
The relationship between the social and the linguistic in 
Critical Discourse Analysis: A case study of Thai political 
science texts 
Ingrid Wijeyewardene, School of Education 

 
Abstract 

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) views discourse and text as social practice. It 
examines how language is used to produce, maintain, resist or challenge power 
relations in society. This paper argues that CDA benefits from an account of 
the historical and socio-political context as well as a detailed linguistic analysis 
of the texts. Both perspectives are important because of the way in which the 
social context and language enable and constrain a rhetorical space within 
which texts are produced. Three Thai political science texts written shortly 
after the 2006 coup in Thailand were analysed. An understanding of the 
historical and socio-political context in Thailand at this time sheds light on the 
specific rhetorical context in which the writers were operating. At the same 
time, the tools of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) allow us to interrogate 
the texts, for example through transitivity structures, to identify the particular 
ideological positions of the writers of the texts and the rhetorical strategies 
they use to legitimise or challenge the discourse of the coup and the coup 
makers. 

 
Introduction 
Times of conflict generate a great amount of political, media and academic debate 
that may support, reproduce or challenge the existing status quo. Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) explores how language is used in such situations to support and 
perpetuate unequal relations of power in society or to otherwise resist or challenge 
these relations. Understanding the rhetoric through which language is used to do 
this demands an interdisciplinary approach, including an assessment of the socio-
political context in which language and texts are produced and a theory of language 
that is socially oriented. This paper presents a brief overview of CDA and Systemic 
Functional Linguistics (SFL) as a theory of language ideally suited to research in CDA 
before illustrating a case in which the social context from above and language from 
below have shaped a rhetorical space within which three Thai political science texts 
on the 2006 coup in Thailand were produced.  

 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) investigates social problems or inequality in society 
as they are manifested through language. To this end, CDA explores not just the use 
of language, but how language is used to maintain, support or challenge relations of 
power in society (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 271). CDA is not a single method or 
approach per se. Rather, it is described as a “research programme” (Wodak & Meyer, 
2009, p. 4) in which researchers draw on a number of theories and methods to reveal 
hidden power relations in society. There is thus a dialectical relationship between 
language and social context, in which the interaction between the two is “mediated” 
(Fairclough, 1989, pp. 140-141; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 21). Texts in CDA are 
viewed as sites of struggle, for example, for political legitimacy. Crucial to 
understanding CDA are a number of key concepts: “ideology”, “discourse” and the 
notion of a “critical approach”. These terms are complex and have been defined 
differently by different schools of thought. Working definitions are provided below. 

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Ideology refers to “representations of the world which can be shown to contribute to 
establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and 
exploitation” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9). Systems of representations are defined by Hall 
(1996, p. 23) as “the systems of meaning through which we represent the world to 
ourselves and one another”. A key feature of ideology is that practices become 
normalised and are not perceived by actors as ideological behaviour (Fairclough & 
Wodak, 1997, p. 261).  

Discourse refers to the way ideology is represented in written or spoken language. 
Fairclough & Wodak (1997, p. 258) define discourse as “language use… as a form of 
social practice”. It also involves “ways of representing aspects of the world – the 
processes, relations and structures of the material world, the mental world… and the 
social world” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124). Discourses both shape and are shaped by 
culture, institutions and the social contexts in which they occur. They are ideological 
in the sense that they “produce and reproduce unequal power relations between… 
social classes… through the ways in which they represent things and position 
people”( Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258).  

A critical approach to the study of discourse requires three steps: the linguistic 
description of texts, the interpretation of texts as discursive practice, and an 
explanation of the relationship between discursive practice and social practices 
(Fairclough, 1989). A critical approach also considers the underpinning interests and 
historical context in which discursive acts take place (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 
261). A critical approach, moreover, seeks to justify these interpretations and 
explanations (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 88).  

