

Paper 1: Linking Paper

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Paper 1: Linking Paper

1. Introduction

This Portfolio consists of seven closely related Papers, of varying length, which propose an approach towards the Philosophy of Education congruent with Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) as it has come to be practised in the State of New South Wales, Australia.

2. The argument of the Portfolio Papers

Each Paper in the Portfolio develops a particular concept and that concept then, is integrated into the broad concept of education being proposed.

- i) This first Paper provides an overview that links the Papers of the Portfolio as an integrated project; it also provides relevant information about this author that positions the writer's professional context in the Portfolio.
- ii) The second Paper examines three background matters relevant to any discussion of CPE as professional education. It begins by noting what is common in the practices of medical doctors and hospital Chaplains and what is distinctive in those practices before concentrating upon the role of the hospital Chaplain and outlining the current practice for the training and formation of Chaplains in the State of New South Wales. After a short comment on the issue of Modernity, the Paper notes the contribution of key figures in the history of CPE in the United States of America and the formulation of the signature pedagogy of the profession of the hospital Chaplain. It is against that background that the following Paper unfolds.
- iii) The third Paper develops a concept of education drawing heavily upon the work of the English Analytical Philosopher of Education, R.S. Peters, and contends that Clinical Pastoral Education programmes offered by the New South Wales College of Clinical Pastoral Education Incorporated (NSWCCPE Inc.—an Inter-Christian Association for the education of Christian Chaplains for Denominational pastoral care in hospitals, aged care facilities, prisons and factories) is an initiation into three worthwhile traditions, namely the traditions of Clinical Pastoral Education, of Denominational Christian Pastoral Care, and of Liberal Education. Drawing upon Aristotle it is maintained that the initiation is through a rhetorical strategy; in the first place it is a rhetoric of identity and a rhetoric of invitation, and secondly, the key rhetorical proof is the ethos of the CPE Supervisors for the CPE Unit. The signature

pedagogy of CPE methodology consists in the use of Verbata in the Supervisory Sessions, both individual and group, and the Verbata are the rhetorical tactic of the persuasion. The Verbata share a family resemblance to both case reasoning and case studies of qualitative research methodology.

- iv) The fourth Paper recognises that the educational context of CPE is tertiary and so there is an examination of what the heart of Liberal Education is at that level. Given that the work of Philosophers of Education used in developing a concept of education had been focussing on School Education, it is relevant to show what the key dimension of Liberal Education is in the context of Higher Learning. Further, given the practice of CPE Units being part of the Master of Arts (Chaplaincy) degree, the New South Wales College of Clinical Pastoral Education Incorporated (NSWCCPE Inc.) grants a raft of awards as a member of the Sydney College of Divinity, a Commonwealth recognised tertiary institution, it is relevant to examine what is the core of Liberal Education in that context of tertiary education. This Paper draws on the insights of J. H. Newman to argue that it consists in being able to reason clearly and accurately.

But CPE does not focus upon theoretical academic disciplines but on teaching and forming the student to be a wise practitioner in the concrete situation of pastoral care as a denominational Chaplain.

- v) The fifth Paper uses insights from case reasoning on the one hand, and on the other, from case studies in Qualitative Research Methodology, to contend that the knowledge generated through the use of the Verbata, is trustworthy. Therefore the educational methodology of the student's Verbatim, presented and discussed in the supervisory sessions, is a trustworthy tactic that complements the rhetorical strategy of initiation.
- vi) The sixth Paper develops the concept of educating the wise practitioner drawing heavily upon the long practice of Harvard University Medical and Business Schools and utilising the phronesiology of Aristotle, Aquinas and Newman. The argument is that "wisdom" is not "taught" but is honed through reflective practice under the guidance of a mentor. That learning can be understood more deeply through the use of Vygotsky's "zone of proximal development" for the individual student, and in the group setting of CPE supervision, insights from Winnicott, Klein, and Bion further enrich the educational concept being proposed.

- vii) Then in the seventh and final Paper, the argument developed across this Portfolio is summarised, and improvements for professional practice in light of the philosophical concept of Education articulated are proposed. Observations are offered in regard to some problems associated with Chaplaincy practice in late capitalist society. Some comments are made around student assessment and possible further work is noted.

3. Methodology

Two strands of the methodology used in this Portfolio warrant comment, the philosophical perspective and the position of the author in the Portfolio. A brief description of the philosophical position will be offered, and then, at greater length, the position of the author will be presented to provide an authorial warrant for the professional voice of the writer.

a) Philosophical perspective

The Papers of this Portfolio have been articulated within two broad schools of philosophical thought. On the one hand I have drawn on Aristotelean thought for an epistemic realism and rationalism, both deductive and inductive, along with an understanding of rhetorical thought; on the other hand, the philosophy of education is formulated within the British Analytical Philosophical tradition that focuses upon the analysis of concepts and arguments as used in English language. The philosophical method of analysis itself is as old as Plato (Bowen & Hobson 1974:346) but in the early years of the Twentieth Century philosophers suggested that such analysis belonged to the essence of philosophy (Bowen & Hobson 1974:346). In the 1930s the approach was developed by the Logical Positivist to include accounts of the general structure of human language and thought and there was a critical concern with language and how meaning was constructed. The approach was challenged by Quine (1908–2000) who contended that there were no determinate structures to thought and language for the philosopher to analyse or assess (Baldwin 2006:13), but many were not persuaded by his argument and were of the view that analytical philosophy has values quite sufficient to ensure it a role as a central philosophical method for the foreseeable future (Baldwin 2006:14).

The later Wittgenstein and the Oxford ordinary language philosophers were not concerned with the underlying structures of language but analysed the way we speak to establish our concepts. In brief, the approach is accurately described as a style or manner of philosophy and historically the approach was used by R.S. Peters and others to develop an account of the concept of education in the school setting. Here I am following principally R.S. Peters and I will be seeking to

examine matters primarily from a philosophical perspective.

b) Positioning of the author in the Portfolio

The general approach being followed in this Portfolio is that as outlined by Maxwell and Kupczyk-Romanczuk (2009), which includes the positioning of the Portfolio author in the Portfolio's investigation, indicating the professional background being brought to that Professional Doctorate research study (Maxwell & Kupczyk-Romanczuk 2009:6–7). Muldoon (2010) records how useful she found Maxwell and Kupczyk-Romanczuk's metaphor of the facade of a Classical Greek Temple building with the writer standing on its steps; my approach is less linear than that of Muldoon. While conceding the recognition of the role of the authorial voice in the project that seeks to contribute to the improvement of the profession, I note the limitation of the metaphor that is one dimensional rather than three and which does not include the time factor, something that is important if an author is seeking to "improve professional practice". At the same time I note Bourdieu's (1996) point that the intellectual/researcher is "not ethically neutral" or "an impartial spectator" (Bourdieu 1996:257); moving beyond the concept of the "total individual" (Sartre) and the "specific intellectual" Bourdieu proposes the "collective individual" of a collaborative critical effort of a group of scholars (Bourdieu 1996:259). The focus is upon "scholarship with commitment" (Bourdieu 1999), in other words bypassing "the canonical opposition that is made, especially in the Anglo-American tradition between "scholarship" and "commitment" (Bourdieu 1999:180). Following Bourdieu, if one treats educational research as a field, then it follows that it is necessary "to situate the individual researcher within it" (Grenfell 2007:246). Accordingly, while recognising the constraints of the metaphor of the Temple facade, I turn now to outline my professional background which positions me in this project.

I am a Roman Catholic Clergyman educated at St Patrick's College Manly (NSW), graduating from that Pontifical Faculty of Theology with the postgraduate Licentiate in Theology. After fifteen months in Parish pastoral responsibilities at a junior level, I was appointed to supervise Religious Education in the Catholic Schools in the small rural Diocese of Armidale in Northern New South Wales; the Diocese had an area of 91,500 square kilometres (Australian Catholic Bishops Conference 2001:52). Each Australian Catholic Diocese appointed a priest to "inspect" the teaching of Christian Doctrine annually in each Catholic school in the Diocese and to report to the Bishop on the level of religious orthodoxy at the school. That practice had been mandated by the 1895 Second Plenary Council (Fogarty 1959b:426) and confirmation of that practice

found support in Pope Leo XIII's letter on education to the Bishops of Hungary (Fogarty 1959b:425). Monsignor Con Duffy, a Diocesan School Inspector in the Archdiocese of Sydney (1952–62), in an undated address, remarked that

(h)is title (Diocesan School Inspector) was the biggest thing in his [appointment]... [that Episcopal appointment in itself was deemed by the appointing Bishop to have] supplied whatever qualifications needed for a junior priest. At the most a simple BA degree and Dip Ed was judged sufficient to permit the priest to assume parallel status with the hierarchy of the State Department where advancement was arduous (quoted in Luttrell 2003:18).

A priest's theological training "would enable them to oversee the content of religious syllabuses" (Luttrell 2003:38). For the teaching of "Christian Doctrine" there was, for both pupil and teacher, the *Catechism of Christian Doctrine* ("the Green Catechism"), mandated by the Second Plenary Council (1895) and the Fourth Plenary Council (1937) along with the *Religion Syllabus for Primary Schools* (1947) and *Syllabus of Studies of Christian Doctrine ... for Use in All Catholic Post-Primary Schools mandated by the Bishops of the Province of New South Wales and the ACT* (1947). The classroom focus had long been on teaching "Christian Doctrine", which concentrated upon drilling pupils to give the correct doctrinal response to a brief doctrinal question—an approach whose earliest recorded instance is in the Eighth Century and which was developed in the late Medieval period and which became common to both Catholic and Reformed Traditions (Flood 1999:33–4). In the early sixties the national Conference of Australian Bishops approved a series of new classroom texts that sought to blend updated theological perspectives and the insights from modern pedagogy informed by the Social Sciences—*Catholic Catechism Book One* (1962), *The Catholic Catechism. Book Two* (1963) and *My Way To God Books 1–4* (1964). The project was under the chairmanship of Monsignor John F. Kelly (1910–92), the third Director of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese of Melbourne, whom the Australian Bishops seconded for that project; the works appeared anonymously but with the full authorisation of the Australian Bishops as mandated classroom texts (Pascoe 2006:121–98).

So as the Diocesan School Inspector, I needed to be familiar with the Social Science behind the new classroom texts as well as the theology informing the texts, but that did not compensate for the absence of "teaching experience or formal teaching qualifications" (Luttrell 2003: 38). Accordingly, there was pressure upon me, if there was to be some credibility before the classroom teachers and for the comments in the reports, to acquire appropriate university qualifications in education.

At the same time the customary duties of the Diocesan School Inspector in the Armidale Diocese included a general inspection of the school to gauge student grasp of the subjects taught with a report going to the school principal, the Pastor and the Bishop. The School Inspector was also responsible for setting and correcting a Diocesan-wide examination for sixth class pupils in the major subject areas. Successful pupils were awarded a Diocesan Certificate at “Pass” and “Honours” levels. The Diocesan Certificate was modelled on the earlier “Qualifying Certificate”, an external Department of Education examination for all sixth class pupils in the State; that Qualifying Certificate examination was held from 1911 to the late 1930s (Luttrell 1996:30). From one angle the sixth class Diocesan examination provided Bishops with a means to monitor “standards” in the Parish schools and served as an alternative and internal assessment as opposed to the assessment for school registration made by a school inspector of the Department of Education and which was required for certification to operate as a registered school since the 1916 *Public Instruction Amendment Act* (Luttrell 1996:30). School registration was seen as important, partly as evidence that Catholic school performance matched the government schools in general, and partly that the registration was essential if a school’s pupils were to be eligible to sit for the State Secondary School Bursary examinations in accordance with the 1912 *Bursary Endowment Act* (Luttrell 1996:30).

The School Syllabi of the Department of Education were followed in the Catholic Schools because pupils sat Public Examinations and also sought Bursaries awarded to the top students sitting those examinations. Those State Department Syllabi were grounded in the pragmatism of the influential American Educational Philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952), who held that

(f)aithe in the divine author [with its] inherited ideas of the soul and its destiny, of fixed revelation...have been made impossible for the cultivated mind of the Western world. It is psychologically natural that the outcome should be a collapse of faith ... Skepticism becomes the mark and even the pose of the educated mind (Dewey 1930 reproduced in Hickman & Alexander 1998, at p.28).

While Catholic teachers and Educationalists rejected Dewey’s epistemology “there was nonetheless an influence [by Dewey] on Catholic practice in Australia, especially in the matter of techniques” (Fogarty 1959b:392).

Accordingly, I developed an interest in a philosophical concept of education that did not clash with the Religious position and purpose of Catholic Schools. During my university studies I read R.S. Peters and J. Habermas and became convinced that their epistemological positions

could be used to formulate a concept of education that was compatible with Catholic religious beliefs. That was explored in postgraduate research (Flood 1999).

At the time of my appointment the Diocese comprised 26 Parishes, 25 of which had a Parish school which enrolled pupils from Kindergarten to Year 3 Secondary, the “Intermediate Certificate” year, so called because of the state-wide examination which was the gateway into the workforce ranging from nursing through to semiskilled labour. The Parish schools were a Parish responsibility rather than a Diocesan Administrative unit; the Parish had sole responsibility for the capital development at the school and a Diocesan mandated financial commitment of three hundred pounds annually for each Religious teaching in the Parish school (Third Diocesan Synod of the Diocese of Armidale 1951, Decree 97). The Religious Congregation staffing the particular school allocated the religious staff, appointed the School Principal and provided some professional support for their members. Each congregation trained its own teachers in its own Teachers’ Training College and from June 1929 with the appointment of the Vincentian Priest, Fr. John Thompson, former lecturer at St Mary’s Teacher Training College Strawberry Hill in Middlesex (1922–9) as Director of Catholic Education in NSW, those graduates were accredited by an agent of the NSW or Provincial Bishops (Luttrell 1992:27–8). The School Principal was responsible for the setting and collecting of all school fees which provided the school with its sole recurrent income.

In addition there were five full secondary schools, each owned and operated by a Congregation and which followed the single-sex policy generally followed in Europe and Australia in the Nineteenth Century. Those schools prepared students for the state-wide Intermediate Certificate, and for university matriculation by the “Leaving Certificate”.

My association with the schools continued for some twenty-five years, with my role gradually changing from being the Inspector of Religious Education into the chief executive officer for a Diocesan System of Schools responsible to the Bishop/chairman of the Diocesan Trustees and continuing for a further five years in the area of Religious Education supervision under a Lay Diocesan Director. During those thirty years in Religious Education responsibilities, the Diocesan role changed from being Inspector of Christian Doctrine to Religious Education Consultant with each school responsible for developing its own school-based religious education curriculum. Eventually another qualified and experienced officer was employed to support curriculum development in the primary schools and the work at office level required close collaboration.

I was succeeded by an experienced lay educationalist from interstate but remained in my role in Religious Education because the incoming Director lacked those skills. When the first lay Diocesan Director of Schools resigned suddenly, the then Bishop appointed me for a further three years as Diocesan Director. Neither the first indefinite appointment, nor the second appointment for three years (1984–7), followed any prior consultation, something that reflected the junior status of the appointment noted in Monsignor Duffy’s comment above.

Three major changes occurred during that time that required responses in my professional roles: first, there was a radical structural reorganisation of the network of Catholic Schools in that region as well as across the nation at large; it was a change that shifted the schools from being a loose parish network to a Diocesan system. The change was not planned and drew strong opposition from the traditional stake-holders as reflected in Luttrell’s title for his M.Ed. Hons thesis: “You’ve taken our schools” (Luttrell 1992). The Religious Congregations of Brothers formed their schools into a loose grouping of so-called Independent Schools, “outside the new System” (Luttrell 1992:93). De La Salle College in Armidale and St Mary’s College in Gunnedah eventually joined the Systemic grouping when religious staffing was no longer possible. That restructuring of the Parish schools was necessary because State and Federal Governments required increasingly accurate financial accountability for all capital and recurrent funding on the one hand, and on the other, as the collective unit of the Diocese. Further, with the rapid decline in the number of religious teachers, school staffing by religious teachers was replaced by lay staffing employed under Industrial Awards which the State Industrial Courts adjudicated if there was a dispute over pay or conditions between employer and employee. Further the large Federal Government Recurrent Grants generated distinctive administrative needs—payment of salaries each fortnight, the allocation of the Systemic Recurrent Grants across the schools according to “need”, the rationale of which was developed locally but articulated to Government in the annual detailed reporting to Government for the use of Recurrent and Capital Grants.

It was soon evident that the intricacies of the Law could be better met by the Parish organisation giving way to a Diocesan structure of “Systemic Schools”. The term “Systematisation” to characterise the centralisation of the schools across a Diocese, was coined in the Catholic Schools Office of the Archdiocese of Sydney (D’Orsa 1999:51) and the schools involved were termed “Systemic Schools”—a practice that spread rapidly. It was also an organisational change encouraged by the Governments preferring to deal with a collective agency rather than a

multitude of individual schools. Further lay staff were usually unionised and their unions acted on behalf of their members referring to the judgement of the Industrial Court contentious cases between employees and employer (cf. Luttrell 1992:112–3). Again, that practice favoured a Systemic approach rather than each school functioning alone. The balancing of competing interests (local against regional) and ensuring that the centrifugal forces of local interest did not undermine those of the larger unit required both sensitivity and firmness.

During the same period state-wide syllabi were replaced by school-based curriculum development and the role of consultant-advisor replaced the old inspectorial model. Curriculum Studies were taught at the University of New England under Professor Jack Walton and one of its graduates was employed for supporting school-based Primary Curriculum development, implementation and evaluation; the area of Religious Education Curriculum continued to remain my responsibility in the small office, but the emphasis shifted more to staff support than inspection of pupils and teachers. Also there were changes in strategies of staff appraisal, but the focus was primarily upon curriculum matters.

The changes in Catholic School administration and the emergence of the Systemic Schools' model was not planned at the level of the rural Dioceses but was a matter of “riding on the coat tails” of the reorganisation of the Archdiocese of Sydney, facilitated by the formation in 1986 of three separate units (Sydney, Broken Bay and Parramatta) from the former larger Archdiocese. The Catholic Education Offices of Sydney, Broken Bay and Parramatta were “complex organizations” and the changes were effected by a Religious Brother whose 1986 Doctoral project at the University of San Francisco provided the blue print for the transition (Canavan 1990). The Diocese of Armidale School System was much smaller in size and insights were drawn from the metropolitan developments particularly in NSW for school administration and in Religious Education from the Archdiocese of Melbourne.

The experience I had gathered in school education and administration had some application to the situation of the College of Clinical Pastoral Education context as the College structured itself to operate as an affiliate of the Sydney College of Divinity. I turn now to outline my role in the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education.

I served on the College Executive and was invited to join the Academic Board because I brought school educational administration experience few other members had; and also, there was experience relating to curriculum development, curriculum implementation, curriculum

evaluation and student assessment that threw a different light on the planning problems. My earlier interests found a new relevance—the need for clear thinking around the purpose of the educational project, the importance of the historical dimension, reflecting my four year history major in the Arts Degree, the need for accurate theological understanding and the foundational importance of respecting people of different Religious viewpoints and their Denominational stance.

It was out of that collection of experiences and ongoing professional need, that the formulating of a concept of Education, clear, coherent and philosophically articulated, became my ongoing interest in the CPE setting. The concern went beyond framing a philosophical view to being able to communicate that insight to others involved in the broader project—“followers” from one perspective, and “stake holders” from another perspective, while being alert to the changing sociological milieu in which we were living.

Nor did that professional interest in education cease with my involvement with School Education and Administration; it was carried through into my involvement with Clinical Pastoral Education as will be made clear when I describe my involvement in the State College of CPE below.

On leaving School Education I returned to Pastoral Ministry and spent twelve months at Fordham University in New York studying Theology, Scripture and Pastoral Counselling and Spiritual Guidance, focussing upon “attentive listening” practice in ordinary pastoral practice; those programmes followed the insights of Karl Rogers and Eugene T. Gendlin, among others, along with training in Spiritual guidance according to the Ignatian model, broadly, an action-research model. During that period I attended a three-day intensive seminar conducted by the American Association for Psychological Type to train people in the use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). The outcome of that seminar was a better self-understanding on the one hand, and on the other, an appreciation of how other people understand and respond. It explained at a personal level the determination that marked “my watch” in the Catholic Schools Office. As a strong INTJ (a person whose Intuition (**N**) is introverted (**I**) and dominant, whose Thinking function (**T**) is extraverted, whose inferior is Extraverted Sensing and whose orientation to the outer world is through organisation and who prefers Judgements (**J**) to perceiving the possibilities in a situation), I am a task-oriented and outcomes focused person; I am comfortable with change and not everyone is; at the same time I am at ease with seeking to be creative in response to a practical situation, and to mix well both theory and practice. There is a strong interest in the larger picture, and a need to reach a quick resolution. Tapping into “my

shadow side” I could acquit myself well enough in other aspects of Psychological Type when I took matters slowly and steadily.

After twelve months postgraduate work in America, I became involved in Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) training, something I had heard about when in America and which was operating in the metropolitan areas of NSW. The initial CPE Unit was part-time and in a correspondence mode of education in a rural setting. Eventually, I completed all the Basic Units and also the Advanced Unit at a registered metropolitan CPE Centre. By then, I was on the Chaplaincy team at Royal North Shore Hospital as a full-time Roman Catholic Chaplain and began the part-time programme for CPE Supervision. In that setting, while tapping into the rich tradition of CPE, I was able to use and apply what I had learnt in the USA about “Attentive Listening”, “spiritual guidance” and used the understanding a MBTI lens brought to many situations.

With my background in Education and organisational change, I took part in the organisational life of the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education. The College was seeking to become an accredited provider of Tertiary Professional Education but was also attracted to a Technical College competency model as a provider. I served several terms on the Executive of the NSW College of CPE Incorporated including the role of Secretary. Because of my previous professional background, I was elected to the College’s Academic Board at the time the College was working towards becoming associated with the Sydney College of Divinity and obtaining recognition from the Higher Education Board for its programmes for a raft of degrees and awards under Commonwealth tertiary regulations. During some of the Academic Board meetings, the most Senior CPE Supervisor and Head of its prestigious CPE Teaching Centre, reviewed earlier developments in the College and the background to the College’s switch to an educational model for its teaching programmes. There were concerns around continuity of the distinctive CPE pedagogy, the issues of standards and student assessment, the use of the portfolio, and organisational unity of purpose among the loose federation of CPE Centres that were the teaching agencies of the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education.

Again, I saw the need for a clear articulation of what was at the heart of the eight educational processes of CPE, the importance of curriculum and the minimum level of recognised prior learning if the programme was to have credibility both with the Churches and Allied Professional Groups in the broader community. Others, both in the College membership and on the Executive and its Committees did not always share my concerns to the same level. It was

there that the MBTI Typology was helpful both in understanding their reservations and why, as “Feelers”, they perceived my “thinking” emphasis as alien to the central concerns of the College. While not pre-empting the professional judgement of my peers, I felt that it was important for me to develop my ideas more fully and more clearly before presenting them to the College at large. This Professional Portfolio reflects my working through some of the key issues; those issues are “key” for me, because of my previous professional background on the one hand, and on the other, the insights generated might be useful for members of the College.

During the postgraduate diploma year at Fordham University I did course work in Family Therapy and developed an abiding interest in the then emerging “Brief Therapy” approach which seemed to me to offer insights into pastoral ministry in general, and into hospital chaplaincy in particular. While the concern was with “normative” behaviour rather than the therapeutic, the pastoral contact in most situations was brief rather than “long term”. An opportunity came up to attend an intensive three-day seminar offered by Eastwood Family Therapy Centre in “Solution-focussed Brief Therapy” with a couple of leading USA exponents. That was followed up with a second intensive a few years later. Three aspects made the approach attractive: its cognitive emphasis; its action-research dynamic; and its usefulness in my professional practice within a broadly CPE model. I applied insights from Solution-focus Therapy into my Chaplaincy practice; from my reading of the response of the patients visited in the hospital, the approach served well my Chaplaincy role. In general the interest in Solution-Focus Therapy built on my interest in the Social Sciences and the help that can be gained from them for improved professional practice—something that is reflected in a number of Papers in this portfolio.

I readily acknowledge that I am not “mid-career” in my profession, but am nearing its end, unlike most professional doctorate students. Nonetheless, the longer experience and the range of those experiences may provide a perspective useful to other members of the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education. My background, therefore, indicates that the voice of this researcher’s Portfolio is “valid” as that of “an experienced professional” and, in turn, that supports that “credibility is brought to bear upon the analysis” (Maxwell & Kupczyk-Romanczuk 2009:7).

Finally, a brief explanation why the Portfolio Papers have not sought to offset gender bias in the language in the discussion. Firstly, as the quotations come from another historical and cultural period, the use of the male pronoun may reflect either the society of that period when women did not engage in that activity, or, if they did, one custom was to use the male pronoun in an

inclusive sense – something which contemporary practice would deem inadequate and perhaps sexist in a contemporary social context. Accordingly, the Reader needs to be alert to the historical and cultural context from which the quotation is taken.

Paper 2: Background Issues

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Paper 2: Background Issues

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to discuss relevant background issues against which a philosophy of education will be proposed and which articulates the educational purpose for the training and formation of Hebraeo-Christian Denominational Chaplains within the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education Inc. (NSWCCPE Inc.). The focus here is the educational training and formation of the accredited Denominational agent for the setting of the hospital ward where she or he provides the pastoral support for a fellow member of the Denomination in that setting. The process is not in competition with either Social Workers or Psychologists/Counsellors working in the hospital setting on the one hand, or with Medical Professionals on the other, because the pastoral support has as its primary focus the religious and spiritual needs of the patient. Yet there is a commonality of interest and approach between holistic Medical Practitioners and Hospital Chaplains which warrants a preliminary amplification and which provides useful insight into Chaplaincy. I will then consider the role of the Chaplain in the hospital setting and the historical background to the present educational strategy of the NSWCCPE Inc. as an Associate Member of the Sydney College of Divinity (SCD). I will then consider the key figures in the development of CPE in the United States of America and their individual contributions to what has become, to borrow Schulman's (2005) terminology, the signature pedagogy of the Hospital Chaplaincy Profession. The Paper will conclude with a discussion of the underlying methodology of this Portfolio.

2. Insights from Medical Practice

While at first glance there is a significant difference between the role of the Chaplain and the Medical Doctor, Nurses and Social Workers in the Hospital setting, it is instructive to examine how Chaplains and Doctors complement each other in the care of the Patient and, in turn, that can enrich one's understanding of the role of the Chaplain. I will be focussing on the Christian Chaplain because that is my background and the NSWCCPE Inc. is primarily focussed on the training and formation of Christian Chaplains. Still, it is readily conceded that major metropolitan hospitals in this State are also serviced by Jewish, Moslem and Buddhist Chaplains.

a. Practices Doctors and Chaplains share in common

There is a certain common territory shared by the Chaplain in his or her pastoral care and the doctor working particularly in palliative care. Insights drawn from that specialised context of

hospital care can be applied both to general hospital care and particularly to Chaplaincy pastoral care, which I shall illustrate now.

i) Insights from Palliative Care—not “to cure” but “to heal”

The palliative care patient’s condition is usually terminal and therefore there is no realistic hope of the doctor effecting a cure as in other situations of patient care. That difference gives rise to a different approach and a different emphasis in the doctor’s professional work with a patient. Not only is there a concern to manage the patient’s physical pain, there is a holistic approach which seeks to address also what Kearney (1996:60–6) terms “soul pain”. By that Kearney means the deeper distress the patient experiences beyond the physical pain and a sense of helplessness that is the outcome of the medical condition and a “particular type of suffering which may be experienced by those close to death” (Kearney 1996:57). Heys-Moore (1996:313) contends that spiritual pain occurs “when a person becomes estranged from the essence of who he or she is ... manifesting itself through physical, psychological or spiritual symptoms, these last being meaningless, anguish, duality and darkness”.

It is there that effective palliative care makes its contribution and brings about, not a healing, but a curing of that condition. Dame Cicely Saunders (1978b:3), founder of the modern hospice movement with the opening of St Christopher’s Hospice in south London in 1967 (Clark 1998), comments that with effective palliative care

(s)uccessful symptomatic treatment should enable a patient to be so relieved of physical distress that he is freed to concentrate on other matters ... This may be the most important part of his life, and the spirit often becomes stronger and more individual as the body weakens ... [It] presupposes an informed decision that active therapy is now inappropriate ... we can ... try to help a patient to attain some kind of harmony with what he sees as truth and rightness ... [in] this essentially individual process.

Commenting more broadly in the context of palliative care at St Luke’s Hospice, Plymouth, which she founded in 1981, Dr Sheila Cassidy observed: “our aim, as Cicely Saunders once put it, is to help people *live* until they die” (Cassidy 2007:149; author’s emphasis).

The concern in the palliative care is to effect a “healing” which is

a relational process involving movement towards an experience of integrity and wholeness which may be facilitated by a caregiver’s interventions but is dependent on an innate potential within the patient... in the setting of advanced and terminal illness, patients and their families want caregivers

who are concerned with the healing of their illness, as well as the curing of their disease (Mount 2003:657).

The transcending of suffering is what “healing” implies (Egnew 2005). Dobkin (2009:1) agrees, noting that “(h)ealing is a process involving movement toward an experience of integrity and wholeness in response to injury or disease. It depends on an innate potential within the patient”. So, Hutchinson et al. (2009) describe it as “whole person care” that encompasses “the two faces of medicine”. I turn now to discuss that difference.

ii) Two faces of Medicine—Hippocratic and Asklepian

One face of medicine is that of curing, “an action by the health care practitioner to eradicate a disease or correct a problem” (Hutchinson et al. 2009:845). Kearney (2009:32 ff) characterises such a model as Hippocratic after the Classical Greek doctor Hippocrates (460–370 BC) in whose rational approach one can see the origins of modern evidence-based medicine. Hippocrates and his followers also aligned themselves with the Greek god of healing, Asklepios. While the Asklepian method of healing is uncertain, devotees flocked to his shrines for healing and it can be contrasted with Hippocratic medicine. Asklepian healing draws on subjective evidence, focusses on clinical subjectivity, is concerned for healing of suffering from within, works with nature, and self-knowledge is its key to effectiveness. Hippocratic curing, however, contrasts in each of those categories—objective evidence, critical objectivity, uses interventions from without, works by coming between the patient and the presenting problem, and the key to effectiveness is what is known and how it is interpreted (Kearney 2009:46–8). It enjoys the traits of the prudent friend as formulated by Josef Pieper within a Thomistic framework:

(a) friend, and a prudent friend, can help share a friend’s decision. He does so by virtue of that love which makes the friend’s problems his own, the friend’s ego his own so that it is not entirely ‘from outside’ (Pieper 1966:29).

Radcliffe’s (2005:39) observation clarifies Pieper’s point further: “(f)riendship means that one sees through people’s eyes, is attentive to their experience, takes seriously their intuitions and their doubts”.

Accordingly, the Asklepian mode of healing and the pastoral care of the Hospital Chaplain share a common approach which becomes even clearer upon examination of the psychological dynamic involved. Hutchinson et al. (2009) draw out other important contrasts: the Hippocratic goal in curing is survival while in Asklepian healing it is to avoid change; the health care worker

has greater power because of his/her expertise in curing, while in healing the balance of power lies with the patient; the basis of knowledge in the curing model is scientific, while in the healing mode the healing comes about through the relationship of one person to the other, on one accompanying the other, and depending more on the gifts/charisms of that health carer. Modern medical practice engages both modes— “to cure when possible and to foster healing even in the absence of cure” (Dobkin 2009:2). And the healing is fostered by the health carer listening actively, relating compassionately, committed to the patient in providing continuity of care, mindful of the patient and the context of the care (Epstein 2003a, 2003b). Accordingly the Asklepian mode of healing and the pastoral care of the Hospital Chaplain share a common approach which becomes even clearer upon examination of the psychological dynamic involved.

iii) Explanations of the psychological dynamic involved in the Asklepian mode

The hospital Chaplain’s encounter with the patient is in an Asklepian mode, similar to the “healing” mode of palliative care. In that, there is a commonality of interest and complementarity of approach between Chaplain and Medical officer, with both concerned around the patient’s “soul pain” (Kearney 1996:13, 57 ff), a “pain that comes from the depth of a person’s being” (Saunders 1995: 12) or what Saunders (1978:194) also refers to as “total pain”, which as Kearney (2009: 5) comments, “is a dynamic construct made up of interweaving layers of physical, social, emotional, and existential distress”. As a palliative care clinician Kearney reports success in his using both “Terror Management Theory” and W. R. Bion’s “container/contained” construct, to understand the patient’s experience and to help them effect a healing (Kearney 2009:21–4). I will give now a brief outline of those positions, firstly Terror Management Theory and then Bion’s construct “container/contained”.

a) Terror Management Theory

The three sociologists Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1991), building upon the work of Becker (1973), hypothesised that a distinguishing feature of the human is an awareness that death is inevitable, a characteristic they termed “mortality salience”. That can generate “terror”, “a profound and usually unconscious dread of death as absolute annihilation” (Kearney 2009:21). The human response is to put in place a “buffer” by “denying or repressing the terror at an individual level while simultaneously creating, maintaining, and participating in ‘culture’ at a communal level” (Kearney 2009:22). The effect is to return to the *status quo ante* by maintaining self esteem, thus lessening anxiety. Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) report experimental verification of the hypothesis of Terror Management Theory.

While terror management processes may be possessed by the health care provider (Kearney 2009:23), my focus here is the patient and respecting the patient's choice whether to address those issues or not. Kearney (2009:157–65, 214–5) describes how he has helped patients address those issues through Jungian dream work, but such expertise is not taught in the usual Chaplaincy training. Nonetheless, as Kearney (2009:264–5) notes:

although the carer can feel deeply for, share in, and, indeed agonise with another in his or her suffering, in some fundamental way, the suffering belongs to that person, and it is only that individual who can live with and through the experience ... The carer's part is to live with and hold that person in his or her suffering; the patient [']s part] is to live with and hopefully through that suffering, as only he or she can.

The Chaplain's focus, while sharing in the Medical Officer's concern for "healing", is within a Denominational framework on the spiritual and religious dimensions of that total pain. It explains the practice of there being professional Chaplains on the palliative care team in many centres. The staff of the palliative care facility share a common approach of giving the patient, as Saunders (1978:6) puts it, "the security they need to face unsafety" in the patient's own time and in the patient's own way. The Chaplain's attentive listening in an attitude of unconditional positive regard during the pastoral conversation enjoys a similarity both in method and outcome. As a member of the palliative care team the Chaplain is involved in that focus on "healing", a dynamic also played out in other Chaplaincy settings in the hospital as noted above.

Kearney (2009:112–3, 117–8, 184) also suggests that Bion's dual concept of "container/contained" articulates well the psychological dynamic at play there between patient and care giver in palliative care. Accordingly I turn to outline that concept of Bion.

b) Bion's construct "container/contained"

Bion begins with the account in psychoanalytic literature of how the infant learns from experience and develops mentally. The infant psyche threatened by surging affect (the contained) projects onto the mother who acts as a container in the dynamic. The mother "holds" the infant in the experience, intuitively through a process - termed "reverie" - the infant's needs or the predominant one, and then retrojects to the infant the needed response. Bion contended that the psychoanalytic dynamic of "container" and "contained" is present in every caring relationship (Bion 2007:90). Kearney (2009:113–3, 117–8, 184) indicates how he used Bion's concepts of "container/contained" both to understand and to map his interventions as a medical care officer in palliative care units, while using the Asklepius mode as an archetype in a Jungian

sense (Kearney 2009:115–48). My point here is to note the strong complementarity of approach between Medical Practitioner and Chaplain.

iv) Theological explanation of the dynamic involved

For the Christian Chaplain there is also a further element in the Asklepan mode of healing that comes from the widely used concept of Christ the Physician (**Christus Medicus**) in pastoral care and preaching in the Early Church. Christ was presented as more powerful than Asklepios whose devotees continued to flock to the Asklepan shrines and temples (Arbesmann 1954:1ff). Dumeige (1980) notes the regular appearance in Patristic writers of the East and West, of the theme of Christ as the healer of body and soul, particularly of the effects of sin; in brief, it was used as a simple metaphor for Christ as Saviour and Redeemer. The theological theme was reinforced by the usual depiction of Asklepios bearing a staff with a snake curled around it (Kearney 2009:42, 77) and the Genesis story of the first human sin being the outcome of the manipulation by the Serpent (Genesis 3:1–13). There was also an apologetic intent as reflected in the language used, presenting Christ as Saviour and Redeemer (Dumeige 1972:137); Christ is not only he who heals but also the one whom Asklepios prefigured (Dumeige 1972:124–5). There is frequent use of the Christ the Physician theme in Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430) reflecting the widespread popularity of the concept in Christian Africa since Tertullian (c.160–c.220) (Arbesmann 1954:1), that is from the end of the second century to the fifth century (Leclercq 1933:158); Augustine therefore, was “drawing on a long Christian tradition especially in his native Africa” (Arbesmann 1954:28).

The metaphor is found also in Eastern Church writers and the best example is Origen (c.185–c.254) who mentioned Christ the Physician “more often and more extensively than any other early Greek author” (Arbesmann 1955:624). In 1919 at Timgard a fragment of an inscription was found to Christ the Physician, seemingly a votary offering from two grateful Donatists (Leclercq 1933:157–9). That is yet further evidence and is beyond that of literary and orthodox Christianity.

Yet, it is important to note that the metaphor of Christ the Physician is not always linked with Asklepios. St Jerome (c.342–420) linked Christ with Hippocrates—*quasi spiritualis Hippocrates* [a quasi spiritual Hippocrates] (cited in Arbesmann 1955:625). While it is the same broad metaphor being used, the difference can be explained either historically by Jerome’s not having experienced African Christianity or theologically by his referring to the Christ of the Parousia (the Second Coming; cf., 1 Corinthians 15:23 and Isaiah 25:6–9) where the metaphor of

the “curing” physician has its theological niche. The understanding of suffering and its Christian spirituality (Noye 1980) takes us beyond the present concern which is the relationship between medical and chaplaincy approaches.

So I conclude that not only does the Christian Chaplain share the same concept of a “healing model” as Medical practitioners operating out of a holistic model of medicine, but it is also within a rich Christian Tradition that honours Christ as the “Great Physician”.

Yet the CPE Programme is also used for the preparation of Chaplains for Pastoral Ministry in aged care facilities, jails and factories; my own experience has been outside jail and factory settings, and accordingly my focus is the hospital setting, and situations akin to that, such as aged care. Accordingly I will be describing the recipient of the Pastoral Care Ministry, as a “patient”. So I consider the role of the Chaplain in the hospital setting, and then outline the received educational strategy to form the Chaplain.

3. The Hospital Chaplain

a) Chaplain’s role

The Chaplain’s aim is to provide support around “religious” issues, nominated by the patient, and to do so within their nominated Denominational tradition. Haldane (2004b:224–5) has pointed out that:

there is a marked tendency [among religious commentators] to distinguish and separate three broad approaches to religious belief: the spiritual, the historical and the philosophical. Those who follow the first emphasise experience, emotion and contemplative reflection; followers of the second concentrate on sacred scripture and Church tradition; and those partial to the third favour abstract and general argument.

In this essay, I will not be following any such separation, but shall be treating religious belief as a holistic unit, which, in fact, is congruent with the recipient’s experience, though at times in my analysis, I will focus on one or more of those broad approaches

b) Training and forming Hospital Chaplains as an educational strategy

The educational process usually followed in New South Wales for the preparation of Denominational Hospital Chaplains is commonly referred to as “Clinical Pastoral Education”, or CPE. I will begin my reflections with a consideration of CPE in this State, seeking to highlight

the educational difficulties embedded in the custom and practice, which a Philosophy of Education for CPE will need to address. I will not be giving an historical outline of the development of CPE but rather, highlighting the key traits that have become part of the process used in mentoring students in gaining mastery in the practice of CPE. My concern is not the technique of supervision, either individual or group, which relates to the teaching procedure and formation of the pastoral minister, but rather, to examine the “learning of how” to be a Hospital Chaplain. In brief, my focus is the learner’s experience, rather than that of the teacher, important as that is. That is not to deny that the experience is interrelated as two sides of the same coin. My greater interest is in the student outputs rather than the teacher inputs. In the interest of conceptual clarity I begin with several descriptions of central processes before I turn to the New South Wales development of Clinical Pastoral education.

The Australian and New Zealand Association for CPE (ANZACPE) in its *Manual* (1998:6) describes Clinical Pastoral Education as follows:

Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) is (professional) education for pastoral ministry involving personal and pastoral identity development. CPE takes place in a setting where the student exercises a pastoral ministry which becomes the focus for learning. Under the supervision of an accredited supervisor the student contracts to enter a self-directed learning process involving an action/ reflection model.

A broadly similar description is found in Clause 2.1 of the *Constitution* of the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education Inc. (NSWCCPE) where the definition is expanded to a number of desired outcomes for the student. I note further that the process is confessional by designation, namely “Christian” (Clause 2.1, p3). While there have been moves within certain of the College’s Teaching Centres to move beyond a Christian Denominationalism to an Inter-Faith context, my discussion confines itself to the *status quo* of the College’s present constitution.

Richey & Laurence (2002:54) offer a more succinct description of CPE: “an interdenominational (interfaith) approach to professional pastoral care education”. The remainder of that entry makes it clear that the “interdenominational (interfaith)” of their description, refers to Christian Denominations. Further, the “Trainees learn by doing ministry under close group and individual supervision” (2002:55). Thornton, however, offers a broader account which foreshadows some of the themes which I will be exploring below, and is worth citing in full:

Drawn to the methods of medical education, psychology and social work, and reacting against the limitations of classical theological education, the founders launched an educational innovation that has significantly influenced pastoral ministry, both in parishes and in mental and general hospitals, prisons, social agencies, and campuses. It has also helped to move theological education and stimulated the emergence of associations of pastoral supervisors in many parts of the world (Thornton 1990:178).

An historical examination of that belongs to another context and I refer my reader to Hall (1992) for the American setting, and to Kenny (2002) for an Australian context.

I move now to consider the development of CPE in New South Wales, seeking to highlight the key practices and processes which a philosophy of CPE needs to explicate if it is to have a “sureness of fit” between the programmes offered and the desired learning outcomes. In all of that, the philosophical reflection may lead to suggestions for curriculum development, and curriculum evaluation as I will show briefly in the final Paper (Paper Seven), but those important topics will not be considered in this portfolio at the length they warrant.

In April 1963 a New South Wales Council for Clinical Pastoral Education was established, whose objectives included the promotion and supervision of courses on Clinical Pastoral Education (Little 2003:1). Inspiration had been drawn from journal articles discussing CPE in the American setting on the one hand, and on the other, a desire to respond to concerns expressed in certain Doctor-Clergy groups for a more effective orientation for Chaplains for Hospital Ministry. CPE was welcomed as an effective process to meet those concerns and the American CPE customs and practices were introduced, but, eventually, with significant modifications. The general focus was on skilling the Chaplain through experiential learning. It followed the preference for the pragmatic over the theoretical; and the Australian CPE approach differed from the American model in that often the students were not graduates of Theological Colleges involved in a professional year in preparation for Church Ministry. The historical reasons for that are not my concerns here, but that change has implications for the process that is part of the CPE method, which is “practical reflection” where the Chaplain seeks to reflect theologically upon the bedside conversation, both the Chaplain’s own conversation as well as that of the patient. Further, that reflection component, which seeks to appreciate the complex dynamic occurring at the bedside, also needs the lens of both Psychology and Sociology to probe and interpret the complexities of the interaction. That in turn, presumes some familiarity with the various schools of thought in the Social Sciences, both to recognise the Pathological for

referral, and to “thicken” the professional understanding of what is happening within the pastoral conversation. The admission of candidates to the programme without some basic understanding of those issues that an undergraduate programme seeks to address, is likely to lessen the ability of the Chaplain to probe the richness of the conversation and to explore the next step in the ongoing care, as well as what might be alternative approaches to explore. Further, it could happen that a student might go through the NSW CPE programmes without any formal tertiary education in Theology of any tradition, or in the relevant Social Sciences. That deficiency has significant implications for the “Reflection” component of the experiential learning methodology. The outcome of developing an adequate Philosophy of Clinical Pastoral Education is that it will allow one to see more clearly where the practical approach favoured in certain quarters is fundamentally flawed; even if a certain facility in Chaplaincy work is acquired, the student does not have a “professional confidence” that allows the Chaplain to function confidently both with the broad range of spiritual needs of hospital patients and on his or her own. Such a Chaplain cannot be said to be a “wise” practitioner (see Paper Six). That stands out with even greater force when it is remembered that the Chaplain acts as an Agent for his or her Denomination, and alongside other health and allied-health agencies in a hospital setting whose staff are trained postgraduates in their particular profession.

There are multifaceted ethical issues that require attention by the Chaplain:

- to the sponsoring Denominational Body;
- to the Patient in the Hospital;
- to the moral person that is the Agency running the Hospital; and
- to the professional Health Officers and Allied-Health Officers working in the Hospital providing holistic care (physical, mental and spiritual) for the Patient.

These will not be discussed as my focus is to examine the educational nature of the educational process involved in Chaplaincy training in the NSW College of C.P.E.. Until recent decades, preparation for Ministry in New South Wales was through Private Denominational Training Institutions. Concern for greater credibility, on the one hand, and, on the other, better training for the Ministerial graduates, eventually led to the Training Institutions for Ministry combining under an umbrella Institution which would award a raft of Tertiary Awards that had Commonwealth recognition. In New South Wales that “umbrella” institution was the Sydney College of Divinity.

Associate membership of the Sydney College of Divinity

A few comments on the historical background of the Sydney College of Divinity are warranted. Here I am drawing heavily upon Hill (1987a, 1987b), and Nobbs (2004). The Australian College of Theology was established by the General Synod of the Anglican Dioceses in Australia and Tasmania in 1891. In 1981 other churches were invited to join. In 1935 Sydney University set up a Board of Studies in Divinity which awarded a postgraduate Bachelor of Divinity but it did not attract support from the Churches, moreover the University favoured a “Studies in religion” approach while the Churches favoured teaching theology from a confessional base. The *NSW Higher Education Act* (1969) set up the Advanced Education Board which made reports to the Minister on the approval of courses as advanced education courses outside universities and colleges of advanced education. That became the occasion for theologates to seek civil recognition for their awards and to join others in a common application. The Higher Education Board favoured a model like that achieved by the Melbourne College of Divinity in 1974 (Hill 1987a:42)—a common degree taught by associated teaching institutions. Negotiations towards setting up a College of Divinity in Sydney (SCD) were influenced by pressures from without, the Higher Education Board (NSW), and by pressures from within arising from Denominational identity and confessional theological integrity on the one hand, and on the other, the institutional autonomy of the colleges involved in the discussion (Hill 1987a, 1987b). After almost seven years of negotiation the Sydney College of Divinity (SCD) was incorporated on 15 September 1983 (Nobbs 2004:121). Internal conflict among the Baptists led to the withdrawal of Morling College at the end of 1985 (Hill 1987b: 43). Moore College (Evangelical Anglican) refused to join the consortium (Nobbs 2004:129; Hill 1987b:44) having failed to obtain the level of autonomy they had sought. It was to the Sydney College of Divinity, then, that the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education turned when seeking tertiary recognition for its in-house awards.

That development favoured a stronger educational approach to CPE programmes initially adopted from the American approach; there was also a greater sympathy in the NSW College, though not universal among the College’s membership, for a following of the American precedent of recognising CPE programmes with a raft of tertiary awards. And in the context of the State of NSW, there was a logic to provide those awards through the same umbrella organisation with which most of the Divinity Colleges in this State were affiliated. Moreover there was the added attraction that the control of the curriculum of the affiliating body lay with that body, but agreed standards were a condition for membership of the umbrella body, the SCD.

