Zionist crusaders' and American hegemony.<sup>48</sup>

This rise of religious discourse in American politics had an impact on its policies towards communist regimes and this trend continued in the post-Cold War era. In the 1980s, another event that gave a definitive shape to Cold War politics was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. For the U.S., this was an opportunity to use political Islam for Cold War politics, which made political Islam a victim of the Cold War politics. The use of religious signs of 'good and evil' and 'dark and light'<sup>49</sup> permitted the Reagan Administration to bequeath political Islam with religious symbols as a weapon to target the U.S.S.R. Thus, the creation of a broad-based religious alliance of Sunni *Mujahedeen*, the use of *Jihad* as a slogan, and mobilisation of religious fervour of monotheistic Muslims against atheist communist regimes was launched. However, China, which was also a Communist regime, was exempted from this propaganda campaign.

One of the important points of analysis during the Cold War had been the change of the approach of the West towards Muslim countries. This pseudo-reconciliation was caused by the need to win friends during the Cold War. With the loss of Iran in 1979, the USA pursued a policy of military and non-military alliances with different Muslim countries, including Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. An important aspect of American Cold War politics was its deliberate encouragement of Islamism in Muslim countries to combat the communist or left wing tendencies. The collaboration of the U.S., Pakistan,

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<sup>47</sup> Northcott, *An Angel Directs the Storm*, p. 10.

<sup>48</sup> Manuel Perez-Rivas, "Bush vows to rid the world of 'evil-doers'," Accessed 9 June, 2011. <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.bush.terrorism/>.

<sup>49</sup> Ronald Reagan, "Evil Empire Speech," Accessed 19 October, 2011. <http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganEvilEmpire1983.html>.

and Saudi Arabia during the Soviet- Afghan war in 1979 illustrated this trend.<sup>50</sup> Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were helpful in mobilising Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in support of the anti-Soviet cause, and the religious parties of Pakistan, with the funding of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, mobilised public opinion in support of *Jihad* and the cause of the *Mujahedeen*<sup>51</sup> and *Muhajareen*.<sup>52</sup>

#### 4.5 Political Islam: Post Cold War Era: Enemy, Threat, and Terrorism

With the collapse of Communism, the U.S. became the sole superpower. It appeared that, as Leslie Gelb puts it, the U.S. found 'no military threat' for the foreseeable future.<sup>53</sup> It was from the 'Bottom-Up Review Policy' of President Clinton in 1993, that the 'threat-based approach' emerged, particularly emanating from the regional powers in the Middle East and Korean Peninsula, from which the 'future conflicts' were expected to emerge.<sup>54</sup> Other threats that were mentioned included the threat of proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the reversal of the democratic process in former USSR republics.<sup>55</sup>

Jason A. Edwards points out that at the end of the Cold War, the U.S. lost the central organising impulse of its foreign policy. The Soviet Union no longer dominated the previously defined threat environment of America.<sup>56</sup> A new vocabulary to describe challenges to U.S. hegemony was needed and it was provided through new concepts of the enemy namely the primitive and modern savage. The primitive savage conjured up the image of a decentralised enemy, which is a culture, rather than an evil individual or government, with no discernible signs of civilisation. A modern savage was depicted as a particular leader or government,

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<sup>50</sup> Fred Halliday, Introduction to *Islam and The Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. ix.

<sup>51</sup> *Mujahideen*: those who strive in the cause of Allah

<sup>52</sup> *Muhajareen*: those who migrate in the face of oppression or aggression or denial of religious freedom.

<sup>53</sup> Cox, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 41.

<sup>54</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment* (Washington DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities :Defense Budget Project, 1994).

<sup>55</sup> Cox, *US Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 44-6.

<sup>56</sup> Jason Edwards, "Defining the Enemy for the Post Cold War World: Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy Discourse in Somalis and Haiti," *International Journal of Communication* 2(2008): pp. 830-2.

[P]erpetrating acts of aggression against the civilized order, which included deeds against the United States, one of its allies, or the savage agent's own population.<sup>57</sup>

Edwards further states that this kind of discourse not only dehumanises the enemy, but also makes them appear irrational and evil.<sup>58</sup> He contends that the definition of the enemy during Clinton's period, which was used against Haiti (modern savage) and Somalia (primitive savage), was also adopted by President George W. Bush in his war against Iraq in 2003, portraying Saddam Hussein as a modern savage and al Qaeda as a primitive savage.<sup>59</sup>

Following the end of the Afghan *Jihad* in 1989 and the victory of the *Mujahedeen* forces against the Soviet forces the U.S. lost interest in the future of Afghanistan. Communism had failed and the U.S.S.R. had disintegrated shortly after that. Although the Arabs who fought alongside the U.S. and Afghan soldiers were inspired by the goal of expelling the U.S.S.R. from Afghanistan, the Gulf War in 1991 shifted the focus of these Arab *Mujahedeen* towards the Middle East. The stationing of US forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states was one factor which had a great impact on the way that the Arab viewed international politics in the years to come. The Afghan *Jihad*, which saw the emergence of al Qaeda, was another.

The rise of al Qaeda owes its origin to the U.S. policy towards the Middle East, its support of dictatorships, monarchs in Middle East, and the Gulf War in 1991. The Gulf War of 1991 set the political trends of post-Cold War politics. This war also shaped the Jihadist ideology within political Islam with transnational dimensions; its adherents began to view the U.S. as a power interested primarily in the oil and mineral resources of the region and the security of Israel as well as the U.S.-Israel interests in the Middle East. The reaction of the U.S. and coalition forces against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 has been considered by al Qaeda to reveal the U.S.'s double standards in the region.

The images emerging from the Afghan *Jihad* were a prelude to post 9/11 imagery of Muslims by the U.S. administration and media. The imagery was of the *Mujahedeen* filled

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<sup>57</sup> Edwards, "Defining the Enemy for the Post Cold War World", p. 834.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 842.

with religious zeal fighting for the cause of Allah. The role of Hollywood movies and media in depicting this imagery was very powerful imagery based on medieval Muslim warriors fighting the infidels with turbans and swords, deriving from the Crusades and the Ottoman period. In a very short time Islam, in the form of Jihadism, began to be seen in the West as a 'green menace'.<sup>60</sup> This concept of green menace was a continuation of the depiction of Islam as a menace for the Byzantium Empire, during the Crusades, and in the appearance of the Turkish Menace in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century. The emphasis was based on the same categories used in the medieval era with *Jihad* as a holy war, militancy, and the sword depicted as the Muslim way to achieve political objectives.

While the West cannot be entirely blamed for the creation of political Islam, it is clear that the emergence of political aspect of Islam in the Muslim world was not an isolated event. It was a reaction in turn to the historical encounters between the West and Islam, and, more recently, to colonialism, modernity, globalisation, and Westernisation. The political ideas of reformists such as Jamalud din Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Mohammad Iqbal as well as religious leaders, such as Syed Qutb, Abu al Alla Maududi, and Abdullah Azzam, were a reaction to and refutation of certain aspects of modernity. The proto-scientific thought inculcated by Europeans declaring religion as a cause of stagnation of Muslim societies produced reformists who tried to solve this mystery by comparing Islam to science, modernity, rationalism, and progress. Maududi and Qutb, for instance sought the solution in a purer form of Islam while movements like al Qaeda and the Taliban drew sustenance from Salafi/Wahabi thought and the success of *Jihad* against the Soviets

#### **4.6 9/11 and Construction of the Enemy in the Discourses of President Bush Jnr and Osama Bin Laden and their Impact on Militant Jihadism**

The attacks of 9/11 ushered a new era in international politics, not only in the coining of a new terminology, but also in the construction of a new enemy for the West. Fred Halliday observes that 9/11, brought about three important changes in international politics. First, it made the 'war on terror' the centre of U.S. foreign policy. Second, it

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<sup>60</sup> Assayag, "East and West: Orientalism, War and the Colonial Past."

illustrated the double standards of U.S. policy towards Muslim states, particularly with respect to the Palestinian crisis. Lastly, it initiated the collaboration between the U.S. and Russia with bases being provided to U.S. in Central Asia and the U.S. supporting opposition to the Chechnya separatist movement.<sup>61</sup>

The impact of historical Muslim-Christian relations, the Cold War and post-Cold War politics is clearly evident in the post-9/11 discourse of al Qaeda and the U.S. administration. This discourse had been initiated by the leadership of al Qaeda, while the American administration, led by President George W. Bush, responded to it in kind. The important terms involved references to 'Evil', 'Crusade', 'Crusader-Zionist alliance', 'Islamic Radicalism', 'victimhood', 'humiliation', 'revenge', and 'oppression'. Although President Bush used the term 'crusade' in his 20 September, 2001 address but never used it again, it resounded in the Muslim world.

Mervyn F. Bendle points out that popular culture in the US shows an increasing interest in apocalypse imagery and narrative.<sup>62</sup> This is evidenced by the TIME/CNN 2005 poll showing that one third of Americans pay more attention to news about the end of the world, 59% believe that events in the Book of Revelation will come true, and one quarter believe that the events of 9/11 were predicted in the Bible. Moreover, there is an increase in movies, books, articles, and TV series using the apocalyptic terms.<sup>63</sup> The resurgence of this type of neoconservative politics during the Bush era has proven to be decisive in providing direction to the 'war on terror'. Similar to his predecessors, President Bush also used religious discourse in his inaugural address and invited evangelical Franklin (Billy) Graham to provide blessings.

Osama bin Laden and the leadership of al Qaeda conducted their discourse mainly in a theological and polemical style, but also included references to the impact of colonisation, Cold War politics, and post-Cold War U.S. policies towards the Middle East and Afghanistan. Halliday notes three influences on the ideology of al Qaeda. These

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<sup>61</sup> Halliday, Introduction to *Islam and The Myth of Confrontation*, p. xiv.

<sup>62</sup> Mervyn F. Bendle, "The Apocalyptic Imagination and Popular Culture," *Journal of Religion and Popular Culture* 11(Fall 2005): p. 1. Accessed 29 July 2011. <http://www.usask.ca/relst/jrpc/art11-apocalypticimagination.html>

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 1.

were that of Hassan al Banna, who provided a new militant form of political organisation at the transnational level (1928); Pakistan's Maulana Maududi, the founder of *Jama'at-i-Islami* (1941), who extended the ideology of *Jihad* to involve a global struggle against secularism and Western ideology, and Egyptian Syed Qutb (1940s-1950s) who allowed no room for reconciliation or negotiations with the West. <sup>64</sup>

The *Al Qaeda Reader*, by Raymond Ibrahim, who is a Coptic Christian from Egypt living in the U.S., was the first attempt to collect and translate the various statements and writings of Aymen al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden.<sup>65</sup> This book provides insights into the mindset of the al Qaeda leadership. An analysis of their writings and speeches shows that they draw heavily on verses from the *Qur'an*, and to some extent the *Hadith*, to support their arguments. In addition, they heavily question Western values and use them to challenge Western hegemony over the Muslim world.

The major theme that emerges from these statements is the aggression, oppression, killing, and occupation of Muslim lands by the West, its control of their resources, and Muslim humiliation because of this. Bin Laden and al Zawahiri also criticised and considered the rulers of Muslim countries to be the accomplices of the West in oppressing Muslims. The Crusades, the Crusader-Jewish alliance, and the West's declaration of war on Allah are constantly highlighted.<sup>66</sup> The Quranic verses that they mostly cited against the West were those originally intended for pagans and idolaters of Mecca,<sup>67</sup> which they directed to the people of the Book. In addition, they gave non-Muslims only three choices: to submit to Islam, to pay *Jizyya* (religious tax), or to face the sword.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Halliday, Introduction to *Islam and The Myth of Confrontation*, p. xi.

<sup>65</sup> Raymond Ibrahim, ed. *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway Books, 2007).

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 13.

*Quran* verse 9:5, "But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them. Beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war): but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them :for God is Oft forgiving, Most Merciful".

Verse 9:36: "So wrong not yourself therein, and fight the Pagans all together as they fight you all together. But know that God is with those who restrain themselves".

<sup>68</sup> Ibrahim, ed. *The Al Qaeda Reader*, p. 20.

In responding to an appeal issued by thirty Christians, 'What we're fighting for', and its answer by Saudi *Ulema* 'How can we coexist', bin Laden declared moderate Islam to be a prostration to the West. The mention of 'crusade' by George W. Bush on 20<sup>th</sup> September, 2001 is cited again and again as the true intention of American leaders. The excessive use of verses from the *Qur'an* depicting antagonism between Muslims and non-Muslims and prohibiting their friendship are the basic tenets of their narrative, together with propagating offensive *Jihad*.

Bin Laden's Statements, which were mostly polemical in nature, were based on Christian-Muslim relations and the Christology of the *Qur'an* (the way Christianity has been described in the *Qur'an*) of the *Qur'an*. He believed that Christian nations have inflicted more harm to Muslims than other nations, and therefore it is incumbent on Muslims to fight Christians. He described Christians as infidels, and quotes all the Quranic verses concerning the fight against infidels. Al Zawahiri goes into detail on the question of 'Enmity' and 'Loyalty' in Islam (*wala al bara*), and addresses the question of relations of Muslims and non-Muslims. He also quotes Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, who formulated the *fatwa* for fighting and resisting against the Mongols. Bin Laden maintained that the, "conflict with the crusading American is over values of justice—both in theory and practice, likewise with freedoms—in theory and practice".<sup>69</sup>

Both presented a charge sheet against the West with the Palestine issue at the top. What appeared to inform their world view is the humiliation suffered by Muslim, conflicts in Kashmir, Chechnya, and because of the plundering of Muslim wealth, the installation of American military bases in Middle East, the continued rule in the Middle East of dictators and of monarchs.

Bin Laden and al Zawahiri further argued that the American people cannot be exonerated, as they are complicit in this history. After all they choose their leaders and support the U.S. military establishment which invaded Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>70</sup> Bin Laden and al Zawahiri called Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf a traitor of Islam

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<sup>69</sup> Ibrahim, ed. *The Al Qaeda Reader*, p. 50.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, pp. 188-201.



and a servant of the Zionist-Crusaders alliance.<sup>71</sup> One of the interesting points raised here is that bin Laden and al Zawahiri made extensive use of verses of fighting and *Jihad* in their narrative. As former Afghan Mujahedeen, this trend goes back to the Jihadi curriculum that was employed against the Soviet Union and its classification as an infidel power.

While analysing the response of the Bush administration to the events of 9/11 and the discourse in which they were engaged, Husam Abuaisha argues that the ideological consensus on the definition of 'terrorism' and the enemy construct in the speeches of George W. Bush, Paul Wolfowitz, and Ariel Sharon depict a trend that delineates the dichotomy of 'us' versus 'them'. He pointed out,

War on terrorism represents the ideological subjectivity of America and Israel in the Middle East region. The macro is rooted in the micro. America and Israel are intertwined and become the first empire to decide which country should lose its rule or not, depending on their priorities, strategies and interests.<sup>72</sup>

Moreover, this discourse links the global interest of the U.S. with the regional interests of Israel and provides a definition of terrorism that transforms the victim (such as Palestine) into the aggressor.<sup>73</sup> He believes that the alliance also gave a very vague and abstract definition of the word 'terror', which provided them room for expanding their policies to whatever frame they wanted.

Philip W. Graham *et al.* analysed four speeches from different eras to compare the 'call to arms', namely those of Pope Urban II (1095), Queen Elizabeth I (1588), Adolf Hitler (1938), and George W. Bush (2001). The contributors in this study found that the discourse has not changed significantly, and all of the speeches show the same four characteristics,

[A] legitimating power source external to the orator; the history (mythological, world-historically, or otherwise conceived) of the social system in which the text is located; an evil and aberrant Other; and a unifying construct (religious,

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<sup>71</sup> Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader*, p. 227.

<sup>72</sup> Husam Abuaisha, "The Rhetoric of the "war on terror", " *Situtaion Analysis 2* (2003) : p. 71.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

racial, political, philosophical, or nationalistic) that links members of the social system to the externally legitimating power source invoked by orator.<sup>74</sup>

Jonathon Crichton did a systematic functional grammar analysis of the word 'terror' in the speeches of George W. Bush and found that the language employed by the Bush administration points to four major themes. These include the depiction of conflict to their own advantage, binary division between 'us' and 'them' and those who support and oppose terrorism,

[To] accrue to itself the capacity to decide the membership of each group, and to forestall disagreement by identifying counter-arguments with support for terrorists.<sup>75</sup>

Crichton observed that in disassociating the word 'terror' from those who experienced it, President Bush was able to use 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' interchangeably, thus enabling his administration to label anyone as the enemy.<sup>76</sup>

One of the efforts of the Bush administration during the period following 9/11 was to avoid construct the conflict that depicted it as a conflict over resources or a reaction to American policies towards the Middle East and U.S. and its support of Israel.<sup>77</sup> The conflict was carefully crafted as essentially one between 'civilisation versus terrorism',<sup>78</sup> through stopping short of upholding Huntington's 'clash of civilisation' thesis, which foreshadowed a fight to the finish between the West and Islam in general. Although the bin Laden narrative mentioned the civilisational conflict, this cannot be taken in isolation, as President Bush also termed 'Islamic extremism' as one of the problems in the conflict instead of mentioning 'militant or extremists' as the main problem while calling also al Qaeda as a radical organisation.

Bush declared on 20 September, 2001,

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<sup>74</sup> Philip W. Graham, Thomas Keenan and Ann-Maree Dowd, "A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror," *Discourse & Society* 15, n 2-3 (2004): p. 6.

<sup>75</sup> Jonathon Crichton, "Doing Battle With A Noun: Notes on the Grammer of 'terror'," *Australian Review of Applied Linguistic* 30, no. 2 (2007) : pp.19.2-3.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>77</sup> Bruce Lincoln, "The Rhetoric of Bush and Bin Laden," *Fathom Archive* (2004): p. 5, Accessed 21 Novemebr , 2011, <http://fathom.lib.uchicago.edu/1/777777190152/>.

<sup>78</sup> Crichton, "Doing Battle With A Noun": p. 14.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.<sup>79</sup>

Drawing attention to an Islamic form of extremism allowed the U.S. to present the conflict in terms of presence of certain trends of extremism within Islamic theology. This gave enough room for constructing this conflict in a civilisational framework of Islam versus the West rather than militant or radical Islamists versus the West. Whereas bin Laden constructed his narratives in purely religious terms while arguing in a polemical fashion, President Bush's initial response to the conflict also contained a religious-biblical reference, which later was carefully turned into a political problem focussing on 'Islamic extremism' and radical groups practicing this form of extremism as the main problem.

Karen Cronick, in her analysis of the rhetorical discourse of President Bush and bin Laden, observes that two terms emerge and are highlighted: 'faith' and 'civilization'. Bin Laden traced his narrative from the past to the present by labelling Muslims as the victims of crusaders and colonisation.<sup>80</sup> Cronick argues that Bush used the term 'crusade' metaphorically, which bin Laden picked up on and incorporated into his narrative.<sup>81</sup> Liu Yongtao argues that the Bush rhetoric was based on a binary image of an 'evil world' and a 'civilised world', which not only helped the U.S. create new enemies, but also was a shift in its national security strategy after 9/11. This rhetoric justified and legitimised actions of the U.S. government for tackling this 'evil'.<sup>82</sup> The prominence of 'evil' in the discourse of Bush is derived from the apocalyptic religious rhetoric that became noticeable in his speeches in the post-9/11 era.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> "Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, 20 September, 2001," Accessed November 23, 2011. CNN.com/U.S.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>

<sup>80</sup> Karen Cronick, "The Discourse of President George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden: A Rhetorical Analysis and Hermeneutic Interpretation," *Forum: Qualitative Social Research* 4, no. 3 (September 2002): p. 7-8 [www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/836](http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/836).

<sup>81</sup> Cronick, "The Discourse of President George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden": p. 9.

<sup>82</sup> Yongtao, "Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies": p.102.

<sup>83</sup> Geoff Berry, "Holy Wars Two Millennia Apart: Religious Rhetoric, Oppositional Politics, and Cultural Identity," *Journal of Classic Association of Victoria* (2008): p. 45.

[http://monash.academia.edu/GeoffBerry/Papers/428588/Holy\\_Wars\\_Two\\_Millennia\\_Apart\\_Religious\\_Rhetoric\\_Oppositional\\_Politics\\_and\\_Cultural\\_Identity](http://monash.academia.edu/GeoffBerry/Papers/428588/Holy_Wars_Two_Millennia_Apart_Religious_Rhetoric_Oppositional_Politics_and_Cultural_Identity).

Yongtao points out that President Bush coined the term 'Axis of Evil' in his 29 January 2002 address for these states backing terrorist activities and seeking to build weapons of mass destruction. It included a diverse group of countries (Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) that had no relation to al Qaeda.<sup>84</sup> The aim was to extend the scope of the 'war on terror' in order to achieve other foreign policy objectives through this war. This was flagged in an earlier warning by Bush that countries that did not join the 'coalition of the willing', would be regarded as giving support to the 'enemy'.

The rhetoric of evil was accompanied by the rhetoric of fear. Daniel R. Labrecque quantitatively observed the level of fear rhetoric in President Bush's speech between 2002-2006 as approximately 55.4%. He stated that,

[T]he finding is significant because the words are important. The language the President uses helps to define the debate. By calling the United States foreign policy a 'war on terror' President Bush wanted to evoke a certain response from the American people that would have been different if he had chosen to call it a 'war on freedom' or something other than a 'war'.<sup>85</sup>

President Bush in his National Security Strategy in 2006 had declared 'war on terror' as an ideological conflict with Islamic extremism and a generational war of ideas with radical Islam, and the concept of Islamo-fascism that promoted the 'clash of civilization' thesis.<sup>86</sup> The al Qaeda leadership based their narrative in the post-9/11 period, by declaring the 'war on terror' as a war against Allah and Islam, which struck a chord in the Muslim mind. The change of administration in the US in 2009 led to some policy changes, and to changes in the symbols and rhetoric of war.

President Obama changed this frame and rhetoric by declaring in his National Security Strategy that the 'war on terror' is not against any religion (Islamic extremism) or any sort of terrorism, but specifically the al Qaeda network and its terrorist affiliates. The Obama administration started a broad-based engagement effort with the Muslim world,

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<sup>84</sup> Yongtao, "Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies": p. 101.

<sup>85</sup> Daniel R. Labrecque, "Fearing Terror: The Effects of the Political Climate on George W. Bush's Use of Fear Rhetoric," p. 10. Accessed October 23, 2012. <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Calkins/Labrecque.pdf>

<sup>86</sup> "National Security Strategy," Accessed 26 November, 2011. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>.

and his Cairo address on 4 June, 2009 was a step in this direction.<sup>87</sup> Instead of focusing on improving the American image, the administration focused on tarnishing al Qaeda's image by adopting a communication strategy of exposing al Qaeda's narrative with the help of a credible third party rather than through any American spokesman.<sup>88</sup> This new rhetoric based on "disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremism"<sup>89</sup> dissociated Islam from al Qaeda and removed the dichotomy of moderate vs. extremist Muslim used by Bush. However, the military policy remained the same. Except for the announcement of closing of the Guantanamo Bay Prison by 22 January, 2009, which could not be achieved due to legal and political problems, the administration continued to pursue hard counterterrorism strategies in Afghanistan and around the world.

In response to changing U.S. rhetoric and how to deal with violent extremists and the al Qaeda network, a number of leading Muslim scholars were encouraged to frame a response to al Qaeda's narrative. Dr Tahir ul Qadri, a prominent Muslim scholar from Pakistan, for example, issued a lengthy *fatwa* (religious edict) in December 2011 in response to the writings and declarations of bin Laden, al Zawahiri and the Taliban. It was a theological response to terrorism, suicide bombings, and rebellion against the government. It also addressed the issue of *Takfeer* and *Kharuj*,<sup>90</sup> which the al Qaeda leadership tended to use against the rulers of Muslims states.

Dr. Qadri explains Islam's position on: the sanctity of human life, the importance of peace and non-violent methods, the rights and protection of non-Muslims in a Muslim state, rebellion against a ruler or *Amir*, and the individual's role in the declaration of *Jihad*. He discusses in detail the history of the *Kharijites* in Islam, drawing on the vast

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<sup>87</sup> Marc Lynch, "Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama," (Washington D.C: Center for a New American Security, June 2010) : p. 5. Accessed 18 June, 2010.  
[http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\\_Rhetoric%20and%20Reality\\_Lynch.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Rhetoric%20and%20Reality_Lynch.pdf)

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 18.

<sup>90</sup> *Takfeer*: practice of declaring other Muslims as *Kafir* (unbelievers). This is particularly used by the al Qaeda leadership against rulers of Muslim countries who are supporting the West in the 'war on terror' and the dictators and kings in the Arab world.

*Khuruji*: a revolt against Muslim ruler against the un-Islamic governance.

literature of *Hadith*. He explains the *Kharijites*<sup>91</sup> were the first group who regarded the killing of Muslims as lawful, challenged the authority of the state, and raised rebellion and armed struggles against authority. Although they based their position on the *Qur'an* and proclaimed religious piety they nonetheless justified the killing of Muslims.<sup>92</sup> Dr Qadri argues that the present day terrorists are reminiscent of this outlawed group of *Kharijites* and he traces similarities to them through the *Hadith* literature. In his Fatwa, declaring al Qaeda as a group of *Kharijites*, Dr Qadri bases his argument not on *Ijtihad* but on the *Quran* and *Hadith* advice for dealing with rebellions.

Although earlier Imam Qaradawi<sup>93</sup> issued a *fatwa* on 12 September, 2001 that also declared the killing of innocent civilians to be illegal and un-Islamic, along with most Arab scholars and jurists, he considers suicide bombings against Israelis to be justified. However, in 2010, Dr Tahir ul Qadri and Abdul Aziz Shiekh, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, declared suicide bombing as un-Islamic. Together, the Fatwa of three religious authorities in the Amman Message on 9 November 2004, including Shiekh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi of Al Azhar University, Iraq's Grand Ayatullah Ali Al Sistani, and Yusuf Qaradawi, tackled the issues of extremism and *takfir* between Muslims.

During the past few decades, especially after the end of Cold War, there have been numerous incidents which have sparked controversy leading to violence between Muslims and the West. These relate to the issues of religious sanctity vs. Freedom of expression as values of Western society. The publication of the *Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie and the subsequent *fatwa* (religious edict) for his death by Imam Khomeini in 1989 centres around this concept of religious sanctity vs. freedom of expression.

The protection given by the Western media and British government to Salman Rushdie on the grounds of 'freedom of expression' created some rift between Muslims and the West. This debate over values had been an issue of West-Muslim relations at a global level since the end of the Second World War. Even though, at local levels, issues of

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<sup>91</sup> Kharajites: as a rebel group who first appeared during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and later in full force during the times of the third and fourth Caliphs Uthman bin Afan and Ali bin Abi Talib.

<sup>92</sup> Muhammad Tahir ul Qadri, *Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombing* (London: Minhaj ul Quran International 2010), p. II.

<sup>93</sup> Imam Qaradawi is an Egyptian Islamic Theologian.

blasphemy and disrespect to certain religious aspects sacred for Muslims or Prophet Muhammad appeared, they never had a global dimension. This controversy and the resultant reaction of Shiite clerics brought the extremist view of Islam at the global level. It also induced negativity towards the West in Muslim societies which resulting in widespread protest and anger in the Muslim world.

Another important event which sparked the controversy was the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 13 February, 2008, and its subsequent publication in different European newspapers as a mark of solidarity on the issue of freedom.<sup>94</sup> The campaign for “International burn a *Qur’an* Day” by a U.S. pastor Terry Jones, and burning and desecration of the *Qur’an* in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan further increased this rift.

The release of the film *Fitna* by a Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilder on March 27, 2008 and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh at the hands of a Moroccan immigrant;<sup>95</sup> the populist campaign against minarets in Switzerland, the commotion about the planned burning of the *Qur’an* by a small extremist Christian community in the US; and the most recent protests against the establishment of a Muslim centre close to Ground Zero in New York in 2011, are bringing the historical encounters and narratives into contemporary times.<sup>96</sup> In the eyes of much of the Western public, the widely scrutinised prophecy of “clashing civilizations” seems to fulfil itself with increasing frequency. The Pew Global Attitude Survey of 2006 on ‘Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground’ found, in the West 70% of Germans and 55% of Americans think that the relations between Muslims and Westerns were generally bad, while 55% of Turks, 58% of Egyptians believe this aspect of Muslim-West relations.

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<sup>94</sup> Salim Mansur, "Of Danish Cartoons, Muslim Rage and the Bedouin State of Mind," *Occasional Papers Series, Center for Security Policy* 10(2006, May). Accessed 1 April, 2010. [http://www.eprism.org/images/BedouinStateofMind\\_-\\_May06.pdf](http://www.eprism.org/images/BedouinStateofMind_-_May06.pdf)

<sup>95</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "After Van Gogh: Roots of Anti Muslim Rage," In *Seventh Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting* (Florence-Montecatini Terme: European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Mediterranean Programme, 2006, March 22-26). Accessed 3 April , 2010. <http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/m.vanbruinessen/publications/ws10-2006MM-van-Bruinessen.pdf>

<sup>96</sup> Liyakat Takim, "The Ground Zero Mosque Controversy: Implications for American Islam," *Religions* 2 (2011). 132-144; doi:10.3390/rel2020132

Moreover, a survey conducted in 2011 found that the Western public opinion became more favourable for Muslims compared to 2006 while Islamic extremism is still one of the prime concerns for 69% of people in the U.S., 70% in Britain and 68% in France.<sup>97</sup>

The speech of Pope Benedict in 2006 reawoke much controversy and negative feeling between Muslims and Christians. In his speech, the Pope quoted a 14<sup>th</sup> Century Byzantine emperor, Manuel II Paleologus, who, in his dialogue with an educated Muslim Persian on the truth of Christianity and Islam, said: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached".<sup>98</sup> This brought to the forefront the image of medieval Popes and theologians who developed the negative image of Islam to refute it theologically. The infuriation over the speech by the Pope that referred to Islam as an essentially 'violent' faith; the case of a British English teacher arrested in Sudan for allowing her pupils to name a teddy-bear 'Mohammad'; the pre-emptive cancellation of the Mozart opera 'Idomeneo' in Berlin because of security fears stirred by a scene that depicts the severed heads of all prophets including that of Mohammad' caused much controversy. Another issue which has become a question of identity is about the *Hijab* (veil) in Western countries. This is more important in Europe compared to America. The issue became more controversial with the banning of the hijab through French law in 2009.

#### **4.7 Post-9/11 Epistemological Imperialism: Peace-War Matrix and Its Impact on Political Islam:**

The post 9/11 era reproduced the images of historical encounters between the West and Islam, and the Oriental images of the colonial period but also the epistemological imperialist tendencies of the colonial period. The interventionist policies and discourse by America and the coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria within the Muslim world come under the 'liberal peace project'. Mikkel V. Rasmussen points out

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<sup>97</sup> "Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground," in *Pew Global Attitude Project* (Pew Research Center, 2006, July 18). Accessed 14 October, 2011. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/07/18/islam-and-the-west-searching-for-common-ground/>

<sup>98</sup> John L. Esposito, "Pope Benedict XVI and Islam," *The Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs* 25, no. 8 (2006, November).



that in the broader context of the 'war on terror', establishing democratic norms, human rights, and a liberal economic system is considered the central aspect of the Western strategy of fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>99</sup> The projection of a specific concept of peace and transformation of Muslim societies to Western liberal ideals through 'peacebuilding' and 'reconstruction' is producing negative political trends strengthening the Jihadists arguments that they constitute a form of Western imperialism. Vivienne Jabri argues that this dimension of intervention is different to the traditional one, as it rests on liberal societies acting as an agent of transformation of target societies rather than working towards conflict resolution. The purpose of this peacebuilding is to redesign the societies in order to transform them into liberal societies and consequently they can be termed as peaceful.<sup>100</sup> Andrew J. Williams points out that this form of reconstruction and peacebuilding can act as,

[T]ying reconstruction to the historical experience of the West in dealing with the 'Rest' over a period that can easily be traced back a couple of hundred years, and in some cases further.<sup>101</sup>

He terms this form of peacebuilding as a continuation of the League of Nation's Mandate System or the United Nations Trusteeship System. He further argues that negotiation with terrorists as a form of conflict resolution has been completely rejected and instead 'reconstruction' through military intervention has been adopted as a policy tool for transformation of these societies exactly the policy that was pursued in the case of Germany and Japan after the Second World War.<sup>102</sup> This form of state-building is defined as 'peacebuilding'. The liberal peace project is also visible in the UN Secretary General's 'An Agenda for Peace' which bases the limits of state sovereignty on human

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<sup>99</sup> Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, "The ideology of Peace: Peacebuilding and The War on Iraq," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 185.

<sup>100</sup> Vivienne Jabri, "War, Government, Politics: A Critical Response to the Hegemony of the Liberal Peace," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 41.

<sup>101</sup> Andrew J. Williams, "Reconstruction: The Missing Historical Link," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. ed. Oliver P. Richmond. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 59.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p. 68.

concerns together with the indicators of state failure due to societal breakdown, warlordism and lack of working state institutions.<sup>103</sup> Jabri points out that,

The argument against the liberal peace project might start from the premise that to intervene at all into other societies is by definition colonial, suggestive of dispossession, radicalised domination, and subjugation. Clearly, the historical record of the forms of intervention mentioned above directly points to resource dispossession, as witnessed in Iraq. However, the primary form of dispossession relates to the dispossession of agency, the capacity to determine what constitutes political identity.<sup>104</sup>

This, according to Jabri, comes under the liberal peace projects view of 'human security' and 'protection' or 'rescue'. Jabri further says that,

Far from being an emancipatory project, therefore, the liberal peace project might be seen as reinforcing a hierarchical conception of subjectivities premised on the primacy of the European liberal self as against others whose modes of articulation remain 'other'.<sup>105</sup>

She cites the example of state building in Afghanistan through the epistemological construction of 'civilizing mission' and 'responsibility to protect',<sup>106</sup> by establishing structures of governance while defining the social breakdown of the society as having the emancipatory potential, the forces of reaction as insurgency, and identification of oppositional forces as militant and culprits. She argues that all these constructions were applied to Afghanistan: the purpose was to use military in order to achieve peace and development goals.<sup>107</sup> Jabri contends that

[w]hile the liberal peace project defines itself in terms of institution-building and governance, relocating it in the matrix of war reveal its working as a twenty-first century form of colonisation. ... Nowhere have these excesses of liberal interventionism been more apparent than in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the acquisitive logic of domination is distinctly expressed in radicalised terms reminiscent of the colonial past.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Vivienne Jabri, "War, Government, Politics," p. 42.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p.43.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p. 48.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, pp.50-1.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p. 53.

She defines the governmentalisation of other societies within Michel Foucault's terms of power-knowledge<sup>109</sup> and 'governmentalisation of the state' which she describes in liberal peace matrix of war as 'governmentalisation of the post colonial state'.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, she considers this aspect of the liberal peace project as dispossessing of the target societies of self determination and following an epistemological and ontological universalism which is not only centred around military and carceral power but also pedagogical power.<sup>111</sup>

The AfPak strategy and pursuance of peacebuilding and development policies in Pakistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan by the Obama administration come under this broader aspect of the epistemological hegemony of liberal peace. The failure of peacebuilding efforts in the tribal areas necessitates a different approach that factors in both an understanding of the dynamics of conflict and the indigenous nature of sustainable peacebuilding. This offers the best chance of escaping the rhetorical presentation of militant Jihadism as an oppositional force to 'Western neo-imperialism through peace' from outside.

#### **4.8 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the construction of the Muslims as 'other' in Western Orientalist discourses, a construction which has impacted on the construction of Muslim identities through the emergence of movements such as Islamism, Jihadism, and the concept of global *Ummah*. The chapter's aim was to examine the impact of the historical construction of 'otherness' of Muslims and Islam on the discourse following the era of colonialism. It further examined the influence of different Western discourses and policies on the trends within political Islam. It concluded by establishing the continuation of trends of historical encounters together with political and epistemological imperialism which are defining the directions of political Islam in the post-9/11 era.

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<sup>109</sup> Michel Foucault, *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, p. 53

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, pp. 54-5.

This chapter has sought to establish that the negative categories of violence, enemy, threat, and the sword attached to Islam, together with the occasional appearance of events that targeted the Prophet and the *Qur'an* in the Western world, reinforce the image of the West as the enemy of Muslims and vice versa. Although there have been numerous efforts to engage in interfaith dialogue and efforts by the Muslim scholars for peace and reconciliation, these efforts are largely in vain due to the weight of the negative imagery derived from history and the normative stereotyping of Muslims by the Western media. This has simply encouraged Muslims to respond with violence. The chapter further argued that the application of a liberal version of peace for reconstructing the war-torn countries, and interventionists' strategies in the wake of the 'war on terror' are enhancing the ability of militant Jihadists to appeal to the Muslim population. An indigenous peace building approach that will be more acceptable to Muslim societies is suggested.

The next chapter builds on this aspect by examining the rise of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The emergence of this organisation and its affiliates in the tribal areas brings this area into the broader West-Islam relationship of confrontation, although historically this area was not associated with this aspect, unlike the Middle East.

## CHAPTER FIVE

# CASE STUDY OF CONFLICT IN THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN (FATA) PART-I

*We [Pakhtuns] have been presented as a collection of uncivilized, wild tribes. ... the courage of our tribal brothers is described as wildness, passion for freedom as lawlessness, their proverbial hospitality as an irrepressible urge for begging, borrowing and pillaging ... Like untended, wild daisies they bloom and fade away in mountain ridges. ... I want to create for them a free world, where they can grow in peace, comfort and happiness. I want to kiss the earth heaped on the ruin of their homes devastated by brutal people. ... I want them to stand with heads erect and then want to throw this challenge 'Show me another decent, gentle and cultured race like them!'*(Abdul Ghaffar Khan).<sup>1</sup>

### 5.1 Introduction

The violent conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan since 2001 is a product of the Global War on Terror, but it has its roots in historical, religious, and social phenomena. Driven by the categories developed in the previous two chapters, this chapter focuses on the in-depth conflict analysis. It will focus on the local and national dimensions of the conflict while Chapter Seven will examine the transnational dimension and the creation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Chapter Eight will develop a peacebuilding and transformative framework for the case study of FATA.

The basic objective of conflict analysis in a peacebuilding and transformative framework is to understand the root causes, actors, and dynamics of a conflict. The creation of such a framework requires the use of social analysis tools to gain a broad-based understanding

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Rajmohan Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan: Nonviolent Badshah of the Pakhtuns* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 8.

of the history, politics, economics, and social and cultural elements within a particular conflict zone. Rather than examining the Taliban movement in each tribal agency, which has already been aptly done by Farhat Taj and Qandeel Siddique,<sup>2</sup> this chapter will examine different dimensions of the conflict especially its connection to the meta-narratives of West-Islam relations. The chapter adopts the dimensions-of-conflict approach by Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, which explains different dimensions of conflict with emphasis on structural, relational and cultural features.

This conflict can be categorized as intractable because of its complexity, its long history of violence, and various socio-economic factors. Moreover, it is threatening the political and economic stability of the entire South Asian region. The roots of the conflict in the tribal areas are many. These include the historical interactions of Europeans with Muslims in the Middle East and Afghanistan and the impact of this on the British understanding of *Pakhtuns* in tribal areas, which was based on images of violence, the sword, and a religiously stagnant society; Orientalist images of *Pakhtuns* as an untamed martial race; and the socio-political and economic issues aftermath of the 1947 partition of the subcontinent, followed by the deliberate lack of development of this area by the Government of Pakistan.

The foundation of the local aspect of the conflict was laid by the *Malaki* system, weaponization, a warrior culture, and the use of this territory as a buffer zone to gain leverage in Afghanistan by Pakistan. The 1979 Afghan *Jihad* against the Soviet Union, al Qaeda, and the U.S. 'war on terror' were important international factors giving a new direction to the revival of global Jihadism. Finally, this chapter will also examine the use of religion, strategic culture, and the tapestry of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan itself to reinforce the image of tribal Muslims as inherently violent in order to achieve Western objectives in this war. The conflict analysis will identify the factors that point up the need for an effective conflict transformation to be tried.

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<sup>2</sup> Qandeel Siddique, "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organisation And the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan's North West," *DIIS Report 12* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2010) ; Farhat Taj, *Taliban and Anti Taliban* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011).

The structural factors that affect the conflict intractability include the level of economic development, capacities for different ways of fighting, cultural patterns, and decision-making institutions. These factors influence self-conceptions and identities, how grievances are experienced and interpreted, what goals are formulated, and the methods used to attain them.<sup>3</sup> All this in turn provides the canvas in which relationships are depicted. An important aspect of conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan is that its root causes lies in the structures of relationships that have propagated the conflict and escalated violence in the area. Since these structures are socially constructed their transformation can potentially lead to peaceful change.

This chapter is divided into five sections, analysing respectively the historical, political, socio-economic, religious, and cultural dimensions of the conflict. The last section examines the philosophy of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the *Khudai Khitmatgar* movement he lead as a cultural approach to peacebuilding. In order to achieve sustainable peace, it is argued, this conflict needs a comprehensive peacebuilding and transformative framework covering its historical, socio-political-economic, and religious dimensions.

## 5.2 Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA): An Introduction

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is located on the border of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (previously the North West Frontier Province) and Afghanistan. The border with Afghanistan is 450 km long, and the area of the FATA is 27,220 square kilometers.<sup>4</sup> The people of this area are called *Pakhtuns* or *Pushtuns*, (mostly Sunni Muslims, with the Shiite communities to be found mostly in the Orakzai and Kuram agencies) and are divided into many tribes with a total population of 3.2 million (Table 1).<sup>5</sup> This chapter will use the term as pronounced in the local language, *Pakhtuns*. The entire area consists of seven tribal agencies, namely Bajur, Khyber,

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
<sup>3</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability," In *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Causes of Intractable Conflict*, eds. Pamela Aall, Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan and Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Northerwest Tribal Belt of Pakistan , Part One: 550 b.C.- 1947 A.D.," *IPRI Paper 10*(2005), p.17. <http://ipripak.org/papers/federally.shtml>.

<sup>5</sup> Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Introduction to "Understanding FATA : 2011 Attitude Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas," (Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP), 2012): p. xi

Kurram, Mohmand, Orakzai, South Waziristan, North Waziristan, and six federal regions.<sup>6</sup> This region has semi-autonomous status in the federation of Pakistan.