CDA researchers have adopted a number of theoretical approaches. The approach 
proposed by Fairclough (e.g. 1989, 1992, 1995, 2003) combines textual analysis 
based on Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) 
with an account of the social structures and discourses within which texts are 
produced. Fairclough (1992) sees discourse as the use of language in social or 
cultural contexts where this use of language is ideological. He adopts SFL to analyse 
how discourse is “shaped and constrained” (p.64) by social structure and how 
discourse can be appropriated by individuals, groups or institutions to reproduce 
and transform the social context (p.65). Discourse can also be used to resist 
traditional power structures in society. Fairclough & Kress (1993, as cited in Wodak, 
2002, p. 12) argue that not only can the various methods in use in CDA expose 
implicit ideologies and structures of dominance in society, they can also be used to 
analyse resistance to conventional power structures. 

The Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (e.g. Wodak, 2002; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) 
stresses the importance of an historical perspective in CDA. The approach works 
from the premise that all discourses occur in a particular time and place, a product 
of their social, political and historical context. The greater the understanding of 
contextual configurations that shape particular practices and discourses, the better 
these discourses can be controlled or resisted. Thus DHA calls for an 
interdisciplinary approach, combining sociological theory, an analysis of the 
historical context and an analysis of discursive strategies in the text (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2009). This paper argues that an understanding of the historical and socio-
political context in which the 2006 coup in Thailand occurred and the prevailing 
discourses of the time can shed light on the nature of the texts themselves, and 
conversely, the linguistic and textual features can provide clues to the writers’ 
positions vis-a ̀-vis the coup and their responses to the dominant political discourses 
prevalent in Thai society.  

 
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Systemic Functional Linguistics 
The approach to CDA outlined above anticipates the need for a theory of language 
that is socially oriented. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) is such a theory as it 
offers a model of language in context. Proponents of SFL regard language or text 
and social structure as inextricably linked. As Halliday (1978, p. 89) argues, 
“language is controlled by the social structure, and the social structure is maintained 
and transmitted through language”. It is easy to see why SFL has been adopted as a 
method in CDA. SFL theorists propose a stratified model of language in which the 
meanings present in social contexts are realised in the form of language or text, and 
in which language or the texts produced by speakers/writers construe the context. 
The notion of context in this model refers to the “context of culture” and the 
“context of situation” (Halliday, 1978). The context of culture represents all the 
possible meanings, or “meaning potential”, that exist in a particular culture. The 
context of situation refers to the particular environment within the context of culture 
in which a text occurs. Speakers/writers have a set of resources or meaning potential 
to draw on. The meaning potential of a given context of situation is shaped by three 
variables: the field or type of social action; the tenor or role relationships and the 
mode or organisational structure of the text. These three variables taken together 
determine the register of a text (Halliday, 1978). This stratified model of language 
can be represented as follows: 

 
Figure 1. A stratified model of language 

Adapted from Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p.25 

 
It is argued that an analysis of the lexicogrammatical system, in this case features of 
the system of transitivity in Thai as used in these texts, can reveal how the writer of 
the text construes the context. At the same time, an understanding of the field is 
necessary to interpret the significance of transitivity choices in the texts about the 
coup. Using Halliday and Matthiessen’s diagram above as a model, this paper 
conceives of the interplay between context and language as follows, where the 
context or the field of discourse from above and the linguistic choices from below 
enabled and constrained a rhetorical space within which the texts were produced: 

 
Field 
 
Tenor 
 
Mode 

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Figure 2. The interplay between context and language 

 
The following sections outline some features of the socio-political context and the 
various discourses prevalent in Thailand at the time of the 2006 coup when the three 
political science texts were written. Looking from above we get a picture of events 
and social actors that shaped the context in which the three writers were working. 
Using the tools of SFL, namely a focus on transitivity choices within the experiential 
meanings found in the texts, we can explore how the language from below construes 
the role of these social actors embroiled in the events surrounding the coup. These 
writers attribute grammatical agency to social actors as a means to convey their 
position on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the coup, and this attribution (and, 
likewise, non-attribution) of grammatical agency reveals the particular ideological 
positions of these writers. The texts and social context in this study are mutually 
constitutive. That is, the texts are a product of the particular historical and socio-
political context in which the coup occurred, and at the same time they represent an 
attempt by the writers to preserve or challenge significant elements of the context 
through their use of language. The following section introduces the writers and their 
texts.  