In 1998, the NSW Council of Clinical Pastoral Education, legally incorporated since 1992 as a College, became an affiliated member of the Sydney College of Divinity allowing it to offer a raft of awards within the Sydney College of Divinity. That was the culmination of a significant shift away from a predominantly psychological training method associated with the Reverend Russell Fowler, a qualified psychotherapist and a dominant figure in the early days of CPE in NSW, to a primarily educational model. (Here I am drawing on the briefing given to the Academic Board by a Senior Supervisor and Centre Director who had worked under the Reverend Fowler; I was on the Academic Board at the time and was working on its curricula for submission to the SCD and the Higher Education Board (cf. Paper One: *Linking Paper*).

In practice, the earlier approach in Chaplaincy training in NSW, associated with a leading CPE Supervisor, the Reverend R. Fowler, approximated to the “Sensitivity Training” of Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) and the “Encounter Groups” of Carl R. Rogers (1902–87). The reservations of CPE graduates and a resistance in the “market” arising from stories circulating about the tense experiences of those graduates, led to the adoption of a more educational model for CPE training. There were intrinsic tensions between two opposing factions within the CPE institution: the first faction was those favouring an advance to an even stronger educational model within an approved Institution offering a raft of tertiary awards, something that was also happening at that time in other Australian Theological Colleges training people for Ministry. The proponents of the old model remained and formed a second faction, convinced that the customary vocational model warranted continued support, and, where they, as Supervisors/Teachers, had both the recognised vocational expertise and the professional accreditation within the organisation; that, they contended, should be deemed sufficient to allow them to continue to act, something not automatically feasible in a tertiary educational institution granting graduate and postgraduate awards. That conflict between the personal and professional motive, while significant, was not the only competing interest present; it also included a covert opposition to the centralisation of the College structure favoured by some of College’s Executive on the one hand, and the centrifugal forces present in the organisation and located in the independence of the Centre Directors and Teachers/Supervisors. Those organisational issues lie outside my present discussion, which is to focus upon the educational elements of the received CPE model. Student assessment remained a process of integrating student self assessment of the achievement of the goals she or he had set at the beginning of that CPE Unit, peer assessment from the peer supervisory group and the Supervisor’s comment.

It is sufficient to note that the immediate compromise, at an institutional level, was to continue to offer the College's own in-house certification, along with the raft of postgraduate Awards possible as member of the Sydney College of Divinity (SCD), (Shakespeare 2005). Yet, the length of the programme for the student, as developed initially in the USA, continued for both forms of delivery, that is, for the academic award and the in-house certificate; each CPE Unit had three ten-week terms and each ten week "Unit" required 400 hours of student time, with 300 hours of face-to-face contact with the hospital patient and/or the patient's family, with written reports of such an encounter presented in 80 hours of Group Supervision and 10 hours of Individual Supervision. In addition, each Unit devoted ten student hours to "didactics", that is, theoretical input in areas of professional need as the Course Supervisor judged warranted for the immediate pastoral and professional needs of this group of students in Chaplaincy. The focus was skilling for the Chaplaincy role; there was no prescribed syllabus or curriculum to be covered; areas covered might include the psychology of grief and loss, introduction to Freudian and Jungian psychology, parallel issues such as transference and counter transference, ethics in the pastoral relationship and issues of self awareness, along with teaching the verbatim technique, namely the written record of the conversation between the Chaplain and the hospital patient, used in CPE supervised practice and learning. The concern was upon the "normative" rather than the therapeutic, and linked with that, the recognition of the pathological and the importance of early referral to the appropriate professional. Three things are important in judging the effectiveness of that "didactic" input; first the limited range of expertise sometimes available for the input and the absence of an agreed curriculum; second, the very limited time available (ten hours) requires not only high expertise in the nominated field for the lecturer but also in the lecturer an ability to present competently and in a way that is readily comprehensible to the learners; third, without a set series of topics, (Curriculum or Syllabus), there is little guarantee that students are being skilled to a minimal agreed level and are therefore, able to be assessed as a "competent" practitioner either by peer review or her/ his employer. Those issues of curriculum content, curriculum implementation and accountability are outside the immediate scope of this present Portfolio.

Because the CPE training has become embedded in a raft of tertiary awards, that has meant there are significant issues, often unaddressed in practice, that are sources of tension between its individual teachers/supervisors and are reflected in different approaches between CPE Centres delivering the CPE programmes approved by the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education. The tensions relate also, to the issue of student assessment; if one favours a vocational and

educational training approach (VET) a competency based approach is favoured, where skills receive high priority; if a university form of Higher Education is favoured then there is high priority on articulating the underpinning theory, justifying the rational warrant for those underpinnings, and examining the effectiveness of the procedures being taught. That inherent tension has been summarised well by Smith and Bush (2006:391–2):

University learning and assessment places more emphasis on an individual's cognitive development and the development of critical thinking than does competency-based training, which is focussed primarily on skill development. While each sector purports to develop generic skills in its learners, universities' 'graduate qualities' are broader than the VET sectors' 'key competencies'...Moreover the 'body of knowledge' is delivered in VET but is considered separate from the key competencies, which is included in the graduate attributes list [of the 1993 Mayer Report].

The interrelated issues of curriculum development, curriculum content, curriculum evaluation, as well as the student assessment, all in the specific setting of CPE, warrant close examination. That close examination, though, is beyond the scope of Paper Three which seeks to develop a philosophy of education that fits the CPE situation.

I turn now to consider the cluster of pedagogical elements that became distinctive for CPE. I will note the formative contributions of key American figures that moulded the common approach and which gave rise to the signature pedagogy of the Chaplaincy profession. By and large those pedagogical elements became the received practice in NSW. Such then is the general background of this Paper. I turn now to consider the educational background of the CPE Movement examining the insights of the key historical figures.

4. Educational Background of the CPE Movement

a) Insights of key figures

Clinical Pastoral Education emerged out of a Protestant Theological Education reform movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States of America. Dissatisfaction was felt with the existing American model of Theological Education which was based upon the classical European university education (Hall 1992:2); a more professionally oriented education was seen as the needed reform. In brief, there was a concern to provide a more pastoral or practical dimension in the training of the adult person for ministry. Graduates from the Theological Colleges wanted training and formation which bridged more effectively the

gap between theological theory and pastoral practice (Hall 1992:3). Protestant Theological Educators were anxious to meet that need (Hall 1992:3–4), particularly in the context of medical care, where it was sometimes thought that Roman Catholics with their sacramental rituals seemed to be a more effective presence among their Catholic co-religionists who were patients in the hospital. Further, the movement appeared in major University Teaching Hospitals, where some of the founders and pioneers of the movement worked as Chaplains or Therapists. That brought an influence to bear that shaped the manner and techniques that have become identified with the “CPE style” of ministerial formation.

At the same time, it is important to note, the “care of souls”, or *cura animarum*, had a long history in the Western Christian Traditions, Protestant and Catholic, along with Islam, Judaism and Eastern Religious Traditions, as well as with classical philosophers (McNeill 1965). More recently Hadot (1995) has sought to revive that understanding of philosophy. That “care of souls” tradition was also present in the background of the American concern to reform Theological Education for Ministry. It was reflected in the Emmanuel Movement, some of whose members, particularly Elwood Worcester and Richard Cabot, played a significant role in the emerging CPE movement; Worcester was an Anglican Minister with a German PhD in psychology; and Cabot, a Unitarian Layman, was a professor of Medicine at Harvard University. But before considering the contribution of those figures to the burgeoning CPE movement and its distinctive approach in teaching-learning, brief comment is needed upon the progressivist educational philosophy, which was the educational framework in which the movement appeared, and whose assumptions it accepted uncritically.

John Dewey (1859–1952) exercised wide influence during his tenure at the University of Chicago (1894–1904) and then at Teachers’ College, Columbia University (1904–52). Copleston (1966c:379) comments that Dewey

brings philosophy down to earth and tries to show its relevance to concrete problems, moral, social, and educational. And this explains his great influence ... [which] must be attributed in great part to the practical relevance of his ideas.

In particular, there was growing interest in John Dewey’s view of education which stressed the experiential side of all human knowledge. A guiding metaphor was that of “growth”—the student’s growth (Dewey 1968: 53); as such it was immediately attractive to the “progressive”.

Yet, in the priority given to that metaphor of “growth”, lies a fundamental weakness. Oakeshott points out that:

(a) human life is composed of performances, choices to do *this* rather than *that* in relation to imagined and wished-for outcomes and governed by beliefs, opinions, understandings, practices, procedures, rules and recognition of desirabilities and undesirabilities, impossible to engage merely in virtue of a genetic equipment and without learning to do so...In short, the education is necessary because no person is born a human being, and because the quality of being human is not a latency which becomes an actuality in a process of “growth”... he is *homo dissens*, a creature capable of learning to think, to understand and to enact himself in a world of human enactments and thus to acquire a human character (Oakeshott 2001:66. Emphasis in original)

In brief, the metaphor “growth” presumes value judgements about the direction of the change; for a change to be welcomed it needs to be in an approved direction. Further, for Dewey, human reason, as in Mathematics and the Physical Sciences, was the sole warrant for human knowledge. Philosophically, the approach had serious limitations as a theoretical underpinning in Theological Education, and for two reasons. First, at the level of human knowing: Heidegger (1889–1976), in his influential 1924 Marburg Lectures on Aristotle, challenged the separation of the affective from the cognitive. “Here Heidegger has pushed forward one of his boldest and most unsettling proposals, for if he is right, modernity’s goal of attaining dispassionate ‘objective’ knowledge must be rejected as self-deception” (Smith 1998:180). There are areas where the affective and the cognitive, although present, can be separated, as for example Wiles’ account of his emotional involvement with proving Fermat’s last theorem while noting his willingness that his earlier proof was incorrect. More importantly though, there are cases where the emotional content is entangled with the cognitive and yet the emotions are a help not a hindrance to objectivity (see Nussbaum 1996). Yet, following Nussbaum (2001), emotions are suffused with intelligence and discernment, and are, therefore, contributory to deep awareness and understanding. For that reason, emotions, whatever their cultural sources may be, become the exploration of what is of value and importance in human thinking about the good and the just. Therefore, emotions cannot be ignored in any account of ethical judgement. In brief, even where the emotion is entangled with the cognitive, the emotion can be a help rather than a hinderance to objectivity.

I will return to this matter, and at greater length, in Paper Three, when discussing the persuasive dimension of the educational process. It is sufficient to note the inadequacy of Dewey’s uncritical appropriation of the scientific method and its goal of “objective” knowledge.

Secondly, followers of the Judaic-Christian Traditions, assert truth claims for their own Religious Book. That assertion also applies to followers of the Islamic tradition. The interplay of, and the “competing” truth claims of, Reason and Revelation, warrant close discussion, but time and space preclude that here. It is sufficient to note that such a philosophy of education (Dewey’s) is a profound challenge to any Theological Education which presupposes it. My concern is epistemological, rather than methodological. As Hall (1992:3) notes:

The influence of ... [Dewey’s] philosophy of education on pastoral training (later to be called clinical pastoral education) is shown in the oft repeated phrase in CPE, “trust the process”. This phrase acknowledges the significance of the educational method of CPE, which is an experiential or process method, as opposed to a method of accumulating facts.

I stress, that my quarrel is not with the educational methodology, but with Dewey’s epistemology. Even in the beginnings of the CPE movement, that inherent contradiction can be found in the views of its primary founder, Anton Boisen.

Anton Theophilus Boisen (1876–1965) conducted the first CPE programme with four students at Worcester State Hospital in the Northern hemisphere university summer vacation in 1925. He was a Presbyterian/Congregational Minister, “Presbygational” in his own terminology (Leas 2006:1). He was attracted by Dewey’s pragmatic emphasis upon experiential learning. Boisen did not follow the traditional Protestant view that God’s Revelation is to be found in the “Scriptures alone”, but he subscribed to an ongoing form of revelation to be found in human experience, in his frequently used phrase, in “living human documents”—“Boisen’s term for the first hand study of human experience” (Kenny 2003:7, n7). That terminology of Boisen’s is not asserting, as Lynch (2005:276) suggests, that “the primary teacher was the patient”, but is rather, following Paver (2006:13) and Coll (1992:14–6), a description of field-based learning under supervision in education for Ministry. Boisen’s aphorism, now commonplace in CPE programmes, has been reshaped for the Chaplaincy setting, to parallel Progressive Education’s emphasis upon education being “child-centred”. That way it removes any direct or implied challenge to a Theology of Revelation. In Chaplaincy practice, it meant that the focus of the Chaplain’s attention was on how the patient’s religious beliefs operated in the patient’s own life (Hall 1992:12), rather than their Theology; in brief the approach is patient-centred. Moreover, the particular Theological views of both patient and Chaplain cannot but be considered when the Chaplain seeks to reflect on the religious aspects of the bedside conversation. I will return to address that matter more explicitly below, when considering aspects of the reflection on practice

segment in CPE practice. My point here is to note that the Theological component of the CPE process is part of the core or central issues to the CPE programme, an emphasis introduced to offset the criticism that the pastoral approach was being over-psychologised (Lynch 2005:276). That was a different criticism to the criticism of Fowler's heavily psychological model in NSW, already noted. Such then was Boisen's first contribution to the development of CPE—the theological hermeneutic that shaped the reflection. The second contribution of Boisen to the CPE method lies in the use of the case study.

Boisen's approach in practice was influenced heavily by Richard C. Cabot (1890–1920) (a Harvard Professor of Medicine, who earlier in 1925 had published a paper, calling for a professional year for Ministry students in a hospital setting, modelled on that required of Harvard Medical Graduates). It would be “clinical” as its focus would be at the bedside (*klinike* in Greek) of the Patient. Nor was the influence of Cabot on Boisen limited to that journal article. As noted above, Cabot was involved in the Emmanuel Movement and was interested in the professional formation of Theology Graduates for their Ministry. Out of his immediate professional concern for the training of medical Doctors and the sharpening of their diagnostic skills, he had pioneered case studies as a teaching strategy in the lecture hall and seminar room at Harvard, collected examples of medical case studies and introduced case studies as an ongoing feature of the prestigious *New England Journal of Medicine* (Dodds 1993:417 ff). In 1922 Boisen had attended a Harvard Medical School graduate course conducted by Cabot on “case studies”; Boisen described the case studies as “living human documents”, but for Boisen, that terminology had also the theological connotation already noted.

The case study, though, became central in the CPE method, sometimes as a longitudinal study of the meetings with a particular patient, but more usually, in the context of a particular and specific meeting between Chaplain and patient. The Reverend Russell L. Dicks (1906–65), a Methodist Minister, argued that Boisen's case study method was flawed because the historical information of the hospital patient, essential for any case study, was not available to the visiting Chaplain. So, Dicks developed a process of the Chaplain's recording the pastoral conversation with the Patient; this was the “verbatim of the pastoral conversation”, “a method of recording keeping” (Kenny 203:5), and in my description, the particular case study of the pastoral visit to the patient. Cabot and Dicks described the Verbatim approach in their 1944 joint article, (quoted in Hall 1992:23), as follows:

When we reproduce in writing a contact, an interview, a working relationship, we do not merely record it, we rethink it and so develop its meaning, *not while we are seeing a patient but as soon after as possible* ... It is a check upon one's work; it is a clarifying and developing process; it relieves emotional strain for the writer ... and stands as a record of one's work ... It is a new creation of ideas which reveals lacks in what we have done. It is a fresh application of ideals to criticise what we have done. It traces out the implication of what we have seen and heard ... It is self-criticism. It is self-evaluation. It is preparation for self improvement [in one's chaplaincy work]. (Emphasis in the original).

The Verbatim became the chief learning tool in CPE programmes (Hall 1992:23)—“the royal road into a student's personal learning issues” (Thornton 1999:180). Not only is the pastoral conversation recorded, paying attention to both the cognitive and affective content in the conversation of each party (Boisen 1936), there should be also a close reflection upon the theological, psychological and sociological issues reflected in the conversation where the visiting Chaplain sought to listen attentively to the patient's conversation and to permit the patient to set the agenda of the pastoral conversation.

The Chaplain listens closely and attentively to what the patient says, primarily to the affective content, both expressed and implied in the verbal and non-verbal signals of the communication. The pioneering leaders in CPE practice found that their better pastoral results came out of that attentive listening to the patient's feelings. Boisen (1936:243, 245) expressed the point, implying a parallel between the Physician and the Chaplain:

of listening without condemning, of trying to understand his language, particularly that symbolic language ... (w)herever the patient has come to trust the physician enough to unburden himself of his problems and whenever the physician is ready to listen with intelligent sympathy, good results are likely to follow, regardless of the correctness of the physician's particular theories or procedures.

Later the practice of Carl Rogers (1959, 1962, 1967) in therapeutic settings, provided confirmation of the professional insights of the CPE pioneers. A similar insight can be found in palliative care, where the patient is given “that feeling of security in which they can begin, when they are ready, to face unsafety” (Saunders 1978b:6). Recently, Symington's (2006) fresh analysis of “how healing works” also locates the healing dynamic in the professional clinical conversation and the Therapist's attentive listening without judgement. In brief, the healing is

“cure by listening” by the Chaplain, and not, in Lynch’s phrase, “cure by talk” (Lynch 2005:275), a phrase which is open to misunderstanding.

CPE interest in the affective dimension of the pastoral conversation was through the influence of both Carroll Alanzo Wise (1903–55) and Helen Flanders Dunbar (1902–59). Wise’s personal contribution has been noted already. Dunbar was a pioneer in psychosomatic medicine (McGovern 2000:1, Ozarin 2001:1) and researched the interrelatedness of mind, body and spirit, an area concentrating on the relationship of mind and body. Her research and professional interest confirmed the approach of both Boisen and Wise with the emphasis upon the importance of the affective. She also contributed to the appreciation of the unity of the human person and a holistic grasp of that. The present burgeoning interest in the scientific research (Holland et al. 1999, Hassed 2000, Matthews et al. 2000, Levin 2001, Koenig 2003, Koenig et al. 2001, Peach 2003a, 2003b) on the effect of the spiritual in the medical care of patients provides contemporary support for Dunbar’s earlier claims. Dunbar’s continuing influence is found in the holistic reflection that is part of each Verbatim’s reflection (Hall 1992: 17).

The development of attending to the affective, as part of CPE method, meant moving away from Boisen’s commitment to Dewey’s epistemological assumptions and from treating the Chaplaincy role as another example of scientific research. That shift was due to the influence of two other pioneering practitioners in the CPE movement. Firstly Wise, seeking to respond to CPE students’ expectations, deliberately shifted the Boisen emphasis from research in CPE to pastoral care. Grudgingly, Boisen eventually conceded the wisdom of that change of emphasis (Hall 1992:19). That altered emphasis continues with NSW CPE (*Constitution Clause 2.1*); while, interest in research was never excluded, it has been recovered only with the College’s affiliation with the Sydney College of Divinity (NSWCCPE Inc. 2004: passim). Prior to then, research was usually within the context of a postgraduate degree in another tertiary institution (e.g., Galt 1979, Weidemann 1987). To summarise: while Dewey’s influence in CPE epistemology with its emphasis upon the objective and on the methodology of empirical science has waned, the valuing of research for the Chaplain’s professional practice would reflect the recovery of a value Dewey endorsed. At the same time the CPE approach still reflects “process education” and harkens back to “learning by doing” that Dewey, among others, favoured (Thomas 2006:9).

A further important influence on CPE method was Seward Hiltner (1909–84) who worked for the Council of Clinical Training 1935–38, and who visited Melbourne in 1959 following his study leave in New Zealand (Kenny 2003:19–20). Hiltner stressed the importance of theological

reflection; “the flow between theological reflection and pastoral practice was both unimpeded and two-way” (Kenny 2003:20). Hiltner valued the theoretical element underlying good practice. Hiltner remarked (1949:244, cited Hall 1992:30)

Clinical training, like practical theology, has to relate theory and practice ... Practical Theology has its theoretical side, else it could not apply its resources to the aid of real people. But its theoretical insights are meaningless unless that application itself is studied and evaluated. Clinical pastoral training includes both.

Hiltner “used concrete cases and records of pastoral conversations to illustrate both theology and practical applications” (Hall 1992:31). That influence continues in the Reflection component of each CPE verbatim. Hiltner’s attention was upon the conscious feelings of the patient and upon what the relationship with the Chaplain meant for that patient. He put renewed emphasis upon the theological reflection in CPE and specifically the Chaplain’s Verbatim of the pastoral conversation. It was at that point that the theology moved from abstraction to the concrete case, “to study [Boisen’s] ‘living human documents’ with theological questions in mind” (Hiltner 1935 quoted in Hall 1992:32). Hiltner’s “contributions were in the area of intellectual understanding and practical application of theology and psychology in pastoral care” (Hall 1992:32). There is a double focus in reflecting upon the pastoral conversation, a focus on what is said and/or felt, on the one hand by the Chaplain, and, on the other, by the patient.

It is important to note how Boisen’s original understanding of the role of the Chaplain has been reshaped radically to focus upon the task of pastoral help for the patient. To do that well, there needed to be attention to each person involved in the pastoral conversation. At the same time Hall’s (1992:33) contrasting the approaches of Wise and Hiltner as being the contrast between an emphasis upon relationship (Wise) as opposed to the key issues (Hiltner) is a contrast that is more apparent than real; in effect it is an oversimplification of the same phenomenon that has been examined from different perspectives. In practice, it is a question of “both/ and”, rather than “either/ or”, of complementary approaches.

The contributions of the key historical figures in the CPE Movement in the United States had the outcome of the formation of a distinctive CPE pedagogy and I turn now to draw further educational insights from the concept of “signature pedagogy” for a profession.

b) Signature pedagogy in the profession

The CPE Unit is taught through the process of supervision by a wise practitioner and peers involved in that Unit. Thomas (2006:9) contends that “CPE supervision has developed a methodology and practice which is quite unusual in professional education”. That “methodology and practice” could also be described accurately as a “pedagogy”. Schulman (2005) coined the term “signature pedagogies in the professions” to refer to

the characteristic forms of teaching and learning...that organise the fundamental ways in which future practitioners are educated in their professions...They form habits of mind, habits of heart, and habits of the hand ... [They] prefigure the cultures of professional work and provide early socialisation into the practices and values of a field (Schulman 2005:52, 59).

Schulman (2005:56–7) notes three features of those signature pedagogies:

- i. they are pervasive and routine;
- ii. they are marked by public student performance; and
- iii. they are visible, accountable to Supervisor and peers in the ongoing exchange. That makes the classroom settings uncertain and in that environment the student hones the ability to make judgements under uncertainty, “one of the most crucial aspects of professionalism” (Schulman 2005:57).

Golde (2007:345) notes: “Signature pedagogies are not just intriguing oddities. They are widespread across departments within a particular discipline, refined by time and practice, and they meet commonly understood pedagogical purposes”.

Accordingly, in light of my previous discussion around CPE custom and practice, it is reasonable to refer to that practice of the verbatim as the signature pedagogy for CPE.

To summarise the argument so far: a philosophy of Education for CPE must take into account existing custom and practice within the CPE professional training, its signature pedagogy. I have noted that the focus of the method is the pastoral conversation, accurately recorded and reflected upon, observing the attentiveness of the listening involved, focusing particularly, though not exclusively, upon the affective component, then examining in hindsight the detail of the pastoral conversation through the lens of theology and social science, in an effort to thicken the description of the patient’s spiritual needs. To see clearly, to judge accurately, and then to act wisely in the interest of the patient—that dynamic will be discussed at greater length in Paper Five when considering insights from the use of Action Research in Case Studies. That learning

process of action-reflection needs to be integrated into the philosophical account of CPE. The Verbatim's reflection upon the conversation requires attention as it uses the insights from Theology and with the Social Sciences.

A new approach is needed because an approach echoing John Dewey cannot provide an adequate educational warrant for CPE programmes, a point already made above. That is the task that I address explicitly, albeit tentatively, in the next Paper. But before I begin a few words are warranted on the methodological assumption underpinning the case being proposed. In brief, it will be framed within the discourse of "Modernity", that is, emphasis is placed upon the rational, that the human mind can know reality and is not confined into a scepticism. The "postmodernist rejection of rationality" (Franklin 2009:42) can be countered beginning with Plato's *Gorgias* (1960) through to the Australian Mathematician and Philosopher Franklin (2009); my focus here is not to contest that postmodernist position but to outline the underpinning modernist discourse in which this portfolio is framed. Accordingly I turn now to that issue of methodology.

5. Methodology: The issue of "Modernity"

Throughout this Paper, the approach is essentially a "modern" discourse, rather than reflecting that of the "post-modern". By "modern", I understand the Enlightenment project (Gay 1977; Hazard 1965; Im Hof 1995; Roche 1998) with its commitment to rational discourse and its associated emphasis upon freedom, justice, and human rights (cf. Hanvey et al, 2005:63). In that, the philosophical concept of Modernity and its understanding is distinguished from the historical process in the West. At the same time it is acknowledged that some historians, noting the difference between the French and German assessment of the Enlightenment, contend that "any notion of a coherent and collective 'Enlightenment Project is little more than a myth" (Wokler 1998:318). Still the collective enterprise with its rich and diverse themes—the fact of the Enlightenment—remains part of the Western history of ideas since the Eighteenth Century (Wokler 1998:318; Taylor 1995). As Israel (2010) argues, some ideas which were initially part of the "radical enlightenment", emerging out of the least respectable strata of Enlightenment, maturing away from the mainstream European and American Enlightenment, provoked argument when they appeared sometime later—issues such as racial segregation, censorship, the role of Religion in Politics, social equality and a democratic structure. More recently, fears have been voiced around the move in certain quarters to forego hard earned freedoms from the Enlightenment, in order to secure the State from possible terrorist attacks (Grayling 2009; Todorov 2009). My concern here is with the central themes of the European Enlightenment.

Immanuel Kant's 1784 essay, "What is Enlightenment?" articulates well one of the central themes of the Enlightenment:

Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. *Sapere aude!* 'Have courage to trust your own reason!'—that is the motto of enlightenment (Kant 1784:1).

Historically,

(t)he precepts of the Enlightenment often challenged Christianity: dare to be adult and let go the church's apron strings; trust your own reason and measure revelation against it; be prepared to use your reason critically in any context. The Enlightenment was in many ways a dangerous antagonist to Christianity (Mason 2000: 200).

The Enlightenment challenged traditional European Religion, both Christianity and Judaism (Lennan 2004:20–1).

My concern here is not to trace historically that clash of ideas, or the church's "spotty record" (Shea 1999: 44), and "the appalling destruction wrought in history in the name of faith" (Taylor 1992:52), as interesting and important as those issues are historically. It is important to note that historically in both the United States of America (May 1979:xiii) and Australia (Gascoigne 2005:14, *passim*), when there was tension between the Enlightenment and Christian Churches the heart of the issue was "Enlightenment *as* religion" (May 1979:xiii; author's emphasis). The debate between the Enlightenment approach and organised Religion cannot be characterised as one of deep and abiding hostility. Thus, for France between 1780–1804, Aston (2000:87) comments that the Catholic Church there "had by Louis XVI's reign absorbed some mainstream Enlightenment values". Again, Jones (1995:129) observes that "(n)o other Estate [the Catholic Clergy] responded more thoroughly to the varied stimuli of the enlightenment".

At the same time it needs to be noted that the response of some philosophers to their critics did not always enshrine the values they espoused. An extended quotation from Palmer (1931:7) illustrates the point well:

[in] theory, the philosophers stood for the toleration of all beliefs and the free expression of ideas ... Their method was not often the mild persuasion favoured by liberals. They talked much of reason, but their sharpest arguments were ridicule and vilification ... La Baumelle went to jail, thanks partly to Voltaire, whose works he had ventured to criticise. Freron, a conservative and Catholic journalist, was called by Voltaire, in a single work, a scribbler, toad, lizard, snake, spider, viper's

tongue, crooked mind, heart of filth, doer of evil, rascal, impudent person, cowardly knave, spy, and hound. He found his journal gagged, his income halved and his career ruined by the concerted attacks of the philosophers. To silence him ... Marmontel and d'Alembert, appealed to the censors ... It is not possible, in short, to accept as characteristic of these thinkers the statement often attributed to Voltaire, that, though he disagreed with what a man said, he would fight to the death for his right to say it (quoted in Gregg 2009:129–30).

While recognising that the polarity in which the historical debate was formulated is misleading” (Mason 2000:200), it is also conceded, as Lauer notes (2003:261) commenting on the *philosophes*, “that much of what they attacked in the religious practices of their day was deserving of criticism”; or again, as Shea (1999:41) puts it:

modernity has not been all wrong, and... the Church has not been all right in the struggles of the last two centuries...modernity has been quite right and the church quite wrong about some important matters (and vice versa). For example, the importance of critical history and of the self determination of peoples.

Still, the old positions, with similar acerbity, continue to be voiced in Australia. I confine my comments to a review of the metropolitan press in this State for the first five months of 2007, to illustrate my point in relation to the perceived rationality in the debate about the intellectual warrant for belief/faith. McGuinness (2007), while critical of Richard Dawkin’s latest book “as really an old fashion pamphlet by a militant atheist” (2007:3), finds religion wanting on two major grounds—its ignoring the primacy of human reason and its intolerance and failure to uphold freedom of religious conscience. His position is little different to, though much more concise than, Lecky (1900). Coleman (2007) replied firstly that “(t)here must be an emotional core [to religion]. Religion is not entirely intellectual” (2007:19); and secondly, that relevant to the argument is the good in the historical record of believers. Another statement favouring Modernity and the Enlightenment, over Religion, was the recent prepublication in the metropolitan press, of edited extracts from Christopher Hitchens’ then forthcoming book, titled “a call for ... a new Enlightenment” (Buchanan. 2007:32), “Father, son and wholly bogus” *The Weekend Australian* 19–20 May: 19; “How God’s soldiers poison the well of life” *The Sydney Morning Herald* 19–20 May: 28–9). The tone of the headlines, sustained in the near identical extracts, is aggressive and approximates to the sneer rather than to a reasoned argument. And, as William Paley commented in 1785, in what became a Cambridge University textbook: “(w)ho can refute a *sneer*?” (Paley 2002:277; emphasis in original).

The issue is that when “intelligent authors ... have thrown respect for each other and careful argument to the wind” (Brennan 2007:8), their response does not, to appropriate Clark’s comment to a different situation, begin “a conversation that invites engagement and a response” (Clark 2006:56); in brief, it is an *ad hominem* argument which is more likely to generate “heat”, rather than “light”.

Again that same discussion surfaced when Catterson (2007:4–5) reviewed the books of Hitchens and three other distinguished authors, Michael Onfray, Sam Harris, and Richard Dawkins, who uphold Science over religion though from differing presuppositions. Those authors remain within the “gung-ho boosters of modernity” who “characterise modern civilisation by what it has set aside [and] for whom the change is a liberation” (Taylor 1999b:106).

In a second editorial in *The Australian* (29 May 2007:15), “Freedom To Believe”, three points were made in comment to the books already noted and two ABC Television documentaries, (namely Richard Dawkins’ “The Root of All Evil?” [based on his recent book], and Andrew Denton’s “God on my side”). The points made are relevant to the present discussion:

- i. in a democratic nation, competing and even mutually hostile discourses have their place in the ongoing public discussion;
- ii. in that public discussion the rhetorics of lampoon and ridicule, and to probe and question have their place; and
- iii. historical record cannot be ignored when relevant to the discourse.

Thus,

Hitchens in his book, *God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (2007) goes so far as to say that faith in God is the cause not only of war and sexual repression but pretty much everything in between ... In such an argument, it is imperative for historical acuity and accuracy not to confuse religion with the way religion is used to justify evil. Contrary to the title of Hitchens’ book, religion does not poison everything. It can motivate good behaviour, engender sacrifice, and encourage brotherly love. It has helped to feed the hungry and provide comfort for the lonely. It provides moral and spiritual guidance for people who utterly reject a message of relationships without responsibility, and indeed without love. (*The Australian*. Second Editorial: “Freedom to Believe” 29 May 2007. 15)

My point is to note firstly, the importance of rational warrants for a position, and secondly the importance of freedom of thought in the debate between the participants of the competing

discourses. The rational warrant for that position is better explained in terms of what it means to be a flourishing human person, rather than in terms of human rights, that is to prioritise the “good” over “rights”, pace Rawls (1976). That is a view close to Nussbaum’s (2006:216–23) “capabilities approach” which avoids the problems inherent in the dominant liberal models of justice, and which, through a care-based theory in a political setting, ensures that liberty is not sacrificed to security and well being throughout the citizen’s life. In my position here, I am following closely Haldane (2004a:168–74); time and space prevent a closer examination of those issues. Also, related to that is an examination of the moral value of “toleration”, which is much more nuanced than being, in Geertz’s (2000) phrase (quoted in Bauman 2007:30), a “vacuous tolerance that engages nothing and changes nothing”; in brief, indifference is not the same as toleration. Further, following Nussbaum (2008:24, 333), rather than speaking of the “toleration” of ideas, the issue is better captured by the concept of “respect” for the human person articulating those views.

To return to my broader discussion of the concept of modernity; it is relevant to note, in light of my immediate discussion that nothing new has been adduced in the Enlightenment debate. The deeper issues have been expressed only within an acultural theory of Modernity, which, as will be argued shortly below, is inadequate. Perhaps those holding a trenchantly critical anti-religious position can find an intellectual warrant within Davidson’s claim (1986:310), as Ginsborg (2006) summarised Davidson that “nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief” —here the belief in Atheism on the one hand, and, on the other, a certain epistemological scepticism. Support for that philosophical position can be found from political science research into how misinformation persists in a democracy in spite of contrary information being made readily available (Kulinski et al. 2000; Nyhan & Reifler 2010; Keohane 2010).

At the same time, it is instructive and relevant, that the earlier Catholic resolute hostility to the Enlightenment at the top level has given way to a nuanced, albeit critical, endorsement (Gregg 2009 *passim*; Habermas & Ratzinger 2005; Ratzinger & Pera 2007). Pope John Paul II (1987–2005) noted that while the Enlightenment “decisively rejected” a transcendental dimension to history (2005:173), he also claimed that “[i]n the documents of the Second Vatican Council we find a stimulating synthesis of the relationship between Christianity and the Enlightenment” (John Paul II 2005:124).

Recently, Pope Benedict XVI (2005–) in his address to the University Teaching Staff at Regensburg (16 September 2006), called for a renewed confidence among Academics in the power of human reason. He went on:

The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we are grateful for the marvellous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us (Benedict XVI 2006:5–6).

And more recently in the context of religious toleration, he called for “greater religious freedom in every nation, so that Christians, *as well as followers of other religions*, can freely express their convictions, both as individuals and as organisations” (Benedict XVI 2007:111, n.87; emphasis added).

Todorov (2010: 158), the Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris, has questioned the political astuteness and sensitivity of the Regensburg address and has examined the historical self presentation of both Christianity and Islam in their attitudes to “faith and reason” (Todorov 2010: 153-67). He claimed that in the early centuries of Christianity Pagan critics, Galen and Porphyry in particular, challenged Christianity “precisely for what Benedict accuses the Muslims of” (Todorov 2010: 154). Yet on closer inspection, Todorov’s examples of Galen and Porphyry are not persuasive. I begin with Galen and then will consider Porphyry.

Galen’s (c.129-c.199) “voluminous writings belong rather to the history of medicine than to that of philosophy” (Kenny 2004: 109). Historically, Galen’s favourable comments on Christians were significant (Benko 1986: 142) because he was “the first pagan commentator of whom we know who has anything good to say about Christians” (Stevenson 1965: 491), being impressed by the Christians’ virtue in their private lives (Benko 1986: 146). At the same time, while he perceived Christians as acting on philosophical principles, like any other group of philosophers, he criticised their philosophical argument as inadequately developed. This was at a time when Christianity was “more a way of life” (Benko 1986: 143). Yet Galen’s regarding Christianity as a philosophical movement marked a “major change in the Pagan attitude to Christianity” (Benko 1986: 144). A little earlier, and also around the same period, the Christian Apologists were seeking to present Christianity in a more intellectual way as a religion which was also a well founded philosophical movement. St Clement of Alexandria (c.150-c.215) encouraged his students to use philosophy; Origen (c.180-c.254) drew heavily on neo-Platonic thought, to the degree that his historical legacy among theologians was not one of uniform approval. St Augustine of Hippo (354-430), during his withdrawal to Cassicacum following his conversion,

writing to Zenobius, a Non-Christian Milanese Platonist (Lancel 2002: 83), described Christianity (Teske in Augustine 2001: 17, n. 2) as “*vera et divina philosophia*” (Augustine *Epistola II* 1993:2, “true, divine philosophy” Trans. Baxter, J.H. 1993:3). Further, in his *De Doctrina Christiana* (II, 1995: 124, n. 144), Augustine urged that

(a)ny statements by those called philosophers, especially Platonists [i.e. “those now known as neo-Platonists, and Plotinus in particular” (Green 1995: 124, n. 116)] which happen to be true and consistent with our faith should not raise alarm, but be claimed for our own use, as it were from owners who have no right to them (Augustine 1995:125, Trans. Green 1995)

The second author named by Todorov is Porphyry (c.234-c.301) and again the record is not as simple as Todorov implies. Firstly, Porphyry’s works are not extant; his writings were proscribed by Constantine (333) and by Theodosius II and Valentinian III (448) (Stevenson 1965: 384-5); and the modern-day knowledge of Porphyry’s views comes from his Christian opponents in the Patristic period. It is uncertain whether Porphyry wrote a work titled “Against the Christians” (*Kata Christianos*) or whether that is but a descriptive phrase for his arguments (O’Meara 2001: vii). Further, while it is generally agreed that Porphyry “was an early and decisive influence on Augustine” (Van Flateren 1999: 664), it is debated which of Porphyry’s works influenced Augustine and when he read those works (Van Flateren 1999: 663). And there was a significant intellectual component in Augustine’s conversion (Lancel 2002: 78-89; Brown 1969: 79-114).

On those grounds then, Todorov’s examples are not persuasive.

Yet having noted all that, it is important that I clarify further my understanding of “modernity”; here I am following closely Charles Taylor (1999) who in “his explanation of cultural history” (Gallagher 2010:105) argues that there are two theories of “modernity”, which have different “takes” on how the contemporary society differs from its forebears. The first he describes as a “cultural theory” of modernity, where the societal transformations now taken for granted in the “Atlantic [Western] world” are best understood as a change of culture, that is a language and set of practices, and specific understandings of human personhood, social relations, states of mind/soul, the good, and so on. The “acultural theory” of modernity describes those same changes in “terms of some culture-neutral operation”, here due either to the growth in reason (scientific consciousness, instrumental reasoning, secularism, and the clear distinction between fact finding and evaluation), or due to intellectual change (the outcome of increased mobility, the growth of cities with increased sizes of populations and the impact of industrialisation). Those

views of secularism, urbanisation and the scientific consciousness are associated with key theorists in Sociology such as Durkheim, Weber, and de Tocqueville. Taylor contends, however, that such an understanding is too limiting because it screens out the background understandings of the earlier approach and foregrounds their preferred model.

In light of the work of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Michael Polyani, John Searle and Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor (1995:5) points out that

our explicit beliefs about our world and ourselves are held against a background of unformulated (and perhaps in part unformulable) understandings, in relation to which these beliefs make the sense they do. These understandings take a variety of forms, and range across a number of matters that could be formulated as beliefs, but aren't functioning as such in our world (and couldn't function as such because of their limited extent).

The background understandings, rather than the explicit beliefs against which they are formulated, may be the source of where we differ from our predecessors. Between doctrines and embodied understanding, or *habitus* in Bordieau's terminology, there is an intermediate level of understanding giving expression at the symbolic level; Taylor names that, again borrowing a French term, as "modern social imaginaries" (Taylor 2007). Accordingly, it follows that social imaginaries cannot be accounted for as change in belief, "either factual belief or normative principle" (Taylor 1995:7). To do so, is to project back onto our intellectual predecessors our present understandings and it fails to appreciate the radical nature of the change that came with Modernity. In brief,—“It misrepresents our forebears, and it distorts the transition from them to us” (Taylor 1995:8). Accordingly Taylor (1995:9) proposes a cultural understanding of Modernity which

sees the change as moving from one dense constellation of background understandings and imaginary to another, both of which place us in relation to others and the good. There is never atomistic and neutral self understanding; there is only a constellation [ours] which tends to throw up the myth of this self-understanding as part of its imaginary.

Against that background then, Taylor (1999:36) suggests that the way forward is not a question of siding with either “the ‘boosters’ or ‘knockers’ who either condemn or affirm Modernity en bloc”. Rather the task is “to rescue admirable ideals from sliding into demeaning modes of realisation” (Taylor 1999:36; cf. Taylor 1991).

There are three broad views around whether the Enlightenment project warrants continued support: Jurgen Habermas (1919–) contends that the Enlightenment project is not over but needs to be relaunched (Habermas 1990); thinkers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard (1928–) argue that the Enlightenment project has finished, having died with the Holocaust which exposed the Enlightenment emphasis upon reason as but a masked desire to both dominate and demand conformity, eliminating all forms of difference. Still others, like Anthony Giddens (1938–), suggest that the Enlightenment project has become intensified and radicalised in what has not been a complete break with the Enlightenment project (Giddens 1998). The position taken here is broadly in sympathy with Habermas on the one hand, and on the other with Taylor and his cultural understanding of modernity. I will not be providing my rational warrant for that stand, though at points in this Paper, there are brief discussions of the rational warrant for a particular position espoused. Thus, there is a brief explanation, at the appropriate point, for rejection of a Foucauldian perspective on the analysis of power, on the one hand, and for the rejection of the widespread scepticism around the attainability of truth, on the other. I will not be examining “the frail foundations of Foucault’s monument ... the ease with which history [was] distorted, facts ignored, the claims of human reason disparaged and dismissed” (Scull 2007a:4); or again, how Foucault (1926–84) and his followers have concentrated “on ... relatively rare incidents” (Nutton 2007:24) as the grounds for the development of a wide-ranging theory,

the archaeology ‘of the human sciences’...[outlined in] the whole vast *oeuvre* that constituted his [Foucault’s] deconstruction of the Enlightenment and its values ... that influence[ed] and capture[d] whole realms of philosophical, literary and sociological inquiry (Scull 2007a:4).

My discussion has been around a philosophical understanding of “modernity”. I have not discussed a sociological understanding, as for example that of Zygmunt Bauman (2005, 2007, 2010). Bauman characterises late Western Capitalist Society as “liquid modernity”. That important project is not germane to the present discussion of philosophical underpinnings to my argument. Yet I will return to consider Bauman’s insights around “liquid modernity” and its implications for Clinical Pastoral Education in my concluding Paper, Paper Seven.

Conclusion

In this Paper, drawing upon insights from Palliative Care practice, I contended that the hospital Chaplain’s contribution in “total care” of the patient may be characterised as an element of the patient’s healing and in that way participating in the Asklepian mode of Health care. That

insight was reinforced by insights from the psychology of terror management theory and Bion's construct of "container/contained".

A historical outline was given of the development of the NSW CPE training and formation programmes and the shift of those strategies into a more deliberately educational mode which has culminated in the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education becoming incorporated by Law and gaining Associate Membership of the Sydney College of Divinity. It was then shown how the signature pedagogy of the Chaplaincy profession emerged historically in the United States of America through the contributions of six key figures, Boisen, Cabot, Dicks, Wise, Dunbar and Hiltner. The NSWCCPE Inc. and the earlier form of its organisation, adopted and implemented that professional pedagogy. I noted that there was a deep philosophical tension between the Christian Tradition and Dewey's influence present in the American model of CPE that the NSW CCPE Inc. appropriated. Accordingly in Paper Three, I turn to propose a philosophy of education for CPE practice that is more congruent with the origins of CPE. That proposal will be formulated within the discourse of "Modernity". Accordingly, this Paper ended with a discussion of Modernity and its assumptions, which is the methodology underpinning the Portfolio. And so, the next Paper focuses on a concept of education which explicates Clinical Pastoral Education as practised in New South Wales.

Paper 3: Towards a Philosophy of Education in the Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) Movement

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Paper 3: Towards a Philosophy of Education in the Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) Movement

1. Introduction

The purpose in this Paper is to articulate a philosophical understanding of the educational dimensions of the tradition developed for the training of chaplains who work in hospitals, within the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education Inc (NSWCCPEInc) and who, in that care, represent the patient's Christian Denomination. The focus here is the educational training and formation of the accredited Denominational agent for the setting of the hospital ward where she or he provides the pastoral support for a fellow member of the Denomination in that setting. The process is not in competition with either Social Workers or Psychologists/Counsellors working in the hospital setting on the one hand, or with Medical Professionals on the other, because the pastoral support has as its primary focus the religious and spiritual needs of the patient. Yet, as noted in Paper Two, there is a commonality of interest and approach between holistic Medical Practitioners and hospital Chaplains.

The CPE Programme is also used for the preparation of Chaplains for Pastoral Ministry in aged care facilities, jails and factories; my own experience has been outside jail and factory settings, and accordingly my focus is the hospital setting, and situations akin to that, such as aged care. Accordingly I will be describing the recipient of the Pastoral Care Ministry, as a "patient".

Outline of this Paper

The intended audience of this Paper is firstly myself, as a CPE practitioner, secondly, my professional colleagues of the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education Inc., and thirdly, readers within the tertiary education sector.

The broad argument of this Paper unfolds in five stages of unequal length. Against the background of Paper Two, drawing principally on the work of R. S. Peters, I will propose a concept of education that "fits well" current CPE practice in New South Wales. I will be contending that the educational project of CPE is well explained as an introduction into a worthwhile tradition, here, three traditions or to use Radcliffe's metaphor from a different context, a "web of traditions" (Radcliffe 2005:177), that is the tradition of the CPE Movement, a specific Christian Denominational tradition of Pastoral Care, and the tradition of Liberal

Education. From there, my argument proceeds to examine at some length the strategy used to effect such initiation into the worthwhile traditions. Drawing upon Aristotle, it is contended that the strategy is rhetorical since it seeks to persuade the student and it will be shown how Aristotle's three major forms of rhetorical proof apply in the CPE setting and are profoundly rational. The role of reason extends beyond deductive logical reasoning to embrace inductive inference in the practise of everyday matters. I will be using a broadly military metaphor of 'strategy and tactic' to clarify what is happening educationally, but it is important that my reader does not carry into the use of that metaphor any hint of conflict or contest between contending parties associated with the usual experience of war and contesting armies. By "strategy" I am referring to the overarching approach; by "tactic", I am referring to the use of a procedure to effect some end within the overall purpose. The conclusion summarises the argument of this Paper and notes that the work of Peters had focussed on school education and the need to show how in a tertiary setting the concept of Liberal Education applies on the one hand, and on the other how the CPE Verbatim, the signature pedagogy of the profession, is rational. That tertiary context will be addressed in Paper Four. In Paper Five the rational warrant underlying the use of case studies and of case reasoning will be examined to show how the CPE Verbatim, which shares a family resemblance with both case study methodology in qualitative research on the one hand, and also with case reasoning on the other. Those two approaches are also rational and thus reflect the liberal concept of education being proposed. In Paper Six I will examine how the outcome of the educational process in this professional educational context is the "honing" of the "wise practitioner" within the network of the Chaplaincy traditions.

So, I turn to the next stage in my unfolding argument.