**Figure 1: Map of FATA**



Source: FATA Conflict Maps. <http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/fata-conflict-maps>

After the 1947 Partition, an instrument of accession was signed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Pakistan Movement and first Governor General of Pakistan, at

<sup>6</sup> FR Regions: Frontier Regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan.



the Bannu Tribal *Jirga* in January 1948, which assured its semi-autonomous status.<sup>7</sup> This entire region borders Afghanistan and has historical, ethnic, religious, and linguistic links with that country. It was a part of Afghanistan before the Durand Line Agreement was signed in 1893 between Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdur Rehman on behalf of the British and Afghan governments respectively. For the British, it served as a strategic buffer zone between British territory and the Russian Empire, which led to its administrative division with indirect British control. This system has been maintained until now though some recent political reforms have made progress towards including the area in the mainstream political process. This area is regulated under the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act of 1901.

The tribal areas became part of Pakistan on August 15, 1947. This status continued until the 1955 One Unit policy under which Pakistan was divided into two administrative units: West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The dissolution of One Unit in Pakistan on 1 July 1970 resulted in the division of the tribal areas into three categories: Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which constituted seven tribal agencies, the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of Balochistan.<sup>8</sup> FATA is the most under-developed area of Pakistan, with a total literacy rate of 17.42 percent and female literacy of 3 percent.<sup>9</sup> This is primarily a result of government negligence, legal impediments and the lack of development initiatives. For economic sustenance, FATA has a flourishing black market economy in the drug and arms trade. The conflict in FATA has seriously affected not only the economy of Pakistan, but also threatens emerging economic powers like China and India with similar internal disturbances.

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<sup>7</sup> Haq, Khan and Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Paksitan ": p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing The Militants," In *Asia Report* no 125 (International Crisis Group, 11 December, 2006) : p. 9.

Figure 2: Map of FATA




Source: FATA Secretariat. <http://fata.gov.pk/>

**Table 1: Population Demography (FATA, 1998)**

<b>Agency/FR</b>	<b>Area (sq Km)</b>	<b>Population (Total)</b>	<b>Population Density (Persons per sq Km)</b>	<b>Annual Growth Rate 1981-98(%)</b>
<b>FATA</b>	27,220	3,176,331	117	2.19
<b>Bajaur</b>	1,290	595,227	461	4.33
<b>Khyber</b>	2,576	546,730	212	3.92
<b>Kurram</b>	3,380	448,310	133	2.50
<b>Mohmand</b>	2,296	334,453	146	4.28
<b>North Waziristan</b>	4,707	361,246	77	2.46
<b>Orakzai</b>	1,538	225,441	147	-2.69
<b>South Waziristan</b>	6,620	429,841	65	1.95
<b>FR Bannu</b>	745	19,593	26	-6.65
<b>FR Dera Ismail Khan</b>	2,008	38,990	19	-2.09
<b>FR Kohat</b>	446	88,456	198	2.59
<b>FR Lakki</b>	132	6,987	53	-4.81
<b>FR Peshawar</b>	261	53,841	206	2.22
<b>FR Tank</b>	1,221	27,216	22	-0.61
<b>Source:</b> <a href="http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=56&amp;Itemid=92">http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=56&amp;Itemid=92</a>				

### 5.3 Dimensional Analysis of Conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

Figure 3: Dimensional Analysis Cycle



#### 5.3.1 Historical Dimensions: British Policy and Construction of the Oriental Image

The historically constructed image of Muslims and *Pakhtuns* has affected conflict in this region. Historically, *Pakhtuns* have variously and commonly been described as brave, hospitable, faithful with friends, revengeful, conservative, avaricious, a rugged, mountainous people, autonomous, and abhorrent of modernization.<sup>10</sup> Heavily influenced by the Orientalist mindset, and having both positive and negative connotations, the image of *Pakhtun* society and culture as primitive was developed during the British colonial period. It was mostly based on the writings of British officers, which took their tone from historical encounters with the Turks, Middle Eastern and Afghan Muslims and the underlying understanding of Muslim societies as warlike and stagnant. The conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan since 9/11 has Orientalist images and the transnational aspect of political Islam at its forefront.

<sup>10</sup> Mountstuart Elphinstone, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1819), p. 400; Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans 550 B.C.-A.D 1957* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1976).

The attempt by the British to administer this area and understand *Pakhtuns* came with their arrival in 1842 and their control over the region. British rule generated stereotypes and narratives that are relevant to the contemporary conflict. Charles Lindholm argues that British perceptions of *Pakhtuns* differed under different Viceroys and also changed according to the Forward and Closed-Door policies adopted by the British Empire in this area. These accounts show up the mentality of the colonial rulers and their policies. Although they controlled the region after 1842, they were involved in the region from 1808, when Mountstuart Elphinstone was sent to discuss an alliance against Napoleon with Shah Shuja of Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup>

Charles Lindholm called *Pakhtuns* the “largest segmentary lineage society” in the world,<sup>12</sup> as they are spread over a large geographic area and have elaborate social organization, hill tribes, and kingdoms in Afghanistan. The British admiration for the *Pakhtuns* was related to their own self-image as a martial race. According to Lindholm, Elphinstone described two different sets of qualities in the *Pakhtuns*. On the one hand, he saw them as revengeful, with envy, avarice, rapacity, and obstinacy, while on the other hand he acknowledged they are very faithful to their friends, hospitable, brave, prudent, and fond of liberty. The Closed-Border policy, which restricted British expansionism in the tribal areas and brought tribes under administrative control, produced some good impressions of the *Pakhtuns*. The image changed from 1842 once the British began pursuing their Forward policy of expansionism. The image of *Pakhtuns* as warriors became more predominant. In later years, colonial officers described acts of resistance by the tribes as acts of banditry, raiding, and theft.

Sir Olaf Caroe and James W. Spain described the *Pakhtuns* in mostly positive terms, but one predominant aspect in the British writings concerns the British engagement in Waziristan, which is mostly portrayed negatively because of the difficulty the British had in controlling the area. James W. Spain called Waziristan ‘a dark and bloody ground’ while Sir Olaf Caroe also explained that the conflict in Waziristan had a deep impact on

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<sup>11</sup> Charles Lindholm, "Images of the Pathan: The Usefulness of Colonial Ethnography," Accessed 13 September, 2011. <http://www.khyber.org/publications/021-025/imagesofpathan.shtml>.

<sup>12</sup> Lindholm, "Images of the Pathan".

the British psyche and on British attitudes towards *Pakhtuns*.<sup>13</sup> Lindholm concluded that the inconsistent Western images of *Pakhtuns* are due to the lack of Western understanding of the structural framework of *Pakhtun* society. Once this framework is understood, together with the role played by the colonial ethnographer, it is easy to understand them.<sup>14</sup> Maira Hayat calls the stereotypes the British developed a “theoretical apartheid” to which the *Pakhtuns* and tribal societies have been subjected since the colonial era.<sup>15</sup> These stereotypes were later applied to the Taliban, portraying them as a band of thieves, criminals, raiders, and drug barons.

Although the British were able to control Afghanistan by installing different rulers or *Amirs*, the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier were difficult to control militarily and administratively as a result of the difficult mountainous terrain. The result was an alternative system of administration; one that did not hamper tribal notions of freedom while advancing British interests. In 1878, under Lord Curzon, the British adopted a system implementing the division of tribal areas into political agencies. In the 1880s, the British adopted the *Malaki* system, which involved appointing a *Malak* (tribal chief) from the tribe who was responsible for obtaining a fixed number of levies for the British Empire. In return, the *Malak* got allowances, reported to a political agent who represented the government in the tribal areas, and was expected to control the tribes.

This was the first time the social fabric of the tribal areas was changed, which greatly affected the tribes’ structure and cultural code.<sup>16</sup> The 1872 adoption of the Frontier Crime Regulatory Act also had influence here. Richard I. Bruce describes this Act as an effort by the British government to bring tribes into the ‘pale of civilization,’ resembling the ‘White Man's Burden’ approach of Europeans to civilize the world.<sup>17</sup> Under this Act, the tribes were given the illusion of freedom by being outside the direct control of the

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<sup>13</sup> Caroe, *The Pathans 550 B.C-A.D 1957*; James W. Spain, *The Way of The Pathans* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972).

<sup>14</sup> Lindholm, "Images of the Pathan".

<sup>15</sup> Maira Hayat, "Still Taming The Turbulent Frontier? The State in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan," *JASO Online* 1, no. 2 (Winter 2009) : p. 181.

<sup>16</sup> Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom and Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>17</sup> Richard Issac Bruce, *The Forward Policy and Its Results* (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1900) , p. 4.

Empire. This helped the British to control them very effectively and to manipulate their code of culture, *Pakhtunwali* for the Empire's benefit.

Martin Chanock observes that all the components of the *Pakhtunwali's* cultural code came under the control of the British through its *Malaki* system and through political agents who were the representatives of the Viceroy in the tribal areas and who had the power to convene or affect the decision of the *Jirga*. This disregards the myth that these tribes have never been colonized.<sup>18</sup> Farhat Taj argues that this notion of autonomous tribes and weak state control involves "sweeping judgments" and is "far from truth"<sup>19</sup> as the tribal areas, through the British administrative system and constitutionally after the establishment of Pakistan, experienced considerable interference if not control by the British Empire until 1947 and then the State of Pakistan thereafter.

### **5.3.2 Political Dimensions: Pakistan's Identity crisis, Political Islam As A Strategic Policy, and Its Impact on FATA**

Tribalism as a form of society does not mean the absence of the modern world. Andre J. Williams points out that,

Indigenous forms of political organisation are written off as 'tribal', 'clan-based', and lacking in modern functionality, 'unfit for purpose'.<sup>20</sup>

'Tribal' society is a concept and strategy allowing for state control, and the forming of an autocratic culture or kingdom that in reality does not exist.<sup>21</sup> Barnett Rubin argues that conflict in these societies mostly results from the forced integration and transformation of tribal-based societies into a Eurocentric state system, which, in the era of colonialism, made tribes a buffer between powerful states.<sup>22</sup> This is particularly true of the tribal areas of Pakistan.

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<sup>18</sup> Chanock, *Law, Custom and Social Order*.

<sup>19</sup> Taj, *Taliban and Anti Taliban*, p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> Andrew J. Williams, "Reconstruction: The Missing Historical Link," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*. ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 60.

<sup>21</sup> Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, 2nd ed. (London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 5.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

At the time of the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent, agreements were signed between tribes and M.A. Jinnah to maintain the status quo in the region, which provided the basis for future relations between the tribal areas and Pakistan.<sup>23</sup> The political status of FATA in the State of Pakistan is governed by Articles 246 and 247 of the 1973 Constitution,<sup>24</sup> which extends the executive authority of the state into this area. The President of Pakistan enjoys discretionary power, and the governor of the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the former North West Frontier Province) exercises executive power on behalf of the President.

The administration and control of FATA is the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), which is answerable to the Prime Minister and National Assembly. However, the real power for policy changes and administration rests with the President. The political design under British colonialism continues with political agents (usually bureaucrats) acting as representatives of the President for each tribal agency. Agents have political, judicial, and executive powers to handle criminal issues and the revenue system. The Levis, or tribal militias, and *Khasadars* (irregular forces from different tribes) are under their authority.<sup>25</sup>

The political agent has the power to grant *Malak* status to tribal elders or conversely to give them *Lungi* (lower than *Malak*) status if he determines that the tribal elder is not sufficiently serving the interests of the State. The financial support of a tribe depends on its role in the maintenance of peace and what the government deems 'social order', the suppression of crimes and support of government policies. The agent also holds the power of appointment to the *Jirga* (tribal council), which is a conflict/dispute resolution mechanism in the absence of a regular civil and criminal judicial system in the area.<sup>26</sup> Political agents exploit the scarce employment in tribal areas (because of the lack of

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<sup>23</sup> Haq, Khan and Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan".

<sup>24</sup> Article 246 deals with defining tribal areas, different agencies and FR regions.

Article 247: "The executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and no act of the Parliament shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Areas or to any part thereof, unless the president so directs." Moreover, clause 7 of this article bars the extension of superior courts, including the Supreme Court and High Court, to FATA unless parliament so provides under the law.

<sup>25</sup> "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing The Militants": p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 4-5.



development opportunities), offering secret funds to change sides in tribal rivalries, gain support for the government, and secure jobs for local tribesmen as *Khasadars*. Thus, the entire socio-political system of the tribal areas is based on exploitation, discrimination, and the denial of political and economic opportunities.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act enshrines judicial authority to settle disputes and combines it with police and executive authority in the Political Agent (PA). It is a continuation of the Federal Crimes Regulatory Act, 1901 ('FCR') with minor modifications. It combines the executive discretionary powers with tribal norms and traditions. Although the *Jirga* system has the power to resolve civil and criminal disputes, it is subservient to the PA as he can refer cases to it. The composition of the *Jirga* is also at his discretion and he is vested with the power to award punishment without trial in a proper court of law. The FATA jurisdiction is divided into inaccessible areas, administered areas, and protected areas.<sup>27</sup> All the areas have been denied due process of justice, allowing the punishment of an entire tribe for any crime, seizure of tribal property, or arrest of any persons the PA deems to be against the interests of the state.

Although many reforms have been initiated, this area is still governed by the FCR. Political reforms were initiated in 1996 by the government of Benazir Bhutto; the adult franchise was introduced to the area,<sup>28</sup> and the first elections were held in 1997 on a non-party basis with twelve seats in the National Assembly and eight seats in the Senate of Pakistan. Control of the election process, however, still remains firmly in the hands of the political agents. In 2002, the FATA Secretariat was set up and in 2004, Agency Councils were introduced to serve as local representative bodies in FATA. On 12 August, 2012, the President of Pakistan signed two orders, extending the Political Parties Order (2002) to FATA, which introduced political parties in the area and amended the FCR by granting prisoners the right to bail within twenty-four hours of arrest. It also

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<sup>27</sup> Inaccessible are those areas where the government has nominal authority but tribesmen settle their disputes themselves, administered areas have government offices and roads, and protected areas are places where, although tribes can solve their civil and criminal disputes themselves, the political agent has the right to make discretionary decisions, citing reasons of state interest or any other reason depending on the issue.

<sup>28</sup> Haq, Khan and Nuri, "Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Paksitan ": p.16.

softened the collective punishment clause. However, while there has been no progress on the issue of auditing the funds of political agents, these reforms are a good starting point.<sup>29</sup>

Maira Hayat points out that since 1948, the State of Pakistan has used the tribal areas as a buffer zone for its military adventures in Kashmir and later in Afghanistan. At the time of Partition, the agreement between Jinnah and the tribes was a confidence-building measure; fifteen battalions were removed from Waziristan and Razmak, which were later believed to be engaged in the 1948 tribal incursion into Kashmir. The deliberate weaponization of tribal society after independence helped the State of Pakistan, as it inherited an army in poor condition, and tribal militia were a good alternative in the early days of the State.<sup>30</sup> She further argues that the Soviet-era *Madrassahs* (religious seminaries) and training camps, along with the poppy cultivation to generate funds, and the post-9/11 stationing of 80,000 troops follow the buffer-zone trend. In order to maintain military/state control, the government's deliberate policy is to keep this area underdeveloped and under brutal FCR regulations, hidden by the cloak of tribal independence. As Hayat contends,

[That] FATA became such a ready safe haven for militants (local as well as foreign) highlights the culpability of the state's historical dealings with the FATA, vacillating between use and abandonment - in contributing to the current crisis.<sup>31</sup>

This policy of Pakistan is rooted in its own identity crisis and insecurity as a state. Concerning Pakistan's role in the 'war on terror', and FATA as the centre of this violent conflict due to refuge given to al Qaeda leadership in the area, Pervez Hoodbhoy describes Pakistan's role as one part of the military establishment of Pakistan clearly at war with another.<sup>32</sup> Allowing al Qaeda in the FATA resulted from a tacit agreement between Lt. General Mehmood and the Taliban at the time of his visit to Kandahar in the

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<sup>29</sup> Shehryar Fazli, "A New Dawn for Pakistan's Tribal Areas?," *Foreign Policy: The AFPAC Channel* (11 August, 2011), Accessed 24 July, 2012.

[http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/a\\_new\\_dawn\\_for\\_pakistans\\_tribal\\_areas](http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/a_new_dawn_for_pakistans_tribal_areas)

<sup>30</sup> Hayat, "Still Taming The Turbulent Frontier?": pp.192-93.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p.196.

<sup>32</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy, "The War Within Islam," *New Age Islam* (June 11, 2011), Accessed 12 April, 2012. [http://newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamWarWithinIslam\\_1.aspx?ArticleID=4811](http://newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamWarWithinIslam_1.aspx?ArticleID=4811).

wake of the 9/11 attacks to convince the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Later, the 2003 suicide attacks on General Musharraf not only showed the extent of al Qaeda's operations but also its inroads into Pakistan's security apparatus.<sup>33</sup>

Suicide attacks inside Pakistan were termed a reaction of al Qaeda and the Taliban to Pakistan's policies in the 'war on terror'; they were pressure tactics to force Pakistan to change its policies. These tactics were adopted in reaction to the U.S. threat to take Pakistan "back to the Stone Age",<sup>34</sup> which led Pakistan to make a U-turn on its Afghan policy.<sup>35</sup> The failure of the United States to win the war in Afghanistan, as it had with its swift victory in and control over Iraq after the 2003 invasion, made the United States reframe the Afghanistan War. From 2002 to 2006, the United States supported President Musharraf's efforts in the 'war on terror', but the strengthening of al Qaeda's and the Taliban's grip on the tribal areas, and their slow re-emergence to the regional scene made the United States realize that the core problem lay with Pakistan.<sup>36</sup>

As a result, the United States invested in democratic and peacebuilding initiatives, leading to the U.S. AfPak policy. The Lal Mosque (Red Mosque) incident in July 2007 and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December, 2007, which appeared in the aftermath of this change of policy, represented a counter-strategy by the Islamists to stop secular democracy in Pakistan. Although al Qaeda and the Taliban have been named as being behind the Islamization drive in the capital city, the fact that both Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Gazi (Head of Jamia Hafsa *Madrassah* which was adjacent to the Red Mosque) worked for the military establishment during the Afghan *Jihad* cannot be ignored.<sup>37</sup> The military operation in Lal Mosque, which resulted in the death of scores of students and one of the leaders, has had tremendous influence on future events in the Swat Valley, including the creation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the ousting of the Musharraf Regime in 2008.

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<sup>33</sup> Syed Saleem Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 10; Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 267.

<sup>34</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 201.

<sup>35</sup> Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban*, p. 12.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

### 5.3.3 Socio-Economic and Gender Dimension

The lack of development, employment opportunities, and low educational levels in the FATA has made people susceptible to militancy as a way to earn money and gain power in society. FATA is the most underdeveloped and impoverished region of Pakistan, with 60% of the population living below the poverty level. The literacy rate is 17.42%, compared to 56% nationally, with male literacy of 32.6% and female literacy of 3%.<sup>38</sup> Political agents control development funds and planning. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood. A total of 7% of FATA land is cultivated for agricultural purposes. Eighty-two percent of the land is not available for agricultural purposes because of difficult topography and lack of irrigation; 44% of agricultural land has to rely on rainfall.<sup>39</sup> A survey of the area conducted by the Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP) in Pakistan shows that, in 2008, before the launch of military operations in the area, justice was residents' main priority (73.3%) but in 2010, security became the vital issue (62.9%). In 2011, security concerns dropped to 44.6%, while education (44.2%), health (39.9%), and employment (40.6%) have remained a constant need for the society.<sup>40</sup>

**Table 2: Demographic Indicators of Pakistan, KPK and FATA**

Indicator	Pakistan	KPK	FATA
Geographical are (sq km)	796,096	74,521	27,220
Annual Population Growth, 1981-98 (%)	2.69	2.82	2.19
Average Household Size (persons)	6.80	8.00	9.30
Urban Population (% of total)	32.50	16.87	2.70
Population Density (persons per sq km)	166.30	238.10	116.70
<b>Source:</b> FATA Secretariat <a href="http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=56&amp;Itemid=92">http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=56&amp;Itemid=92</a>			

<sup>38</sup> "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing The Militants": p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> Shinwari, Introduction to "Understanding FATA": pp. xi-xii.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, pp.3-4.

**Table 3: Socio-Economic Indicators (Pakistan, KPK and FATA, 1998, 2003)**

Indicator	Pakistan	NWFP	FATA
Literacy ratio (both sexes, %)	43.92	35.41	17.42
Male Literacy ratio (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51
Female Literacy ratio (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00
Population per doctor	1,226	4,916	7,670
Population per bed in health institutions	1,341	1,594	2,179
Roads (per sq km)	0.26	0.13	0.17
<b>Source:</b> <a href="http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=55&amp;Itemid=91">http://www.fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=55&amp;Itemid=91</a>			

**Table 4: Education Indicators of Pakistan, KPK and FATA (1998, 2003)**

Indicator	Pakistan	KPK	FATA
Literacy ratio (both census, %)	43,92	35,41	17,42
Male Literacy ratio (%)	54.81	51.39	29.51
Female Literacy ratio (%)	32.02	18.82	3.00
<i>Literacy rates according to 1998 census; all other figures for 2003-04</i>			
Source: <a href="http://www.fata.gov.pk">http://www.fata.gov.pk</a>			

The lack of development activities in the area is due to the negligence of successive governments. Communities lack of access to clean water, health facilities, communication networks, and schools. The result is a flourishing illegal trade including smuggling, the drug trade, the arms trade, and other criminal activities in the area. The black economy flourished in this area during the Afghan *Jihad* from 1979 as a result of the lack of effective control of finance and the encouragement of the government to arrange alternative sources of income for fighting the war. This black economy continued until the rule of the Taliban in the 1990s. Although the Taliban stopped poppy cultivation, they did not stop the actual trade in drugs.

Although al Qaeda is said to be the major financial sponsor of the Taliban regime, another major source of funding was the nexus of the Taliban and drug traffickers. Gretchen Peters points out that Taliban insurgents and drug traffickers successfully

integrated an agricultural product into the global economy.<sup>41</sup> Peters argues that Haji Bashar Noorzai, the son of a leading member of the Quetta alliance of traffickers and a former Afghan *mujahid*, was one of the key sponsors of Mullah Omar and the Taliban during their initial days. He raised \$ 8 million along with ammunition and logistics support for the new regime. Haji Baz Muhammad (who pleaded guilty in the United States in 2007 to helping the Taliban) and Haji Jumma Khan's drug network also helped the Taliban financially.<sup>42</sup>

Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf admitted that retired army officers supported the drug networks, which was a major source of funding for Taliban and Jihadist groups.<sup>43</sup> After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, clashes between senior Taliban commanders over drug profits were reported, involving Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, Mullah Dadullah Lang, and Mullah Akhtar Osmani. There were also reports that Gulbaden Hikmatyar, Jallaluddin Haqqani, and Pakistani traffickers, together with the ISI, were involved in moving narcotics out of Afghanistan and also in smuggling of all sorts of contraband to generate funds for the Taliban after 9/11. The involvement of transnational Jihadist organizations in trafficking is also clear, as clashes were reported in April 2007 between fighters of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and the Pakistani Taliban over land and smuggling rights.<sup>44</sup>

Along with the drug trade, kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, illegal timber logging, and other criminal activities have become a source of income for people in this area. As the Taliban gives protection and support to such activities, as well as financing them and recruiting local people for work, these activities have replaced legal sources of income. Although the government has initiated development plans, the failure to implement them has resulted in the continuation of these activities. As a result, changes in the economic structure of the society have also eroded the power of local *Khans* (traditional tribal leader) and *Malaks*.

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<sup>41</sup> Gretchen S. Peters, "Taliban and the Opium Trade," In *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field*. ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) , pp. 7-23.

<sup>42</sup> Peters, "Taliban and the Opium Trade," pp. 14-15.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13.

The Taliban movement also brought social revolution to the society,<sup>45</sup> but of another kind. The Taliban-criminal-Mullah nexus is leading to the erosion of tribal hierarchy and the diminished legitimacy of tribal elders. The traditional power enjoyed by the political agent in FATA, the *Malaks*, and tribal elders has ended; the decision-making power of the *Jirgas* has been reduced to zero. The use of *Takfir*, or religious edicts declaring others non-Muslim, against tribal elders who oppose the Taliban's decisions has devastated the social fabric of tribal society. On the other hand, its cultural code has been used by the government to give refuge to al Qaeda members, and the targeted killing of tribal elders who try to oppose Taliban decisions has pitted the youth against the elders.

Consequently, the authority of the tribal *Mashar* (elder) has eroded, and attempts to use the power of the *Jirga* to solve this conflict and end the violence are not working. Qandeel Siddiqui calls it a struggle between *Kashar* (younger) and *Mashar* (elder) in tribal society, as most of the leadership of TTP is under the age of 35 and from a poor background. Although these young leaders do not belong to a religious class and were not students of *Madrassahs*, they are using religion to gain power and break the society's hierarchal power structure.<sup>46</sup> However, there have been efforts to form *Lashkars* (tribal militia) and hold *Jirgas* against the Taliban to counter their force and control the area with the support of the government. These *Lashkars* and *Jirgas* have faced targeted killings and suicide bombings.

Although not initially a trigger of the conflict, gender has become an important aspect of this conflict. The plight of women in the FATA region was not good even before the start of the conflict, as the female literacy rate was just 3% and the child mortality rate is higher than elsewhere in the country. Tribal customs, together with a strict interpretation of religion, barred women from active participation in socio-economic life. With the Islamization drive and the take over of the Swat Valley by Taliban and affiliate organizations in 2006, women's education and schools, female teachers and NGO

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<sup>45</sup> Abubakar Siddique, "Taliban Violence Creating Social Revolution Among Pashtuns," (23 July , 2010), Accessed 1 September , 2010. [http://www.rferl.org/content/Taliban\\_Violence\\_Creating\\_Social\\_Revolution\\_Among\\_Afghanistans\\_Pashtuns/2108012.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Taliban_Violence_Creating_Social_Revolution_Among_Afghanistans_Pashtuns/2108012.html).

<sup>46</sup> Siddique, "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.": p. 61.

representatives were targeted as an attack on Western symbols. The concept of women's liberation is considered Western, which is not acceptable in traditional *Pakhtun* society.<sup>47</sup>

Despite, the conflict in the Swat Valley ending with the 2009 military operation, the gender aspect has had a spill over effect in tribal areas, where girls' schools have been targeted and bombed. This strategy was used as a symbolic gesture to target the West and its values, as well as gaining media attention. The Taliban consider secular form of women's education to be un-Islamic, as the only form of education considered permissible is religious education in *Madrassahs*. Statistics about the destruction of girls' schools given by the FATA Disaster Management Authority show that 542 primary schools for boys and 108 girls' schools are dysfunctional, while 440 schools, of which 130 are girls' schools, have been destroyed by the Taliban.<sup>48</sup> Yasmeen Hassan has called this a "war on Pakistani school girls."<sup>49</sup>

#### **5.3.4 Religious-Cultural Dimensions: The Role of Religion and Culture in Pakhtun Society and the Indigenous approaches for Peacebuilding**

One of the most contested issues in the tribal areas is the fusion of religion and culture. Traditionally, the cultural code (*Pakhtunwali*) has been more important when dealing with social issues, while religion is interpreted in a way that fits in with cultural beliefs. Religion plays an important role in cohesiveness and taking a common stand. This factor gives additional power to the traditional religious leader or prayer leader *Mullah* or *Imam* in the society. They have generally been considered of lower status, but for bringing unity in the name of religion, they play an important part. Other religious leaders, such as the *Ulema* (religious scholars), *Sayyeds* (belonging to the Prophet's family), and *Pirs* (Sufi saints) have also occasionally had a role in the society. Tom Ginsburg very simply defines the relationship of *Malak* (tribal elder), *Mullah*, and *Jirga* (tribal council of elders) as follows:

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<sup>47</sup> Saira Bano Orakzai, "Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peace Building Theory -Practice Application," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no. 1 (2011): p. 42.

<sup>48</sup> Fawad Ali Sher and Alam Shirwari, "Devastation: Bombing of Schools in KP and FATA," *DAWN* (20 February, 2012), Accessed 13 April, 2012. <http://dawn.com/2012/02/26/devastation-bombing-of-schools-in-kp-and=fata/>.

<sup>49</sup> Yasmeen Hassan, "A War on Pakistan's School Girls," (2010, April 18), Accessed 1 August, 2011. [www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/2009/01/26/20090126WVP-hassan0126.html](http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/2009/01/26/20090126WVP-hassan0126.html).



*Mullahs* represent Islam, *Jirgas* reflect the will of the community, and *Malaks* derive their authority from a mix of sources, including level of education, position in the social structure, or wealth.<sup>50</sup>

The importance of tribal elders, such as *Mashars* or *Malaks*, remains strong during peace time and in decision making, but the religious leaders are accustomed to achieving a particular target under circumstances in which tribal elders need support for their decisions in a religious sense in order to achieve greater acceptability. Historically, religious leaders have shown great leadership abilities and have played an important role, especially during the Mutiny [or War of Independence as it tends to be better known in the sub-continent] against Britain in the 19th Century. Haji Sahib Tarangzai, Faqir of Ipi, Mullah Pawindah, Pir Roshan are some of the prominent examples, while in Swat Akund Baba also played an important role.

One of the more striking aspects of *Pakhtun* culture is the permeability of cultural notions and their use for propagating both violence and non-violence. In the post 9/11 era, tribal customs, especially the code of culture/honour *Pakhtunwali*, hospitality (*Melmastia*), not handing over a guest under protection, forgiveness (*Nanawati*), retaliation (*Badal*), honour (*Nang*), and one who shares the same shadow (*Hamsaya*) are alleged to have been the basis on which non-Pakhtuns obtained refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan.<sup>51</sup> As reported in the International Crisis Group Report of December 2006, after the U.S.-led attack in Spinghar near Tora Bora in 2001 and after Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot Valley in Paktia in 2002, almost 500-600 Arabs, Uzbeks, and Chechens took refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas.<sup>52</sup> The control of the *Taliban* over this entire area has created problems for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan as they frequently disrupt their supply routes, which are mostly through Pakistan.

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<sup>50</sup> Tom Ginsburg, "An Economic Interpretation of Pashtunwali," (University of Chicago Legal Forum Draft: University of Chicago Law School, December 15, 2010): p. 9. Accessed 1 June, 2012.

[www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/548-tg-Pastunwalli.pdf](http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/548-tg-Pastunwalli.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> Shahid Azfar, Chris Samples and Thomas Wood, "The Taliban: An Organisational Analysis," *Military Review* (May-June, 2008): p. 61. Accessed 12 May, 2011.

[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/MILREVIEW\\_Taliban\\_Organizational\\_Analysis.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/MILREVIEW_Taliban_Organizational_Analysis.pdf)

<sup>52</sup> "Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA," *International Crisis Group Report No. 178* (21 October 2009).

Saleem Shahzad and Zahid Hussain are of the opinion that the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership were given refuge in the area because of the sympathy of the local tribes with the Taliban and foreign fighters on the basis of the *Pakhtun* cultural code of *Pakhtunwali*, *Malmestia*, and *Nanawati*.<sup>53</sup> Farhat Taj disagrees with this notion; however, arguing that when the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership fled to the tribal areas, they met no resistance from the military government under General Musharraf. The invasion of Afghanistan created anti-Americanism in the area, which can be seen as an important reason for the tribes' preparedness to give refuge. She points out that under FCR, no one can give refuge to any outsider without the consent of the political agent; if he disagrees, he can demolish the whole village. This strongly suggests the tacit acceptance by the government of Pakistan and its military establishment of the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership within Pakistan.<sup>54</sup>

Tribal culture and society are based on the cultural code *Pakhtunwali*, which literally means 'the way of *Pakhtuns*.' The code covers all the structures and processes that underpin social, political, and economic life in *Pakhtun* society. *Pakhtunwali* is integral to *Pakhtun* identity. Barth considers five traits essential for being considered a *Pakhtun*, which is a cultural as well as an ethnic term. These comprise *Pashto* (language), religion (Islam), Patrilineal descent, *Pakhtunwali* (cultural code), and the customs and values embedded in that code. It is an unwritten code of culture or customary law, embedded in memory and history. It is a "complex idea that centres on honour and shame, dignity, courage and bravery".<sup>55</sup> Ginsburg observes,

The *Pakhtunwali* is an example of a system of non-state norms and institutions in which self-help and non-coercive adjudication are the chief mechanisms of resolving problems. The key is to have norms and institutions that can coordinate private behaviour and reduce violence.<sup>56</sup>

*Pakhtunwali* is referred to as *Pashto* or *Pakhto*, which not only denotes language but also ethnicity, with the meaning of an honourable life for the self and community. Although

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<sup>53</sup> Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban*; Zahid Hussain, *The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan -And How it Threatens America* (New York: Free Press, 2010).

<sup>54</sup> Taj, *Taliban and Anti Taliban*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>55</sup> Frederik Barth, *Features of Persons and Society in Swat: Collected Essays on Pathans, Volume II* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 105.

<sup>56</sup> Ginsburg, "An Economic Interpretation of Pashtunwali": p. 6.

*Pakhto* as a term encompasses the code of honour and respect in *Pakhtun* society, the cultural code has a sub-culture for honour, which serves as the foundation of its customary law. This sub-culture encompasses shame, honour, and revenge which, although a part of *Pakhtunwali*, has its own places under this code. Oliver Roy gives a very interesting description of *Pakhtunwali*, which explains the role of religion and culture within tribal society:

In tribal zones. ... there is a positive system, comprising the tribal code (*Pakhtunwali*) and the assembly (*Jirga*). *Pakhtunwali* is at one and the same time an ideology and a body of common law which has evolved its own sanctions and institutions. Political power in the tribes is secular in origin (that is to say not dependent on religion) and, on the level of law, the tribal code and *Shariaht* are clearly opposed. ... The status of mullah is low in the tribal zones. ... The *Pakhtunwali* has as its goal the maintaining within the tribe of an equilibrium which is always under threat—as to the definition of the tribe, this is arrived at by consensus of opinion. A *Pashtun* defines himself in opposition to everything which is not *Pashtun*. The *Shariaht*, on the other hand, attempts to transcend specific groups such as tribes, *qawm* and other *asabiya* in the universality of the *ummah*.<sup>57</sup>

By adhering to *Pakhtunwali*, a *Pakhtun* possesses honour (*Izzat*); without honour, she or he is no longer considered a *Pakhtun* and is not given the rights, protection, or support of the *Pakhtun* community. The honour-based society of *Pakhtunwali* is governed by the concepts of chivalry or bravery (*Ghayrat* or *Nang*), hospitality (*Melmastia*), gender boundaries (*Purdah* or *Namoos*), which ensure privacy and sanctity, the tribal council (*Jirga*), the right of a fugitive to seek refuge and acceptance of his offer of peace and forgiveness (*Nanawati*), the right of revenge (*Badal*), bravery (*Tureh*), steadfastness (*Sabat*), righteousness (*Imandari*), and persistence (*Isteqamat*).<sup>58</sup> The institution of *Jirga* (the tribal council of elders) is responsible for the resolution of all kinds of conflict within *Pakhtun* society and has social, political, religious, and judicial functions. In this judicial council, tribal elders make decisions on the basis of Islamic law and *Pakhtunwali*. In short, *Pakhtunwali* may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Honour is paramount, and the honour of women is to be protected.

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<sup>57</sup> Oliver Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 35-6.

<sup>58</sup> Palwasha Kakar "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority," Accessed 21 January, 2011. [www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf](http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf).

- (2) Gender boundaries must be rigidly maintained.
- (3) One has a right to compensation or *por* when one is wronged.
- (4) Revenge is tolerated and even encouraged.
- (5) Apologies accompanied by *por* are to be accepted.
- (6) Guests are to be sheltered.
- (7) The *Jirga* is to be obeyed.<sup>59</sup>

It is perceived that occasionally *Pakhtunwali* supersedes Islamic law and is interpreted in light of *Pakhtun* customary law, especially in the decision-making and conflict-resolution process of *Jirga*. Nevertheless, Palwasha Kakar observes that for a *Pakhtun*, there is no contradiction between being a Muslim and *Pakhtun*, even if religious scholars draw such a distinction.<sup>60</sup>

*Pakhtunwali* is considered to be an "alternative form of social organisation with an advanced conflict resolution mechanism".<sup>61</sup> According to Ali Wardak, within *Pakhtunwali*, over the centuries, *Jirga* has operated as an important mechanism of conflict resolution among the *Pakhtuns* and has contributed to the maintenance of social order in the rest of *Pakhtun* society, in both direct and indirect ways.<sup>62</sup> All these cultural codes are interrelated and work in a process which either leads to aggressiveness or violence or are helpful in dispute resolution. *Badal* (revenge) is the absence or damage of *Nang*, while *Namus* is related to *Nang*. Any impairment of these concepts leads to violence, especially when there is violation of *Namus* and *Nang*. On the other hand, *Badal* and *Malmestia* are also interrelated, as *Badal* requires avenging the blood of and fighting to the death to protect a person who has either taken refuge or is a guest. *Nanawati* and *Melmestia* are

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<sup>59</sup> Ginsburg, "An Economic Interpretation of Pashtunwali": p. 11.

<sup>60</sup> Kakar "Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative Authority."

<sup>61</sup> M.Chris Mason and Thomas H. Johnson "No Sign until the Burst of Fire," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): p. 61. Accessed 23 January, 2011. [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204\\_pp041-077\\_Johnson\\_Mason.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3204_pp041-077_Johnson_Mason.pdf)

<sup>62</sup> Ali Wardak, "Jirga: A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan," (2003), Accessed 5 April, 2011. [www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/.../apcity/unpan017434.pdf](http://www.unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/.../apcity/unpan017434.pdf)

also related, as *Nanawati* calls for forgiveness for whoever asks for it, while *Melmestia* is based on hospitality and respect for whoever comes to a person for help. *Tureh* plays an important role in violence, as it encourages aggressiveness and bravery. It is connected to the concepts of honour and courage.

Ginsburg points out that the normative content of *Pakhtunwali* is fluid. It is mainly a code of honour rather than a legal code, as “the *Pakhtunwali* consists of a set of meta-rules about the legitimate subjects of conflict and ways of resolving them. It is a cultural system that channels, and thus limits, private violence.”<sup>63</sup> He further argues against the certainty that a Hobbesian state structure is important to keep society from being engaged in endless conflict, pointing out that the cultural code of *Pakhtun* society provides ample ground for society to have its own norms without a formal state system or laws. This is particularly true for the tribal areas of Pakistan, as the jurisdiction and laws of the State of Pakistan are not operative in these areas. *Pakhtunwali* provides room for private maintenance of order. The high level of violence in *Pakhtun* society has several reasons, which include questions of honour connected to reputation, ambiguities with norms, economic marginality, and lack of wealth and resources. The cultural-religious basis for this society continued until 1979, when the Afghan *Jihad* changed its structure and social fabric for the second time.

The territory of the tribal areas provided a fertile ground to pursue this *Jihad* with no international legal obligations. During the Afghan *Jihad*, not only did Jihadi (Holy warrior) culture flourish, with fighters armed with sophisticated weaponry due to the funding and support of the United States and Saudi Arabia,<sup>64</sup> but also the drug trade, and especially the opium trade, became a source of income for these Jihadis to support their activities. Together with trade in other smuggled and illegal goods, these areas were made safe havens for smugglers and drug barons. Rubin explains the discourse of Afghan *Jihad* as a combination of *Pashto ladai* and Persian epic *Shahnamah*, stressing self-sacrificing heroism and the popular tradition of *Jihad*, with the collective responsibility

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<sup>63</sup> Ginsburg, "An Economic Interpretation of Pashtunwali": p. 2.

<sup>64</sup> Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan Between Afghanistan and India, *Middle East Report*, no. 222 (spring 2002) : p. 25.

(*Fard-e-Kafaya*) of the community and the addition of individual responsibility (*Fard-e-Ain*).<sup>65</sup>

During this period, Muslims from all over the world came to participate in the *Jihad* and were trained in the *Madrassahs*, the curriculum of which was prepared with the help of the CIA and USAID.<sup>66</sup> This not only led to the rise of religious-based militancy, but also caused a massive influx of refugees to Pakistan. The Muslim World League, headed by the chief of the Saudi religious establishment Shaikh Abd al Aziz bin Baaz, funded many schools and *Madrassahs*, and the support committee, led by Prince Salman bin Abd al Aziz, the Governor of Riyadh, funded Arab volunteers to work for Abdur-Rasul Sayyaf's party. Arab volunteers came from the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical organizations, regulated through the Islamic Coordination Council, which was founded by Abdullah Azaam, a Palestinian-educated activist from Al Azhar who was assassinated by a car bomb on 24 November 1989.

#### **5.4 Cultural Approaches to Peacebuilding: Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Philosophy of Nonviolence**

In cultural approaches, the philosophy of peace and nonviolence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988) <sup>67</sup> a *Pakhtun* from the North West of Pakistan and a follower of Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence and peace, is important. This study will use his religious-cultural approach for the development of peacebuilding and transformative framework for the conflict in the tribal areas. Ghaffar Khan campaigned for the adoption of nonviolent strategies and believed in using "patience, righteousness, and forgiveness as weapons to fight against any enemy."<sup>68</sup> He built his 'force of peace', known as '*Khudai Khadmatgar*' (Servant of God), which enshrined the values of peace, nonviolence, and

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<sup>65</sup> Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p. 186.

<sup>66</sup> The Story of Jihadi Curriculum in Pakistan," *Research Report*, Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, Accessed 3 April, 2011. [www.crss.pk/rreports/php](http://www.crss.pk/rreports/php).

<sup>67</sup> Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, son of a local landlord in the Charsada District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (former NWFP) of Pakistan, was born in 1880 and belonged to the Mohaamedzai tribe of Pukhtuns. He started a historical movement for change in the society in 1912 when the province of the North West Frontier was under British rule.