 
The writers and their texts 
The three texts used in this study were all written shortly after the coup. “The right 
to stage the coup” by Khien Theeravit was published online on 13 October 2006 by 
the Thai World Affairs Centre, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. 
Khien is a retired, conservative, political scientist formerly of Chulalongkorn 
University who has been a loyal supporter of the royalist and conservative forces in 
Thailand for many years. His paper supports the actions of the coup leaders and 
condemns those of the Thaksin government. Chaiwat Satha-Anan’s “Aristotle and the 
19 September coup” was originally presented as the keynote speech to the Annual 
Meeting of Political Science and Administration at Ramkhamhaeng University on 29 
November, 2006. It was subsequently published in the journal, Faa Diaw Kan [Same 
Sky], (2007, special coup edition). Chaiwat is a US-trained political philosopher 
specialising in Peace Studies from Thammasat University. Chaiwat’s position is that, 
while he understood people’s felt need to overthrow the Thaksin government, coups 
are morally reprehensible. The third article, “The coup of 19 September turned 
citizens into phrai” by Pitch Pongsawat, was published in the same coup edition of 
the journal Faa Diaw Kan, (2007). Pitch is a younger, Marxist political scientist from 
Chulalongkorn University, trained in England and the United States. Pitch opposes 
the coup and the actions of the coup leaders. Due to the length of the texts and the 
intensive nature of the analysis, only selected sections from each of them have been 
analysed. The following sections illustrate how the texts construe aspects of the 
context, how the context bears upon the texts and the way in which they engage or 
not with various political and royalist discourses in Thai society. 

 
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Rhetorical context 
Various state ideologies have shaped what people say or are able to say about actors 
and events. The rhetorical context in which these events occurred is characterised by 
a dominant conservative, royalist/state ideology and a harsh defamation law that 
maintains and preserves the status quo in what Streckfuss (2011, p. 24) has called a 
“defamation regime”. A pervasive feature of the Thai socio-political landscape is the 
draconian le ̀se majeste ́ law, Article 112 of the criminal code, which dictates that any 
defamation of or insult directed at the king, the queen or the crown prince is 
punishable by up to 15 years in prison. Since 2001, the law has been used as a tool 
to silence political dissent and as a result, since around 2005, prosecutions have 
risen exponentially by over 1500% (Streckfuss, 2011, p. 205). This law means that 
any claim or belief propagated by the monarchy is unlikely to be contested. Royalist 
commentators and intellectuals have free rein to champion the royalist agenda while 
any open discussion of the monarchy or royal affairs is constrained. Indeed, in the 
three texts of this study, there is little or no overt reference to the king.  

Discourses in support of the monarchy are often presented in terms of a dichotomy. 
For example, the king or the elite in the royalist discourses are juxtaposed with 
corrupt politicians on the one hand and the rural masses and the poor on the other. 
The king is depicted as moral and ethical; he is “the moral authority “above” – on top 
of, higher than, superior to – the normal political institutions that are considered 
extremely corrupt” (Thongchai, 2008, p.24). This notion has fed into a discourse of 
“clean politics” which has influenced how people view politics in Thailand. Thongchai 
(2008) identifies four ideas that constitute this discourse of clean politics: 
“politicians are extremely corrupt”, “politicians come to power by vote-buying”; “an 
election does not equal democracy”; “democracy means a moral, ethical rule” (p. 25).  

Another key group in the discourse of clean politics is the rural masses who, it is 
claimed, prop up corrupt politicians because they are too ignorant or naive to know 
better. Because of the supposed pervasiveness of vote-buying, politicians are not 
regarded as legitimate. In this way the legitimacy of the whole electoral process has 
been questioned (Thongchai, 2008, p.27).  

These discourses have contributed to the debate on political legitimacy in Thailand. 
Askew (2010) argues that the current political crisis that began in 2005 represents 
the “manipulation of potent symbols of nation and monarchy to resist and limit 
change towards a fuller democracy” (p.7). Dressel (2010) makes an important 
connection in his discussion on the crisis of political legitimacy in Thailand with the 
role that agency plays in the construction of legitimacy and argues that “a focus on 
social actors clarifies the critical relationship between legitimacy and struggles over 
political power” (p.464).  