2. Towards a Philosophy of Education for CPE

It is important that CPE have a strong underpinning philosophy of education to ensure there is purpose and direction to the educative enterprise. A similar point is reflected well in the title of David P. Campbell's (2007) self-help book: *If You Don't Know Where You Are Going, You Will Probably End Up Somewhere Else*. John Wilson (2003) offers four philosophical reasons why the concept of education warrants close consideration:

- firstly, "what we do is largely determined by how we think, and how we think by the concepts we use, so that we need to understand them thoroughly if our practice is to be efficient";

- secondly, clarity of public discourse requires that there be an articulation of the heart of the matter, the central concepts, to allow those involved to explore a common understanding both of agreement and disagreement;
- thirdly, it becomes possible to clarify the values inherent in one's position and how those values connect with other interests, both core communal interests as well as the optional; and
- fourthly, it allows us to explore the logical consequences of the understanding developed in the concept espoused (Wilson 2003:106).

Accordingly, I turn now to propose a concept of education apposite for Clinical Pastoral Education, as practised in this State. My argument will unfold in five stages of unequal length:

- a) the concept of "education" and its insight for CPE;
- b) the strategy of that educational project;
- c) the primary tactic for that strategy in a CPE setting;
- d) how philosophically the tactic and the strategy mutually complement the educational project in a CPE setting; and
- e) the educational outcome for the CPE student.

I will conclude by summarising the insights developed and put forward a number of reasons why the proposal brings fresh insight to the educational dimension of CPE practice, along with a comment for professional practice in terms of future curriculum development for CPE. I begin with the concept of "education".

a) The concept of "education" and its insight for CPE

In developing the concept of "education" I will be drawing heavily upon the early work of the Quaker, Richard Stanley Peters (1919–) "the founding father of British Philosophy of Education as practised in the second half of the twentieth century" (White 2005:118). His approach was from within British Analytical philosophy. While Peter R. Hobson (in Bowen & Hobson 1974:345) claimed that "the school of philosophical analysis is now dominant in philosophy ... at least in the English-speaking countries", his assessment was a little premature, for "(b)y the early 1980s linguistic analysis has had its day" (Ker 1997:376). That is not to suggest that Peters' insights are only of historical interest, even though his tools of philosophical examination are no longer so widely practised. The issues raised and the insights he gained from his inquiry continue to make it useful to hear his voice yet again (cf. Warnock 1988:101).

Peters came to prominence with his inaugural lecture entitled “Education as Initiation”, delivered on 9 December 1963 (Collits 1992:91), and delivered on his appointment to the Chair of Philosophy of Education at the Institute of Education at the University of London. Up till then the philosophy of education did not exist as an area of independent study outside the USA, where John Dewey (1859–1952), among others, had made his mark (Collits 1992:75). Peters’ inaugural lecture “had an immediate impact on educational circles” (Collits 1992:91); lecture tours in the UK, USA, South East Asia, and Australia followed. Books and articles by Peters attracted a wide readership. That influence was consolidated by former students being appointed in Universities to lecture on the philosophy of education.

Two aspects of Peters’ approach are particularly attractive, especially in the context of the present project. The first is his concern for clear and accurate thinking about the matter of education. His concern was to get educational thinking “unmuddled ... he wanted educators to become clearer about what they were really on about” (Collits1992:153).

Getting CPE educational thinking “unmuddled” is also part of the current project, and therefore, that explains part of the attractiveness of Peters’ thinking on the concept of education. For Peters was convinced that theory and practice in understanding the concept of Education were interrelated; “education is a field like politics, where several of the basic branches of philosophy have application” (Peters 1966:17–18).

The second attractive feature is Peters’ move away from the position of the Progressivists such as Dewey (1966) on the one hand, and, on the other, from the Perrenialist view of education (Bowen 1974:21–30) which draws upon Plato, Aristotle or Aquinas for its foundation. The so-called “progressivist movement” in schooling was based on either

a Deweyan approach to school as a microcosm of society, where members could be introduced to participatory democracy by engaging in curriculum that reflected their needs and those of society; or on a fully child-centered education as championed by A.S. Neill [1883–1973] where the freedom of the child ‘to grow according to his nature’ was the central issue (Collits 1992:81).

Peters rejects the Progressivist approach because it is deficient in its emphasis upon curriculum content and the student’s critical appropriation of what is taught; likewise he sets aside the Perrenialist position because it fails to give due weight both to the cognitive and psychological readiness of the student. Peters saw difficulties on both sides which he wanted to avoid by

developing a middle-of-the-road position that avoids the faults on both sides. But he needed a new model of education to express this middle position and this he found in his idea of education as initiation (Hobson 1973, in Bowen & Hobson 1974:348).

Peters' views on that facet of education are to be found in his early writings and I will be focussing upon them. At the same time, it is readily acknowledged as Thiessen (1989:1–9) has argued, Peters is concerned with “liberal education”; while Peters, however, claimed that his view was different (Peters 1965:101), he did concede that his concept of education and the liberal concept were “almost indistinguishable” (Peters 1996:43). Further, while Peters' examples refer to the education of children, education as initiation also applies to adults:

the education of adults too involves an initiation component which is a precondition to the critical/rational phase of their education. With adults, however, these two phases of liberal education are much more closely intertwined in practice, though it is still possible and important to make the conceptual distinction between them (Thiessen 1989:8, n.2).

Accordingly, in the context of CPE, Peters' thought has a place, and I turn now to discuss Peter's concept of “education as initiation”.

Important too, was Peters' concern not to replace practice with theory but to provide a theory that made sense of “learning on the job under skilled direction” (Peters 1963, cited in Collits 1992:88)—an approach that is broadly the description of the CPE programme's Units, given above.

I move now to discuss Peters' concept of education as initiation into a worthwhile tradition, not that Peters was the first to use such language to describe education. I will be endorsing Peters' position in general because of his acuity of perception and because for some forty years I found his insights professionally accurate and insightful for liberal education. As Barrow (2009) asks, was Peters was “Nearly right about education”. Modifications to Peters' approach will be suggested during the discussion. At times his use of metaphor is unhelpful; thus I do not accept the suggestion that the uneducated are “barbarians outside the gates of civilisation” (Peters 1978, quoted in Luntley 2010:34) Education is a process of a special form that involves the student who is not tricked or propelled through the gates of civilisation. The ethical dimension cannot be ignored. Education is not a process of absorption, but involves a complex blend of tradition and critique (Warnock 2009). Michael Oakeshott (1901–90) in his 1951 Inaugural Lecture on “Political Education,” commented that:

political education is not merely a matter of coming to understand a tradition; it is learning how to participate in a conversation; it is an **initiation** into an inheritance in which we have a life, and the exploration of its intimations. (Oakeshott 1962:129; emphasis added).

Oakeshott returned to that metaphor in other writings which were published before Peters' 1963 Inaugural Lecture (1962:199); and in later publications (Oakeshott 2001:62, 69, 79, 100, 103, 179, 195). Thiessen (1998:3) has suggested that Peters was "no doubt inspired by Oakeshott". Yet neither Oakeshott nor Peters acknowledge any such dependence, even though both were working within the same Liberal tradition of education, roughly during the same historical period and both were in London. Collits (1992:152) notes the influence of I. Scheffler, C. D. Hardie, G. Ryle and D. J. O'Connor on Peters' thinking, and makes no mention of Oakeshott. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is legitimate to conclude that each arrived at the insight independently. In the following discussion, I will be drawing primarily upon Peters and supplementing his insights from Oakeshott.

i) Education as initiation

Peters came to distinguish an older understanding of "education" and a use of the word that is more recent. The older undifferentiated concept of education referred to the very general idea of raising children and learning; the 19th century saw the emergence of the liberal concept of education, a new ideal of "the educated man". [It needs to be noted that at that time the gender-specific noun reflected accurately societal practice; here, however, the noun is being used in the older inclusive sense common in English usage.] It is an examination of that more recent concept which is the primary focus of Peters' analysis (Thiessen 1998). Peters drew attention to what he contended was the crucial insight into understanding what "education" was about, by using the metaphor of "initiation" to describe the process. His attention was not the process of "socialisation" as such, because his focus was on the public forms of knowledge and their content, and the ensuing intentional development of the critical mind within that received public culture; the educational outcome was the effecting of the free human being; in short, his concern is with "liberal education" (Thiessen 1998:3). Yet, while upholding the liberal values of autonomy and freedom, Peters acknowledges that there is a certain "paradox" in his position, since those values are never absolute, given the contending rights of others in specific situations—individuals, groups, and even the State, either in competition with each other or in terms of domination of one over the other (Peters 1977:68, 80). My concern here is not to address that matter, although that tension is acknowledged.

The term “initiation” is used to describe the overarching process. Earlier phases of the initiation may be marked by processes closer to socialisation or even indoctrination; yet those stages remain no more than a stage towards autonomous, critical appropriation of what the person is being initiated into. Ultimately “(e)ducation is not acquiring a stock of ready-made ideas images, sentiments, beliefs and so forth; it is learning to look, to listen, to feel, to imagine, to believe, to understand, to choose, to wish” (Oakeshott 2001:67).

For the metaphor “initiation” presumes a process of entering **into** some “tradition of behaviour”, in Oakeshott’s phrase (Oakeshott 1962:128). Before discussing that tradition of behaviours, I turn to outline what is implied in describing “education” as “initiation”.

Following Thiessen (1998:2–4), Peters’ views can be summarised under four criteria for the process of initiation if it is to warrant the label of “education”:

- a) the normative criterion, namely, that which is transmitted is done so intentionally and in a morally acceptable manner;
- b) the cognition criterion, namely, that which is transmitted is a body of knowledge which involves some understanding of the overarching schema of the information involved, that pays attention to the cogency, simplicity and elegance underpinning the body of thought. In short, it must have a cognitive perspective if it is to warrant the description “education”. That, in turn, effects a transformation in the learner who values the knowledge and understanding achieved. I will return to that point below, when considering more immediately the adult status of the student in CPE programmes;
- c) the third criterion relates to the educational process. Mention has already been made of the morally acceptable manner required in the transmission of knowledge. No one process is privileged in that—training, instruction, learning by experience, teaching; each has its place. In that, the affective, the cognitive, and the conative, each has a role in shaping the richness of the concrete whole (cf. Oakeshott 1962:113). At the same time, the cognitive criterion excludes such processes as indoctrination, socialising, conditioning, and brainwashing. For that reason the acquisition of the preliminary skills of spelling and arithmetical tables, while crucial preliminary skills, do not attract the label “educational” because they do not respect both the students’ liberty, and the students’ awareness of the process, the students’ “fittingness”; and
- d) the fourth criterion refers to the initiation facet of education for education is seen as a process rather than an event. Hence Peters’ comment that Education, then, can have no

end beyond itself. Its value derives from principles and standards implicit in itself. To be educated is not to have arrived at a destination but to have travelled with a different view (Peters 1972:110; 1970:8).

Because it is initiation, there comes a point where the initiated has confidence and maturity to stand alone, autonomous, yet within that inheritance. It is there that the newcomer is then in a position to critique the tradition that has been handed on. If education is considered as an achievement word, then it is an achievement word in a particular way (Peters 1971:2, 26–8, 37), covering a range of tasks—both trying and succeeding. It implies that the person is interested in what is worthwhile and cares about the process. While a range of tasks are implied, a successful outcome is also presumed, if the process is to warrant the label of “education”.

That outcome is not a matter of completing the process but of enabling a confidence to emerge in the educated person that allows him/her to take part in, to use Oakeshott’s metaphor, “a conversation which goes on in public and within each of ourselves” (Oakeshott 1962:199). Three elements are implied in the metaphor of education as an initiation into conversation. First, the initiation involves the learning of the “grammar” which makes the conversation possible—“normative sources of our speech” (Harvey et al. 2005:62), for irresponsible speech cannot but undermine the process and destroy the outcome. In short, its ethics is, so to speak, ontological.

Second where the conversation is with the other, either an individual or the public at large, the metaphor, if it is to be sustained, requires an ability in at least one of its participants, to “translate” so that one can understand, and/or communicate with, another from a different culture or tradition. If that is not there, then it is impossible to share the “web of significance” that our discourse creates. Mastery is more important than a “Deweyite emphasis upon skills and the accompanying de-emphasis on the content of learning” (Fuller 2001:xix). Fuller continues, and is worth quoting in full:

for Oakeshott the aim is to enter a relationship of ‘conversation’ informed with the traditional literary, philosophical, artistic and scientific expressions of European civilisation. There is...no plausible distinction between ‘essence’ and ‘accident’, and thus no true learning that separates the ‘how’ from the ‘what’ of learning (Fuller 2001:xix).

(One notes but does not endorse the Euro-centric nature of the comment). At the same time, the newcomer once initiated, moves to a point where, now at home in that tradition, he/she has “an intellectual and emotional maturity” (Fuller 2001:xxxv) that allows a justifiable confidence and

autonomy within that tradition on the one hand, and on the other, allows him/her to critique rationally that received tradition as well as the views of others. On the other hand, the individual lives “in an *agonistic* culture, a culture of contest and disputation” (Steinfells 2005:129; emphasis in original), that demands intellectual and emotional maturity if he/she is to be at home in that tradition.

The third element, implied in the “conversational” manner, is that the conversation is from “within a tradition of behaviour” (Oakeshott 1962:126). The focus is not ideologies or abstract formulation of ideas but is found in the concrete activity of persons living within the tradition (Oakeshott 1962:121, 125). Further, it requires that one know of other traditions if one is to value one’s own tradition.

Some comment is warranted upon the understanding of a “worthwhile tradition” and my discussion now turns to that. I begin with some reflections on my understanding of “tradition” drawing upon Oakeshott and then reflect briefly upon the inherently conservative nature of that understanding. Next I discuss my proposal around determining the concept of “worthwhile” to assess a particular tradition.

ii. Tradition

According to Oakeshott (2001:74), education is concerned with the transmission of an “historic inheritance of human understandings and imaginings”. It is readily acknowledged that in the present context, the historic inheritance in the dominant Australian culture is Eurocentric, or Western in its bias. That label is descriptive of the historical culture in which I am living; it is in no way prescriptive, for persons of another culture would enjoy a different historic inheritance. As such, my position is “unavoidably conservative” (Oakeshott 2001:116). By “conservative” is meant

not a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition. To be conservative is to be disposed to think and behave in certain manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain kinds of choices ... there are few of our activities which do not on all occasions call into partnership a disposition to be conservative and on some occasions recognise it as the senior partner; and there are some activities when it is properly the senior partner (Oakeshott 1962:168, 182).

The guiding principle of its identity is, as Oakeshott pointed out, “in the principle of **continuity**, authority is diffused between past, present and future; between the old, the new and what is to come” (Oakeshott 1962:129; emphasis in the original).

The tradition is not immune to change, but the concern of the conservative disposition is to improve the *status quo* by small adjustments and avoid “large-scale alterations the consequences of which nobody can really envisage” (Scrutton 2006:2).

Yet characterising education as intrinsically “conservative” is significantly different from suggesting it is “inspired by a backward or reactionary agenda” (Furedi 2009:49), and that needs to be stressed.

(T)he argument for conservation is based on the understanding that, in a generational transaction, adults must assume responsibility for the work as it is and pass on its cultural and intellectual legacy (Furedi 2009: 49).

Accordingly as such, education is intrinsically conservative; as Haldane commented “in the first instance education is a matter of conserving bodies of knowledge, sentiment and conduct, as these are incarnated in traditional practices” (Haldane 1995:83).

But the question still remains how one tradition deserves to be deemed to be more commendable or worthwhile than another, and my discussion now seeks to address that dimension.

But there is a deeper issue that warrants philosophical consideration, if the present project is to be constituted within the wider project of Modernity, as claimed above. A lengthy quotation for MacIntyre (1988:6) highlights well the central problem:

(i)t was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment, an aspiration the formulation of which was itself a great achievement, to provide for debate in the public realm standards and methods of rational justification by which alternative courses of action in every sphere of life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or unrational, enlightened or unenlightened. So, it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition.

The question therefore remains, whether the definition of education being proposed gives greater weight to authority and tradition. Again, MacIntyre offers a way forward (1988:7):

(w)hat the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to, and what we now need to recover, is...a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors within history of that same tradition. Not all traditions of course, have embodied rational enquiry as a constitutive part of themselves.

Later, in his Gifford Lectures, MacIntyre (1990) developed his point further through his analysis of three rival versions of moral enquiry in the Western Tradition and he contended that “it is not too much to speak of rival conceptions of rationality” (1990: 13), within the broad tradition. Yet, traditions are living processes which can grow or adjust, even mutate over a period of time. MacIntyre’s (2009: 165) recent comment is relevant and deserves a lengthier quotation:

(t)raditions are defined retrospectively. It is only on looking back that the unity of the project to which over considerable stretches of time there have been many contributors, each with their own goals and concerns, becomes apparent. When it does, it is sometimes because of some challenge to a tradition from outside it, a challenge that awakens in those whose lives and work are informed by that tradition a new awareness, both of their shared inheritance and of the issues and problems that they now have to address, if they are to sustain their tradition in the future.

That “double awareness” (MacIntyre 2009:165) ensures the strength and vitality of the tradition. The important role of tradition is particularly relevant where, as in CPE, **praxis** is involved. Here I am following the approach of Kemmis and Smith (2008:6), who, while they acknowledge there are other usages current, use the term **praxis**

to refer to those forms of practice that are enacted by those who are conscious and self-aware that their actions are ‘morally committed and oriented and informed by a tradition’—like the traditions that orient the work, the being and the becoming of people practising a particular occupation or profession.

The Christian Hospital Chaplain clearly falls within such an occupational or professional categorisation. Yet, if a broadly liberal concept of education is being used in such an education, as is being argued here, then it needs to be shown, not merely asserted, that the rational dimension is not sacrificed to, or prejudiced by, a dominant and contrary view. So, I turn to examine the role of rationality in the Christian philosophical perspective.

Christianity has had a long commitment to rationality, as Stark (2005) argues in his revisionist history of the rational in Christianity. Pope Benedict XVI in his 12 September 2006 lecture to the teaching Faculty of Regensburg University (2006), rejected the scepticism of Post Modernity, as a “reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned.” He argued that “rationality [was] the Greek contribution to Christianity and was intrinsic to it” (aydin.net 2006:1). Given the quarter of a millennium conflict between the upholders of the Enlightenment and the Catholic Church, it is important that that be acknowledged. Yet Todorov (2010:154) questions the papal characterisations of both the

Christian Faith and Islamic Faith and he points out that “Christianity has not always promoted the unity of faith and reason” and that it is a matter of historical record that in the first centuries AD Greek critics such as Galen and Porphyry “were criticising the Christians precisely for what Benedict accuses the Moslems of” (Todorov 2010:154). Todorov (2010:158) goes on to suggest, the “Pope’s speech was a clumsy mistake, perhaps even quite the wrong thing to do”. But my concern here is not the historical or political astuteness of Benedict’s remarks, but to note that since reason plays an important dimension in the discourse of the Christian Tradition, it shares the Enlightenment concern for rationality. It endorses a fundamental optimism around the use of reason. As Charles Taylor remarked (1999:37; cf. 26)

[i]t is perhaps not an accident that the history of the twentieth century can be read either in a perspective of progress or in one of mounting horror. Perhaps it is not contingent that it is the century both of Auschwitz and Hiroshima and of Amnesty International and *Medecins sans Frontieres*.

At the same time the broader Tradition is not univocal, but rather one of contesting rationalities. In brief, there is a social nature to rationality. Here I am following MacIntyre, accepting his critique of the “Enlightenment project” while subscribing to the superiority of Aristotle and his commentators (MacIntyre 1984). As Pinkard (2003:185) notes:

(r)easoning is always carried out in terms of shared, socially established standards and in light of what he [Alasdair MacIntyre] calls a ‘tradition’, (a more or less technical term for him, meaning an inquiry directed toward a truth independent of the inquiring mind, whose normative standards are developed over time in light of the problems, anomalies, and clashes with other such traditions that appear in its history).

When speaking of that Christian Tradition, I am referring to an understanding of religion different from that favoured by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who differentiated “ecclesiastical faith” of the churches from “pure religious faith” with “no additional beliefs beyond those available to reason itself” (Bryne 1996:225). Christianity from its earliest days upheld an authority for its belief beyond reason itself. So, in the *Acts of the Apostles* the early Christian community is characterised, in an idealised description, as a group that “remained faithful to the teaching of the apostles, to the brotherhood [of believers], to the breaking of bread [the Eucharistic meal], and to the prayers [in common]” (Acts 2:42 Jerusalem Bible Translation).

Because tradition has conflicting views, and Modernity is characterised by an absence of agreement, MacIntyre (1990:230–1) sees the University as the place where, in the context of “constrained disagreement”, one is “initiated” into that conflict in the wider cultural discourse; it reflects a twelfth century description of intellectual life as *diversi sed non adversi* [of different but not divisive understandings] (Colish 2005:79). And I note MacIntyre’s use of the metaphor of “initiation” in his description, and it dovetails with what has been argued is the nature of “education” for the CPE process. So, in the context of Chaplaincy Education, the CPE programme initiates the student into that dimension of the network of traditions as well. That raises the issue of what makes a tradition “worthwhile”, and I turn now to consider that trait.

iii) Worthwhile

The worthwhile nature of the educational process comes not from the time or the money spent on it, nor the specific agency where it occurs, but it comes from the cognitive perspective gained by the student and also its value to both the teacher and the student. Skilling has its place, but it is not “education”. Some have suggested Peters’ measure of “worthwhile” is the “elitist” model of schooling (Hobson 1973, in Bowen & Hobson 1974:355), where educational opportunity is confined to the highly intelligent (as measured in terms of cognitive knowledge and generalised abstract thinking) and to those from wealthy backgrounds. Peters’ account does not automatically exclude such opportunities for a wider clientele: how to achieve that politically, is clearly a different issue to the “matter of principle” being examined here. Peters’ conclusion is valid for any student no matter the natural gifts or the economic background:

education consists essentially in the initiation of others into the public world, picked up by the language and concepts of a people and structured by rules governing the purpose and interactions with each other ... [The teacher’s] function is...to act as a guide in helping them to explore and share a public world whose contours have been marked out by generations that have preceded both of them [i.e., teacher and student] (Peters 1967:26).

The label “worthwhile” indicates a value judgement by a group; yet, given the complexities of large modern groups, urban or national, it is unlikely that such communities would achieve a ready consensus on what is deemed “worthwhile”. Accordingly, one can settle for a weaker sense of the word (Flood 1999:242–3), meaning what a group within the wider Democratic society, which is not hostile to it, deems to be valuable. And in regard to our wider Democratic society, I accept that

modern liberal culture is characterized by an affirmation of universal human rights—to life, freedom, citizenship, self-realisation—which are seen as radically unconditional; that is not dependent on such things as gender, cultural belonging, civilizational development, or religious allegiance which always limited them in the past (Taylor 1999:16).

In short the gains of the Enlightenment project need to be endorsed, while recognising that the Enlightenment project is incomplete. As Taylor (1991:10) has contended, there are three malaises, or fears about modernity, that require further analysis: “the first fear is about what we might call a loss of meaning, the fading of moral horizons. The second concerns the eclipse of ends, in face of rampant instrumental reason. And the third is about a loss of freedom”.

Thus the position favoured here towards Modernity en bloc, is neither that of a “knocker” nor of a “booster” (Taylor 1999:36; 1991:11). In my present discussion I am presuming that the members of the Christian Churches and the CPE within their different communities share the understanding and values common in a Western democratic country (Flood 1999:243; and for the UK situation see: Harvey et al. 2005:12).

It needs to be stressed that a worthwhile intellectual tradition does not imply the concept of an “educated public”, a goal beyond our present capabilities as MacIntyre has shown. MacIntyre examined that concept of “the educated public” in his 1985 Richard Peters lecture, where he took as his paradigm, the eighteenth century society of the Scottish Enlightenment, a movement centred in the University of Edinburgh, under its Principal William Carstairs (MacIntyre 1987:19). The rise and fall of the Scottish Enlightenment coincided with the rise and fall of the influence of Thomas Reid (1710–96) and Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) leading proponents of the philosophy of common sense (MacIntyre 1987:22). That educated public included moderate clergy who favoured the Williamite settlement, lawyers, larger farmers, merchants especially the more prosperous, and schoolmasters, among whom the dominant *Weltanschauung* received direction and that made them in Kant’s sense “enlightened” (MacIntyre 1987:22–4).

MacIntyre suggests three reasons for the collapse of that educated public; firstly, the historical instability of philosophical viewpoints; secondly the collapse of the cohesiveness that small communities enjoy; the third was economic growth and its impact of shifting individual loyalties from society as a whole, to the individual. So MacIntyre contends that the causes which destroyed the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment, and their effects upon our attitudes to arts and sciences, remain as a “ghost that cannot be exorcised” (MacIntyre 1987:34). Accordingly, there is no educated public as once existed in Scotland, for the graduate of the

current educational system to flourish in. Further, the historical causes of the failure of the educated public of the Scottish Enlightenment are still present in Western society and could be expected to effect the formation and maintenance of a similar educated public in a contemporary setting. While taking MacIntyre's general point, Peters' insight of initiation into a worthwhile tradition holds, even while acknowledging that the goal of an educated public may lie somewhere in the future. The fact that there is not such an educated public does not undermine Peters' analysis of the concept of education.

To summarise my argument so far: following Peters, I have argued that education of its nature is initiation into a worthwhile tradition; further, Clinical Pastoral Education is one worthwhile tradition in Australian Democratic Society, and accordingly, the process of initiation warrants the educational label of "initiation". Two further matters require discussion and amplification—the intellectual process of that initiation into the worthwhile Tradition of CPE, and, using the strategy and tactics to effect that initiation. Each of those matters will be discussed in turn, and in that order.

Firstly then, what is the intellectual process of that initiation? My argument now turns to showing that the initiation is through a rhetorical process, a process that is persuasive by its very nature.

b) The rhetorical process of initiation

Plato (428–348/7) pointed out that all teaching is persuasive, that is, teaching that is consistent with "initiation" is rhetorical in its intent. Cushmann (1958:221) explains:

(a)ready in the *Gorgias* [453d, 454a, Plato 1975: 29], as in the *Crito* [51b, c, Plato 1958:64–5] {cf. *Protagoras* 352e, Plato 1972:89; *The Apology* 35c, Plato 1975:42}, Plato was prepared to assert that whoever teaches anything, must necessarily, in the course of teaching, also persuade. The mathematician persuades as do the practitioners of other sciences and arts. All of them secure conviction about verities relating to their peculiar subject-matter (*Gorgias* 454a, Plato 1975:30).

By "must", Cushmann is asserting a process implied, not an implied physical or moral necessity. At the same time it is conceded that Plato was also openly hostile to rhetoric as practised in the Athens of his day. In fact the term "rhetoric" may have been coined by Plato (Cole 1991:2) as a pejorative term; Plato's objection to rhetoric, however, lay in its intent to seduce the listener into agreement (*Gorgias* 453a, j [Plato 1973:28–30]; *Phaedrus* 261a [Plato 1970:278]) and doing that through its use of base flattery along with the deliberately misleading others (Golden et al.

2000:9, 17). Plato argues that persuasion is linked with deception (cf. *Republic* 364c [Plato 1970:126], 156 [Plato 1970:156], 511d [Plato 1970:295]); in modern terms, Plato's concern around the imbalance in power relations (cf. Herrick 2005:69) and the lack of transparency in public life, is something that still is a cause for concern in public life (O'Neill 2002, Booth 2004, When 2004, Frankfurt 2005; Laura & Penny 2005). As Golden et al. comment (2000:17): "(i)n a way his [Plato's] criticisms is still relevant".

Nonetheless, while Guthrie (1969: Vol. 3:177) contends otherwise, Plato does take rhetoric seriously as is reflected just in his purpose in writing the *Dialogues*, namely, to convince his listeners of the warrant of his argument (Lewis 1986). Cashman (1958:221) concludes that Plato's animus is directed not against persuasion as a concomitant of instruction but against the forensic temper which prizes success in verbal combat above responsibility to the truth. If rhetoric is liable to criticism, according to the *Gorgias*, it is because it has no subject matter except the 'knack' of persuasion itself.

It fell to Aristotle (384–22 BC) to articulate a philosophical discussion of rhetoric, drawing upon the best custom and practice of his day (*endoxa*) to set out the key features of rhetoric. And so I turn to consider insights from Aristotle towards how the process of initiation works through persuasion.

Aristotle's views are found in his *The Art of Rhetoric*. Ross (1960: 275–6) commented that "(i)n understanding the book it is essential to bear in mind its purely practical purpose...it is a manual for the speaker...and this [work on rhetoric] attained enormous authority".

More recently, Aristotle's *The Rhetoric* has been described as "the most important single work on persuasion ever written" (Golden et al. 2000:29). Aristotle is concerned with examining the art of selecting the best means to persuade in every situation, and he does that by critically analysing what had been found to be the best custom and practice in Ancient Greece—the received opinions [*endoxa*] (Thompson 1998:25, 192 ff).

Before examining more closely the grounds of persuasion Aristotle identified, it is relevant to note Heidegger's contention that all human discourse is essentially persuasive; in other words it is an ontological characteristic of human discourse. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) developed that position in his 1924 Summer Semester lecture series on the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy at the University of Marburg [usually referred to as SS 1924] published in 2002 (Metcalf & Tanzer 2009:xi) and translated into English in 2009 (Heidegger 2009). Heidegger

had begun his examination of Aristotelian thought in 1922. Heidegger's 1924 Lecture series characterised Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as "the first systematic hermeneutics of everydayness of being-with-one-another" (cited in Kiesel 2005:132); the community context is essential to the rhetorical project (Gross 205:48). Those 1924 lectures are now seen as "breaking ground" in understanding Classical Greek thought and in Heidegger's own developing thought. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1964:201), one of the 1924 Marburg students, commented:

(t)he remarkable phenomenological power of intuition Heidegger brought to his interpretation liberated the Aristotelian text so profoundly and strikingly from the sedimentation of the scholastic tradition and from the lamentably distorted image of Aristotle in the criticism of the time.

Almost four decades later, Gadamer noted in an interview: "(a)nd I must certainly say that [SS1924] had a determining influence on me. How Aristotle came alive for me ... But with Heidegger Aristotle came suddenly alive" (Kemmann 2001:50 cf. 48).

Such then is Gadamer's reflection on the impact of Heidegger's 1924 lectures on his own thinking. Struever makes a larger claim: that those Heideggerian lectures are "arguably the best twentieth century reading of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (Struever 2005:127). My present purpose is to integrate Heidegger's insights into my general argument, while utilising the insights of Grimaldi (1972, 1980, 1988) whose contribution to detailed textual scholarship on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is unique. So, to return to Aristotle's thought.

Aristotle identifies three forms of civic rhetoric in Athenian society of his day—deliberative, forensic and ceremonial or epideictic. The classification is probably Aristotle's own insight (Grimaldi 1980:79). Burke, however, argues that

(i)nsofar as a choice of action is restricted, rhetoric seeks to have a formative effect upon attitude...Thus in Cicero and Augustine [of Hippo] there is a shift between the words 'move' (*movere*) and 'bend' (*flectere*) to name the ultimate function of rhetoric. This shift corresponds to a distinctive act and attitude (attitude being an incipient act, a leaning or inclination) (Burke 1968:50).

Still, the choice to move on from the attitude of inclination evoked in the listener to action depends upon the judgement of the listener, for which the listener alone is responsible. Further, unless that inclination is already there, the Listener's judgement is highly unlikely to follow in that direction. While Burke's insight adds clarity to our discussion around the purpose of

rhetoric, it does not invalidate Aristotle's categorisation of epideictic rhetoric which is of particular relevance here.

At the same time, additional insights can be drawn from the United States of America, particularly the great speeches in its political history. While the list is by no means exhaustive, the five speeches being considered here are Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address (1863), Martin Luther King's Civil Rights address "I have a dream"(1963), and Barack Obama's three inaugural addresses (2007, 2008a, 2008b). Lincoln's address was deliberately echoed by both Martin Luther King and Barack Obama, so it is relevant to my argument to examine a little more closely President Lincoln's address.

At Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) gave an introductory talk of two minutes duration, supporting the two hour main address of the day delivered by Congressman Edward Everett (Wills 1992: 35; Smith 2008:256). Yet it was Lincoln's brief comments, but "272 words" (Wills 1992:40), that made the historical impact. Lincoln called for unity (Smith 2008:259) "to finish the work ...we [the United States of America] are ... to complete the unfinished work ... the great task before us" (Wills 1992:35)—namely, in Lincoln's closing words, "that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth" (Lincoln 1863). Wills (1992:147, 175) contends that

(b)ecause of it [Lincoln's Gettysburg Address] we [contemporary Americans] live in a different America ... In his brief time before the crowd at Gettysburg he [Lincoln] wove a spell that has not yet, been broken—he [Lincoln] called up a new nation out of the blood and trauma [of the Civil War].

Lincoln is tapping into the national identity of his audience and calling them to move with him to effect the next step in that unfolding identity—a twofold rhetoric—a rhetoric of identity and a rhetoric of invitation. Both Dr Martin Luther King and Barack Obama linked themselves with Abraham Lincoln's concept of American identity and used his twofold rhetoric of identity and rhetoric of invitation to persuade their audience to support them politically.

Smith (2008:267), commenting to Lincoln's and Obama's words, notes that "they were deliberately designed to persuade but they also reveal a deep sense of identification—with their causes, audiences, and political beliefs".

That rhetorical process, the rhetoric of identity and the rhetoric of invitation, has an important role in the persuading the Adult CPE Student to appropriate the CPE tradition, a matter I will

return to below. Meanwhile further insights can be gained from a closer examination of Aristotle's three rhetorical proofs, and I turn to that now.

i) The rhetorical proofs of persuasion

For Aristotle the proofs through persuasion (*pistis*; *pisteis* pl) seek to lead the listener to a rational judgement; it is a rhetorical proof rather than a demonstrative proof (Cope 1877:5). Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1356a1–4) bases his analysis on a *triangle pragmatique* (Brunschwig 1994: 89), the elements involved in the persuasive project, namely, the speaker, the listener, and the message and their distinctive contribution therein. A little later (*Rhetoric* 1356a36–1356b8) Aristotle “slightly modified his pragmatic triangle” (Brunschwig 1996:48) where the third element, the speech, is replaced by the subject of the speech; that indicates the triple varieties of rhetorical discourse according to the audience being persuaded—designed to serve as a foundation for the tripartition of rhetorical kinds” (Brunschwig 1996:48)—deliberative, forensic and epideictic rhetorics. While that modification is “a bit perplexing” (Brunschwig 1996:48), I will be following the earlier version of Aristotle's pragmatic triangle for the insights into where the rhetorical proof is being focussed.

Each of the proofs is a process effected through the spoken word and is threefold: argumentation (*logos*) that convinces intellectually, the character of the speaker (*ethos*) that is conveyed in the spoken word and the listener concludes that the speaker is prudent, benevolent and reliable, and the affective dispositions evoked in the listener (*pathos*) that incline the listener to judge favourably and endorse the speaker's position. Clearly, *ethos* and *pathos* proofs are related to affective response and involve the emotions but in different ways. With the *ethos* proof, the attitude or trust in the speaker depends on how the listener “reads” the discourse of the speaker; whereas, with the *pathos* proof, the speaker sets out deliberately to evoke a particular affective response in the audience. Reason is involved in each proof and there is a symphonic relationship between reason and emotion (Skolon 2006).

Despite Aristotle's admission that reason is the primary aspect of decision making, he rejects the idea that reason single-handedly is a necessary and sufficient condition for ethical and political decision making (Skolon 2006:4).

It should be noted that most speeches use all three means of proof *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos*, though the proportion may differ from context to context.

My concern here is with the rhetorical and not the political, and I turn now to consider briefly the three rhetorical proofs, firstly *ethos*, then *pathos* and lastly, *logos*. I examined those rhetorical proofs at greater length in Flood (1999:174–237) and confine myself here to Aristotle’s discussion, leaving aside further reflection from the Rhetorical tradition.

ii) *Ethos* or character of the speaker as evidenced in the spoken word.

In this proof (*ethos*) Aristotle is not concerned with a speaker’s reputation or social or political status. The focus is on how the speaker’s reliability and credibility are manifested in the very act of speaking. That perceived reliability and credibility evokes a trust both in the speaker and in what is said. According to Aristotle (*Rhetoric II.1.5*, 1378a. 6–19), the listener notes three dispositions reflected in the speaker’s speech that evokes that trust:

- i. *phronesis* or the virtue of good sense or sound judgement;
- ii. integrity of character (*arete*) which will prevent the speaker from deceiving the listener; and
- iii. goodwill (*eunoia*) towards his listener(s) and their concerns.

Those “qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers” (*Rhetoric II*, 1. 6, 1378a. [Trans. Freese 1994:171]).

And again:

we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our confidence is absolute (*Rhetoric I*. ii.4. 1356a; Trans. Freese 1994:17).

Whately (1991[1846]:159–60) characterises *ethos* as

raising a favourable impression of the speaker ... Thus Pericles is represented by Thucydides as claiming, directly, when speaking of his own vindication, exactly the qualities (good Sense, good Principle, and Goodwill) which Aristotle lays down as constituting the character we [the speaker] must seek to appear in...but this must be done in an oblique and seemingly incidental manner, lest the hearers be disgusted with a pompous and studied display of fine sentiments; and care must be taken not to affront them by seeming to articulate, as something likely to be new to them, maxims which they regard as truisms. Of course the application of this last caution must vary according to the character of the persons addressed.

In brief, the listener's perception is sufficient grounding for that level of trust (cf. Baumlin 1994:xv). Aristotle's *ethos* comes very close to the English word "character" (Wisse 1989:59), but as disclosed, not by reputation, but in the actual words of the speaker.

According to Aristotle's model of *ethos*, the rhetorical situation renders the speaker an element of the discourse itself standing inside an expanded text ... a signifier *inside* an expanded text. (Baumlin 1994:xvi, emphasis in original).

Smith notes that "(a)s an empiricist, he [Aristotle] examines not what is given in a culture, but the notion of *ethos* as the *public* manifestation of the person" (Smith 2004:2, emphasis in original).

In brief, it is the interpretation of a speaker's particular audience on that specific occasion. Accordingly, Herrick's (2005:84–5) description of *ethos* as the "sociology of Good Character" is misleading. Further, Aristotelean *ethos* is quite different from *auctoritas* of the orators of the Roman Republic, whereby *auctoritas* ["authority, credibility"] gave to the political orator "the right to speak publicly and to persuade their fellow-citizens that their proposals were the best" (David 2006:420). Similarly, there is also a difference to the Roman concept of *gravitas*, a term which encapsulated the authority of proposals delivered with seriousness and reserve and filled with the assurance and the spirit of command bestowed by the tenure of office past or present (David 2006:420; cf. Hellouegou'arc'h 1972:279–81). Yet, David (2006:437 n.17) contends that "[g]ravitas in oratory is an aspect of rhetorical *ethos*, i.e., persuasiveness through the projection of character". But *gravitas* goes beyond the person speaking to include the appearance, manner and style deemed appropriate and relevant by the audience. Aristotle's analysis does not end there.

Aristotle does note how a speaker needs to be alert to the values shared by his audience, reflecting, for example, political interest or stage of life, (Aristotle. *Politics III*. 7–8; IV. [Trans. Sinclair 1972: 115–8; 149–88]. cf. *Rhetoric I*. viii. 1366a. [Trans. Freese 1994:89]). It can shape the presentation so that the speaker comes across with a style of *ethos* the listener is likely to endorse, as practically wise, virtuous and showing goodwill both towards the audience and to what the audience values. The task is to "appear to be of a certain character" (*Rhetoric* 1377b21. [Trans. Freese 1994:170]).

Determining the audience's beliefs is the key to successful adaptation in terms of building credibility. In this way, *ethos* dwells not only in the speaker as Plato and Isocrates would have us believe but also in the audience (Smith 2004:6).

It is important to note that the ethical evaluation of the speaker's doing that, is a separate issue. Aristotle presumes that the speaker is unknown to the audience and is concerned with the artistic proof, thus an effect arising from within the speech itself, separate from "considerations of the speaker's prior reputation or true moral character" (Baumlin 2001:266).

For Aristotle *ethos* was about building the credibility of a speaker before an audience, not about the speaker's inherent worth (Smith 2004:5).

As such then, *ethos* is "pervasive in the speaking event" (Smith 2004:13) and enjoys an "ontological nature" (Smith 2004:14), and is "a moral enterprise ... aiming towards a moral end (a *telos*)" (Smith 2004:15). When discussing *ethos*, Aristotle's concern is the element in the discourse that "presents the speaker as trustworthy" (Wisse 1989:33).

I have stayed with the Aristotelean text and have not considered *ethos* from a psychological perspective as projection, transference, or counter transference. Pace Alcorn (1994), Aristotle's separation of "a speaker's person and the emotions used by the speaker to move an audience" (Alcorn 1994:9) is conceptually appropriate; appearing trustworthy and reliable is very different from evoking a particular emotion or set of emotions in an audience. The focus, for Aristotle, is "how a hermeneutic of trust ...works" (Garver 1994:162).

Whately in his 1846 *Elements of Rhetoric* summarises Aristotle's view on "character" as follows:

Aristotle means not his *real* character, according to the fanciful notion of Quintilian, but the impression, produced on the minds of the hearers, by the Speaker himself...that the character to be established is that of, first, Good Principle, secondly, Good Sense, and thirdly, Goodwill and friendly disposition towards the audience addressed; and if the Orator can completely succeed in this, he will persuade more powerfully than by the strongest Arguments (Whately 1991:144–5. Emphasis in original).

Contrary to the Isocratean tradition which asserts that speakers need *to be good*, the Aristotelean tradition asserts it is sufficient to *seem good* in the view of the listener: "for the former, discourse

becomes a revelation of character; for the latter, discourse becomes an active construction of character” (Baumlin 1994:xv).

Ethos, then refers to the proof focusing upon the speaker, while *pathos* refers to the audience, and *logos* refers to the text (Streuver 2005:107) or, in Ross’s phrase, “the ‘sheer force’ of the argument” (Ross 1924:271)

I turn now to the second rhetorical proof, namely, the persuasive role of the emotion the speaker evokes in the listener, *pathos*.

iii) Aristotle’s second means of persuasion—*pathos*

Pathos refers to the speaker “putting his listener into an emotional frame of mind which will encourage receptivity to his conclusion” (Cooper 1994:196). The aim is to put the audience “in a certain frame of mind”. Accordingly, the context of how the listener, or the audience, is receptive to the persuasive communication, must be considered; “the proper exercise of rhetoric is constrained by the proper mental dispositions of its audience” (McCabe 1994:158). As Hyde (2005:82–3) observes:

(i)n the rhetorical situation an audience is not set at a distance. Rather, it is acknowledged, engaged, and called into the space of practical concerns as the orator works to establish an emotional connection with the audience and its immediate concerns and interests...A moving of the passions is a sine qua non of persuasion; truth alone is not sufficient to guide the thoughtful actions of human beings.

Heidegger concludes that *pathos* “provides the mood and motivation necessary for the speaking animal to emerge and find its place in the world” (Gross 2007:37). Aristotle provides “the most complete analysis of *pathe* in the Greek world” (Green 2001:557). The primary concern in the rhetorical context is the pleasant or distressful dispositions that lead the Listener to change his/her mind, and not the motivation for his/her wrong doing.

In Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discusses *pathos* as a motive for judgement, “since people judge differently depending upon whether they feel pain or pleasure” (Green 2001:558).

Aristotle’s emphasis upon the judgement explains why he does not include bodily appetites in his consideration in the *Rhetoric*, whereas the sensual appetites, which are not necessarily accompanied by pleasure or pain, are considered in his discussion in the *Ethics Nichomachean* (1105b21). When discussing rhetoric, Aristotle is concerned with “the cognitive side of

emotional response” (Fortenbaugh 2002:19), and, accordingly, because an emotion can be altered by argument and in that way “thoughts or beliefs” (Fortenbaugh 2002:94) can be altered, “it was possible to adopt a positive attitude towards emotional appeal” (Fortenbaugh 2002:18). For Aristotle, in the rhetorical setting,

emotions are not blind impulses. When a man responds emotionally, he is not the victim of some automatic reflex. On the contrary he is acting according to judgement ...Emotional responses can be intelligent and reasonable actions (Fortenbaugh 1970:61–2).

Gross (2006: 5) contends that “the idea that emotion is a kind of excess” has its historical origins with Descartes’ “reductive psychophysiology of emotion that informs both romantic expressivism and latter-day sciences of the mind and brain”. Nussbaum (2001:22), drawing on Ancient Greek Stoical thought, characterises emotions as “forms of evaluative judgement that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person’s own control great importance for one’s own flourishing”. Accordingly, “emotion judgements are a subclass of value judgements” (Nussbaum 2001:30. n.21). The judgement is an assent to appearances, accepting that appearance, or secondly, rejecting the appearance, or thirdly, having no belief or no judgement in the matter being considered (cf. Nussbaum, 2001:37). For Aristotle “(t)he *pathe* are (1) something that are capable of changing or turning around and (2) this ‘turning around’ additionally changes or alters human judgement” (Sokolon 2006:14).

In brief, the emotion being considered here is the emotion in the mind of the hearer (Garver 1994:37). The speaker’s ability to evoke the appropriate *pathe* is how the speaker demonstrates the speaker’s credibility, the *ethos* discussed above.

Nussbaum (1996:303) has summarised well the case I have argued here: the emotions are “intelligent and discriminating parts of the personality, closely related to beliefs of a certain sort, and therefore responsive to cognitive modification”.

On the one hand, one can modify a listener’s emotion by argument, and on the other hand, the listener’s reason-based beliefs “can dispose a person in a certain way to have corresponding emotional responses” (Striker 1996:299). *Pathos*, then is “an appeal to the audience’s sympathies and imagination ...which moves the audience to decision or action” (Ramage & Bean. 1998:81–2).

I turn now to consider briefly Aristotle's third rhetorical proof (*pistis*)—**Logos** or persuading by the use of reason. Persuasion by the use of reason is directed towards judgement in relation to the probable, about "plausibility" (Wells 2001:49), "since certainties are not matters of deliberation" (Ross 1960:271).

iv) Aristotle's third means of persuasion—logos

Logical appeals (*logos*)

operate primarily through the hearer's judgement about the issue under debate ... **Logos** does not denote what is eternally or certainly the case, but only what is true or can be made to seem true to a given audience (Wells 2001:459).

It should be noted that most speeches use all three means of persuasion *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, though the proportion may differ from context to context. **Logos** though concerns the argument proposed using, not "formal" logic, but "substantive" logic (Golden, Goodwin & Coleman 2000:251).

While **logos** entails the use of reason, it is important that a Twenty-first Century person does not attribute to Aristotle, a later understanding of reason. Toulmin (2001) provides a useful way forward; Toulmin labels non-formal kinds of reasoning "reasonableness", contrasting that with the formal rationality of Mathematics and of the Physical Sciences which since the mid Seventeenth Century, has been characterised as the privileged, and only legitimate, setting for human reason—"the war of Logic against Rhetoric" (Toulmin 2001:22). Toulmin situates his position in the context of the long history of Western Philosophy.

Even the philosophers of Antiquity employed two distinct standards of judgement. Early in the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle criticised Plato for demanding in ethics a kind of exactitude that is appropriate in Geometry, but not to human situations or the moral issues they entail. Where Platonists insisted on general principles in every form of human thought, Aristotle asked us to aim at whatever kinds of generality the nature of our particular problems justified (Toulmin 2001:168–9).