<sup>68</sup> Robert C. Johansen "Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraints Among Pushtuns," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no.1(1997): p. 57. Accessed 13 April, 2011. <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/34/1/53>

forgiveness. His followers worked for social welfare, propagation of education, and women's empowerment, which were new concepts in pre-partition India. It follows that, any peacebuilding and development strategy in FATA might usefully take into account the philosophy of Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

Mukulika Banerjee observed that this movement shed important light on the relationship between Orientalist images, stereotypes, and perception development with its connection to colonial historiography. Ghaffar Khan wanted to avoid the inclusion of religious figures and *Mullahs* in the movement and any move which might give it a religious character. The movement started with a reform movement called the *Anjuman Islah ul Afghania* (Movement for Reform of Afghania) and the *Mullahs* initially opposed the *Madrassahs* established under this reform movement.<sup>69</sup>

Banerjee compared the non-violent activities of *Khudai Khidmatgar* with the guerrilla warfare prevalent in the area before 1930, as Afghans had won three Anglo-Afghan wars (1839-1842) on the basis of these tactics. She differentiates between guerrilla warfare and nonviolent activism, where the former is based on surprise, ambush, and hide-and-seek tactics, while nonviolent resistance faces the enemy upfront and moves to the target instead of waiting for the enemy. Banerjee contends that nonviolent resistance is superior to guerrilla warfare as it is based on tactical initiatives that are good for the morale of the members of the movement. *Pakhtuns*, who are seen as courageous and brave people, depict the two sides of courage - personal courage and spiritual courage. Through nonviolence, they subdue the personal courage of taking revenge and accept violence for spiritual courage through protests, arrests, and beatings.<sup>70</sup>

This movement was a clear departure from the culture that had traditionally prevailed among *Pakhtuns*, which took pride in violence, aggressiveness, and revenge. Ghaffar Khan's social movement focused on community and forgiveness rather than excessive individualism and revenge. It was the first social movement of its kind in *Pakhtun* society as it called for education, gender equality, reform in the society, and the fostering of

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<sup>69</sup> Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 101-2.

discipline in young people. It had the chief aim of training youth, reforming society, and fighting against the British to gain independence.<sup>71</sup>

The basic principles of his movement rested on nonviolence and self-restraint as well as reform at the social, political, and economic levels. Service to humanity, truth, purity, and struggle were at its heart. Ghaffar Khan was inspired by the non-violent movement led by Gandhi for the independence of India and actively participated in his struggle. However, he differed from Gandhi on the basis that his philosophy had self-restraint as a principle of nonviolence, while Gandhi relied on active suffering and sacrifice, by men and women, to confound the adversary.<sup>72</sup> Banarjee while explaining the difference between both approaches to nonviolence contends that in response to coloniser's (British) hyper masculinity, Gandhi,

[r]evolutionised the terms of confrontation by placing it within the philosophical framework in which androgyny was most valued, followed by femininity. Masculinity ranked third, being superior only to cowardice. ... In respect of nonviolence, where Gandhi drew on the tradition of androgyny, Badshah Khan drew instead on the tradition on the tradition of self restraint. ... [s]trength of will which Gandhi attribute to the feminine principles in Indian cosmology is similarly present as a virtue of ideal Pathan manhood. ... Where Gandhi mocked and subverted British hyper masculinity through androgyny, Badshah Khan and Khudai Khidmatgar movement subverted it by providing countervailing image of *truly manifest* restraint and self control.....<sup>73</sup>

As religion is one of the important markers that is identified and recognized in *Pakhtun* society, Ghaffar Khan did not shy away from emphasizing religion in his nonviolent strategy. Although his movement, which is often referred to as secular, used religious principles, it took care to avoid the inclusion of religious figures in the movement. This acknowledged that religion and *Pakhtunwali* had historically united *Pakhtuns* and had acted as a force for social change. Khan's philosophy rested on carefully carving a path of nonviolence through Islamic values and principles. Unlike Buddhism, Islam is not a strictly nonviolent religion, since it does authorize the use of force either for self-defence, fighting an aggressor, or in cases of transgression of rights and injustices.

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<sup>71</sup> Syed Waqar Ali Shah, "Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Khudai Khidmatgars, Congress and the Partition of India," *Pakistan Vision* 8, no. 2: pp. 107-18.

<sup>72</sup> Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed*, p. 212.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 211-12.



Khan relied on the definition of *Jihad*, which calls for a struggle against one's ego as well for a just and lawful community,<sup>74</sup> while the struggle should be guided by patience. This became a formidable principle of his struggle. He strove for the right of self-determination and ending structural violence through his movement and philosophy. His philosophy reflected his own spirituality and Islamic education together with his experiences of being raised in a traditional *Pakhtun* society. He believed that the principle of nonviolence is also an important aspect of Islam, as Prophet Mohammad followed nonviolent ways during the thirteen years of his life in Mecca while spreading his message, which depicted forgiveness and patience as primary virtues and a foundation of struggle for spreading the message of Islam and dealing with opponents.

In the event Ghaffar Khan faced the challenge of addressing the violent tendencies and factionalism of *Pakhtun* society, which he dealt with by stressing the attributes of forbearance and nonviolence, and charging the *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement with the task of reforming society on the basis of religion and culture.<sup>75</sup> An examination of his philosophy shows that he firmly believed in the superiority of religion as a guide to practical living over the norms of cultural practice. This represented a dramatic break from *Pakhtun* notion of pride and honour that was embedded in their culture. The greatest achievement of Ghaffar Khan was fostering a non-violence philosophy in a society that takes pride in having guns in their hands. Instead of using a gun or rifle as a weapon, he viewed religion as a source of pride and forgiveness as a virtue.

Rajmohan Gandhi observed that 9/11 brought the image of Ghaffar Khan back to the minds of the people and contrasts his ideas with the philosophy of Mullah Omar. The biggest difference was that Khan mobilized *Pakhtuns* for nonviolent resistance and attempted to change their code of revenge. He stressed forgiveness, the idea that non-Muslims were equal to Muslims, the importance of women's education, Islam's respect for the Buddhist period of *Pakhtun* history and no to double standards in politics. His encounter with the British involved a struggle not only against colonialism but also with

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<sup>74</sup> Askevold Torjorn, "Religion - Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace: Islamic Pacifism," p. 3. Accessed 12 Decemebr, 2011. [www.koed.hu/mozaik21/torbjorn.pdf](http://www.koed.hu/mozaik21/torbjorn.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> Shah, "Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Khudai Khidmatgars."

modernity.<sup>76</sup>As Rajmohun Gandhi has asked, 'does Badshah Khan contribute anything of value to the modern debate within the Islamic world?'<sup>77</sup>

Certainly, Ghaffar Khan's struggle was a departure from creating heroes on the basis of militancy, such as Sher Shah Suri, and Ahmed Shah Abdeli, the warrior kings; the Pakhtuns he focussed on were peaceful heroes. One of the more important aspects of Ghaffar Khan's nonviolence movement and philosophy was the attempt to bring about social reform in tribal society. This was long overdue because of factionalism, violence, inter-tribal killing, prevailing illiteracy and the lack of development opportunities.

The current militancy in the tribal belt of Pakistan is the product of the same defects that Ghaffar Khan had described decades ago. The underdevelopment of the FATA region specifically, and of *Pakhtuns* in particular, is an important issue. Moreover, the development index is the lowest of all areas in Pakistan. The inter-tribal rivalry, non-inclusion of youth in the decision-making process, and low level of religious knowledge within the religious community together with the interpretation of religion based on cultural lines has resulted in militancy at the local level. Although the international and transnational aspects cannot be denied, the rise of violence and militancy specifically in this region is worth noting. Rajmohan Gandhi compared Ghaffar Khan's movement with the Taliban and noted that:

If we compare the social movement of Ghaffar Khan with the Taliban movement, it is noticeable that the *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement was based on service, nonviolence, discipline, forbearance, and love of humanity. It aimed for social reform to bringing prosperity for the people and struggle to gain independence from the British. Though the Taliban movement of Pakistan is also struggling against the foreign attack on its soil, the members of this organization started their movement mainly due to their opposition to the traditional hierarchy, underdevelopment, poverty, lack of education and need for instant gain of power.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Rajmohan Gandhi, *Ghaffar Khan: Nonviolent Badshah of the Pakhtuns* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 3-6.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

## 5.5 Conclusion

The local dimensions of the conflict examined in this chapter show that British colonial rule played an important part in laying the foundations of the conflict in historical and political terms, while also generating stereotypical Orientalist images about *Pakhtuns*. On the other hand, the continuation of this policy of political control and use of FATA territory by Pakistan represents another aspect of Western influence. The role of imperialism in inculcating nationalism in British India produced a unique form of Muslim nationalism, which laid the basis for the creation of Pakistan.

The deliberate lack of socio-economic development in the tribal areas on the pretext of its semi-autonomous nature and preservation of tribal society and culture, has resulted in the rise of a movement which is tearing down the social fabric of the tribal society and its hierarchal structures. The trends which this movement depicts are anti-Americanism, anti-Westernisation and militant Jihadism. Furthermore, the Western role in the Afghan *Jihad*, drug trade and selective support to militant Jihadism created socio-economic problems that have paved the way for militancy in the area.

In this regard, an analysis of cultural approaches of peacebuilding shows two important trends. Firstly, the way Abdul Ghaffar Khan's movement was suppressed as an anti-colonial movement in the tribal areas by the British Empire was later continued by Pakistan. Secondly, the deliberate use of the *Pakhtun* cultural code for promoting militancy and providing refuge for transnational militants. These approaches will be used in Chapter Eight to develop a framework for peacebuilding and transformation. The next chapter will build on the transnational dimension of the conflict in the tribal areas. It will illustrate the use of transnational political Islam and the influence of West-Islam relations at a systemic level, which has thrust this localised conflict into the post 9/11 international scene.

## CHAPTER SIX

# TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT IN FATA: PART-II

## The Impact of West-Islam Relations and Political Islam

*One might ask whether the Afghan resistance is the last war waged by basmachi, traditionalist rebels fighting a rearguard action against Soviet expansion or the first stirrings of an Islamic revival within the Soviet Empire, which will go on to invent new forms of organisations that are, at one and the same time, both modern and rooted in tradition. (Oliver Roy)<sup>1</sup>*

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the transnational dimensions of the conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal areas of Pakistan. It argues that, together with local, political, economic and historical issues, the conflict in FATA is the product of a long history of West-Islam relations and subsequent trends within political Islam, influenced by Western discourses. The violent and intractable nature of the conflict can be traced to the emergence of global Jihadism within political Islam as a reaction to U.S. hegemony and to unresolved conflicts involving Muslims all over the world, and specifically in the Middle East. Moreover, the conflict has developed the individual character through the connection of Islamism with Jihadism. The chapter is divided into three sections. Firstly, it examines Muslim nationalism, and political Islam in South Asia, and the rise of the Taliban movement. Secondly, it explains the rise of al Qaeda as a transnational

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<sup>1</sup> Oliver Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 9.

movement, and lastly it provides an analysis of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the impact of West-Islam relations and political Islam on it.

Transnationalism as a phenomenon is a product of the nation-state system.<sup>2</sup> Muslim transnationalism has been the subject of many theories. Pan-Islamic movements, fundamentalists, neo-fundamentalists, global Jihadists, and Islamists all have been deemed to be strengthening the religious bases. Although transnationalism presupposes the presence of nationalistic tendencies, it cannot be considered to be connected completely to the idea of nation-states.

The emergence of al Qaeda and the Taliban as transnational organisations challenged the nation-state system in three aspects as follows:

- a) The use of religion to forge transnational solidarity among Muslims.
- b) The employment of historical encounters between Muslims and the West, together with a sense of grievance, victimhood and humiliation, as a way of connecting Muslims around the world.
- c) The attempt to form a counter-ideology and organisations in order to oppose Western hegemony worldwide.

One of the important assumptions of the national state system was its secular and democratic basis, which is challenged by the rise of al Qaeda and TTP and their attempt to forge transnational linkages. James Piscatori observes that religious phenomena within transnationalism have not been adequately addressed as it concerns societal rather than individual concerns which have been termed as irrational. He points out that the role of religion, in providing political language, giving a sense of unity, and as a cultural symbol, cannot be ignored in Muslim societies.<sup>3</sup> One of the important aspects of Muslim nationalism, which emerged mostly in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, was the

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<sup>2</sup> Muhammad Khalid Masud, ed. *Travelers In Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jama'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal* (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, ed. *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination* (Berkeley: Routledge, University of California Press, 1990); Susanne H. Rudolph and James Piscatori, eds. *Transnational Religion and Fading States* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1997).

importance of religion, rather than race, language, ethnicity, culture or territory as the maker of identity and nationalism. This was particularly important in the South Asian context.

## **6.2 Transnational Political Islam and Muslim Nationalism in South Asia: Pakistan's Strategic Culture and FATA**

The status of the FATA region within the State of Pakistan is maintained because of the combination of identity crisis and political Islam, the use of this territory for *Jihad* and the existential threat to the State of Pakistan posed by India. Ahmed Rashid considers Pakistan's identity to be rooted in fears, insecurities, and contradictions associated historically with the changing role and power structure of Muslims in the subcontinent.<sup>4</sup> This fear and insecurity emanates from the loss of Muslim power in the subcontinent after the end of Mogul Empire (1526-1857) resulting in the loss of status of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent.<sup>5</sup>

Pakistan's military establishment has had an Islamic orientation since its inception in 1947. Political Islam played an important role in developing the orientation towards Muslim nationalism that was predominant during the freedom struggle. The idea of a Muslim nationalism cultivated in an *Ummah* without boundaries helped Pakistan create a vision of Islam beyond its borders. For the military establishment, the 1948 Kashmir War gave the common Muslim identity a reason and a forge, and justified fighting the 'infidels'. Subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971 were also used similarly, though the 1971 creation of Bangladesh proved to be a disaster for the two-nation theory and Islamic ideology.

From 1960 to 1980, some important trends gave direction to the use of Islam for dealing with India's 'existential threat' to Pakistan. Zahid Hussein considers Yahya Khan responsible for coining the phrases 'Islamic ideology of Pakistan' and 'the glory of Islam' in service of a strategy to create an alliance between the military and Islamists. The

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<sup>4</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 34.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

purpose was to check the rising power of secular democracy and maintain the influence of the military.<sup>6</sup> The politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto saw political Islam established closer ties with Colonel Qaddafi, King Feisal and Yasser Arafat.

Critical to the search for identity was Zia ul Haq's Islamisation process in the 1980s and a body of literature depicting the grand purpose behind the creation of Pakistan. Qudratullah Shahab and his book *Shahab Nama*,<sup>7</sup> Mumtaz Mufti's *Alakh Nagri*,<sup>8</sup> and Ishfaq Ahmad's writings all contributed here.<sup>9</sup> The common theme in their writing is the stories of mythical figures in South Asian culture who predicted the creation and grand purpose of Pakistan drawing examples from the *Hadith* from the Prophet Muhammad. Prominent among these stories is one concerning the rise of Muslims from the east, especially from *Khorasan* (an ancient province in Afghanistan and Iran) who will lead Muslims to ultimate victory.<sup>10</sup> The spreading of the *Khorasan theory* with an emphasis on the *Ghazawa-e-Hind* (the final victory over India) *Hadith* based on the dreams of important Sufi saints from the subcontinent connected Pakistan's strategic design with the popular imagination. This can be compared with the apocalyptic vision of the Christian Right and neo-conservative politics in the United States.

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<sup>6</sup> Zahid Hussain, *The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan - And How it Threatens America* (New York: Free Press, 2010), p. 49.

<sup>7</sup> Qudratullah Shahab, *Shahab Nama (Urdu)* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1987). He was a bureaucrat and personal secretary of former President Ayub Khan.

<sup>8</sup> Mumtaz Mufti, *Alakh Nagri (Urdu)* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1992). A prominent literary figure in Pakistan and a friend of Qudrutullah Shahab.

<sup>9</sup> A prominent Urdu writer and novelist who presented the concept of spiritualism in novels and promoted the culture of mystical persons.

<sup>10</sup> See also Syed Saleem Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). *Khorasan Theory, Ghazwa-e-Hind and Hadith*: Khorasan is an ancient region covering lands including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This region is also related to a Hadith of Prophet Muhammad. Narrated by Abdur Rehman Al-Jarshi that I heard companion of dear Prophet (PBUH), Hazrat Amr Bin Marra Al-Jamli (R.A) that dear Prophet (salallahu alayhay wa sallam) said: Surely Black Flag will appear from the Khorasan until the people (under the leadership of this flag) will tie their horses with the Olive Trees between Bait-e-Lahya and Harasta. We asked are there any olive trees between these places? He said, "If there isn't then soon it will grow so that those people (of Khorasan) will come and tie their horses there." Kitab-al-Fitan, Page 215. "Islam main Imam Mahdi ka Tasawer" by Maulana Professor Muhammad Yousaf Khan, Jamia Ashrafia Lahore, Pakistan.]

Al Qaeda's official Magazine is named Khorasan, different groups and leaders of Taliban and Al Qaeda are named after Khorasan, like Laskkar-e-Khorasan, Ittihad-e-Mujaheedeen-e-Khorasan, Caucaus Mujahideen-e-Khorasaan.

An important reason for the complex strategic culture of Pakistan's military was the training of Pakistani officers as a part of the British Indian army with a strategic doctrine that suited the British Raj. Hussain Haqqani points out that while the British Empire planned for its defence to stretch from one part of its empire to another, with Afghanistan as a buffer, Pakistan's generals applied the same strategic doctrine to the defence of a much smaller country.<sup>11</sup> Zahid Hussain adds that while Pakistan's army inherited the British tradition and remained a secular organisation until 1979, General Zia ul Haq attempted to give it an Islamic orientation.<sup>12</sup> The *Pir Bhai* group (spiritual leader and follower) in the army, which established spiritual relations with religious leaders and members of *Tablighi Jama'at* (a group of missionaries) of Pakistan, flourished during the Afghan *Jihad*.<sup>13</sup> The 1980 Islamisation process of General Zia proved to be vital for the Afghan *Jihad*. While the Taliban has long been considered a protégé of Pakistan and its intelligence agencies, the *Tablighi Jama'at* has also exercised considerable influence on the army since the era of Gen Zia ul Haq. This provides ample grounds for its influence on the creation of the Taliban with an emphasis on piety and militancy. The upshot was a combination of these two ideologies – *Jam'at-e-Islami* and *Tablighi Jama'at*.

At the end of the Cold War, *Jihadi* culture in the army was revived with the appointment of Lieutenant General Javed Nasir as the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. He was a follower of the *Tablighi Jama'at*. He was retired prematurely on 13 May, 1992, because of U.S. pressure. Under his direction, the ISI had violated the UN embargo on supplying arms to the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and had “airlifted sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles.”<sup>14</sup> General Mahmood Ahmed, Lt. General Mohammad Aziz and Lt. General Muzaffar Usmani were staunch supporters of the Taliban, militant parties and Kashmir Jihad, while Brigadier General Ali Khan, allegedly supporting Hizb-e-Tahrir, who is undergoing court martial.<sup>15</sup> Although after 9/11 General Pervez Musharraf removed most of the army personnel involved in *Jihadi* politics, its strategic doctrine remains intact.

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<sup>11</sup> Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Karachi: Vanguard Books, 2005), p. 165.

<sup>12</sup> Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, p. 19.

<sup>13</sup> Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban*, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, p. 292; see also Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*.

<sup>15</sup> Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*. p. 271.



*Jama'at-e-Islami* (the Party of Islam), which was established in the 1941 by Abu Al Alaa Maududi, played an important role in establishing links between Pakistan's military and Islamic groups throughout the Muslim world. Under *Jama'at's* influence, the *Jamiat-e-Islami* Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan) was established in 1972. After clashes between communists and Islamists, Burhanuddin Rabbani was first exiled to Pakistan where he was the guest of the *Jam'at-e-Islami* Pakistan. A little later, the ISI started supporting and funding the Islamists.<sup>16</sup> After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, U.S. officials believed that General Zia ul Haq envisaged an Islamic bloc stretching across Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the newly independent Central Asian States. According to Shahzad, having "such a huge area shaded green on the map would be worse than Afghanistan painted red,"<sup>17</sup> At any rate this possibility was not acceptable for the United States and Pakistan's military establishment "pushed Islamists out of the loop,"<sup>18</sup> Farhat Taj contends that Pakistan's army still controls Islamists indirectly through the Punjabi Taliban and military personnel who joined Islamist organisations after 9/11.<sup>19</sup>

### **6.3 Transnational Political Islam and Taliban: The Rise of a New Political Elite Class**

Oliver Roy described the whole Afghan resistance, while predicting the rise of movements that would change the regional scenario.<sup>20</sup> From 1982 until 1990, the CIA, working with the ISI and the Saudi Intelligence Service, funded the training, arrival, and arming in Pakistan of some 35,000 Islamic militants from 43 Muslim countries to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. This global *Jihad*, launched by the West and supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, was to sow the seeds of al Qaeda and turn Pakistan into the world centre of Jihadism for the next two decades.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, pp. 171-2.

<sup>17</sup> Shahzad, *Inside Al Qaeda and the Taliban*, p. 197.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10.

<sup>19</sup> Taj, *Taliban and Anti Taliban*.

<sup>20</sup> Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, p. 9.

<sup>21</sup> Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 39.

The rise of the Taliban in 1994 in the post civil war era in Afghanistan, as a “potential new elite,”<sup>22</sup> and also as a political force in Afghanistan, is the subject of much debate. Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam describes the rise of Taliban as:

... based on a process of stereotyping of Afghan ethnicities, resulting in the construction of myths that are repeated as fact and thereby perpetuated. This mythology presents Taliban as a fundamentally rural, Pashtun movement. It posits that certain Pashtun tribes are particularly poor, marginalised and neglected and that the Taliban movement arose from the grievances of these groups in the underdeveloped south and east, especially among the impressionable, uneducated and unemployed young. Additionally, in creating the Taliban pantheon, the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI, staunchly support their Pashtun creations and has hostile relations with the leaders of other ethnic groups. On the basis of such stereotyping it is assumed that the north-eastern region of Afghanistan is a mountainous backwater with a non-Pashtun majority of Tajiks, Uzbeks and others, inimical and imperious to the advances of the Pashtun Taliban and related insurgent groups.<sup>23</sup>

The rise of the Taliban is variously portrayed as:

- 1) a consequence of the civil war in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1994,
- 2) a creation of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies,
- 3) as a movement designed to fulfil the economic interests of mafias, traders, and regional countries.

The revolt against the *Mujahedeen* forces started in 1994, when Mullah Omar, a preacher at a local mosque in Qandahar, along with a few other locals, killed a warlord in reaction to the warlord’s rape and then killing of a boy (in some report a girl). People supported this action as the long civil war and lack of law and order had destroyed the structure of Afghan society. Mullah Omar was elected as the *Amir ul Momineen* at Qandahar in an assembly of *Ulema*, which was in session from 20 March to 14 April, 1996, and the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ was established on 27 September, 1996. Ahmad Rashid

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<sup>22</sup> Barnett R. Rubin, Introduction to *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, 2nd ed. (London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. xii.

<sup>23</sup> Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, "Northern Exposure for the Taliban," In *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from Afghan Field*, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 248.

argues that what led the Taliban towards al Qaeda, was its philosophy of global *Jihad*.<sup>24</sup> The Taliban had a narrow or a micro-perspective, its goal primarily was to restore law and order in Afghanistan and form an Islamic government. They had no understanding or a macro-perspective of political Islam at the global level. Al Qaeda provided them with this.

*Talibanisation*, which appeared in Afghanistan in 1994, after the civil war, started as a religious/political movement of students<sup>25</sup> in Afghan refugee camps based in Pakistan. They had a declared aim of improving law and order, bringing peace, and providing security to the population through the application of Islamic law. In this sense theirs was a reaction to the failure of the *Mujahedeen* to establish a broad-based government in Afghanistan.

After the Soviet withdrawal, warlordism and killing became common place with atrocities, rape and plunder by the *Mujahedeen* and interference from other countries in the region. Barnett Rubin proffers three main reasons for the rise of Taliban: foreign aid, commercial agriculture, and long-distance contraband, along with the increasing power of *Mullahs* and mosques as a result of the collapse of the administrative basis of the civil-war era. Another important theory about the Taliban's emergence concerns the nexus of trader mafias, the Taliban and Pakistan. Rubin contends that a coalition of Pakistani authorities, Afghan-Pakistani traders, and ultra-conservative religious leaders created the Taliban because Afghan commanders had previously imposed a heavy cost on commerce and blocked Pakistan's access to Central Asia. Support for this theory may be seen in the first operation by the Taliban, in October 1994, to liberate a Pakistani trade convoy led by Colonel Imam captured by warlords and mafia people, which was heading towards Turkmenistan.<sup>26</sup> The Colonel developed strong links between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban but was killed by the later in 2011.

The 1994 emergence of the Taliban has also been understood as a policy adopted by Pakistan not only to provide stability in Afghanistan and promote its grand strategic

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<sup>24</sup> Rashid, Introduction to *Descent Into Chaos*, pp. xii-xi.

<sup>25</sup> Talib means student, Taliban is it's plural form.

<sup>26</sup> Rubin, Introduction to *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. xxi-xxii.

design in the region, but also because of its sense of insecurity with respect to India. The success of the Taliban in maintaining law and order in the areas under their control made them a formidable force in the eyes of Naseer ullah Baber, a retired major general and interior minister of Benazir Bhutto's government. He has been considered the architect of Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban, which was later continued by the ISI.<sup>27</sup>

Although Pakistan's initial policy was more concerned with its economic interests in Central Asia, the ISI infused these economic interests with strategic and religious considerations. Pakistan's full support of the Taliban started in 1995, although the objective of getting the Taliban to recognize the Durand Line as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and to drop their claim over parts of the NWFP province was not achieved.<sup>28</sup> Rubin contends that Pakistan pursued a policy of fragmenting *Pakhtun* tribal power in order to downplay India in the region. By stressing Islamic identity, Pakistan hoped to alienate forces of *Pakhtun* nationalism and any possible alliance with India. The Taliban gave Pakistan an opportunity to bring these fragmented *Pakhtun* tribes under its control, serving Pakistan's strategic interests.<sup>29</sup> What mattered to Pakistan was its 'strategic depth policy' towards Afghanistan in the post-Cold War era, the stability of Afghanistan to open trade routes to the markets of Central Asia, the avoidance of nationalist impulses in the *Pakhtun*-Sunni movement, and the Durand Line dispute with Afghanistan. International support was tacit: the United States believed the Taliban might help them gain control of oil and gas from Afghanistan, the extraction of which was dependent on political stability.

Initially the group mainly comprised Qandahari Taliban who never stressed *Pakhtun* nationalism. The Taliban connected Pakistan's *Madrassahs* (religious seminaries) with the religious class through their association with the Deobandi school <sup>30</sup> within Islam. They effectively brought culture and religion under one Islamic discourse using the slogan "For Islam, for homeland, and for honour" (*da Islam da Para, da Watan da Para, da Namus*

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<sup>27</sup> Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, p. 28.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 30.

<sup>29</sup> Rubin, Introduction to *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p. xi.

<sup>30</sup> Deobandi School owes its origin to the Deobandi movement (1920) in India, based on conservative social reforms.

*da Para*), and advocated resisting modernity through cultural and religious ways.<sup>31</sup> Other actors, like Saudi Arabia and the United States, played important roles as well in the promotion of the Taliban. For Saudi Arabia, the Taliban were Sunni Muslims following a Deobandi version of Islam and confronting Shiites who were supported by Saudi Arabia's rival Iran, while the United States saw ways of using them for political and economic advantages. All of these actors sought political leverage against their rivals, like Iran, Russia, and India, serving their economic and strategic purposes.

Both the Soviet Union after 1979, and the U.S. in the 1980s, were engaged in creating an élite class through a foreign-funded educational system, a class that could help them "control, penetrate, and transform the society."<sup>32</sup> The basic purpose was the fragmentation of social power and social control. The Soviets worked through the communist system, giving massive aid to the working class to serve its purposes, while the Americans sought to produce a class through *Madrassah* education that could oppose the Communists. However, as Rubin asserts that the West did little to give refugees an alternative form of education, allowing the *Madrassah* education to be manipulated by Middle East sponsors with their.<sup>33</sup>

At the time, the United States did not consider the Taliban a strategic threat and simply ignored Pakistan's and Saudi Arabia's policies towards them. Basically it saw the rise of the Taliban as an opportunity for peace, and for furthering its economic interest (through UNOCAL<sup>34</sup>) in the construction of an oil and gas pipeline from Turkmenistan-Afghanistan to Pakistan.

The situation suddenly changed in 1998 when al Qaeda began bombing U.S. targets around the world. In October 1999, UN resolution 1267 called for the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden to the appropriate authorities, who had been in Afghanistan since 1998. In December 2000, UN resolution, 1333, called for a complete arms ban on the Taliban and asked for training camps in Afghanistan to close. On 30 July, 2001, yet

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<sup>31</sup> Rubin, Introduction to *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp. xvii, 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. x.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. xii.

<sup>34</sup> UNOCAL: Union Oil Company of California

another UN resolution, 1363, authorized UN monitors on Afghanistan's borders to ensure that the UN arms embargo was enforced.

In the post-9/11 era, one frequently raised and key question concerns the role of Pakistan and the swift movement of al Qaeda and the Taliban into Pakistani territory, from where they resumed their activities. Ahmed Rashid argues that the exit of the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan was facilitated by the ISI and the Pakistani regime when, during the 2001 Battle of Kunduz, hundreds of stranded ISI personnel and soldiers from the frontier corps were airlifted along with hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda members. This was later dubbed 'Operation Evil Airlift' by U.S. Special Operations personnel, and had great import for the 'war on terror' in the years to come.<sup>35</sup>

Another factor was that the Taliban and al Qaeda bribed local Afghan commanders and *Pakhtun* guides who helped them into the tribal areas of Pakistan, where they retreated to Tora Bora in the *Koh-e-Safaid* mountainous range.<sup>36</sup> The main force of the Taliban escaped with the help of Afghan commanders who had been bribed. From six to eight hundred Arabs were escorted out of Tora Bora by *Pakhtun* guides from the Pakistani side of the border, at an average cost of \$1200 each.<sup>37</sup>

Jihadi groups in Pakistan, and religious parties, especially *Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Pakistan* and charity workers welcomed the refugees arriving from Afghanistan.<sup>38</sup> In FATA, Jalaluddin Haqqani made arrangements to provide housing for the Taliban and al Qaeda. He became a key organizer, hiring FATA tribesmen to provide safe sanctuary within the area.<sup>39</sup> The Haqqani network supported the Taliban after their rise to power in Afghanistan and after the U.S. invasion made North Waziristan its headquarters supporting. Haqqani's son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who rose to power in 2005, is an active member of the Taliban and involved in training and commanding, while also brutal killing and kidnapping. Strongly connected to al Qaeda, he is the son of the Arab wife of

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<sup>35</sup> Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 92.

<sup>36</sup> *Spin Ghar* in the *Pashto* language.

<sup>37</sup> Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 98.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 240.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, p. 268.

Jalauddin Haqqani and since 2005, has been Taliban military commander of Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Ghazni.<sup>40</sup>

Jalaluddin Haqqani had close relations with the CIA and ISI during the 1979-1989 Afghan War, and later continued to be an ISI favourite after Gulbadin Hikmatyar became anti-U.S. during the first Gulf War of 1991. On 14 December, 2007, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was founded at the ISI's behest with the help of Jalauddin Haqqani and with Baitullah Mehsud as its leader.<sup>41</sup> Thomas Ruttig called it a "tactical alliance" between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban movement.<sup>42</sup> In this scenario, the Taliban gave refuge to all those movements and leaders who were either struggling against their governments or against Western countries or were also former Jihadis. These included Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda leadership, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechen Muslims fighting against Russians, Uyghur Muslims struggling against Chinese rule, and Kashmiris struggling against Indian rule. Ahrari argues that this transnational network phenomenon is "based on the notion of *Ummah*. It de-emphasizes such exclusivist characteristics of a modern-day nation state as nationality, ethnicity and tribal identity" and provides a binding force for all these movements.<sup>43</sup> Ahmad Rashid observes, that meanwhile the "state breakdown in Afghanistan offered militants from Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian republics and China's predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Province a tempting package deal: sanctuary and financial support through smuggling."<sup>44</sup>

#### 6.4 The Rise of Al Qaeda as a Transnational Jihadist Movement

The post-Cold-War era has seen political Islam expand beyond national boundaries. The Gulf War of 1991 played an important role in forging a need in the Muslim world that the Muslims now had to organise to deal with the 'next enemy'. Although the Gulf War

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<sup>40</sup> Thomas Ruttig, "Loya Paktia's Insurgency: The Haqqani Network As An Autonomous Entity," In *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from Afghan Field*, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 63.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 76.

<sup>42</sup> Ruttig, "Loya Paktia's Insurgency": p. 88.

<sup>43</sup> Mohammed E. Ahrari, "China, Pakistan and the Taliban Syndrome," *Asian Survey*, XL, no 4 (July-August 2000), p. 666.

<sup>44</sup> Ahmad Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1999), p. 2.

centered on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the use of Islam as a political tool by Saddam Hussein, the immediate U.S. action to liberate Kuwait, and the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia changed the direction of this conflict. These factors not only raised the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict by analogy to the Kuwait-Iraq war, but also made the redundant Islamist forces within the Muslim world refocus their energies, which had become insulated after the success of the *Afghan Jihad*. The Gulf War (1990) not only gave them a direction in domestic issues towards removing their governments, but also encouraged political Islam to regroup at the international level.

This regrouping of the *Afghan Mujahedeen* had formed what is now known as al Qaeda. Al Qaeda developed into its present form from the *Maktab al Khidmat*, the service bureau established in Peshawar in 1980 by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Palestinian Islamic scholar. The main purpose of this organisation was to facilitate the recruitment of Muslims for the *Afghan Jihad*. The International Islamic University and *Maktab-e-Khidmat* in the 1980s provided not only recruits but also spread the Deobandi brand of *Jihad* to Muslims who began coming from all over the world. After the death of Azzam in 1989, Osama bin Laden succeeded him as leader. The end of the Afghan War and the Soviet withdrawal led this organisation to transform its structure and character. The victory over the Soviets proved both critical for the Afghan-Arab fighters and for the Pakistan military establishment, whose support has been vital for the *Jihad*. The death of General Zia ul Haq in a plane crash along with top military commanders and the American ambassador, hinted at a change in domestic and regional politics.

Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia for Sudan in 1992; Saudi Arabia deprived him of citizenship in 1994. The conflict between Osama Bin Laden and the Saudi government started when he opposed the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and offered the Saudi government former *Afghan Jihad* fighters to defend the holy places. After his expulsion from Saudi Arabia, the government in Sudan likewise expelled him in 1996 under Egyptian pressure. In May 1996 he came to Afghanistan, where he lived under the patronage of Maulvi Yunas Khalis until the Taliban captured the area in September 1996. He then shifted to Qandahar in 1997, widely considered to be the capital of the Taliban.



Al Qaeda's politics after the Afghan *Jihad* was based on a combination of issues that emerged with the Gulf War and the stationing of permanent U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia. Three considerations informed them:

- 1) The overthrow of despots throughout the Middle East,
- 2) Palestinian liberation, and
- 3) The Gulf War and the Allied/American invasion of Iraq.

The combination of Egyptian ideologues with the finance and structure of al Qaeda proved vital for the organisation. Thus began their ideology of global resistance against American hegemony in the Middle East and the Muslim world. Although initially al Qaeda and the Taliban had separate aims, with the Taliban committed to a limited ideology of the Islamisation and stability in Afghanistan, al Qaeda added a global perspective to these goals. This was coupled with the 'strategic depth' policy of Pakistan's military establishment, which was to be achieved by the *Khorasan* and *Ghazwa-e-Hind* theories that had served Pakistan's long-term interests in South Asia, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban in the U.S.-led 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the leadership of al Qaeda and the Taliban moved to the tribal areas of Pakistan. The penetration of the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership into tribal society greatly jeopardised that society's structure.

*Jihad* and tribal warfare occur in different spaces. Moreover, *Jihad* implies a shift in power relations in tribal society, reducing the power of the *Khan* (traditional leader).<sup>45</sup> An earlier attempt to oust the traditional power of the tribal system had come during the time of Sayed Ahmed Bareli (1786-1831), who declared *Jihad* against the Sikhs in 1827. In this movement, he implored tribes to renounce their tribal customs and to adopt *Shariah* (Islamic Law). By declaring *Jihad*, he addressed the people directly, overriding their traditional leaders.<sup>46</sup> The power of *Khans* was replaced by that of the *Ulema* during this era.

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<sup>45</sup> Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, p. 61.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid*, p. 56.

Zahid Hussain also draws attention to the threat posed to the traditional tribal system by the replacement of the *Jirga* system with Taliban councils. The Taliban wished to influence tribal decisions and cultural codes by emphasising their version of Islam.<sup>47</sup> The roles of the political agents and tribal elders were reduced, with religious leaders, or *Mullahs*, coming to the fore. Akbar S. Ahmed argues that because of the strictly military approach of the United States, the Pakistani army has control of the area, sidelining the political agents by abolishing the administrative system. This has created a power vacuum in the area<sup>48</sup>, and facilitated the leadership of the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership in the area. The Mullah-Military alliance through the Haqqani network has thus come to direct the strategic goals of Pakistan's Army. Although FATA is under the administrative control of Pakistan, military deployment there was fraught with difficulty. For the first time in fifty-five years, Pakistani troops entered the valley of Tirah in the Khyber agency and, later, North and South Waziristan.<sup>49</sup>

Ahmed Rashid argues that although the United States gave \$750 million to support the FATA Sustainable Development Plan (2006-2015), the plan set unrealistic goals and was based on Orientalist images of the tribal areas.<sup>50</sup> He believes that changes in the FATA can only happen by giving political freedom and choice to the people and by changing the FATA political status. The government and army did not contemplate this, which resulted in al Qaeda and the Taliban triggering political change by renaming the region the 'Islamic Emirates of Waziristan'. The Pakistani army's undermining of Political Agents, replacing them with army officers who had no knowledge of the area, complicated the conflict even more. The entire administrative system of FATA was destroyed, with tribesmen losing trust in the Pakistani government. Although the army is exercising full control over Balochistan, it has ceded its writ in FATA, raising many questions about Pakistan's role in both regions.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Hussain, *The Scorpion's Tail*, p. 103.

<sup>48</sup> Akbar Ahmed, "Dealing with Pakistan's Wild West," *The Globalist* (January 24, 2008). Accessed 27 March, 2011. <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=6738>.

<sup>49</sup> Hussain, *The Scorpion's Tail*, p. 145.

<sup>50</sup> Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 273.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, p. 28.

## 6.5 Transnational Dimensions: Al Qaeda and Militancy in FATA - A New Face of Political Islam

FATA is now considered to be the breeding ground of many Islamists and terrorists and a home to supporters of al Qaeda. These warriors came to this region as '*Mujahedeens*' during the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989. The latter came from different regions of the world, including Central Asia, the Far East, the Arab world and Europe, for the purpose of getting training in order to continue their struggle back home against repressive regimes or trying to bring an Islamic government. Since 9/11, the tribal areas have been declared a war zone because of frequent U.S. drone attacks, which are greatly resented by the local people as their targeting of foreigners has led to the killing of innocent civilians. This area, with its difficult terrain, is the centre of the 'war against terror'; a sanctuary for Taliban and al Qaeda members.

The rising militancy of the tribal areas is of grave concern for the entire region, since they border Afghanistan. The Taliban has strong links with the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), dating back to the participation of Central Asian Muslims in the Soviet-Afghan War.<sup>52</sup> Pakistan's Chitral District, which is close to the tribal areas, also borders the Xinxiang province of China, which has an Islamic movement called the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). In the early 1990s, this movement was a cause of friction between Pakistan and China. In the post-9/11 era, the leader of the ETIM, Hasan Mahsum, who had taken refuge in South Waziristan, was killed in a Pakistani military operation on 2 October, 2004. These alliances show the extent of the transnational spread of the Taliban movement and its support to different Muslim organisations in the region.

The violent reaction by the Taliban in the tribal areas and in the Swat Region owes its origins to the American drone attack on the *Madrasah* in the Bajur Agency in 2006. This attack triggered the cultural code of *Badal* (revenge) because it killed 80 schoolchildren below the age of 12. The formal existence of Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) began in the wake of this tragedy, in 2007, with a campaign of suicide bombings and violent attacks

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<sup>52</sup> Tahir Ali, "Dir Linking Waziristan and Swat Talibans", *Weekly Pulse* (7 May, 2009). Accessed 28 March, 2011. [www.weeklypulse.org/pulse/article/3522.php](http://www.weeklypulse.org/pulse/article/3522.php).

against American targets and government installations in Pakistan. So far, more than 40,000 Pakistanis have died in these attacks, which have damaged numerous embassies and killed many foreign staff.

## 6.6 An Analysis of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan was formed on 14 December, 2007, as a regional chapter of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. Several events created an environment for the emergence of this organization.

Since 1998, the Taliban have been present in the FATA, especially in the Orakzai agency, under the name *Tehreek-e-Tulaba* (Movement of Students).<sup>53</sup> The military operations of 22 June, 2002 and October 2003, in South Waziristan, helped militants to recruit people from the area. Recruiting gained further steam after the Red Mosque Incident in July 2007, when the army raided Islamabad mosque and adjacent library, leading to the death of prominent cleric Maulana Ghazi and scores of female students.

Historically, with the exception of the anti-colonial struggle against the British in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century led by the Faqir of Ipi and Haji Sahab Tarangzi, the FATA has experienced no movement combining social, economic, religious and political issues. The American-led invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent flight of the al Qaeda leadership to the FATA changed this situation. Moreover, the Pakistani military operations to capture foreign militants in the area, and the subsequent violation of the peace agreements gave further impetus for the creation of indigenous resistance force.

Qandeel Siddiqui differentiates between Talibanisation and the Taliban movement as two separate phenomena.<sup>54</sup> Talibanisation promotes an Islamic way of life and Islamic law while also respecting local culture and *Rewaj* (custom). The Taliban movement, by contrast, focuses on violent activities, suicide bombings, declarations of apostasy, kidnapping, smuggling and the drug trade. The first refers to Islamism, while the latter

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<sup>53</sup> Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 2 (January 2008): p. 2. Accessed 12 March, 2011. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CTC%20Sentinel%20-%20Profile%20of%20Tehrik-i-Taliban%20Pakistan.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> Siddique, "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan," p. 11.

can be categorized as radical Jihadism. The presence of these two streams within TTP is what gives this organisation its new face. Hassan Abbas argues that the TTP developed its distinct identity by engaging with Pakistan's military through peace deals, while at the same time launching military attacks that led them to establish their autonomy in the tribal areas. In the process, the tribal *Khans*, whose understanding of Jihadism and Islamic rule was different, were dislodged from their power base.<sup>55</sup>

Another important factor contributing to the rise of the TTP is its local and nationalist orientation. Although Zahid Hussain<sup>56</sup> and former President Musharraf called this a *Pakhtun* movement, the inclusion of Punjabi Taliban (composed of militant factions of *Jamat ud Dawa* and *Jaish-e-Muhammad*) from the *Madrassahs* in Punjab is misleading. Moreover, an important aim of this organisation is to have an Islamic system under *Shariah* in Pakistan and to rid Pakistan of American influence altogether. This is one of the main reasons the TTP targets the Pakistan army's symbols and installations, as it considers the army to be a puppet of the United States.