These struggles between the opposing social forces are taken up in the rhetorical 
strategies used by various commentators or intellectuals to try to position their 
listeners or readers. Thus insights on this issue may be gained by an analysis of how 
the linguistic potential of Thai can be used to serve and promote the interests of 
these divergent positions. The following section will look at how the coup and key 
actors/institutions such as the Thaksin government, the military and “the people” are 
represented in the three political science texts. It is argued that the construal of 
social actors, for example as agents, as affected by events, or as carriers of certain 
attributes, reflects the writers’ positions on the legitimacy of the coup. 

 
The 2006 Thai coup 
On 19th September, 2006, conservative interests loyal to the Thai monarchy and led 
by royalist factions within the military staged a coup that overthrew the popularly 
elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. The coup makers annulled the 1997 
“People’s Constitution”, restricted media and imposed martial law. The conflict 

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signalled a critical stage in a struggle between competing elite forces. It also 
triggered a conflict between conservative elites and a broader, society-based 
oppositional movement in Thailand. This struggle has polarised the country and the 
legitimacy or otherwise of the actions of those competing forces has been widely 
debated.  

The coup is realised in the three texts in significantly different ways. For example, it 
is realised in the grammar by Khien as something that merely occurred or as a carrier 
of certain attributes, with agent unstated or invisible, for example: 

rátthaprahǎan [[thiî kə̀ət khʉn̂ nay prathêet thay mʉ̂a wan thii ̂ 19 kanyaayon 2006]] ca 
prasòp khwaamsǎmre ̀t 

The coup [[that occurred in Thailand on 19 September 2006]] was successful. 

 
kaan tham rátthaprahǎan ʔàat ca nâaklia ̀t 

The staging of the coup may be ugly. 

 
Pitch on the other hand represents the coup as something to be considered. The 
second example here also suggests an external agent through a passive 
construction: 

… thátsanáʔ nay sǎŋkhom || thîi wa ̂a kaanrátthaprahǎan nán pen sìŋ campen 

… the view in society || that the coup is a necessary thing 

 
kaantham rátthaprahǎan mʉ̂a 19 kanyaa [[thii ̂ phàan maa]] nán ma ̂y sǎama ̂at ʔathíbaay 

The staging of the coup on 19 September [[that has past]] can’t be explained 

 
Chaiwat, however, construes the coup itself as agent, as something to instruct us: 

saphâap che ̂n nií tham hây khâaphacâw tòk yùu nay pomprisanǎa thaaŋ sii ̌nlatham 

This situation makes me fall into a moral enigma. 

 
phrɔ́ʔ Ø da ̂y tham hây sǎŋkhom thay læ ́ʔ na ́krátthasàat tɔ̂ŋ phachəən kàp pri ̀tsanǎa 
thaaŋ siǐnlatham  

because (the coup) made Thai society and political scientists confront a moral enigma  

 
Even from these few examples we can see a divergence in the writers’ 
representations of the coup that hints at how they construe the context. An analysis 
of the representation of various social actors also reveals further contrasts between 
the writers. 

 
The Thaksin government 
Thaksin’s rule in Thailand was complex. He rose to power in Thailand in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis, uniting disparate social forces and 
interests behind his pursuit of a neoliberal economic agenda aimed at restoring Thai 
business and introducing various social welfare programmes targeting the poor 
(Hewison, 2008; Pye & Schaffar, 2008). After the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) election victory 
in 2001, Thaksin faced two challenges: how to restructure business and counter the 
dominant, conservative state ideology that perpetuated the idea of a moral, 

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righteous monarchy and hierarchical notions of rule and subservience. With an 
electoral mandate in his favour, Thaksin and TRT proceeded to reshape the state, 
giving more power to professional and business classes in the governing of the 
country and taking power away from traditional sources, namely the monarchy, the 
military and the bureaucrats (Connors & Hewison, 2008, p.66). As the Thaksin 
government proceeded to implement new social welfare policies, Thaksin’s 
popularity increased with the working class and the farmers. The support enjoyed by 
Thaksin and the TRT party from formerly politically excluded sections of Thai society 
ensured their resounding victory in the 2005 election. However, as Thaksin’s 
electoral mandate was increased at this election, his authoritarianism grew (Hewison, 
2008, p.201). His rule became characterised by a number of contradictions in policy 
that contributed to the mass protests against him in 2005-6 and his eventual 
downfall in the coup of 19 September (Pye & Schaffar, 2008).  