As Toulmin (1988:341) noted in an earlier work, "(a)fter centuries of Aristotelean practical philosophy, the years 1620 to 1660 saw not just a renewed interest in universal abstract theory but the outright rejection of traditional practical concerns".

From around 1630, because of the prestige of Mathematics, philosophers paid little attention to non-formal human arguments (Toulmin 2001:14–28). “Formal Logic was in, Rhetoric was out” (Toulmin 1988:339). I do not intend to detail Toulmin’s critique of the exclusive emphasis upon Formal Logic and it is sufficient here to note his inclusion of probability in his preferred model (Toulmin 1958:90–1). Toulmin’s approach “highlights the *movement* of the rhetor’s reasoning” (Golden, Goodwin and Coleman 2000:238—emphasis in original). In 1972 Toulmin (Golden, Goodwin and Coleman 2000:247–50) “freely uses, and identifies with, the term rhetoric” (Golden, Goodwin, and Coleman 2000: 251), something he had not done earlier (Toulmin 1958). Toulmin contrasts theoretical arguments with practical arguments; theoretical arguments have a formal validity, while practical arguments enjoy “substantive soundness” (Toulmin 1988:346). Accordingly I will be using “reasonableness”, the term Toulmin gave currency to, as the English equivalent of *logos* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* without implying that Toulmin drew his initial inspiration from that work of Aristotle.

I turn, now, to Aristotle’s treatment of *logos*, or reasonableness, in the *Rhetoric*. I begin with some brief observations on the background to our present texts, before discussing at greater length the form of reasonableness Aristotle is positing. I will then consider the enthymeme, the exemplar and metaphor for their insights for this argument developing a concept of education for CPE.

Following Fortenbaugh (1991), Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* once comprised two separate sections: our Books 1 and 2, and what was once a separate treatise on Style which became our Book 3. What may be the older section gives priority to argumentation as the means of persuasion, while other means of proof are adjunct (*Rhetoric* 1404b18–1404a39); a similar pattern is to be observed in *Rhetoric III*. The first (*Rhetoric* 1403b18–1404b39), which is likely to be of a later composition, also includes emotional appeal and appeal through character; the second, and possibly earlier composition, (*Rhetoric* 1403b6–18) emphasises solely arguments based on facts. Aristotle points out that “the object of rhetoric is judgement—for judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are a judgement” (*Rhetoric II*. 1, 1377b. [Trans. Freese 1994:169]). The same is true of epideictic proofs of persuasion. Contrary to Plato’s assessment of rhetoric, Aristotle contended that “good rhetoric places before the audience all the means necessary for sound decision making” (Pollock 2001:410); and again as Grimaldi notes (1972:3): the intention is “of presenting the matter in such a way as to make assessable to the other the possibility of reasonable judgement”, or in Pollock’s succinct phrase, “forming sound

judgements”. Farrell (1993) argues that rhetoric is connected to judgement because the speaker needs to engage with the values and beliefs of the auditor; and that requires that the speaker cultivate the speaker’s own “master virtue of phronesis” (Pollock 2001:411), and in the persuasive discourse shape the attitudes, beliefs and values of the audience in the process of their forming sound judgements. Aristotle contends that rational speech belongs to the essence of being fully human and while ethical and praiseworthy, circumstances may render rhetorical discourse a shameful practice attracting censure or even warranting the invocation of the “rule of Law” (cf. Bingham 2010). But, I return to examine more closely the rhetorical proof Aristotle designates as *logos*, the logical proof from reason.

The logical proofs need to be produced “artistically” and operate through the hearer’s judgement about the occurring exchange; *logos* does not “guarantee truth, but only plausibility” (Wells 2001:459). The focus is the reasonableness of the argument and, therefore, because the concern is about the plausible, Aristotle is concerned with the enthymeme, the “syllogism” in rhetoric; it is the “master structural idea” (Grimaldi 1972:136) of rhetoric. “Rhetoric, like dialectic, is for Aristotle a methodology. But it is a methodology for discourse with others; as a dynamic its function is to aid discovering that structure in discourse on any subject that leads to conviction and belief” (Grimaldi 1972:2, n.2). For Aristotle, reasonableness lies at the heart of Rhetoric and he criticises strongly the earlier writers who had not discussed enthymemes—“the body of the proof—*soma tes pisteis*” (*Rhetoric* 1354a; Trans. J.H. Freese 1994:5).

Aristotle develops his assertion that Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectics by showing that the example is the rhetorical counterpart of induction, and the enthymeme is the counterpart of the syllogism and “the rhetorical method par excellence” (Ross 1960:271). I turn now to discuss more closely, firstly the enthymeme and then the example in rhetorical discourse.

α) the enthymeme

The Greek noun *enthumema*, transliterated into English as *enthymeme*, refers to a thought, piece of reasoning, argument (Liddell & Scott 1958:567). Aristotle gives the term a specialised meaning as “a kind of syllogism” (*Rhetoric I*, i1355a6; Trans. Freese 1994:9) drawing upon “a selection of premises about probabilities and what is most suitable” (*Rhetoric II*, xxii 1396b24. [Trans. Freese 1994:293]), contrasting it with the apodictic or logical syllogism that is based upon certainties and facts, and which is “a strictly demonstrable proof” (Freese 1994, Glossary 475), “demonstrating something by the deductive method” (Grimaldi 1980:20–1). But more is

needed if one is to describe the form of the enthymeme, a “kind of demonstrative process which is syllogistic in character ...a reasoned and rational endeavour” (Grimaldi 1972:21–2).

But as Ross (1924:499) objects, more is needed if its real nature is to be disclosed beyond describing the procedure involved in its use to effect conviction and in a way that “scientific demonstration” (Ross 1924:499) does not. Whately (1855: 75) notes that “[the] Enthymeme ... is a syllogism with one premiss suppressed ... e.g. “Caesar was a tyrant, therefore he deserved death”. “A free nation must be happy; therefore the English are happy”. Further the enthymeme “is the ordinary way of speaking and writing” (Whately 1855: 76). The more recent characterisation of the enthymeme as a syllogism with one premise or its conclusion omitted, “forms no part of Aristotle’s definition” (Ross 1924: 500) and, in fact, is “un-Aristotelean” (Barnes 1994:83). Yet in the *Analytica Priora* (ii. 29 [27] 2) Aristotle describes the enthymeme as an “incomplete syllogism”. Kennedy in his translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (*Rhetoric* 1991:29 n.3) offers a description of the enthymeme as a “proposition and supporting reason”.

De Quincey (1828:886) endorses the 1724 view of Jacob Facciolati that the enthymeme “consists of one premise and the conclusion”. The difference lies not in the suppression of one of its propositions because both Logic and Rhetoric may do that;

the difference is essential, and in the nature of the *matter*; that of the syllogism being certain and apodeictic, that of the enthymeme probable, and drawn from the province of opinion(w)here it is possible for understanding to be convinced no field is open for rhetorical persuasion. Absolute certainty, and fixed science, transcend and exclude opinion and probability (De Quincey 1823:888).

Hamilton (1833:221) likewise, is highly critical of the view that the enthymeme

is a species of reasoning, distinguished from syllogism proper, by having one or other of its premises not expressed but understood ... The division of syllogism and enthymeme, in *this* sense, would involve nothing less than a discrimination of species between the reasoning of logic and the reasoning of ordinary discourse: syllogism being the form peculiar to one, enthymeme that appropriate to the other (Emphasis in original).

Hamilton, basing himself in Aristotle (*Analytica Posteriora*, i. 19, #7) agrees with De Quincey that the difference between the “pure syllogism” and the enthymeme “is the reasoning of a peculiar matter—from *signs* and *likelihoods*” (Hamilton 1833:222. emphasis in original). Hamilton listed some seventeen different usages of “enthymeme” (Madden 1952:367), two of

which are relevant to this discussion. The first is that of Aristotle's use as just noted; the second, which enjoyed great popularity, is that the enthymeme is an abbreviated syllogism. As Burnyeat (1994:5) notes: "(t)he speaker does not express the whole of their reasoning but is holding part of them back or one of them back".

Seaton (1914), however, restored credibility to the earlier common interpretation of the difference between the dialectical syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme, that the enthymeme is a syllogism with one premise suppressed, a truncated syllogism. That general view is endorsed by both Thinssen & Baird (1948:65–9) and Corbett (1990:60–1). Johnstone (2001) highlights the important role of the auditor being persuaded, with their beliefs and values through which they process the case being presented and, therefore, there is no need for the speaker to articulate those views which the audience "can be counted on to provide" (Johnstone 2001:249); further the case being argued is to a specific, practical conclusion directed towards action, rather than the universal conclusion and the objective case. The role of the rhetorical strategy is to guide judgement about matters of deliberation "for which there are no systematic rules" (*Rhetoric I. ii. 12. 1357a*. [Trans. Freese 1994:23]). While the human knowledge in the rhetorical situation is the probable it is "legitimate material for [rational] discourse" (Grimaldi 1972:93); rhetoric

is the use of language in an artistic way, language which brings together in its effort to communicate knowledge and understanding to another the elements essential to that understanding (Grimaldi 1972:151).

One can find support for the Aristotelean position in Toulmin's discussion of developing a consensus on a committee evaluating rules and principles around contentious ethical matters, in balancing, what Toulmin described as the inflexible quest for certainty in ethics on the one hand, and on the other, an equally dogmatic relativism.

Practical reasoning in ethics, as elsewhere, is a matter of judgement, of weighing different considerations against one another, never a matter of formal theoretical deduction from strict or self-evident axioms ... a morality based on general rules and principles alone, is a tyrannical, disproportioned thing, and that only those who know how to 'make equitable allowances' for individual differences have a proper feel for the different demands of ethics. (Toulmin 1982:15, 17).

While theoretical arguments, the deductive syllogism, have a formal validity, practical arguments, the rhetorical syllogism, have a “substantive soundness” (Toulmin 1988:346). Inference warrants are established in the relevant field, but remain always “warrants” rather than “conclusions or data” (Toulmin 1993:98). Here I am asserting the informality, maybe the essential informality, of good practical reason. Following Tallmon (1995), the methodology of rhetorical reasoning or informal reasoning is explained well in John Henry Newman’s 1870 book, *An Essay In Aid Of a Grammar of Assent*. Newman (1801–90) contends that it is rhetorical reason which makes the unconditional assent of religious belief rational. The intellect, drawing upon probabilities, gradually achieves certitude of assent, by using the intellect’s faculty, the sense of right judgement in ratiocination, or what he termed the “illative sense” (Newman 1985:221). As Tallmon (1985: 201) has noted: “(t)he illative sense extends [Aristotle’s] *phronesis* beyond the realm of moral development by illuminating the parallels between individual growth in virtue and individual growth in belief (or faith).” That process of reasoning, the convergence of probabilities, “the method of concrete inference” is “more or less implicit, and without the direct and full advertence of the mind exercising it” (Newman 1985:190). Tallmon (1985:201) contends that “(t)he epistemology that sanctions the illative sense, with its attendant critique of formal logic, is precisely the point where Newman helps fix the borders of the realm of rhetoric”.

I leave a more detailed discussion of Newman’s position to my Paper on *Educating the Wise Practitioner* (Paper Six).

Such then is the rhetorical syllogism or warrant. I turn now to consider rhetorical induction, or the example.

β) example—rhetorical induction

A quotation from Barnes (1994:83) helps clarify the concepts of enthymeme and example in rhetorical discourse:

(e)xample (*paradeigma*) and enthymeme (*enthumeme*) together exhaust rhetorical reasoning...Example is often treated as the name given to inductive arguments in rhetorical context (e.g. *Rhetoric* A 2, 1356 a34–b11); but it is defined as inference from a particular *to a particular*, and thereby distinguished from induction (*Rhetorical* A 2, 1357b25–30; *Analytica Priora* B 24, 69a 13–9, emphasis in original).

Accordingly, before discussing “example” I will consider Aristotle’s understanding of “induction”.

As Ross (1960:38) notes, for Aristotle:

(t)here is an opposition between syllogism (or deduction) and induction as the two fundamentally different modes of advance in thought—the former from universal to particular, the latter from particular to universal, the former from prior and more intelligible by nature, more compelling, the latter clearer to us, more persuasive, more intelligible in terms of sensation, and making more general appeal.

Each mode is syllogistic but with induction, the conclusion is no wider than the premises. But Aristotle did not offer a complete and thorough analysis, omitting as Coplestone (1956b:284) noted, as one instance, the form of inference when the mind infers a conclusion after critically weighing up concrete facts and draws a particular conclusion rather than a general proposition.

In induction (*epagoge*), Aristotle is not concerned with “perfect induction”, the intellectual process which delays drawing a universal conclusion until every particular case has been examined. That is not the way the inductive argument is applied by human beings, being outside the worthwhile limits of time and circumstances of everyday living (Guthrie 1998f:188). In the *Topics*, Aristotle defines induction (*epagoge*) as the “proceeding from particulars to universals” (Aristotle 1997:105a13; Trans. Smith, R. 11). Induction, in contrast to deduction, is more persuasive or more convincing because it is closer to the sense experience (Ross 149:487); further, induction is more readily assessable to the majority of people, and more easily learned through the senses, but the deductive syllogism is more effective against more argumentative persons (Guthrie 1998. Vol. 6:187). Aristotle suggests in the *Problemata*—(916b25–30) that the reason humans prefer examples and fables in “rhetorical displays” over enthymemes may be

because they like to learn quickly, and this end is achieved more easily by examples and fables, since these are familiar to them and are of the nature of particulars, whereas enthymemes are proofs based on generalities, with which we are less familiar than with the particular (Aristotle 1927. Trans. Forster, E.S. in Ross et al. (Eds.). [the pages are unnumbered]).

Aristotle goes on to suggest that there is a parallel with proofs in a legal court setting that are persuasive because those proofs are supported by the evidence of witnesses. “(M)en like to hear of similarities, and examples and fables display similarities” (Aristotle 1927: *Problemata* 916b34; Trans. Forster in Ross et al. (Eds.). 1927. [the pages are unnumbered]).

When it comes to rhetoric, the example (*paradeigma*) “resembles induction” (*Rhetoric II. XIX. 1 20. 2 1393a*; Trans. Freese 1994:273), and, the example, along with the enthymeme, are the sole

rhetoical means of producing rhetoical belief (Lyons 2001:278). Yet *paradeigma* (example) is different from induction in that it argues from one or several instances, though not from all, but “to a particular belief” (Ross 1949: 488). (*Rhetoric* 1355b6; Trans. Freese 1994:19). Aristotle introduces further clarification of the concept of example accordingly as the example is fictitious, that is developed to support an argument, or factual, that is based on historical instance; if fictitious or invented, the example may be a “comparison” (**parabole**) or a “fable” (**logos**) (*Rhetoric* 1393a–b; Trans. Freese 1994:271–3). The instance, example or paradigm (*paradeigma*) is a

kind of induction...it is neither the relation of part to whole, nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to another whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other (*Rhetoric* 1357b; Trans. Freese 1994:29).

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) provide further insights, examining the establishing of the rhetoical structure of reality through the use of the particular case, that is through

the resort to the particular case...as an example, it makes generalisation possible; as an illustration, it provides support for an already established regularity; as a model, it encourages imitation useful to argument by example ... Argumentation by example ... assumes earlier agreement on the possibility of arriving at generalisation from a particular case (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:350).

The invoking of particular phenomena does not automatically imply that the speaker’s intending to present “facts as examples”, but where the phenomena show similarity “we are inclined to regard them as examples” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:351). One situation moves to another and where the “examples ...are different as possible ... it can be shown that the differences are without importance on this occasion”, (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:353). Thought becomes more precise as examples are multiplied.

While an example is designed to establish a rule,

the role of illustrating is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing instances which clarify the general statement, show the import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its presence in the consciousness (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:357).

Aristotle suggests that there needs to be numerous examples to prove the rule but if placed last in the argument, one is sufficient, particularly if the example is a good one. If examples stand first,

they resemble induction...if they stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in every case likely to induce belief (*Rhetoric II*. xx. 91394a; Trans Freese 1994:279).

But my concern here is with how induction works in human knowing and the Canadian Jesuit philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904–84) who is concerned with cognitional structure offers a useful extension of my epistemological project in regard to induction. Lonergan (1970:288) has noted that

induction is a valid process of the human mind, an almost automatic procedure of intelligence. We appeal to analogies and we generalise because we cannot help understanding similars similarly. This solution [to the problem of explaining induction] be it noted, squares with the broad fact that there is no problem teaching men to generalise. There is a problem of teaching them to frame their generalisations accurately; indeed the whole point of analogy is that it absolves one from that conceptual task and the complexities it involves. There is, above all, a problem of preventing men from generalising on insufficient grounds, and very easily such grounds are merely putative.

Yet, as Lonergan (1970:288–9) goes on to note, four conditions need to be first met for induction to be a valid process, namely:

- i. that there is a “correct insight regarding the basic situation”;
- ii. that the act of understanding comes out of “a process of learning and attainment of familiarity and mastery”;
- iii. that there is similarity between the situations; if not, then the original insight may need modification or revision; and
- iv. significant differences need to be noted in order to see whether both situations are “similar in all respects”; only then is it legitimate to transfer the insight of the one to the other.

But my concern here is rhetorical induction, the example.

Aristotle claims that both example and enthymeme are proofs “common to all branches of Rhetoric” (*Rhetoric* 1393a23–4; Trans. Freese 1994:273). Hauser (1968) contends that Aristotle uses example in two different senses; one sense refers to an independent mode of proof, and the other as a basis for enthymic proof. The issue is whether the mind forms a generalisation which is then applied, or to rephrase the matter, whether the mind moves from “part to part”, or “part to whole to part” or a logical interpretation. Hauser rejects the logical interpretation; Grimaldi (1972:105) favours the logical interpretation of the intellectual process. Consigny (1976) using

different terminology and relying on the Freese's (1994) translation of *Rhetoric*, argues that the example moves from part to part. But Benoit (1980:187), after reviewing Aristotle's use of example, contends "that much evidence in the *Rhetoric* as well as from the *Prior Analytics*, mitigates against Hauser's and Consigny's interpretations".

At one point Aristotle likens the argument from example to the testimony of witnesses (Benoit 1980: 191). Benoit (1980:192) concludes

rhetorical induction or example moves inductively from a non exhaustive examination of particular instances of a given class of generalisation concerning a property of that class, and then moves enthymetically to apply that generalisation to another specific instance of that class...It is more easily understood but less impressive than [the enthymeme].

Hauser (1985) however, has revisited his case showing that Aristotle "means literally that example moves from part to part, that in performance and in perception it is an argument based on an unmediated inference, a recognition. His 'part to part' captures perfectly the dynamics of the rhetor as *phronimos* in the act of arguing and of the perceptual element of the audience as the judge of rhetorical *pistis* [proof]".

Both Hauser and Benoit agree that Aristotle's concept of the example "includes a mediating generalisation" (Hauser 1987:268). McGuire (1982) suggests that a way forward in examining the role of example is to distinguish the verbal movement, which is from part to part, from the epistemological qualities of example which is from "part to whole to part".

Metaphor

While Aristotle considers metaphor under the characterisation of style, the work of the cognitive scientists Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1993, 1999) and Lakoff's (1987, 2004, 2008) popularisations of Lakoff and Johnson's work, focus upon the epistemic content of the metaphor. Two concepts explored in those works are relevant to this present project. Firstly, there is the importance of metaphor in human reasoning;

many, if not all, of our abstract concepts are defined in significant part by conceptual metaphor ... The fundamental role of metaphor is to project patterns from the source domain to the target domain. Much of our reasoning is metaphorical ... Conceptual metaphor is what makes abstract thought possible (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:128–9).

Lakoff (2004, 2008) illustrates that through the application of the theory in the context of USA politics, how voters were convinced, not by argument, but by the use of conceptual metaphor. Through the process of hypocognition a relatively simple fixed frame is “evoked by a word or two” (Lakoff 2004:24). That is illustrated through the Republican politicians use of the metaphor of the “strict Parent”, as opposed to the “nurturant Parent”, (Lakoff 2004:39; cf. 2008:268) to win voters to their cause in the campaigns for the American presidency. In that, the conceptual metaphor enjoys many of the epistemological features of example noted above.

That insight from the epistemic contribution of metaphor has special relevance in CPE in the way basic ethical understandings relating to the use of power in the professional relationship and respecting of the other’s autonomy, are taught through key metaphors. Two examples illustrate my point:

- i. one is from cooking—*let them marinate in their own mess*. The implication is that when the person concerned has had enough s/he will begin to change; the initiative is theirs and they will be prepared to invest their energy in effecting the needed change; and
- ii. the second metaphor is from ballroom dancing—*they [patient] lead, the chaplain follows* [in the dance]. The Chaplain leaves the choice whether to be involved and how that is done, to the person being visited. The conceptual metaphor is applied in different particular settings and reflects a rich and complex ethical theory that is, following Lakoff & Johnson (1999), an embodied truth. And that is of particular relevance when educating for *praxis*.

3. Conclusion

This Paper has presented a concept of education that accounts for CPE as followed in the State of New South Wales. CPE is an initiation into three worthwhile traditions that amalgamate in the praxis of the Hospital Chaplain—the CPE tradition, the Denominational Tradition of the Chaplain, as well as within a tradition of liberal education that may have commenced elsewhere in the Student’s education. It was contended that that initiation is through a rhetorical strategy, in the first place a general strategy through a rhetoric of identity on the one hand, and a rhetoric of invitation on the other. A second broad strategy is through the use of rhetorical proofs as elaborated by Aristotle. It was proposed that the proofs of Aristotelean rhetoric play a role in that educative initiation, though not necessarily all together on each occasion—*pathos*, *ethos* and *logos*, the most powerful being that of *ethos*. It was contended that the three proofs are profoundly rational, and not just *logos* with its rhetorical syllogism (enthymeme) and its

rhetorical induction (example/ paradeigm). It was argued, drawing on the work of Cognitive Scientists, that *logos* could be extended to include conceptual metaphors. The use of conceptual metaphors was shown to have particular relevance in the initiation into the ethical dimensions of Denominational Chaplaincy and that provides an epistemic warrant for the current practice in the CPE Units. Over and against a view arising out of the Western Enlightenment of a caution, even suspicion of tradition in the educational process as sabotaging the crucial rational element in an educational project, it was proposed that the use of Traditions was both rational and worthwhile educationally. Accordingly, where the initiation has been effected, the educational outcome of the adult student experiencing that process of training and formation may be characterised as transformative education (Mezirow & Associates 2000).

It was argued that the rhetorical strategy made particular use of example. In the CPE Unit, the example is the student's pastoral visit presented in both individual and peer Supervision settings. The Verbata form the "signature pedagogy" of Chaplaincy training as a professional chaplain. Moreover, in the peer supervision setting, the student listens closely to the presentation of peers and contributes to that supervisory process while also learning from the presentation of others.

The insights developed in this Paper will be extended in a later Paper which will examine the "tactic" used in the rhetorical strategy of initiation into the worthwhile traditions discussed above. In particular the epistemological warrant of case studies and case reasoning will be examined in (Paper Five). I will examine more specifically the educating of the "wise practitioner" (Paper Six) which will complement the positions taken in this and the next Paper.

Because the present Paper has been drawing upon educational theory developed for the school situation, my next Paper will develop a liberal concept of education for a tertiary or a university setting. That is needed as the Masters of Arts (Chaplaincy), is a year and a half fulltime equivalent study programme with CPE Units mandated to the Advanced level and are taught at a Registered CPE Centre of the NSW CCPE Inc. Other Units towards the MA (Chaplaincy) are taught at a fellow Member Institution of the Sydney College of Divinity (NSW CCPE Inc. 2004:28–9). Accordingly some discussion of Liberal Education in a university context is warranted and I turn to that in my next Paper.

Paper 4: The Heart or Essence of Education in a Tertiary Context

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Paper 4: The Heart or Essence of Education in a Tertiary Context

1. Introduction

Because CPE occurs in a post-school environment, and further, because the Masters of Arts (Chaplaincy) includes Basic and Advanced CPE Units and it is a postgraduate Commonwealth Award, comment is warranted upon what the heart of education is at that tertiary level. My argument on “educating the wise practitioner” (Paper Six) will make sense only against the background of practitioner already having an ability to think clearly and argue coherently, a “habit of mind” (Bottone 2010:155) which is, as I will show in this Paper, the particular educational outcome of university education. The focus is the “acquired capacity”, or “habit in an Aristotelean sense” (Hochschild 2003:336) that is the perfection of the intellect. CPE programmes originated historically as postgraduate programmes and accordingly, it is permissible to presume that background while admitting custom and practice may be different. Further, in my professional experience, Clinical Pastoral Education, to be effective, presumes a level of undergraduate tertiary education in Theology and the Social Sciences, if the Theological Reflection component of the Verbatim is to be informed. An example will illustrate my point.

Pastoral care practitioners, along with nursing professionals utilised the work of the Swiss-born psychiatrist Kubler-Ross (1969, 1974) and her “five stages of grief”. Linn et al. (1978) and Linn et al. (1985) are two examples of pastoral care guidebooks applying Kubler-Ross’s DABBA model (Denial, Anger, Bargaining, Depression, Acceptance) and are occasionally still in use in the New England region. Yet as Lilienfeld et al. (2010:60–2) note, while widely accepted, Kubler-Ross’s universal stages of human grief is little more than a “myth of popular psychology”. An extended quotation from Lilienfeld et al. (2010:61) articulates how poor psychological research becomes what Aristotle calls a ‘Lesbian rule’ (EN V.10.7), a metaphor referring to the measuring rule popular on the Greek island of Lesbos and which enjoyed the characteristic not dissimilar to the modern dressmaker’s tape-measure in being able to measure surfaces besides those that are flat and so

Kubler-Ross’s stages may be popular not merely because of the extensive media coverage they’ve attracted, but because they offer people a sense of predictability over the previously unpredictable—the process of dying ... the scientific support for these stage theories has been at best mixed ... Kubler-Ross’s (1969) claims regarding her five stages weren’t based on carefully controlled research. In particular, her research was based almost entirely on potentially biased samples (she didn’t study a broad cross-section of the population), subjective observations, and

unstandardised measurements of people's emotions across time ... Admittedly some people do pass through some or even all of Kubler-Ross's stages of dying, so there is probably a grain of truth to her model that lends it a sense of credibility ... There's no uniform recipe for dying or grieving ... a point that even Kubler-Ross acknowledged in her final book: "Our grief is as individual as is our lives" (Kubler-Ross & Kessler 2005:1).

My point is that a better understanding of Psychology and its methodology, an outcome of undergraduate study of that discipline, would have ensured a more critical response to Kubler-Ross's work and, accordingly, better professional practice; hence the importance of CPE maintaining its position as a postgraduate form of education. But my argument extends beyond any particular discipline or "parcels of specialised knowledge" (Marsden 1996:304) to acknowledging the important acquisition of an attitude or an ability to think and discriminate, where the perfection of the intellectual virtues is evident. Accordingly I am presuming a hermeneutic of recovery or a return to the earlier practice in the teaching of CPE. Yet, over and above that is the importance of training the intellect as background to the professional education, the educating of the wise practitioner.

It is readily conceded that the background to much of the philosophical thinking on which I have been drawing in the previous Paper on the concept of education, is reflecting on schooling in Western Society, particularly as experienced in Britain and Australia. Moreover, the approach has been the formulation of a concept of Liberal Education where education is contrasted with schooling, having a non-instrumental purpose, and, in that, is unlike "vocational education".

The debate around Liberal versus Vocational Education has had a long history in university education, finding a dramatic spilling over into print, in the debate between Edinburgh and Oxford Scholars in the early eighteenth century and in the subsequent decades (Gilley 2003:284–306, Ker 1976:612 n138.37; Ker 1976:623 n.141.6). While those issues will not be considered here, it will be assumed that Carr's contention stands, namely that there is not an intrinsic opposition between those two approaches to education; "knowledge has its practical as well as its theoretical aspects" (Carr 1995:5). The issue, therefore, is that of effecting a balance rather than formulating the issue as one of dualistic tension (Pring 1999:185–93). Over and above that, while my previous discussion has focussed on education as a process, because the education at the post-school level is self directed and does not envisage some further stage that might be characterised as "Quaternary" Education, as distinct from "Tertiary" education, it is warranted to

consider the education involved both in terms both of the process and of the outcome. My discussion will indicate that the educational process and the educational outcome are closely interrelated, because the outcome, if effective, presumes an ability to continue the process in a manner that is independent and self sufficient.

As noted above in Paper 2, the CPE programmes developed historically as postgraduate education and in the university environment. An adequate concept of CPE as an educational endeavour is best articulated against the setting where, historically, CPE programmes first emerged; the matter of professional education as a postgraduate experience will be addressed in a later Paper considering the “education of the wise practitioner” (Paper Six), but that presumes that certain intellectual capacities associated with university education have been acquired already, particularly that of “the well-trained mind”. Any contrary custom or practice for CPE training and formation, such as a level of teaching equivalent to TAFE programmes as some suggest as a way to increase the number of CPE accredited persons for hospital and prison Chaplaincies, requires significantly different strategies and standards. That proposal lies beyond this Paper. I turn now, to develop a concept of Liberal Education in a university setting, complementing the insights already developed.

My Paper proceeds in three steps. First I will examine what is the heart or essence of university education from an educational perspective, an argument which draws heavily upon the writings of John Henry Newman (1801-90), specifically his Lectures and Addresses associated with his founding of the Catholic University in Dublin, some of which were eventually published in 1875 as *The Idea Of A University*, which, since then, “has exerted extraordinary influence over the discussion and conceptualisation of higher education” (Turner 1996a:x).

Turner is no lone voice in that assessment. In 1950 Young opined that historically therein “the spirit evoked by Erasmus had found voice at last” (cited in Gilley 2003:305); Young went on to comment lyrically that Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and Newman’s *The Idea of A University* were the two most important books on education alongside which it was safe to pulp all others (quoted in Barr 2003:1). Turner (2002:1) asserted that that book was “the most influential book on liberal education in the English language”. Chadwick commented that Newman’s *Idea* “has remained the historic statement of an ideal of higher education which influenced Britain and through Britain the educational systems of many other countries” (Chadwick 1983:52).

Pelikan summarised the favourable response of Academics to Newman's *The Idea Of A University* as ranging from J. M. Cameron's enthusiastic overstatement that "modern thinking on university education is a series of footnotes to Newman's lectures and essays" (quoted in Pelikan 1992:6), to Savaglic's (1967:vii) more measured "[an] eloquent defence of a liberal education". And recently Ker (2011:20) wrote that "*The Idea of a University* is still the one classic work on university education". Accordingly I will be drawing heavily upon Newman. Second, I will use insights from Ryle's epistemology, namely, the difference between knowing "that", knowing "why" and knowing "how" will be used to enrich the educational argument developed in the main part of the Paper. And third, I will draw together the insights developed and present a case why such background is needed before the discussion of the concept of the education of the "wise practitioner" commences. So, I turn to examine Newman's concept of the essence of university education.

2. Newman and the core element of university education

I will not consider here the historical and biographical background to Newman's thought (see Ker 1988:397–462; Ker 1976:ix-lxxv, cf. Newman 1896; McGrath 1951; and Carr 2003); Newman set out to articulate his beau ideal (Briel 2008:5) or "perfect type or model" (Little et al. 1959a:159) of university education, or again, in Newman's own phrase, the concept of university education in its "speculative perfection" (L&D XVI:172). J. M. Roberts, sometime Vice-Chancellor of Southampton University and Warden of Merton College, Oxford, is highly critical of Newman because he did not examine other universities in the UK, or Europe or the USA, when developing his views of university education, and that he did not have the social conscience to consider issues of discrimination such as that of gender, or economic disadvantage; in brief, Roberts' criticism is that Newman did not use current methodology or address matters from the perspective of a later generation (Roberts 1990).

However, Robert's objections on methodology hold no water owing to the context of another time and another place, being before such understandings had emerged and relevant to that point is Derrida's contention that "(t)he Western university is a very recent *construction* or artifact ... every great Western University was, between 1810 and 1850, in some sense re-instituted" (quoted in Bottone 2010:207). Accordingly, that historical context must be acknowledged.

Lash (1990), commenting on the crisis of identity in university education in Britain and the United States, noted that

Newman was a Victorian Tory, an Englishman, and the superior of an Oratory whose ethos, deeply indebted, of course to Philip Neri, [the Sixteenth Century founder of the Oratorians, the group Newman joined in 1847] yet also carried echoes of the Oriel Common Room. It was from within a world formed by these elements that he considered the idea of a university. If, nevertheless, his Discourses still speak freshly to our so very different situation, this is in no small measure due to the way in which, again and again, the values and assumptions of the standard accounts of liberal education are bounded, checked, set in tension with the requirements of a very different vision (Lash 1990:195).

Newman was writing at a time when Victorian England was involved in a two decades long debate about reconciling the “traditional priorities of liberal education ... with the demands of an increasingly industrialised society” (White 1986:39). The focus of that debate was “on the content rather than the idea of liberal education” (White 1986:39). Newman’s contribution was the first to appear during those two decades, 1850–70, and it “attracted little serious interest or attention” (White 1986:41) at the time of publication. “The contributions of Mill, Sidgwick, Huxley and Arnold even when they were not consciously intended [can be seen] as responses to the kind of claims Newman staked out” (White 1986: 41). Newman’s contribution was marked by its “theoretical sharpness” and its “historical awareness” (White 1986:41). Part of Newman’s discussion on the one hand, was the place of the religious, and, on the other, the relationship between religious and secular knowledge and education; while those important issues will not be discussed here, I will be assuming Newman’s conclusion, namely, that while Theology has an important place in university studies, educationally it is not the most important educative discipline. Newman’s immediate focus was on the educational importance of the Disciplines of Medieval Liberal studies (Ker 2002:13). At the same time it needs to be born in mind, that

since the students were only sixteen on entry [to Dublin Catholic University] and the course lasted only two years, they were in effect only receiving the equivalent of the last two years of a secondary education [in the UK and USA] ... the students could proceed immediately at the age of eighteen to a specialised degree in a number of subjects, including for example, both theology and medicine (Ker 2002a:12–3).

While Newman considered Theology and the Sciences important in university education, as part of the “circle of knowledge”, he did not see those subjects as part of the core subjects of liberal

education, *qua* education (Ker 2002a:14); that, however, is not to suggest that theological or philosophical studies should be marginalised (Dulles 2002a:103).

Newman's concept of Liberal Education still inspires and stimulates (Strange 2008:85). And so my discussion turns to consider Newman's thought on liberal university education, on what is its essence.

Garland reminds us that "(f)or whatever he was, Newman was first and foremost an Oxford Man" (Garland 1996:266). Newman's views on university education were shaped by his own experience of Oriel College which was "the centre of Newman's life" (Nockles 2009:411) from his election as a Fellow (12 April 1822) till his resignation (3 October 1845). Edward Coplestone, Provost at Oriel (1814–28) was responsible for Oriel's emergence in academic leadership (Richards 1933:235) "following its eighteenth century doldrums" (Turner 2002:66), and Coplestone and his colleague John Davidson vigorously defended Oxford's classical education against those favouring a more utilitarian approach to tertiary education (Svaglic 1955:1021). Coplestone held that the purpose of tertiary education was "to *exercise* (his emphasis) the mind of the student ... rather than to pour in knowledge" (Gilley 2003:43). Newman made that concept of education a foundational principle in *The Idea of a University* (Gilley 2003:43). In that period at Oriel, particularly formative was the time as tutor when Newman and two other junior tutors (Hurrell Froude and Robert Wilberforce) were "making the individual relations of tutor and pupil much closer, improving the lectures, and introducing the study of new books, especially English books" (Richards 1933:237). Thus Newman was "a pioneer of the Oxford tutorial system that was to develop later, a more direct, personal teaching relationship with undergraduates" (Ker 2011:19). In 1831, Oriel Provost Edward Hawkins in an assertion of will (Richards 1933:237), though Nockles contends that other political and theological elements were also present in that decision (Nockles 2009: 414-5), chose not to assign those three junior tutors further pupils and replaced them with three other tutors, seen today, in contrast to the highly competent tutors they replaced. In effect Hawkins' decision forced the resignation of the junior tutors including Newman. From then, the previous dominance of Oriel, a "stunning academic supremacy" (Nockles 2009:416), among the Oxford Colleges fell away and Balliol became the leading College (Richards 1933:235). Yet Newman's "intellectual initiation and formation" was the outcome of the earlier mentoring of the "so-called Oriel *Noetics*, notably Richard Whately and Edward Hawkins" (Nockles 2009:411); the *Noetics*

were “a group of scholars so named because of their insistence that in intellectual matters, reason, not authority, was supreme” (Merrigan 1986:193). Nockles (2009: 418) comments:

Newman took from his experience at Oriel an ‘idea’ of university education and its tutorial basis which he was to make famous...A university education crucially depended on personal influence of mind upon mind. Newman learned this lesson at Oriel.

So, I turn to examine more closely Newman’s “idea” of university education. It must be stressed that the ideal form of university education that Newman had in mind was significantly different to the modern university in the English speaking world. Cornwell’s (2010:136) comment is apposite:

(n)ot only are universities today heavily biased towards research rather than teaching, but the smorgas board of vocational courses offered at undergraduate level could never have been envisaged in the mid-nineteenth century: degrees in ...business studies, journalism etc. At the same time, academics are now governed by monetarist business models - the application of the market to the curriculum and research ‘outcomes’; the survival of disciplines based on ‘client’ choice. Distance learning expansion, moreover, takes universities even further from the kind of ideal face-to-face ‘college’ communities of Newman’s day.

Yet it is interesting to note that while residential colleges continue in some Australian universities, they do not enjoy a teaching role at the university; nonetheless, Barber (2010:32) contends that the residential colleges function as “informal learning spaces”. “(O)ur residential college system [at the University of New England, Armidale] ... provides students with life experiences that form them as people, not merely inform them as students” (Barber 2010:32).

Newman’s student-centred focus was on the impact of university teaching on the undergraduate’s education, and those insights are still useful. His primary concern was not curriculum content but the encouraging in undergraduates of “the ability to think” (Culler 1955:203) or “learning to think clearly” (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:133). That outcome presumes the student having a capacity to think in the first place and accordingly Ker’s (2011:20, author’s emphasis) claim that “at the heart of his [Newman’s] philosophy of education is simply the capacity to *think*”, is open to misunderstanding. Accordingly, the claim that Newman considered that “classics are the very highest form of all university education” (Craven 2008:4) is without foundation because, as I will show, Newman was more concerned with the educational process

and its outcome for the student involved, not primarily the curriculum content useful to effect that. Moreover, Newman was writing

just at the moment when professionalisation and specialisation of university studies were initiating the transformation to the modern research multiversity, constituting the major challenge to the very tradition Newman was defending (Fuller 2003:37).

Further, although Newman “was not a very systematic thinker and writer” (Ker 1999:19), nonetheless, Newman sought to articulate the quintessential element of university education, what he referred to as “the Idea of a University”. I turn now to consider at some length that concept of “idea” in Newman’s title.

a) The concept of “Idea”

Contrary to Thornton’s suggestion (2006:4), there is no need, in this context, to turn to Kant if we are to clarify Newman’s understanding of the concept of “idea”. Newman is explicit: he is reflecting upon “the theory of University Education...my ideal University ... the theory of University Education” (Newman 1976:12); or again, the University “in its bare idea” (Newman 1976:114). Moreover, he stresses that there “is nothing novel or original in the argument” (Newman 1976:5), as he is drawing upon his critical reflection on his own Oxford experiences (Ker 1976), particularly as a Fellow of Oriel College. Writing to Dean Church in 1885, Newman described his election as Tutor at Oriel as “the turning point of my life” (Stanford & Spark 1957:72). As early as 1826, Newman had noted his immense debt to Whately at Oriel (L&D I:307) who had taught him to think accurately and clearly. Yet while Newman was involved in the reforms at Oriel (Culler 1965:65, 67–9, 77–8), particularly the tutorial reforms (Culler 1965:117–8), he was not involved in the great nineteenth century reforms at Oxford in 1800–09, 1850–8, and 1871–82 (Culler 1965:115). Newman always looked back with fondness on his experience at Oxford (Newman 1956:254) and appreciated how that tertiary educational experience had shaped his own thinking. At the same time Newman was a man of his age and it is inappropriate to expect later developments to be foreshadowed and espoused in his writings. Thus women were first admitted at Oxford at Lady Margaret Hall in 1879; 1888 saw the first women graduate in Honours in Classics at Oxford and in 1920 women were admitted on equal terms to the University Awards (McGrath 1951:157, n.1) and at Cambridge in 1921 (Zimmerman 1995:5, n. 2). And, yet again, nineteenth century Oxford witnessed the rise of the Lay Don at Oxford (Engel 1983: *passim*), replacing the Anglican Clergy of Newman’s day (Culler 1965:101). Moreover, to claim in Newman’s scheme for the Catholic University of

Dublin that his scheme of his educational vision was defective in its social justice and moral compass, is to burden him with a different task. Vargish's comments here are relevant:

(b)ut the important point, I think, is that Newman had been asked to help found a University and not a technical college which could train Irishmen to save their country from depression and poverty (Vargish 1965:131).

It is of greater importance to note that in Newman's day the development of the relevant tertiary disciplines for such a task, lay a considerable number of years in the future. Newman observed in a 1852 letter to Robert Ornsby that what the Dublin Catholic professionals were seeking was a Catholic university "as good as Oxford" (L&D XV:67). But it is to misrepresent Newman's purpose to suggest that Newman "had in mind a kind of Oxford ideal transposed to the banks of the Liffey" (Strange 2008:84)—a view rejected by Ker (1999:15). Newman's rhetorical argument was to counter the expectation seemingly held in some quarters that the Dublin University he was founding was

a kind of glorified seminary where Catholics could be shielded from the malign influences of both Protestant Trinity College, Dublin, and the newly founded secular Queen's Colleges ... Newman was determined to make it crystal clear that it was a university he was founding like those non-Catholic universities that Catholics were to be protected from (Ker 2011:27).

The Irish Catholic Bishops insisted that the educational administrative model for the Dublin Catholic University would be the Catholic University of Louvain, "a continental corrective to the Oxbridge collegiate system" (Ker 1999:15). Newman concedes that some may suggest that he "servilely followed the English idea of a University" (Newman 1976:5), but the university structure being modelled at Dublin, was not Oxford, but the Belgian Catholic University of Louvain (Ker 1976:xxii-xxiii). Newman's aim was not just to open "a replica of Oxford in Dublin" (Ker 1999:15; 2011:28).

But while Newman wished to preserve the collegiate, tutorial dimensions in Dublin, he also wanted to supplement it with the university and professorial dimension which was then very weak at Oxford (Ker 2011:28).

It was there that the University of Louvain model, favoured by the Irish Bishops, complemented Newman's Oxford experience.

Nonetheless, in developing his view on what university learning and education consisted,

Newman was reflecting on the best of his own Oxford experience and the nineteenth century developments debated in Britain. Thus he was critical of the approach of London University, founded in 1828 and “much inspired by Benthamite principles” (White 1986:40); he criticised London’s extension of the curriculum beyond the traditional Classics and also its opting for a Professorial lecturing system, over the Oxford tutorial system which encouraged an energetic meeting of minds between tutors and students (Ker 1976:609, n.129.7; 612, n.138.37; 613, n.141.6. cf. Newman 1976:419–423; Culler 1965:99). In brief, Newman was moderately conservative when it came to curriculum but progressive in his pedagogy. Newman satirised the London development as a “sort of bazaar” (Ker 1999:27), or in contemporary parlance, a supermarket offering a great range of goods for customer choice. For Newman, the London University had capitulated to a utilitarian concept of university education (Lash 1990:190); whereas, for Newman the university education was that

process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture (Newman 1976:135).

In Newman’s perspective, the London University had completely misunderstood the essence of university education. The London University did not seek to “educate the intellect to reason well” (Newman 1976:114), or the development of “intellectual powers” (Newman 1976:221), the formation of an “imperial intellect” (Newman 1976:371). Thus London University had missed out on capturing the essence of University education. In brief, London University was not aiming at inculcating a “philosophical habit of mind” (Newman 1976:57), which is “a comprehensive view of truth in all its branches, of the relations of science to science, of their mutual bearings, and their respective values” (Newman 1976: 96–7). In that Newman’s concern “is not the academic subject called philosophy” (Ker 1996:206), but “knowledge ... when it is acted upon, informed ... impregnated by Reason” (Newman 1976:103). In the absence of an English term for “intellectual proficiency” Newman described the desired outcome as a “philosophical habit of mind” (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:126). Newman is not talking of a studied neutrality often associated with the Enlightenment (Ker 1996:207), something he deemed impossible but which sciences from after his time would endorse (Mitchell 1990:237). As Ker remarked: “(t)he impossibility of neutrality in the University is one of the central insights of *The Idea of a University*, but one which has escaped the notice of commentators on the work (Ker 1996:215).

But to refocus back upon my immediate concern here, namely, Newman's examination of what is the "essence" (Newman 1976:5), the formal purpose, of the university and that form of education (Lash 1990:191). What one observes, in Pelikan's phrase, is Newman's "invaluable habit of pushing things up to their first principles" (Pelikan 1992:25); it is important to pay attention to those first principles and assumptions which "are always present whether they are recognised or not" (Pelikan 1992:30). Newman contended that the first purpose of university education was not professional training but Liberal Education,

a process of training by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular of accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture (Newman 1976:I.vi.1).

Newman described the university as

a place of *teaching universal knowledge*. This implies that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather than the advancement. If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have students (Newman 1976:5; his emphasis).

Newman is considering "a University, taken in its bare idea" (Newman 1976:179), and that is, that "(i)t educates the intellect to reason well" (Newman 1976:114). Newman's primary educational aim is to develop the "elastic force of reason" (Newman 1976:123).

In modern educational language we would say that this 'philosophy' involves the ability to draw conclusions from a body of information through applying, analysing, synthesising, and evaluation from observation, experience and reflection (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:130).

The university is "the territory of the intellect" (Newman 1976:458); "(l)earning for Newman necessarily implies teaching" (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:129). While Newman sees research and publication by university staff as essential (Newman 1896:96–7, 100–11, 299, 368), his concept of research was not that of modern research methods. Bottone (2010:47) observes that "Newman opposes the German model of a university, where the teacher and the lesson are a central aspect of the college model, and students are guided by tutors who take care of their

studies". Still, Newman was not unaware of the issues raised in that educational development. Bottone (2010:134) asserts:

(i)n his [Newman's] Dublin writings can be found all the problems discussed in the same years by Wilhelm von Humboldt in Germany, Ernest Renan in France, Antonio Labriola in Italy: namely the relationships between different disciplines, the need for a balance between traditional and new subjects and a critical reflection on the sense of knowledge.

At the same time, Newman was explicit on the research duties of university academic staff (Newman 1896:96–7, 110–1); in fact, he was adamant that the professors [university lecturers] were not to be “overburdened with lectures” (Newman 1896:110) to ensure that they had the time needed for research and writing. He went on to observe (1896:111): “(n)or are his [professorial] duties confined to the lecture hall: in this day especially, he [the lecturer] may be quite as usefully employed with the pen as with the tongue”. Newman planned research in “science, technology, archaeology, and medicine” (Newman 1976:575, n.5.6) and he launched the *Atlantis*, as the University journal “for depositing professional work” (L&D xvii: 543; cf. 1896:299, 368). He was proud of the Chemistry Laboratory at Dublin University after the style of “certain German Universities” (Newman 1896:359). But Newman’s major interest was in what today are characterised as the Humanities. The German university and its idea of research, articulated by von Humboldt (1810) in Berlin and carried to the United States of America (Davis 2010:61), eventually became a generally accepted understanding of the role of the university. Accompanying that emerging understanding came important scientific advances which reinforced that concept of the university, but at the time Newman wrote, his observation (Newman 1976:8) was well informed:

(t)he great discoveries in chemistry and electricity were not made in universities ... still I think it must be allowed on the whole that, while teaching involves external engagements, the natural home for experiment and speculation is retirement.