The main goals of TTP at the time of its creation were:

- enforcement of *Shariah* law in Pakistan,
- unification against NATO and coalition forces in Afghanistan,
- defensive *Jihad* against the Pakistani army,
- strong responses in the event that military operations in the Swat Valley and North Waziristan were not stopped,
- abolishing all checkpoints in the FATA.
- release of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) Imam Abdul Aziz, and
- refusal to engage in future peace talks with the government of Pakistan.<sup>57</sup>

An analysis of statements by the leaders and spokesmen of the TTP from 2009 to 2011, as published in local newspapers,<sup>58</sup> reveals the presence of four important themes:

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<sup>55</sup> Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," p. 1.

<sup>56</sup> Hussain, *The Scorpion's Tail*, p. 13.

<sup>57</sup> Siddique, "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan," p. 20; Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i- Taliban Pak," p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Statements Of Leaders and Spokesmen of TTP, Collected from Newspapers, Appendix 1.

- *Jihad* (defensive)
- Revenge
- Anti-Americanism and
- The call for justice and Islamic law.

The preconditions that the TTP has set for talks with the government include importantly the enforcement of *Shariah* and severing of relations with the United States. For the most part they oppose the secular and nationalist parties, including the Pakistan People's Party and the Awami (People's) National Party. Their posture is anti-Indian and they consider the Kashmiri *Jihad* to be an improper *Jihad* because the aim there is not the enforcement of *Shariah* but mere independence. However, they do collaborate with parties who are active in the Kashmir *Jihad*, including *Jamat ud Dawah* and *Jasih-e-Muhammad*.

There are five main reasons this organisation has grown and strengthened in the FATA:

- The American-led invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant call for *Jihad*,
- Pakistan government leniency and encouragement to allow al Qaeda and Taliban leaders to come and live in this area on the pretext of *Pakhtunwali* and Islamic brotherhood.
- The political vacuum created by the FCR laws and the lack of political participation,
- The discriminatory power structure, with *Malaks*, *Khans*, and political agents previously holding all the power, and
- The lack of education and unemployment and widespread poverty.

One of the important aspects of this organisation is its recognition of the importance of communication and the media. Although its leaders use various ways to communicate, including FM radio, statements to the press, video and so on, they also strictly monitor any content published about them. For that purpose, they have established the Taliban Media Regulatory Authority, which measures the level of bias against the Taliban in local media and targets journalists who write against them or

call them names (like 'militants', 'radicals' etc) other than Taliban. Their active role in propaganda warfare is one way they accept the trends of modernity, which makes them an offshoot of globalisation even though they are engrossed in traditional Islamism. Their desire for media control has led to the brutal killing and disappearance of many journalists in the tribal areas.

The movement has adopted brutal tactics and a reign of terror to gain obedience and implementation of its orders. It uses the media to spread word of its horrendous tactics in order to induce fear in the hearts of people. The TTP has also established *Lashkar-e-Khorasan* (LeK) or Army of Khorasan<sup>59</sup> as a vigilante cell formed out of the Haqqani and Hafiz Gul Bahadur groups among the Taliban, charged with the task of hunting down people involved in providing information to U.S. to guide its drone attacks. Earlier, *Ittihad-e-Mujahideen Khorason* or Unified Group of fighters of Khorasan, was also formed by al Qaeda to hunt down U.S. spies in FATA.

The TTP emphasises 'martyrdom' and suicide bombing as a way of resistance. They have even threatened religious scholars who have denounced and issued *Fatwas* against suicide bombing. Their recruitment of children for suicide bombing shows the social dilemmas and conditions of children in the FATA. The bombing of schools, and lack of educational facilities and no sources of income forces people to offer themselves for this role. Religious motivation and brainwashing are still endemic, but there are other reasons as well.

This movement has resulted in the growth of an alternative form of economy in the absence of regular economic and development opportunities. This economy includes the following.

- *Chanda* (donations) from locals,
- *Hundi* (foreign currency) and *Hawala* from overseas,
- Kidnapping for ransom, and bank robberies,
- Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban sponsorship,

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<sup>59</sup> Brill Roggio, "Bahadar has Falling out with Lashkar-e-Khorasan," A Blog of the Long War Journal. Accessed 23 July, 2012. [www.longwarjournal.org/.../bahadar\\_has\\_falling\\_out\\_with\\_1.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/.../bahadar_has_falling_out_with_1.php)

- Donations by the *Pakhtun* community in Karachi.
- Revenue collected from each tribal administrative zone,
- Taxes on trucks and transport,
- Safe passage of contraband shipments from Afghanistan to FATA/KPK,
- Jizya (religious tax) from religious minorities,
- Illegal timber logging and emerald mines in Swat before the 2009 military operation, when the Taliban were virtually wiped out there.<sup>60</sup>

On 2 January, 2012, *Shura-e-Muraqaba* (Council of Protection), a five member council, was formed. It included the TTP, Afghan Taliban and other militant groups. An agreement was signed between major Taliban groups of Maulvi Nazeer, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Afghan Taliban faction, along with the TTP. Its main aims are as follows:

- To end the targeting of the security forces of Pakistan.
- To focus attention on U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan.
- To form a committee to resolve differences among various factions.
- To step up support for the war against coalition forces in Afghanistan.
- To stop killing innocent people.
- To stop kidnapping for ransom.<sup>61</sup>

This accord was signed at the behest of Mullah Omar to stop the TTP attacking military and civilian targets in Pakistan and to get it to concentrate on fighting the common enemy. Similar pressure was applied by Pakistan's military establishment. However, although the TTP agreed to stop attacks on civilian targets, it vowed to continue attacks on military targets in Pakistan, as evidenced by the killing and beheading of fifteen Frontier Constabulary personnel in Mir Ali, North Waziristan on 5 January 2012. This operation was justified as revenge for the killing of the TTP members by military forces.

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<sup>60</sup> Siddique, "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan" :pp. 52-6.

<sup>61</sup> "FATA Assessment - 2012," (South Asia Terrorism Portal ). Accessed 23 October, 2012. <http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Waziristan/index.html>



## 6.7 Military Operations and Peace Agreements in FATA

The violent turn of the conflict in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. led war on Afghanistan, as has been said, resulted in shifting of Taliban and al Qaeda leadership into Pakistani territory. This resulted in Operation *Meezan* (balance) conducted by Pakistan's military in 2002, which entered FATA for the first time and stationed 80,000 troops on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (Appendix 4). The escalating militant activities in FATA by al Qaeda, the Taliban and foreign militants from Central Asia, together with the movements to Islamize North and South Waziristan, the Orakzai Agency and the Swat Valley, prompted the government to launch more military operations to wipe out militants in the area. At the same time, a number of peace agreements were also signed between militants and the military to restore order in the area (Appendix 2).

**Table 5: FATA IDPs- Statistics: 28 January, 2012**

Agency	Camp/Host	Total Registrati on	NADRA Verified	Returned	In Camp	Off camp	Total
<b>Bajaur</b>	Jalozai/Host	70,258	70,258	69,158	1,100	0	<b>1,100</b>
<b>Mohmand</b>	Jalozai/Nahaqi/ Danishkot	43,052	39,098	38,598	500	0	<b>500</b>
<b>Khyber</b>	Jalozai/Bara	10,016	4,794	0	8,542	0	<b>8,542</b>
<b>Orakzai</b>	ToghSarai Camp	60,836	36,257	24,869	1,115	10,273	<b>11,338</b>
<b>Kurram</b>	Host/New Durrani/ Togh Sarai Camp	50,857	22,211	4,742	3,376	30,092	<b>33,468</b>
<b>SWA</b>	Host	69,279	41,563	6,580	0	34,983	<b>34,983</b>
<b>Bhittani Tribe (FR Tank)</b>	Host	2,097	2,097	0	0	2,097	<b>2,097</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>306,395</b>	<b>216,278</b>	<b>143,947</b>	<b>14,633</b>	<b>77,44</b>	<b>92,078</b>

**Source:** FATA Research Centre: Accessed 01 February, 2012.

<http://www.frc.com.pk/linkc/subCatCon/30>

These peace agreements, although they failed to achieve their objectives, gave legitimacy to the militants and enhanced their status as a party in the conflict. Furthermore, the agreements have also been solely concerned with temporary ceasefires or dealing with militants and have not considered the whole perspective of the conflict. Factors such as the exclusion of political actors in the peace agreements, making FATA closed to independent journalists, the military having exclusive control over the news, alleged killing of journalists by both military and militants, lack of trust between parties, drone attacks with tacit approval of the government, and lack of sincerity to achieve peace as a goal in the area, have resulted in escalation of the conflict.

The failure of multiple peace agreements and military operations has created a deep sense of distrust among the inhabitants of FATA. The lack of empathy shown by the government and people of Pakistan towards indiscriminate killing by U.S. drone attacks (under the pretext of killing foreigners) of innocent tribal civilians has added to the alienation. The result of the failed peace talks and bruising military operations is that thousands of internally displaced people from the tribal areas have had to leave their homes and live in deplorable conditions. Out of a total population of 3.2 million in FATA, 1.1 million people have been displaced. Although the return of IDPs started in May 2011, renewed drone attacks and military operations in Khyber and the Orakzai Agency have started a new wave of IDPs. The new military operations have resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, creating a crisis of displacement in the area. The FATA IDPs statistics of January 2012 show the return process (Table 5).

Farhat Taj puts the case that the lack of sincerity both in military operations and peace agreements by the military and the government is due to the fact that the TTP and Taliban are Pakistan government proxies and Pakistan is achieving its long-term objective by maintaining conflict in the area. Moreover, the legitimacy which the government of Pakistan accorded to Nek Muhammad and Baitullah Mehsud, in the Shakai Peace Agreement of 2004 and the Sararogha Agreement of 2005, gave these leaders power and control over the *Jirga* and other institutions in FATA, thus laying the foundation of the TTP. She also argues that drone attacks, although condemned by the Pakistani government, and the parliament is passing resolutions in this regard, are

welcomed by the people in FATA as these attacks are precisely killing the foreign militants who have become a problem for local people. She insists that the government of Pakistan's leniency and tacit approval that led to all the foreign militants entering FATA, and blaming *Pakhtunwali* and local people for giving them shelter on the basis of *Melmastia* (hospitality) is not based on ground realities.<sup>62</sup>

There are two other peacemaking efforts made by civil society and political parties that are worth noting. They are the Peshawar Declaration of February 2010, and the *Aman Tehreek* (Movement for Peace). The Peshawar Declaration involved people from all walks of life, political parties, NGOs, and *Aman Tehreek* members who considered al Qaeda and the 'Strategic Depth' policy of Pakistan as responsible for spreading terrorism. It held that *Pakhtuns* have been falsely blamed for terrorism as there were 1100 Uzbeks, 6000 Arabs and 9000 Punjabis, but only 4000 *Pakhtuns* who were involved in terrorist activities. It also declared that drone attacks are the most effective counter-militancy strategy and that it is favoured by the people of FATA. It calls that to blame a 'foreign hand' is not correct as all the militant organisations have been created by Pakistan itself, and failure of military operations is a deliberate attempt to secure its strategic policy.

The authors of the Declaration believed that parties like *Jam'at-e-Islami* (both factions), *Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam*, *Jamat ahl-e-Hadis* (*Sajid Mir group*) and *Tehreek-e-Insaf* are components of the Pakistan's military establishment. It demanded for the trial of all those involved in this policy, demanded that financing of terrorists by Arab countries should stop and that the Pakistan army should not involve itself with the rehabilitation of IDPs and reconstruction efforts in FATA. It condemned the 'Arabisation' of the *Pakhtun* people and asked for the reform of the *Jirga* to involve all tribes and *Khels* (sub tribes) as well as women's, while describing *Jirgas* as "time tested indigenous

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<sup>62</sup> Taj, *Taliban and Anti Taliban*; Taj, "Taliban are Pak Army Proxies, not Pashtun Nationalists - I," *The Friday Times* XXIV, no. 07 (30 March - 5 April, 2012). Accessed 21 April, 2012. <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20120330&page=8#.T3h1WdfH80A>, — — —, "Taliban are Pak Army Proxies, not Pashtun Nationalists - II," *The Friday Times* XXIV, no. 08 (6-12 April, 2010), <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?issue=20120406&page=6#.T375sObw8jM>, — — —, "Taliban are Pak Army Proxies, not Pashtun Nationalists - III," *The Friday Times* XXIV, no. 10 (20-26 April, 2012), <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=20120420&page=6>.

workshops” for maintaining peace. <sup>63</sup> Overall, *Aman Tehreek* called for the restoration of the institutions of *Jirga, Hujra, Lashkars* and collective responsibility which have been pillars of *Pakhtun* society for the last 6000 years and also emphasised on the restoration of *Pakhtun* cultural activities as an important factor to eliminate religious fanaticism.<sup>64</sup>

**Table 6: Attacks on Tribal Elders in Pakistan**

Year	Killed	Injured
2005	7	0
2006	7	0
2007	5	12
2008	19	10
2009	7	2
2010	42	8
2011	12	15
2012- January-	5	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>50</b>
Source: <i>South Asia Terrorism Portal</i> . Accessed 2 March 2012 <a href="http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Tribalelders.htm">.http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Tribalelders.htm</a>		

The *Aman Tehreek* members also called for the banning of the *Difa-e-Pakistan Council* (Defense of Pakistan),<sup>65</sup> previously named the *Difa-e-Afghanistan Council* (Defense of

<sup>63</sup> "Peshawar Declaration: A Path for Pakistan,"p.6. Accessed 01 October, 2012.  
[http://www.thesouthasian.org/archives/2010/peshawar\\_declaration\\_a\\_path\\_for.html](http://www.thesouthasian.org/archives/2010/peshawar_declaration_a_path_for.html)

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> It is a coalition of over 40 religious and political parties demanding that the government keep NATO supply routes closed and reverse its decision to grant India the Most Favoured Nation Status. It became very active after the killing of 24 Pakistan soldiers by NATO forces on 26 November, 2011 in the Salala village of Baizai Tehsil Muhmand Agency, which led to closing the NATO supply route to Afghanistan and suspension of drone attacks.

Afghanistan Council), on the grounds that it was encouraging and supporting Pakistan's 'Strategic Depth' policy, which is a root cause of terrorism and militancy.<sup>66</sup>

**Table 7: Drone Attacks in Pakistan 2005-2012**

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
2005	1	1	0
2006	0	0	0
2007	1	20	15
2008	19	156	17
2009	46	536	75
2010	90	831	85+
2011	59	548	52
Feb/2012	25	175	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>2266</b>	<b>253+</b>

**Source:** *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, Accessed 4 March, 2012.  
<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.htm>

On the other hand, the Qatar round of Taliban and U.S. talks (although these failed) was also considered to be potentially a key step for the restoration of peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both parties to the conflict had previously refused to have direct talks with each other, so the talks which started in January 2012 were notable, especially in anticipation of the U.S. exit strategy from Afghanistan in 2014. One of the priorities of the talks was the release of Taliban commanders. They included their former army chief (Mullah Fazil Akhund), the interior minister (Kairullah KairKhuwa), the deputy intelligence chief (Abdul Haq Waseeq), the ex-governor of Bulkh Province (Noorullah Noori), and the military commander (Mohammad Nabi). The U.S. wanted the release of its soldier, Bowe Bergadahi.<sup>67</sup> While these peace talks included only the Afghan Taliban and the U.S. government, such negotiation has opened avenues for peace in FATA where

<sup>66</sup> Iftikhar Firdous, "Peshawar Civil Society demands ban on Difa-e-Pakistan," *The Express Tribune*, 6 March, 2012. Accessed 10 March, 2012. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/346208/peshawar-civil-society-demands-ban-on-difa-e-pakistan/>

<sup>67</sup> Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Qatar breakthrough on Afghanistan," *The News International* 17 January, 2012. Accessed 13 March, 2012. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=87988&Cat=9>

peace talks may also be held with the TTP, and the governments of Pakistan and the U.S.A.

## **6.8 West-Islam Discourses, Political Islam and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan**

The emergence of the TTP as a militant Jihadist group in FATA has brought this area within the discourse of West-Islam relations and political Islam. The discussion in the preceding chapters examined the nature of historical encounters between the West and Islam, the impact of this discourse on theological, military and socio-political relations, and the changing nature of relations in the wake of the European Enlightenment and Reformation. It established that the question of violence, the personality of the Prophet Mohammad, the authenticity of the *Qur'an* as a revealed text, and the status of Islam as a religion, emerged as predominant discourses in the Middle Ages. Although these discourses acquired milder tones due to the potential decline of religious authority in Europe, these images and discourses continued in one form or another, poisoning the relations between the West and Islam.

An analysis of the Taliban movement and the TTP reveals the presence of discourses of West-Islam encounters as their ideological base. The emergence of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan in 1994 was as a reaction to prolong civil war from 1989-1992, but the creation of the TTP in 2007 was a result of the 'war on terror' foregrounded in the 'clash of civilizations' discourse. The use of terms such as 'crusaders' and 'Zionists' by the TTP for America and its allies typifies this trend. Moreover, the ideological alliance between al Qaeda and the TTP has also introduced the TTP to theological terms like 'infidels' and 'unbelievers' to describe coalition forces and the Western world. While the TTP had no theological ideology at its inception in 2007, but was just a reaction to the Red Mosque incident in 2007 in Islamabad when hundreds of female students mostly belonging to FATA were killed in a religious seminary. The ideological borrowing from al Qaeda connected it to the meta-narratives of West-Islam. In the aftermath of the killing of

Osama bin Laden on 11 May 2011 in the Abbottabad Operation, the TTP vowed to take revenge and continue the 'Mission of Bin Laden'.<sup>68</sup>

The adoption of the meta-narrative of 'civilisational clash' has made the TTP not only place emphasis on the Islamic system within FATA, but also increase its role in regional and international politics. The upshot is a transnational organisation centred on militant Jihadism. The support of the TTP for Jihadists in Kashmir, Chechnya, Uigur, Central Asia, and the Middle East demonstrates its transnational spread, a development that can be traced back to the emergence of transitional Jihadism and political Islam during the European colonial rule and continued in the Afghan Jihad of 1979.

The antagonism of Taliban against the West, its discourses and its policies is manifested in terms of:

- a) Its opposition to an education system which is not 'Islamic' and hence is influenced by the Western education system. This is exemplified by the destruction of schools, mainly girls' schools in FATA and Swat.
- b) The TTP's threats to NGOs working in FATA because they are seen as agents of Westernisation, and its opposition to Western funding and policy agendas that involve gender issues, education, health, human rights and democratic reforms.
- c) The TTP's attacks against Pakistan's army personnel and civilian targets based on al Qaeda's theological doctrine of '*Takfir*,' to declare Muslims supporting American and Western policies as outside the realm of Islam.
- d) The propensity of the TTP to Islamise government in Pakistan shows the influence of Islamist trends on militant Jihadism. It is interesting to note that al Qaeda, although it called for the overthrow of despots and kings in the Middle East, never had any political inclination towards the establishment of government. It was a purely militant Jihadist organisation confronting Western hegemony. The TTP is also reacting to events impacting on Muslims which depict their individual stance and are not in the control of al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban.

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<sup>68</sup> Appendix No 1: 3-4.

In the wake of the blasphemous movie 'Innocence of Muslims' that was shown on YouTube in September 2012, a TTP spokesman referred to it in relations not only to that of West-Islam encounters but also to the theory of 'civilisational clash'. The TTP spokesman, Ehsanullah Ehsan, said,

We invite ... especially youth of Pakistan to stand up in defence of their religion and its sanctity. ... You are no less than the lads of Benghazi. ... Stop looking toward your tyrant rulers that they will do something, as they have accepted a life of humiliation. ... Zionist and Crusader enemies of Islam are insulting the signs of Islam everywhere.<sup>69</sup>

He added that atrocities against Muslims were increasing, and called upon Muslim youth to confront them in order to restore the honour and place of Muslims in the world. He added that it clearly shows the enmity of U.S. and its allies towards Islam and Muslims.<sup>70</sup>

Similarly, on the killing and displacement of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar's (Burma) western Arakan state by Buddhist ethnic Rakhine people in June and July 2012, the TTP threatened Myanmar by supporting Muslims that it will "revenge your [Muslim] blood."<sup>71</sup> It also called upon the Pakistan's government to cut off relations with Myanmar, and threatened attacks against Burmese interests in the region. The TTP portrayed itself not only as the defenders of Islam but also of Muslims all over the world. One of the important aspects of the TTP which differentiates it from the Afghan-based Taliban is its attacks on Pakistan's military and civilians. Irrespective of U.S's exit plan in 2014, the TTP has vowed to seek the establishment of an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan and fighting for the cause of Islam and Muslims.<sup>72</sup> It is against all form of peace agreements or efforts to establish peace. Its spokesman said in 2011 that the anti-

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<sup>69</sup> "TTP urges Muslim Youth to Rise up," *The Nation*, 25 September, 2012. Accessed 29 September, 2012. <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/16-Sep-2012/ttp-urges-muslim-youths-to-rise-up>

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Threaten Myanmar over Rohingya," 26 July, 2012. Accessed 13 September, 2012. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/413231/taliban-threaten-myanmar-over-rohingya/>

<sup>72</sup> Appendix no 1: 6.



Taliban peace committees should be disbanded, otherwise they would continue to be attacked until totally eliminated.<sup>73</sup>

Although the government of Pakistan has started many peacebuilding measures for the development of FATA, together with peacebuilding initiatives under the AfPak policy of U.S. (to deal with Pakistan and Afghanistan jointly) and its support to government of Pakistan in its peacebuilding efforts are counter-productive. This is a significant challenge facing any peacebuilding and transformation efforts within FATA. The killing of tribal elders and attacks on those involved in peacemaking is a serious limitation to this process.

The analysis shows that, irrespective of any solution to socio-political problems in the area, West-Islam discourses, opposition to liberal peace, and violent methods to deal with the West and its allies, are the important factors in this conflict. Any effort to transform this conflict has to take into account these three factors:

- a) The West's political and epistemological hegemony,
- b) Calls for the establishment of an Islamic system, and
- c) Violence and *Jihad* as a holy war in the area.

Jihadism, which has been informed by the West-Islam discourses and the failure of Western forms of democracy to take root, has become a worldwide phenomenon. Although survey results in FATA show an aversion of people to terrorist activities, ongoing military operations have failed to stop them. These trends are also visible in the public opinion survey conducted by the 2011 The Pew Global Attitude Project on the U.S. image in Pakistan<sup>74</sup>, and in a public opinion poll conducted by the New American Foundation in 2010. According to the New American Foundation public opinion poll in Pakistan's Tribal Region (June-July 2010), 87% of the people of FATA oppose the U.S.-led

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<sup>73</sup> Appendix no 1: 10.

<sup>74</sup> "Support for Campaign against Extremists Wanes. U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following Bin Laden Killing," In *Pew Global Survey*, Pew Research Centre, 21 June, 2011. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/06/21/u-s-image-in-pakistan-falls-no-further-following-bin-laden-killing/>

'war on terror' and believe that its real purpose is to weaken and divide the Muslim world and to ensure American domination. 10% of the people believe that its object was to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban. Three quarters of FATA oppose a continuing American occupation of Afghanistan because it is considered part of an effort to secure control of oil and minerals in the region, 11% believe that it was because of 9/11 that American attacked Afghanistan, and 5% believe that the real motive was to prevent the Taliban from returning to power. Furthermore, in 2009, 58% disapproved of missile strikes by U.S., while in 2010, 76% opposed drone attacks and counter-militancy tactics of U.S., 48% believed that they largely killed civilians. In 2011, the disapproval rate for drone attacks was 62%.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, the problems which were major concerns of the FATA residents were: corruption (65%), lack of jobs (81.4%), lack of schools (67.3%), lack of communication facilities (70.8%), and lack of health facilities (70%). Security concerns, which include drone attacks (60%), foreign fighters (50.4%), and Taliban fighters (49.8%), were of secondary importance to the primary needs of the residents.<sup>76</sup> The overall trend which these surveys and opinion polls depict is that people in FATA view the 'war on terror' in the West-Islam frame as an attempt by the U.S. to weaken Islam and capture its resources. On the other hand, they do not approve of foreign fighters, military operations and the presence of the Taliban in the region. Their basic concerns encompass economic, social and political issues. However, due to the prolonged exposure of the area to conflicts, media depiction of the West-Islam dichotomy and its use by the al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, the *Madrassah* education system, and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era have made this area a classic case of a 'conflict attracter'.

## 6.9 Conclusion

This chapter has tried to establish four important aspects contributing to the intractability of this conflict. Firstly, the conflict is embedded in the long history of

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<sup>75</sup> "Public Opinion in Pakistan's Tribal Region," New American Foundation, (2010), Accessed 15 May, 2012. <http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/FATApoll.pdf>

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

Muslim-West relations, which generated conflictual narratives and images. Secondly, British policies concerning status of tribal areas and Orientalist images of *Pakhtuns*, together with Muslim nationalism and political Islam has made this area a safe haven for Jihadists and Islamists. Thirdly, the construction by the West of the Afghan-Soviet war of 1979 as a *Jihad* proceeds to promote *Jihad* as an effective tool for fighting Western imperialism, U.S. hegemony. Lastly, the shift of al Qaeda's leadership to FATA, and the incorporation of al Qaeda's ideology into the Taliban's traditional Islamism, has had a far-reaching impact, not only on Pakistan but also on the entire region. The al Qaeda's relationship with and support of religious parties, and their provision of training to Muslim militant organisations throughout the region. The combination of all these factors has produced a unique organisation, which while it would not last much beyond the end of the conflict in Afghanistan in 2014, has promoted a potent doctrine of resistance, militancy, and religious fervour in collaboration with the religious parties and military establishment of Pakistan.

The conflict that has now emerged in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan is not confined to only one territory. Currently, it has only affected Pakistan, but the effective interconnectedness of al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan with the Islamic movements will leave its extended mark in the region. The inability of the United Nations and the world community to handle the issues of Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Uygur, and the silence of the world community, is causing them to give vent to their grievances. The pro-U.S. government of Pakistan and the lack of public support for U.S. policies may rebound on the government itself. A broader Islamic alliance in the region, crossing ethnic and linguistic boundaries, seems to be in the offing. While the frequent bomb blasts and deaths of innocent civilians are eroding its mass appeal, the concept of the greater cause of a united Muslim world, rule of Islam, and freedom from Western interference continue to attract recruits.

The transnational aspect of the Taliban movement has also brought social revolution in FATA society, but of a kind which was not experienced by *Pakhtun* society earlier. The Taliban-criminal-Mullah nexus is leading to the erosion of tribal hierarchy and legitimacy of the tribal elders. The traditional power enjoyed by the Political Agent in

FATA, the *Maliks*, and the tribal elders has ended, and their decision-making power have been completely nullified. The use of religious edicts of '*takfir*' (declaring others non-Muslim) against the tribal elders who oppose the Taliban decisions has devastated the social fabric of *Pakhtun* society. The authority of the tribal *Mashar* has eroded and the power of *Jirga* to solve this conflict and end the violence is severely curtailed.

The next chapter will formulate the Islamic concept of conflict transformation as a step towards addressing questions which emerged in the last three chapters. It will be argued that this concept will be helpful in developing a working framework for peacebuilding and conflict transformation for the FATA.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

# THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION: *SUBAL AL SALAAM WAL SAYRURA* (PATHWAYS TO PEACE AND TRANSFORMATION)

*At times they [ulema and scholars] make a commotion saying the Mujahedeen do not know the difference between right and wrong and that they have caused more harm than good. And yet they do not respond to the embarrassing question: . . .what then is the approach to Jihad that you propose that will do good and avoid harm? Their response? Abandon Jihad altogether (Aymen al-Zawahiri).<sup>1</sup>*

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to answer the question posed by al-Zawahiri and develops an Islamic concept of conflict transformation to address the conflict in post-9/11 period. The discussion in the chapters on the history of encounters between Islam and the West and their impact on the conflict in FATA depicts the West-Islam relationship as a conflictual one because of the pursuance of truth in theological terms, of hegemony and control in political terms, and of universalist claims in socio-cultural terms. Three areas have emerged from the preceding chapters that need to be addressed in order to formulate a concept for transformation in Islam. These are

- 1) Theological issues that need a transformative approach,
- 2) Issues concerning violence and militancy, and

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<sup>1</sup>Aymen Al Zawahiri quoted in Raymond Ibrahim, ed. *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), p.108.

### 3) Socio-political and cultural issues concerning reconciliation and identity.

The present chapter develops the concept of conflict transformation by examining the issues of violence, militancy, identity and peace in Islam, to formulate a framework of peacebuilding and conflict transformation for the case study. It needs a new approach based on the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith* (traditions) of the Prophet Muhammad. It argues that conflict transformation in Islam should not involve addressing conflictual issues with terminology and techniques adopted from non-Islamic cultural settings. Islam has a rich heritage of sources for the conflict intervention process. Furthermore, no uniform method suits all Muslim societies: every intervention process should fit the society or culture it is addressing. The Orientalist concept of a single, unified and stagnant Islam was based on a misperception; while the essence of Islam is singular, and the way it is practiced varies in time and place. The plurality of Islam allows considerable flexibility in applying Islamic principles to conflict settings.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section describes the role of *Din* (way of life), conflict and human nature (*Fitrah*), and explains how Islam regulates the relations among humans and between humans and God. Secondly, it explains the way Islam deals with and defines conflict. Thirdly, it examines the concepts related to the transformation approach. Lastly, it explains the strategies for transformation within the Islamic framework. The chapter uses the theories of Mahmoud Muhammed Taha,<sup>2</sup> who wrote *The Second Message of Islam* that provided an alternative explanation of peace, *Jihad* and human rights in Islam, and Mohammad Shahrur,<sup>3</sup> who provided the *Theory of Limits* for the interpretation of the *Qur'an*.

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<sup>2</sup> Mahmoud Mohammed Taha (1909-1985) was a Sudanese religious thinker who was sentenced to death for apostasy. His book *The Second Message of Islam* focused on the Meccan verses as the essence of *Shariah* law and which were in contrast to the Medina verses. He called for reforms, human rights, universal equality, and social justice on the basis of the Meccan *Qur'an*.

<sup>3</sup> Mohammad Shahrur (1938- ) is a professor at the University of Damascus, Syria. Although trained as a civil engineer, he has written extensively on Islam. He belongs to the *Qur'anist* group but uses *Hadith* in a limited sense also. His book *Al-Kitab wa 'l-Qur'an: Qir 'a Mu'asira - The Book and The Qur'an: A Contemporary Reading* (1990) was one of the more widely circulated books in Middle East, although some of his books have also been banned. He challenges the traditional reading of the *Qur'an* and considers that the *Qur'an* should be brought to the social realities of this era. His work has been criticised by *Ulema* of Al Azhar for taking a modern approach.

A premium is placed on the transformation approach within the Islamic framework, since the conflict in the 'war on terror' is defined by al Qaeda and the TTP in their discourses based on both the classical and traditionalist interpretation of Islam and in response to the Western construction of Islam as the enemy or the 'other'. The historical chapters have demonstrated that Islam as a theological and cultural 'other' still forms the basis of West-Islam relations; the discourses generated by the West have resulted in the emergence of specific kinds of Islamism and Jihadism, which in turn have produced violent organisations like al Qaeda and the TTP. This form of militant Jihadism at a global level is also the result of Western-induced education system in *Madrassahs* in the refugee camps in Pakistan of Jihadism as a form of response to the Soviet invasion in 1979.

The chapters on historical encounters between West-Islam and on trends in political Islam, together with the case study of tribal areas, depict a series of responses from Muslims influenced by Western discourses and policies. The conflict in the post-9/11 era is one such response. The transformation principles inherent in Islam have the potential to change the pattern of their responses to the Western discourses. It is the argument of this thesis that Muslims can break this cycle of violence if these principles are adopted.

The guiding principles of the Islamic concept of conflict transformation are:

- Patience (*Sabr*), Forgiveness (*Afu*) and Striving or Struggle (*Jihad*). This formulation was derived from the experiences of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca for 13 years, and also used to avoid conflict to persuade, prepare and achieve the goal through patience, forgiveness and peaceful striving, as shown by the *Treaty of Hudaibiya*.<sup>4</sup> This Treaty gave concessions to the pagans of Mecca and allowed Muslims to achieve victory without war. Patience was applied despite a

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<sup>4</sup> During the 6<sup>th</sup> year after *Hijra* (migration), according to the Muslim calendar (628 C.E.), Prophet Mohammad decided to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca. The pagans of Mecca resisted and stopped him outside Mecca at the point of *Hudaibiya*. This laid the basis of the 'Treaty of *Hudaibiya*' which allowed Muslims to perform pilgrimage in the coming years and also had different clauses which restored peace between Muslims and the pagans of Mecca. Although the tribe of Banu Bakar violated the treaty, the Prophet went to Mecca in 629 C.E. The result was a smooth victory due to the previous treaty arrangements, contact between the parties during the treaty period, and the numerical strength of Muslims.

position of weakness and, through constant pursuance, the goal was achieved and a position of strength was gained. In the final stages, the threat of force was applied although not actually used at the time of the conquest of Mecca in 630 C.E. (8<sup>th</sup> AH).

- *Istikhlaaf* (vicegerent), *Amana* (trust), *Ibtala* (test) and *Jaza* (reward or punishment) form the basic pillars of the human relationship with Allah. For peace and conflict transformation, these four principles must work with and build upon *Tawhid* (unity, oneness of God), *Tazkiya* (purification) and civilisation with a sense of values (*Imran*: a term adopted from Ibn Khaldun).<sup>5</sup>

Together, these make for a transformation concept which is community-driven and based on understanding, mutual respect and knowledge of the issues and concepts that tend to generate conflict within a particular cultural setting. This brings controversial terms and concepts into perspective and suggests suitable strategies. Here is a concept of transformation which suggests different techniques for different conflict situations and stages, even though the principles informing it remain same. The application of these principles, in combination, offer the best chance for transforming the violence-prone conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

## 7.2 Din, Human Nature and Conflict

The resolution of conflict and maintenance of peace is a well-established principle in Islam. For Muslims, the salutation *Assalam-u-Alakum* (May peace be upon you) is symbolic of this. The term '*Islam*' means peace, and submission to the divine will and His purpose. In other words, individuals should not have a private relationship with God, but rather a collective relation with their fellow humans. The root word of Islam is derived from *salaam-silm*, which suggests a condition of peace, security, wholeness and safety from harm that is attained through surrender (*Taslim*) to the divine.<sup>6</sup> Peace is considered the greeting of heaven (Figure 4). As the *Qur'an* says,

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<sup>5</sup> Interview with Dr Taha Jabar Alawani, Cairo, Egypt. 20 July, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Nathan C. Funk, Abdul Aziz Said and A. S. Kadayifci, *Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precepts and Practices* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2001), p. 7.




They will not there hear any vain discourse, but only salutation of Peace.  
(19:62).

Islam does not believe in self-abnegation or self-mortification, but rather in harmonious progress and prosperity for all of humanity, while allowing for the development of human intellect and reason. Islam is thus referred to in the *Qur'an* as a *Din* (way of life) rather than as a religion in the traditional sense of the word, based on rituals or dogmas. The *Qur'an* says:

This day I have perfected your religion (*Din*) for you, completed My favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion (*Din*). (5:3).

**Figure 4: Islamic Concept of Peace and Submission**



The Islamic concept of conflict transformation is based on the *Qur'an*, the practice of the Prophet Muhammad, and Islamic values such as justice, equality, brotherhood, love, compassion, forgiveness, mercy, empathy and equity. As the conflict in post-9/11 period involves the Sunni sect of Islam, and since both al Qaeda and the Taliban are Sunni Muslim groups, the concept delves into the sources of Sunni scholars to address this conflict. It centers on the idea that a peaceful society and international relations can only be established through a process of inner and outer peace. This desire for worldwide peace, irrespective of caste, creed, religion and nationality, forms the basis to end all

conflict. Therefore, Islam constitutes both an ethical and a legal system centered on the principle of social behavior. Within the context of conflict, Islam provides general principles and an authoritative set of rules. Khalifa Abdul Hakim argues that “Islam succeeded in changing the meaning of religion which had become a dualism of spirit and the flesh”,<sup>7</sup> and re-defining it as living a full life within a spiritual framework. He then refers to Paul Deussen, the great German Sanskritist and historian of philosophy, who stated that Islam should not be called a religion because:

[it] sanctifies the life of sense while a true religion should try to negate them. ... Religion should teach men [sic] how to escape from the demands of the flesh and the world in general which are unreal and fleeting phenomena.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, Esposito points out that in the post-Enlightenment period the definition of religion that hampered the understanding of Islam, was that it was a system of belief rather than a way of life. Such a compartmentalisation of religion makes all religious traditions fanatical and retrogressive.<sup>9</sup> In Islamic thought, the most important aspect of *Din* is to develop the human personality so that all inner conflicts are removed to allow for humans to live in peace and harmony. Islam envisages humanity rather than the nation or state as its basic unit of analysis. Conscience and humanity rather than empire (*Dawla*) constitute a Muslim’s primary pathway to peace.<sup>10</sup>

Peace in Islam rests on the concept of *al Musalaha*, namely common good or public interest. Islam does not consider conflict intrinsic to human nature. It believes that God has created human nature (*Fitrah*) based on peace and harmony. Nor does it believe in protracted conflict but suggests ways to resolve conflict and promote peace. Numerous examples can be found in the lives of the Prophet Muhammad and the four guided Caliphs (*Khalifah*) regarding solutions to different disputes – even if they result in temporary losses to Muslims (such as the Treaty of *Hudaibiya*, and the Charter of Medina).

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<sup>7</sup> Khalifa Abdul Hakim, *The Prophet and His Message* (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1972), p. 310.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 130.

<sup>9</sup> John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 201.

<sup>10</sup> Mishal Fahm Al Sulami, *The West and Islam: Western Liberal Democracy versus The System of Shura* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p. 85.

Sohail Hashmi describes Islam's attitude towards war and peace as 'idealist realism', because it calls for fighting in some cases but it inclines towards peace in most situations. He believes that peace in society can be attained only if one's life is surrendered to Allah's will according to the rules prescribed by His laws. This is important because humans are morally weak and can easily succumb to temptation and evil. Thus a divine law is necessary to save them from straying and spreading anarchy.<sup>11</sup> In contrast, the use of force is sanctioned in Islam only for fighting evil tendencies in order to establish justice in the world. The challenge for humans is to struggle or strive in the way of God to stop all kinds of transgressions, violence and evil.

### 7.3 Islamic Values Regarding Conflict

The foundation of every society rests on a set of premises and presuppositions relating to human nature, the universe, ultimate reality, the structure and source of knowledge and the guiding principles of behavior.<sup>12</sup> Islamic society is no exception to this. The Islamic value system is based on the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* (the practices of the Prophet Mohammad). This tells people how to behave with each other, with God and as individuals (through the message of the *Qur'an*).<sup>13</sup> Human action or behavior can be analysed at four levels: those directed towards God, fellow humans, other members of creation, and oneself. Islam does not take a hedonistic view of life, namely that the main aim of life is individual satisfaction. The goal of the Islamic way of life is to achieve peace at all levels, including spiritual, social, political and economic, by following God's instructions.<sup>14</sup>

Religion, like culture, ethnicity, family, and social and moral influences, is a factor in value determination. According to Yasin Istanbuli, the pre-Islamic concept of *Jahiliyya*, Arabia was transformed into a polarity between *Kufar* (rejection or unbelief) and Islam (submission) after the revelation of the *Qur'an*. This was the Islamic teaching through

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<sup>11</sup> Sohail H. Hashmi, *Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism and Conflict* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 91-3.

<sup>12</sup> Abdur Rehman Momin, "Pluralism and Multiculturalism: An Islamic Perspective," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 18, no. 2 (2001): p. 126.


<sup>13</sup> Momin, "Pluralism and Multiculturalism: An Islamic Perspective."

<sup>14</sup> Cited in Omar Siddiqui, "Relativism vs Universalism: Islam and Human Rights Debate," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 18, no. 2 (2001): p. 71.

which the vengeful spirit of Arabs was transformed into a positive notion of *Hilm* (mild, gentle). *Hilm* is a dominant virtue in the *Qur'an* where it applies only to a person's relation to his fellow humans, not to their relation to God. The human relationship to God is that of a servant (*Abd*), but the relationship with fellow humans should be determined by *Hilm* by controlling their feelings and passions. Thus, it is not a passive virtue but an active power of soul that enables people to control their fierce tempers.<sup>15</sup>

Describing the role of reason and passion, Abdul Aziz Said and Nathan C. Funk cite the concept of *Nafs-al Mutmainna* (the soul at peace), which combines and integrates conscience, desire and reason. They argue that Islam views reason and passion as complementary aspects of humans that can be positively integrated through submission and practice of Islam. They point out that Islam is a force for resolving conflict owing to its program of moral education and its system of values based on enjoining good and forbidding evil, rather than on intensifying self-interest and greed.<sup>16</sup>

Figure 5: Islamic Values and Conflict



<sup>15</sup> Yasin Istanbuli, *Diplomacy and Diplomatic Practice in the Early Islamic Era* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 91-2.

<sup>16</sup> Nathan C. Funk and Abdul Aziz Said, *Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East* (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), p. 150.

As shown in Figure 5 shows Islamic teachings are based on human nature and the humanistic ethos.<sup>17</sup> They rest on the mercy and kindness of God towards people, on the one hand, and the mercy and kindness of humans towards their fellow beings, on the other. The values of mercy (*Rehma*), forgiveness (*Afu*), justice (*Adl*), equity (*Qist*), kindness (*Latif*) and relational empathy in Islam, all contribute towards removing conflict from relationships and within society.

Islam gives due value to the concept of relational empathy. In the *Qur'an*, Allah is referred to as 'The Compassionate and Merciful' (1:1). The *Qur'an* stresses respect for all religions and their scriptures, and this provides an important basis for relational empathy. This concept is a starting point for interfaith dialogue and understanding the needs and aspirations of the parties involved. As Funk and Said continue, Islam prefers nonviolence to violence and forgiveness to retribution.<sup>18</sup>

Concerning the importance of forgiveness, the *Qur'an* says:

The recompense of an injury is an injury equal (in degree): but if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from God; for (God) loveth not those who do wrong (42:40).

Another verse refers to,

Those who avoid the greater crimes and shameful deeds, and, when they are angry even then forgive (42:37).