The Thaksin government features prominently as agent in the article by Khien. In 
addition, Khien couples this agentive role with negative appraisal choices, for 
example, by using words with strong negative connotations such as “murder” and 
“violate”, or even equating the Thaksin government with Adolf Hitler, effectively 
demonising it. In this way, Khien taps into the discourse of the corrupt politician: 

Ø da ̂y tham kaankhâa tàttɔɔn prachaachon phûu bɔrísùt maa læ ́æw lǎay khráŋ 

Ø (Thaksin government) murdered and censored innocent people many times. 

 
rátthabaan Tháksǐn dây la ́mə̂ət sǎnyaa prachaakhom sám læ ́æw sám la ̂w 

Thaksin government repeatedly violated the social contract. 

 
Chaiwat on the other hand explicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of the government 
in an identifying clause: 

phrɔ́ʔ rátthabaan [[thiî thu ̀uk lóm pay]] pen rátthabaan [[sʉ̂ŋ mii thii ̂maa ya ̀aŋ 
chɔ̂ɔptham phaaytây rátthathammanuun…]] 

because the government [[that was toppled]] was a government [[that had legitimacy 
under the constitution…]]. 

 
Interestingly, Pitch does not explicitly mention Thaksin. The implication is that, 
unlike Khien, he does not see Thaksin as the main issue in claims for the legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of the coup.  

 
The people 
Thaksin’s rule saw an increasing participation in Thai politics by more sectors of Thai 
society as people from the working class and rural masses became more aware of 
the empowerment brought about by their active citizenship. This contrasts with a 
number of discourses of “the Thai people” who must bear the responsibility for the 
failure of Thai democracy, as perpetuated by the elite. “‘The people’ are an 
anonymous category which Thai urban classes think of as simple, close to the land, 
and preserving ‘culture’ from Western corruption. At the same time, ‘the people’ 
have caused democracy to fail through vote-selling” (Streckfuss, 2011, p. 207).  

Pitch alludes to the empowerment of the rural and working classes in his article. He 
argues that the coup represented an attempt by conservative forces to arrest this 
groundswell of participatory politics, effectively turning these citizens into “modern 
phrai”, a term historically used to refer to a “bonded commoner”, dependent on a 
hierarchical master and colloquially used as an insult to depict a vile, base, 
uneducated person. His representation of “the people” as affected by events and 

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possessing no agency illustrates how this group was disenfranchised by the Thai 
elites:  

 
Ø tɔ̂ŋ thùuk khûapkhum dooy phûupòkkhrɔɔŋ 

(Phrai) must be controlled by governors 

 
rát ʔeeŋ … tham hây phonlamʉaŋ pen phrây  

the state itself … turned citizens into phrai  

 
“The people” figure prominently in Khien’s article as an amorphous mass, like-
minded, following the rule of law, and rising up as one against a corrupt, 
authoritarian government:  

 
thúk khon ca tɔ̂ŋ tham taam ko ̀tmǎay læ ́ʔ rátthathammanuun 

Everyone must follow the law and constitution 

 
During the crisis in 2005-6, the opposition countered Thaksin’s claims of an electoral 
mandate with their discourse of “clean politics”. Since the coup, there have been calls 
to reform Thai democracy to ensure that political decision-making remains in the 
hands of the monarchy and the elite who know what is best for the country. A 
Western-style democracy, it is claimed, would not suit Thailand and could lead to a 
“tyranny of the majority” (Phasuk & Baker, 2008, p.78, citing de Tocqueville). Khien 
promotes this view: 

 
…ra ́tthǎathípa ̀t [[thiî tham tua nʉ̌a kòtma ̌ay dooy ʔaasǎy khon camnuan ma ̂ak]] nán 
pen “thɔrarâat khɔ̌ɔŋ khon khâaŋ mâak”  