Kerr (2001:203–4), commenting to the mid-twentieth century situation in the USA, noted:

(t)he teaching university morphed into the “research university” in the sense that many in the [teaching] faculty devoted their primary attention to their research and not their teaching ... Teaching attention that once was devoted to undergraduates was increasingly devoted to graduate students.

For Newman, the modern research university would perhaps be better described, using current terminology, as a “Think Tank” or “Research Institute”.

Newman’s priority is the teaching of the university student. Further, it is relevant in the present context to note that Kerr (2001:49) had lamented “the general deterioration of undergraduate teaching” and nominated in the American context, that one problem “still to be fully faced ... is the improvement of undergraduate instruction in the university” (Kerr 2001:89). Accordingly, Newman’s concern for the quality of undergraduate teaching has current relevance and is reflected in American undergraduate expectations (Kerr 2001:78).

It is important to stress that Newman did not exclude research from the university—a charge repeated regularly by modern educational writers (Newman 1976:575, n.5.6). Thus, Thornton (2004:7) asserts that Newman’s “idea of the university did not include research, which he assigned to separate research institutes”. And, more recently, and at greater length, Davis (2010:61) is more definite:

John Henry Newman saw the cultivation of the intellect through teaching universal knowledge as the sole purpose of the university. There could be no place for research. Scientific and philosophical discovery were not appropriate for an institution focussed on students. For Newman, scholars engaged in teaching were too busy to do research, while those engaged in research were much too preoccupied for teaching.

Newman’s clear focus is upon university teaching, the intellectual experience of the student in the University College environment as the students interact with the university scholars and fellow students. Lash summarises the point well:

The ‘idea’ of a university is that one unifying formal feature or aspect of these things [libraries, lecture rooms, departments and faculties, seminars and field trips, playing fields and late night resolutions of the problems of mankind] which explains and justifies the university’s existence and its purpose when considered precisely in abstraction from the myriad activities, institutions and enterprises which go (materially) to make it up (Lash 1990:196).

For Newman sought to articulate, in Fuller’s (2003–4:40, 52) phrase, “the animating spirit” of what university education was seeking, or the “essential experience at the heart of liberal education” (Fuller 2003–4:41), or yet again, the “intrinsic value of a liberal education” (Arthur &

Nicholls 2007:138). And so, that educational intention is my focus here, both the intended end which is the purpose of the university education, namely the philosophical habit characteristic of a well trained mind (Newman 1976:146) and the automatic, yet secondary, outcome, of developing a more intelligent and more civilised society, which is the “practical end of the University”, in Newman’s phrase (Newman 1976:154). The utilitarian outcome of university education, such as that espoused by London University and which Newman criticised, ever remains secondary, because the cultivation of the mind is the good pursued in itself, and therefore, being non-instrumental, is accurately described as “Liberal Education” (Newman 1976:110). It is a matter of emphasis, a question of where the heart of the matter lies.

Brief comment is warranted on the range of disciplines Newman favoured in a tertiary context, much wider than the Classics or Humanities. Thus Newman wrote to Monsignor George Talbot in 1856, commenting to the University in Dublin he was establishing: “our principal success, is, and will be our Medical School, which promises to be the first in Dublin” (Newman L&D XVII:303). The Medical School, opened in the second year of the Catholic University of Ireland’s existence (Bottone 2010:40), was “a highly successful institution that in the twentieth century merged with the permanent National University” (Garland 1996:273). Law and Medicine were taught at the Dublin University (Newman 1976:145). Newman set up a Department of Engineering which did not exist at Oxford; and the School of Science in Dublin was independent of the Arts Faculty, unlike Oxford University (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:138), but multiplicity of disciplines is not the heart of the university educational experience, certainly an important feature, but not its essential experience.

That issue of “the essential experience”, enjoys a priority ahead of any discussion of curricula content, a point Fuller emphasises: “(c)urricular discussions themselves, even when not preoccupied with external critics, require this clarity” (Fuller 2003–4:41). It is important to attend “to the essential experience which the content serves” (Fuller 2003–4:43). Oakeshott (1901–90), while not commenting on Newman, has remarked:

(i)t is a favourite theory of mine that what people call “ideals” and “purposes” are never themselves the source of human activity; they are shorthand expressions for the real spring of conduct, which is a disposition to do certain things and a knowledge of how to do them (Oakeshott 2001: 108).

It is instructive that Strauss (1899–1973), arguing from a different point of departure, arrives at a similar conclusion to Newman. Strauss asserts

(t)he finished product of liberal education is a cultured human being... ‘culture’ means derivatively and today chiefly the cultivation of the mind, the taking care and improving the native faculties of the mind in accordance with the nature of the mind (Fuller 2003–4:31).

More recently, Davis (2010), misreading a phrase in a 1522 letter of Erasmus (1989:185, l. 1–2) declining Zwingli’s invitation to become a citizen of Zurich and cast in his lot with the Protestant Reformation (Erasmus 1989:185, note), suggests an Erasmian description of the university as “a republic of learning”; I will suggest below that Newman’s view would be comfortable with including such an understanding.

Accordingly, it is important to recognise that Newman’s concept of university education was formulated in a particular historical context. Furthermore, since the context of the essence of University education, the tradition in which it is formulated, is never a timeless formulation, but is within “a slowly changing tradition” (Oakeshott 2003:109), so it becomes all the more important to focus upon the essential dimension of that educational experience to ensure that the project stays focussed and on track.

Professional training, even where it presumes a university education, as the usual presentation of CPE does, is “separable from it [the heart of university education] and directed to different ends” (Fuller 2003–4:44) because it has an instrumental purpose. That will be examined more closely in Paper Six on educating the wise practitioner; here my focus is on the essential experience that university education seeks to effect for the student learner, the “insight of wisdom” (Fuller 2003–4:44), a “manner of human activity”, and “the intimations of a human life” in Oakeshott’s phrases (Oakeshott 1989: 96, 30). For Oakeshott, Fuller contends; “(t)he university is the place where practical concerns are not paramount and where learning for its own sake is possible” (Fuller 2003–4:48). It is only at a later stage in that university education, which the professional education develops and extends the liberal education already received. That was the American model that was the historical background of CPE as has been shown above and in previous Papers, and is the background for my Paper Six on “educating the wise practitioner”. So, my immediate attention is what can be described as the outcome of university liberal education.

b) Three outcomes of liberal education

I turn now to examine more closely Newman’s analysis of the outcome of liberal education under three headings, beginning with the “well-trained mind” (L&D XVI:562), then I turn to

consider the educational process of “enlargement” or “illumination” which effects that, and, rounding out the discussion, of how the educated university graduate functions in society; in brief, I will consider the end, the process, and the educational outcome of university liberal education, what Newman called “the gentleman”. Newman does not suggest that the well-trained mind does not develop outside the setting of a university education, but he is arguing that it is in that setting it does enjoy a privileged outcome.

i) The well-trained mind

Newman is emphatic that Liberal Education “viewed in itself, is simply the cultivation of the intellect, as such, and its object is nothing more or less than intellectual excellence” (Newman 1976:111). Newman found in Cicero support for his idea of education as an end in itself (Bottone 2010: 135). But that is more than being well read or possessing considerable quantities of information. Newman notes that “a great memory ... does not make a philosopher, any more than a dictionary can be called a grammar” (Newman 1976:121). More is required than a recitation of knowledge, more important is what the mind does with that knowledge and how the new information is integrated into existing knowledge. In brief, the way the mind grows its knowledge, what Newman refers to as the “enlargement” or “illumination” of the mind is decisive. What Newman is highlighting is well reflected in his 1828 letter to Oriel’s Provost, Edward Hawkins, suggesting why William Copleston was intellectually unsuitable as a tutor at Oriel; William James Copleston (d. 1874), nephew of the better known Oriel Tutor and Provost Edward Copleston (1766-1849) who was responsible for Oriel College’s rise to pre-eminence at Oxford in the first third of the Nineteenth Century, Newman wrote:

(h)e seems to me quite or nearly without, not merely original talent, but the power of making the thoughts of others his own.—To me he always appears to speak by rote and rule, not as if his mind had worked on a subject, but as if he recollected what he had learned. (L&D II. 53).

In brief, Copleston lacked a “well trained mind”. Newman’s concern is encouraging the quest for meaning that is the philosophical habit of mind (Bottone 2010:150), something Bottone contends that has “strong affinities with classical rhetoric” (Bottone 2010:151–2); in modern terminology, Newman is espousing “epistemic rhetoric” (Jost 1998:xiii) focussing upon judgement and discrimination, “the centrepiece of liberal education” (Bottone 2010:153).

That takes me to Newman’s second outcome.

ii) The enlargement or illumination of the mind

A lengthy quotation from Newman describes the phenomenology of the intellectual process he is considering in that language:

The enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there is a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematising of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding *then*, when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not the mere addition to our knowledge that is the illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of the mental centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements gravitates ... The mind makes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another; without which there is no whole and no centre. It possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge, not merely considered as acquirement, but as philosophy (Newman 1976:120-1, his emphasis).

Newman mixes his metaphors of storehouse (enlargement) on the one hand, and on the other, that of organic digestion. The latter metaphor is taken from Coleridge, while the earlier metaphor “derives from the Liberal tradition of the Enlightenment” (Culler 1965:206–7). The University setting in which that occurs is not a “sort of bazaar or pantechnicon” (Newman 1976:421), he says, varying his metaphor of a storehouse, and the university trained mind is not “a fortuitous heap of acquisitions and accomplishments” (Newman 1976:422). The focus is upon the educated mind.

(T)he intellect, which has been disciplined to the perfection of its powers, which it knows, and thinks while it knows, which has learned to leave cannot be partial, cannot be exclusive, cannot be impetuous, cannot be at a loss, cannot but be patient, collected, and majestically calm, because it discerns the end in the very beginning, the origin in the very end, the law in every interruption, the limit in each delay; because it knows where it stands, and how its path lies from one point to another (Newman 1976:123–4).

Again, I note the similarity to the earlier 1828 comments referred to above. Newman has in mind three powers of the mind:

- a) its synthetic power which allows the intellect to perceive things as a whole;
- b) its formative power whereby the mind brings order and owns the knowledge; and
- c) its critical or discriminating power that recognises the individual value of the elements while determining the mutual independence (Newman 1976:122).

In brief, the outcome is the development of critical mind (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:128).

(The importance of the well trained mind, of its enlargement will become even clearer in Paper Six on the educating the wise practitioner).

And already, Newman is characterising the end product of Liberal Education, the university graduate, and reflecting the custom and practice of his day, what he terms “the gentleman”. A few words are warranted upon that Liberal Education trait, which Newman so prized, though its elements are by no means gender-specific as the name “gentleman” might suggest at first. Rather it is “a habit, a personal possession and an inward endowment” (Newman 1976:105). “The great point” Newman wrote to the historian Sir John Acton in 1859, “is to open men’s minds and make them logical” (L&D XIX:190); yet Newman was more emphatic that it is the whole person which makes the decision, not merely the logical mind: “man is not a reasoning animal; he is a sensing, feeling, contemplating acting animal” (1907:294). Further, Newman is not suggesting that such education effects an identical impact, regardless of the person involved and their abilities.

When the intellect has been properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things, it will display its powers with more or less effort according to the particular quality and capacity of the individual (Newman 1976:11).

Newman is not talking about what more recent writers call socialisation. Murray (2004:26) notes: “(t)he fundamental thing to be kept in mind about Newman’s idea of a gentleman, is that ‘gentleman likeness’ as he quaintly calls it is the hallmark of a liberal education rather than a badge of social rank”. Newman’s rhetorical understanding of that process was touched upon above and will not be re-examined here. So, I turn to Newman’s understanding of “gentleman” as the outcome of university Liberal Education. As noted above, the gender-bias in that term is evident but the outcome being described there transcends the gender bias of the historical nomenclature.

iii) “The Gentleman”

Newman claims that “Education”, being a “higher” word than instruction implies the formation of character. In that understanding Newman is tapping into an older understanding. We find a similar understanding in Thackeray’s tribute to the Prince of Wales (Thackeray 1902:423), in Edmund Burke’s lament on the loss of chivalry in the French Revolution (Burke 1986:170) and noted with approval by Newman (1976:173), and in Milton in his “On Education” (Milton 1959b:578–9), St Basil’s (c.330–79) description of a Monk in his *Letter 2* (Basil 1951b:9–10, and cited by Newman 2002:64–5), and St Athanasius on St Antony (1980:18). Huber wrote in 1842: “(a) liberal education such as could scarcely be obtained, but at the Universities, was, at all events, requisite for a perfect gentleman” (cited in Ker 1976:575, n.6n). Newman’s letter to J. Spencer Northcote in 1872 echoes closely the same sentiments:

University Education has, properly speaking no equivalent; what is most like an equivalent in its effect, is for a youth to be well read, well travelled, and well introduced; which many cannot be, and which is the accident of personal good fortune, not the result of a system. For youths between 18 and 22 I know of no system of Liberal Education except University Education (L&D XXVI:25).

So, Newman was silent on the issue of student background, but I will return to this matter below.

It is instructive in the present discussion, that Newman presented that trait of “gentleman likeness” as the norm of community life to be aspired to by the members of his Religious Congregation, the Oratory (Murray 2004:25), a trait that he referred to as “external polish and refinement” (Newman 2004:191); in that same Fifth Address to the Chapter (1848), when his “newly-formed community was still at Maryvale” (Murray 2004:141), Newman contended: “(t)he nearest approximation in fact to an Oratorian Congregation that I know, [is]...one of the Colleges in the Anglican Universities [such as Oxford]” (Newman 2004:191, cf, 217). It is important to note that Newman is writing several years before his lectures on university education and his focus is the formation of the group gathering around him; his concern was not the Oratorians having social rank but rather, their having “an educated mind” (Murray 2004:10), a characteristic needed for those wishing to join him in the pastoral work he was anxious to pursue as a Catholic Priest.

Accordingly, I am contending that Garland (1996:268) is misreading things when he reduces Newman’s view to describing a “socialisation process”, even while allowing the German Huber’s 1843 observation that “English Universities ... content themselves with producing ... a

well educated gentleman” [emphasis added] (cited in Garland 2003:268).

So, against that background, I return to continue exploring Newman’s gentleman-like trait of the Liberal university graduate as—“the talent of not offending” (Newman 2001:10); and again, “it is almost a definition of a gentleman to say that he is one who never inflicts pain” (Newman 1976:179). He continues to articulate the description of a refined, well mannered, diplomatic individual, civilised in his dealings with others. Ker suggests that the chief literary influence on Newman in that formulation was Forrester’s *The Polite Philosopher etc.* (Ker 1976:616, n179.2). The focus is upon the self-presentation of the speaker rather than their inner virtue; it is intellectual excellence, not moral excellence, which is the focus. Those traits of intellectual excellence may be exhibited by both heroes and scoundrels (Newman 1976:111); “Liberal Education makes not the Christian... but the Gentleman” (Newman 1976:110).

In the report of his November 1854 address at a *soiree* for the fifteen enrolling students, (Newman 1896:320), sixteen year old youths (Tillman 2001:xviii) which may explain the “high-school Principal” tone of his comments for a modern reader, Newman elaborated that theme of the “gentleman”, the outcome of university education:

a man ... well educated, of cultivated mind, well principled, and gentleman-like, whatever place he is in will be valued for what he is ... he will adorn his place, he will render himself and his place respectable (Newman 1896:314).

In contrast to the “gentleman” is

the case of the man who has never grown up without learning to be a real man ... [such men] have no opinion, no view, no resource; they are not fond of reading or thinking, they cannot amuse themselves ... they never have an opinion, and no one would think of asking for their opinion ... the one [“the boy”] depends upon others for instruction and amusement, the other [“the gentleman”] is able in great measure to depend on himself (Newman 1896:117, 118).

In brief, it is a person of imperial intellect, comfortable with, and able to articulate, their own intellectual perspective with courtesy in any setting. The focus is, as Gilley (2003:303) notes,

power of judging in the mind [which] is...much more than possession of knowledge...[and] is also to be distinguished from the mere ‘viewiness’ of holding a great number of unintegrated opinions, which is the ‘unreal’ condition of the unformed but uncultivated men who remain boys all their lives.

For Newman, “viewiness” refers to “the light-headed holding and voicing of opinions which do not rest on long experience and settled conviction” (Gilley 2003:368). At the same time, from what has been shown, it is evident that Castro-Klaren’s contention (1996:323) does not stand, namely that Newman’s understanding of knowledge in a university setting attracts Friere’s (1993:53) the label of “banking concept of education”.

Parallels to Newman’s concept of a “gentleman” have been proposed. Jost (1989:176) proposed Quintillian’s orator—*vir bonus dicendi peritus* (the good man skilled in speaking); Begley (quoted in Bottone 2010:184) suggests Aristotle’s (EN IV.2 1123b2; Trans. Ross 1963:89) *megalopsychos* (great-souled man); Bottone (2010:89–102) argues persuasively that Cicero “represents the best specimen of the liberal, educated man” (Bottone 2010:15, 89), but Cicero, for Newman, also shows “the limits of the man educated outside the Christian faith” (Bottone 2010:93).

I turn now to consider whether, for Newman, the essence of university education also has a moral or ethical element.

c) The moral dimension of University Education

Newman was under “no illusion that a liberal education can lead to either moral virtue or religious faith” (Turner 1996:288). Newman is emphatic that the cultivation of the virtuous person is beyond the scope of Liberal Education. Liberal education is concerned with the honing of “the imperial intellect”. “(The) philosophy of the imperial intellect ... is based not so much on simplification as on discrimination” (Newman 1976:370-1); and that is different to the mind’s choosing the good outcome.

Newman, accordingly, insists on keeping the concept of Liberal Education distinct from both Moral Education and Religious Education (cf. Newman 1976:110, 112) because “liberal education aims at producing a condition of mind which is its own end” (Vargish 1970:154; cf. Newman 1976:159–65, 167–9). Ker (2010:27) notes that “the object of University education is...intellectual, not moral ... Newman’s concern is to argue that a university is for education ... as opposed to moral and spiritual formation”. In that, Newman’ disagreed with Locke’s utilitarian view of moral education. So, it is instructive, if Newman’s position is to be appreciated, to consider Locke’s position which Newman rejects

i) Locke's utilitarian position on Moral Education

John Locke (1632–1704) placed great importance on nurturing in education:

(o)f all the Men we meet with, Nine parts of Ten are what they are, Good or Evil, useful or not by their Education. 'Tis that which makes the great difference in Mankind (Locke 1989:1, 1.16-9).

Locke's concern is not with ordinary schooling or a university setting but with what today is referred to as "home schooling" or private tuition for the "well-off (Aldrich 1994:69) and which shows its outcome in "*Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding and Learning*" (Locke 1989, #134:194, 1.28. Locke's emphasis). For Locke moral excellence is tightly linked to education, too tightly linked in Newman's view. Further, while in ethical education Aristotle focussed on education of desire, Locke focussed on the education of reason (Brady 2005:157–73):

(t)he difference lies not in having or not having Appetites, but in the Power to govern, and deny ourselves in them. He that is not used to submit his Will to the Reason of others *when* he is *young*, will scarce hearken or submit his own Reason, when he is of Age to make use of it (Locke #36, 1989: 105, 1. 11-3; Locke's emphasis).

In the context of that difference, Newman supported Aristotle's position. Bottone (2010:118) summarises the difference between Locke and Newman thus:

(f)or Locke , in every case the ultimate end of education is an adult, whether it be the father or the child in his future years, while for Newman the core of education is the student and his mind.

Thus, Newman would disagree strongly with the recent comments of Slattery (2008:22) and Armstrong (2008:22–3) advocating teaching the Liberal Arts at university as a way of offsetting the greed motive sometimes encouraged in late Western Capitalism and also such as that advocated for Macquarie University by Vice-Chancellor Schwartz (2010a, 2010b, 2010c). The comment on the proposal by the Editor *Sydney Morning Herald* (2010) was dismissive and fatalistic:

(u)nfortunately, Schwartz's initiative , though well intentioned and worthy is destined to fail. Universities reflect the communities they serve. This is a utilitarian age, given neither to the character-building Schwartz admires nor to respect for those who worry about moral choices. Universities are no longer about character building, because character is not especially valued outside them. The same goes for morality. What is valued is money, so universities are valued for the money they earn, and enable graduates to earn. And that, sadly, is all.

It is one thing to suggest that a proposal is utopian, or visionary, another to suggest that it is too idealistic or impractical.

Newman acknowledged the need for moral education and its importance, but he contended that the task of character formation does not belong to the setting of University Education; the university is a place of instruction (Newman 1976:168) and that refers to matters of logic and reasoning, while moral education seeks to move a person to act in a particular way and that is an act of persuasion, a rhetorical matter. Rhetoric is different from Logic (Newman 1976:415). Following Aristotle, Newman (1976: 29) notes that the source of great persuasiveness lies in the personal, the perceived practical wisdom (*phronesis*), the speaker's integrity (*arete*) and good will (*eunoia*) towards the auditor, perceptions drawn from the actual words spoken. Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1371b) names that rhetorical proof as *ethos*, which can be translated accurately as "character" (Wisse 1998:31–2).

For Aristotle the use of *ethos*, moral character, as a means of persuasion consists in creating through speech a character which will induce the required degree of trust on the part of the hearer (Carey 1994:34–5).

It is that understanding that informs Newman's emphasis upon the role of the tutor in the residential colleges in the university, what he calls "the collegiate principle" (Newman 2001:74) which balances the "university principle" on the one hand, and, on the other contrasts the different roles of the university professor and college tutor (Tillman 2001:xxxiii). Newman (2001:189) explains:

(i)n educational institutions, colleges, the small residential communities of scholars and tutors living together, are the place of discipline—first intellectual discipline, and also of moral and religious formation. Colleges take over where the family leaves off.

Newman wrote to a friend (L&D XV:136; Newman's emphasis)

I do not think a University has to do with morals ... [but] uses small bodies in the Universities, Colleges, Halls etc. etc. as the preservative of *morals*, more naturally.

And again:

(t)he professorial system fulfils the strict idea of a University, and is sufficient for its being, but it is not sufficient of its well-being (Newman 2001: 182; Newman's emphasis).

For Newman, the Colleges or Halls of Residence play an important role but "have no pretension indeed to be the essence of a University, but are conservative of that essence" (Newman

2001:189); Newman (2001:191) explains his preference for the College system, in his view, if functioning well, a home-away-from-home (Tillman 2001: 502; note p.189):

because in themselves smaller bodies of students are easier to manage on the long run, than large ones. I should not like to do either, but, if I must choose between the two, I would rather drive four-in-hand, than the fifty wild cows which were harnessed to the travelling wagon of the Tartars.

Newman envisaged small colleges, “or rather hostels as they were only to hold twenty students” (Ker 1990:412) rather than “large colleges [which were] impenetrable and unmanageable” (Newman 1896:39). But Newman is addressing more than the issue of student discipline but the educational strategy of moral formation which he is suggesting belongs to the College, not the University. “Knowledge is one thing, but virtue [is]...much more than knowledge” (Tillman 2001:xxxii).

The different roles can also be contrasted using Newman’s distinction between “real” and “notional assent”—“assent to notions, and assent to things” (Newman 1985:30). Notional assents are given to abstract notions and are not personal (Newman 1985:60) and do not affect conduct (Newman 1985:64). Real assents “are sometimes called beliefs, convictions, certitudes” (Newman 1985:62) and they bring conviction and energise the individual (Newman 1985:63).

The more wholly one is intellectually imaginatively and personally engaged by an object, the more likely it is that one’s apprehension is a dynamic interplay of both the notional and the real, the conceptual and the imaginative, the abstract and the personal (Tillman 2001:xxvii).

The “real”, being personal and subjective, does not enjoy the same sense of being at home in a university environment as does the notional, which explains why issues of commitment do not belong in university teaching. “Logic ... is limited to correct reasoning” (Bottone 2010:82) and accordingly is included in the “intellectual excellence” sought by liberal education (Newman 1976:121–2).

So Newman would contend that the theory of Ethics has a place in university education but moral education belongs to a different setting because it is concerned about significantly different matters. That does not exclude a simultaneous educational approach during the same period of university study; it is a matter of complementarity that the university might encourage but always it remains outside its essence. That way the university seeks to encourage “the full human flourishing” (Bottone 2010:70) of its students. “The perfection of the intellect is, then, the *raison d’être* of a university in its ‘bare and necessary idea’” (Tillman 2010:xxxi).

Bottone (2010:71) notes that

Newman's idea of a university is a revised Aristotelean idea of a university. What emerges is an organic, comprehensive, conception of the human being requiring an integral formation in both the intellectual and moral spheres. Even when Newman maintains that the main and direct end of a university is not moral but intellectual, he recognises the preservation of morality as an indirect end.

I will return to this matter of ethical formation as part of the mission of university education in my concluding Paper (Paper Seven).

Moreover, it needs to be noted that Newman in his writing was resisting the "spirit of the age" or liberal theological *zeitgeist*, upholding the traditional Christian sentiment, whereas more recent writers such as Michael Oakeshott (1901–90) and Leo Strauss (1899–1973) "write in circumstances in which the secularisation Newman rejected is insisted upon" (Fuller 2003–4:40). Like Newman, Oakeshott (2001) and Strauss (1959) defended "in part what Newman defended" and were writing "against the spirit of the age" (Fuller 2003–4:40), in other words, against the politically correct view of their day.

Yet, one such view in the current *zeitgeist* is the universal right to education and that includes a right to tertiary education across economic and social divisions within a society; accordingly it is important to inquire whether Newman's concept of Liberal Education is not "elitist" and therefore flawed. I turn now to show that Newman's concept of Liberal Education does not have that flaw.

ii) Is Newman's view of University education "elitist"?

While, as already noted, Newman's view of the essence of liberal tertiary education was shaped by his own experience of mid-nineteenth century Oxford, or more exactly by his experience of Oriel College as tutor, the question can be asked, because of Oxford's long-time "establishment" status, whether Newman's "view" of university education is essentially elitist. Thus, George Bernard Shaw once acerbically dismissed the Oxbridge experience as "the caste-initiation practised under the mask of education at Oxford and Cambridge" (quoted in Gregor 1983:20). The evidence for that establishment status enjoyed by Oxford and Cambridge Universities is incontrovertible:

(i)n the twentieth century, sixty percent of all cabinet ministers were the products of Oxbridge, as have been most senior civil servants, judges, Anglican bishops, and a disproportionate percentage of Britain's intelligentsia, however defined. Until Tony Blair's resignation in June 2007, despite the enormous growth in the university system in recent decades, both the prime minister and the leader of the opposition were Oxford graduates (Rubinstein 2009:715).

The question remains, though, whether such an education is essentially an elitist form of tertiary education. I have argued above that Newman's concern is the educated mind, not social rank but the query requires a more thorough response. Rubinstein (2009:716) examined the backgrounds and career paths from a random sample of 100 matriculants from Oxford and Cambridge Universities for the 1840, 1870 and 1900 matriculations; he noted four traits, namely, that

- i) “(m)ost Oxbridge matriculants were educated at a school regarded in the popular mind, as of a somewhat lower social cachet” (Rubinstein 2009: 722);
- ii) “the great majority of Oxbridge matriculants ... became professional men. Strikingly, more than sixty percent of the 1840 cohorts at both universities became Anglican clergymen” (Rubinstein 2009:723), a period that was “the zenith of early Victorian religiosity” (Rubinstein 2009:725);
- iii) “(t)here was no ready nexus at nineteenth century Oxbridge between the universities and business life” (Rubinstein 2009:727); and
- iv) while there were examples of upward social mobility, that was not the rule, a finding reinforced by probate evaluations of the London principal probate registry (Rubinstein 2009:928–9).

Accordingly Rubinstein (2009:730) concludes that

most Oxbridge matriculants enjoyed careers lacking in real success of any kind, let alone elite status ... Such an education did not guarantee success, which was, as always, a product of talent, good luck, and circumstances ... Nor did an Oxbridge education hold the key to rising to the highest places in an elite group.

While acknowledging the high repute of Oxford and Cambridge Universities, Newman's concept of Liberal Tertiary Education does not warrant the label of “socially elitist”. Yet in fairness to Newman, one notes his 1854 Memorandum to Cardinal Cullen and the Irish Bishops, which lists that among the objectives of the proposed Catholic University in Dublin was the objective “(t)o develop the talents of promising youths in the lower classes” (Newman 1854. L&D XVI:557; cf.

the corrected version of that Memorandum in Newman 1896: 93–100).

At the same time, it must be conceded that from one angle, university education is elitist, “an aristocracy of intellect” in Kerr’s phrase (2001:91): “The great university is of necessity elitist—the elite of merit—but it operates in an environment dedicated to an egalitarian philosophy” (Kerr 2001:91).

d) Summary of Newman’s concept of Liberal University Education

To summarise the case being argued, in Newman’s own words: a liberal university education is an

education which gives a man a clear conscious view of his own opinions and judgements, a truth in developing them, an eloquence in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It teaches him to view things as they are, to go right to the point, to detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is irrelevant (Newman 1976:154).

Newman is not implying that the university graduate be academically omni-competent. Rather his contention is that with Liberal education,

a habit of mind is formed which lasts through life...the special fruit of the education furnished at a University ... This is the main purpose of a University in its treatment of its students (Newman 1976:96).

While Newman takes for granted that university curricula are compromised of the traditional Classics and Humanities (Classical Greek and Latin, Philosophy and History), it is instructive, and relevant, that Newman was critical of contemporary universities that did not study Shakespeare or Milton (Newman 1976:213, 219). Ker’s conclusion stands:

there is no reason to suppose that Newman, who was responsible for setting up one of the first university chairs of English Literature, would not have admitted modern arts courses as legitimate heirs of the old liberal tradition based on the Classics, although he would have had justifiable regrets (Ker 1988: 393).

To hone “the imperial intellect” there needs to be found in the student “accuracy of thought”, “scholar like precision” and an ability to write down those thoughts and arguments (Newman 1988:394, 402–4). MacIntyre points out that in Newman’s view:

(t)he aim of university education is not to fit students for this or that profession or career, or to equip them with theory that will later on find useful application to this or that form of practice. It is

to transform their minds, so that the student becomes a different kind of individual, one able to engage fruitfully in conversation and debate, one who has the capacity for exercising judgement, for having insights and arguments from a variety of disciplines to bear on particular complex issues. This is the capacity that Aquinas takes to be the expression of the virtue of prudence (MacIntyre 2009:147-8).

Gilley (2003: 302) makes a similar point to MacIntyre, that, for Newman, “the aim of the University is not so much even to teach the particular sciences, though of course it does, but to impart to its students a ‘real cultivation of mind’” (Newman 1976:10).

In brief, it is the intellectual tradition into which the Student is initiated. Newman sees a common aim in both school and university education, namely

that one main portion of intellectual education, of the labours of both school and university, is to remove the original dimness of the mind’s eye... to give the mind clearness, accuracy, precision; to enable it to use words aright, to understand what it says, to conceive justly what it thinks about, to abstract, compare, analyse, divide, define, and reason, correctly (Newman 1976:273).

Such an education “produces a breadth and spaciousness of thought” (Newman 1976:134). As Ker observes: “(t)he end of liberal education may be idealistic ... but the means of attaining it are strictly practical as well as practicable” (Ker 1988:396; 1976:134).

The question still remains whether Newman’s philosophical habit of mind, whether that “attitude” (Bottone 2010:226), can be acquired in settings other than that of a university. Writing in 1854 in *The Catholic University Gazette* Newman contended that the commercial, intellectual, political and cultural life of the chief city of a country “necessarily invests it with functions of a university...with an atmosphere of intellect” (Newman 2001:13) so that the chief city becomes

a sort of necessary University, whether we will or no ... We cannot then be without virtual Universities; a metropolis is such ... a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge (Newman 2001:13–6).

While that does not detract from the privileged historical role of the official educational institutions which targets a specific population, there is clearly a family resemblance to Davis’s (2010:15) account of higher learning, for which he reworks Erasmus’ (1466–1536) 1522

comment to Zwingli (1484–1531) “*ego mundi civis esse cupio*” [I desire to be a citizen of the world] (Erasmus 1989b: 185) as the “Republic of learning” or “Commonwealth of learning” to characterise the world-wide phenomenon of higher education. I note in passing that Davis (2010) seems to have missed the Renaissance Scholar’s deliberate echo of Cicero’s (*In Verrem* v. lvii. 147) *civis Romanus sum* (I am a citizen of the Rome), which strengthens Davis’ interpretation of Erasmus’ view.

I note that Newman’s focus is not curriculum content but the heart of university education. Newman’s insight contrasts strongly with the arguments of Nussbaum (2010) and Armstrong (2011) commenting respectively to American and to Australian university education urging the recovery of the Humanities as an integral component of university education if, in Armstrong’s phrase (2011:50), the university is “to cultivate dispositions” of the mind as its central purpose. By that “disposition” Armstrong means

the reliable, intelligent deployment of abilities in real-world situations. It is the ability to think carefully—when under pressure, when there are strong countervailing forces, when there is a need to do so, in the service of an important purpose.

Nussbaum (cited in Oriel 2011:25) contends that the key outcomes from education in the humanities are

to think critically...[rather than parroting slogans ... a reasonable degree of knowledge behind the claims being made ... a high level of listening and curiosity, some self-doubt and humility rather than complacency and an ability to imagine what other people are thinking and feeling.

While Nussbaum and Armstrong are focussing on the Humanities and the importance of their continued funding at universities, Newman would contend that the outcomes sought belong to the heart of university education itself and not to any branch of knowledge or grouping of disciplines.

Following Ker (2011), Newman’s focus is intellectual culture and in that Newman’s understanding was different to Matthew Arnold’s concept of culture as “a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know...the best which has been thought and said in the world” (1965:233), something which approximates to the content of liberal education (Ker 2011:23) whereas Newman is concerned with an intellectual outcome he characterises as “the perfection of the intellect ... enlargement of the mind, or illumination” (Newman 1976:114). While a

particular university may not teach all branches of knowledge “none [is] omitted on principle” (Newman 1976:33; cf. Ker 2011:29)

And he [Newman] emphasises that the neglect or omission of any branch of knowledge, particularly if it is important and likely to impinge on other branches, does not mean that that subject simply slips out of the totality of knowledge (Ker 2011: 29-30).

Newman therefore rejects narrowing the range of academic disciplines through any strategy that, in Ker’s (2011:30–31) phrase, is “academic imperialism”. In that, Newman’s concern is the unity of the circle of knowledge rather than what is at the heart of university education.

It is a great point then to enlarge the range of studies which a University professes, even for the sake of students; and, though they cannot pursue every subject which is open to them, they will be the gainers by living among those and under those who represent the whole circle (Newman 1976: 94).

In brief, I am suggesting that Newman is not advocating a Liberal Arts programme as favoured at some tertiary institutions, but is focussed upon the heart of the experience of university education even where the student has not included humanities subjects among the subjects studied.

Newman favours a non-instrumental approach to education if it is to be characterised as “liberal” whereas, Nussbaum favours a recovery of the Socratic legacy so that a “truly democratic” (Nussbaum 2010:51) political and social life is promoted. The outcome is that:

(c)lass, fame, and prestige count for nothing, and the argument count for all ... the Socratic arguer is a confined dissenter because she knows that it is just each person and the argument wrestling things out ... Socrates’ attitude toward his interlocutors ... is exactly the same as his attitude towards himself. Everyone needs examination, and all are equal in the face of argument (Nussbaum 2010:51).

Moreover Nussbaum is articulating her argument in an American setting and its educational inheritance of progressive education which gives a particular resonance to her comments.

Socratic thinking ... is one of the hallmarks of progressive education...Socratic thinking is a social practice ... John Dewey (1869–1952) ... made [the connection] between democratic citizenship and Socratic education (Nussbaum 2010:51, 54, 64).

In contrast to Nussbaum's position, Papers Three and Four in this Portfolio have argued for a non-instrumental purpose at the heart of education, including tertiary education.

Yet that logical geography fails to offer an account of specific professional education at University. The student preparing for the Professions needs to move beyond knowing "that" and "what", to knowing "how" in the specific professional context, something distinct from knowing "that" and "what" of curriculum content. Accordingly, the discussion turns to examine those concepts more closely in order to show that education in a profession is different from university education though it builds upon it through the honing of "the imperial intellect" in practical judgements as Paper Six will show, in brief, knowing "how" is different.

3. Knowing "that", and knowing "how"

Burt (1974:300) reminds us that a person can know *how* but may not be able to express that knowledge in a proposition. The problem, Brown (1974) contended, is not one of knowing but a matter of "doing"; one may know how to prune trees but may not be able to do that to an acceptable standard. Conversely, "(t)here are an abundant supply of people who cannot do things but know how to explain them" (Brown 1974:303). Brown gives as examples among others, an actor with stage fright, and a male expert in natural childbirth. Ryle remarked even earlier, that we distinguish "habits" from "intelligent capacities"; habits are learnt by drill; intelligent capacities are learnt by training (Ryle 1949:42). Thus one can say the multiplication tables in one's sleep, but not read maps in one's sleep (Ryle 1949:42–3). There is need for an exercise of intelligence behind the performance, and that is the focus of our attention here. "We learn how by practice, schooled and aided by criticism and example, but often quite unaided by any lessons in the theory" (Ryle 1949:41). The central issue is doing things "intelligently"; "putting things into practice" is not identical with "intellectually grasping the prescriptions" (Ryle 1949:49). In short, the propositional acknowledgement of rules, reasons or principles is not the parent of the intelligent application of them, it is the stepchild of that application (Ryle 1946:9). In terms of the knowing, knowing "how", presupposes the knowing "that" (Ryle 1946:15).

Ryle makes the point well:

(e)ffective possession of a piece of knowledge involves knowing how to use that knowledge, when required, for the solution of other theoretical or practical problems. There is a distinction between

the museum-possession and the workshop possession of knowledge. A ... person can be stocked with information, yet never know how to answer a particular question (Ryle 1946:16).

In brief, knowing “how” requires that the agent be a “wise practitioner”. Such a trait is irreplaceable in the hospital Chaplain, no matter how deep and wide his/her academic learning may be. The issue is the choosing between alternative actions in the professional context, of making wise choices. The educational problem then is to develop an educational understanding of how that wise choosing can be taught. That will be addressed in closer detail in a separate Paper in this Portfolio (Paper Six). The wise practitioner begins the professional training building upon the undergraduate experience of tertiary education where the intellect has been educated to reason well (Newman 1976:114), where the imperial intellect was cultivated and the student has a “well trained mind”.

4. Conclusion

I conclude this Paper with some observations on the utility of Newman’s concept of Liberal Education in the context of Professional Training in a university environment.

Professional training and liberal education can be viewed as standing at either pole of a single continuum, not necessarily in conflict with each other, but complementary ... (Further) intellectual breadth and depth require a well-balanced curriculum (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:173).

There is an apparent contradiction between the “intrinsic worth of liberal education” and the implied “extrinsic worth of professional training” (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:172). It is not a question of both liberal education and professional training existing side by side; this issue is rather one of integration, something which occurs after the liberal education phase has been completed. As Arthur and Nicholls (2007:173) point out: “(v)ocational training should refer back to, apply, and be enriched by the intellectual lessons and skills acquired through liberal education. That provides a very different form of higher education to that which is led by a “rhetoric of skills and competencies” (Arthur & Nicholls 2007:174). In Paper Six I will address that matter, professional training within the university context that is integral to a liberal education, under the heading of “educating the wise practitioner”. But before considering that professional education it is important to show that the Verbatim used in CPE programmes, the signature pedagogy of the profession (Paper Two), is essentially a rational strategy. That will be done in the next paper, Paper 5, through a discussion of the case study and action research of

Qualitative Research Methodology, and case reasoning to which the Verbatim in CPE bears a strong family resemblance.

Paper 5: An Epistemic Warrant for Case Studies in Clinical Pastoral Education Programmes

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Paper 5: An Epistemic Warrant for Case Studies in Clinical Pastoral Education Programmes

1. Introduction

In Paper Two I contended that the initiation into the worthwhile traditions that are Clinical Pastoral Education is effected through two rhetorical strategies and suggested that the tactic of that strategy was the use of the student's Verbata in the supervisory settings. Here I will be examining the epistemic warrant for using Verbata as case studies as an educational strategy in Clinical Pastoral Education.

The term "case study" is in Gerring's (2004:341) phrase "a definitional morass" and accordingly Gerring (2004:342) provides a descriptive definition of the case study as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units". On the other hand, Thacker (2006:1631, n.2) offers what he calls "an intuitive definition" of the case study as "a piece of qualitative research (often historical) that portrays a more or less well-defined event, organization, individual, group, or culture". While Stake (2005:443) suggests that the case study "is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the method used". At the same time, "the interpretative paradigm or method of inquiry shapes the definition [of the case study]. Seen from different worldviews and in different situations, the "same" case is different" (Stake 2005:460, n. 3).

The focus of the CPE case study is the student's Verbatim as an accurate written record of the professional practice of the Chaplain in his/her pastoral care conversation with the individual encountered in the hospital setting. The response of the recipient of that pastoral care, while crucial to that project, is of secondary and indirect interest here; yet, the presumption is that the wise practitioner will be of greater spiritual "help" to the recipient, than the presence of a less able practitioner. Casuistry or case reasoning, by way of contrast, is focussed on the line of reasoning in the particular bounded instance, and in this Paper I will be following that contrast and will explore the insights to be gained from each approach.

I begin with a brief description of the educational processes common in CPE in both the Basic and the Advanced Units of training, as formulated in the Handbooks of the Royal North Shore Hospital CPE Centre (1998) and the Gosford CPE Centre (2008) and approved by the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education Inc. In these CPE settings, the trainee's verbatim report, brought by the student to either individual or group supervision, can be understood as having the characteristics of an individual case study by the student Chaplain focussing on a single encounter. That will be examined in the second part of this Paper. The fellow students (peers) in the group supervision are processing another's pastoral case in light of their own intellectual and/or moral virtue of prudence; in that way each student's listening to another student's verbatim not only contributes to that presenting student's honing of his/her own intellectual and moral virtue of *phronesis* (Aristotle), or *prudentia* (Aquinas) or Illative Sense (Newman), but also contributes to the honing of the auditor's own intellectual virtue at the same time (see Paper Six). It is an experiential learning in action and reflection on that action; it is a process, across time and in the different settings of the CPE Unit/s. The reflection on the pastoral practice has a similarity to case reasoning, or, the process of casuistry, that part of Ethics which seeks to resolve the complex instance by applying general rules in a way that takes into account the special circumstances or conflicting obligations present; further the CPE student's verbatim as a report of the pastoral conversation at the bedside of the patient, can be compared to the case study of qualitative research methodology; those matters will be examined in the first part of this Paper. The process of reflection in the student's verbatim, before, during and after the pastoral encounter, has a close family resemblance to what is known in Qualitative Research Methodology generically as "Action Research" and that will be discussed in the third section of this Paper, along with Mezirow's view that adult education can be transformative. In each section my concern is the epistemic warrant for the practical and personal knowledge of ministerial practice that is thereby generated; the purpose is not to construct, or examine a theory. The Paper concludes with a summary of the insights drawn from those discussions and their relevance towards an educational philosophy for CPE. I begin with the understandings that can be gleaned from "casuistry".

2. Insights from Casuistry

Because casuistry often carries a pejorative connotation, I will begin my discussion with examining the historical origins of that legacy before discussing the more recent rehabilitation of casuistry or case reasoning.

a) Historical legacy—pejorative connotation

The conversation between Chaplain and the hospital patient occurs in the context of a pastoral care visit and accordingly, it can be claimed to be conducted within an “ethic of care” where, as Noddings (1995:187) notes, “(e)thical decisions are made in caring interactions with those affected by the discussion. Indeed, it is exactly in the most difficult situations that principles fail us” (Noddings 1995:187).

My point here is that the “wise practitioner” makes ethically informed judgements frequently “on the run”, without the time or space to work through the complexities involved. If such “ethically important moments” (Guillemin & Gillam 2004:262) are to be negotiated well, then they are “moments that demand moral reasoning and the deepest respect for the ethical implications of actions to be taken in the moment” (Rallis & Rossman 2010:385).

It is a process that Rallis and Rossman (2010) name “caring reflexivity”, a process where two questions are addressed—“(w)hat is the ethical practice in this instance with these people and am I enacting ethical practice in this instance with these people?” (Rallis & Rossman 2010:496). After the pastoral care encounter and upon reflection it may be possible to elaborate the moral principles one has used; nonetheless, the implementation may be contested by other professionals, or those professionals might even propose alternative moral principles to guide the solution in that instance of professional practice. I am assuming that the Chaplain has studied ethical theory at tertiary level and, that the skills have been learned, and, if not, that further study is required. Accordingly, the issue here is the wise application of those principles in the concrete particularity at hand.

In order to achieve the required level of expertise, an educational strategy is needed for the training and formation of the hospital Chaplain. That is effected in the presentation and discussion of the Verbatim with the supervisors and fellow students during the supervisory sessions of each CPE Unit. That dimension of the CPE Verbatim enjoys a similarity to the educational strategy once widely used in the training in Applied Ethics or Moral Theology for Roman Catholic Ministry students, though the approach was not confined to that Denomination. That educational strategy went by the name of “casuistry” and was used to educate the student in making wise choices in situations of complex or contested ethical situations, through the reasoning out of the various, conflicting elements of the concrete particular instance requiring an ethical decision. At the same time the presentation and discussion of the Verbatim in a CPE context may be viewed as a case study, which encourages the presenting student and the auditors

in the supervisory group to critically reflect on issues of wise practice in an actual clinical situation. So from the practice of CPE, a closer examination of both case reasoning and case studies is warranted.

The use of case studies as an educational strategy began at Harvard Business School over a century ago, and its success there has led to case studies in the form of case reasoning being incorporated as a teaching tool in law, education and medicine (Delpier 2006:204). In the context of nursing education, Delpier (2006:209) noted: “(a)fter years of using cases in place of traditional lectures ... [the author] is convinced that teaching with cases is the best way to teach nursing students to think like nurses”. Henning, Nielsen and Hauschildt reported that their experience of using case study methodology in critical care nursing education, was marked by “increasing student engagement with problem solving and content knowledge acquisition” (Henning, Nielsen and Hauschildt 2006:157). In the context of teacher education, Sykes and Bird (1992:514) express caution while acknowledging that “the turn to cases in teacher education reflects an interest in drawing closer to practice and in exploring new means of connecting practice and researchers’ interest in the uses of cases”.

Accordingly, my discussion turns to examine casuistry or case reasoning as an educational tool in the CPE context, a tool that links experience, the concrete, and professional wisdom. Yet casuistry was effectively disparaged by Blaise Pascal (1623–62) as part of the Jansenist campaign to discredit the Jesuits and their preferred strategy of arguing moral solutions for Confessors in the Catholic practice at the heart of the Catholic Sacrament of Penance. Pascal’s concern was the practice of the Jesuits to use casuistry to train Confessors in making informed moral judgements in the Confessional. That use of casuistry was the common approach as part of the Counter-Reformation revival in Europe following the Council of Trent (1545–63) and was not confined to the Jesuits, the leading Counter-Reformation Religious Order of the period and leaders in the field of training and forming Confessors. Pascal’s polemic had two significant historical outcomes. First it was effective to the degree that “casuistry” was discredited as a strategy in itself, so that in current English “casuistry” is a word which is “(o)ften applied to a quibbling or evasive way of dealing with difficult cases of duty; sophistry” (Little et al. 1959a:273; cf. 961). The Oxford English Dictionary instances as an early example of that pejorative connotation, Bolingbroke’s acid observation in 1736 that “casuistry ... destroys, by distinctions and exceptions, all morality, and effaces the essential differences between right and wrong” (Simpson & Werner 1989b:961).