These two verses clearly show the preference for forgiveness over anger and revenge. Indeed, the concept of justice is pivotal to Islam:

And when you judge between the people, judge with justice. Verily, how excellent is the teaching, which he giveth you! For Allah is He who heareth and seeth all (4:58).

Again:

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<sup>17</sup> Momin, "Pluralism and Multiculturalism: An Islamic Perspectives," p. 129.

<sup>18</sup> Funk and Said, *Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East*, p. 151.

O ye who believe, stand out firmly for justice, as witness to God, even as against yourself, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for God can best protect both. Follow not the lust (of your hearts), lest ye swerve to do justice, verily God is well acquainted with all that ye do (4:135).

Although peace and justice are two important values for ending conflicts, an important debate concerns whether the establishment of peace leads to justice or whether justice leads to peace. The *Qur'an* clearly says that social-political injustice and oppression in society are the main causes of discord and that the maintenance of justice can lead to lasting peace. Therefore, in Islam, social justice is the path to peace and a society without conflict. To this end, Islam lays down that there should be not only equal opportunity of economic development but also wealth and property rights for people irrespective of colour, race, sex or religion:

And in their wealth there is an acknowledged right for the needy and destitute (51:12).

In this way, Islam ensures some distribution of wealth and a minimum standard of living for all people through one of its pillars, *Zakat* (charity tax). In this regard, the concepts of *Ma'aruf* (doing good) and *Munkar* (forbidding evil) also ensure rights and social justice for all. Asghar Ali Engineer points out that *Ma'aruf* is representative of what is good for humanity and also includes human rights which promote human welfare, while *Munkar* concerns the denial of rights that detract from the promotion of human rights.<sup>19</sup>

Patience is another important value of Islam, which prefers nonviolence to impatience that can result in violent reactions. Many commands in the *Qur'an* regarding patience order Muslims to hold this value in the event of conflict, and reward is promised to those who maintain it. The *Qur'an* strictly forbids Muslims to cause *Fitna* (mischief or problems between people), and it urges them to incline towards peace if enemies are amenable instead of entering into aggressive and vengeful conflict. The *Qur'an* defines a good Muslim as “one who restrains his anger or one who forgives when he is angry” (3:134), as well as these who “keep to forgiveness, enjoy kindness and turn away from the ignorant” (7:199).

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<sup>19</sup> Asghar Ali Engineer, *Islam in the Contemporary World* (New Delhi: New Dawn Press, 2007), p. 65.

Abu Nimer explains the value of patience as “facing those biases that you have, and having the energy to face them. Patience in terms of dealing with prejudice, with things that will bother you”.<sup>20</sup> One of the important aspects of patience is to have the energy and the capacity to listen to others, to their pain, misperceptions and even ignorance.

To sum up, Islam is a holistic religion which enshrines principles of balance, moderation and moral accountability in the framework of *Tawhid* (oneness of God, or unity), that makes humans responsible to God for their deeds. Thus it paves the way for the application of Islamic principles for the benefit of humans instead of the pursuance of self-interest. It balances worldly duties with spirituality, and stresses human relations with God through prayer, meditation, ecstasy, struggle and repentance. This not only leads to a balanced state of mind for peacemakers but also helps them understand the inner state of people prone to violence. Abu Nimer maintains that all world religions have their own ways of solving conflict and allow for fighting in some cases to avoid injustice.<sup>21</sup> Islam, he states, is essentially a religion of peace, a peace which encourages the values of kindness, mercy, and forgiveness. This contrasts with the general stereotype that Muslims are violent, a stereotype derived from the past that has served to taint Islam as a religion and inherently its followers across the world.

#### **7.4 Conflict within the Islamic Framework**

The dominant Western model of peace and conflict theory has limitations when applied to an Islamic setting. It is based more on the values of individualism, autonomy, rationalism and self-interest than on collective interest or divine purpose. Western sociological categories such as class stratification, nation and society are accepted by Muslim social researchers as they tend to be universal in nature. However, if applied to an Islamic setting, they must fit the social reality of Islamic societies.<sup>22</sup> In this regard, the

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<sup>20</sup> Mohammad Abu Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida), 2003 , p. 71.

<sup>21</sup> Julia Portilla, "Interview with Mohammad Abu Nimer." Accessed 14 April, 2011. [www.beyondintractability.org/audio/mohammad\\_abu\\_nimer/?nid=2402](http://www.beyondintractability.org/audio/mohammad_abu_nimer/?nid=2402).

<sup>22</sup> Ahmed Hussein, *Bias in Western Social School of Thought: Our Heritage is the Point of Departure for Development in The Question of Bias*, p. 108, cited in Amr Abdalla, "Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention: A Search Within Islam and Western Literature," *Journal of Law and Religion* 15, no. 1/2 (2000-2001). Accessed 23 April, 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1051517>

definition of conflict will be examined, because this sets the framework within which transformation can be used as an approach. A definition of conflict in terms of aggression, human needs, interests and values will lead towards the conflict intervention process which will be adopted.

Amr Abdallah defined conflict using a 'situational approach' that takes account of the situation, behaviour and attitudes towards conflict.<sup>23</sup> He developed an Islamic modeling approach to apply Islamic techniques. He pointed out that the *Qur'anic* values, principles, and prophetic precedents constantly call on Muslims to model their lives on these principles. As the basic message of Islam is one of peace, reconciliation and the avoidance of conflict, Muslims should keep in mind *Qur'anic* principles and the Prophet's Sunnah by modeling their behaviour accordingly. This enhances the image of Muslims as a peace-loving people as opposed to extremists and fanatics, which might help solve the international conflicts not only between Muslim states but also with non-Muslim states.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, Islam adopts an integrative rather than a rational approach to conflict. Rationality, which is the product of modernity and the European Enlightenment, is based on power and self-interest, while the integrative approach rests on two important principles: accountability and reciprocity. Amr Abdalla argues that the integrative approach connects the definition of one's own interests to those of society in general in a conflict situation, which results in altering an interest-based approach towards a communal approach.<sup>25</sup> The *Qur'an*, which also supports a definition of conflict based on the nature of the conflict situation and the different stages in which it occurs, states:

But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God: for He is one that heareth and knoweth (all things) (8:61).

It considers those who indulge in *Fitna* or *Fasad* (mischief and discord) as friends of Satan with no place in Heaven. Thus, the terms describing types of conflict – *Fitna*, *Fasad* and *Qital* – also explain the different stages of the initiation of conflict.

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
<sup>23</sup> Abdalla, "Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention," p. 161.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, pp. 167-8.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.



**Figure 6: Conflict within the Islamic Framework**



The basis of conflicting behaviour is *Ikhtalaaf* or difference of opinion leading to conflict over an issue. *Fitna* (mischief) is the second stage of conflict, namely when an issue is raised with the intention of causing conflict. *Fasad* (discord) then leads to exacerbating differences of opinion or the incompatibility of goals because of the lack of intention to resolve them. *Fasad* also stresses self-interest and the assertion of one's own demands. The *Qur'an* defines the aims of *Fitna* and *Fasad* as,

[t]o spread mischief through the earth and destroy crops and cattle. But God loveth not mischief (2:205).

Maulana Wahiduddin defined *Fasad* as, "that action, which results in disruption of the social system, causing huge losses in terms of lives and property."<sup>26</sup> The book of Hadith '*Kitab ul Fitan*' (book of mischief)<sup>27</sup> describes the kinds of discord and mischief that result

<sup>26</sup> Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, "Non Violence and Islam". Accessed 23 December, 2011. <http://islam101.net/human-relations-mainmenu-27/37-terrorism/264-non-violence-and-islam.html>

<sup>27</sup> *Kitab al Fitan wa Ashrat As Sa'ah* (The Book pertaining to Turmoil and Portent of the Last Hour (Sahih Muslim), *Kitab al Fitab wal Malahim* (Book of Trials and Fierce Battles (Sunan Abu Dawud).

in disruption in society. The penultimate stage of conflict is *Shiqaaq*, or tearing apart, which causes the rending of relationships, and in turn leads to violence or *Qital*. Although fighting (*Qital*) is considered to be the worst thing in Islam, it is only prescribed if there is oppression, transgression and the denial of religious and other freedoms to people. As the *Qur'an* says, "Fight against them till *fitna* is no more." (2:193).

Islamic methods aim to facilitate social justice and social change by helping the oppressed and by solving conflict so that justice prevails. They constantly call for the application of values such as patience (*Sabr*), avoiding anger, and the welfare of humanity and common good or public interest (*Musalaha*) in order to change the basic attitudes and behaviors of members of a community. Islam prohibits self-interest at the expense of the welfare of the community, and only allows wars of self-defense (not for the promotion of self-interest or selfish desires). For initiating wars of self-defense, it is clearly given in Islam that efforts and calls for peace must be made before the escalation of conflict and that peace must be given the fullest chance. If nothing works, only then does Islam allow for fighting to eradicate oppression, injustice and the promotion of self-interest.

Furthermore, Islamic methods of conflict intervention are practical because they are not static but oscillate and adjust according to changing circumstances:

If the enemy incline to peace do thou (also) incline towards peace (8:61).

In Islam, it is important to take account of the purpose of restoring justice and upholding Islamic values during the intervention method, as this will give a clear sense of direction to the mediator and help bring sustainable peace to society.<sup>28</sup> The *Qur'an*, in a clear example of adjusting the intervention according to the conflict stage, promotes reconciliation between conflicting parties. It says:

If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it complies, then make peace between them with justice (*adl*), and be fair (*qist*): for Allah loves those who are fair (and just) (49:9).

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<sup>28</sup> Abdalla, "Principles of Islamic Interpersonal Conflict Intervention": pp. 167-8.

The final goal of the intervention process is to bring reconciliation to society or between parties. Therefore, the successful application of Islamic methods for the promotion of peace requires adherence to Islamic values and principles, because this forms the basis on which peace and conflict resolution rests.

Islam prescribes intervention for humanitarian purposes as a method of conflict resolution, as indicated in the *Qur'an*:

And what is wrong with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah, and for those weak, ill-treated and oppressed among men, women, and children, whose cry is: O Lord! Rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from You one who will protect, and raise for us from You one who will help (4:75).

This verse calls for protection and help to oppressed peoples. Humanitarian intervention is one such reason among many, in which war is also justified under the UN Charter.<sup>29</sup> After the creation of the UN in 1945, and especially at the end of the Cold War, this method has been adopted to limit and resolve ethnic conflicts or conflicts between disintegrating states. The humanitarian aspect is related to the concept of peace through universalism, which is important in this regard, as it provides a moral conception about how Muslims should become a community in relation to each other, with other communities, and with the world at large.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the Islamic worldview combines the religious and the rational, the divine and the realistic. Here is a framework that combines divinity and humanity, and integrates personal, social and spiritual levels into one coherent whole.

The definition of conflict provided in the Islamic framework offers the opportunity to analyse conflict from a broader perspective which connects individuals to society and offers solutions according to the type and stage of the conflict. The value system in Islam provides the basic ground for developing a framework for analysing and solving conflicts from interpersonal to international levels. By defining conflict thus, we can

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<sup>29</sup> Articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter call for collective action and humanitarian action, and Article 51 for unilateral action for self-defense.

<sup>30</sup> Funk and Said, *Islam and Peacemaking in the Middle East*, p. 218.

better understand its nature and more easily conceive the approaches that can be applied for its transformation.

In brief, the definition of conflict in the Islamic framework is:

A situation defined as an *Ikhtalaaf* (difference of opinion) involving values, goals, needs and interests that lead to different stages of conflict, that is, *Fitna*, *Fasad*, *Qital* and *Shiqaq*, of people or communities.

The primary sources of reference to deal with conflict involve:

- a) *The Qur'an*: as a compendium of guidance for all conflicts;
- b) *The Hadith*: the tradition and life of the Prophet as an example for the application of Qur'anic principles in a conflict situation;
- c) *Ijithad*: use of independent reasoning for finding solutions to a conflict situation;
- d) *Istislah*: a solution based on the interests of the parties involved, and
- e) *Masalah*: finding grounds for common good and public interest for the parties involved.

## 7.5 Terrorism: Definitional Problems in Islam

In the post-9/11 era, 'terrorism' has emerged as a key term to define violence perpetuated by al Qaeda. Terrorism has been defined in numerous ways, as a political strategy of a powerless group against a powerful enemy. However, Muslim scholars have attempted to define this term within the Islamic framework. Waleen El Ansary argues that the linguistics and terminology used by Muslim scholars to refer to peacebuilding, conflict resolution and transformation, justice and peaceful coexistence are usually grounded in theology, religious texts, ethics and history. The use of terminology is important because al Qaeda members describe themselves as *Mujahedeen* or soldiers of God. By contrast, the scholars who oppose this usage cite other religious terms to declare them terrorists and outlaws.<sup>31</sup> Terrorism has been termed *Irhab* or *Irhabi* (terrorist) in Arabic, while *Hirabah* has been used as an alternative to armed *Jihad*. *Hirabah*

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<sup>31</sup> Waleed El Ansary, "Revisiting the Qur'anic Basis for the Use of War Language," In *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar ul Huda (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 63.

shares the root of *Harb*, or war, which may be just or unjust and generally connotes fighting between two legal entities (*Tarafayn*). The term *Muharib*, or one who engages in *Hirabah*, can mean combatant, fighter or warrior with neutral connotations.<sup>32</sup> Douglas Streusand points out that *Irhab* is a better alternative to *Hirabah*, as it is the literal translation of terrorist in Arabic.<sup>33</sup>

However, Shaykh Ali Goma'a, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, considers *Irhab* to be a mistaken translation of terrorism. According to him, *Hirabah* consists of armed highway robbery and not attacks on cities such as the 9/11 attacks on New York. He suggests an alternative term, *Irjaf*, which denotes subversion and scaremongering to bring quaking and commotion to society. This term is derived from the root word *Rajafa*, which means to quake, tremble, be in violent motion, convulse or shake or bring commotion to society (*Tarjufu*).

So the earthquake (*rajfa*) took them unaware, and they lay prostrate in the home in the morning (7:78).

While Al Qurtabi, a renowned 13th Century Quranic commentator and Maliki jurist, explained the meaning of *Irjaf* as the "shaking of the hearts (*Tehrik al Qulub*)",<sup>34</sup> Shayek Goma'a considers *Irjaf* or *Murjif* to be a better representation of terrorism than *Irhab* or *Hirabah*. In *Irjaf*, the *Murjafun* is not considered to be a legal entity, while their target is. Further, it includes connotations of cowardice, deceit and betrayal, which better describes al Qaeda ideology. Moreover, compared with *Hirabah*, the legal sanctions for *Irjaf* are much clearer, as is execution as a form of punishment. The term *Irjaf* is used to describe the actions of the *Khawarij* (plural of Kharaji: a rebel group among Muslims), who killed the fourth Caliph Ali Ibn Talib and massacred many Muslims.<sup>35</sup> El Ansary considered *Irjaf* to be the best Qur'anic terminology to counter use of the *Qur'an* by the al Qaeda leadership.

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<sup>32</sup> El Ansary, "Revisiting the Qur'anic Basis for the Use of War Language", p. 66.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 64.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 67.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 68.

## 7.6 *Subal al Salaam wal Sayrura* (Pathways to Peace and Transformation):

The word '*Subal*' in Arabic is the plural of '*Sabeel*', which means road, path of access,<sup>36</sup> expedient, or possibility.<sup>37</sup> *Salaam* is both salutation and peace or submission, as explained in the previous section. The term denoting transformation in Arabic is '*al Sayrura*', which is a verb for movement that literally means becoming or transforming. It comes from the root word '*Sara*', which means to become (*sayr, sayrura, masira*).<sup>38</sup>

*Sara* literally means the idea of change or conversion, to turn out, to become.<sup>39</sup> This gives meaning to the verbs of movement that has a beginning and/or an end. Those verbs which designate a continuous or repeating motion do not take this form. Mostly they are intransitive, but they can also take an accusative form as well.<sup>40</sup> Winder considers '*Sara*' or 'to become' to be the most frequently used verb 'which takes a predicate in the accusative.'<sup>41</sup>

Change means altering a condition from one form to another, whereas transformation is a gradual process of change until the final form completely alters the structure of a given issue or society. Qamar ul Huda considers the Qur'anic word for change to be '*Badalna*', as expressed here:

The Qur'anic term *Badalna* calls for changing human suffering to prosperity, and it is used for positive change. Qamar ul Huda points out that the multiple uses of the word 'change' in the *Qur'an* are mostly associated with wrongdoing and disobedience.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> J.G. Hava, *Al Farid Arabic English Dictionary* (Beruit: Dar al Mashriq, 1986), p. 308.

<sup>37</sup> Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (New York: Spoken Language Services, Inc, 1971), p. 396.

<sup>38</sup> David Charles Larsen, *Means of Intelligibility* (Berkeley: University of California, 2007), p. 161.

<sup>39</sup> William Wright, "A Grammar of the Arabic language," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), p. 102

<sup>40</sup> Larsen, *Means of Intelligibility*, p. 161.

<sup>41</sup> Farhat J. Ziadeh and R. Bayly Winder, *An Introduction to Modern Arabic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 77.

<sup>42</sup> Qamar ul Huda, "Enhancing Skills and Capacity Building in Islamic Peacemaking," In *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar ul Huda (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 216.

'*Yuhawalo*' also means 'transformed' but it involves suddenly changes to the form, and is not a process. Vicente Cantarino points out:

This verb takes two accusative objects, generally one of the person and the other of the thing, but both can also be person or things. In this category are verbs that have meaning of 'to make into something' or 'to take as' to 'appoint' or 'to think to be'.<sup>43</sup>

Mohammad Shahrur explains the concept of *Sayrura* by providing a tripartite notion of existence which involves reading the *Qur'an*, understanding the dynamics of existence and appropriating the progress of human societies. The three principles of *Sayrura* are as follows:

- a) Being: depicts material existence of the universe. It exists irrespective of human perception about it (*al Kaynuna*).
- b) Progressing: refers to time, movement and process (*al-Sayrura*).
- c) Becoming: refers to change and transformation (*al-Sayrura*).<sup>44</sup>

All three principles are indispensable to each other. If applied to human society, the basic biological existence can be termed as 'being', advancement in history is 'progress', while civilisational development, and social change and transformation, can be termed 'becoming'. Shahrur maintains that the biggest challenge for humans is of 'becoming', or the transformation of human society that varies from culture to culture and across historical periods. For him,

[b]ecoming is an historical change (*al sayruriyya al tarikjiyya*) which human beings, in exercising their free will, either accelerate or slow down – but can never fully stop.<sup>45</sup>

This transformation makes humans assume responsibility and acquire their full potential. This becoming or transformation is based on the following:

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<sup>43</sup> Vicente Cantarino, *Syntax of Modern Arabic Prose: The Expanded Sentence*, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 166.

<sup>44</sup> Andreas Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur*, vol. 106, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Leiden, Boston: BRILL, 2009), pp. 11–2.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

1. (Becoming or transformation of) the unity of God (*al Tawhid*), as the belief in the unity of God passed through many stages.
2. (Becoming or transformation of) morality and ethics, transformation of ethics over the times till it reached to the Messengerhood of the Prophet Muhammad.
3. (Becoming or transformation in) human legislation (*al Tashri*).<sup>46</sup>

Shahrur holds that societies based on 'being' or at the level of existence or progress, and not based on 'becoming' or transformation, lose their purpose and place in human societies. He states that "becoming produces a development that varies from one culture to another and from one historical period to another, even within the same culture."<sup>47</sup> He terms this as historical development and change. This transformation, according to him, happened only 1400 years ago in Islamic society, as it transformed the pre-Islamic Arabian society from *Jahiliyya* (ignorant), and introduced concepts of education, women's rights, property rights, mannerism, coexistence and submission to one God. This also gave sanctity to the acts and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, whose message was of transformation not stagnation.<sup>48</sup>

Thus, conflict transformation in Islam envisages different stages of the progress of humanity at personal and societal levels, and considers transformation as an inevitable aspect of the conflict intervention process. It paves the way for a culture of peace and reconciliation, which is an ongoing process that breaks the cycle of violence and conflict within the society. This occurred in 7<sup>th</sup> Century Mecca and Medina when Islam transformed tribal conflict through a process of coexistence and forgiveness.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, pp. 17-8.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 18.

<sup>49</sup> The resolution of conflict on the placement of the Black Stone in Mecca was one of the initial conflicts which were resolved by Prophet Mohammad through his emphasis on collective placement rather than giving privilege to one tribe, thus ending the tribal rivalry. The Treaty of *Hudaybiyya* and the Charter of Medina are also examples of transformation of conflict through peaceful means.



**Figure 7: Islamic Concept of Conflict Transformation**




Figure 7 show different stages of transformation process. The Islamic concept of conflict transformation is connected through six interrelated steps followed by strategies for transformation.

- a) *Al Islam, al Iman, al Ihsan*: the Islamic Spiral
- b) *Sirate-e Mustaqeem*: The Straight path
- c) *Jihad fi Sabil Allah*: Struggle or strive in the way of Allah
- d) *Sabr fi Sabil Allah*: Patience in the way of Allah
- e) *Sakeena tal Qulub*: Reconciliation
- f) *Al Wala wal Bara*: Transformation of Identity

### 7.6.1 Islamic Spiral: Connecting Universal, Societal and Personal Levels of Transformation

Mahmoud Mohamed Taha defined the Islamic spiral as consisting of seven cycles: *al Islam*, *al Iman*, *al Ihsan*, *ilm al Yaqin*, *ilm ayn al Yaqin*, *ilm haqq al yaqin* and *al Islam*.<sup>50</sup> This cycle is primarily based on three main concepts – *al Islam* (submitting), *al Iman* (believing) and *al Ihsan* (doing good and being fair)-and the recognition of believing and truth (*ilm al Yaqin*, *ilm ayn al Yaqin*, *ilm haqq al yaqin*). Explaining the difference between *al Islam* and *al Iman*, Shahrur points out that the adherents of *al Islam* are known as *al-Muslimun* which is the global/universal level, while their faith is termed *al Iman* or *al Muminun* which denotes the personal/individual level.

The important ethical injunctions of *al Islam*, *al Iman* and *al Ihsan* are its pillars, without which *al Islam* cannot be complete. Joseph E.B.Lumbard explains that the *Ihsani* intellectual tradition began with the teachings of the *Qur'an* and the Prophet Muhammad who told his companions, God has ordained *Ihsan* for everything. In perhaps his most famous teaching on the subject, he said: “*Ihsan* is to worship God as if you see Him, He nonetheless sees you”.<sup>51</sup> Shahrur defines *al Ihsan* which at the societal level, as the pillar of *al Islam*, and *al-Amal al Salih* (doing what is righteous) as the pillar of *al Iman*. This will bring a “sustainable Islamic awakening” that will put morality and ethics above ritualism. He bases his definition of *al-Islam* on verse 41:33:

Who is fairer in speech (*ahsana qaul*) than one who calls unto Allah and performs the righteous deed (*amila salih*) and says I am one of those who submit (*min al-muslimin*)?<sup>52</sup>

This defines the universal level of *al Islam* as good, fair, and just in words and deeds. The prime conditions of *al Islam*, *al Iman* and *al Ihsan* are peace and justice. Ibrahim Kalin points out that,

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<sup>50</sup> Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, *The Second Message of Islam*, edited and translated by Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 124.

<sup>51</sup> Joseph E. B. Lumbard, "The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology in the Modern Islamic World," In *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition, Essays by Western Muslim Scholars*. ed. Joseph E. B. Lumbard (New Delhi: Third Eye, 2005), p. 41.

<sup>52</sup> Christmann, *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, pp. 27–30.

Peace as a substantive value is also based on justice, equity (*adl, qist*), for peace is predicated upon the availability of equal rights and opportunities for all to realize their goals and potentials. Thus, *Qur'an* combines justice with *Ihsan* when it commands its followers to act with justice and good manners (*bil adl wa'l ihsan* (16:90)).<sup>53</sup>

The terms *Mohsin* (from *Ihsan*, doer of good) and *Mu'umin* (from *Iman*, believer who provides safety and security) are important, as a Muslim should have the characteristics of both to be a complete Muslim. The question of good and evil in Islam is discussed in the context of *Husn/Khayr* (good, beautiful) and *Sharr/Qubah* (bad, evil), while in Islamic theology and philosophy all questions of conflict, war, violence, injustice and discord are considered to be an extension of the general problem of evil.<sup>54</sup> The *Qur'anic* verse that describes the concepts of *Khayr* and *Sharr* is as follows.

Fighting is prescribed for you. It may well be that you hate a thing while it is good [*khayr*] for you, it may well be that you like a thing while it is bad [*sharr*] for you. And God knows, and you know not (2:216).

Thus, fighting is termed as something which is opposite to one's nature (*Fitrah*) as one is not naturally inclined to indulge in it. Joseph Lumbard points out that the central manifestation of the practice of *Ihsan* took its form in what is traditionally known as *Sufism* (Islamic mysticism), where emphasis is on making one's heart and soul beautiful so that beauty will arise naturally from within.<sup>55</sup> By contrast, *Tahqiq* is the process of reaching the truth. This process includes *Irfan*, which is derived from the verb *Arafa*, and both together mean to know and to recognize. The verification (*Marifa*) process leads to witnessing the truth (*Haqq*), which brings one near to God,<sup>56</sup> which makes *al Ihsan* (goodness) and *Haqq* (Truth) the basis for transformation at the societal level.

At the universal level, *Ta'aruf* is one of the pillars of transformation; meaning mutual understanding, acquaintance and peaceful coexistence, both between individuals and between groups, states and nations. It constitutes the purpose of Allah's creation, as depicted in the following verse:

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<sup>53</sup> Ibrahim Kalin, "Islam and Peace: A Survey of the Sources of Peace in the Islamic Tradition," In *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar ul Huda (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), pp. 8-9.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11.

<sup>55</sup> Lumbard, "The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology in the Modern Islamic World," p. 41.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p. 63.

O [human kind] we created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other) [*li-ta'arifu*]. Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you (49:13).<sup>57</sup>

This explains the need for knowing, understanding and having mutual respect of different civilizations, a worldview not based on clash, contestation or competition but mutual acceptance and recognition of each other's existence in the world.

### 7.6.2 Transformation Through Perseverance: *Sirat al Mustaqeem*: The Straight Path

This is one of the most important principles of transformation because it requires a gradual and constant effort to transform individually and collectively. This concept includes patience as its primary pillar, followed by forgiveness and mercy, which lead to perseverance on the right path. It is through forgiveness and mercy that issues are transformed, although justice and equity remain cardinal principles for achieving long-term transformation. However, the *Qur'an* clearly states that although justice and equity are important, if forgiveness is given a chance, it can produce durable change and transformation in a conflict.

Shahrur points out that his *Theory of Limits* for the understanding of the *Qur'an* as a vehicle for transformation is based on two contradictory but complementary principles:

These are 'straightness' (*al istiqama*: straight path) and 'curvature' (*al hanifiyya*: true faith): they represent the internal dialectics of human life between constant acquisition of new knowledge, leading to social and economic changes, on the one hand, and on the other, the introduction of new legislation as a proactive response to these changes and development.<sup>58</sup>

Shahrur contends that ethical ideals in Islam are referred to in two terms: *A'budu Allah'* (worship God) and '*al Sirat al Mustaqim'* (straight path).<sup>59</sup> Worshipping God not only includes rituals but taking heed of the message he has sent for justice and fairness in life.

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<sup>57</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 382.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 180.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 35.

*Sirat al Mustaqim* has a moral injunction out of which spread *al Salam and al lin fi'l qaul*.<sup>60</sup> The following *Qur'anic* verses connect *Sirat al Mustaqim* to peace and transformation.

O you [who] believe! Enter into [*al salam*] whole heartedly (2:208).

Say not to anyone who offers you peace (*al salam*): 'You art none of a believer' (4:94).

But if the enemy incline towards peace, do you also towards peace [*li'l-salam*] and trust in Allah (8:61).

Therefore if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and (instead) send you (a guarantee of) peace (*al salam*), then God has opened no way for you (to war against them) (4:90).

Ibrahim Kalin also points out that this concept of *Sirat al Mustaqim* is not confined to Islam or Muslims, and that *Qur'anic* ethical-spiritual universalism is not confined to one nation or tribe but is based on enjoining good (*Ma'aruf*) and forbidding evil (*Munkar*), which is applicable for the entire world.<sup>61</sup> This requires courage and forbearance both at societal and personal levels respectively and ultimately leads to a peaceful society.

### **7.6.3 Transformation of the Concept of Jihad: From Militancy to Constructive Resistance**

One of the most contentious topics in West-Islam relations is the concept of *Jihad* and terrorist violence in Muslim societies. The prevailing terrorist and militant activities by Muslim groups have been termed Jihadism or the global Jihadist movement in the post-9/11 era, with emphasis on the use of violence to achieve goals instead of the pursuance of peace. *Jihad*, which literally means to struggle or to strive, has been equated with Holy War.<sup>62</sup> This definition uses a social constructionist view to define within one's own

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<sup>60</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 42.

<sup>61</sup> Kalin, "Islam and Peace," p. 24.

<sup>62</sup> Asma Afsaruddin, "Recovering the Early Semantic Purview of Jihad and Martyrdom: Challenging Statist-Military Perspectives," In *Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam*, ed. Qamar ul Huda (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010); Muhammad Tahir ul Qadri, *Fatwa On Terrorism And Suicide Bombing* (London: Minhaj ul Quran International UK, 2010).

linguistic framework the concepts and terms of other societies and cultures. The European experiences of religious wars and their destructiveness reinforced the perception of *Jihad* as a Holy War, particularly in the era of colonialism. Although there had been declarations of *Jihad* against colonial rule in Muslim societies, its emergence as a transnational phenomenon with global implications is a new development. In the post-9/11 era, one of the main issues in West-Islam relations, which appeared at the global level, is of *Jihad* as a cause of militancy and terrorism. Therefore, it is important to reconstruct *Jihad* as a transformative pillar of Islam.

The concepts of *Jihad*, *Mujahid* and *Shaheed* need redefining to differentiate between violence and the constructive use of force as a way of intervening in humanitarian missions, and defending and maintaining peace. These concepts are interconnected and are normally considered in military terms, with *Jihad* as a militant struggle, *Mujahid* as someone who fights in a Holy War and *Shaheed* as someone who dies in the Holy War. The redefinition of these concepts involves separating the fighting or armed aspects of *Jihad*. An alternative definition includes *Jihad* as a constructive resistance, a struggle against oppression, aggression, injustice and against the violation of human rights. *Mujahid* is thus the one who performs these acts and upholds these principles, while *Shaheed* means to suffer physically and emotionally to uphold these principles and to bear witness on the Day of Judgment.

*Jihad* is of four types: *Jihad bil Nafs* (through inner transformation: greater *Jihad*), *Jihad bil Lisan* (through speech), *Jihad bil Qalm* (through the pen) and *Jihad bil Saif* (through the sword - alternatively called lesser *Jihad*). *Jihad* with the sword and *Qital* (fighting) has also been differentiated in the *Qur'an*. Numerous conditions for fighting have been provided for in the *Qur'an*, the primary reason being to help the weak and to uphold justice, to help those who have been thrown out of their homes without a just cause, and to resist those who suppress religious freedoms. In this regard, there are numerous interpretations of *Jihad*. Apologists who present their views of *Jihad* in reply to the Western perceptions of Islam as being spread by the sword emphasise the nonviolent and peaceful aspect of *Jihad*. For modernists, the ethical dimension of *Jihad* is more

important than the military one, while for extremists *Jihad* means to propagate Islamic order worldwide by military or forceful means.

Historically, *Jihad* has been used as a pretext to gain territory, power and empire. Later, it has been used by Islamists and *Ulema* as a mission to spread Islam through violent means or, in the case of the *Tablighi-e-Jama'at* (a group of missionaries established in India in the 1920s), a call for *Jihad* by *Dawah* or propagation. The origin of armed *Jihad* by the state or empire goes back to the jurists of the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Imam Shafi'i (750-805 C.E.) and other jurists of his time formulated *Jihad* as an armed struggle with an expansionist doctrine for *Dar ul Islam* (the House of Peace) to bring all *Dar ul Harb* (houses of war) under Muslim rule. Shafi'i considered expansionist *Jihad* as a religious duty and argued that fighting was justified because of *Kufar* (disbelief rather than self-defense). However, jurists from other legal schools of jurisprudence had different views, such as Abu Hanifa (d. 798), Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), Muhammad B. Al Hasan al Shaybani (d. 804) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328).<sup>63</sup>

*Jihad* took on a cultural tone during the colonial era when it was used as a tool of resistance against the colonial empire, not only to stop their political and military dominance, but also to save Islam as a religious/cultural force within the Muslim communities from the onslaught of secular modernity.<sup>64</sup> This religious/cultural resistance became a military struggle in the post-colonial period, mostly directed against Westernisation and globalisation. The development of a threat perception among Muslims against the West developed because of the decline in the political-religious power of Muslim Empires, thus making it conditional that, for Islam to survive as a religious force, political power be regained. Political-military *Jihad* was favoured as the way to achieve political power and re-establish the authority of Islam. But Mahmoud Mohamed Taha points out that *Jihad* is not an original and dominant precept in Islam: it was later turned into a pillar of Islam through the abrogation of *Quranic* verses, which

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<sup>63</sup> Kalin, "Islam and Peace," p. 17.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

was necessitated by circumstances which he describes as requiring a “surgeon’s” not as a “butcher’s” knife.”<sup>65</sup>

Muhammad Shahrur defines *Jihad* in a different way from the common understanding of striving. According to him:

The noun *Jihad* is derived from the third verb form *jahada* and thus has the structure and semantic meaning of words of the *fa’ala* group, such as *jidat* (dispute), *Qital* (fight), and *khisam* (argument). *Jihad*, like these three nouns, connotes a struggle between two sides in which one side wants to overcome and triumph over the other (which may be an individual or a whole group). It has often been assumed that *Jihad* derived from the first verb form, *jahaada*, and the long ‘a’ is accidental and not constitutive for its meaning. This has led to the understanding of *Jihad* as a derivative of *juhd* (exertion) and to the fatal parallel classification of *Qital* (fight) as *qatl* (killing), culminating in the association of *Jihad* with *qatl* (killing) and not *Qital* (fight).<sup>66</sup>

Therefore, Shahrur differentiates between *Jihad*, *Juhd*, *Qital* and *Qatal*, which he considered as the main cause of misunderstanding and misuse not only by the militants but also the rest of the world.

David Dakake explains the concept of *Jihad* as,

[a]nything that requires something of us – that is, requires that we go beyond the confines of our individual ego and desires – or anything that we bear with or strive after for the sake of pleasing God can be spoken of as a ‘*Jihad*’ in Islam.<sup>67</sup>

Sometimes considered to be the sixth pillar of Islam, *Jihad* provides a framework for the other five pillars of *Shahada* (witness to oneness of God), *Salah* (five time prayers), *Zakat* (charity tax), *Sawm* (fasting) and *Hajj* (annual pilgrimage), to be performed by striving against evil tendencies. Dakake considers those who portray *Jihad* as a purely spiritual form of exertion to be ‘apologetists’ who try to make *Jihad* fit in with notion of peace and nonviolence, while those who see it in purely military terms become militants.

The overemphasis of the military aspect of *Jihad* disregards the fact that the first form of *Jihad* ordered by Allah was against the Meccans which called for peaceful struggle. This

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<sup>65</sup> Taha, *The Second Message of Islam*, pp. 133–4.

<sup>66</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 396.

<sup>67</sup> David Dakake, "The Myth of a Militant Islam," In *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars*, ed. Joseph E. B. Lumbard (New Delhi: Third Eye, 2005), p. 3.



is the point stressed by Mahmoud Mohammed Taha in his book *The Second Message of Islam*. In the words of the *Qur'an*,

Therefore listen not to the Unbelievers [kafirun], but strive against them [jihadihum]with the utmost strenuousness, with it (*Qur'an*). (25:52).

The 'it' in the verse calls for striving or *Jihad* with the help of the *Qur'an*, not sword.<sup>68</sup> The first verses that called for military *Jihad* were 22:39-40 and 2:190-191.<sup>69</sup> These verses indicate that initial permission to fight was given for religious freedom, namely, saving places of worship and helping the oppressed.

Historically, *Jihad* mainly targeted those who opposed the political authority of the Islamic state. A military *Jihad* was initiated by the state only, while all individual efforts to declare *Jihad* were dubbed *Fitna* or *Fasad* by the political and religious authorities. But for both individuals and the state to initiate *Jihad*, the preferred method is what the Prophet adopted in Mecca and Medina. With individual *Jihad*, the preferred model of persuasion was that demonstrated by the Prophet Muhammad against the Meccans, with collective *Jihad*, the preferred mode initiation of *Jihad* as a military struggle against external invasion through the orders of the ruler as a collective responsibility was adopted in Medina. It was not the only way of *Jihad* adopted, as Prophet Muhammad used peaceful means where he could and entered many treaties with enemies to avoid military encounters. His was more a situational approach.

Muhammad Shahrur points out that the approach of the *Fuqaha* (classical jurists) to equate *Jihad* with *Qatl* (killing) is made possible through the *Naskh* (abrogation) that brought military activities within the fold of *Jihad*. He believes that, as a rule, abrogation

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<sup>68</sup> Dakake, "The Myth of a Militant Islam," p. 13.

<sup>69</sup> "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors, 2:191: And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosques, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith" (2: 190).

"To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged; and verily God is most Powerful for their aid" (22:39).

"(They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right - (for no cause) except that they say, "Our lord is God". Did not God check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure? God will certainly aid those who aid His (cause); for verily God is full strength, Exalted in might (able to enforce his will)" (22:40)

of verses occurred but not within the time period of the same messenger or prophets. It occurred between different messengers or prophets. The need for abrogation of verses of the *Qur'an* arose from the confusion among the *Fuqaha* (jurists) about the apparent contradiction between verses about nonviolence and peaceful persuasion on one hand, and those about intolerance, aggressive expansionism and violence against other religions, on the other. Shahrur explains this contradiction as some verses constituting only 'news' while others can be considered 'obligatory'. He considers the verses of *Surat al Tawabah* (Chapter 9: Repentance or Immunity) for example, which give an account of the military expeditions of Muhammad, as only '*Khabar*' - news of events during those times.<sup>70</sup>

Similarly, the terms *Shahada* and *Shaheed* also need understanding because of their military implications. Derived from the root word *sh.h.d*, the terms appear 160 times in the *Qur'an*. The meaning of *sh.h.d* concerns only the act of witnessing, involving the physical presence of witnesses. There is no mention of martyrdom or martyrs.<sup>71</sup> Shahrur considers a *Shaheed* to be one who struggles against vices in society and who works against corrupt governments, aggression and oppression.<sup>72</sup> He cites one particular *Hadith* in which the Prophet listed those who would be *Shaheed*, as those who are killed in the way of Allah. Shahrur considers this to be an innovation, as the definition in the Book requires a *Shaheed* to be alive to qualify as a witness. Even if death is part of the definition of *Shaheed*, then death should be as an act of witness against oppression, not an offensive military act.<sup>73</sup> He believes that the *Fuqaha* were corrupted by their alliance with despotic rulers since the time of the Umayyad (661-750), and thus they corrupted the text to support their desire for power and expansionism.<sup>74</sup> Asma Asrafudin also points out that the meaning of *Shaheed* as a martyr has been influenced by the Syriac word *Shedo*, which had military connotations.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 402.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 402-3.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 403-5.

<sup>73</sup>, *Ibid*, p. 408.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, p. 209.

<sup>75</sup> Afsaruddin, "Recovering the Early Semantic Purview of Jihad and Martyrdom," p. 52.

Furthermore, although '*Fi sabil al Allah*' appears 70 times in the *Qur'an*, it is not mentioned as a way of 'killing other people' or 'sacrificing oneself for a divine will'. Likewise, 'fight in the way of Allah' (2:190) is mentioned, but there is a difference between '*Qital*' (fighting) and '*Qatl*' (killing). Fight or struggle could be for a cause or mission.<sup>76</sup> Shahrur, thus deconstructs the militant interpretation of this verse and changes it into a peaceful meaning.

Shahrur goes on to insist that the meaning of *Istishhad* (2:282, 4:15)<sup>77</sup> is not martyrdom but rather the giving of evidence as an eyewitness. He says this meaning of martyrdom appeared as a result of the Prophet dividing *Jihad* into lesser and greater categories. Greater *Jihad* was the struggle against base human desires, while lesser *Jihad* emerges as armed defense against aggression. However, even the defensive military battles of Prophet Muhammad began to be termed *Ghazwas* (raids) and given the connotation of conquest.<sup>78</sup> Part of the problem was that the entire concept of *Jihad* began to be encapsulated by the term *Ghazwa*, a concept taken from the *Jahiliyya* (pre-Islamic) Arabs, with the result that greater *Jihad* began to be overtaken by lesser *Jihad* and lose its true meaning. This confusion between *Jihad* and *Ghazwa* and the blurring of any distinction between them is the main reason for the alleged militancy in *Qur'anic* verses, which became more dominant with the emergence of the Islamic Empire. This confusion also arose due to the integration of power politics with religious doctrine, which provided justification for conquests, led to the validation of political objectives in religious terms,

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<sup>76</sup> Christmann, *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 412.

<sup>77</sup> 2: 282 "O you who have believed, when you contract a debt for a specified term, write it down. And let a scribe write [it] between you in justice. Let no scribe refuse to write as Allah has taught him. So let him write and let the one who has the obligation dictate. And let him fear Allah, his Lord, and not leave anything out of it. But if the one who has the obligation is of limited understanding or weak or unable to dictate himself, then let his guardian dictate in justice. And bring to witness two witnesses from among your men. And if there are not two men [available], then a man and two women from those whom you accept as witnesses - so that if one of the women errs, then the other can remind her. And let not the witnesses refuse when they are called upon. And do not be [too] weary to write it, whether it is small or large, for its [specified] term. That is more just in the sight of Allah and stronger as evidence and more likely to prevent doubt between you, except when it is an immediate transaction which you conduct among yourselves. For [then] there is no blame upon you if you do not write it. And take witnesses when you conclude a contract. Let no scribe be harmed or any witness. For if you do so, indeed, it is [grave] disobedience in you. And fear Allah. And Allah teaches you. And Allah is Knowing of all things". 4:15," Those who commit unlawful sexual intercourse with your women - bring against them four [witnesses] from among you. And if they testify, confine the guilty women to houses until death takes them or Allah ordains for them [another] way.

<sup>78</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 417.

rendered political opponents as infidels, and sacrificed soldiers in the name of martyrdom. Thus, *Jihad* became interwoven with *Qital* which signified the meaning of *Qatala* (to kill).