…the government [[that puts itself above the law by depending on a majority of 
people]] is a “tyranny of the majority” 

 
Adolf Hitler... kɔ̂ dâyra ́p khánææn siǎŋ sanàpsanǔn càak kaanlʉâktâŋ maa ya ̀aŋ 
thûamthón ma ̂y phæ ́æ khɔ̌ɔŋ rátthabaan Tháksǐn  

Adolf Hitler... also received overwhelming electoral support like the Thaksin 
government 

 
It is clear here that the two writers’ positions are vastly different. Khien’s rhetorical 
stance aligns with the voices of the monarchy and the elite whereas Pitch, by 
representing the people as phrai and as affected participants with no grammatical 
agency, takes up the voice of the people.   

 
The military 
Many scholars see the coup fundamentally as a move by the monarchy and its 
supporters to regain control over the hearts and minds of the Thai population 
(Hewison, 2008; Thongchai, 2008; Ukrist, 2008). The empowerment of the rural 
masses through Thaksin’s popular policies was a concern for the monarchy that 
found it had to compete for the loyalty of the people (Hewison, 2008, p.207). 

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Royalist factions within the military were intent on protecting a “monarchy in danger” 
(Askew, 2010, p.14) from the anti-monarchy and anti-democratic Thaksin 
government. The military group that toppled Thaksin and the TRT party legitimated 
their actions through this anti-Thaksin royalist sentiment.  

Each of the articles refers to the military and their role in the 2006 coup. But the 
contrast between Pitch’s and Khien’s representations is stark. For Khien, the military 
in this latest coup is construed as an unwilling participant with no agency but 
ultimately being forced into a position where they had to act against an amoral and 
antagonistic enemy. 

Ø ca tɔ̂ŋ thùuk tàt sìt khân phʉ́ʉnthǎan nay thaaŋ kaanmʉaŋ pay dûay 

Ø(military) must be cut off from their political rights 

 
“phu ̂uráay [[thii ̂ mii ʔi ̀tthíphon” læ ́ʔ mii ʔamna ̂at thaaŋ kaanmʉaŋ]] tɔ̂ŋkaan dʉŋ phûak 
khǎw khâw pay sanàpsanǔn Ø nay kaantɔ̀ɔsûu kàp fàay troŋkhâam nán  

Influential offenders with political power pull them (military) in to support (offenders) 
in a fight with the opposition 

 
thahǎan yɔ̂ɔm ʔʉt̀ʔàtcay mâak  

The military are likely very frustrated. 

 
nay thîi sùt klùm thahǎan….kɔ̂ dây tàtsǐncay tham rátthaprahǎan 

Finally, the military group… decided to stage the coup. 

 
For Pitch, on the other hand, the military are depicted as agents working to keep “the 
people” in their place. 

nææwkhít rʉâŋ kaanpen thahǎan ʔaachiîp nán yi ̂ŋ tham hây thahǎan yûŋ kìaw ka ̀p 
kaanmʉaŋ mâak khʉ̂n  

The idea of military professionalism causes the military even more to interfere in 
politics 

 
thahǎan sâaŋ khwaamchɔ̂ɔptham nay kaan khâw sæ ̂æksææŋ thaaŋ kaanmʉaŋ dooy 
troŋ 

The military build legitimacy for direct political intervention 

 
Conclusion 
The few examples presented here of how different social actors are construed in the 
three texts illustrate the link between the socio-political context the linguistic 
choices. Forces and ideologies within the social context have shaped the way writers 
have discussed the 2006 coup. For example, the way in which the writers construe 
agency in their texts reveals their particular ideological stance, and their attempt to 
legitimise or delegitimise the discourse of the coup. Khien champions the royalist 
agenda and legitimises the actions of the military in staging the coup. Pitch 
highlights how the struggle for political legitimacy has excluded a large part of the 
population. Chaiwat cites the legitimacy of the Thaksin government and suggests 
that academics must question the coup. Further analysis of these texts is warranted 
to gain a clearer picture of how the context and language has shaped this rhetorical 
space. 

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