Pascal's polemic was unfair, being but popular advocacy in the theological quarrel between, on the one hand, the followers of Cornelius Otto Jansen (1585–1638) who were inspired by Jansen's posthumous work *Augustinus* (1640), and, on the other hand, Catholic Theologians and Bishops who challenged the moral rigorism and theological pessimism of Jansenism. Jansenism itself was a loosely organised movement led by Jean Duvergier de Hairane (1581–1643) (the Abbe de Saint Cyran), Antoine Arnauld (1612–94) and his sister Jacqueline Marie Angelique Arnauld (1601–1661), (Mere Angelique, Abbess of the convent at Port Royal, southwest of Paris), and opposed on the other hand, as already noted, by the official Catholic Church represented by the Jesuits in particular. The theological issue central to the dispute was the need for Divine help to be virtuous and the role of the human will under that Divine help. Each side of the debate claimed St Augustine of Hippo (354–430) as their mentor; the contest focused on the strategy of casuistry used to determine blame or innocence in the particular moral act. The Jansenists perceived the Jesuit practice of following a probable point of view as intolerable moral laxity; the Jesuits, on the other hand, contended that the Jansenists were overly harsh and rigid; in brief, each claimed the other was betraying their Catholic identity and tradition. Rather than a close critique of the practice of casuistry at the time, Pascal led the Jansenistic critique with a blanket rejection of casuistry; and hence Krailsheimer (1967:16) contends that *The Provincial Letters* “mark the birth of journalism”; the author seems to be noting the similarity in that both Pascal and modern journalism may mislead either by misreporting the facts or alternatively by giving what would be a fair judgement if the facts were accurately reported. Pascal's focus was not a rigorous critique of the casuistry of the day (Jensen & Toulmin 1989: 248). The best known of the laxist casuists were Antonio Diana (1585-1663), a Theatine Cleric, and Jean Caramuel-Lebkowitz (1610-82), a Cistercian Monk and Bishop. Neither were Jesuits. Diana, the “pure casuist” (Prummer 1961: 226) considered some twenty thousand cases in ten published volumes offering crowds of authorities for alternative solutions (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989: 156). Pascal mentions Diana seven times, usually to show Diana's agreement with some Jesuit; Pascal refers but four times to Caramuel-Lebkowitz, a casuist “who most merited Pascal's scorn” (Jensen & Toulmin 1989: 156). Pascal never cites the leading Jesuit casuist of the day, Herman Busenbaum (1600-80), a “judicious cautious moralist” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1898: 156) and a casuist of “notably balanced judgement” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989: 249). Further, it is relevant to note that Busenbaum's *Medulla Theologiae Moralis* (1605) became the basis of the magisterial treatise of the greatest moral theologian Alphonsus Ligouri (1691-1787)”. First and foremost Pascal's broadside was against the Jesuits, not the Casuists (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989:

157).

The excesses of some Casuists is noted. The “pure Casuist” (Prummer 1961: 226) the Theatine Cleric Antonius Diana (1585-1663) published ten volumes of his *Resolutiones Morales* (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989: 156) (1629-59) dealing with some 20,000 cases finding the position of most as based on “probable” reasons; while Diana enjoyed great popularity through compendia and resumes, his work as a casuist “was an aberration” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989: 156). Another prominent casuist was the Cistercian monk and Bishop, Jean Caramuel-Lebkowitz (1606-82) who, with Diana, represented “casuistry at its laxist extreme” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989: 156). It is significant and relevant that neither was a Jesuit and that Pascal referred to them “less than a dozen times” (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989: 157). Accordingly, it seems that Pascal’s antagonism was “aimed more at Jesuits” (Jonsen and Toulmin 1989: 156) than at Casuistry.

The second historical outcome was that moral philosophers, beginning with Henry Sidgwick’s book *The Method of Ethics* (1874), moved away from practical, concrete issues of moral practice to issues of “meta-ethics” and general principles (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989:12). In addressing the dilemmas of everyday life, though, casuistry continued in the wider community, focusing not only on the similarity between cases but also on their dissimilarities; the same applied to Roman Catholic Pastoral practice (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989:14). Thus, Brosnahan (1908:45), reflecting Catholic Pastoral practice, defined casuistry as

(t)he application of general principles of morality to define the concrete of human activity, for the purpose primarily, of determining what one ought to do, or ought not to do, or what one may leave undone as one pleases; and for the purpose, secondarily, of deciding whether and to what extent guilt or immunity from guilt followed on the action already posited.

The focus remained on concrete, particular ethical or moral decisions for which the general theories did not offer clear or uncontested guidance that recognized both the similarities and the differences between particular instances. That difficulty, the relationship between ethical theory and practical judgement, has been described by Jonsen (1991) in terms of the metaphor of a traveler seeing the way across the land ahead, from either a balloon (general theory) or a bicycle (the concrete particularity of a situation). Life is always lived in the concrete particularity. Neither Pascal nor those after him had resolved that tension.

b) Rehabilitation and rational warrant of casuistry

Jonsen and Toulmin (1989) rehabilitated casuistry as a strategy for addressing the ethics of complex biomedical issues present in the United States of America in the mid 1970s (Jonsen and Toulmin 1989:vii). That issue was different from the use of case studies to educate the practitioner, which is a question of an educational methodology rather than articulating an ethical or moral solution, which is the concern of casuistry.

Yet the philosophical problem raised by Pascal continued, namely, how casuistry could be justified, a matter which Jonsen & Toulmin's historical account of the abuse of casuistry did not consider. Yet when casuistry lost its credibility under the withering satire of Pascal, it "survived within the churches, while rising like a phoenix in Literature" (Toulmin 2001:1135). Since the 1960s there has been a renewed interest in casuistry (Jonsen & Toulmin 1988:303–32) in what is now termed "case reasoning", or "practical reasoning in the clinical arts" (Toulmin 2001: 211), or "case method" (Toulmin 2001:135). The focus is upon "reasonableness" rather than "rationality" (Toulmin 2001:169)—a distinction also found in Aristotle (*N.E.* 1.4.5. Ross 1962:4–5). A longer quotation from Toulmin will highlight that unique quality:

Aristotle did not claim that universal concepts were applicable invariably and without exception: in real life situations, many universals hold generally rather than invariably. So, in medicine and other human disciplines, we must remember the difference between general assumptions that support 'reasonable' arguments in the practical arts, and the rational deductions that are the stock-in-trade of mathematically formulated theories ... In theoretical physics and similar enterprises, scientists and philosophers are in the business of refining general features of the World, whereas in clinical fields, practitioners are concerned with what happens less on the whole (*kat'houlou*) than on a *particular* occasion (*kat'hekaston*). So, the focus of clinical attention is on the particular *case* (Toulmin 2001:111; emphasis in original).

When speaking of "reasonableness" in assessing the "solution" to a complex and conflicted situation, the question automatically arises as to how stringent the evidence needs to be so that the solution can be termed "reasonable". Or to cast the problem slightly differently, how compelling that evidence needs to be, before it is reasonable to so act? There are five possible positions as an answer to that question, answers that are across a continuum: *tutiorism* (only the safest position) or *probabiliorism* (only the more probable position is acceptable), *equi-probabilism* (the solution must be at least as probable as the other options), *probabilism* (a probable or plausible position all things considered) and *laxism* (where anything goes) (Mortimer 1975a, b, c). [The complicated story of the development and acceptance of

“probabilism” in ethical and moral theory is beyond my concern here; see Deman (1936: Cols. 417–619)]. While it has been contended that there is little difference between *equi-probabilism* and *probabilism* (Jonsen & Toulmin 1989:378, n.66), there can be ethical situations where the difference can be sustained, and accordingly under one perspective the action is ethical, but not under the other. *Tutorism* fades into rigidity, favouring the Rule over the Agent and therefore is unhelpful in negotiating the difficult, complex concrete situation requiring action; *laxism*, at the other extreme of the continuum, quickly fades into the chaotic or the anarchic, and renders ethical discourse impossible; *equi-probabilism* quickly becomes unwieldy in the concrete particular situation demanding action because another possibility always remains, at least conceptually. Accordingly, *probabilism* carries an attraction because there is a feasibility in the concrete on the one hand, and on the other, it enjoys a flexibility that favours the Agent rather than the rule; the action is “reasonable”, and to act upon it is warranted.

Following Finnis (1983:30 ff.), examining the logic of practical reasoning is helpful to understanding practical reasonableness. Kenny (1975:89. cf. 81) says that practical reasoning seeks the “satisfaction of the reasoner’s wants”. That is the starting point. But, Anscombe’s account (1958:62), following Aristotle and Aquinas, contends that practical reasoning “starts with something wanted”. That account ensures that practical reasoning and reasonableness remain a matter of reasoning and understanding (Finnis 1983:32). Accordingly, Finnis (1983:35; emphasis in original) contends, practical reasoning does not begin “with *wants* (or desires) and [then] seeks *satisfactory ways* of satisfying them; but that practical reasoning begins by identifying *something wanted* (or desired), i.e. something (*practically* considered) desirable.” Therefore, the reasoning is ethical or moral because the focus is on the reasonableness and understanding involved.

Jonsen (1990, 1991) faced the problem and contended that the reasoning in casuistry lay outside the realm of “geometric or demonstrative reasoning” (Tallmon 2001:84). In brief, the deductive reasoning of the Enlightenment (see Paper One) did not exhaust the way humans reason; the human mind is not limited to the logic of deduction and the methodology of casuistry is “utterly rhetorical” (Tallmon 2001:85). Three ways are used to identify the special issues relevant to the particular case under consideration: first, articulating the special matters peculiar to this case; second, focusing upon the determining issue in this instance; and third, by examining the issues held in common with other cases. *Phronesis* is used to develop a solution at each of those three steps. Such practice was routine in the legal practice of the Ancient Civic World and its tradition

continued through to the High Middle Ages, drawing upon the thought of Cicero (106–43 BC) Quintillian (c35–c100AD), Augustine (345–430AD), Boethius (480–524 AD), and Aquinas (1225–74 AD). Jonsen shows how Casuists did not articulate their underpinning theory but operated out of a presumed common methodology, namely “the form of reasoning constitutive of classical casuistry is rhetorical reasoning” (Jonsen 2001:84; cf. 1991:295–307). One begins with discerning the structure of the case; then, using sound judgement, *phronesis*, the centre of the case is determined, that is the concepts that are basic to, and indelibly present in, any ethical problem that presents itself in a clinical case (Jonsen 1990:63); analogical reasoning ensures that the similarity with paradigm cases is underlined; *phronesis* determines the relevance of issues in the practical situation.

(T)he dynamics of rhetorical reasoning which constitute the faculty of discovering the crux of the matter (*heuresis*), that precedes the art of argumentation (*techne*) explicated in the *Rhetoric* [of Aristotle], and simultaneously brings it to bear on the act of choosing the mean between extremes, elucidated in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (Tallmon 2001:86).

The rhetorical methodology helps our understanding of casuistry and its concern with the probable in concrete particular circumstances, rather than mathematical style of certainty. As Aristotle remarked

for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject permits; it is evidentially equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2094a 25 ff.; Trans. Ross 1963:3).

And case reasoning, in any discipline, seeks to establish the probable solution for this particular circumstance. That immediately raises the level of probability to be sought, and again casuistry or case reasoning offers useful insight.

To recapitulate: it was the Jesuit Probabilists who were the main objects of Pascal’s attacks discussed above. On rational grounds, the extreme positions of rigor and “anything-goes” can be ruled out; *equi-probabilism* is unworkable in practice where a decision needs to be made and acted upon; *probabilism* offers an attractive balance between liberty and obligation (Deman 1936; Noldin 1957b:213–34, Prummer 1961:222–35).

My concern here extends further than ethical issues in Chaplaincy education, to using cases drawn from Chaplaincy practice for a Chaplain to learn from his/her professional experience,

and to reflect on how s/he might have responded in a similar situation when the context is that of Group supervision. Now, case reasoning or casuistry has also had a long use in situations other than that of practical ethics, as was noted at the beginning of this Paper. The development of clinical judgement and practice of medical practitioners has used case studies or case reasoning for many years (Montgomery 2006:113–20). Accordingly, one can wonder whether the case idea could provide useful insights for Clinical Pastoral Education as well. I will be contending that it does and has.

In Paper Two in this Portfolio, it was noted how Dr Richard Cabot took “the case” idea from the Medical School at Harvard, and used the approach in developing the process of Clinical Pastoral Education. As noted above, Rev’d Anton Boisen, “one of the ‘fathers’ of clinical pastoral education” (King 2007:26), “advocated a style of case study” (Ford and Tartaglia 2006:675); in fact the case study or verbatim has become a mainstay of CPE professional pedagogy. Accordingly, it is relevant to examine the educational warrant for the use of cases in the education and formation of Chaplains.

The first part of this Paper has been examining the insights “casuistry” or “case reasoning” has for CPE. My immediate focus is the use of the Verbatim in Group Supervision where the Verbatim of a student is listened to as a case in the professional practice of Chaplaincy to which the fellow student applies insights from his/her own intellectual and moral virtues of prudence. The ensuing conversation following the presentation of the Verbatim to the Group may become an educative experience for both the presenter of the Verbatim and the auditors of the Verbatim, namely the members of the Peer Supervision Group (see Paper Two). My aim here then, is to explicate the educational concepts embedded in that custom and practice and, then, to integrate those understandings into a concept of Education for CPE. I have argued that the educational process is rhetorical, and that dovetails nicely with the view being argued that the initiation into a worthwhile tradition that is Clinical Pastoral Education, is profoundly rhetorical. Through “case reasoning” both the individual student presenting an instance of professional practice for supervision, and the peer students in Group supervision gather worthwhile professional knowledge. There is in that what Argyis & Schön (1974:19) named, “double loop learning” through the commitment to reflection and commitment to action consequent upon that reflection. Thus the student is gradually educated to be truly a “reflective practitioner” (Schön 1991). But, further insights can be gained from the use of case studies in Qualitative Research, and I move to consider at greater length, the use of case methodology in that.

3. Insights from Case Studies in Qualitative Research Methodology

a) Introduction

In the second part of this Paper, I am focusing upon the insights that can be gained from case studies as developed in Qualitative Research, and which is now generally accepted as a legitimate research methodology in sociological disciplines (Babbie, 2010; Cohen et al, 2001; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Gomm et al, 2006; Richards, 2006; Yin, 2003; and elsewhere). It will be argued that while such case studies do not generate new (scientific) knowledge through deductive reasoning but through using generalisations from a sample studied and from probability they do “thicken” the description of the situation and enrich the knowledge available (Geertz 1973) by adding to experience. It is the logic of induction at play, and is a legitimate form of reason. Such insight is valuable for any Professional, including the Pastoral Care Chaplain, even though there is no ground for broadening the epistemic warrant for generalisation from a case study or a number of case studies. It is the reader who generalises, not the writer, and the reader is using not syllogistic, but an inductive rationality.

Three important prior distinctions are relevant in this discussion. First, the concern is focusing exclusively on the warrant of epistemic probability and I will not be addressing the warrant of statistical probability appropriate to Quantitative Research, which is a separate issue. Second, the concern is in the immediate situation, and that, by definition, is different from a general theoretical situation. In brief, the context is the practical, the concrete and the immediate, where there is a greater urgency about coming to a decision in order to proceed to action. Third, the context is the level of adequate intellectual warrant for the particular individual to act reasonably on the information contained in the case before them. The focus then is on the warrant for personal certitude to allow the individual to act reasonably in the practical situation. To that certitude, I am contrasting the certainty which has an automatic generalisability across the board; the presumption in that setting is that any intelligent person using their reason will arrive at the same and certain outcome upon mature reflection. That is the certainty that belongs to the propositions of the Physical Sciences and to Mathematics in particular. It is the category of “certainty” that I am using to describe the latter, and “certitude” for the former, which applies to a subjective rational outcome which allows the person to act with rational warrant in the practical concrete situation. In that, I am utilising the distinction developed by John Henry Newman as discussed in an earlier Paper in this portfolio (Paper Three). In the words of a fairly

common phrase in modern use is that of “moral certainty”. In modern English usage that would be termed “moral certainty ... the quality or state of being subjectively certain; assurance, confidence” (Simpson & Weiner 1989b: 1052). Following Vlastos (1985, 1997) one can detect the same concept in Socrates in the Platonic Dialogues. There in discussing his own knowledge Socrates contrasts epistemological certainty, the “indestructible certainty as the prerogative of the philosopher” (Vlastos 1985: 17) with fallible everyday knowledge. Within Socrates’ understanding

[the] willingness to live with fallible knowledge is built into the human condition. Only a god could do without it. Only a crazy man would want to. (Vlastos 1985: 14)

The question is whether moral certainty, while remaining short of epistemic certitude, is sufficient for prudent action. Vlastos argues that it is when there is more to be gained on the probability than on its denial.

The method is admittedly fallible. Even so, with all its hazards, it is the best truth-seeking, truth-testing procedure he knows. Any alternative open to him would be worse – would enhance, not reduce, the risk of moral error. (Vlastos 1997: 271)

That then is the certitude Newman has I mind though admittedly Newman is not referring to Socrates at that point in his discussion.

In brief, certitude is a reflex act whereby I know I know; it is a cognitional, intellectual act rather than psychological as Vance (1917:217) seems to suggest in his description of certitude as “a state of repose following upon our assent to the truth of a statement”. (There remains always the possibility that the certitude may be mistaken and I will return to that matter later in this Paper when discussing “naturalistic generalisation” as a warrant in Qualitative Methodology of Cases Research). To express that difference another way, I am contrasting the categories of “reasonableness” and “positivistic rationality” (Kinder 2007:55). And in that, it is being argued that it is important to move beyond the “version of reason bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment” (Kinder 2007:55). In brief I will be asserting the trustworthiness and rational warrant for practical action of the logic of induction, as a way that the human mind works.

It is useful to examine how case studies “work” in Medicine, partly for the insights gained, and partly because of the historical links the CPE Movement has had with Medicine, particularly in its early development, as pointed out in an earlier Paper (Paper Two) and again above. The

following subsection begins then with a short historical note around the long use of case studies in Medicine in Western society and the role of induction.

b) Case Studies in Medicine—historical insights

The prestigious American publication *The New England Journal of Medicine* carries a regular weekly feature “Case Records of the Massachusetts General Hospital”; that column was begun by Dr. Richard C. Cabot (1868–1939) (Dodds 1993:417). Cabot’s contribution has a twofold interest here. Not only was Cabot an important medical reformer during the Progressive Era (1890–1920) in the USA (Dodds 1993:417–22) who taught case study method at Harvard Medical School and at the Massachusetts General Hospital (Kenny 2003:3), but in 1922 Cabot had Anton T Boisen, (Hall 1992:7), soon to be the founder of CPE, among his students. Further, because of his subsequent involvement in the early days of the CPE movement, Cabot is considered to be among the founders of the Clinical Pastoral Education movement (Leas 2006:2). Boisen was to describe the case study approach he first learnt from Cabot, as learning from “living human documents” (Hall 1992:7), a popular aphorism still current in CPE as already noted. Accordingly, from a CPE perspective, it is instructive to reflect briefly on the long use of case studies in medicine.

It is interesting, and relevant to this inquiry, that it was Aristotle (385/4–322 BC), the son of Nichomachus, the personal physician of King Amyntas of Macedonia (Guthrie 1998:20) who introduced the then “(r)evolutionary study” of “the technique of orderly observation of particulars, scientifically pursued” (Jaeger 1962:336, 337). A little earlier, Hippocrates (469–399 BC) in the *De Epidemiis*, Books 1 & 111, the only Books certainly written by him, gave the history of the medical cases: “the clinical histories are confined to the march of the disease to a favourable or a fatal issue. Nothing irrelevant is mentioned, everything relevant is included” (Hippocrates 1948b:144). Francis Bacon (1561–1626) lamented the discontinuation of case studies by Hippocrates’ successors (Bacon 2002:211). Closer to our own times, Biomedicine in the Laboratory of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, between 1887 and 1920, made extensive use of case studies to advance Medical knowledge (Sturdy 2007). In the context of this present project, Sturdy’s proposal (2007) about the role of case studies in the production of scientific knowledge is of particular interest. An outline of that position now follows.

Sturdy begins with a review of the work of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh from its foundation in 1887 to 1920. Sturdy (2007:662) applies Star’s (1986:96–117) concept of

explanatory triangulation to the process of combining laboratory observations with the clinical. The focus is “an examination of the relationship between laboratory science and clinical medicine” in those years and specifically of scientific knowledge production (Sturdy 2008:660) of “clinical puzzle solving and the production of more generalised forms of biological knowledge” (Sturdy 2007:661). Using a “sociologically informed reading” of Kuhn (1970, 1977), Sturdy (2007:662) illustrates that, using “previously solved puzzles as exemplars for the solution of new problems” deemed to be typical cases, both the laboratory research and the clinical case contribute to the “the same basic process of knowledge production”. Through the comparative or contrasting narrative of “rare” and “interesting” or “unusual” cases, a new narrative is articulated “to provide a single account of the case” (Sturdy 2007:667), and with that, a “new view of the case” is generated (Sturdy 2007:671). Three examples from the medical history of the Edinburgh Laboratory in the period under consideration illustrate my point: the characterisation of what became known as “multiple sclerosis” (Sturdy 2007:670) and the transmission of the bovine tubercle bacillus to humans through the drinking of milk from infected cows (Sturdy 2007:671–2), and the role of the spleen in “the constitution of the blood” in the disease of pernicious anaemia (Sturdy 2007:673–5). It was an intellectual task that was an hermeneutic working whereby the collectivity of cases produced new scientific knowledge. It became an instance of what Kuhn (1970:189–90; 1977:298) designated as an exemplar, as Sturdy argued.

Sturdy’s comments to that epistemic process, warrant an extended quotation:

(s)cientific knowledge, on this view, is knowledge of cases—specifically, of exemplary cases of scientific puzzle-solving—while the generation of new scientific knowledge proceeds on a case-by-case, working from solved to unsolved puzzles ... Such judgement is not simply a matter of deductive reasoning from general principles to specific instantiations of those principles. Rather it depends upon a holistic appraisal of the current and previous puzzle situations, on reasonable analogy, and on the creative and imaginative construal of relevant dimensions of similarity between them ... Scientific categories are thus matters of family resemblance, not logical identity (Sturdy 2007:676–7).

But I note that Sturdy does not explain how such cases are “scientific” when the logic used is not deductive, as in mathematics, or evidence-based Science, established through Quantitative Research Methodology. My contention throughout this portfolio is that the logic of inference to the best explanation can be used with confidence following the warrant established by Harman

(1988). Relevant to that, one observes the increased interest in “mixed methodology”, quantitative and qualitative, in educational research. My contention is that it is a question of “both and”, rather than “either or”, when weighing up the epistemic warrants of inductive or deductive logic. Accordingly, a concept of education may legitimately use both approaches in articulating an educational and formative adult programme. While Sturdy’s observations are to “the increasingly complex integration of technical and epistemic practices that characterise modern biomedicine” (Sturdy 2007:681), it is reasonable to draw a similar conclusion around the cases reported by students in their Verbata brought to supervision, in the context of Clinical Pastoral Education.

Accordingly, it is evident that the purpose of the medical case studies is twofold. First it allows the comparison or the contrast of similar cases, and also of extreme cases, within the same family of cases, so that the Medical Practitioner has a richer understanding of a disease and its progress when treated with specific medication. It has the stamp of “Qualitative” research on the one hand, yet at the same time it may provide grounds for proposing a hypothesis for testing by Quantitative research. In the terminology of C.S. Peirce (1839–1914), it is then a process of “abduction”, literally, a “leading from”, which is distinct from deduction or induction, but “abduction” does not render unwarranted the knowledge gained through the inductive process. The work at the Edinburgh Laboratory, Sturdy contends, illustrates the role of cases in the construction of knowledge; “yet the [knowledge] judgements are open to revision” (Sturdy 2007:679), depending upon the “disciplinary matrix” (Kuhn 1970:181–7) in which the particular paradigmatic community evaluated and employed their chosen exemplars (Sturdy 2007:685, n. 21).

c) Inductive logic

Sturdy’s analysis carries a similarity to Aristotle’s description of the “ascent from sense-particulars to universal concepts” (Ross 1960:55), what Aristotle names “induction”. In *The Metaphysics* Aristotle argues:

(n)ow the circumstances in which a skill arises are that from the many cases of thinking in experience a single general assumption is formed in connection with similar things. For instance, to have the assumption that when Callias is ill with such and such a disease such and such a medicine is appropriate and similarly for Socrates and for many others individually is a matter of experience. But the knowledge that for all such people, defined by species, when ill with such and

such a disease, such and such a medicine is beneficial belongs to a skill (Aristotle 1998. 981a. Trans. Lawson-Tancred:4–5).

The formation of such judgements belongs to experience (*empeiria*) (Ross 1960:55, n. 30). In brief, it is a matter not of *deduction*, but *induction*, and it is reasonable to act on such a warrant in the particular concrete instance. As Aristotle comments further in *The Metaphysics*:

(h)owever in regard to practice, experience is not thought to be different at all from skill. In fact, we rather observe those with experience being practically successful than those who, without experience, have a theoretical understanding. This is because, experience is the knowledge of particulars and skill that of universals, and practical actions, like all occurrences, are concerned with particulars (Aristotle 981a. 15. Trans. Lawson-Tancred 1998:5).

Induction and syllogism lie at opposite ends of the reasoning process's continuum. As Guthrie (1998d:187) notes, for Aristotle, the characteristics of induction and syllogism are different:

(i)n comparison with syllogism, or deduction, Aristotle notes as general characteristics of induction that it is more persuasive and clear, more easily learned through the senses, and more readily available to the mass of men; the syllogism is more compelling and more efficacious against contentious people.

The knowledge gained from induction remains always revisable, but it is sufficient for the Agent to be acting according to reason. Perfect induction is possible only after “every relevant individual has been examined” (Guthrie 1998d:188).

When it comes to scientific knowledge, Aristotle contended that the intellectual disposition called *nous* acted as a kind of intuition, and is “the original source (*arche*) of scientific knowledge” (*An. Post.* 88b36).

By its means, after examining a number of particular specimens or cases we can say we know that there is a common form or universal law underlying them which will hold good for all unexamined instances of the same kind. The close association of *nous*, form and causation constitutes Aristotle's justification for claiming that future instances will resemble the already known, an assumption commonly made by scientists and by others in everyday thinking (Guthrie 1998d:192).

Aristotle's explanation provided the epistemic warrant for Sturdy's (2007) account of the growth of medical knowledge through the Edinburgh Laboratory. I will return to this Aristotelian position, when discussing the "naturalistic" generalisability of case studies in Qualitative

Research shortly. But before leaving the present discussion, further insight is needed into the epistemic warrant to “generalise” from the specific research as applied to concrete individuals, and I will return to that topic shortly.

From another angle, the honing of *phronesis/prudentia*/illative sense can be described as a habit developed by the Agent or extended in a different direction by their further experience (*empeiria*). I will develop this insight when I discuss the warrant for the “generalizability” of case studies as an ethnographic design found in Qualitative Research. It is sufficient here to note that possibility. So, I turn now to case studies in Qualitative Research for further epistemological and educational insight into the student’s Verbatim that is brought to Supervision in the CPE Course Units.

I am arguing that the rational warrant underlying case studies is sufficient grounds for including case studies among the rational strategies of action learning and action research which, then, will be integrated into the proposed philosophical concept of education. In that way I will outline a more nuanced concept of education for CPE practice, based upon common practice in the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education Inc.

I have already argued in this paper and will develop further in the next chapter, that it is through experiential learning the student hones his/her illative sense in the concrete particularity of the Pastoral visit to the patient. The honing of the *phronesis/prudentia/Illative Sense* effects a wisdom that cannot be taught to the student Chaplain; such is the desired outcome which is effected through a process of reflexivity outside the usual teacher-learner relationship. The concept of “reflexivity” requires closer examination. While there is no agreed definition of “reflexivity” in the literature (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008:168), I will be following Alvesson and Skoldberg’s (2000:5) description which sees “reflexivity” as being alert to “the way different kinds of linguistic, social, ... and theoretical elements are woven together in the process of knowledge development, during which empirical material is constructed, interpreted and written”.

A similar view is held by Richards (2008:197) who emphasises that reflexivity is “more than reflective”; and reflexivity seeks to

question the taken-for-granted knowledge they [researchers] take into a study and the many ways they [the taken-for-granted knowledge] influence what they [researchers] record as data ...

preconceptions ... interpretations ... [and] to tell honestly this multilayered interpretation (Richards 2008:197; cf. 51,178,188,190).

In brief, it is paying attention to “the baggage” one takes into the conversation (Richards 2008:42). I note that Cohen et al. (2001:25) and Creswell (2002:50, 274) use different language to express the same idea. The student’s Verbatim clearly seeks to reflect that process as it records the pastoral conversation, both holistically and accurately, and to reflect on the theological, psychological and sociological themes in that conversation both for the Chaplain and for the person visited. At the same time I am assuming that the issues of the Chaplain’s identity or issues relating to the use of power, or the role of boundaries, are first and foremost issues relating to the supervisory process and the observance of professional ethics in the pastoral relationship, rather than the use of radical reflexivity. I will clarify that when discussing radical reflexivity later in this Paper.

I turn now to look more closely at Qualitative Research Methodologies for case studies and action research for insights useful for a proposed philosophical concept for CPE education. I will then consider at greater length the concept of radical reflexivity and integrate that to further the conceptual richness. I will be reflecting upon actual practice as the grounding for my reflection, though not developing “grounded theory” for a philosophy of education for the CPE professional education and formation. Clearly, I am assuming that the existing custom and practice is effective education; I have not located any relevant empirical research in English; and the warrant for the assumption lies in the widespread use of CPE for training Chaplains in the Americas, Australia and the United Kingdom. Advertisements for Chaplains for pastoral care in hospitals, centres for aged care and jails in Australia, normally require at least one CPE Unit if an application is to be considered. Accordingly one may assume that employing authorities in both the Private and the Public sector deem the CPE Unit(s) to be a professional formation that can be effective education and formation. I say “can”, because no educational organisation can guarantee that its graduates automatically command the level of knowledge sought and still less, that the graduate is a “wise practitioner” in that discipline. In brief, the position favoured here enjoys a *prima facie* plausibility. The focus of my inquiry is the epistemic warrant for such practices in an educational context.

d) Insights from Case Studies in Qualitative Research

In this section I turn to consider insights that Qualitative Research can offer for a philosophy of

Clinical Pastoral Education. Throughout this Portfolio I have argued that the CPE student's educational project is to hone his/her practical wisdom in the concrete situation of the professional practice of Pastoral Care and I will be examining the concept of educating the "wise practitioner" at greater length in Paper Six. While the context of Pastoral Care practice is not confined to a hospital setting, it is that context that I am addressing and which is the usual context in which CPE programmes are taught. The educational experience is aimed at wise practice in the particular. That would exclude the development of a grounded theory of Chaplaincy Care, though an individual might seek to generalise his/her experience into a paradigm for others. The focus of the educational project, I have been stressing, is turning the student into a "wise practitioner" and for that reason, I will not be examining Grounded Theory (Bryant & Chamatz 2008; Suddaby 2006) for possible insights, even though Babbie (2007:293) designates Grounded Theory among the "paradigms" of Qualitative Research.

The student's CPE Verbatim has elements of Qualitative Research designated "Naturalism" (Babbie 2008:293) because it presumes that the student's Verbatim of the pastoral visit is both accurate and comprehensive in its reporting. The Verbatim also seeks to chart the Chaplain's perception of the pastoral visit, in the views, including the "initial hunches and frames of reference" (Sigglekow 2007:21), she or he brings to the visit, their impact, verbal and non-verbal, during the visit, and in his or her reflections upon the visit in writing up the Verbatim account for the supervisory process. The supervisory process, be it individual or group supervision, also contributes to the Chaplain's understanding of that encounter and shapes the Chaplain's views as she or he meets up again with that hospital patient as a Pastoral Carer from his or her Church. The educational process is dynamic, and that is highlighted in the student's self-assessment and the Supervisor's evaluation that is part of the CPE process—which will be considered briefly towards the end of this Paper. For those reasons then, this section will be focussing upon two other methodologies in Qualitative Research: firstly Case Studies, and then Action Research.

The Verbatim as an educational Case Study

It is relevant to recall once more that CPE practice involves both the single meeting narrative for the process of Supervision, and occasionally, as a case study of a particular patient during their extended stay in the hospital. The focus of attention is twofold, firstly, the Chaplain's interaction with the patient in the bedside conversation where attentive listening is the primary strategy of the Chaplain during his/her visit; and secondly, the changes in the patient's view of their present situation as evidence of the impact of that attentive listening, both in terms of mindset and in

terms of changes in behaviours. My focus here is the Verbatim of a single visit to a particular patient as the case study. Nonetheless, as will be shown in Paper Six when discussing Newman's views on probability and the phenomenology of the human mind illustrated through the analogies of the strength in a cable or a bundle of sticks, the human mind reaches a warranted certitude stronger than the single instance warrants. That phenomenology of the mind illustrates the rational impact of experience in generating trustworthy knowledge that enriches the professional understanding of the Chaplain. My focus here though, is the beginning of the educational process and so I turn to consider the warrant for the educational use of the case study.

The attention behind the visit selected for the Verbatim, or that particular case study, can range from its being a critical incident warranting closer attention, an occasion that causes unease for the Chaplain, either at the time of or after the visit, to the need to bring an example of their recent practice to Supervision so that she or he can reflect professionally on his or her pastoral practice. In that, the CPE case study falls within Siggelkow's taxonomy (2007) of an interesting example, or again, a representative sample of a certain type of patient and their spiritual needs, or yet again, an example of the Chaplain's professional work in the institution. In that way, the case (Verbatim) provides "motivation, inspiration, and illustration" (Siggelkow 2007:21) for the adult student, and for his or her peers; for the Supervisor taking the training group it provides illustration of the student's progress, and occasionally of curriculum gaps in the student's background warranting supplementary didactic input for improved professional practice as a Chaplain.

e) Epistemological warrant for the use of the Case Study

I turn now to consider the epistemological advantages in considering the "case study" approach. In the first place, it provides, in Geertz's (1973) phrase, a "thick" description of the patient's spiritual and religious values of their world at that time because it recognises the importance of both the context and the actors. I distinguish "spiritual" from "religious", using "religious" to designate values reflecting the patient's denominational allegiance, and "spiritual" as descriptive of general humanistic human values. In practice, there may be an overlap, but the distinction is useful for greater conceptual clarity. Further, the encounter and the subsequent reflection on that encounter, shapes the Chaplain's expectations of and moulds his/her attitude towards future pastoral encounters both with that Patient along with others. Smith's (1978) observation, in that

context, is suggestive: “(i)t is intuition that persuades both the researcher and the reader that what is known about one case may very well be true about a similar case” (Smith 1978; cited in Skate 2005:254).

That raises the epistemological question of what is the warrant for such generalisation and how trustworthy is it. A hunch or intuition is certainly an intellectual activity that may end in a provisional judgement; so it becomes important to consider the intellectual warrant for responsible action based on that warrant if relativism is to be avoided and the ethical behaviour of the agent upheld as responsible. Two proposals will be reviewed, namely the proposals of “naturalistic generalisation”, and abduction or inference to the best explanation. Those proposals will be considered in that order. The third proposal, the logic of induction has already been earlier in this Paper.

i. Naturalistic Generalisation

This proposal begins with the phenomenological observation that the human mind does make generalisation after the experience of a small number of cases. It is firstly a response because life is for action, and living does not always allow the time needed for extended studies using accepted scientific procedure; human beings accept such judgements as warranted and responsible. At times the case study is a process; at times it is a structure for the process and in that sense is a product. This, both the process and the product, referred to in the literature, as “naturalistic generalisation”, is a term popularised by Skate and Turnbull (1978). Skate (2005:444) notes that the terms “case” and “study” do not enjoy a widely accepted definition; further, “case study” refers both to a “process” or methodology and to an outcome, a “product”. Gerring’s definition of “case study”, while developed for the context of Political Science studies is an adequate beginning for the present purpose. Gerring (2004:341) proposes that a case study “is best defined as an in-depth single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomenon”. Nonetheless, Gerring’s definition needs to be extended to include the extreme case which can be quite instructive for the growth of professional knowledge.

While the CPE student’s Verbatim is not a scholar’s report, it is an in-depth single unit and bounded phenomenon, a report of one limited visit to a patient. The focus of a case study is to probe its “particularity” (Skate 2005:447), but while the study is concerned with the particular,

there is a tension in the mind of the researcher and reader between the particulars recorded and an instinct to generalise (Stake 2005:447–8) and that is over and above the richness of the description, which, in itself, is a worthwhile advance in knowledge and understanding, providing the necessary context for the reader. Thus Weick contends that the value of “richness” lies in part in that it “restrains hubris”, the rush to conclusion that side-steps the complexity of the situation, a crucial dimension of the case study:

it is an argument for a larger point. It is an argument for detail, for thoroughness, for prototypical narratives, and an argument against formulations that strip out most of what matters. It is an argument that the power of richness lies in the fact that it feeds on itself in ways that enlarge our understanding of the human condition (Weick 2007:18).

Accordingly, it has special relevance to a Chaplaincy situation recorded in the student’s Verbatim of the visit to this particular patient.

Flyvbjerg (2006) examined five common misunderstandings relating to case study research, and these need to be noted at this point of my argument. Flyvbjerg nominated five oversimplifications or misunderstandings; they are:

1. theoretical, context-independent knowledge is to be preferred to practical, concrete context-dependent knowledge;
2. one cannot generalise on the basis of an individual instance;
3. case studies are useful for generating only hypotheses;
4. case studies carry a bias towards verifying the researcher’s preconceived ideas; and
5. it is difficult to summarise or generalise on the basis of specific cases.

Flyvbjerg responded to those misunderstandings by beginning with acknowledging the influence on his thought, the long experience of professional education at Harvard University where the “fluid performance of tacit skills” is beyond “rule-governed rationality” ensuring that the adult learner has achieved “virtuosity and true expertise” in their profession (Flyvbjerg 2006:222–3). Student CPE Verbata clearly aim to fit such situations. Further, useful knowledge is generated from case studies and Flyvbjerg instances Galileo’s experiments around Aristotle’s view of the rate of a falling object and its relationship to its weight. Nonetheless, one single example of falsification undermines any possibility of generalisation for that particular case; so one single example of a white swan undermines an Australian’s assertion or generalisation from his/her

experience that “all swans are black”; the appropriate generalisation from the Australian’s experience is that “some swans are black”. A greater care around the selection and type of case study improves the generalisability of case studies; for instance, the situation is very different when the particular case is an extreme example, or again, a critical case, or yet again, a paradigmatic case, or even a mixture of all three. The issue of the possibility of subjective bias stands, but that type of bias is not confined to Qualitative Research (Flyvbjerg 2001:83). Qualitative case study/research is particularly open to falsification. And because of the richness of the case study detail, the tendency to summarise the narrative is unhelpful in that it bleaches out the richness in the description of the case, and it is that richness which generates new knowledge about the particular case.

A problem still remains to be addressed, namely, the articulation of an epistemological warrant for knowledge generated by the case study. Lincoln and Guba (1979) contended that, in the words of the title of their article, “the only generalisation is that there is no generalisation”, but they add: “(n)evertheless we may take some comfort from Peircean principles of abduction (retroduction) in asserting that we may come to discover” (Lincoln and Guba 1979: in Guba et al. 2006:43). (I will return to discuss Peirce’s concept of “abduction” below.) Donmoyer (1990) also speaks of the problematic of generalisation; a less constricted sense of “generalisability” is needed for applied fields such as education and social work arguing for an application of the Piagetian concepts of assimilation, accommodation, integration and differentiation from Schema theory. There, the role of the research is to expand “cognitive structures” rather than generalizability or transferability of knowledge. Schofield (1990) favoured an approach based on using Boolean algebra, the algebra of sets and logic. Grom et al (2006) argue that “reasonably sure generalisations can be posited from case studies, after following the ‘appropriate precautions’”. Moreover Bent Flyvbjerg developed a warrant for generalisation from case studies that demands closer inspection.

Flyvbjerg (2001:66 ff.) notes the power of example in generating human knowledge. Aristotle rejected Plato’s views of the unhelpful nature of the case study (Flyvbjerg 2001:69–71) and emphasised the role of *phronesis* in the concrete and the particular. That becomes particularly important in the case of professional knowledge. “Context-dependent knowledge is at the very heart of expert activity” (Flyvbjerg 2001:71), and that is contrary to views expressed by Plato in the *Meno* (72–74a. Trans. Guthrie 1972:118–9) and the *Euthyphro* (15. Trans. Lindsay 1930:318–9), where Plato gave preference to a Mathematical model of knowledge generation

(Flyvbjerg 2001:70).

Ruddin (2006) following Flyvbjerg (2001), maintains that the case study, when well done, does provide “trustworthy information” (Ruddin 2006:799); case law is a good instance of that (Ruddin 2006:805–7), along with the “current spate of case studies” that have been published (Ruddin 2006:798). So, Ruddin (2006:807) pleads for “the construct[ion] of archives [for] the [social science] cases parallel to those of legal system”.

In the context of the CPE full training programme of four Units, the experience of some one hundred and twenty Verbata of the student’s own professional work, along with a third of that number from others in the training group delivered in the group sessions, the individual student would experience such a case archive. Moreover, it would be of use for the State College of CPE to publish useful Verbata in their own Journal along with the existing practice of presenting Verbata at Joint Study Days sponsored by the College. The inference from a detailed analysis of a single inference can be justified either by using the inference to the best explanation, or compatible with that, Bayesianism. The issue of trusting the researcher’s honesty remains and that matter is addressed in Paper Three in the discussion of ‘rhetoric’.

Useful too, is Thacher’s (2006) view of the “normative case study” where the focus is upon public values.

Each of us in our personal and professional lives must arrive at some view, however tentative and revisable, about how we should understand our ideals and obligations—about the ends we should pursue and the duties we should observe (Thacher 2006: 1637).

There the “normative case study” has a special role since it “rests on the assumption that we can make better judgements by reflecting upon actual cases, and indeed that such action is indispensable for ethical growth” (Thacher 2006:1637).

And, following Thacher (2006:1665), one can suggest that the CPE Verbatim enjoys that very role; accordingly it is appropriate to designate it as one example of a normative case study within the CPE professional education. Thick ethical concepts develop out of the normative case studies of the CPE Units and thereby shape the ministerial identity of the student Chaplain.

So far, I have reviewed the discussions around Stake and Trumball’s (1982) and Stake’s (2005:454) “naturalistic generalisations” in which “people make generalisations entirely from

personal or vicarious experience. Enduring meanings come from encounter, and they are modified and reinforced by repeated encounter”.

The epistemological warrant for such generalisations is best explained by a logic of induction, drawing upon the work of Aristotle on the role of *phronesis* in human knowing, “phronetic knowledge”, along with Aristotelean commentators such as Aquinas and Newman. I have noted Flyvbjerg’s reference to Aristotle in this Paper, and will elaborate at some length those views of Aristotle, Aquinas and Newman in Paper Six in this Portfolio. I turn now to consider the concept of abduction or inference to the best explanation as an alternative epistemological justification.

ii. Abduction, inference to the best explanation

Evers and Wu (2006) offer a different epistemological justification drawing upon the concept of “abduction”, an inference to the best explanation, a view of probable or plausible reasoning common in everyday life (Walton 2004:2–5), as developed by the American Pragmatist, Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914). Peirce’s own brief comment, quoted by Walton (2004:7), clarifies the difference between induction, deduction and abduction. “Deduction proves that something *must* be; Induction shows that something *actually* is operative; and abduction merely suggests that something *may* be” (Peirce 1965:106; author’s emphasis).

In the abductive process “reasoning, hypothesis generation, criticism and acceptance all occur together” (Evers and Wu 2006:519). But Peirce’s proposal does not explain the epistemic warrant for the *certitude* of that judgement, or for the transferability of the knowledge generated in the single case study. It is relevant in the present argument, that later Peirce abandoned his attempt to offer a formal characterisation of valid

inductive and abductive inferences ... Peirce was led to modify the way he classified inferences as deductive, inductive and abductive and to do so in methodological rather than formal terms (Levi 1997:52).

For Peirce

the abductive argument is predictive in character. That is to say, it formulates an hypothesis from observed facts and deduces what should be the case if the hypothesis be true. And we can test that prediction (Copleston 1966d:310).

While Peirce originated the term “abduction”, others have developed the concept further. Thus Walton (2004) has shown how abductive inference is used in medicine, science and law; further Walton illustrates the use of abductive inference as a heuristic search process (Walton 2004:272). That takes me beyond my present concern, which is to examine the epistemological

warrant for generalisation from a particular instance.

I am contending that Aristotle's phronesiology, as developed by later commentators, provides an explanation that carries greater conviction and offers a warrant for certitude in the Agent while conceding that the trait of certainty does not follow for the proposition, a distinction which will be discussed in Paper Six.

iii. Radical reflexivity methodology in the case studies/Verbata

Before leaving this section comment is warranted upon the reflexive methodology needed as part of the case studies in the Verbatim. Leary (2007:80–2) has noted, that reflexivity methodology provides a useful tool for ensuring the trustworthiness of the case study.

Radical reflexivity refers to awareness of self-awareness (Taylor 1977) that may refer, in the present context, to either the Chaplain offering pastoral care (cf. Leary 2010) or to its recipient (cf. Rennie 2007). As Finlay (2002:532) has noted:

(r)eflexivity analysis ... encompasses continual evaluation of subjective responses, intersubjective responses, intersubjective dynamics, and the research process itself. It involves a shift in our understanding of data collection from something that is objective that is accomplished through detached scrutiny of 'What I know and how I know it' to recognising how we actively construct our knowledge.

There are two defining characteristics in the approach: "careful interpretation and reflection" (Alvesson & Skoldberg 2005: 5). Such reflexivity has a crucial role in the pastoral encounter where ethical issues are at play, and related to that, the observance of the professional boundaries therein. In the CPE programmes in question the process of supervision, both individual and group, draws on radical reflexivity continually. Besides focussing on the ethical use of power in the pastoral relationship, such radical reflexivity also effects the constructing of knowledge relating to the pastoral encounter which is my present concern. Those matters need to be differentiated both in theory and in practice, something Leary (2010) fails to do clearly and which confuses the matters in his research project, though in his actual dissertation, Leary (2007:327) commented:

(g)ood clinical and research supervision is required for such a potentially highly charged set of encounters [discussed in the Dissertation]. This is particularly the case if the research is new to a field of inquiry that is bound with emotional and psychological intensity.

In terms of the educational process being discussed here, the skill of radical reflexivity plays an ongoing role in the student's professional life, particularly if good professional supervision is not readily available, a frequent situation in rural areas.

iv. Application of insights from “case studies” to CPE Verbata

To summarise, the Verbatim or Pastoral Case Studies of the CPE Programme provide worthwhile knowledge for the adult student of the CPE programme. While the epistemological warrant tends to be assumed rather than articulated in current CPE programmes, a broadly Aristotelean view, such as that articulated throughout this Portfolio, provides solid epistemological warrant for the practice in an educational context of professional education. Moreover radical reflexivity is crucial both as a teaching tool in professional practice, and as the style of the wise practitioner.