Shahrur defines the meaning of fight (*Qital*) as the use violence to resolve conflict when all other means have failed. He gives three legitimate causes for *al Qital*: (i) injustice (22:39: aggression against God's limit), (ii) a humanitarian crisis in the shape of the expulsion of people (22:40)<sup>79</sup>, and (iii) an internal or external attack against people's lives, property or rights.<sup>80</sup> He differentiates between verses of the sword, which are specific to a certain historical period, and the universal application of verses 'to fight':<sup>81</sup> "Then fight and slay the pagans wherever you find them" (9:5). This verse referred only to the pagans of Mecca while another verse, "Fighting is prescribed for you, and you dislike it" (2:216), has a universal application but with conditions prescribed by God.

It is also important to differentiate between *al Qital* (fighting) and *al Tadafu* (to check or push back, compete). The *Qur'an* says, "And did not God check one set of people by means of another, the earth would indeed be full of mischief. But God is full of bounty to all the worlds" (2:251). In the *Qur'an*, the term that can best be used as an argument of the 'clash of civilizations is *'al Tadafu'*, which means to check the mutual rivalry between societies. The Arabic term for 'to check' in the sense of 'to drive back' is *Dafa*, a transitive verb that requires a direct object, while the term for 'mutual push' is *Tadafa'a*, a verb that requires both a subject and an object, because it implies a process of simultaneously pushing and being pushed. *Al Qita'al* describes a similar competition between two sides, but in contrast to *al Tadafu*, this might culminate in a violent battle between two armed opponents, resulting in potentially high numbers of casualties. However, mutual competition does not always have to be violent or deadly.<sup>82</sup>

The *Qur'an's* vocabulary was given a military connotation by associating *Jihad* with 'fighting', 'killing', and raiding (*Ghazwa*), and associating 'an opening' (*al Fatah*) with

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<sup>79</sup> 22:40: "(They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right - (for not cause) except that they say, "Our Lord is God."

<sup>80</sup> Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 441.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p. 425.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 435.

victory in war (*al Harb*). Accordingly, by using the theory of abrogation, a new *Fiqh* terminology was introduced that repealed the Meccan verses of peaceful persuasion with verses of the sword, thereby eliminating the *Qur'an's* original meanings. Shahrur blames the consensus (*Ijma*) of the *Fuqaha* on abrogation and their privileging of the military aspects of *Jihad* centuries ago for its binding nature on present-day Muslims, because it ignores the principle of constant progress and development in human societies.

#### 7.6.4 *Sabr fi Sabil Allah* as a Transformative Concept

*Sabr fi Sabil Allah* means 'patience in the way of Allah'. Compared with *Jihad fi Sabil Allah*, Asma Afsaruddin, while explaining the concept of *Sabr fi Sabil Allah*, states that the *Qur'an* differentiates between active strivers (*al Mujahidun*) and quiet forbearing (*al Sabirin*), which come under the broader framework of *Jihad* as the two important forms of *Jihad* depicted in Mecca and Medina.

Important verses which connect *Jihad* with *Sabr* include the following:

As for those who after persecution fled their homes and strove actively (*jahadu*) and were patient (*sabaru*) to the last, your lord will be forgiving and merciful to them on the day when every soul will come pleading for itself (16:10).

We shall put you to the test until we know the active strivers (*al Mujahidun*) and the quietly forbearing (*al sabirin*) among you (47:31).

These verses depict patience as an important virtue in the pursuit of *Jihad* which constitutes an integral part of the process of *Jihad*. Afsaruddin points out that Meccan verses stress *Sabr fi Sabil Allah* (patience in the way of Allah) as a form of struggle, while the Medina period favours *Jihad fi Sabil Allah* (struggle or strive in the way of Allah) as the primary concept. She writes:

Both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, medieval and modern, have tended to downplay the critical Meccan phase in the development of *Qur'anic* doctrine of *Jihad*. It is, however, practically impossible to contextualize the *Qur'anic* discourse on the various meanings of *Jihad* without considering the Meccan phase. The introduction of the military aspect of *Jihad* in the Medina period can then be appropriately and better understood as a last resort option, resorted to

when attempts at negotiations and peaceful proselytization among the Meccans had failed during the first thirteen years of the propagation of Islam.<sup>83</sup>

Afsaruddin argues that a decline in the importance of patience (*Sabr*) occurred during the Umayyad period (661–750) because constant border skirmishing with Byzantium compelled Syrian and Iraqi jurists to promote the concept of an offensive *Jihad* as an effective military strategy. She suggests that the literature on *Fada'il al Jihad* (virtues of *Jihad*) and *Fada'il al Sabr* (virtues of patience) should form the framework for understanding *Jihad*, as *Sabr* is an important aspect and a condition to fulfill the obligation of *Jihad*, both militarily and spiritually.<sup>84</sup> Indeed, the *Qur'an* considers '*Sabr un Jameel*' (patience of beautiful contentment) as the highest stage of the value of patience as it says "therefore do thou hold patience - a patience of beautiful (contentment)" (70:5). This emphasises the importance of patience in the process of *Jihad*.

#### 7.6.5 Reconciliation: *Sakina and Taleef al Qulub*

Reconciliation (*Ta'lif*) within society is an important aspect of the transformative process. Islam has placed emphasis on reconciliation through two important concepts. The first is *Sakina tul Qulub* (tranquility in the heart) and the second is *Taleef ul Qulub* (reconciling hearts). This is opposite to *Tehrik-e-Qulub* which denotes shaking of hearts and is the basis of terrorizing people. *Sakina* is derived from the word *Sukun*, which means tranquility and peace. The *Qur'an* in the following verses states the importance of achieving tranquility as a process of peace and reconciliation:

It is he who sent down tranquility (*Sakinah tal Qulub*) into the hearts of the believers, that they may add faith to their Faith (48:4).

God's good pleasure was on the believers when they swore fealty to thee under the tree: He knew what was in their hearts, and He sent down tranquility to them; and He rewarded them with a speedy victory (48:18).

While the unbelievers (*Kufar*) got up in their hearts and cant - the heat and cant of ignorance - God sent down His tranquility to His Apostle and to the Believers, and made them stick close to the command of self restraint; and well were they entitled to it and worthy of it (48:26).

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<sup>83</sup> Afsaruddin, "Recovering the Early Semantic Purview of Jihad and Martyrdom," p. 44.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p. 44

These verses depict *Sakina or Sukun* as a special favour from God in the form of peace in the heart, which paves the way for the reconciliation process. A heart full of hatred and violent tendencies can neither forgive nor show mercy towards others. Asrafuddin, explaining the concept of *Taleef ul Qulub*, says that any change in society cannot be successful unless there is inner transformation of individuals. The heart, a cognitive and emotive organ, is where this change and peace can be grafted.<sup>85</sup> She considers two verses in the *Qur'an* as the basis of the reconciliation process:

Hold fast, one and all, to the "rope of Allah" and let nothing divide you, and remember with gratitude God's favour on you; for ye were enemies and He joined your hearts in love (3:103),

He hath put affection between their hearts (8:63).

For both verses, Asrafuddin uses the exegeses of al Tabari, al Qurbati, Ibn-e-Kathir and Muhammad Abduh. She points out that al Tabari considers these verses as a reminder of the way that submission to God and guidance of the Prophet led to reconciliation between two tribes (the *Aws* and *Khazrij*) of Medina. Al Qurtabi considers this verse in terms of 'communal life' and forbidding separation from community, based on submission to God and following the Prophet for peace and reconciliation. Ibn Kathir observes that remembrance of God leads to forgiving past memories, and results in reconciliation. On the other hand, Muhammad Abduh considers this a verse denouncing tribalism and promoting reconciliation based on submission to God and following the Prophet, and explains modern-day nationalism as a form of tribalism of pre-Islamic *Jahiliyya* (ignorance). Asrafuddin puts the concept of reconciliation thus:

The *Qur'anic* concept of *ta'lif al qulub* engendered the important sociological category of "those whose hearts are to be reconciled" (Ar. *Mu'allafat al qulub*), referring to people whose friendship and alliance were to be nurtured and cultivated in a number of ways in the early period. This category of people included new converts to Islam and non-Muslims: Jews, Christians, and even "polytheists" (as they are termed in the literature), whose good will and friendship were deemed contributing to the well-being of the community.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Asma Afsaruddin, "Taking Faith to Heart: Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Islam," In *Spiritual Dimensions of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi's Risale-i-Nur*, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), p. 214.

<sup>86</sup> Afsaruddin, "Taking Faith to Heart: Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Islam," p. 222.

### 7.6.6 Transformation of Identity issues

Identity issues based on 'self' and the 'other' concepts have played an important role in developing antagonism between Muslims and the West. Al Qaeda leadership and the TTP have actively used this concept for forging separateness of Muslims from non-Muslims. There are two perspectives in this regard. The concept of *Wala* and *Barra*, namely loyalty and friendship towards others, is subject to multiple interpretations. The terms '*Wala*' (likeness) and '*Bara*' (otherness) deal with the question of identity in the Islamic discourse promoted by the al Qaeda leadership. This discourse has been used by them to justify the basis of likeness and otherwise for Muslims towards non-Muslims, and call it "Loyalty and Enmity".<sup>87</sup> Al Zawahiri uses verse 3:28 for justification of his point of foundation of loyalty and enmity in Islam:

Let believers [Muslims] not take for friends and allies infidels [non-Muslims] rather than believers: whoever does this shall have no relationship left with Allah - unless you but guard yourself against them, taking precautions. But Allah cautions you [to fear] Himself. For the final goal is to Allah.

He also quotes other verses of the *Qur'an* to justify the basis of friendship and loyalty in Islam, thus defining identity discourse strictly on the basis of enmity of non-Muslims for defining the Muslim 'self'. He proposes *Taqiyya*, self-preservation through dissembling, as a form of deception while dealing with non-Muslims so that Muslims are not killed or harmed by them.<sup>88</sup>

The Arabic root word for *Wala* is *w.l.a*, which has two contradictory meanings: a turn towards something or a turn away from someone or something. In the *Qur'an*, the term has been used to define a turn towards God and friendship, while *Fiqh* employs it with the question of loyalty and friendship towards Muslims and non-Muslims:

*Al wala* expresses a form of social identity that is realized first as a decision by an individual who wants to stay in a relationship with someone else. ... The book provides the term *Ummah* as in 3:110.<sup>89</sup> The community here shares the

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<sup>87</sup> Raymond Ibrahim, ed. *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), p. 66.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 73.

<sup>89</sup> 3:110: "Ye you are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God. If only the People of the Book had faith, it were best for them; among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors".



same goal, that is 'to prescribe what is right and proscribe what is wrong', while the community also shares the same ideology, that is 'to believe in God'.<sup>90</sup>

One of the importance aspects of *al Wala* is obedience, usually depicted as what is prescribed and what is not allowed by the God. The kind of identity formation woven around the obedience of God is at the religious level, not at the level of nations or groups for which God has already cited the division of people as a basis of different identity groups.<sup>91</sup> The act of disengagement is expressed through declaring 'otherness' with disobedience of God as its basis. This is opposite to 'likeness' which depicts obedience of God and signifies the Muslim 'self'.<sup>92</sup>

Different levels of the identity exists in different social institutions from *Ummah* to nation or tribe, while the divine message in the form of different apostles, messengers and prophets forms the basis of a new identity that transcends other identities but never contradicts them. One of the impacts of the historical concept of identity is the creation of a single identity based on religious ideals, while ignoring the rest of the identities and mixing state ideology with religion. This bars the recognition of other forms of identities, thus leading to out-group issues. The issue of single identity contradicts the *Qur'an*, as it allows the holding of multiple identities but at the same time holding a religious identity.<sup>93</sup> The State of Medina held several identities, while those who are not from the same religious community can hold the same social identity.

## 7.7 Strategies for Transformation

The present conflict of 'war on terror' and the role of Muslims in it are based on two important historical aspects which have made this conflict intractable: the historical fixation of Muslims 7<sup>th</sup> Century Arabia, and the feelings of victimhood and humiliation as a result of colonialism and imperialism. The solution requires transforming the ideals about these historical conditions in order to change the conflict. Principal among these include:

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<sup>90</sup> Christmann, *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 469.

<sup>91</sup> 5:55: "Your (real friends are (no less then) God, His Apostle, and the (fellowship of) believer. Those who establish regular prayers and regular charity, and they bow down humbly (in worship)".

<sup>92</sup> Christmann, *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason*, p. 475.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 478-79.

- a) The sense of failure among Muslims to respond to the challenges of modernity, industrialisation and globalisation, which is leading them to revert to the idea of the Golden Age,
- b) The mindset of the West towards Muslims, and
- c) The alleged stagnation of Islamic principles and precepts encapsulated to meet changing requirements.

In essence, the concept of conflict transformation in Islam is in *Qur'an* 57:25 which covers the major aspects of transforming the present state of the Muslim community:

We sent aforetime our messengers with clear Signs and sent down with them the Book and the Balance (of Right and Wrong), that people may stand forth in justice and fairness; and we sent down Iron, in which is (material for) mighty war, as well as many benefits for mankind, that God may test who it is that will help, Unseen, Him and His apostles: for God is full of strength, Exalted in Might (57:25).

Ibn Kathir<sup>94</sup> observes that balance (*Mizan*) in this verse means justice and fairness. He points out: "This *Ayah* (verse) refers to the truth that is attested to by the sound, straight minds, that oppose misguided opinions and ideas",<sup>95</sup> and says "Who will help him (his religion) as *Fitrah* or religion of Islam?" He defines iron as a 'deterrent' for those who refuse the truth and oppose it after the proof has been established against them.<sup>96</sup>

The following are the main principles derived from this verse.

- a) Mutual respect, which lays a strong basis for interfaith dialogue.
- b) Recognition and acceptance of all messengers who deliver the divine message.
- c) Recognition that not just the *Qur'an* but all revealed scriptures are authentic. 'The Book' here means the original text which has been preserved by Allah, and all scripture are its parts, with the *Qur'an* completing the revelation of scriptures.
- d) Balance: a way of judging right from wrong for establishing equity and social justice.

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<sup>94</sup> Ismail Ibn Kathir was a Muslim jurist, Muhadith and historian in 14<sup>th</sup> Century.

<sup>95</sup> Ismail Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*, ed. Shaykh Safiur Rehman Al Mubarakpuri, vol. 9 (Riyad: Maktaba Darussalam, 2003), p. 498.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, p. 499.

- e) Iron: the use of iron in war is deemed beneficial as a deterrent to establish truth and end oppression, together with its benefits for development and progress. This means that Islam encourages the development of technology that can be used for deterrent purposes, as a sign of preparedness and for helping the oppressed against aggression and those who have been expelled.

The application of all these principles leads to mutual respect, interfaith understanding, equity and justice, an end to structural violence and military preparedness acts as deterrence.

Based on these broad principles of transformation, the pathway to peace and transformation in Islam is based on these strategies:

1. *Iqra*(to read): *Jihad bil Qalm* and *Dawah* (inter- and intra-faith and dialogue), struggle through writing, speech and education. As the epistemological imperialism during colonial era and the education system during the Afghan war (1979-89) were primarily responsible for inducing conflict generating tendencies, and militant Jihadism, this aspect is very important to start the transformation at the grassroots levels.
2. Positive action<sup>97</sup> thought and intentions: Positive action should target:
  - The rejection of *takfeer*.
  - The negativity attached to action against grievance, victimhood, humiliation.
  - Violence is not the solution to any or all problems.
  - Social justice.
  - *Khayr/Munkar* (encourages good and forbid evil): societal participation.
  - *Jihad* as a constructive resistance.

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<sup>97</sup> This concept of positive action was Said Nursi's major contribution; his philosophy of '*Musbat Hareket*' was based on his principles of non-violence. He considered spiritual *Jihad* as the *Jihad* of contemporary times, which involved "preventive action through communication and open dialogue". His philosophy of positive action was a new way of non-violence that does not include hunger strikes, sit-ins, blockades and similar forms of non-violent resistance. His methods included taming anger and revenge, helping others and responding to intolerance through love. His entire life was based on the Quranic verse 4:128 - "peace is better".

3. The actions based on *Ihsan* (common good): to complete the cycle of *Islam*, *Iman* through *Irfan* (knowledge).
4. Social and political empowerment, which also includes gender aspects in the wake of asymmetrical conflict to break the circle of structural violence.
5. Victimhood and humiliation: telling the world of the difference between the values and actions of the West to create an awareness of its lost heritage.
6. Bringing the war out of the cosmic circle of good and evil and religiously inspiring a way of pleasing God.

## 7.8 Conclusion

The Islamic concept of conflict transformation is based on an idealist and realist framework. This offers maximum advantage for conflicting parties to achieve transformation as a long-term process within the framework of Islam, cultural approaches and third party mediation. This concept suggests the constructive use of Islamic values for the transformation process, which is an ongoing process. Based on the issues identified, this chapter questioned violence, *Jihad* and identity issues in Islam through an Islamic spiral that uses humanity as the core unit of ethical-universalism.

The development of the concept of transformation at the personal, societal and universal level is imperative in order to bring a positive change in Muslim society. At present, Muslim societies are witnessing issues such as suicide bombing targeting Muslims, blasphemy charges and the killing of non-Muslims, eruption of violence in the wake of issues such as cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, movies e.g. *Submission* and *Fitna*, and burning of the *Qur'an*. Moreover, in the wake of the Western invasion of Muslim countries in the post-9/11 era, the major victims of the violence and invasions have been Muslims themselves, both from the Western onslaught and from Islamist Jihadist violence. The deconstruction of *Jihad*, *Qital* and *Shaheed* opens a way to a new understanding, which needs to be brought out in the transformation process.

The construction of Jihadi culture during the Soviet-Afghan War has transformed Islamism to militant Jihadism, with long-term repercussions, such as the 9/11 attacks. A transformative approach to deconstruct all these elements has the potential to reverse the

cycle of violence in the name of peace. The transformation of the concept of *Jihad* from militant to constructive resistance provides an opportunity for Muslims to adopt a middle approach between militancy, nonviolence and pacifism. This will allow Muslims to stand for and defend all those who are oppressed, expelled from their homeland, and/or are victims of injustice and oppression in the world.

Although the definitions of oppression and victimhood will be contested, the transformation of the culture of violence in Muslim societies will pave the way for applying justice and fairness to the initiation of action. Together with this, the Islamic spiral of *al Islam*, *al Iman* and *al Ihsan* allows transformation to be pursued at different levels based on justice, equity and peace, while *Sirat-e-Mustaqeem* and *Talif-ul Qulub* give an opportunity to implement the values of reconciliation, forgiveness and truth in society for building structures of peace instead of engaging in violence and militancy. This concept of transformation addresses the issue of violence and brings positive values to and action within Muslim societies as a counter to these Western discourses and policy choices that inspired Muslim militancy and Jihadism. The next chapter will build on this concept and develop a framework for transformation and peacebuilding for the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

# FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE PATHWAYS AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION FOR THE CONFLICT IN FATA<sup>1</sup>

*And those who perform Jihad for Us, We shall certainly guide them in our ways (Subulna), and God is surely with the doers of good (Quran: 29:69).*

*The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the human and cultural resources from within a given setting. The setting and the people cannot be seen as the problem and the outsider as the answer. Rather, the long term goal of transformation demands that external agents of change take as the primary task of accompaniment the validation of the people and the expansion of resources within the setting (John P. Lederach).<sup>2</sup>*

### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter develops the framework of peace pathways and conflict transformation for conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. It draws on the Islamic concept of conflict transformation developed in the previous chapter and adds a further cultural dimension to it. This chapter argues that, in most cases, frameworks for the transformation of conflict involve in-depth analysis of the conflict and the reasons for its intractability. Once that is established, a framework for peacebuilding and transformation can be developed that takes into account not only socio-political and economic needs and interests, but also addresses the root cause (or causes) of the conflict. The root causes of this conflict are embedded in historical, religious-cultural,

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<sup>1</sup> This chapter is the extended version of my published paper: Saira Bano Orakzai, "Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peace Building Theory -Practice Application," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 6, no. 1 (2011).

<sup>2</sup> John Paul Lederach and R. Scott Appleby, "Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview," In *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, eds. Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 28.

socio-economic, and structural issues. This chapter will address these causes. One important question that this chapter tries to answer is; the nature of transformation sought, by whom and for whom it is sought.

The first part of the chapter examines the concept of 'peace pathways', the role of religion and the intractability of conflict, which place the issues to be addressed into proper perspective. The second part examines the current trends in peacebuilding and the need to develop an indigenous approach for the case under study. The third part of the chapter formulates the framework for 'peace pathways' based on a religious-cultural approach. The chapter argues that specific strategies need to be designed for conflicts, which are suitable for controlling and transforming their intractability.

The analysis described in this chapter will provide a foundation for the development of processes in similarly fragile settings. The proposed framework will enable the actors to adopt policies that will ensure a conflict-sensitive approach so that it does not lead to future conflict, but rather to peace and development.

## **8.2 Peace Pathways: The Role of Religion and Intractability of Conflict**

Based on an in-depth conflict analysis, the intractability of conflict and the inapplicability of peacebuilding ventures inherent in Western liberal peace approaches for this particular conflict, this section suggests 'peace pathways' rather than 'peacebuilding' as a process for the transformation of conflict in FATA. It also provides a framework and recommendations for its implementation based on the analysis in the preceding chapters as well as my own knowledge and experience as both an insider and outsider (as the author herself belongs to the conflict zone of the tribal areas).

The 'peace pathway' (*Subal al Salaam*) is based on the Qur'anic concept of '*Sirat-e-Mustaqeem*', which is a straight path. This concept was discussed in Chapter Six as transformation through perseverance. It offers a model of a path to peace and transformation of conflicts by using the resources that are already present in the memory bank of a culture or society through constant individual and collective efforts. This concept of 'pathway', 'road', or simply a 'way' is derived from the *Qur'an's* overall

understanding of Islam as a way of achieving peace, which becomes a 'way of life': '*Din*' as a way of life, '*Shariah*' as a path to be followed for governing life, and '*Salaam*' as a way of peace. A peace pathway is the way of organising life, which is considered in Islam to be inherent in human *Fitrah* (nature) as an inclination towards peace.

This 'way of peace' within humans and society connects them to the inner, outer and universal ways of peace. Unlike peacebuilding, it does not involve the 'building' of an infrastructure of peace by an outsider or borrowing from other cultural settings, but rather develops human personality and society on the existing pathways in order to transform the factors responsible for violence. It follows a gradual process and a long-term view of transforming society that is based on the concept of '*Sayrura*', or 'becoming', one form from another. Muhammad Shahrur has explained a straight path as '*Istaqama*', which is a representation of the internal dialectical nature of human life based on the acquisition of new knowledge that leads to changes in social and political conditions, while at the same time introducing new legislation or interpretation as a "proactive response to these changes and development."<sup>3</sup>

The inclusion of a religious approach for developing this framework is imperative for terminating conflict in the tribal areas because the foundational and core narrative of the conflict rests on West-Islam discourse and encounters. Gerard F. Powers argue that the role of religion in a conflict situation serves two purposes: to promote religious militancy or to play a positive role in peacemaking and peacebuilding.<sup>4</sup> This is true for the tribal areas, as the militancy is informed by interpretations of religious texts, and the same texts can play an important role in conflict transformation. Powers further states that there are three critical dimensions of religious peacebuilding: the inherent public nature, the relationship of nonviolence to war and peacebuilding, and the role of inter-religious peacebuilding.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Andreas Christmann, ed. *The Qur'an, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur*, vol. 106, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Leiden, Boston: BRILL, 2009), p.180.

<sup>4</sup> Gerard F. Powers, "Religion and Peacebuilding," In *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, eds. Daniel Philpott and Gerard F. Powers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) , p. 318

<sup>5</sup> Powers, "Religion and Peacebuilding," p.318.



Powers observes that the challenge concerning the role of religion in conflict is not about religion *per se*, but rather religious extremism. He suggests that the Western secularist paradigm “as a solution to religious extremism can have the unintended effect of feeding extremism by further threatening traditional sources of personal, cultural, and religious identity.”<sup>6</sup> Powers states that from a sociological point of view, this division of extremist and non-extremist is problematic, but from a peacebuilding perspective, it is crucial for distinguishing between them due to its impact on peacebuilding ventures.<sup>7</sup>

This point is relevant for the FATA conflict, as the Western-infused peacebuilding ventures for dealing with religious extremism are proving to be futile. An important aspect of religious actors and institutions in peacebuilding is their transnational reach, which can play a decisive role in long-term peacebuilding efforts, although the same transnational aspect can be important for conflict intractability, which is also critical for the religious dimension of the conflict.

Intractability is a particular kind of social conflict that is protracted and destructive, and attempts for solution and transformation of such conflicts have not been successful in most cases. Kriesberg’s observation about this kind of conflict fits well with the conflict in the tribal areas:

Leaders of one side in a fight may evoke old battles with the adversary and try to characterise a new fight as part of a long-standing, perhaps decades- or centuries-old intractable conflict.<sup>8</sup>

This explains the connection of the present conflict in the tribal areas with the history of West-Islam relations, the Western discourse concerning them and the use of conflict-generating narratives and images by al Qaeda-Taliban. This has given specific historical-religious intractability to this conflict, as examined in Chapters Four and Five, which brought to the forefront theological problems, apocalyptic visions of the future, military threats and Orientalism, all of which impacted on different trends within political Islam.

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<sup>6</sup> Powers, "Religion and Peacebuilding," p. 321.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 322.

<sup>8</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability," In *Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Causes of Intractable Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), p. 67.

Fundamentally, the efforts to end this conflict have been made only through military operations and war, which have not allowed any intervener to transform this conflict.

To develop this framework, the intractability of conflict in the tribal areas will be examined. Louis Kriesburg defines six phases of intractability, phases that are informed by a dimensional analysis of the conflict as examined in Chapters Four and Five. These phases are: the eruption of conflict with the potential of generating intractability; the escalation of conflict with destructive patterns; the failure of all peacemaking efforts to reduce or transform intractability; internalisation and institutionalisation of destructive conflicts; the patterns of de-escalation that lead to transformation, and termination and recovery from the intractable nature of the conflict.<sup>9</sup>


The eruption phase of the conflict in the tribal areas emerged with the attacks by al Qaeda operatives on 11 September, 2001. The eruption of this conflict and the subsequent reaction of the U.S. and its allies aroused memories of past traumas suffered by Muslims in different parts of the world, with legacies of fear, hatred, longstanding grievances, oppression and injustice. This also had an effect on the choice of method adopted for resistance by local people to tackle this conflict. The creation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2007 using violent methods, such as suicide bombing, terrorism, bombs, and brutal methods of killing people, epitomises this trend.

The escalation phase of the conflict started with the formation of TTP, which created a destructive pattern of the conflict. This had an impact on identity formation, which was shaped in opposition to the enemy. It generated new grievances, goals, and methods that differed from the eruption phase, as fighting itself creates new grievances and goals due to the level of injuries inflicted on the combatants. This also brought old injustices and dissatisfaction with the government of Pakistan to the fore.

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<sup>9</sup> Kriesberg, "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability," p. 68.

**Figure 8: Phases of Intractability**



The failure of a peacemaking effort phase has important implications on the intervention and transformation of the conflict. There have been numerous efforts for peace agreements between the TTP and the government of Pakistan. However, because these efforts were mainly focused on ending the violence and hostilities and not on the transformation of conflict, it did not produce the desired result.

Another phase that increases intractability is the internalisation and institutionalisation of conflict, which increases the degree of its protraction. Kriesberg defines internalisation as:

[m]any processes contribute to its [conflicts] institutionalisation and self perpetuation. ... In addition to internalising attitude and beliefs about each other, people on each side develop guiding rules about how to wage their struggle. The rules make certain means of struggle legitimate. ... [a]s the fight persists, some people develop vested interests in continuing the struggle.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Kriesberg, "Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability," p. 74.

The internalisation of the conflict attitude and belief of enemy brutality enacted in the form of persistent drone attacks by Americans on tribal areas, the ordeal that prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Baghram and other prisons experienced, and killings through military operations by Pakistan. This triggered memories of a long period of victimhood and humiliation of Muslims under Western control. The impact of the cartoon controversy, the burning of the *Qur'an*, the statement by Pope Benedict, and movies such as 'Fitna', 'Submission', and 'Innocence of Muslims' denigrating the Prophet Muhammad and generating feelings of blasphemy, have been selectively used to induce violence.

The institutionalisation of the conflict occurred as a result of the dismantling of the existing institutions present in the tribal areas, the chief among them being the *Jirga* system, the power hierarchy, and the absence of institutional structure similar to the rest of Pakistan. The conflict has given the leadership of TTP added power prestige and income, together with the development of a war economy through smuggling and the drug trade in order to sustain militant activities.

This conflict is still in the internalisation phase, although there is a possibility of its termination as a result of the proposed withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014. Although this step may terminate the violence and the destructive aspects of the conflict, there is still a need to adopt a transformation approach as long as the internalisation of the conflict persists and grievances related to the meta-narratives of al Qaeda continue to be framed in FATA. This requires a religious-cultural approach to deal with the conflict, but also changes in the structures of those relationships which are at the core of this conflict.

### **8.3 Trends in Peacebuilding and the Need for a Cultural-Religious Approach of 'Peace Pathways'**

Many peacebuilding theories assume that people in a given society should value diversity and be tolerant of differences, whether these are based on religion, ethnicity or race. Galtung's concept of negative and positive peace, as applied to peacebuilding, defines termination of conflict as 'negative peace' and post-conflict peacebuilding

ventures as 'positive peace'. He defines this as building 'structural peace' and 'cultural peace', as opposed to 'structural violence' and 'cultural violence'.<sup>11</sup>

Most peacebuilding strategies that include nonviolent mobilisation methods, conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation aim for constructive social change by considering the needs and interests of individuals and communities. They also stress the need to address structural issues and long-term relationships that are at the root of the problems between conflicting parties, as a way of overcoming the structural, relational, and cultural contradictions.<sup>12</sup>

Lederach maintains that violent conflicts are mostly followed by negotiation, and violence in a cyclical process, which leads to a humanitarian crisis that obscures the long-term view of conflict while focusing solely on complex disaster management processes.<sup>13</sup> This cyclical process (and humanitarian crises) often forecloses efforts to sustain the peace process between the conflicting parties. Therefore, instead of this method of peacebuilding, which he believes to be ineffective, Lederach supports a framework that not only includes complex disaster management, but also has a transformative peacebuilding model that focuses on building sustainable relationships.<sup>14</sup>

Lederach suggests three levels of responses to conflict structures: a short-term response for crisis prevention and complex disaster management; a long range response for 'visioning the common future'; and a middle range response for connecting short-term and long-term responses when designing social change processes of intervention.<sup>15</sup>

Lederach observes:

'Structures' suggest the need to think *comprehensively* about the affected population and systematically about the issue. The "Process" underscores the necessity of thinking creatively about the *progression* of conflict and

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<sup>11</sup> Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage, 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugu Miall, eds. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), pp. 74-5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

*sustainability* of its transformation by *linking* roles, functions, and activities in an integrated manner. Together, the two sets of lenses suggest an integrated approach to peacebuilding.<sup>16</sup>

While defining strategic peacebuilding, Lederach states:

At its core, peacebuilding nurtures constructive human relationships. To be relevant, it must do it strategically, at every level of society and across the potentially polarizing lines of ethnicity, class, religion, and race.<sup>17</sup>

He further says,

Our definition therefore includes a prescriptive dimension; we believe that the greater potential can be realised by envisioning peacebuilding as a holistic enterprise, a comprehensive and coherent set of actions and operations, that can be improved by greater levels of collaboration, complementarity, coordination and, where possible, integration across all levels of society.<sup>18</sup>

Lederach contends that traditional peacebuilding uses the nation state as its basic unit of analysis and focuses on root causes and structural changes, while strategic peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era assumes the presence of multiple actors and multiple intervention methods for sustainable peace. He points out that a transformative process focused on social justice, ending violent conflict, and creating cooperative relationships is a complex process. Lederach's approach is based on integrating multiple dimensions and time-frames for peacebuilding and transformation.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, Abu-Nimer suggests that the adoption of the structural transformation of Islam as a religion brought about transformation and change to pre-Islamic civilizations.<sup>20</sup> He believes that a peacebuilding initiative, while taking indigenous approaches into account, can lead to the preservation of a community's structure and identity. This kind of social change through structural transformation requires planning, implementation, and follow-up stages based on collective and collaborative efforts. The main aim is to address the needs and interests of the parties for

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<sup>16</sup> Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, p. 79.

<sup>17</sup> Lederach and Appleby, "Strategic Peacebuilding: An Overview," p. 22.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 24.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pp. 26-27.

<sup>20</sup> Mohammad Abu Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

building future bonds and relationships, which will result in agreements for peace between the parties.

Abu-Nimer further suggests that the application of peacebuilding approaches should not only include approaches developed by Western theory, but should also involve indigenous approaches.<sup>21</sup> To achieve this goal, he suggests an Islamic peacebuilding approach based on structural transformation, using Islamic values and principles for the development of a framework for Muslim societies that utilises their own cultural/religious resources. Moreover, this approach maintains that the primary motivation for peacebuilding activism in Muslim communities is to change the current reality by fostering socio-economic development and fulfilling basic human needs and rights of groups and individuals (security, self-determination, identity, growth and development, among others). He maintains that the changes need to be facilitated through self-examination and an in-depth critique of internal social and cultural realities of a given society, because peacebuilding strategies presuppose such processes of self-examination and analysis. This will often lead to the realization that an individual has the ability and responsibility to act in his or her own best interests.<sup>22</sup>

Abdul Aziz Sachidena argues that pluralism is one of the more important pillars of peacebuilding in Islam that specifically deals with the question of 'otherness'. He suggests that it is imperative to rediscover the moral concerns towards peacebuilding in Islam based on social justice and pluralistic values.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, Yalmaz and Esposito suggest a vibrant civil society of informed and responsible citizens which can play an important role in the peace-building, pluralism, and the democratic spirit in the society.<sup>24</sup> They argue that instead of promoting militancy and violence, transnational religious and faith-based movements can play an important role in peace-building at the international level.

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<sup>21</sup> Abu Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam*, p. 74.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 113.

<sup>23</sup> Abdul Aziz Sachidena, *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 5-6.

<sup>24</sup> John L Esposito and Ihsan Yilmaz, ed. *Islam and Peacebuilding: Gulen Movement Initiative* (New York: Blue Dome, 2010), pp. 1-7.

One of the problems concerning peacebuilding in FATA is the absence of 'civil society', as understood in the modern nation-state system in the sense of 'informed and responsible citizens'. The society in the tribal areas is a 'traditional' society that has its own values of pluralism, social justice, and individuality. Developing peacebuilding measures for such a society requires 'out of box' strategies based on indigenous religious-cultural resources, but the universal knowledge base of peace-building as a form of knowledge cannot be neglected in this process. Although most of the world's peacebuilding work has occurred in secular, Mennonite, Quaker, Catholic, and Buddhist traditions, the work cannot be discounted as irrelevant to Muslim societies. The interconnection of Abrahamic religions and universal spirituality provides ample grounds for utilising the knowledge base of peacebuilding.

#### **8.4 Peacebuilding and the Need for Indigenous Approaches**

Oliver P. Richmond opines that peacebuilding is torn between two forms of liberalism. The first is based on state security and territorial sovereignty, while the second emphasises human emancipation based on justice and equity.<sup>25</sup> Peacebuilding is mostly concerned with Galtung's concept of positive peace following a bottom-up approach and local consensus.<sup>26</sup> Yet in the post-Cold War era it has become a multidimensional activity aimed at the construction of liberal peace, connecting peacebuilding with statebuilding with or without local consent.<sup>27</sup> This includes the establishment of a vibrant civil society, a human rights regime, democratic and participatory processes, market economy, and good governance, which are basic pillars of liberal peace. According to Richmond, the critics of liberal peace focus on "issues with its universal claims, its cultural assumptions, its top down institutional, neo-liberal and neo-colonial overtones, and its secular and rationalist nature"<sup>28</sup> and call it a hegemonic peace. This is particularly true of peacebuilding projects in Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era.

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<sup>25</sup> Oliver P. Richmond, "A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 15.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p. 21

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26.



On the other hand, while the post-colonial thinking writes off the indigenous form as tribal, clan-based, and primitive that lacks modern functionality and is not 'civilized', the indigenous form of peacebuilding is considered a bottom-up approach that is based on local culture and traditional practices, which are assumed to be peaceful. It is contended that this approach is difficult to adjust to liberal peace values, which are individualist and institution-centric.<sup>29</sup> The post-war reaction to peace-building or state-building in Iraq and Afghanistan by the local population or by 'insurgents', relating to the intervention, and 'emancipation' of society, illustrates this rejection of liberal peace.

Roger MacGinty terms indigenous peacebuilding as 'organic peacebuilding'.<sup>30</sup> There is an important distinction between organic or indigenous peacebuilding and traditional peacebuilding. The former refers to practices based on local custom, while the latter refers to practices that have long been held by the local population.<sup>31</sup> William L. Ury considers the role of the local population in the peacebuilding and transformation process as developing a "social immune system, preventing the spread of the virus of violence."<sup>32</sup> These approaches rest on the moral authority of community figures, have a public, communal element and story-telling, and rely on locally-derived resources having material and symbolic values connecting "cultural memory banks to norms and expectations."<sup>33</sup>

For MacGinty, the drawbacks of some indigenous approaches include being essentially conservative, reinforcing power hierarchies, upholding the legitimacy of existing norms and practices, and excluding some groups.<sup>34</sup> Ury refers to third party actors as 'providers' or 'bridge builders' in the prevention stage, 'mediators' or 'healers' in the

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<sup>29</sup> Andrew J. Williams, "Reconstruction: The Missing Historical Link," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 61; Richmond, "A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory," p. 29.

<sup>30</sup> Roger MacGinty, "Gilding The Lily? International Support for Indigenous and Traditional Peacebuilding," In *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 348.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 349.

<sup>32</sup> William L. Ury, *The Third Side: How We Fight and How We Can Stop* (New York: Penguin, 2000), p. 7.

<sup>33</sup> MacGinty, "Gilding The Lily?," pp. 349-50.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 359.

resolution stage, and 'witnesses' and 'referees' during the peacekeeping stage.<sup>35</sup> In the peace pathways process, the role of the third party can be termed as the 'listener' and 'path finder', who can open the avenues for promoting peace, ending hostilities, acknowledging victimhood and humiliation, and working for socio-economic development and justice. A third party can also play an important role in 'bridging', in the words of Bassam Tibi, as an approach for providing inter-civilisational dialogue to promote harmony at the international level.<sup>36</sup> The use of terms such as 'building', 'infrastructure', 'packages', 'deliverable', 'peace engineer', or 'peace builder' sometimes contradict the perception of peace in local cultures, which consider peace and transformation as a process from inside, rather than from outside builders.

The peacebuilding approaches adopted by Pakistan's government and under the AfPak strategy adopted by the U.S. suffer from the dilemmas discussed above. The FATA Sustainable Development Plan ("SDP") 2007-2015 by the government of Pakistan is important in this regard.<sup>37</sup> It is based on a strategic framework targeting the grassroots level of society in the tribal areas. The framework takes an integrated approach based on the principles of equity and participation. Its main focuses are developmental planning, economic and social development, environmental integrity and poverty alleviation. The period from 2007 to 2015 has been divided into three phases for monitoring, evaluating and implementing the SDP. One of the problems concerning the SDP is defining the issues that require development strategies. The focus has been on the micro level of problems facing FATA, rather than addressing the macro level of problems, which are at the core of the conflict. The SDP is also limited to developmental issues and a major failing is that it is not addressing the religious or political dimensions of the conflict.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, the peacebuilding measures under the AfPak strategy of the U.S. in Pakistan and FATA also seem to be futile as they are not taking into account on-the-ground realities or using a conflict-sensitive approach.

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<sup>35</sup> Ury, *The Third Side*.

<sup>36</sup> Bassam Tibi, *Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Cross Civilizational Bridging* (London: Routledge, 2012).

<sup>37</sup> "FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007-2015," Civil Secretariat FATA, Peshawar. Accessed 3 May, 2010. [http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/Booklet\\_on\\_FATA\\_SDP\\_2006\\_-\\_15.pdf](http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/Booklet_on_FATA_SDP_2006_-_15.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

## 8.5 Framework for Peace Pathways and Transformation

The basic objective of conflict analysis in a peacebuilding framework is to understand the root causes, actors, and dynamics of a conflict. One important aspect of peacebuilding is preventing the recurrence of violence while concomitantly identifying causative factors and helping society prepare to handle such situations in the future. This principle is relevant to the context of FATA. The creation of a framework for peacebuilding requires the use of social analysis tools for an in-depth understanding of the history, politics, economics and social and cultural elements within a particular conflict zone. The components of the framework are as follows.

- *Conduct a conflict and context analysis.* A conflict analysis is an examination of the root causes, proximate causes, triggers, and dynamics of the conflict. The historical, political/judicial, economic and transnational dimensions need to be analysed, with special attention given to the religious and cultural dimensions. This has been aptly covered in the preceding chapters through an historical narrative analysis and the case study of the tribal areas.
- *Analyse the current context in which peace and development issues can be undertaken.* Together with other assessments, this can help to discern the prospects for further interventions, thereby maximising opportunities for peacebuilding. This was done by further examining the nature of intractability of this conflict.
- *Develop a peacebuilding and transformation process.* This process is a multi-stage and multi-domain strategy for intervening in a conflict context with the goal of achieving sustainable peace and development. The suggested process addresses both immediate and long-term preventive measures for social reconstruction and reconciliation.


The process suggests how to achieve political and economic empowerment and justice while incorporating a conflict-sensitive approach and an understanding of the cultural, social and religious contexts. The development and peacebuilding initiatives in the region may include government, international, and local development partners in the governmental and non-governmental sectors, civil society and the local population. The

proposed framework will enable the actors to adopt policies that will ensure a conflict-sensitive approach that does not lead to future conflict, but rather to sustaining peace and development.

### 8.6 Pathways for Transformation

The situation in FATA requires developing approaches based on the concept of ‘peace pathways’, which also takes into account the indigenous code of culture of *Pakhtunwali*. The process includes a time frame for short-term and long-term goals in FATA. Based on the conflict analysis and phases of intractability as well as my own knowledge and experience as both an insider and outsider, this section suggests a process and includes recommendations for its implementation. This section is divided into three parts: firstly addressing religious, theological and historical issues; secondly socio-political, economic and cultural issues, and lastly, the roles of different actors in the process. Figure 9 shows the process of ‘peace pathways’ which will be explained in detail in the following section.

**Figure 9: Framework for Peace Pathways and Transformation**



### 8.6.1 Addressing Religious/Theological Aspects of the Conflict.

The section utilises the Islamic concept of conflict transformation as developed in Chapter Seven for religious and theological aspects of the conflict.

- a) *Iqra (to read) and Balagh (to spread)*: Education and training programmes in conflict transformation and peacebuilding process. This is one of the most important aspects of transformation in FATA. The *Madrassah* education system based on the Deobandi/Wahabi school of thought, and the low literacy rate of 17.42%, have greatly hampered the development of education system. In 1980 and again in the 1990s, the emphasis on a particular form of religious education based on Deobandi-Salafi doctrines created a movement that has damaged the entire fabric of the tribal society. It is imperative now to revamp that system of education and carefully to establish a new system.

This new system of education should not be exclusively based on Western ideas or traditional Islam, but rather needs to be a fusion of new interpretations of Islamic concepts and precepts within the framework of Islamic education. This is particularly important, considering the sensitivity of the people and their aversion towards much that is 'Western'. According to Prof. Bhaedin Bakri, the *Qur'an* says we created humans based on two principles (*Izwaj*: pair) which cannot live without one another; it not a fight between two classes like in the Marxist ideology. This is a human concept, not an opposite like Communism or Marxism. He calls for establishing peace in the sense of unity of philosophy of *Izwaj*, and come out of the closed mindset of classical or traditional religion and interpretations. Bakri points that it is important to read, interpret and teach the *Qur'an* according to 21st Century reality as it is only mind or conscience which frees mankind from illusions.<sup>39</sup>

- b) *Transformation of Jihad as Constructive Resistance*:

The concept of constructive resistance is used to deal with the question of victimhood, humiliation and emotional injury. This study suggests that the

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<sup>39</sup> Interview: Prof. Bhaedin Bakri, Chairman Green Party and Member of Moral Re-Armament Program, Cairo, Egypt: 20 June, 2010.

concept of Islamic conflict transformation is based on the use of *Jihad* as a constructive resistance tool rather than for violent purpose. Prof. Nadia Mustafa called for a 'civilizational resistance' by education, change of perspective, and by behavior."<sup>40</sup> The concept can be applied to this conflict as well and involves focusing on redefining concepts of *Jihad*, *Mujahid*, and *Shaheed* to differentiate between violence and the constructive resistance for maintaining peace. *Jihad* should be understood through the *Qur'an* as a positive struggle between two opposite camps, and the purpose should be to end *Fitna*, *Fasad*, and *Shiqaaq* within the community. *Jihad* needs to be understood as struggling for and on the path to the preservation of peace.

The *Jihad* as a way of peace is guided by the principles of *Islam*, *Iman*, and *Ihsan*; it encapsulates all these at the universal, societal, and individual levels. It is important to educate the people indulging in militancy and terrorism in FATA to understand the concept of *Jihad* not as an offensive or defensive military struggle, but rather as ending *Fitna* and *Fasad*, or mischief and discord within society. It is the concept of *Jihad* as a military struggle that was used as a policy tool by the West during the Afghan *Jihad* in 1979. Based on the classical understanding of *Jihad* in Islam, this version of *Jihad* was changed into terrorism and militancy and applied particularly in 9/11. It is therefore imperative to transform this concept through the education system.

c) *Combining Jihad with the Concept of Sabr (Patience):*

This is needed for a better understanding of *Mujahideen* (active strivers) and *Sabirin* (quiet forbearers) and to give them equal importance. The thirteen years of Prophet Muhammad's struggle against the pagans of Mecca underscores the importance of patience and perseverance. It lays the basis for the emergence of Islam as a major religion in Arabia and for opening up the pre-Islamic Arabian society to the virtues of peace and Islam. This is clearly evident in defining victory as the 'opening' [al *Fateh*: an opening] in the *Qur'an* (Chapter 48) which

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<sup>40</sup> Interview: Prof. Nadia Mustafa, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Cairo University and Dialogue Among Civilization, Cairo University, 18 April, 2010.

underscores the use of hegemonic discourse of victory and defeat. The 'opening' or victory at Mecca by the Muslims was not due to violence or the use of military force, but rather to forgiveness, mercy and patience. The discourse of 'victory-defeat' of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. by al Qaeda and TTP can be addressed through changing the discourse of 'victory' towards one of 'opening'. This will be enshrined in the values of peace, forgiveness, mercy, and patience, as depicted by the Prophet's 'victory' in Mecca, which is referred to as 'al Fateh' or 'an opening' in the *Qur'an*.

d) *Taleef al Qulub* and *Sakina*

One of the issues concerning the adoption of brutal methods of killing and suicide bombing by militants in FATA is the lack of recognition of the victimhood, humiliation, and emotional scars suffered by the people of FATA since 9/11. The military operation, drone attacks, missing persons, killings and displacements are the issues that require greater reconciliation efforts. This is evident from the commentary in the video of the Taliban severing the heads of kidnapped Pakistani soldiers. The Taliban provided the following explanation of their actions:

... because of them [military] our mosques were ruined, our *Madrasahs* destroyed, our women were dishonoured, our children were martyred, children and elders were dishonoured: it was an injustice done to us, because of all these reasons we took revenge and also for the establishment of the law and system of Allah.<sup>41</sup>

In order to address and tackle this issue, the concept of *Taleef al Qulub* (joining of hearts) and *Sakina* (tranquility) can be applied to reconcile people and provide 'recognition' of the injustices done to the people of FATA. This can be achieved through holding *Taleef* (joining, togetherness) *Jirgas* in the tribal areas to listen to and understand their stories of humiliation, victimhood and injustices. The final act of the reconciliation process is '*Sulh*' (settlement), which is accomplished for achieving common good, or *Musalaha*, to start a new beginning and achieve long-term transformation.

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<sup>41</sup> "Tehreek-e Taliban Severed Heads Video," Video released August 2012. Accessed 4 September, 2012. <http://mrctv.org/videos/tehreek-e-taliban-severed-heads-video>

e) *Historical Dialogue in a Peacebuilding Framework* is to understand the root causes, actors, and dynamics of a conflict and to suggest tools for engaging parties to develop and sustain the transformation through dialogue processes. This framework suggests the use of a historical dialogue process for the conflict in FATA. This historical dialogue is to be addressed at two levels. Firstly, at the local level, FATA has experienced discrimination since the creation of Pakistan, and from the misuse of history and culture to keep tribal society underdeveloped. It involves analysing official and competing narratives about militancy and violence in the area.

Secondly, a historical dialogue framework will address the connection between militancy and historical encounters between West and Islam, and socio-economic conditions which made this region a centre of militancy and extremism using Islam as its basis. *The sub-system strategy* proposed by Lederach could open new avenues for peace by “linking immediate issues within the setting to the broader systemic dynamics within which the particular conflict unfolds.”<sup>42</sup> Because violence in the FATA conflict emerged in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the ‘war against terror’, it is important to consider these points as peacebuilding strategies are developed. Peacebuilders need to hold strategic dialogues on West-Islam relations while emphasising reconciliation and peace. Dr Cornelis Hulsman contends that there are ‘positive memories’ and ‘negative memories’ concerning West-Islam relations. The need is to emphasize positive memories for reconciliation process to succeed.<sup>43</sup> This should be done by holding group meetings with youth and religious leaders to discuss the positive aspects, based on the historical relations between the two civilizations, as a way of dispelling negativity and misperceptions.

In this regard, Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s nonviolent approach focusing on forgiveness can play an effective role; as a *Pakhtun* himself, his espousal of forgiveness instead of revenge symbolically offers a significant contribution to the dialogue. Abaas Zouache suggested a ‘Dialogue for Life’ to get to know each

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<sup>42</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, p. 151.

<sup>43</sup> Interview: Dr Cornelis Hulsman, Director Arab-West Report, Cairo, Egypt. 15 July, 2010.



other and to get rid of stereotypes as we all are humans and creations of God. But we are different also. Difference does not mean to be antagonistic or developing hatred. It means searching for common grounds which are very large and which should be utilised with mutual respect.<sup>44</sup> He also called for the publication of history books written by Eastern (Pakistanis, Afghans, Iraqis, Egyptians, Arabs and so on) and Western scholars to present each side and every trend and to exchange views, to work together, as it allows and enables those dialogues to relativise which depends on memories: each society has its own memories.<sup>45</sup>

### 8.6.2 Addressing the Political, Socio-Economic and Cultural issues:

This section focuses on *Pakhtunwali* and Ghaffar Khan's philosophy of self-restraint and nonviolence for transformation of the conflict.

- a) *Ceasefire and Cessation of Violence*: This involves first limiting the destructiveness of the conflict by arranging a ceasefire and cessation of violence, which is related to assessment of the issues that led to loss of human life, displacement, terrorist activities and killing of tribal leaders and people opposing the Taliban. As Nagia Abdelmoghney Said commented that “we need to appreciate the value of ‘life gold’ instead of black or white gold and save human being from being wasted in wars and violence.” She suggested the launching ‘Operation Desert Spring’ instead military operation, which should be centred on values of human liberation, conscience and freedom.<sup>46</sup>
- b) *Ghaffar Khan’s Philosophy of Self-restraint*. Although the Ghaffar Khan philosophy calls for self-restraint and nonviolence, I recommend the use only of self-restraint, which is a positive action or *Musbat harakat*<sup>47</sup> and focuses on constructing a society

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<sup>44</sup> Interview: Abbas Zouache, Historian, War and Peace in Middle East, French Institute Cairo, Egypt. 20 July, 2010

<sup>45</sup> Interview: Abbas Zouache.

<sup>46</sup> Interview: Nagia Abdelmoghney Said, Moral Rearmament Program, Cairo, Egypt. 23 June, 2012.

<sup>47</sup> This concept of positive action was Said Nursi’s major contribution; his philosophy of ‘*Musbat Hareket*’ was based on his principles of non-violence. He considered spiritual *Jihad* as the *Jihad* of contemporary times, which involved “preventive action through communication and open dialogue”. His philosophy of positive action was a new way of non-violence that does not include hunger strikes, sit-ins, blockades and similar forms of non-violent resistance. His methods included taming anger and revenge, helping others

with a positive attitude. Because this framework is also for policymakers who are involved with the government itself, any recommendation of nonviolence would not be acceptable. Positive action can be used when dealing with West-Islam discourses. Instead of focusing on conflicting encounters, it is important to consider the West-Islam encounters in a positive way. Although Funk and Said called for developing a story of complementarities, this thesis takes the view that both negative and positive elements in the encounters need to be considered in order to understand the root causes of recurrent conflict.

- c) *The Use of a Nonviolent 'Army' Instead of Lashkars (militant tribal group) to Deal with the Taliban in FATA.* Ghaffar Khan introduced the concept of a nonviolent army (*Khudai Khidmatgar*) in his philosophy. He gave this a practical shape by actually forming a nonviolent army that voluntarily worked in society by cleaning activities, educating and dispensing positive virtues and peace messages of Islam. He formed his nonviolent army to oppose British colonialism. Instead of forming tribal *Lashkars* to confront the Taliban in the FATA region, it is important to form a volunteer nonviolent army of youth as Khan did in his movement. This will serve two purposes. First, it will provide an alternative of positive activity for the youth who are facing unemployment, drug addiction, terrorism and other problems. Secondly, it will be helpful for social reform and training in peaceful methods. As Ghaffar Khan called for greater literacy among *Pakhtuns* and formed schools and education institutions, this movement will bring the youth closer to religion and the concepts that support peace, harmony, development and prosperity.
- d) *Reforming the Cultural Code: Pakhtunwali.* Although Ghaffar Khan was a *Pakhtun* and believed in its code of honour, he made subtle efforts to change it by reshuffling the order of priority in the cultural code. Traditionally, it is the *Pakhtunwali* that takes precedence, because *Pakhtuns* believe that this code of culture was present even before the arrival of Islam in the region. The Taliban has also used this strategy, but to promote violence. The aim here is to emphasize the values of peace and conflict transformation. This includes the cycle of *al Islam, al*

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and responding to intolerance through love. His entire life was based on the *Qur'an*: verse 4:128 - "peace is better."

*Iman* and *al Ihsan*, to foster transformation at the universal, societal and personal levels. In addition, the values embedded in the principle of *Sirat-e-Mustaqeem* should be inculcated for mutual respect, justice, peace and respect as values within Islam, including those in the *Qur'an* and the traditions of the Prophet. Consequently, it will be helpful in rejecting the edict of *takfir* by the Taliban to influence the elders and youth who oppose them. Ghaffar Khan's approach of self-restraint against anger and utilising the values of forgiveness, hospitality and honour offer a workable way of achieving this. It will also help dissociating Islam from the concepts of revenge and killing.

- e) *Need for Reform*: The introduction of a broad range of socio-economic and political reforms in FATA and inclusion into the State of Pakistan as an active actor, as well as paying more attention to development, education and employment issues, is needed. This also includes the following: increasing the federal budget for this purpose and the proper use of funds based on an approach that does not offend local sensitivities. Repealing the Frontier Crime Regulation Act and ending FATA's exclusive character by fully integrating it into Pakistan. Extending the judicial system in FATA would end the monopoly of political agents and tribal elders over the decisions of *Jirga*. Dr Said Kadri suggested building a counter force, a counter way of thinking; of cooperation not confrontation, to have heroes of peace, not heroes of war. He points out that people never feel proud of peace; rather, they are proud of victories. He suggests the need to inculcate a culture or change of mindset which makes Muslims proud of peace and development.<sup>48</sup>
- f) *Approach to Transform the Stereotyping of Muslims and Pakhtuns*: Stereotyping of Muslims and *Pakhtuns* has generated misperceptions and conflict-generating tendencies. Ghaffar Khan's approach to self-restraint as a form of nonviolence targeted this aspect effectively. During the struggle against British colonialism, he realised that *Pakhtuns* were behaving in a way that had been stereotyped. The aim and purpose of his movement was to resist these stereotypes. He brought humility, conflict resolution against pride and feud, self-reform and indigenous

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<sup>48</sup> Interview: Dr Mohammad Said Kadri, Al Ahram Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt. 20 April, 2010.

and self-reliant institutions against 'un-governability'. The adoption of this approach not only by *Pakhtuns*, but also by Muslims at large, will dispel the stereotypes to which they have been subjected. The approach will repeat the way nonviolence and self-restraint surprised and discomfited the British, who were persuaded to react differently. Therefore, this approach has the potential to surprise the West and to encourage a change of policy.

- g) *The Role of the International Community*: It is also the responsibility of the international community to play an active part in ending the conflict that has been prevalent in the area since 9/11. The drone attacks, whose extent is seldom reported, currently fuel negative feelings and instill support for militant retaliation. This is where the international community can help transform this conflict.

### **8.6.3 Addressing Different Levels of Actors in the Tribal Areas**

This section explains the role of different levels of actors who have the potential to transform this conflict.

- a) *Middle-Range Actors* must be central to building infrastructures for 'peace pathways.' These should include ethnic and religious leaders, academics/intellectuals and humanitarian leaders and most of all ordinary people of the area. In the FATA conflict, religious and humanitarian nongovernmental organisations' (NGOs) leaders are in competition with each other due to their different approaches to peace and development in the region. Religious leaders stress Islamic law and cultural/religious approaches to guide strategies, whereas NGO leaders call for education, the empowerment of women and economic development. It is important to have local leaders of NGOs trained with knowledge of FATA culture and a more sensitive approach to local people. Inviting them to the *Jirgas* on the basis of *Pakhtunwali* approach, based on '*melmastia*' or 'hospitality', would help pave way for listening to and respecting different views.

- b) *Issue of Governance*. One of the more important issues within the conflict in FATA is that of governance. As Lederach observes, “Conflict is also fuelled by governance issues”.<sup>49</sup> The lack of judicial reforms and development opportunities has contributed to this conflict. The region needs relief for displaced persons (who, the government claims, have been resettled), development opportunities, employment, and facilities for learning different vocations. The *Jirga* system also needs to be transformed from a decision-making institution to a social forum for interaction and reconciliation that is free from political and religious exploitation by both government and religious leaders. Abu Nimer suggested that it would help if issues of governance, development and peacebuilding could be addressed in the light of indigenous approaches to peace and values enshrined in Islam and dealing with structural issues.<sup>50</sup> This includes the pursuit of justice, social empowerment, recognition of the sanctity of human life, collaborative action and solidarity, and inclusive and participatory processes.
- c) *The Issue of Female Education and Employment Opportunities for Women* could be addressed by creating an awareness of Islamic principles of education and the rights of women, to counter TTP claims that there is no place for the education or employment of women in Islamic/*Pakhtun* society. The attack on 14 year old Malala Yousufzai by TTP on 9 October, 2012 for her advocacy of female education depicts sensitivity attached to these issues as it has been viewed as bringing ‘Westernisation’ to the tribal society. Awareness concerning education for women and their rights in Islam and *Pakhtun* culture by opening up the education system can be accomplished through workshops which address the changing realities of society and to stop the attacks on female schools and students.
- d) *To Achieve Transformation and Reconciliation, it is Imperative to Build ‘Institutions’* in FATA that can pave the way for political reconciliation with the State of Pakistan, acknowledge the atrocities and discrimination that have occurred over the past 64 years, and understand the emotional and psychological wounds arising out of the military operations, displacement and drone strikes. There is also a need for

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<sup>49</sup> John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, p. 165.

<sup>50</sup> Abu Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam*, p. 30.

reparation for the displaced people through public recognition of their victimhood. This can be in the form of development reforms, employment opportunities, resettlement of people back to their areas, or establishment of schools and health services. The inclusion of retributive justice for the punishment of criminals and terrorists should form a portion of the restorative justice practices. This must be done by setting up an independent judicial commission in order to ensure a fair process.

- e) *To Reduce the Level of Hostility in FATA* is one of the prime objectives of this framework as it influences the local capacity for socio-economic development. The participation of local people in the peacebuilding process is imperative and can be achieved through the resettlement of IDPs, ending military operations and introducing reforms, together with changing the status of FATA in the Federation of Pakistan. This will align the area with mainstream political and developmental processes instead of making it a safe haven for terrorists. Therefore, this approach can pave the way for reducing hostility, which is linked to increased local capacity due to the inclusion of people in the development process.
- f) *The Role of NGOs is Very Important in This Regard.* They should not act as “force multipliers” for the foreign policies of Western powers, which is a term used by Colin Powell in 2001<sup>51</sup> for the U.S. role in Iraq. In FATA, there have been killings and kidnappings of male and female NGO workers by militants. The NGO workers have been accused of promoting Western values and agendas, and as a result Westernising the society. NGOs are currently not operating in the area, due to security concerns. It is important that NGOs working in the area should abide by the local customs and religious-cultural concerns, as they are integral players in the peacebuilding process. As a result of their absence, the social wings of militant organisations have jumped into the breach as relief workers for displaced and war-affected people.

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<sup>51</sup> Colin Powell, “Secretary of State Colin L. Powell Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations,” 26 October, 2001. Accessed 26 November, 2011. [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept\\_11/powell\\_brief31.htm](http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/powell_brief31.htm).

Lastly, a break in the cycle of the criminal-trafficker-Taliban nexus in the area is required. The exclusive character of FATA in the State of Pakistan and the corruption embedded in the political agent system is encouraging this nexus and providing a source of monetary support for TTP. Furthermore, it is recommended that the former British Empire's strategic policy of buffer zones currently used in FATA, be terminated. It is imperative that this conflict is viewed from the perspectives of both economic and strategic policy options available to Pakistan as a vulnerable country. Any policy that is based on empire-building projects will result in the emergence of movements and conditions that promote separatism as the only option for a people seeking to escape the familiar cycle of exploitation.

## 8.7 Conclusion

In summary, there are five principles of peacebuilding in Islam that have informed the conceptual framework of a religious-cultural approach of 'peace pathways' for the case study of the tribal areas.

Firstly, the 'peace pathways' is a *human-centered* approach that considers peace as an inherent part of human nature, or *Fitrah*, which includes all that encompasses human needs and guides the actions in the process through a vision of transforming conflict. It is based on ending hostile feelings that in turn impact on the local capacity for making this transformation a successful process. It gives 'the people' the role of a 'pathfinder' to search for new possibilities of peace and harmony within the society.

Secondly, 'peace pathways' are *communal and comprehensive* as they envisage the inner, outer, societal and universal levels for building communal relationships. The purpose of the approach is to reconstruct the relationships within a war-torn society through interconnected roles, activities through mutual acknowledgment, and recognition of the need to transform a violent culture into ways of peace.

Thirdly, 'peace pathways' is a *gradual and long-term process* based on the concept of '*Sayrura*', or 'to become'. It further considers '*Istaqama*' as perseverance on a straight path, which takes a long-term view of transformation and formulates strategies along the

way. It not only focuses on prevention and resolution of immediate conflict, but also develops and promotes cultural resources within a setting to stop the recurrence of conflicts and wars. It requires a long-term commitment among the people involved and the society at large. This is supplemented by the self-restraint approach of Ghaffar Khan, which gives added benefit for the 'peace pathways' process.

Fourthly, 'peace pathways' is a *Misaaq* (covenant) or 'peace of believers', which uses *Ihsan* (doing good) as a common virtue and *Mohsin* (doer of good) as an ideal Muslim character to make the area a sanctuary of peace. Moreover, *Pakhtunwali* can play an important role by using a positive approach and serving as an agency for change. The transformation process, if based on the ethics of 'common good' and connected to the processes, frames or lenses and levels of activity, has the potential to work and bring about desired results.

Lastly, 'peace pathways' is a form of '*Sulh*', or settlement as the last stage of the reconciliation process to start a new beginning, which combines the levels of *Islam* (submission), *Iman* (believing), and *Ihsan* (doing good). It focuses on *Iqra* (reading) and *Irfan* (knowledge) for education empowerment, *Musalaha* for political and socio-economic development for the common good, *Sabr*, or patience, for acknowledging victimhood and humiliation, and *Taleef-ul Qulub* for reconciliation or bridging of inter-civilisational dialogue.

To sum up, this chapter provides evidence of an abundance of resources for conflict transformation within Islam and the tribal society in the FATA that can be used to end this conflict. The discussion and recommendations provided in this chapter proceed from the understanding that a religious framework is a basic requirement for peacebuilding and transformation strategies since it critically overcomes the sensitivity of local people to Western approaches or other cultural approaches. However, these recommendations are not final and require the participation of people and grassroots leaders together with the sincere and active involvement of the Federal Government of Pakistan. Nevertheless, these recommendations can be considered as a first step towards



the long-term transformation of this conflict and other conflicts involving similar dynamics.

## CHAPTER NINE

# CONCLUSION

*Making Peace or Settlement (through reconciliation) is better (Quran: 4:128).*<sup>52</sup>

The Global War on Terror, which started in 2001 with undefined objectives, perpetuated military means as a solution to a conflict of an intractable and protracted nature. The conflict presents a number of critical challenges. The international community is faced with a systemic issue of how to deal with the conflict, involving meta-narratives of 'West-Islam' historical encounters which not only fuel but also take this conflict to an extraordinary level of violence and hostility. The characteristics of such conflicts pose dilemmas of peacebuilding and transformation in deeply-divided and fragile societies.

The effect such conflict generates is compounded by an international tendency to resort to war or armed conflict, as manifested in Iraq and Afghanistan, and subsequent 'peacebuilding' measures based on Western-liberal peace approaches in such conflict zones. Alternatively, the conflict zone of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan requires an approach of transformation based not only on religious sources, but also a peacebuilding framework which takes into consideration the area's cultural sensitivities. Thus, the development of the concept of conflict transformation in Islam and 'peace pathways' as the framework for peacebuilding is posited as serving this objective.

The different trends within political Islam in the post-9/11 period and the subsequent Muslim responses in the form of militant Jihadism are not isolated events. The response

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<sup>52</sup> Qur'an Translation: *Tafsir Ibn Kathir*. Accessed 31 October, 2012.  
[http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=598&Itemid=59](http://www.qtafsir.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=598&Itemid=59)

of al Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in FATA is connected to a long chain of West-Islam historical encounters, discourses and resultant policies which have added intractability to the conflict. The discussion of historical encounters between the West and Islam reveals that once the component attributes, forms and functions are evident, it is possible to identify similarities in the pattern and reoccurrence of conflict across different Muslim societies. A potential weakness of an approach to historical narratives, identity constructs and context-dependent discourses, is that it is potentially difficult to compare dissimilar contexts.

In this thesis, I first analysed the West-Islam historical encounters and resulting meta-narratives which had conflict-generating tendencies for the conflict involving militant Jihadists and the West in the post-9/11 era. I looked at the history of encounters, narratives and Western discourses on Islam which had an impact on the development of different trends within political Islam. The study then focused on the emergence of militant Jihadism within political Islam, with particular emphasis on al Qaeda's ideology. I investigated the militancy in FATA in the post-9/11 period as a product of West-Islam meta-narratives, Western discourses and policies resulting in the emergence of movements and organisations like TTP. The thesis approached this conflict through an alternative lens, thus rejecting 'war' or 'negative peace' as a solution. Focusing on transformation and peacebuilding, this lens highlights the importance of responding to this conflict by exploring the religious-cultural approaches to peace within the given conflict setting.

This study was structured around seven main chapters. It started from the premise that studying the historical meta-narratives, images and stereotypes of West-Islam relations is critical to an understanding of West-Islam conflict. This examined West-Islam relations through a number of different historical frames which informed the analysis. Particularly important was the biblical frame based on fear, threat perception, theological misunderstandings and ignorance of Islam which were present in each encounter and underpinned the longstanding and deep-rooted tradition in Christian/Western history of demonising the Islamic 'other'. The biblical stereotypes, which were established in the collective consciousness of West, were accentuated by the experience of 'holy war' from

the emergence of Islam through the Crusades and extending into the colonial period of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries.

The narratives which emerged from the story of faith between Muslims and Christians were centred on questions of interpretation, dogma and prophetic claims on both sides. This also served an identity construction process of defining 'self' and demonising 'other', and it had a deep impact on the way conflict involving meta-narratives unfolds as description, explanation and meaning. In the process Muslim stereotypes, creating counter identities, were generated on ethnic, tribal or religious bases.

The broad survey of the historical encounters of West-Islam focused on aspects with conflict-generating tendencies. This is not to deny that there were also narratives which accentuate coexistence in Christian/Western literature. I have focussed on the dominant types of meta-narratives which were used to construct broadly based dichotomous identities. The object of the analysis was to show that all these narratives, images and stereotypes are social constructs. As such, they remain discursive constructs that defy objective verification. While an empirical analysis of narratives of West-Islam encounters was not required, the way they were used and developed is central to the argument.

An important aim of Chapter Three was to understand the function of these narratives and images and to deconstruct their use in the events following 9/11. The meta-narratives, and the images embedded in them, were replete with negative depictions of the 'other'. The exception, perhaps, was the treatment afforded to Saladin. Overall, however, despite the different spatial and theological contexts in which the historical narratives were constructed, certain themes ran through them all. The images associated with the Renaissance and Reformation, for example, although portraying Islam and Muslims somewhat differently than during the Middle Ages, had resonances in the earlier meta-narrative. It was just that the fundamental 'other' had changed.

One positive development was the gradual acceptance of Islam into the class of 'world religions', thus ending its centuries-old label as a 'heresy' or 'paganism'. During the colonial period, the dominant historical meta-narrative discarded the biblical or apocalyptic frames, as terms like 'heretic', 'anti-Christ' or 'scourge of God' began to

disappear. Rather, the Enlightenment values changed the context to one of a struggle between the forces of progress and the forces of stagnation. Islam was thus defined as a 'religion' that was the cause of Muslim decline and of societal backwardness. Nonetheless, despite the humanist influence in the Renaissance and afterwards, the negative view of the Prophet Muhammad, the symbology of Islamic expansion at the point of sword and perceptions of Muslim violence persisted in the post-Renaissance period as well. The colonial period brought interaction at the political and cultural levels, as a new image of the 'Orient' emerged to depict a fallen Islam, in drastic need of reform. This time, the Western narrative impacted on Muslim society, arousing a response against orientalism that involved adjustment and resistance.

In short, the representation of Muslims throughout history served the collective Christian or European self, and continues to play an important role in the conflict involving West and Islam today. It has been shown that in times of high crisis, the historical images and narratives are recycled, further escalating the tensions between Muslims and the West. This was apparent in the 1989 publication of 'The Satanic Verses', the Danish caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in 2006 and their re-publication in different European countries. Although newspapers in the U.S. did not publish these caricatures, the general perception in the Muslim world about the homogeneity of the 'West', simply eclipsed the positive role played by the U.S. in that crisis.

The reflection of historical narratives in contemporary times and its impact on West-Islam relations is also visible at the highest level. A 2006 speech by Pope Benedict in Germany, for example, brought back the memories of former criticisms of Islam by popes and theologians in the past. This provoked a strong, negative response, not only from the Muslim masses but also from the media, academia and governments as well. Incidents like the call of U.S. pastor Terry Jones to establish an 'International Burn a *Qur'an* Day' the burning of the *Qur'an* by U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, the sexual abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, Bagram prison and Guantanamo Bay, pictures of a mutilated Afghan soldier, and movies like 'Innocence of Muslims' have reinforced the memory of negative historical images. These events are increasing the Muslim feelings of victimhood and humiliation and are exacerbating emotions on all sides.

Even though these events are isolated and unrepresentative, they are nevertheless defended by Western governments extensively in support of such principles as freedom of expression and human rights. This impact deeply on the intractability of conflicts involving West-Islam meta-narratives and transformation processes, as these events are exploited by extremist organisations for political purposes and to gain local support. Certainly, they are cited in support of their argument of the inherent hostility between Islam and the West and the need for Islam to mobilise in defence of Muslim values.

In Chapter Four, I examined the different trends within political Islam as a consequence of the impact of Western discourses and resultant Western policies on the Muslim world. Germane to this process was the Christian/Western world view and its construction of identity against the Muslim 'other' that was accomplished through the 'epistemological imperialism' of Europe in Muslim societies during the colonial period and extended during the Afghan *Jihad* of 1979, when U.S. gave recognition to a particular form of Jihadism. These trends within political Islam were influenced by the historical meta-narratives, images and stereotypes which provided the background and reasoning for the emergence of organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban as well as helping to inform their respective ideologies.

I examined the change of emphasis from religious-cultural centred narratives and images to political, social and economic ones within West-Islam discourses, which mainly emerged during colonialism. I argued that this change had a tremendous influence on creating new forces of resistance within the Muslim world. Political Islam was one such reaction. This idealisation of Islam by Muslims, in opposition to the Western notion of modernity and promotion of its values, changed the nature of West-Islam relations. The emergence of Muslim reformists and organisations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt and the *Jama'at-e-Islami* in South Asia in 1941, which combined Islamic principles and values and concepts of Western modernity, determined the nature of resistance to colonialism.

This form of resistance was replaced by militancy and violence under the influence of the Middle Eastern conflict and the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973. It was directed

principally against the U.S. to persuade it to change its policies towards the Muslim world, especially with respect to Palestine. The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 also influenced the form of resistance to the West. Accordingly, religion was re-introduced as a force in international politics: the use of religiously-inspired resistance against the West in the form of militancy and violence started during the post-Afghan *Jihad* period from circa 1989. However, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 used rhetoric and political, economic and social forms of resistance, although this never generated on a formal military scale.

This thesis makes the case that the use of *Jihad* as a means of violence by non-state actors was a product of the West itself. Education was a tool for inculcating violence among the *Mujahedeen* by declaring *Jihad* as a military form of resistance during the Afghan-Soviet War from 1979. Initially, this policy was successful in creating a strong, religiously-inspired front against the Soviet Union. The help and support of the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the international community under the United Nations, were very important factors in this campaign. The argument that *Jihad* cannot be used as an approach by non-state actors seems untrue, as the examples of the *Mujahedeen* appear to demonstrate. Different religious authorities issued religious edicts (*Fatwa*) declaring *Jihad* against the Soviet Union, but neither Pakistan nor Saudi Arabia officially declared *Jihad* against the Soviet Union.

The use of Jihad by non-state actors has been critical for the al-Qaeda and Taliban declarations of *Jihad*. Although several U.S. officials have accepted responsibility for the creation and funding of *Mujahedeen* in the Soviet-Afghan War, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,<sup>53</sup> none has accepted that the U.S. played any role in changing and directing the wave of Islamism to militant Jihadism.

Furthermore, it was noted that the form of militant Jihadism that appeared during the post-9/11 era was again influenced by religious rhetoric and the historical narratives of 'crusade', 'good versus evil', and 'forces of light and darkness' by the administration of President George W. Bush. This employment of historical terminology in the

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<sup>53</sup> "Hillary Clinton: We Created, Trained Al Qaeda". Accessed 7 October, 2012. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k\\_2oTczb3Qo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k_2oTczb3Qo).

contemporary era has served to exacerbate the cycle of violence. By analysing the rhetoric of both the Bush administration and the al-Qaeda leadership I have shown that this fostering of the cycle is not one- but rather two-sided.

In addition, it was found that the discourse of al-Qaeda before 9/11 mainly focused on the solution of political change within the Middle East itself, and resistance to U.S. economic and political imperialism, U.S. support of Israel and Middle Eastern dictatorships, and the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. The 9/11 attacks represented a change of strategy and a change of ideology. The change from the regional ambitions of al Qaeda to global ones was fostered by the instillation of a religious dimension to the conflict with the U.S. administration, its invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq, and the maltreatment of captured Muslims alleged to be involved in terrorism.

It was further propounded that the use of war to deal with terrorism or Islamist militancy is proving futile, as manifested in the obvious failure of the U.S. invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan to bring about peace. Moreover, the 'liberal peace' agendas for 'peacebuilding' in these countries is aiding the militants' call for local resistance, which is increasing the intractability of the conflict in these countries.

In Chapter Five, I analysed the historical and local dimensions of the conflict in FATA which is exacerbated by West-Islam historical meta-narratives and images. It was found that the British, who entered this area in 1842, generated stereotypes of *Pakhtuns* which were influenced by an 'Orientalist' mindset and the European encounter with the Turks and in the Middle East. Moreover, the area was termed as 'tribal' which itself depicted images of barbarism, lack of scientific and rational progress, and an aversion to modernity. The deliberate lack of development, and the use of this area as a buffer zone between the British and Russian Empires, was projected as a 'strategic policy'.

The continuation by Pakistan of the British 'strategic policy' of a buffer zone helped cause one of the critical consequences of the British colonial period in Islam: nationalism. The emergence of Muslim nationalism was evident in the use of tribal areas for the '*Jihad*' in Kashmir in 1948, and later in Afghanistan in 1979. It was found that to promote a militant response, the cultural code *Pakhtunwali* was deliberately used as 'strategic



policy'. Furthermore, socio-economic underdevelopment helped to foster the drug trade and generate funds for first the 1979 *Jihad* and later for terrorist activities (a term used in the western discourses for '*Jihad*' in the post 9/11 period). Although the conflict in FATA is local in character, it has global dimensions due to the use of Islamism and global Jihadism as policy tools by Pakistan and other international actors.

An analysis of local dimensions of the conflict exhibited tremendous potential for cultural approaches for peacebuilding which have been found helpful for countering militancy. Prominent among these were nonviolence and the self-restraint philosophy of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The movement which he led, the *Khudai Khitmatgar* movement, is termed a subaltern movement that empowered ordinary people and recognised their understanding of history and movements. Khan's movement was an anti-colonial struggle and also a movement to challenge the stereotypes and negative imagery of Islam, Muslims and *Pakhtuns*. His focus was more on 'local' than 'transnational Islam.'

In Chapter Six, I looked specifically at the transnational dimension of the conflict in FATA and the emergence of the TTP as a militant Jihadist organisation. In discussing this dimension, I focussed on the emergence of a transnational aspect of Muslim nationalism in South Asia as a vestige of the British colonial legacy. This legacy has added intractability to the conflict in FATA. The use of religion to forge transnational solidarity in the shape of a universal '*Ummah*', united by shared apprehensions of victimhood, grievance and humiliation have fertilised this transnationalism and helped create a cosmopolitan form of Islam.

It was noted that the emergence of Tehreek-e-Taliban in Pakistan indicates three important trends. Firstly, it shows the influence of al-Qaeda-Taliban ideology, which shifted to FATA and Balochistan in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Secondly, there are the local trends and problems peculiar to FATA. And lastly, there is the influence of Jihadi thinking within the political, religious and military circles of Pakistan leading to the emergence of the TTP. It has been shown that the conflict's political character has been influenced by Western policies and discourses originating in the colonial era, while militancy has stemmed from the employment of Jihadism during

the Afghan *Jihad* of 1979 as a policy tool. One of the important factors emerging from this discussion is the role that Western policies and influences have played in setting the trends of this conflict, which is now out of control.

My analysis of statements issued by leaders of the TTP shows that terminology they have used draws significantly on the historical meta-narratives, the sense of grievances, the increasing use of *Jihad* to achieve objectives, and anti-Western and specifically anti-American views. Other themes to emerge included feelings of revenge and betrayal that were directed against the Pakistani government and the military, the influence of Islamists belonging to religious parties and ex-military personnel, and resistance as a form of restoration of *Pakhtun* honour. This points up the need for in depth analyses of the cultural code of *Pakhtuns* and the role of religion and violence in *Pakhtun* society, particularly in the tribal areas. Although the government of Pakistan, through various peace agreements and development ventures, and the U.S through its AfPAK policy in 2009, has made some effort for long-term peace in the area, their peacebuilding initiatives neither follow a conflict-sensitive approach nor address the root causes of the problem. Yet both are required for the long-term transformation of this conflict.

Chapter Seven argued that the militant *Jihadism* in question can be looked at as a 'Muslim response' to Western discourses and policies. It suggested that the pattern of these responses might be broken by introducing the concept of '*Sayrura*' or 'becoming-transforming' as a Muslim conflict transformation process. The basic thrust of this concept is centred on addressing the issues of violence, militancy and *Jihad* in Islam. It provides a perspective that disentangles *Jihad* from violence, which makes it a force for constructive resistance but not a complete paradigm of peace or nonviolence. '*Sayrura*' emphasises the Mahmoud Mohammad Taha Model of Persuasion which rests on the method adopted by the Prophet Muhammad while he was in Mecca for thirteen years: as the initial *Jihad*. This is coupled with patience and forgiveness as suitable forces of resistance, but eschews forms of passive resistance. The different steps of transformation suggested are designed to bring about constructive changes in Muslim societies. The need for transformation within Muslim societies has arisen as a realistic way of breaking the cycle of Western hegemony over Muslim discourses, which have guided Muslim

responses in terms that suit the West. The primary aim of the chapter was to show that the transformation principles inherent in Islam have the potential to change the pattern of responses to the Western discourses.

The intractable and protracted nature of this conflict poses important questions which require a conceptual framework, and approaches to deal with it. I have argued that the answer lies in the creation of an indigenous form of transformation process. Muslim societies need to take the lead in determining their own form of resistance and remedy. The concept is built on a set of perspectives embedded in the *Qur'an* which focuses on human progress at both personal and community levels, is community driven and has mutual respect as its basis. Intrinsic to this approach is its emphasis on striving for human progress, peace, reconciliation, forgiveness and helping oppressed people.

The discussion of *al Islam*, *al Iman* and *al Ihsan* focused on three levels of transformation (universal, societal and individual), while *Sirat-e-Mustaqeem* or straight path has been defined as a process for a long-term and consistent effort by different actors utilizing the potential and sources available in a given setting. The discussion of *Sakeena tul Qulub* focused on the reconciliation process with *Sulh* (settlement) as an end. The joining of hearts is the fundamental principle entailing; striving to forgive, exercising patience, and showing mercy. In combination, these attributes can play an important role in transforming notions of identity, whether based on 'likeness or friendship' or 'otherness or enmity' (*al Wala al Bara*). This concept of transformation utilises positive values and necessitates positive action as its basis, but does not deny the need for restorative justice. In the Islamic context, peace and justice go hand-in-hand. The concept of balance or *Meezan* or *Wast* (moderation) is the underlying value.

I developed the framework of 'peace pathways' in Chapter Eight with the potential to transform the conflict in the tribal areas that is entwined in the long history of encounters, and narrative and discourse formation. This is not to suggest that the Western models and theories of transformation can be ignored in the formulation of this transformation and peacebuilding framework. It is suggested that Islam's initial awakening and transformation was also influenced by encounters with Hellenistic

culture, the encounter with Europe through Spain, and that Islamic culture helped Europe emerge from the Dark Ages. This is the process of civilisational development by inter-civilisation encounters and borrowing, which leads to the enrichment of cultures and sources of knowledge.

'Peace pathways' has been described as an alternative concept for peacebuilding for Muslim societies. It rests on the premise of utilising the existing religious-cultural resources from the given conflict setting rather than importing them from other settings. It has been argued that this Islamic framework has a 'pathway' to peace and transformation by taking a long-term view of a given situation and exercising '*Istaqama*' (perseverance) on this path. Taking a religious approach to the conflict in the tribal areas taps into the cultural and religious sensitivities of the people and acknowledges that religion itself is one of the important factors in the conflict.

It was argued that examining different phases of intractability is important to gauge the need for utilising the framework. This approach of 'peace pathways' was developed as the concepts of civil society, pluralism, and responsible citizenship, as understood in the modern nation-state system, were absent in the traditional and tribal societies of FATA. An indigenous approach was needed. Moreover, the aversion of local people for anything 'Western' underscores the need for another approach than the liberal peace approach for pursuing 'peacebuilding' in the area. The components of the framework include: conflict and context analysis, developing a peacebuilding and transformation process, and inclusion of different levels of conflict and actors. The approach for the framework is human-centred, communal and comprehensive, requiring a gradual and long-term process, *Misa'aq* (or peace of believers) and lastly *Sulh* and *Taleef* as settlement or reconciliation processes in the society.

Several important factors underlie development of this framework for peace pathways and transformation. Firstly, it was suggested that the intractable and protracted conflict requires an approach which focuses on indigenous 'religious-cultural' premises to tackle the sensitivities attached to the historical, political, religious and cultural dimensions of the conflict.

Secondly, the framework's focus is on a 'bottom-up' and approach which utilises the subaltern perspective of inclusion of ordinary people in the process, not only elite and government actors. It was argued that the *Pakhtunwali* cultural code and Ghaffar Khan's movement of *Khudai Khidmatgar* provide necessary historical evidence and support for the success of this approach.