But CPE consists of an extended experience over time while the adult student learns in the context of pastoral practice, such as visiting patients at the bedside in a hospital setting. Therefore, it will be useful to examine what insights Action Research or Action Learning can offer. So, I turn now to consider Action Research and its insights, using the phrase “Action Research” in a generalised sense.

4. Insights from Action Research in Qualitative Research Methodology

According to Reason & Bradbury (2008:2) action research is

about working towards practical outcomes, and also about creating new forms of understanding, since action without understanding is blind, just as theory without action is meaningless ... Since action research starts with everyday experience and is concerned with the development of living knowledge, in many ways the process of inquiry is as important as the specific outcomes. (Reason & Bradbury 2008:2).

Coghlan & Brannick (2007:3–4) suggest that several broad trends are found in action research:

- research in action, rather than research about action;
- a collaborative democratic partnership;
- concurrent with action; and
- a sequence of events and an approach to problem solving.

It is a single process utilising twin aims “to improve some aspect of society, as well as generate knowledge through a single process” (Hughes 2001:1). The origins of action research are unclear (Masters 2001:1; Reason & Bradbury 2008:3), though its practice, even if not so named, has had a long history. It was Kurt Lewin, in the 1940s, who first articulated a theory of action research (Masters 2001:1) as “proceeding in a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of planning, action and the evaluation of the result of action” (Kemmis & McTaggart 1988:8).

Kemmis (2009:463; author’s emphasis) comments that “(a)ction research aims at changing three things: practitioners’ *practices*, their *understandings* of their practices, and the *conditions* in which they practise”. I note that the CPE Verbatim focusses upon the Chaplain’s practices, the Chaplain’s understanding of those practices and is alert to the context (physical, emotional and psychological) in which the pastoral encounter takes place. For that reason, I contend that the CPE Verbatim provides a good example of action research in use.

Action research has been applied across a wide range of disciplines, from business and organisational settings (Coglan & Brannick 2007, Dehler & Edmonds 2006, Dewar & Sharp 2006, Grant 2007, Raelin & Coghlan 2006), to school education (Elliot 1978, Elliot 1993), higher education (Dick 2002, Levin & Martin 2007, Newton & Goodman. 2009, Zeichner & Liston 1987), and social research (McTaggart 1994), including even as a tool for understanding spiritual guidance (Coghlan 2004, 2005). My examples are by no means exhaustive, but they do illustrate the wide range of disciplines where action research has been used.

In summary, action research describes well both the writing up of the Chaplain’s Verbatim and the reflection that is part of that, along with the experience of his/her peers in the context of Group Supervision. The initial meeting(s) between Chaplain and patient usually has a twofold purpose: first the development of trust between patient and Chaplain that is foundational in effective ongoing pastoral encounter, and second, for the Chaplain to make a preliminary assessment of the patient’s religious and spiritual needs which shapes her or his ongoing response. Some sense of those matters is made through the student’s Verbatim and following discussion with the Supervisors where some follow-up plan for future action is examined for the next pastoral encounter at the bedside. There follows another Verbatim and so the longitudinal process unfolds in the process of the pastoral care visits. The “research” dimension implies an articulated question which may be behind the conversational strategy of the Chaplain; Action Learning implies a different purpose and could apply to the overall purpose of the pastoral

experience of the student Chaplain, and as “action learning” it is “an educative process” (Raelin & Coghlan 2006:685). I have focussed rather upon Action Research methodology as my concern is the outcome, namely the development of the “wise practitioner”, a matter which will be examined more closely in Paper Six. An Action Research approach provides a useful insight for an effective integration of theory and practice (Brydon-Miller et al. 2003:15). And as Kurt Lewin observed half a century ago, “there is nothing so practical as a good theory” (Lewin 1951:169).

Winter (2006:14) notes that “action research provides the necessary link between self-evaluation and professional development”. The Action Research, that underpins the CPE student’s Verbatim and the forms of reflection in it, combines those very traits. Accordingly Action Research plays an important educative role in the CPE programmes through the Verbatim. It is that which may generate the transformative (Mezirow 1991) dimension of the educative experience for the CPE student; further, because it is transformative educational experience, it necessarily entails its having an emancipatory dimension, something that some authors argue is an essential element of some forms of action research. The emancipatory dimension has not been discussed here because in the present context the transformative dimension, becoming the “wise practitioner” subsumes that emancipatory dimension. Further, because my focus has been on the adult being educated and of set purpose, I have not considered the possible role of “action science” (Friedman 2008) in the NSW College of CPE or its accredited teaching Centers. The constraints of time and space preclude an examination of that important dimension here.

5. Conclusion

This Paper has argued that the use of the student’s Verbata in CPE is an educational tactic that is part of the rhetorical strategy of initiating the student into the worthwhile traditions that inform CPE. Insights from case reasoning on the one hand, and on the other, from case studies of Quantitative Methodology allow a deeper appreciation of the educational tactic within that rhetorical strategy. Action research and action learning provided further insight into the process and the product of CPE education. In the next Paper (Paper Six) I will discuss the educating of the wise practitioner and integrate the insights of this paper (Paper Five) into the expanding concept of education for a CPE context.

Paper 6: Educating the Wise Practitioner

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Paper 6: Educating the Wise Practitioner

Introduction

In the previous Papers I have outlined a concept of education that aims to be congruent with CPE custom and practice. In brief, it was contended that the CPE programme was an initiation into the worthwhile traditions of Liberal Education, of a Christian Denominational care, and of the Clinical Pastoral Education Movement as observed in New South Wales. While acknowledging that sometimes CPE programmes are run for persons who have not completed a graduate degree at a tertiary college, I am seeking to develop a concept of education which articulates the postgraduate experience as the norm. Accordingly, the fourth Paper proposed that the essential component of tertiary liberal education is the well trained mind, focussing on the imperial intellect, and the enlargement or illumination of the mind.

The focus of this Paper is the educating in practice, the “how”, as opposed to the “what” and the “why”. My third Paper argued that the educational process was an initiation into a worthwhile tradition; further, that the strategy used in that process, is essentially rhetorical, and specifically by using twin, inter-related rhetorics, a rhetoric of identification and a rhetoric of invitation. In this Paper I propose that the Verbatim practice of CPE, the student’s recording of the pastoral conversation and the critical reflection upon it, theologically, psychologically and sociologically, is an educational tactic whose desired educational outcome is “the wise practitioner”.

My argument here falls into three unequal parts. I begin by considering the educational process of the educational formation of the wise practitioner and those practices to effect that as developed at the University of Harvard in its Schools of Business and Medicine. (I examined the insights that can be drawn from the use of case studies in Qualitative Research in Paper Five because the immediate focus in the CPE programme is not on gaining more knowledge about patients and their behaviours, but rather, the developing, or the honing, of the professional skills of the hospital Chaplain, that is, teaching the “know-how” of that profession.) The key attribute for the “wise practitioner”, it will be proposed, is that of wisdom of the professional practitioner in the particular, practical, concrete situation. I begin by drawing on Aristotle’s understanding of “practical wisdom”, *phronesis*, extended further through the insights of Aquinas as an Aristotelean commentator, and note the limitations of the Aristotelean concept for the situation being discussed, and then integrate Newman’s understanding of the “illative sense”, also from within that broad Aristotelean perspective, to suggest that intellectual virtue being “honed” in the

wise practitioner can be nominated as being *phronesis* (Aristotle), or *prudentia* (Aquinas) or *the illative sense* (Newman). Using Aquino's development of Newman's illative sense, I will show that the educational process in developing *the illative sense* occurs within communities of informed judgment. The community dimension of the epistemological position proposed will be developed further drawing upon John Macmurray's Gifford Lectures on the self as both agent and as a person-in-relation.

Finally, in this present Paper, the tactic of developing the "wise practitioner", which is effected through the student's Verbatim or accurate written record of the Chaplain's conversation with the patient, will be situated in a psycho-social context drawing upon Vygotsky's construct of the "zone of proximal development", and Myerhoff's definitional ceremonies and the mechanism of re-membering in those ways enabling the student to construct the identities relevant to his/her own role as Chaplain.

The outcome will be that the CPE custom and practice of the Verbatim, itself inherently reflexive, will be presented as the tactic whereby the Wise Practitioner is formed and educated. I start by considering the education and formation of the wise practitioner.

1. The shaping of well-informed practitioners who can use their professional knowledge in the concrete, particular setting

I begin by noting the difference between a "skill" and an "art". Skill is exercised by the craftsman. "A craftsman takes pride in his work. He takes pleasure in a thing well done; and others respect him for his skill" (Casey 1992:148).

The value of the skill comes from applying the appropriate *rules* in its social setting (Casey 1992:150). Most arts involve the application of certain skills, but the "characteristic of an art [is] ... that one cannot possess or master it just by applying rules" (Casey 1992:151). And Casey exemplifies his point from the instance of the medical doctor who excels in his diagnostic art, something no machine can mirror. More is needed, as the following extended quotation from Casey (1992:151–2) illustrates:

The good or great physician will possess all the scientific and medical knowledge that is necessary, but beyond that he will have a gift, a quality of insight, an art that cannot be captured by a set of rules, and cannot be taught except by a person of influence ... No one could learn to be a good physician from a book, but only by being the disciple of a good physician. The same applies—perhaps still more obviously—to becoming a great musician, rather than simply a skilful one.

Everybody knows that the art a great teacher passes onto his pupils cannot be captured by a set of written precepts, but is more like—indeed is—the passing on of a tradition, a practice.

Casey clinches his argument with the examples of the art of the successful cricket captain, the art of military generalship, and, of particular importance to my educational argument here, the art of politics, where “statesmanship” is distinguished from the “mere” politician. The art of politics “can only be learned retrospectively” (Casey 1992:152). That art includes the relevant skills, but those skills cannot be codified (Casey 1992:153). Casey goes on to argue that the practical wisdom “is not a skill in the sense that being able to tie up one’s shoe laces is a skill, it *is* like an art “ (Casey 1992:154; emphasis in original). It is an ability “to recognise” the right prudential principle of specific action, and where appropriate, in “combination with other principles”, to effect the right outcome; “good sense and intelligence” manifested in the agent’s action (Casey 1992: 146-7). Further, its focus is not the initial teaching but an ongoing process which involves reflection on the action of the Pastoral Carer, something discussed in Paper Five under Action Research and Action Learning and to which I will return in my final Paper.

In understanding that, the concept of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom, found in Aristotle’s writings and later thinkers influenced by him, offers deeper and richer insights into the purpose of the educational strategy considered here and its desired outcome. There are immediate implications for student assessment in such a view. Because it is an art and not a skill, it would seem to follow logically that there is no place for “competency assessment” favoured by some for the professions and vocational training (cf., Masters & McCurry 1990; Miller & Rutheford 1997; Andre & Hartfield 2007, Little 2010), and which some NSW CPE Centre Directors tend to favour, though they were stymied when it came to naming the “professional skills” being assessed in order to determine a student’s competency and the grading level of that competency. I will return to the matter of assessment briefly towards the end of this Paper, having argued the position that the educational task is the development of the “wise practitioner”. I turn now to the relevant Harvard University experience as developed over a century in its Schools of Medicine and Business. In both cases it is a postgraduate university programme; further, I have noted in my first Paper how the Verbatim practice used in CPE programmes was inspired by the medical postgraduate practicum at Harvard University.

I am presuming that the Chaplain or Pastoral Care Agent is, sociologically, a member of a “profession”. Wilensky (1964), commenting on the American scene of the early 1960s, noted a growing tendency to assert professional status for occupations beyond the “traditional model” of

professionalisation with the traits of exclusive skills and jurisdiction in that occupation, self-regulatory norms for the practice of the profession, stability of employment, and enjoyment of high public esteem. Fichter (1966:142–5) specifically nominates the “pastoral role” in his discussion of the sociology of Religion as a profession. Klegon (1978), while critical of the classical definition preferred to focus on the social meaning of the occupational tasks and the social consequences of professionalism. Within that framework, Chaplaincy and Pastoral Caring of the sick enjoys a certain family resemblance to allied health care professionals such as social workers and counsellors alongside of whom the hospital Chaplain works. Within Morrell’s categorization (2008), Chaplains and Pastoral Care providers in a hospital setting would be in a “secondary profession”, enjoying high social status within the community, involved in a highly skilled work, requiring professional qualifications and credentials if one is to gain entry to that field, having a control over their own knowledge base with technical knowledge, exerting social power dominating their field of expertise, and tending to be conservative before change. Morrell notes that the classical definition of a profession, already noted above, “while valid and useful, is also a somewhat fuzzy and deficient definition that requires some fine tuning” (Morrell 2008:4). Further, Andrew Greeley, a sociologist then lecturing at the University of Chicago while commenting to the culture of Roman Catholic Clergy as disclosed by professional surveys, does not hesitate to refer to that group as “professionals” and their being Agents of Pastoral Care is the ground for that description (Greeley 2004:86–99). Accordingly there is sufficient warrant, outside the historical adaptation of the professional postgraduate training model at Harvard University, to consider the education and formation of Chaplains and Pastoral Care givers, as a preparation for a profession usually achieved through the completion of a relevant Bachelor’s or Master’s Degree.

My argument is developed further from the insights of Dr Anttony Williams (1999), a Melbourne psychologist in private practice, who argued for the rehabilitation of the concept of “clinical wisdom” as a major goal of the supervisory process of forming psychotherapists.

The proposed goal for supervision is not ‘wisdom’ as such, but the development of ‘wise clinicians’, who may or may not be foolish as the rest of us in their private lives. As professionals, though, they know how to help clients with difficult and uncertain matters in their lives. (Williams 1999:27–8)

There is a similar aim in CPE and its supervisory process, namely, the goal of educating and forming the “wise” Chaplain or Pastoral Carer. Williams nominates four “factors” that are subsumed in that clinical wisdom:

1. **Theory:** richness of knowledge about life and its uncertainties; awareness of relativism associated with variations in values and life’s priorities;
2. **Procedural knowledge:** knowing how to help others;
3. **Insight:** an ability to ‘read’ persons and systems; and
4. **Judgement:** includes timing, ‘soundness’, inclusion of all relevant factors in coming to a decision or making an intervention (Williams 1999:27–8).

Williams follows Airlin (1990) in giving priority to the questions asked, rather than the solution found, when deciding if the label “wise” is warranted. Rather, I contend, one could argue that it is a question of both dimensions, of the quality of the question asked and the quality of the answer proffered; again, it is an issue of “both/and” , rather than “either/or” . My interest here is the epistemological issue, rather than Psychology research studies, (cf. Chandler & Holliday 1990; Dixon & Baltes 1986). So, I turn to discuss the Harvard model on which CPE is based; moreover, the Harvard experience had articulated a process involving the factors later mentioned by Williams, which forms the “wise practitioner” in a profession.

a) The Harvard experience

Charles I. Gragg (1940) described the Harvard Business School’s “case plan of teaching”; its purpose was to teach its graduates

to think purposefully ... to develop in students these qualities of understanding, judgement, and communication leading to action ... to accelerate the student’s ability to act in mature fashion under conditions of responsibility (Gragg 1940:1–3).

The learning was experiential. The teaching assumption grew out of the observation that

the mere act of listening to wise statements and sound advice does little for anyone. In the process of learning, the learner’s dynamic cooperation is required. Such cooperation from students does not arise automatically, however. It has to be provided for and continually encouraged (Gragg 1940:1).

Harvard’s solution was twofold: first, “the stumbling block of the ages”, was rejected, namely, that “it is possible by a simple process of *telling* to pass on knowledge in a useful form” (Gragg 1940:3; emphasis added); second, the students were deeply engaged in the learning process,

using their own insight and knowledge in the particular situation being addressed (Gragg 1940:3–4); moreover, students and teachers were involved in collaborative learning (Gragg 1940:5–6), important values which also carried a strong American (i.e. USA) patriotic resonance, partly in its reflection of John Dewey’s philosophy of education (Dewey 1966).

While “(n)o method is foolproof” (Gragg 1940:6), the outcomes of the approach have stood the test of time, something implied in the title of Gragg’s paper “Because wisdom can’t be told”. More recently Nichhani (2004) reported on his application of Gragg’s insights in the area of e-learning in an Australian context. Herreid (2005), on the other hand, confuses Gragg’s approach with Problem Based Learning (PBL), which is, rather, a teaching strategy seeking to engage student interest and has a clear knowledge component in a “reality” setting. While the CPE student Verbata share some of the traits of PBL, it is my strong contention that the Verbata have a different educational thrust. That thrust is different to that of PBL, since the former is seeking to hone the student’s wise application of abstract theory in the concrete particular situation. In brief, gaining the learner’s attention is one thing and, admittedly, is a crucial element in teaching. The educational outcome of a wise practitioner is a vastly different matter. The first is a teaching strategy; the latter is an educational outcome.

That raises the issue of the characteristics of “wisdom” that is the educational outcome of the Harvard “case system of instruction”. There the insights of Aristotle (384–322 BC), on practical wisdom and its characteristics, as extended by Aquinas (1225–74 AD) and Newman (1801–90 AD), can enlarge our understanding and provide clarification around what the tactic of the CPE Verbatim seeks as its educational outcome. That enlarged understanding takes us beyond the insights of Williams (1990) noted above. The view of each of those thinkers will be discussed in turn.

2. Practical Wisdom—a conversation with three thinkers

a) Practical Wisdom—*phronesis*—Aristotle

Aristotle’s term for practical wisdom is *phronesis*. Aristotle makes

a much sharper distinction than Plato ever did between the intellectual virtue of wisdom which governs ethical behaviour and intellectual virtue of understanding, which is expressed in scientific understanding and contemplation (Kenny 2004a:81).

Wisdom is defined as a ratiocinative excellence that ascertains the truth concerning what is good and bad for human beings (EN VI. 5. 1149b. Ross 1963:140). It is “wisdom of action, for action, in action ... a true *savoir faire*” (Comte-Sponville 2003:33). Aristotle’s master, Plato (427–347 BC) in the Socratic Dialogues

sometimes substituted *phronesis* (usually translated ‘wisdom’ or ‘good sense’) for *episteme* (knowledge) obviously with no change in meaning intended ... Both in Plato and elsewhere one must translate *phronesis* and *sophia* as either ‘knowledge’ or ‘wisdom’ according to the context. Plato uses this [sic] feature of Greek thought and language to further the thesis that virtue is knowledge (Guthrie 1975d:265).

The word “knowledge” here, has a different sense to the way we use the word today and that needs to be borne in mind when discussing Classical Greek thought.

Guthrie (1975d:265) goes on to note:

(t)he Greeks would have found it difficult to write an essay like [Bertrand] Russell’s on the difference between knowledge and wisdom, or a line like Tennyson’s ‘knowledge comes but wisdom lingers’ ... They knew the difference ... but could scarcely express it in those terms.

Accordingly, for conceptual clarity, I will be using the transliteration of Aristotle’s own terminology rather than use an English word that is, at best, only a rough equivalent. At the same time, I will not be reviewing the debate since 1990 on Aristotle’s meaning of *phronesis*. It is sufficient here to note Natali’s (2001:188) conclusion “(t)here is wide agreement among interpreters in characterising *phronesis* as practical knowledge”.

Further, Aristotle accepts that practical judgements, are “by and large valid” (Natali 2001:34); there is a solid confidence in the judgement, but there is no claim to infallibility. Moreover, the agent is both “rationally bent on acting well and achieving practical success” (Natali 2001:189). The possibility of error can arise under any one of four possibilities—in the reasoning or in the desire, which can be either correct or false, and in the matching of those possibilities (Natali 2001:109). I will be examining Aristotle’s discussion of the Practical Syllogism and the impact of the “weakness” of the will in my final Paper. Both topics are important, but are side issues to my present discussion.

Because *phronesis* has two elements, true reasoning and correct desire, Natali (2001:15) develops a useful “general map of human behaviour”:

1. true reasoning + correct desire: *phronesis*, good practical knowledge;
2. true reasoning + incorrect desire: *akrasia*, weakness of the will;
3. erroneous reasoning + correct desire: *kakia*, wickedness;
4. erroneous reasoning + incorrect desire: inability to act.

Moreover it is important to note that *Phronesis* “tends towards an end in an absolute sense” and so differs from *eupraxia* where “the object of production is useful to someone or something” (Natali 2001:20). *Phronesis* is “an habitual state of the intellect (or better, part of the intellect), but is also linked to a habitual state of desire” (Natali 2001:20). The outcome is knowledge that is “by and large” valid (Natali 2001:14).

Experience of life and the fact of having seen many things make one ready for practical knowledge and capable of making decisions ... precisely because they provide the individual with much knowledge of this type, which is generally valid (Natali 2001:34).

Analytically, since the concept of “wisdom” includes in its content “the concept of “acting well”, the aim of wisdom is given as being that of “behaving properly” or “acting nobly” (Natali 2001:180). For Aristotle, the focus for both virtue and *phronesis* is more knowing *how*, than knowing *that* (Graver 1994:132).

That habit of mind, the knowing *how*, allows an individual, at times, to skip premises of the practical syllogism as the Agent makes ethical decisions; it is “a true instinct determining between right and wrong”, as Newman (1964 [1893]:84) would put it later; or yet again, as Guthrie (1998:346) describes it:

an adult power of insight into practical matters, the outcome of an initial aptitude cultivated and developed by experience ... it can never offer the cast iron certainty of metaphysical truths. He who has attained it is the *phronimos*, and from him we must take our standards.

I note in passing that skipping also occurs in theoretical reasoning; thus it was not noticed until the Nineteenth Century that Euclid omitted an important axiom. The wisdom we are considering here is an intellectual virtue that differentiates action from impulse and heroes from hotheads (Compte-Sponville 2004: 43).

Aristotle’s language carries an intentional male and social-political bias because, reflecting the society he knew well, he excludes women and slaves from any possibility of being *phronimoi* (cf. Aristotle 1972 *The Politics* 1.2 [26–8]). While conceding that historical limitation in his thought on this matter, his insights are being accepted as warranted but are being interpreted here

in an inclusive sense. Further, I note in parenthesis, that my concern here is *phronesis* in the human animal; it is conceded, though, that Aristotle, and after him Aquinas, “ascribed to some non human animals [*phronesis*] in virtue of their foresight” (MacIntyre 1999:6); still, Aristotle was using the word *phronesis* for non-human animals in a different sense, as the Aristotelean commentator W. L. Newman noted (Newman 1973b:124, n.16).

I turn now to consider Aristotle’s understanding of *phronesis*, mainly as found in his mature work (Jaeger 1962:238), the *Nichomachean Ethics* (hereafter *EN*). An act is virtuous, contends Aristotle, only when it is deliberately chosen (*EN* 2.4. 1105a31 Ross 1963:34; *EN* 6.12. 1144a19, Trans. Ross 1963:156); any virtuous action involves a conscious act of choice (*prohairesis*). While commentators debate whether choice (*prohairesis*) refers only to choosing the means to one’s goal (Sorabji 1980:201–4), Sorabji argues that Aristotle’s concern is rather to emphasise the link with rationality and accordingly that it is legitimate to read *prohairesis* (choice) in a looser sense that the choice is a rational choice.

We need only remember that one can choose ends, so long as they are related to further ends, and that the relationship may be that of instance, manner, or part, as well as that of means (Sorabji 1980:204).

The deliberation is

not merely to particular goals but to the good life in general (*pros to eu zen holos* [*EN*] 6.5. 1140a 25–31) with a view to the best (*to ariston* [*EN*] 6.7. 1141b13; 6.12. 1144a32–33) or with a view to happiness (*eudaimonia* *Rhet.* 1366b20) (Sorabji 1980:205).

For Aristotle, then, *phronesis* involves deliberation, leading to choice, which in turn leads to action. The choice is rational and is linked with deliberation. “Practical wisdom, says Aristotle, is concerned with the practical syllogism, e.g. A is the end, B is the means, therefore B is to be done” (Copleston 1956a:344).

Or again, “*phronesis* determines the concrete means by which the good will be realised in the concrete situation” (Byrne 1997:174). Some people may know what is to be done, drawing upon their experience of life even though they may be unable to articulate the principles upon which their stance is based (cf. *EN* VI.7 1141b 14–22, Trans. Ross 1963:146). Although unarticulated, the process is implied in its being a human act and is “something analogous to the deliberation described in [*EN*] 3.3” (Sorabji 1980:205).

The very fact that *phronesis* issues an order to choose, makes *phronesis* different from understanding (Guthrie 1998:346). “Because it is concerned with concrete particular cases it is analogous to sensation in the epistemological field. Accordingly it is different from knowledge” (Guthrie 1998:346). In fact, Sorabji (1980:206) notes that Aristotle compares *phronesis* with sense-perception five times in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

In summary, *Phronesis* “is a virtue of rational desire (*orexis dianoetike*) or desiring reason (*orektikos nous*)” (Zagebski 1996:217). Deliberation is a thought process undertaken with a view to “discovering the best means to a predetermined end ... Choice is its outcome” (Guthrie 1990:Vol. VI:351). The focus is the ethical life, not the rational life in general. Yet, as MacIntyre (2007:71) notes, Aristotle concedes

that not every voluntary action is *chosen*, especially in a specially defined sense of chosen which involves deliberation ... What does follow from Aristotle’s account is that we can access every action in light of what would have been done by an agent who had in fact deliberated before he acted. But this imagined agent cannot of course be any agent. He has to be *o phronimos*, the prudent man (emphasis in the original).

As already noted, Aristotle sees *phronesis* as an “adult power”; “it is the outcome of an initial aptitude cultivated and developed by experience” (Guthrie 1998:346).

And because it is the fruit of extended experience, the young are not *phronimoi* even though they may be experts (e.g. in mathematics). As Aristotle remarks:

it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1142a, Trans. Ross 1963:148).

So, in the context of the usual rather than that of the prodigy, we speak of the experienced or practised eye (EN 1143b [Ross 1963:153]) and of informed perception, a sense of the fitting (EN 1109b, Trans. Ross 1963:47; 1113a Trans. Ross 1963:56; 11142a Trans. Ross 1963:150). Practice or experience effects the learning (EN 1170a, Trans. Ross 1963:240). *Phronesis*’ (EN 1103a15, Trans. Ross 1963:28–9) “beginning lies in habituation, its growth in experience ... produced by a circuitous and indirect process beginning in infancy” (Newman 1973:90). Earlier Plato had made a similar point in the *Laws* (653), namely that in the education of boys, their tastes need to be trained before their reasoning. So, I note that *phronesis* development is through

experience, over time; and that has implications for an educational strategy focussing on the honing of *phronesis*, and where the educational outcome is the *phronimos*. But it is a particular kind of experience that leads to that outcome.

The *phronimos* has the ability to select and apply the general principle in the concrete practical situation; the *phronimos* “deliberates with a view not merely to particular goals but to the good life in general ... with a view to the best” (Sorabji 1980:205). A person of practical wisdom is “virtuous, not vicious” (Sorabji 1980:206): “it is impossible to be practically wise without being good” (*EN* 1144a; Trans. Ross 1963:156). “*Phronesis* is not just what someone knows, but also and primarily what he or she is” (McGee 2001:5). That does not exclude the possibility of error or vice on the part of the *phronimos*, for “the object of the *phronimos* is a process rather than a product” (McGee 2001:5). Gadamer (1994:322) notes that knowledge and experience are so close that it is “pointless” to seek to distinguish them here. “The *phronimos* is always displaying his or her *phronesis*—indeed when *phronesis* is part of your Being you can hide it only with the same difficulty that you can hide the less attractive features of your body” (McGee 2001:5).

The *Phronesis* exercised there, is not only a virtue but “the keystone of all virtues ... without it one cannot be virtuous” (MacIntyre 2007:71). Accordingly, Oakley and Cocking’s (2001:30) conclusion follows:

(i)f our actions and our lives were not governed and coordinated by the general regulative ideal of *phronesis*, we would not be living a fully human life, but a life akin to that of the “lower animals” who as Aristotle says “have no universal judgement but only imagination and memory of particulars” (*EN* VII. 3 1147b; [Ross 1963:166–7]).

So Aristotle contends that Socrates was right when he said that all virtues imply practical wisdom, but wrong in holding that all virtues were forms of practical wisdom (*EN* 1144b 19–21; Trans. Ross 1963:157). As Wiggins (1980:236) notes, it is the trait of a person of practical wisdom “to be able to select from an infinite number of features that bear upon the notion or ideal of existence which it is his standing aim to make real”.

But, in the interest of conceptual clarity two other matters warrant brief comment in their relation to *phronesis*, namely “chance” or “luck” on the one hand, and on the other “cleverness”.

Regarding chance or luck, Kenny (2002:58) formulates the matter well:

There are people—stupid people—who get things right, often in two different cases: first in areas where luck rules; and secondly, in cases where, while there is an appropriate skill, there is plenty of room also for luck. Games of chance are the paradigm of the former case; Aristotle gives strategy and navigation as examples of the second. So, we have lucky gamblers, lucky generals, and lucky helmsmen.

My interest here is not Aristotle's concern whether the luck is an "inborn" or "acquired characteristic", but whether that success is the outcome of *phronesis*. In matters of morality the intellect judges the particular concrete good and directs the appropriate means to effect that end. The concern is twofold—both hitting the right target and for the right reasons (cf. Wall 2005:315). An activity may be virtuous even if unsuccessful in its desired outcome, and vice versa, a worthy outcome from a vicious deed. "It is *phronesis* that makes the difference between natural virtue and genuine virtue" (Kenny 2002:66). So, for instance, a kind gesture by a person sleep-walking is not a moral action or act of virtue, because reason is not operating for the sleep-walker. The recipient experiences the gesture as a "good" act but from the perspective of the Agent, it remains at a pre-human level and, therefore, cannot be labelled as "virtuous".

Phronesis requires perception.

It is not a faculty, comparable with the five senses, of perceiving the specific range of objects: colours, sounds, tastes. It is perception in a wide or generic sense, as is also what has been called "common sense" in the psychological treatises. But common sense belongs to the faculty of *sense* perception and is still bound up with the five senses. The man of practical judgment shows sense in the wider sense of the term; alternatively he can be described as having *nous* *EN* 1143 b5. Ross 1963:153 (Hardie 1980:234; emphasis in original).

Cleverness can be part of *phronesis* in that it focuses on how the right choice is carried out (*EN* 1148a, Trans. Ross 1963:156; cf. Garver 1994:147, 204); it can be done well or poorly, and be clever or smart, and, further, be done "morally well or morally badly" (Engberg-Pedersen 1996:125)). Cleverness, however does not persuade, *phronesis* does. "People are persuaded by what they think is *phronesis*; they are not persuaded by what they take to be cleverness" (Garver 1994:147). *Phronesis* is different because *phronesis* is concerned with the starting point; the intellect enables the agent to judge how to act on excellent principles in the concrete situation (MacIntyre 2007:72). Again *phronesis*, which is prescriptive about the action to be done or avoided, is different from good advice (*synesis*) which judges but does not command action (*EN* 1143a; Trans. Ross 1965: 151). Aristotle's "blindness" (MacIntyre 2007:72–4) to the problem

of the Agent failing to act and the problem of human fallibility are beyond my present concern. I note further, that Aristotle's context is ethical, not epistemological, which is my concern here.

Before closing my discussion of Aristotle's insights on practical reasoning it is important to note the place of the passions and imagination. With Nussbaum and Putman (2003), I note that Aristotle regards emotions and the imagination as embodied and rational. Aristotle restores the emotions "to the central place in morality from which Plato had banished them" (Nussbaum 1990:78). The emotional component in cognition needs to be acknowledged if the Agent is to take things in a "full-bodied way ... Their responses are part of what knowing ... consists in" (Nussbaum 1990:79). "Deficiency in passional response" (Nussbaum 1990:81) means that the Agent's heart's "confrontation with concrete ethical reality" is missing (Nussbaum 1990: 81; cf. 1996: 46, 134, 204–6, 307–9); because attention is to the particular, "imagination can play a role in deliberation that cannot altogether be replaced by the functioning of abstract thought" (Nussbaum 1990:83) In brief, in the characterisation of the Agent's full range of the cognitive dimension, mention must be given "to character, to well-trained desires, and to the responsive quality of ... [the] desires" (Nussbaum 1996 :311).

Three further matters, relevant to my conversation with Aristotle, require comment: is *phronesis* taught or learnt? who does that teaching? and how is that teaching done? Each question will be discussed in turn. First, is *phronesis* taught/learnt?

Since *phronesis* is "an intellectual virtue in the main it owes its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires both time and experience)" *EN*.103a; Trans. Ross 1963: 28). Because the *Politics* is incomplete, we do not have Aristotle's views on the higher education in science and philosophy (Copleston 1956a: 357). Still, I note, Aristotle says that is "in the main", and accordingly implies that like moral virtues, the intellectual virtues are also acquired by habit - "we get first by exercising them...learn by doing them" (*EN* 1103a; Trans. Ross 1963:28–9). Accordingly, both teaching and mentoring play important and complementary roles. Yet because my focus is on the outcome for the learning student, following most theorists of education, that receives greater priority in my discussion than the teacher's objectives.

Second, the question of who does that teaching is not addressed directly by Aristotle be it by a person or persons of practical wisdom (*phronimos/phronimoi*) on the one hand, or on the other hand, by a community in which the *phronema* or wisdom tradition is found. Cottingham remarks that:

(w)e learn to grow morally by being immersed in a community before we fully understand what morality means. And we learn to trust by trusting. But in human life there is no other way (Cottingham 2005:17).

Aristotle does not address the community dimension, but hints can be found in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. Here I am drawing upon Wiggins (1980) and Nussbaum (1990). Aristotle contends, and I am using Wiggin's paraphrase-cum-translation of *EN* 1143a25 ff.;

when we speak of judgment and understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason, we credit the same people with possessing judgment and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding ... Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright (Wiggins 1980:236).

More is needed than a system of rules which transmit the wisdom of others' experience, because

(e)xperience is concrete and not exhaustively summarised by a set of rules ... [nor] adequately encompassed in a treatise ... Even if rules are not sufficient, they may be highly useful, frequently even necessary (Nussbaum 1990:75).

Accordingly one can conclude that Aristotle's approach implies the teaching by, or mentoring by, experienced practitioners of practical wisdom whose experience has taught them "to see aright" when faced with a concrete decision in a particular situation. Yet this still leaves us with the thinking *individual* that is central to both Aristotelean and Cartesian thought. To move beyond that I will draw upon the Gifford Lectures of John MacMurray (1978, 1979) to place the person-in-relationship above the thinking individual. I will develop that point when I discuss Newman below.

Aristotle does not offer an immediate answer to the third query about how the teaching of, or educating in, *phronesis* is effected. The way forward is found not in his *Ethics* but in *The Rhetoric*, a matter I discussed at some length in Paper Three and Aristotle's account of the rhetorical proof *ethos*.

Phronesis combines the virtuous and sound knowledge in the speaker.

It is knowledge based on the speaker's experience that guides good practice (*eupraxia*) in a contingent, diverse world. The experience conditions the human to repeat good decisions, to be in

the habit of good decision making ... “means of judgment” used to make choices about truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and what action to take (Smith 2004:11).

Aristotle’s emphasis upon *phronesis* puts the spotlight on rationality and *logos*.

The difference is important and for conceptual clarity it needs to be noted. Russo (2000) and Smith (2004:12-3) speak incorrectly of Aristotle’s concept of “*ethos* of the audience” and refer to Aristotle’s insistence that the persuasive speaker attends to the distinguishing traits or characteristics of the specific audience where that is relevant. So, for instance, the speaker takes a different tack when the audience is adolescent than when the audience is that of senior citizens, to use modern categories (Aristotle refers to the young (*neoi*) and to the older men (*presbyteroi*); what touches one age group may not influence the affective response of the other (*Rhet* 2. xii–xiv, 1389a–1390a;). In that, one is talking about the rhetorical proof (*pistis*) of *pathos*, not that of the Aristotelean *ethos*. The issue of “style” in Aristotle’s thinking (Newman 1998, 2005) has insights for teaching method and has been discussed when discussing the rhetorical proof (*pistis*) of *logos* in my third Paper above, but it offers no insight on who teaches, or who mentors, which is my immediate focus here.

Characteristics or traits of a specific audience, such as age, education, gender etc., are attended to by the speaker so that “the speech is spoken in such a way that the speaker is made more worthy of credence” (Smith 2004:12). So, I return to my discussion of Aristotle’s components of the *ethos* of the speaker, specifically the perception by the audience through the speaker’s own words, that there is an attitude of “good-will” towards the listener.

Eunoia (goodwill) refers to the hearer’s judgment from the words spoken about the speaker’s benevolent attitude towards the Audience. Should the speaker be thought to be hostile or indifferent, then the Audience has no prior reason for presuming that the speaker’s interests may not conflict with the Auditor’s on the one hand, and, on the other, the advice may not be in the listener’s interest. In short, the focus is the grounds for presuming, on the basis of the spoken word alone, that the speaker has the interest of the listener at heart. Goodwill is different from friendship, since goodwill wishes the other well for their own sake and lacks the reciprocal nature of friendship (*Rhet* 1155b33-1156a5); goodwill may be the beginning of friendship (*Rhet* 1167a). “(F)or most audiences goodwill generates more credibility than friendship” (Smith 2004:12).

Accordingly Aristotle contends that **Ethos** is the most powerful ground for persuasion (*Rhet* 1356a13) because it can persuade before the listener has attended fully to either the argument (**logos**) or the feelings (**pathos**) aroused. “This created sense of character [in the words of the speaker as they impress the listener] becomes the most controlling factor in persuasion” (Smith 2004:11). The *ethos* is distinct from the speaker’s reputation, dignity or authority, earned or attributed, which has circulated prior to the speaker’s speaking.

Often, in the literature on classical rhetoric, there is a contrasting of Aristotelan theory with Ciceronian practice, particularly in Cicero’s legal and political addresses (Enos & Schnakenberg 1994:191–2). The term **ethos** is used only once by Cicero (*Orator* 128; Hubbell 1987:400). Quintillian claimed that there was no synonym for **ethos** in Latin (*Institutio Oratoria* 6.2.8–9). While scholars draw on a range of Ciceronian concepts to suggest a Ciceronian **ethos**, what is produced is a “confluence of notions, a synthesis of several concepts that interact in different ways” (Enos & Schnakenberg 1994:193).

Cicero fashioned a uniquely Latinized **ethos**. **Conciliare** is the result of *ethos* but not the dynamic of *ethos* itself. **Conciliare** is the indirect product of **ethos**, the result of **ethos** as the response to traits with the audience but not the creation of **ethos** itself nor even part of the process (Enos & Schnakenberg 1994:205).

In particular, Roman Public Life in the age of the Republic, placed great importance on persuading large political audiences; and in that dynamic, **gravitas** in the speaker was seen as decisive. **Gravitas**

encapsulated the authority of proposals delivered with seriousness and reserve and filled with the assurance and reserve and filled with the spirit of command bestowed by the tenure of office past or present (David 2006:428).

It was a persuasive trait associated with the Senatorial rank, Cicero being its best example, marked by a stability and conservatism that was projected in the oratory (Hellegouarc’h 1072:279–90).

In the context of CPE education, drawing on insights from Aristotle, the Verbatim contributes to the honing of the practical wisdom (**phronesis**) of the CPE student and the teaching and mentoring involved is effected primarily through the **ethos** of the Supervisor of the CPE Unit.

Such then are Aristotle's insights and we have a useful beginning in developing an understanding of the "wise practitioner" and how to be one which can enrich the concept of CPE education. Yet Aristotle's concept has limitations in my present context. Aristotle offers little insight on the role of the community in developing *phronesis*, something that flows on from Newman's insights as will be seen below. But that little is still useful in my discussion. Here I am following closely C.C.W. Taylor, drawing on Aristotle's *Politics* (hereafter *Pol*), a work Aristotle himself presents as a continuation and completion of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Taylor 1995: 233). Aristotle begins his case with the human good which is achieved only in the context of the political community. The *polis* exists for the sake of the good life, and in that sense, the *polis* is "essentially" prior to the individual. The individual lives the life of intellectual and moral virtue in his/her practical reasoning; the social requirement from the human, demands attention to the good life of the total community.

The good life is the life directed by *phronesis*, and the most perfect exercise of *phronesis* is the application of that virtue to the common good of a community ... In Aristotelean terms, the good human being must be a *phronimos*, and the ideal *phronimos* is the *politikos* (Taylor 1995:241–2).

Admittedly, Aristotle does not consider associations within the *polis* community, and professional education lay outside his worldview, as the "citizens will never need to earn their living" (Ross 1960:268). Still in a modern context, it is warranted to apply Aristotle's insights into the context of a professional association whose members seek to promote the common good, distinctive of their particular association; in brief, what Aristotle asserts of the *polis*, may be applied *mutatis mutandis*, to the professional association and the *phronimoi* that is their membership. In the context of my present discussion, the CPE community is *essentially* prior to the individual CPE practitioner; and it is the CPE "community" or *polis* that leads forth (educates) the *phronimos*, whose virtue is *phronesis*, which is not "knowledge, but another form of understanding" (Aristotle 1992 *Eudemian Ethics* 1246b35, [Woods 1992:36]). Moreover, since "the ultimate end of all education" (Newman 1973. Vol. 3:529) is the intellectual virtues, including *phronesis* (*Pol* 1334b [Sinclair 1962:291]), it is warranted to extend Aristotle's insights into an educational setting where the honing of *phronesis* is the primary focus.

Having drawn on Aristotle's insights, I turn to consider the view of Aquinas which deepens further our understanding of the nature of practical wisdom.

b) Practical Wisdom—*prudentia*—Aquinas

Two preliminary remarks are in order. First, while Aquinas lectured on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, and on many other Aristotelean works, his lectures were in the nature of a conversation between a great Christian thinker and a great Pagan philosopher whose insights were being rediscovered in the West. Aquinas was to spend a decade “at the height of his theological career” (Owens 1974:238) lecturing on twelve Books of Aristotle between 1264 and 1273 (Owens 1974:216). Aquinas is not concerned primarily to present an introduction to, or to present the thinking of, another philosopher of another time.

But in two thirds of these commentaries on Aristotle there are passages that show an overriding theological concern. In two thirds of them there are likewise passages that reveal a definitely existential metaphysics, something not found in the Aristotelean texts. Finally, three quarters of the commentaries have passages that locate their subject matter in a framework of the sciences rather different from that of Aristotle (Owens 1974:234–5).

Yet that historical context of Aquinas’ thought does not vitiate his insights. Also Aquinas acknowledged the difference between the disciplines of Philosophy and Theology (ST II–II, 1, 5, ad 2m). Yet in Aquinas, theology and philosophy are found together. It might be contended that Aquinas’ philosophical project is undermined by his theological agenda, as Owen notes accurately: “the anvil on which it [Aquinas’ philosophy] was hammered into shape was theology” (Owens 1974: 238). Kenny observed:

It is not in fact a serious charge against a philosopher to say that he is looking for good reasons for what he already believes in. Descartes, sitting beside his fire, wearing his dressing gown, sought reasons for judging that that was what he was doing, and took a long time to find them. Russell himself spent much energy in seeking proofs of what he already believed: *Principia Mathematica* takes hundreds of pages to prove that 1 and 1 make 2 (Kenny 2005:76).

The barb of Kenny’s observation on Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) is sharpened by its context - he has just recalled Russell’s dismissal of Aquinas’ philosophical thought as “special pleading”. Pace Russell, the issue is not a Thinker’s motive for examining an issue, but the quality of the insights offered in that examination. “We judge a philosopher by whether his reasonings are sound, not by where he first lighted on his premises or how he first came to believe his conclusions” (Kenny 2005:76). The same applies to Newman and his views on belief and certainty, to which I will turn shortly. But my immediate concern is Aquinas’ insights on practical wisdom.

Thomas Aquinas (c1225–74) lectured on *The Nicomachean Ethics* in 1261–4 and the final revision was in 1272 (Bourke 1974:250, 255). It is readily acknowledged that there are widely differing views among scholars, on the value of Aquinas’ commentary on *The Nicomachean Ethics*, ranging from valueless to priceless (Bourke 1974: 256–9). My review of Aquinas’ thought will focus on the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas’ mature work, and because “a good deal of Aquinas’ moral wisdom is ... found ... in his theological writing” (Bourke 1974:259).

Aquinas follows the customary Medieval Latin translation of the Aristotelian *phronesis* as *prudentia*, and, in MacIntyre’s view, that is “well translated” (MacIntyre 2007:71). The word *phronesis* occurs only once in the *Summa Theologiae*, a hapaxlegomenon, or hapax legomenon, (Deferrari and Barry 1956:259), (meaning used only once in the text) and therein, it is a reference to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (ST 1 q79, a10, ad 3). At the same time in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics* (6.4.nr9/7) Aquinas transliterates *phronesis* as *fronesis* which he explicitly equates with *prudentia* (Busa et al. 1975: 294. 6240). Accordingly, one may assume that Aquinas was satisfied that the Latin word *prudentia* carried the required nuance for him, a contraction “from *providens* according to Cicero, from *porro videns* according to the *Etymologies* of St Isidore” (Gilby 1967:925). At the same time, in English, the phrase “practical wisdom” is “a happier translation” (Gilby 1961:10, n.) as the English word “prudence” now carries overtones of the Kantian *klugheit* (Gilby 1967:925), or as Westberg (1994:3) stated: “caution and self-referential care ... a miserable sort of prudence, self protective, preferring safety to change, far removed from Thomistic “prudence”. And that “miserable sort of prudence” is close to Kant’s concept of “prudence” (Aubenque 1975). Kant in his *Critique of Practical Reason* commented: “(s)kill in the choice of means to one’s own highest welfare can be called prudence in the narrowest sense” (Kant 1949:75). And again, “the maxim of self love (prudence) merely advises, the law of morality commands” (Kant 1949:148). As Comte-Sponville (2002:30) states succinctly: “Kant doesn’t regard it [prudence] as a virtue”. MacIntyre (2007:71) also notes the narrow connotation of “prudent” in modern English which has “something of the flavour of cautious and calculating in one’s self interest”, an understanding that carries an echo of Kant.

Aquinas’ view of practical reason and prudence (ST 2–II 47, 8) is more wide-ranging and articulates the important role of prudence for humans—“prudence is for human beings what instinct is for animals” (Comte-Sponville 2002:34). It is an activity of reason that passes through three stages:

- i) weighing up the possibilities around the means to the good desired;
- ii) judging which means is the best; and, lastly and most importantly
- iii) executing/implementing the results of that deliberation.

It is a virtue of the intellect and is distinct from the moral virtue of prudence. It applies in every walk of life, from domestic management through to military leadership and to state-craft. Prudence is more than conscience or affective orientation; Aquinas highlighted the third stage where the agent executes the good decision. Will (*voluntas*) is important but it is not “the exclusive factor in choice” (Westberg 1994:38). Aquinas wished “to maintain the rational element in the stage of execution or action, using the word *imperium* in preference to *impetus*” (Westberg 1994:182). Gilson (1957:263) summarises Aquinas’ point: “(i)t is not enough to decide to act well. We must also decide to act according to reason, not merely by blind impulse or passion”.

That process of moving from intention to execution requires further elucidation.

Again, Westberg is helpful.

(T)he means end structuring is a feature of each stage of the process from intention to execution. The agent in deliberation formulates this structure and identifies the particular actions when there is uncertainty; then he comes to a decision by choosing on the basis both of its correctness and its attractiveness, and carries out the action under the guidance of both intellect and will. Because circumstances may change the validity of a particular means-end structuring, both intellect and will are constantly involved in the formulation, choice, and execution of all our actions (Westberg 1994:183).