Thirdly, the framework emphasises the importance of an 'indigenous epistemological empowerment approach' to counter the 'epistemological imperialism' of the colonial era and the impulses provided by the U.S. and its allies to militant Jihadism carried out by non-state actors during the *Afghan Jihad*, which promoted a specific form of *Jihad* through the *Madrasah* education system. The conflict transformation concept that this study suggests will target only these Muslims involved in the conflict. Hopefully, this will lead to awakening, empowerment, and rethinking of these discourses that are essentially a reaction to Western policies and the responses based on them.

Fourthly, it calls for historical dialogue and reconciliation efforts to deal with the antagonistic patterns of historical West-Islam relations in order to prevent their recurrence in times of high crisis. It also calls for reconciliation efforts across tribal areas and Pakistani society to facilitate economic development, encourage the process of harmonising relations among the parties in conflict, bringing developmental changes, and improving the status of FATA in the Federation of Pakistan, as a critical step in bringing peace in the area.

Lastly, one of the weaknesses of the conflict transformation approach is the lack of a detailed and in-depth conflict analysis that can open avenues for the formulation of effective strategies. This thesis has attempted to fill this gap. It attempted to have an in-depth conflict analysis to track the root cause of the conflict in FATA, by examining the history of West-Islam encounters that gave rise to a specific form of political Islam, which was found to be the central problem of the conflict. It was argued that, in order to make the peace pathways process successful, conflict analysis of such in-depth nature is important for the application of the framework and for achieving transformation in the society.

This study has thrown up a number of dimensions, which have been apprehended but not fully engaged with largely because of the constraints of time and space. Nonetheless, they can be foreshadowed here as areas worthy of future consideration and research. Prime among these pertains to Muslim images of Christianity and the West and how these may not only have helped inform Muslim discourses but also impacted on Western perspectives of Islam and Western policies towards it. What role the Muslim construction of the Western 'Other' played during the various encounters between the West and Islam is a subject worthy of investigation in its own right.

The impact of indigenous Muslim responses and their role both in the creation of forces of resistance and in the strategy, tactics and details of the on-ground insurgency of the Taliban and TTP in FATA have also only been tackled in passing. This is partly because such issues have been explored fully in a number of other studies, partly because this thesis has focused mainly on the emergence of the conflict phenomenon, its connection with the history of West/Islam relations, and its possible transformation. The strategies of transformation the thesis has advanced are based on an in-depth analysis of the conflict, and the attempt to find a way through the intractable nature of the conflict. In the long run, the shaping of the future, in the case of Muslim societies in a conflict zone, will depend upon the formulation of effective policy tools and a sincere effort to transform the conflict involving grassroots, middle-range, and elite class actors in the process. This thesis has been a tentative move towards making this case.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: STATEMENTS OF TTP LEADER: 2009-11

#### 2011

##### **1. TTP leader claims gains in Swat, Mohmand**

ISLAMABAD: The head of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud, claimed on Sunday that his fighters have the upper hand in Swat and Mohmand, regions that are close to the Afghan border.

He urged Muslims to support the group, according to a video monitored by the SITE Intel Group, which tracks militant websites. It was Mehsud's first appearance in such a video since he admitted a role in the failed May 1, 2010, attempt to set off a car bomb in New York's Times Square.

Militants from Afghanistan have been attacking security checkpoints in Pakistan in recent months. The Pakistan Army has said the attackers fled the military's offensives in Pakistan and are using Afghan territory as a safe haven. Hakimullah said the militants scored victories in the Swat and Mohmand regions during Ramazan but gave no details. He called on Muslims to join the fight, saying, "the answer to all our problems lies in jihad."<sup>1</sup>

[http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C09%5C05%5Cstory\\_5-9-2011\\_pg7\\_10](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C09%5C05%5Cstory_5-9-2011_pg7_10)

##### **2. Taliban video shows execution of policemen**

**The Inter-Services Public Relations said on Monday that a gruesome Taliban video showing the execution of 17 security personnel was authentic.**

"On June 1, some 50 to 60 Taliban insurgents belonging to Tehrik-i-Taliban's Swat faction crossed over from Kunar (Afghanistan) and attacked a joint checkpost of police and levies in Upper Dir and killed 30 personnel. Seventeen out of the 30 killed were brutally executed with their hands tied," said ISPR spokesman Maj-Gen Athar Abbas after Taliban posted the video on a website. The policemen and levies had been taken hostage after the raid on the post in Shaltalu.

Gen Abbas said the execution was supervised by important Taliban commanders Hafeezullah alias Kowchwan, Muftahuddin alias Shabbar, Tor Mohammad alias Tor Mullah, all of them belonging to Swat. Though the site of the execution could not be verified, those familiar with the landscape believe it took place in Dir.

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<sup>1</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, September 5, 2011.

In the video, a commander, whose face was covered, accused security personnel of being enemies of Islam.

*“These are the enemies of Allah’s religion and have left Islam. Allah orders to kill such people,” the commander said in Pashto before he and his fighters opened fire on them with their AK-47 rifles.*

The victims were shot a number of times from close range after the initial round of firing to ensure that none survived.

Taliban claim that the executions were in revenge for the killing of six children in Swat, but ISPR promptly denied the allegation. Besides killing the security personnel, the terrorists had set ablaze six schools in the area after the pre-dawn raid.<sup>2</sup>

[http://www.google.com.pk/#sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&biw=1138&bih=555&source=hp&q=TTP+swat+release+video+executing+17+security+personnel%2C+dawn&pbx=1&oq=TTP+swat+release+video+executing+17+security+personnel%2C+dawn&aq=f&aqi=&aql=1&gs\\_sm=e&gs\\_upl=4989016393710164171160132101010101226711201418-3.31710&bav=cf.osb&fp=141275b95a42a7f4](http://www.google.com.pk/#sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&biw=1138&bih=555&source=hp&q=TTP+swat+release+video+executing+17+security+personnel%2C+dawn&pbx=1&oq=TTP+swat+release+video+executing+17+security+personnel%2C+dawn&aq=f&aqi=&aql=1&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=4989016393710164171160132101010101226711201418-3.31710&bav=cf.osb&fp=141275b95a42a7f4)

### **3. Omar Khalid vows revenge for Bin Laden’s death**

Al Jazeera has obtained video of Omar Khalid, commander of the Taliban in Pakistani tribal agency Mohmand and a deputy of Hakeemullah Mehsud’s Taliban movement in Pakistan, vowing revenge on Pakistani and US forces for the death of Osama Bin Laden. “WE will take revenge of Osama’s killing from the Pakistani government, its security forces, the Pakistani ISI, the CIA and the Americas, they are now on our hit list,” said Khalid.<sup>3</sup>

[http://www.longwarjournal.org/videos/2011/05/omar\\_khalid\\_vows\\_revenge\\_for\\_b.p hp#ixzz1bFTXw8EH](http://www.longwarjournal.org/videos/2011/05/omar_khalid_vows_revenge_for_b.p hp#ixzz1bFTXw8EH)

### **4. Pakistani Taliban vow revenge attacks on US**

**PESHAWAR: Pakistan’s Taliban, a close ally of al Qaeda, plans to attack American targets abroad to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden, said one of its senior leaders.**

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Taliban Movement of Pakistan, has delivered on threats to avenge the killing of bin Laden by US Special Forces in a Pakistani town on May 2. It bombed an American consulate convoy, laid siege to a naval base and blew up paramilitary cadets in Pakistan, which the Taliban sees as a US puppet and Washington regards as indispensable in its war on militancy.

Omar Khalid Khorasani, the top Taliban commander in Mohmand, one of Pakistan’s unruly tribal agencies, agreed to answer questions posed by Reuters and record them on a DVD. The video starts with him and some associates sitting on the floor of a mud-walled house, eating mango slices and joking. Then he turns serious and speaks about the TTP’s intentions. Recent TTP attacks in Pakistan were only the start of bloody reprisals after bin Laden’s death. “These attacks were just a part of our revenge. God

<sup>2</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, July 19, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Bill Ardolino, “Omar Khalid vows revenge for bin Laden’s death,” *Us Long War Journal*, 18 May, 2011

willing, the world will see how we avenge Osama bin Laden's martyrdom," said Khorasani. "We have networks in several countries outside Pakistan."

The questions were delivered to Khorasani's associates in Mohmand, and then he recorded his answers on tape and sent them back to a Reuters reporter who had interviewed him in the past. The TTP has not demonstrated the ability to stage sophisticated attacks in the West. Its one apparent bid to carnage in the United States failed.

It claimed responsibility for the botched car bomb attack in New York's Times Square last year. But American intelligence agencies take it seriously. It was later added to the United States' list of foreign terrorist organisations. Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud appeared in a video with the Jordanian double agent who blew himself up in a well-fortified US base in Afghanistan last year, in the second most deadly attack in CIA history. Seven CIA officials were killed.

"Our war against America is continuing inside and outside of Pakistan. When we launch attacks, it will prove that we can hit American targets outside Pakistan," said Khorasani, a tall man with a beard and shoulder-length hair common among the ethnic Pashtun warriors of tribal areas along the Afghan border.

The TTP has built up a long C.V. of bloodshed, carrying out suicide bombings which often kill dozens. The organisation gained most of its experience waging an insurgency inside Pakistan. A loose alliance of a dozen groups, the TTP intensified its battle against the state in 2007, after a bloody army raid on Islamabad's Red Mosque, which was controlled by its allies.

Sitting with a pistol strapped to his waist and flanked by two of his comrades with AK-47 assault rifles, Khorasani said the death of bin Laden would not demoralise the Taliban. It had in fact, injected a "new courage" into its fighters, said Khorasani, the top Taliban commander in Mohmand agency. "The ideology given to us by Osama bin Laden and the spirit and courage that he gave to us to fight infidels of the world is alive," said Khorasani, wearing a brown shalwar kameez, traditional baggy trousers and tunics, and a round top hat.

He described Ayman al-Zawahri, the former Egyptian physician who is the likely successor to bin Laden, as the Pakistani Taliban's "chief and supreme leader". The Pakistani Taliban are closely linked with the Afghan Taliban. They move back and forth through the porous border and exchange intelligence and provide shelter for each other in a region US President Barack Obama has described as "the most dangerous place in the world".

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said on Saturday there could be political talks with the Afghan Taliban by the end of this year if Nato made more military advances. If the Afghan Taliban lay down their weapons there will be no let up in the Pakistani Taliban campaign to impose its version of Islam which would see women covered from head to toe and those deemed immoral publicly whipped or executed. "Even if some rapprochement is reached in Afghanistan, our ideology, aim and objective is to change the system in Pakistan," said Khorasani. "Whether there is war or peace throughout the world, our struggle for the implementation of Islamic system in Pakistan will continue."

It seems the TTP expects to wage holy war for generations. In another video clip provided by Khorasani, a young boy wearing a camouflage ammunition belt shuffles along the ground, weighed down by a Kalashnikov rifle hung over his shoulder.<sup>4</sup>

<http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/06/pakistani-taliban-vow-revenge-attacks-on-us-targets.html>

#### **5. TTP Warning: 'Assaults to continue even after US exit'**

**The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on Thursday vowed to continue attacks against Pakistan, even if the US leaves Afghanistan, till the implementation of the Islamic system in the country.**

Talking to the BBC, the spokesperson for the TTP in Mohmand Agency Sajjad Mohmand, warned of strikes on high-value targets at an even larger scale to avenge the death of Osama bin Laden.

He said that Taliban attackers are not only limited to tribal areas they have also spread across Pakistan and the world.

Sajjad Mohmand said that the Taliban were not against the nuclear assets of Pakistan, which he said were assets of Muslims and of Islam. He added that these assets will be preserved and used for the security of the Muslims.<sup>5</sup>

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/177014/ttp-warning-assaults-to-continue-even-after-us-exit/>

**6. TTP distributed a leaflet in which it defended the organization's decision to execute former Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) operative Colonel (R) Imam.** The Urdu language leaflet praised TTP head Hakeemullah Mehsud for taking decision to execute Colonel Imam. The message insisted that TTP did not believe in nationalism because it was not fighting for the cause of Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Uzbeks or Arabs. It claimed TTP was fighting for Islam and Muslims.<sup>6</sup>

#### **7. Olive branch: Taliban welcome government peace overtures**

**PESHAWAR: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the banned conglomerate of militant groups blamed for most violent acts in the country, on Monday welcomed the government's offer for peace talks with all insurgent groups.**

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said a day earlier that his administration was ready to hold negotiations with all militant groups, including the Haqqani network. "The TTP welcomes the prime minister's offer," Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, TTP's deputy commander and commander-in-chief in Bajaur Agency, told The Express Tribune by phone from an undisclosed location. But he set two preconditions for dialogue: The government should reconsider its relationship with the United States and enforce Islamic sharia in the country.

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<sup>4</sup> "Pakistani Taliban vow revenge attacks on US targets," *Dawn*, Islamabad, 6 June, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> "TTP Warning" Assaults to continue even after US exit," *Express Tribune*, Islamabad, 27 May, 2011.

<sup>6</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 27 March, 2011.

Maulvi Faqir and other senior TTP cadres are believed to be hiding in the eastern Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. And Islamabad has blamed militants led by Maulvi Faqir for the recent cross-border attacks on its security forces. "We have always had serious doubts about Pakistan-US relations. The United States has never been sincere to Pakistan or Muslims in general," he said.

Although Maulvi Faqir showed willingness for negotiations, he said that his group would not accept Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Mian Iftikhar Hussain as a negotiator. "Mian Iftikhar should not be part of any reconciliatory talks," he added, identifying him as one of his group's biggest enemies. Maulvi Faqir said that his group believed in direct talks, and would not accept mediation. "We want direct talks with the government and not through intermediaries," he added.

To a question, Maulvi Faqir said that his fighters were not battle-fatigued. "We will continue to fight till the establishment of an Islamic state. But if our demands are met and an Islamic justice system is established in Pakistan, which is our country, we will lay down our weapons because we are peace-loving people," he said.

Interestingly, Maulvi Faqir told the BBC in an interview on Sunday that the TTP would not blindly support the Pakistani government, if the United States mounted a ground attack. He had also blamed Pakistan for playing a "double game" in Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup>

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/266054/ttp-ready-for-talks-with-pakistan-maulvi-faqir/>

## **8. If the US attacks Pakistan: TTP says it will not blindly side with Islamabad**

**The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the banned umbrella of militant groups, has categorically said that it will not blindly support Pakistan if the US troops attacked the country.**

In a telephone interview with BBC on Saturday, the group's deputy chief Maulvi Faqir Muhammad also came down hard on the Pakistani government for, what he called, "its double game" in Afghanistan.

"Although Pakistan and the US are allies in the war against terrorism, they don't trust each other. Instead, the two deceitful allies want to outsmart each other," said Maulvi Faqir, who is also chief of the Bajaur chapter of TTP.

He said that the United States wanted to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, but Pakistan wanted to trap the American troops in the Afghan quagmire.

Referring to drone strikes in the tribal regions, the TTP deputy chief said that although the US was continuously infringing on Pakistan's sovereignty. However, if the US sent ground troops into Pakistan, the TTP would not blindly support the government. "The decision will be taken by the TTP shura," he added.

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<sup>7</sup> Islamuddin Sajid, "Olive branch: Taliban welcome government peace overtures," *Express Tribune*, Islamabad, 30 October, 2011.

Maulvi Faqir blamed Pakistan's "double standards" for the fluid security situation in Afghanistan. "Peace cannot be restored in Pakistan and Afghanistan unless the two neighbours learn to coexist with peace," he added.

He said that attacks against the United States will decrease if it pulls out troops from the Islamic countries and called off its covert war in Pakistan's tribal regions.

Maulvi Faqir strongly rejected the allegations that the TTP was now getting support from Afghan authorities and the US troops stationed across the Durand Line.

This is the first time that the Taliban have hinted that they would not side with Pakistan against any US aggression. In earlier statements, the group called the fight against the US as 'jihad'.<sup>8</sup>

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/265667/if-the-us-attacks-pakistan-ttp-says-it-will-not-blindly-side-with-islamabad/>

### **9. TTP claims training a large number of suicide bombers**

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed that it has imparted training to a large number of suicide bombers and sent them to various destinations to target the places they have been assigned. TTP spokesperson Shakirullah Shakir said in a statement, "The boy arrested on charge of attacking Sakhi Sarwar Shrine in D.G. Khan some days ago belonged to the organizations." Shakir also said that suicide bombers have been given various targets and they had already left for their destinations. He said TTP's *Fidayeen-e-Islam* Group was carrying out various activities. He also verified the claim made by arrested teen age suicide bomber that TTP had its training camps in Miran Shah, North Waziristan agency.<sup>9</sup>

**The Pakistani Taliban warned the government on Tuesday it would punish any move to release a US consulate employee accused of murdering two Pakistanis in a case that has inflamed already strained ties with Washington.**

"If (Pakistani) rulers hand him over to America then we will target these rulers. If Pakistani courts cannot punish Davis then they should hand him over to us," said Azam Tariq, spokesman for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban movement of Pakistan). "We will give exemplary punishment to the killer Davis."

The warning from the al-Qaeda linked Taliban, which has kept up suicide bombings to destabilise Pakistan's government despite several army offensives, underscores the charged atmosphere surrounding Davis' case. US Senator John Kerry was due in Pakistan as part of the Obama administration's efforts to resolve the crisis.

Raymond Davis, the US consular employee jailed in Lahore for shooting two Pakistanis last month, says he acted in self-defense during an armed robbery.

Washington insists Davis has diplomatic immunity and should be released but the Pakistani government, fearful of a backlash from Pakistanis already wary of the United

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<sup>8</sup> "If the US attacks Pakistan: TTP says it will not blindly side with Islamabad," *Express Tribune*, Islamabad, 3 October, 2011.

<sup>9</sup> *The Nation*, Islamabad, 21 April, 2011.

States and enraged by the shooting, says the matter should be decided in court. On Thursday, the United States is expected to present a petition to a Lahore court to certify that Davis has diplomatic immunity and should be released.

Religious parties don't win many votes in elections. But the government can't afford to ignore the groups who often seize on issues concerning the United States to promote their cause. "Of course he (Davis) should not be released. He has committed a crime and he should be punished. He doesn't have immunity," said Yahya Mujhaid, a spokesman for Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which was blacklisted by the UN over its links to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant group blamed for the 2008 attack on Mumbai. It denies it has links to the LeT.

"If he is released, we will register our protest but in a peaceful way. We will hold rallies ... Not only us, the whole of Pakistan will protest against any such move." Supporters of the slain men have held protests and burned US flags. In addition to the two men Davis shot, a third man was killed when a U.S. consulate vehicle, apparently trying to rescue Davis, struck and killed a passer-by.<sup>10</sup>

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/119291/taliban-warns-pakistan-against-releasing-raymond-davis/>

#### **10. Taliban suicide bomber kills pro-government tribal elders in Pakistan's northwest**

The Taliban claimed credit for a suicide attack that killed two leader of anti-Taliban militia and six others in Pakistan's northwest. The suicide bomber detonated his vest at a market in Peshawar bazaar in the Salarzai area of the Bajaur tribal agency.

Taliban confirmed that Khan and Jan were targeted because they had joined the government and were maligning Taliban. Taliban spokesperson Ihsanullah Ihsna told AFO after the attack, "We had warned them, before and warn them again that they should disband this anti-Taliban peace committee otherwise we will continue to attack them till they are totally eliminated."<sup>11</sup>

[http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/taliban\\_suicide\\_bomb\\_27.php#ixz1bGFRa1AS](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/taliban_suicide_bomb_27.php#ixz1bGFRa1AS)

#### **2010**

1. The TTP Speke Person Azam Tariq has said "From April 01 TTP has started organized activities in all parts of the country including Swat, Dir, Bajaur, Kurram, Orakzai and South Waziristan Agencies." He also claimed responsibilities of recent attack on American Consulate in Peshawar and warned more such attacks across the country against the government and military.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> "Taliban warn against releasing Raymond Davis," *Express Tribune*, Islamabad, 15 February, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Bill Roggio, "Taliban suicide bomber kills pro-government tribal elders in Pakistan's northwest," *Long War Journal*, 28 May, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> *Daily Express*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 14 April, 2010.



2. In a statement TTP has warned several thousand Mehsuds (who left their homes due to the ongoing operations) not to return to their homes. A pamphlet circulated by the Mehsud chapter of TTP has asked the tribesmen to avoid returning to the territory for their own safety. The pamphlet also asked Khasadars and contractors belonging to Mehsud tribes to avoid serving on pickets and bringing in machinery and labor into the territory.<sup>13</sup>
3. The spokesman Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Maulana Azam Tariq has threatened to launch more attacks across country in response to the growing US drone attacks in the Tribal Areas and the military operations of the security forces. He said, "Taliban has trained 3000 suicide bombers in the reaction of US drone attacks. These Suicide bombers will target the government buildings, offices and intelligence agencies in different parts of the country."<sup>14</sup> The TTP has also threatened to kidnap US and Afghan diplomats in order to get arrested terrorists released in exchange of abducted foreigners.<sup>15</sup>
4. Rejecting the news of its leader Maulvi Faqir Muhammad's possible death—a close aide of Hakeemullah Mehsud and former TTP chief of Bajaur Agency--TTP has claimed that he is alive and safe in Bajaur. TTP also threatened to resume their attacks on security forces in Bajaur if the government does not stop the operations in the region.<sup>16</sup> After the successful operation of security forces in Bajaur, Taliban has threatened the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of Jalozai Camp not to return to their homes.<sup>17</sup>
5. In Mardan Taliban distributed threatening letters against the leaders of ruling Awami National Party (ANP). These letters were distributed in mosques of Mian Gulzara Kali area which is the constituency of the Chief of Minister of Khyber-Pukhtunkhawa Amri Haider Khan Hoti. The hand-written letter on a plain simple paper noted that CM Amir Haider Khan Hoti killed people of Malakand and Swat and in the same way "we will kill his fellows and children."<sup>18</sup>
6. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) Media Department, the Omar Studio, has released a new video of their chief Hakeemullah Mehsud in which he debunked the speculations of his death in a January 14, 2010 drone attack in North Waziristan. He has threatened to launch more terrorist attacks in American cities within "days and months" to avenge the killings of his mentor (Biatullah Mehsud) and several senior Al-Qaeda leaders by United States.<sup>19</sup> However, TTP denied any links with the alleged New York bomb plotter further confusing inquiries into possible links between the suspect and militant cells. TTP Spokesperson Azam Tariq maintained TTP neither

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<sup>13</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 22 January, 2010.

<sup>14</sup> *Daily Aaj*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 11 March, 2010.

<sup>15</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 29 March, 2010.

<sup>16</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 12 March, 2010.

<sup>17</sup> *Daily Aaj*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 13 March, 2010.

<sup>18</sup> *The Nation*, Islamabad, 12 May, 2010.

<sup>19</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 4 May, 2010.

trained nor recruited Faisal Shahzad.<sup>20</sup> Hakeemullah Mehsud has also written a letter to sister of Dr Affia Siddiqui – under detention in US – expressing sympathy with Dr Affia’s family for the ordeal the latter had suffered and offered all kind of assistance to her.<sup>21</sup> It is pertinent to mention that the letter had surfaced after a botched attack on New York’s Time Squares.

7. After the resurfacing of TTP chief Hakeemullah Mehsud, the militants are slowly expanding their activities from FATA to other districts of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa as well as showing their intentions to launch guerilla operations against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan as well. In a statement the spokesperson of TTP Azam Tariq has threatened to launch attacks against America on its soil to avenge the killings and atrocities afflicted by US drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas. He maintained that TTP possesses the capability of defeating the Americans and the TTP fighters will soon launch their guerilla operation The “Ithad-e-Mujahideen-e-Khurasan”, a wing of the Taliban tracking American spies warned local population against facilitating drone attacks by providing information about Taliban. They said anybody caught doing so will be killed immediately.<sup>22</sup> It is pertinent to mention that Taliban has adopted a new brutal way to kill the US spies in North Waziristan. This week two suspected US spies were killed by strapping bombs to their bodies in the Degan area, North Waziristan.<sup>23</sup>
8. The central spokesperson of TTP Azam Tariq has said, “The growing partnership between the US and India is alarming for Pakistan.” He maintained TTP was not afraid of drone attacks. They were ready to embrace martyrdom. According to him TTP is just not confined to the tribal areas. It has created its cells in Punjba, Sindh and Balochistan as well.<sup>24</sup>
9. To monitor the activities of media outlets involved in propaganda against Islam and biased reporting or analysis against the Taliban’s struggle to create an Islamic state the militant networks based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) have announced to create a self-proclaimed Taliban Media Regulatory Authority. In an email sent to different media outlets by Taliban’s spokesperson Muhammad Umar noted “The work on Taliban Media Regulatory Authority is under way which will be made operational in few days.” It is pertinent to mention that this self-proclaimed authority has been constituted in the aftermath of twin suicide attack on Datarbar, Lahore. TTP categorically disassociated itself from these attacks but their view was not highlighted per se. The email alleged that many journalists work as agents of the government and security intelligence agencies.<sup>25</sup>
10. TTP has announced to suspend all its activities in South Waziristan Agency during Ramazan till 10 day of Eid. The TTP leader from Wana Mullah Nazir Ahmed

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<sup>20</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 7 May, 2010.

<sup>21</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 5 May, 2010.

<sup>22</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 19 May, 2010.

<sup>23</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 21 May, 2010.

<sup>24</sup> *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 20 July, 2010.

<sup>25</sup> *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 6 July, 2010.

Mujahid, Qari Amir Hamza, Maulvi Ikramullah issued a signed statement announcing suspension of militant activities in South Waziristan during the holy month.<sup>26</sup>

11. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Shura has appointed Inshllah Ahsan as its new Deputy Spokesperson. According to TTP Spokesperson Azam Tariq it was difficult for him to do his duties in other areas along with South Waziristan Agency that is why Inshllah Ahsan has been appointed as the Deputy Spokesperson who will perform his duties in Orakzia, Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber and Kurram Agencies.<sup>27</sup>
12. TTP has offered government a prisoner swap in return for 33 missing soldiers (which went missing in Mohmand Agency after an attack of the militants on a security forces convoy), or threatened to kill the men if their proposal was rejected. A Taliban spokesperson said “Pakistani authorities should face the consequences if they did not agree to the swap, calling for the details to be worked out in talks with tribal elders in Mohmand Agency.”<sup>28</sup> TTP has also put up posters in Khyber Agency warning those who supply goods to NATO forces in Afghanistan or their homes will be destroyed.<sup>29</sup> In Sherakai area of Frontier Region Kohat militants shot dead Haji Muhammad Khan the Chief of Jammāt-e-Islami (JI) FR Kohat.<sup>30</sup>
13. The spokesperson of banned TTP Swat Chapter Salman Ahrabi has warned people of Malakand Division not to purchase the properties of Awami National Party (ANP) members. He warned people of staying away from hujras (guest houses) and residences of ANP members as Taliban would soon target the residences and hujras of ANP members.<sup>31</sup>
14. Banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has denied its involvement in the abduction of Islamia College University’s (ICU) Vice Chancellor (VC) Dr. Ajmal. In an interview with a foreign news agency TTP Commander Tariq Afridi admitted kidnapping the VC of Kohat University of Science and Technology Dr. Lutfullah Kakakhel, who was later released after fulfillment of their demands and payment of ransom money. He hinted that Dr. Ajmal has been kidnapped by militant outfits of North Waziristan Agency.<sup>32</sup>
15. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed the responsibility of attacks on Afghan-bound NATO supplies across the country. They have vowed to carry out more such attacks. The spokesperson of TTP Azam Tariq has said, “We will carry out more such attacks in future. We will not allow use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan. This is also to avenge drone attacks.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> *Daily Jang*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 30 July, 2010.

<sup>27</sup> *Online News Network*, Islamabad, 25 June, 2010.

<sup>28</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 23 June, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 23 June, 2010.

<sup>30</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 24 June, 2010.

<sup>31</sup> *Daily Jang*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 27 November, 2010.

<sup>32</sup> *Daily Aaj*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 10 November, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 5 October, 2010.

16. The Hakeemullah Mehsud Group of TTP has claimed responsibility of killing three rival militants allegedly involved in murder of Usman Punjabi – the self proclaimed Spokesperson of Asian Tigers. A pamphlet distributed by the banned TTP in Miranshah said “General public is informed that Abid Masood alias Sabir Masood was killer of Mujahideen and spread anarchy in the area.”<sup>34</sup> Meanwhile Commander Tariq Ali of LI was injured along with his two younger brothers in a blast in Yousaf Talab area of Bara when a hand grenade went off at their home. Commander Shekhajan of Ansar-ul-Islam (AI) was shot dead by unknown militants in Matani areas in Peshawar.<sup>35</sup>
17. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has announced Rs 2 million for the flood-affected people of Mohmand Agency. Omar Khalid, spokesman of TTP in Mohmand, through a statement said he was announcing the aid due to government’s failure to provide proper and timely assistance to flood-hit people.<sup>36</sup>
18. The central spokesperson of TTP Azam Tariq has asked media reporters and journalists to be impartial in their coverage of incidents related to militancy. He maintained, “The media should avoid creating rifts in the ranks of mujahideen who are fighting a holy war.” He further upheld that International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander General David Petraeus was dictating Pakistani government and security forces to secure US interests in the region. TTP’s struggle would continue until government parted its ways with US-led NATO forces. Despite the floods the group’s activities were in full swing and their skirmishes were going on with the security forces in South Waziristan and Orakzai Agency.<sup>37</sup>

## 2009

1. The Swat Taliban head, Maulana Fazlullah, has conceded that his organization had been weakened. He said: “The Taliban movement is presently in a state of illness. When you are ill, your activities are curtailed. That is what has happened to Taliban organization, but it would bounce back.”<sup>38</sup>
2. In an interview with BBC the TTP chief Hakeemullah Mehsud has threatened to attack India. He said “If Pakistani security forces stop being sub-servant to American and end their alliance with US, the TTP will stop its attacks against the security forces as well.<sup>39</sup> He said their struggle will continue till the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan and after achieving this goal they will open up another front with India. Meanwhile, Hakeemullah Mehsud has constituted a special suicide squad “Baitullah Mehsud Shaeed Group” to avenge the killing of ex-TTP chief. The group has been

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<sup>34</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 5 October, 2010.

<sup>35</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, (Urdu), Peshawar, 9 October, 2010.

<sup>36</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 29 August, 2010.

<sup>37</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 3 August, 2010.

<sup>38</sup> *The News*, Islamabad.11 September 2009.

<sup>39</sup> *Daily Aaj-Kal*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 15 October, 2009.

entrusted with the task of carrying out suicide attacks against offices of foreign missions, security forces and government installations and officials.<sup>40</sup>

3. The deputy chief of TTP Qari Hussian has said the military operation against TTP in South Waziristan has helped them identify their enemies as the operation has exposed who their enemy is? He maintained that all the political parties who supported the current operation in South Waziristan including the ruling PPP and ANP are their enemies and they will deal with them.<sup>41</sup> TTP has warned media to stop working against it or face their wrath. TTP Spokesperson Azam Tariq has said, "The media would be called an independent only if it highlighted their point view along with government's stance."<sup>42</sup>

Also see,

#### 4. Stop working against us or face our wrath, Taliban warns media

Islamabad, Oct 24 (PTI) The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has warned the media to stop working against it or face its wrath. Any media that projects only the government's viewpoint and ignores that of the Taliban will be perceived as being part of the US'propaganda campaign and will be put on the militants'hit list, Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq said. The media could be described as independent only when it projected both versions, he said.<sup>43</sup>

<http://www.indiareport.com/India-usa-uk-news/latest-news/690957/Breaking/2/20/2>

5. The deputy chief of TTP Qari Hussian has said the military operation against TTP in South Waziristan has helped them identify their enemies as the operation has exposed who their enemy is? He maintained that all the political parties who supported the current operation in South Waziristan including the ruling PPP and ANP are their enemies and they will deal with them.<sup>44</sup> TTP has warned media to stop working against it or face their wrath. TTP Spokesperson Azam Tariq has said, "The media would be called an independent only if it highlighted their point view along with government's stance."<sup>45</sup> Meanwhile the militants have banned the entry of non-local journalists into North Waziristan Agency, alleging most of the outsiders were spreading propaganda against them.<sup>46</sup>

6. The spokesperson of banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Azam Tariq has claimed that the TTP leadership is safe and sound and their tactical retreat from

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<sup>40</sup> Daily Aaj, 18 October 2009.

<sup>41</sup> *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 21 October, 2009.

<sup>42</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 24 October, 2009.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 21 October, 2009.

<sup>45</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 24 October, 2009.

<sup>46</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 24 October, 2009.

South Waziristan is a part of their strategy. According to him the TTP militants will launch their guerilla operations against Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan very soon. He said the security forces are annexing the roads while their operatives are present in the mountains and forests that have started their guerilla activities against the security forces.<sup>47</sup> He said “Our Jihad against America is everlasting and we will not give up our struggle as long the government does not part its way from US.” He maintained that TTP did not make any declarations of Independent Waziristan.”<sup>48</sup>

7. In a surprising development a report of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Urdu Service revealed that the chief of TTP Swat chapter, Maulana Fazlullah had escaped to Afghanistan. In an interview with *BBC Urdu Service* he said that “Now the TTP will start its guerilla operations against the security forces in Swat and will debunk false claims the security forces about victories in Swat.”<sup>49</sup> An arrested terrorist Mushtaq Khatak has said the chief of TTP Swat Chapter is in Qandhar province of Afghanistan.<sup>50</sup>
8. Taliban militants have distributed pamphlets in South Waziristan Agency asking the government to accept their 10 demands by May 25 or face consequences. The demands include withdrawal of security forces from certain areas including the regional headquarter Wana, Ziari Noor army camp, Tanai and Shakai. The Taliban also want that the movement of the security forces is reduced and they stop monitoring roads and hunting Taliban. The TTP also demanded on 18 May 25 million rupees as ransom and release of their prisoners in the custody of the security forces in exchange for the release of Abdul Khaliq Farahi, Afghan Ambassador-designate for Pakistan, who was kidnapped from Peshawar on 22 September 2008.<sup>51</sup>
9. Unable to pose a substantial resistance to successful military operation onslaught in South Waziristan Agency, the Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has claimed of dispatching thousands of its fighters to Afghanistan to help Taliban against the American troop surge. Rejecting the US President Barack Obama’s new Afghan policy the TTP Commander Waliur Rehman, in an interview with Sky News, has said “A troop surge in Afghanistan will not defeat them.” He claimed that the TTP fighters were undeterred by the announcement of 30,000 extra US troops in Afghanistan. He said, “US defeat in Afghanistan is more visible day by day. Statements from their officials and army generals show that they are fed up and questioning how long they will stay in Afghanistan? They don’t have any idea that the Afghan nation and fighters from all over the Muslim world fight like brave soldiers. US plans have failed in Afghanistan and very soon the US will face defeat in Afghanistan.”<sup>52</sup> He maintained “The TTP move to send its troops into Afghanistan was consistent with Taliban strategy of waging a guerilla war against Pakistani forces

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<sup>47</sup> *Dialy Aaj-Kal*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 11 November, 2009.

<sup>48</sup> *Daily Aaj*, (Urdu), Peshawar, 19 November, 2009.

<sup>49</sup> *Daily Jinnah*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 18 November, 2009.

<sup>50</sup> *Daily Jnag*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 19 November, 2009.

<sup>51</sup> *Daily Mashriq*, (Urdu), Peshawar, 19 May, 2009.

<sup>52</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 3 December, 2009.

and a small number our fighters are sufficient to engage troops in Waziristan.” He claimed that Taliban are still strong in South Waziristan despite their tactical withdrawal in the wake of Operation *Rah-e-Nijat*. Wali-ur-Rehman was accompanied by TTP spokesperson Azam Tariq. He said the move to send TTP fighters to Afghanistan was in response to US decision of sending more troops to Afghanistan.<sup>53</sup>

10. While the TTP Chief Hakeemullah Mehsud has said, “The TTP is waiting for the snow fall in tribal areas and a befitting response to the security forces will be given in January. He said, “Currently we are regrouping and reorganizing. We will retaliate to the current operation in the same coin.”<sup>54</sup> While the TTP spokesperson, Azam Tariq has blamed the security agencies for the ongoing wave of terror in the cities of the country. He said, “It was an attempt by the agencies to defame the jihadi organizations.”<sup>55</sup> He directed his commanders to desist from abductions and other criminal activities and interference in North Waziristan Political Administration’s governance. He warned of stern consequences for those who violated his orders.<sup>56</sup>
11. Denying the involvement in the ongoing spate of terrorism in the major cities of the country especially, Peshawar and adjoining areas, the spokesperson of Tehik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Azam Tariq, has blamed that secret agencies of the country of such heinous acts to defame jihadi organizations.<sup>57</sup> He also warned the religious scholars of the country to be careful while issuing Fatwas against “*Mujahideen*” and their suicide bombings in Pakistan. He said these scholars should have visited areas where military operations were conducted and the military destroyed the mosques and madrassas in those areas before issuing such Fatwas.

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<sup>53</sup> *Dawn*, Islamabad, 24 December, 2009; *Daily Aaj*, (Urdu),

<sup>54</sup> *Daily Express*, (Urdu), Islamabad, 10 December, 2009.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>56</sup> *Daily Times*, Islamabad, 24 December, 2009.

<sup>57</sup> *The News*, Islamabad, 15 December, 2009.

## APPENDIX 2: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE - I

1. What, in your view, is the nature of conflict between Islam/Muslims and the West?
2. What role do you think historical interpretation of events played in the development of antagonistic images in West-Islam relations?
3. What are the major causes of misperception between Muslims and the West? Are they imagery or developed to suit particular interests of states or political elites?
4. How did the rise of Islam contribute to initial misperceptions? Why do we find this kind of rhetoric even during the Renaissance and Enlightenment?
5. During the period of emergence of Islam, the Christian world was not feared nor taken as a threat to the religion or state. On the other hand, this attitude is seen in medieval Christendom towards Islam. What are the reasons for this threat perception in Christendom and later in the secular West?
6. How far do you think Crusades 11<sup>th</sup> 13<sup>th</sup> Century contributed to these feelings?
7. Do you think the problem in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Iraq are rooted in the same pattern, or has each case a different set of issues which has led to this global problem of terrorism?
8. Is there any possibility of reducing the impacts of the conflicts between Muslims and the West? How far do you think economic and political interests of the United States are contributing to this phenomenon?
9. How do you think United Nations can contribute towards the transformation of this conflict?
10. The Muslims, for the first time in history, are suffering a defeatist mentality by portraying themselves as victims needing outside help. What strategies can help to change this outlook?
11. Can you suggest some strategies for the transformation of conflict between Muslims and the West?



### APPENDIX 3: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE - II

1. What in your view are the predominant narratives having conflict-generating tendencies between Muslims and the West?
2. How far do narratives by Europeans concerning the Crusades, the Golden Age of Islam and the end of the Ottoman Caliphate contribute to misperceptions? And what kind of images have these narratives produced in the Muslim mind?
3. How do you view Islamism: a threat to liberal democracy or a reformist movement?
4. In your view, is the antagonism within the Muslim world towards the West and especially America a result of a double standard policy of the West towards the Muslim world, or are other factors also involved?
5. How far do you think it is correct that Islam was spread by the sword?
6. How do you see co-existence and cooperation between Muslims and the West?
7. What in your view is the possibility of transformation of conflict between Muslims and the West?
8. Jihad as a political tool was used by the West against the Soviet Union during Afghan Jihad from 1979 and the *Mujahedeen* were promoted as heroes of the war. How far do you think this overnight change of terminology by the West concerning the same people from *Mujahedeen* to Terrorists contributed to the ongoing conflict between *Taliban* and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Tribal Areas of Pakistan?
9. Is the West sincere in promoting democracy and peace in the Muslim world?

**APPENDIX 4: MILITARY OPERATIONS AND PEACE AGREEMENTS 2002-2012**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Military Operation</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Peace Agreement</b>
2002	Operation Meezan. 30,000 Thousand Troops enter FATA		
Mar. 2004	South Waziristan: Kaloosha Village near Wana	27 Mar., 2004	Shakai Agreement between Nek Muhammad and Pakistan's Military
Jun. 11, 2004	South Waziristan: Nek Muhammad killed in Drone attack	22 Feb., 2005	Sararogha Peace Deal between Military and Baituallh Mehsud in South Waziristan
		5 Sept., 2006	Miranshah Peace Accord; North Waziristan. Peace Deal broke down on 20 May, 2007
Oct-Nov 2007	North Waziristan		
Oct 2007- May 2008	Swat Military Operation	20 April, 2008 21 May, 2008	Peace Deal between Awami National party Government and Tehreek-e-Nifaz-Shariat-Muhammadi led by Sufi Muhammad Swat militants under Fazulullah and ANP government
2008	Operation <i>Sirat-e-Mustaqeem</i> (right path)	June-July 2008	Khyber Agency Pact 18 member Jirga of Afridi Tribe against the militant activities of Mangal Bagh of Lashkar-e-Islam
Jan. 2008-Feb. 2008	South Waziristan: Operation <i>Zalzala</i> (earthquake) against TTP.		
Aug. 2008- Feb. 2009	Bajaur: Operation <i>Sher Dil</i> (Lion Heart)		
Oct. 2008-Sep. 2009	Mohmand following collapse of peace deal in May 2008		
26 Jan. 2009-Feb. 2009	Military operation in Swat	16 Feb, 2009	Peace agreement between Taliban and Government

<b>Apr. 2009- Aug. 2009</b>	Malakand Division: Operation <i>Rah-e-Rast</i> (Black Thunderstorm)		
<b>Sep. 2009- Nov. 2009</b>	Khyber: Operation <i>Bia Darghalam</i> (here I come back again) and <i>Khwakh ba Desham</i> (I will see you) against <i>Lashkar-e-Islam</i>		
<b>Oct. 2009- Mar. 2010</b>	South Waziristan: Operation <i>Rah-e-Nijat</i> (Path of Salvation) against TTP		
<b>Dec. 2009- Mar. 2010</b>	Orakzai. Military Operation in December 2009 and again in March 2010 re-launch of Operation <i>Khwakh Ba de Sham</i> .		
<b>2-3 Jul. - 18 Aug., 2011, 2011</b>	Kurram agency: Operation <i>Koh-e-Safaid</i> (Operation White Mountain)		
<b>21 Oct., 2011 -till date</b>	Khyber Agency against Lashkar-e-Islam		
<b>6 Apr., 2011</b>	Orakzai and Mohmand: Operation <i>Brekhna</i> (Thunder)		
		3 Feb., 2011	Kurram Peace Accord between Shiite and Sunni factions
<b>Source:</b> Author's own through Multiple resources			