As Gerhard (1945:444–5) notes:

(t)he principal act of prudence is that of issuing precepts, of making exact determinations of what is to be done; but since the matter determined is the contingent situation, the course of action to be followed cannot be perceived at once ... In matters of action more than speculative matters there is need of an ability to reason well, for in practical syllogisms all conclusions are beginnings of action in regard to particular, contingent cases ... we can state that a prime requisite of a prudent man is that he be good at reasoning well. And in that remark, Gerhard is developing Aquinas (*ST* II–II q.49, a.5, ad 2).

In the practical syllogism, we know the situation immediately, not through a process of reasoning, but our estimation of it as good or bad is affected by our past experience (Gerhard 1945:449). Experience, I note, is crucial;

it is not a demonstrable knowledge, it is a judgement arrived at by a gathering together of the many like instances I have formerly known, and a recognition that in every instance similar to this particular one, the course I am now advocating has been the best. Experience which depends upon a collation of the data of memory, is of supreme importance in aiding us to act prudently, and in our estimation of the singular instance which forms the minor [of the practical syllogism], it is of paramount importance ... [The practical person] can choose the proper means to the end not by any ability at subsuming this particular case under the proper universal, but because he “feels” [intuits] from his experience that this will work (Gerhard 1945:450–1 cf. Aquinas In *Nich Eth* VI, Lect 7).

Yet, if its estimations are to be sound, the cogitative power must first be trained in a way that will render it sound (Gerhard 1945:456).

Although Aquinas does not address that issue of “training” explicitly, several useful insights can be drawn from his discussion of Ethics. Firstly:

Prudentia is the disposition to guide one’s choices and actions by practical reasonableness. So it is informed and directed at every stage by every relevant practical principle and true moral norm (Finnis 1998:168).

It is the good that is being sought in the various types of *prudentia*—individual, familial [or *economica*], political and military; each has its distinctive good. The good in its broadest sense is the “common good”, the good of the “complete community” (Finnis 1998:122) [*perfecta communitas*]. While there are individuals, the group enjoys a unity of order, and while there may be analogies with an organism, the differences are more important than the analogies; so, “Aquinas firmly discourages attempts to understand human societies as organisms or substances” (Finnis 1998:35). Accordingly there is warrant for applying those insights in the present context.

Second, Aquinas insists that *prudentia* is a rational motivation in contrast to an emotional motivation. Reason does not suppress, nor eliminate, nor dominate the emotions; nor vice versa. The role of reason is to integrate. In that way, Aquinas avoids Hume’s problem of reason being automatically dominated by the emotions (Finnis 1998:72).

Third, Aquinas contends that *prudentia* is moved by *synderesis*—the mind’s “stock [*habitus*] of effortless insights into basic reasons for action” (Finnis 1998:89 n.138, 382) (cf. *ST* I–II q.58, a. 5c; II–II q.47 a. 6c). Such insights are the outcome of experience either of oneself or of others; once acquired those insights are “etched in one’s mind (even when one is not thinking of them) in the way that the principles of geometry are etched on the mind of someone who understands geometry” (Finnis 1998:89 n.138).

Thus the honing of *phronesis* and *synderesis* are interrelated, as virtue and habit. In that way Aquinas provides an insight into the educational dynamic of effecting a wise practitioner.

In summary, Aquinas’ prudence “is the outlook or disposition which enables the agent to arrive at the right application in the particular situation and to perform it” (Westberg 1994:190). Further, for Aquinas the issue of “execution” is crucial; the issues of error and defective action lie beyond the present consideration. The wise practitioner can pick up on error or defective action using the action-reflection approach or through reflection in action as discussed in Paper Five. The role of experience implies a communal or social dimension in the process of developing the habit of the intellectual virtues which “perfect a man’s rational powers” (Coppleston 1955:206), specifically here of prudence which is both communally nurtured and also is shaped by a process of communal accountability while allowing for individual discretion (cf. Aristotle’s *epikeia* EN 5.10, 6.11). Aquinas takes our reflection beyond *phronesis* to the role of charity (*caritas*) and thus he “actually broadened” (Westberg 1994:256) Aristotle’s view of *phronesis*. My concern here though is with an epistemological issue, important as the ethical is. As with Aristotle, Aquinas limits the epistemological focus to the individual; I will return to that matter following my discussion of Newman’s insight. Aquinas’ focus upon “experience” has enlarged the understanding of practical wisdom and how it is acquired. I will develop that important insight below when drawing on Wittgenstein to support Newman’s view; but more is needed to provide insight into practical reasoning in any setting and not just in an ethical context. In that, Newman takes us the next step and so, the discussion turns to Newman and his insights for the present project.

c) Practical Wisdom—the *Illative Sense*—Newman

John Henry Newman (1801–1890), as a philosopher, belonged to the same empirist tradition as John Stuart Mill (Kenny 2007:145). Newman gives a greater role to reason than does Kant (Kenny 2007:146). Kenny comments that

Newman's epistemology has not been much studied by subsequent Philosophers because of the religious purpose that was his overarching aim in developing it. But the treatment of belief, knowledge, and certainty in *The Grammar of Assent* has merits that are quite independent of the theological context, and which bear comparison with classical texts of the empiricist tradition from Locke to Russell (Kenny 2007:150).

Ker points out that "the originality of Newman's philosophy is only just beginning to be appreciated" (Ker 2004:655). Because we are considering how reason can warrant holding beliefs, Svaglic's (1967:538. n.100.3) observation is relevant to the present discussion: "Newman maintained against Locke that as individuals we hold many beliefs with a certainty greater than strictly warranted by our adducible logical proofs"

My concern here is not Newman and his place in the empiricist tradition of English philosophy, but to draw on his epistemological insights. The motive of "religious purpose" automatically "tainting" a thinker's objectivity has been addressed above when considering Aquinas' insights, and will not be repeated here in the context of Newman's insights.

In his phenomenology of the human mind, Newman extends Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*, the intellectual virtue used in ethical thinking, to include thinking in any matter, personal and concrete. Huang's (2005:137) suggestion that "Newman uses Aristotle's *prudencia* to illustrate the illative sense", does not square with the evidence in Newman's writings as my discussion will indicate. And again, Robinson's description (202:167) of the "illative sense" as "a near relative of Aristotelean *phronesis*" is incorrect as will be shown below. In fact, Newman draws a parallel between Aristotelean *phronesis* and his "illative sense" (Newman 1985: 228-30, 380) rather than using it as illustrative; for Newman was drawing attention to a different aspect of human thinking. Stanford and Sparke (1957:146) suggest the insight of the "illative sense" is "generally regarded as Newman's greatest discovery". Verdeke (1978) speaks more accurately of the "Aristotelean roots of Newman's illative sense". My concern here, however, is not with how Newman uses the "illative sense" as the rational warrant for Religious Belief, but to use his insight in the phenomenology of the mind in developing my proposals towards a concept of Education that provides insight and clarity for the CPE programmes.

In outlining Newman's approach I will range beyond his 1870 *An Essay In Aid of a Grammar of Assent* using comments drawn from his letters which both clarify and sharpen his thinking. In that way, I will be seeking to avoid the "blemishes" (Sullivan 1988:o98, n.35) which drew the criticism of Price (1969:130–57). Moreover, I will not be discussing the development of

Newman's thought (cf. Ker 1985: xxii–xxxii; Huang 2005:11–86; Verdeke 1978). It is sufficient for my present purpose to note the influence of Aristotle on Newman (Huang 2005:11-5) and which Newman acknowledges in several places (1976 101–2, 379 cf. 59; 2001:180–2, 195; *Phil.N.* i:159ff). Newman, however cannot be said to be a “pure Aristotelean” (Sillem in *Phil.N.* i:163).

Aquino (2004:5) summarises Newman's position:

Newman's project focusses upon the informal and tacit dimension of reasoning, shaped by experience and personal insight ...The illative sense sifts, evaluates, and integrates various pieces of evidence into a synthetic judgement and furnishes concrete answers to specific questions...[while] (t)he illative sense connects various pieces of data, its manner of concluding does not follow strictly a rule-governed process of inquiry.

And again, at greater length, Strange (2008:29–30) comments:

(i)llation is reasoning. The illative sense, therefore refers to the human capacity for reasoning, our gift for assessing evidence, and Newman claimed, doing so accurately. Inadequate evidence, of course, will as stated, mislead us, but given the evidence ... we commonly reason well. This confidence in the human condition was fundamental for him. When using the illative sense, we weigh the evidence, discern the evidence in the converging probabilities, and come to certitude. Moreover for him the process was always intensely personal.

In that, Newman rejected “the Lockean narrow conception of inference from evidence that is analytical, deductively-valid and in the strict logical form” (Huang 2005:260). Some, such as Carr (1996:148–9) and Jay Newman (1989:84), dismiss Newman's position as fanatical or arbitrary, having no common measure for justification. On the other hand, Huang (2005:268–9) concedes that there is no measure of a *logical sort*, but notes that Newman appeals to the normal operation of the mind in concrete matters which are too subtle, minute, delicate and intricate to be put into logical rules or forms. As Lonergan (1985:195) remarked, Newman is inquiring into “the kind of knowledge by which most people live their lives ... It is the knowledge of which Newman wrote in his *Grammar of Assent*, Polyani wrote in his *Personal Knowledge*, Gadamer in his *Truth and Method*.” In brief, Newman contends that Locke's analysis, focussing on the physical sciences, is based in an incomplete phenomenology of mind, and Newman's insights seek to offset that. So, I turn to Newman's account of the “illative sense”.

Newman was seeking to engage Locke, not by rejecting

the claims of reason as such but to demand a much more subtle appreciation of the way reason works ... in respect of all matters of serious importance ... Newman undertook to show that reason in matters of religion did not operate differently from the way it worked in history, philosophy, or morality (Mitchell 1990:226).

And one could also add law to Mitchell's list (cf. Gleeson & Higgins 2007) and education.

Presciently, Newman identified several themes which recent epistemology has sought to address and Newman also offered solutions that resolve those difficulties—the issue of tacit and informal reasoning, how many arguments depend for their warrant upon their cumulative form, and the outcome is warrantable certitude, even though logical or mathematical certainty is not present (Mitchell 1990:227). Newman distinguished “certainty” and “certitude”: “(c)ertitude is a mental state: certainty a quality of propositions” (Newman 1985:223). Earlier in his *Apologia pro Vita Sua* Newman had remarked that “(c)ertitude is a reflex action; it is to know that one knows” (Apo. 195). And, again and at greater length:

certitude was a habit of the mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that probabilities which did not reach logical certainty, might suffice for mental certitude; that the certitude thus brought about might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was created by the strictest scientific demonstration (Newman 1967:31).

That distinction is important in Newman's thought, yet, I contend, scholars such as Robinson (2002:167) who reverse Newman's distinction only end in misrepresenting his thought. Newman was seeking to explain the phenomenon whereby the human mind came to such certitude in the concrete and the particular and where logic plays no role. The phenomenon he is addressing is summarised well in one of his letters:

the living intelligence of the prudent man decides that a certain conclusion is trustworthy, or imposes upon him the duty of believing it. He is not able, be he ever so logical, to express how much and what evidence in a logical shape is just sufficient, neither more nor less, to impose a conclusion on his assent; he only sees that logically a certain modicum of evidence would be too little, and another modicum superfluously much, and that in this particular case it is his duty on that particular evidence to receive it as true on that particular evidence which he has, though he cannot compare it with other supposable evidence or assign precisely its logical value (*LD* XXVI: 41–2).

Newman, as he commented in another letter, was concerned with “the probable as opposed to the demonstrative” (*LD* XV:293). He is arguing that in concrete, practical matters, the

phenomenology of mind acknowledges epistemic probability, as distinct from statistical probability, as an intelligent ground for human action.

We are so constituted, that if we insist upon being as sure as is conceivable, in every step of our course, we must be content to creep along the ground, and can never soar. If we are intended for great ends, we are called to great hazards; and whereas we are given absolute certainty in nothing, we must in all things choose between doubt and inactivity (*US*:215).

Newman's concern is with articulating the phenomenology of mind for the

clear headed, and practical reasoner, who sees conclusions at a glance, is uncomfortable under the drill of a logician, being oppressed and hampered, as David in Saul's armour [1 Sam 17:38–9], by what is intended as a benefit (Newman 1985: 218).

Newman's assumption is that it is only through the examination of the human mind's operation that can one state with confidence how the mind operates (Merrigan 1991:205). As Carr noted:

Newman, much like Gadamer, sets at the forefront of his epistemology a phenomenological account of what *actually* does happen when a person comes to know what he or she knows. And his sampling field is limited to one: himself (Carr 1996:91; emphasis in the original).

Newman's phenomenology of reasoning is well summarised in the following lengthy quotation:

(r)reason, according to the simplest view of it, is the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another. In this way it is able, from small beginnings, to create a world of ideas ... The mind ranges to and fro, and spreads out, and advances forward with a quickness which has become a proverb, and a subtlety and versatility which baffle investigation. It passes on from point to point, gaining one by some indication, another on probability; then availing itself of an association; then falling back on some received law; next seizing on testimony; then committing itself to some popular impression, or some inward instinct, or some obscure memory; and thus it makes progress not unlike some clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another. It is not too much to say that the stepping by which great geniuses scale the mountain of truth is as unsafe and precarious to men in general, as the ascent of a skilful mountaineer up a literal crag. It is a way which they alone can take, and its justification lies in its success. And such mainly is the way in which all men, gifted or not gifted, commonly reason—not by rule, but by inward faculty (Newman: 2006[1870]:176–7).

Some maintain that Newman, “a master of introspection” (Dulles 2007:5), is describing his own experience here (Earnest & Tracey 2006:378, n176. 38).

Reflecting upon the experience of that phenomenology of mind, Newman drew four conclusions in explaining how the mind arrives at that point of certitude:

- i. “the living intelligence of the prudent man decides that a certain conclusion is trustworthy” (*LD XXVI:40*);
- ii. Newman’s account of that proof in the concrete matter does not lie (so to say) on one line, as the stages of a race course, (as it does in abstract,) but is made up of momenta converging from various directions, the joint force of which no analytical expression can represent (*LD XXV:41*).

Newman used three different analogies to illustrate how the accumulation of probabilities, each of which is not grounds for the rational conclusion, but collectively carry the weight of the rational warrant for the certitude—“the more of them [probabilities] there are, the greater their combined force” *LD XXIV:146*) The first analogy is from the architecture “of the tower or spire, geometrical staircase, or vaulted roof ... where all display of strength is carefully avoided, and the weight is ingeniously thrown in a variety of directions, upon supports which are distinct from, or independent of each other” (*LD XXIV:460*); the second, and “an even more compelling analogy” (Ker 1990:50), “that of a cable which is made up of a number separate threads, each feeble, yet together as sufficient as an iron rod [which] represents mathematical or strict demonstration” (*LD XXI:146*); the third is a “whole bundle of sticks, each of which ... you could snap in two, if taken separately from the rest” (*LD XXIV:146*).

In brief, in the concrete and personal, “a collection of weak evidences ... makes up strong evidence and a converging evidence amounts to proof” (Ker 1990:50).

- iii. Newman posits an inward mental faculty (1970:257, cf. 211–3, 277), it is a faculty of the mind, which I [Newman] ... have called the inductive sense which when properly cultivated and used, answers to Aristotle’s *phronesis*, its province being not virtue, but “*inquisitio veri*”, which decides for us beyond technical rules, when, how, etc. to pass from inference to assent, and when and under what circumstances etc. not ... the gradual process by which great conclusions are forced upon the mind, and the confidence of their correctness which the mind feels from the fact of their gradualness ... that minute, continuous, experimental reasoning, which shows badly on Paper, but which drifts silently into an overwhelmingly cumulus of proof, and when our start is true, brings us on to a true result (*LD XXIX:115, 116*).

I note Newman's confidence in the process and its outcome, provided "our start is true", something that cannot be automatically assumed. I will return to the role of experience in that below.

- iv. it is an "intellectual judgment ... common sense, good judgement" (*LD* XV:118), that "habit and act of the mind which leads a man to determine when 'inference' is to pass to assent" (*LD* XXX:148). And being "right judgement in rationation" (Newman 1985:221), "the elements of evaluation and reason need to be emphasised" (Ker 1988:648; 1991:67).

While Newman's language is not used, the very same concepts do appear from time to time in political discourse in the contemporary media. My concern is not the accuracy of the comment, but, rather to note the concept used, the asserted lack of "judgment" in the public figure concerned. Four examples illustrate the point:

- i. of former Labour Parliamentary Leader, Mark Latham:
this intelligent man(s)...potential contribution to Australian political life [has been] undermined by a lack of judgement...his credibility with Australians damaged by ... lack of judgement (The Australian Second Editorial: "Once again, it's a Latham loss", 9 August 2010, p.15);
- ii. of Ms Christina Nixon, former Victorian Police Commissioner: "(her) poor judgement in leaving [the bushfires' control room on "Black Saturday"] as Australia's worst bushfire disaster unfolded is now a political issue" (*The Australian* Second Editorial: "A matter of judgement 9 April 2010, p.17);
- iii. of Federal Government Opposition Leader, Malcolm Turnbull, in the context of what was dubbed the "utegate disaster": "his much remarked upon lack of judgement" (*The Sydney Morning Herald* Second editorial: "MP for Wentworth, not middle Australia" 15 September 2009, p.14); and
- iv. Aarons (2010: 26–7), from a political science perspective and reflecting upon the Party in office in the State and Federal Governments, reflects adversely on their "political judgement" and "political wisdom".

The elements of intellectual judgement and reason, that Newman was positing, are the same elements considered in those comments as being absent in the actions and judgement of a prominent public figures and as grounds for lack of public trust in those person. But to return to Newman's comment around the accumulation of probabilities.

While imagination may play a role in making or recognising the pattern in the accumulation of probabilities, that play is a synthesising role in regard to the converging evidence. Newman's emphasis is upon judgment of the rational intellect which needs to assess the warrant of that synthesising conclusion (Merrigan 2002:217 n.85; 1991: 50–3). I will not be discussing that synthesising role of the imagination here (cf. Flood 1999:151–4).

Newman coined the name “illative sense” to name that faculty of the mind. While he never explained the origin of the term, the adjective “illative” appears to be based on the past participle of the Latin *ferre*—to bring, the same root meaning as “infer”, or “draw a conclusion” (Mahoney 2007:232. n36); Locke, however, had spoken earlier of “(i)llation or inference ... the perception of the connection there is between the ideas in each step of a deduction” (Locke 1959b:387). The similarity, however, does not suggest automatically that Newman was borrowing Locke's language; the awareness of *illative*'s Latin root, is sufficient to explain the use both of Locke and of Newman; of greater interest is Newman's concept of reason.

Terlinden (2007:214–5) suggests that *the illative sense* is best understood as understanding reason as “procedural reason”, a concept of reason according to Taylor (1989 85–90; 143–58) introduced to Western thought by Descartes and which replaced the hitherto prevailing “substantive concept of reason”, according to which “the criterion for rationality is that one get it right” (Taylor 1989: 85). Contrary to Terlinden's claim, the evidence from Newman's own writings discussed above, indicate that Newman consciously developed his own view out of Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*. Newman wrote to a correspondent: “I consider what Aristotle calls *phronesis* is that habit and act of mind which leads a man to determine when inference is to pass to assent (*LD* XXX:148).

Now Newman's concern was with that act of “assent”, that is, “the acceptance of a proposition as true” (*LD* XII: 289), an acceptance that follows the act of inference (*LD* XII:228): “a normal operation of pure nature, which men in general do actually instance. That is a law of our mind” (Newman 1985:343).

In brief, that is the way the mind operates though its performance may be improved through practice; it is not an issue of nature or nurture. The “illative sense”, then, is “right judgement in rationation” (Newman 1985:342). Its use articulates why that particular concrete judgement is warranted. Moleski has drawn attention to the similarity between Newman's “illative sense” and Michael Polanyi's (1891–1976) views on personal and tacit knowledge—“two conceptual maps,

though not identical, cover the same intellectual territory in similar fashion” (Moleski 2000:112); I will not be examining that similarity here as it would take me beyond my immediate concerns.

D’Arcy (1931:148–51) suggests that the word “sense” in Newman’s phrase, reflects the empiricist influence on Newman’s thinking, and rather than the designation of “illative sense”, it might be preferable to call it the “illative intellect” to better name its role and function. While conceding D’Arcy’s point, I will be using Newman’s terminology, because as Newman (1985:223) notes, the word “sense” is “paralleled to our use of it in “good sense”, “common sense”, a “sense of beauty”.

Newman once described *the illative sense* as “a grand word for a common thing” (*LD. XXIV*:275) and he began using that terminology when writing his 1870 *An Essay In Aid Of A Grammar Of Assent* (Ker 1985:xxiii, xxx, xxxii), “though it had been developing in his mind over a period of many years” (Richardson 2007:132)—a “new terminology rather than an entirely new notion” (Moleski 2000:10). Earlier, Newman had referred to that phenomenon of the human mind as “prudence” or “prudent judgement” (1989 107, 115, 123, 327; 1976–9: 24, 30, 36–8; 1969–70 ii:163; cf. Ker 1990:50). *The illative sense* is both personal and also refers to the complex process, elastic and immediate, which enables a person to form a judgement with confident certitude (Vargish 1991:67–8), yet sufficiently conscious to preserve the process from “the errors of and excesses of intuition” (Vargish 1991:68). First principles and assumptions, are important, but are not the immediate concern here (Ker 1990:64–5).

Newman’s “illative sense” has two functions:

1. to bring together ALL arguments, however subtle, and next
2. to determine their worth separately and in combination (1969–70 ii: 163; emphasis in the original).

Hick (1974:81) noted:

the reasoning of the illative sense does not consist in acquiring Cartesian “clear and distinct ideas” ... but rather in appreciating the drift of a miscellaneous mass of evidence as a whole and divine its significance [through rational judgment in the particular concrete situation].

Newman (1985: 233) stresses that the Illative Sense is the “reasoning faculty”. In brief, for Newman, “(t) rue wisdom is not the product of a rigorous method, but the prize of a disciplined

soul” (Hochschild 2003:4). That raises the issue of how that intellectual faculty is acquired and developed; something that is important if the concept is to be integrated into a concept of education for the wise practitioner.

Newman explains:

(t)his Prudentia is partly a natural endowment common to all, or a special gift to certain persons, partly the result of experience; and it varies in its worth and preciousness and its rarity, with the subject matter on which it is employed. Accordingly it has different names, and kinds; sometimes it is sagacity, sometimes common sense, strong sense, shrewdness, acuteness, penetration, are all terms denoting it in different matters, so are instinctive perception, the tact of experience (1976–9:24, cf. 30, 36–8; 1969–70. ii:163).

Accordingly, in the context of the educational dimension of my present project, *the illative sense* is something which can be honed in persons who enjoy that sense at least to a minimal level. In other words, it raises the question of readiness, both psychological and intellectual, something implied in an 1843 letter of Newman: “(a)nyone can reason; only disciplined, educated, informed minds can perceive” (*LD IX:274*), observe the situation and so act. And in the present context, it is a question of the Chaplain listening empathetically and who perceives the Theological and Social Science elements embedded within the conversation. If there is to be a wise use of those Disciplines, there is the presumption that the Chaplain is conversant with those disciplines to a minimal level. The issue is of concrete practical wisdom that goes well beyond the technique (Greek: *techne*) of empathic, attentive listening in an attitude of unconditional positive regard. It refers to the wise use in the concrete and the practical situations of the theoretical insights from relevant disciplines studied at some depth. Accordingly, more is needed upon the characteristics of *the illative sense* that render it so useful a concept.

Newman, I note, maintains that *the illative sense* enjoys four traits: first, “it is the one and the same in all concrete matters” (Newman 1985:230); second, “it is in fact attached to subject matters” (Newman 1985:231). Because an individual may have *the illative sense* in one area it does not mean that it also exists in another area of life for them. “A good man may make a bad king; profligates have been great statesmen, or magnanimous political leaders” (Newman 1985:230); third, it is always (Newman 1985:231) “the mind that reasons, that controls its own reasonings” (Newman 1985:227); and fourth, in concrete reasonings it is the Illative sense, alone, that “gives them its sanction” (Newman 1985: 231) and Newman contends that it is also the duty here of the individual to hone *the illative sense* (Newman 1985:232).

That process of the human mind, *the illative sense*, Newman (1985:232) summarised as follows:

the Illative Sense, that is the reasoning faculty, as exercised by the gifted, or by the educated or otherwise well prepared minds, has its function in the beginning, the middle, and end of all verbal discussion and inquiry, and in every step of the process. It is a rule to itself, and appeals to no judgement beyond its own; and attends upon the whole course of thought from antecedents to consequents, with a minute diligence and unwearied presence, which is impossible to a cumbersome apparatus of verbal reasoning, though, in communicating with others, words are the only instrument we possess, and a serviceable, though imperfect instrument.

Richardson (2007:137–9) contends that Newman sees the development of *the illative sense* as part of the “enlargement of mind” (Newman 1976:112, 119–22, 122–3) something that Newman contended was integral to the nature of university education. *The illative sense* is concerned with the concrete and particular, not with the abstract, the theoretical, or, in Newman’s own term, with a “view”, important as that is. For Newman, “view” refers to a more comprehensive account of matters and the making of judgement of the interrelationship of elements in light of each other. Practical wisdom is distinct from “philosophic wisdom” which “is a combination of intuitive reason, which apprehends universals, and scientific knowledge, which is a capacity to demonstrate what may follow from them” (Culler 1965:201).

While education in practical wisdom has a place in a university environment, I contend that the distinctive nature of the university educational environment needs to be recognised for clarity of thought and improved practice in a profession. That matter was examined in Paper Four.

Support for Newman’s phenomenology of mind, and the accuracy of his description of *the illative sense*, can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Wittgenstein’s reflection on judging the genuineness of an expressed feeling carries a certain “family resemblance” (cf. Wittgenstein 1968:17) to what Newman observed. Wittgenstein poses the question whether a person can learn the art of expert judgment around the genuineness of feelings, and says:

Yes; some can. Not however, by taking a course in it, but through “*experience*”—Can someone else be a man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right *tip*.—This is what “learning” and “teaching” are like here. What one acquires here is not technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right—unlike calculating rules (Wittgenstein 1968:227e; his emphasis).

As with Aristotle and Aquinas, Newman's epistemological focus is upon the individual. The problem remains in that "each mind pursues its own course and is actuated in that course by ten thousand indescribable incommunicable feelings and imaginings" (*LD* ii. 60).

The "reasonings" of *the illative sense* cannot be articulated in a "formula" (*LD* ii. 264). Unlike logic, individuals may conclude differently while using the same evidence; there needs to be, Newman (1985: 1701) contends, a

common measure between mind and mind, as a means of joint investigation, and as a recognised intellectual standard, a standard such as to secure us against hopeless mistakes, and to emancipate us from the capricious *ipse dixit* of authority.

And we are dealing with concrete matters, so some further explanation is needed if *the illative sense* is to avoid the charge of "relativism" (Aquino 2004:84–5, 136). Carr (1961:139), paralleling Kant's legitimation of the aesthetic sense, suggests that "(i)t should follow ... that the illative sense is also a *communal* sense, for one has only a personal "being" by relation to other "beings" with whom we live in community" (emphasis in original).

Merrigan (1991:228) argues that Newman's writings contain an "implicit suggestion" about the communal form of the Illative Sense. Newman in his 1859 *Rambler* essay, "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine" (Newman 1961:73) posits a communal *phronesis* in the Church community, a *phronema*, which enables it to be a trustworthy community of informed theological judgment. Coulson (1970:122, 153) comments that the communal *phronema* mirrors the individual Illative Sense or *phronesis*. And what is instructive for my present project, Aquino (2004) develops the phenomenology of Social Epistemology in the context of *the illative sense* and thus completes Newman's project. Aquino draws on the work of Virtue Ethics, Sociology and Cognitive Psychology, to expand the personal dimension of *the illative sense* to embrace the "community of informed judgment" (Aquino 2004:91). One's Illative Sense is perfected through a process of socialisation that "fosters, corrects and achieves...good epistemic practices" (Aquino 2004:106, 121). Newman's problem of a "common measure" to broaden the public warrant of *the illative sense* has been adjusted by Aquino to that, establishing a trustworthy belief-forming process: "a belief-forming process is reliable if and only if it, guided by good cognitive processes, produces a preponderance of true beliefs over false ones" (Aquino 2004:7).

It is there that the community of informed judgment provides a strong educational role. “(A) vibrant tradition is indispensable for acquiring and passing on requisite qualities of informed judgment ... [and] ensures maturation of the illative sense” (Aquino 2004:121).

And so in the context of the present project, using Newman’s insights, it is contended that the student hones *the illative sense* in the concrete situation of the hospital Chaplain through an educational process within three communities of Informed Judgment—the CPE tradition, the Denominational tradition of the student and the tradition of Liberal Education.

Yet, the approaches discussed suffer from a philosophical weakness, already referred to, namely the hegemony of the thinking *ego* over the acting person-in-relation, a philosophical weakness found in both Cartesian and Classical Greek thought (Dunne 1997:444, n.108). I turn therefore to the insight offered by the Scottish philosopher John Macmurray (1891–1976), particularly in his 1953–4 Gifford Lectures (Macmurray 1991, 1999) where “he summarised the work of a lifetime” (Kirkpatrick 1999:ix). A few introductory comments are needed to indicate the historical philosophical issues Macmurray sought to address.

3. Macmurray on the “Self” and “Persons in relation”

Macmurray argued that the key philosophical issue since Descartes (1596–1650) was the nature of the self and he distinguished three epochs. Fielding (2007:385) summarised those epochs as being characterised by the distinctive manner in which the self is conceived:

- a. the first epoch was that of formal Rationalism - from Descartes to the end of the French Revolution where “the self is conceived primarily as a substance whose unity is best understood mathematically, mechanically and causally”;
- b. the second epoch was that of Romanticism, from the French Revolution to the First World War, where the view of the previous epoch is rejected and “in its stead conceives of the self as a living being, an organism”;
- c. the third epoch, beginning at the start of the second quarter of the twentieth century and which has a new concept of the self where “personal relationships dominate, control and subordinate all organic functions”.

Macmurray sought to articulate that newer understanding of the self, contending that “the essence of the self is that of an agent in action, rather than a thinker in thought” (Kirkpatrick 1999:xi). In that Macmurray stepped back from the “too egocentric” (Bevir & O’Brien 2003:312) starting point of both Descartes and Kant: “the self realisation of any individual

person is only fully achieved if he is positively motivated towards every other person with whom he is in relation” (Macmurray 1999:159).

The paradigmatic example of the Human self is seen in the relationship between mother and child (Macmurray 1995:44–63), which is “the basic form of human existence ... a “You and I” with a common life (Macmurray 1999:60); from his phenomenological study of that relationship Macmurray (1999:61) contends:

human experience is, in principle, shared experience; human life even in its most individual elements, is a common life; and human behaviour carries always, in its inherent structure, a reference to the personal Other ... The personal is constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the personal is not “I”, but “You and I”.

Macmurray argues that “(t)ransferring the centre of reference to action ... is that man becomes personal” (Macmurray 1999:12); and further that the personal dimension of existence is effected only through friendship relationships with other persons. As Macmurray observed, “the Self is a *person*, and ... personal existence is *constituted* by the relation of persons” (Macmurray 1991:12; emphasis in original). Contrary to much of “modern philosophy”, where “there are many ‘I’s but no ‘You’ (Macmurray 1999:23), Macmurray argues for a “thick concept of the self embedded in interpersonal relations” (Bevir & O’Brien 1999:2). In brief, the Self is “inherently communal” (Bevir & O’Brien 1999:2).

Further, contrary to Descartes, Macmurray “privileges action over thought” (Bevir & O’Brien 1999:3). Thinking, he contends, presumes action; thought presumes the Agent’s acting. Thought is less complete since it “is constituted by the exclusion of some of our powers” (Macmurray 1999:86); “thinking is a subset of action” (Bevir & O’Brien 1999:3). As Harrison (1991:xviii) comments: “it is not that action is possible without thought (it isn’t) but rather that thought is ultimately for action. This means that the self as agent is primary, the self as object is secondary”.

Macmurray’s “thick concept of the self”, as just noted above, is inherently communal and therefore provides a warrant for correcting the excessive individualism in their views that were examined.

4. Insights drawn

From my conversation with Aristotle, Aquinas and Newman around practical wisdom, I conclude that the educational tactic underlying the use of the Verbatim in CPE programmes, is the honing of the intellectual virtue of *phronesis* (Aristotle) or *prudentia* (Aquinas) in matters of ethical import, and of *the illative sense* (Newman) in any matter at all: “(w)hat Aristotle called *phronesis*, which he confined to the practical order, [and Newman showed] can be extended to all reasoning on concrete matters” (McInerny 2001: 101). Newman, as Dunne remarked (1997: 55), “moves toward the eventual enthronement of *phronesis*” in the social world. And again, “(*p*)*hronesis* is precisely the kind of reason, which including practical *nous*, has developed an ‘eye’ (Aristotle) or a ‘nose’ (Wittgenstein) for what is salient in concrete situations” (Dunne 1997:368).

Moreover, it is crucial that the teachers/supervisors/mentors be both wise persons (*phronimoi*) and have an excellent grasp of the relevant academic disciplines, if they are to help persons in the profession of Pastoral Care to become *phronimoi*, something that is beyond the mere acquisition of skills. Drawing on Aquino’s extension of Newman’s Illative Sense, communities of informed judgment, based upon the *phronema* of their professional wisdom/tradition, provide a trustworthy warrant for judging whether *the illative sense* judgment of an individual carries sufficient authority for endorsement by other members of the profession. As Dunne (1997:370) commented:

for (as no one saw more clearly than Dewey) not all ‘experience’ is educative, or in Aristotle’s words, “it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre players are produced”. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so there would have been no need of a teacher (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1 1103b8–12; Trans. Ross 1963:29).

That applies all the more so in educating the wise practitioner where critical reflection is so important.

Alongside that, is the “insight” that transcends mere cleverness (Aristotle’s *dionetes* *EN* 1141a24–7) and moves to practical wisdom (*phronesis*). Aristotle also comments:

(t)hat we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations, because experience has given them an eye they see aright (*EN* VI.11. Ross 1965:153).

Newman cites that same passage from Aristotle and then adds:

Instead of trusting logical science, we must respect persons, namely those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge. And if we wish to share in their convictions and the grounds for them, we must follow their history, and learn as they have learned ... By following this course, we may make ourselves of their number (Newman 1985:221).

Thus critical reflection is important.

Accordingly, in extending our conversation to persons of another age and culture, we approximate to participating in a tradition, and so the Verbatim, the student's accurate written record of the conversation with the patient, becomes the tactic supporting the process of initiation into the worthwhile traditions, through a twofold rhetorical strategy of identification (Burke 1969:20–3; 64) and ongoing invitation. For Newman, “(k)nowledge depends on personal testimony; prudence defers to history; learning is joining a tradition” (Hochschild 2003:6).

Because it is a question of honing an intellectual virtue, of strengthening and polishing a habit, there are further traits of the acquired professional “wisdom” that need to be noted. The matter of the transfer of skills to the work situation (Cheng & Ho 2001) does not apply in the educational model discussed in this Paper, since the issue is not one of skill (*techné*) but of *phronesis/prudentia/the illative sense*; the wisdom gained, the habit of judging is what is applied in the particular concrete situation.

The philosophical understanding of that educational tactic of the student's Verbatim can be enriched further with insights from Vygotsky's psychological construct of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD), and the cultural anthropologist Barbara Myerhoff's work on definitional ceremonies and re-membering conversations. Each will be discussed in turn, integrated into the philosophical understanding proposed. My insights here draw heavily upon Michael White's (1948–2008) articulation of his use of their writings to provide part of the underpinning theory for his Narrative Therapy (White 2007). In 1983 Michael White founded the Dulwich Centre in Adelaide and with his New Zealand colleague, David Epston, developed a counselling approach that became known as “narrative therapy”.

5. Further insights from Social Sciences

a) The Zone of Proximal Development (Vygotsky)

The Russian psychologist Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896–1934) became interested in the educational psychology of the child. As a clinical psychologist working with children who were hearing, vision and mentally challenged, his criticisms of intelligence (IQ) tests led him to probe the relationship between instruction and mental development. In 1933 Vygotsky “hit upon the concept of the zone of proximal development” (van der Veer 2007:78), and, while he always said that he had drawn the concept from current teaching and he referred vaguely to American researchers and a German educationalist as shaping his thought in the matter, “(t)hese references were so vague that no one has as yet been able to clarify the origin and history of the concept and until the present day [2007] the concept of the zone of proximal development is attributed to Vygotsky” (van de Veer 2007:79).

The problem is exacerbated by Vygotsky’s early death from TB and his having “only eight published texts where the concept of the zone of proximal development is mentioned or discussed” (van der Veer 2007:78).

Vygotsky developed his ideas in a world influenced by “progressive” education, a broad educational movement, then nearly fifty years old, with often contradictory philosophical views, yet sharing a desire to engage the pupil more actively in the learning, to provide a more practical curriculum, and to integrate school and society (van der Veer 2007:136–7)—figures such as John Bradley (1865–1967) and the Bedales School (1896) in the UK, John Dewey (1859–1952) and his Laboratory School at the University of Chicago (1896); Maria Montessori (1870–1952) and her *Casa dei Bambini* (1907), Helen Pankhurst (1857–1973) and the Dalton School (1918), Peter Petersen (1854–1952) and the Jena concept of the experimental school (1924); Rudolf Steiner (1861–1925) and the Waldorf school; and Georg Kerschensteiner (1854–1932) and the labor school (*Arbeitsschule*), illustrate the breadth of that movement. Vygotsky was not a professional educationalist but his focus was “*the child acquiring the culture of its parents*” (van der Veer 2007:139, emphasis in original); his immediate concern was to develop a prognostic device for the child’s future performance at school. Based upon his research findings he claimed that it was a:

sociogenetic law that higher mental processes and self regulation originate in social interaction with a more able partner. What the child can do in co-operation now, it can do independently

tomorrow. The stage of joint performance precedes that of autonomous performance (van der Veer 2007:83).

That was the necessary psychological zone immediately prior to the cognitive development for the child, the “zone of proximal development” (ZPD). Good instruction, therefore, calls into being and makes possible that cognitive development (van der Veer 2007:84). “The only fruitful instruction is that which stimulates the child, because it is just above the level of the child’s independent performance” (van der Veer 2007:87).

For Vygotsky, “development is based on both maturation and instruction” (van der Veer 2007:89), a theoretical position midway between Piaget on the one hand, and James and Thorndike on the other (van der Veer 2007:88–9). Vygotsky argued that the pedagogical tasks will be effective only when they are within that child’s zone of proximal development (van der Veer 2007:141).

In brief, Vygotsky argued that it is in the zone of proximal development that the child distances itself from its own immediate experience, and, aided by the collaboration of peers or adult mentor who break down the task into manageable portions, (a process is described by the metaphor of “scaffolding”), which enables the child to stretch its mind and exercise imagination in the learning task and to do so in manageable portions (White 2007:272). While Vygotsky’s research is concerned with the development of the young child, Michael White, the distinguished Australian Narrative Therapist, comments out of his more than two decades of clinical practice (White 2007:275): “I have found his [Vygotsky’s] conclusions about learning and development to be relevant to all stages and ages”. Accordingly it is legitimate to apply Vygotsky’s insights to adults in Clinical Pastoral Education.

The educational tactic of the Verbata, as an ongoing process over a 400 hour Basic Unit of the NSW CPE programme, has the potential to be perceived as occurring within a zone of proximal development (ZPD) where the student’s practical wisdom in applying in the concrete practical situation, the insights from theological and/or Social Science disciplines previously studied at an abstract and theoretical level. That clearly presumes that both supervisor and peers are able to identify correctly the student’s ZPD in offering their alternatives; the teaching of that lies outside my present discussion analysing the educational process. The “scaffolding” comes in the setting of the presentation of the Verbatim both to the supervisor and to one’s peers in supervision, and their sifting through with the presenting student alternative scenarios as the earlier conversation

is re-examined from the perspective of alternative responses and their possible impact in that setting. Supervisors and fellow students assist in so far as they present alternatives within the presenting student's ZPD. The language is, to borrow Todorov's (1977) appropriation of the grammar of verbs in Classical Greek and Latin, "subjunctive"—"perhaps", "might", and "could" of the subjunctive mood of the verb forms.

In each NSW Basic CPE Unit, the student presents about thirty Verbata for individual and group supervision, where the CPE student not only hones their practical wisdom but contributes to the developing concept of themselves as a "pastoral carer", or chaplain. The desired educational outcome of the CPE Unit(s) is not to have educated the world's best Pastoral Carer, but, to borrow Winnicott's descriptive, (1971:10, 11n, 47, 71, 81, 89, 111–2, 139, 141; 1990a: 63, 119, 120, 144, 154; 1990b: 57–8, 145–6) for the goal of healthy self-perception by the young mother to be "good enough", the goal of the Chaplain is to be a "good-enough" Pastoral Carer. [That insight was first drawn to my attention by my sometime CPE Supervisor, Mrs Dianna Davidson]. That ministerial identity is socially constructed through the ongoing Verbata process of the first of the Basic Units and is further deepened as the student completes other CPE Units.

To provide an explanation of that psycho-social process I turn now to the work of the cultural anthropologist Barra Myerhoff (1935–85) on "definitional ceremonies" and "re-membering conversations".

b) Definitional Ceremonies and re-membering conversations (Myerhoff)

Michael White (1948–2008) has reported his successful use in Narrative Therapy of Myerhoff's work on reflexivity, both as a therapeutic instrument and as a heuristic tool (White 1997:177–9; 2000: 66–8; 2007:136–7, 180–4). Myerhoff's insights also provide a useful lens through which to view the social construction (Burr 2003) of the pastoral identity of the Chaplain, something developed directly through the individual's own Verbata and indirectly through the reflection on the Verbata of his/her peers in the CPE Unit. I begin by summarising Myerhoff's views, and then use them to bring insight to the educational process that arises out of the ongoing use of the Verbata.

The central idea is that of reflexivity which:

generates the heightened awareness and vertigo, the creative intensity of a possibility that loosens us from habit and custom and turns us back to contemplate ourselves just as we may be beginning

to realise we have no clear idea of what we are doing ... the capacity of any system of signification to turn back on itself, to make itself its own object by referring to itself: subject and object fuse ... It may be public or private, collective or individual, displayed openly or pondered introspectively (Myerhoff and Ruby 1982:1–2, 4).

In the present context of the ongoing use of the Verbatim, the critical component in that process, namely reflexivity, may take place for the individual in their writing up of the Verbatim (the private, introspective dimensions with the student's critical reflections on the pastoral conversation) as well as in their reading the Verbatim in both individual and group supervisory sessions, (the open and collective dimensions), where peers and supervisors critically reflect together with the CPE student on the Verbatim presented. There, the Verbatim is "putting experience into circulation" (Geertz 1982:375) for the process of reflexivity.

Barbara Myerhoff used reflexivity to report her participant-observation ethnographical study in the early 1970s of a group of elderly Holocaust survivors, Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe living in a ghetto in Venice Beach, Los Angeles, California (Myerhoff 1978, 1986, 1994). Her interest was in how that community articulated and maintained their distinctive cultural identity. She reported that two mechanisms were crucial, "re-membering" conversations and definitional ceremonies; a brief comment on each is in order—firstly "re-membering conversations".

i) Re-membering conversations

The idiosyncratic spelling of "re-membering" is deliberate. The term is used

(t)o signify the special type of recollection ... calling attention to the reaggregation of members ... a purposive; significant unification, quite different from the passive, continuous fragmentary flickerings of images and feelings that accompany other activities in the normal flow of consciousness. The focussed unification provided by re-membering is requisite to sense and ordering. A life is given shape that extends back in the past and forward into the future ... Private and collective lives, properly remembered are interpretative. Full or 'thick description' is such an analysis. This involves finding linkages between the group's shared, valued beliefs and symbols, and specific historical events (Myerhoff 1982:111).

Within the framework of the individual and group supervisory setting, the Verbatim remembers the student to the past pastoral conversation. The Verbatim remembers supervisors and peers through the communality of the remembered experiences. The Verbatim in its final section, having recorded the Pastoral Carer's earlier conversation at the bedside, interprets its

significance in light of the academic disciplines of Theology and the Social Sciences in that concrete practical setting, and, in light of that reflection, proposes the next possible step in the ongoing pastoral care of the person visited.

The articulation of the Chaplain's pastoral identity, both as a member of this Denomination and as a professional in the hospital setting, is an outcome of the series of some thirty individual and group Verbata of a basic CPE Unit. The student Chaplain is united by a past and through his/her practice expresses his/her belonging to those traditions; that is, she or he becomes "membered" within those traditions. It is in that setting that the Pastoral Carer's social identity is constructed. The construction of that Pastoral Identity is implicit and integral to the process of the CPE Unit. That becomes important given the invisibility of the Pastoral Carer in the work situation. The "invisibility" of the hospital Chaplain in the hospital is the outcome of a number of factors: firstly, she or he is working among Health and Allied Health professionals whose disciplines (Medicine, Counselling, and Social Welfare) are evidence-based; secondly, the pastoral care interaction remains personal and confidential; thirdly, the pastoral carer functions as an autonomous and independent professional, even though there is an accountability both to their Denominational Authority and to the Health Agency in whose hospital they are serving.

ii) Definitional ceremonies

Myerhoff (1986:267) explains that:

(d)efinitional ceremonies deal with problems of invisibility and marginality; they are strategies that provide opportunities for being seen and in one's own terms, garnering witnesses to one's worth, vitality, and being.

The therapists Hedtke and Winsdale (2004:9) note that the re-membering is "a special form of recollection ... an active process ... more than reminiscing ... an ongoing construction of a present reality ... an invocation of current membership status".

The series of Verbata function as definitional ceremonies in Myerhoff's account. Nor is the social construction of that pastoral identity exhausted by the process of re-membering just discussed; also important is what Myerhoff termed "definitional ceremonies" within that group. A few words are in order on what Myerhoff understood by that term.

Myerhoff noted how the ethnic group, lacking a sympathetic outside audience, invented artificially their own defining cultural performances for themselves as the audience:

arousing consciousness of ourselves as we see ourselves. As heroes in our own dramas, we are made self aware, conscious of our own consciousness... [They] are collective self-definitions specifically intended to proclaim an interpretation to an audience not otherwise available ... Again and again they attempt to show outsiders, as well as each other, who they were, why they mattered, what the nature of their past and present lives was (Myerhoff 1982:105; emphasis in original).

The socially constructed identity is also socially verified (White 2007:183n); the audience acknowledges the claims of the actor and that has particular significance for the actor. As far as CPE Units are concerned, the risk of complacency by the participants on the one hand, and, on the other, of “group think” is offset by the presence of trained, accredited, experienced CPE supervisors at the Verbatim presentations. In the context of my present argument, those supervisors are acknowledged and credited “wise practitioners”, or *phronimo*, along with the students in training to become “wise practitioners”; accordingly; there is an inbuilt safeguard in that process.

Likewise, the audience of the Verbatim, both supervisor and peers, verify the pastoral identity of the CPE student presenting their Verbata, which is that student’s record of some thirty pastoral conversations and their reflection upon them. As such they fit Myerhoff’s description of definitional ceremonies, and in this context contribute to the student’s pastoral identity, to building thick conclusions about that identity and to the integration of that pastoral style into the Chaplain’s ongoing practice (cf. White 2007:184). Following Sen (2006:23–5), it is noted that each Chaplain has a number of identities, or, in Pearson’s (2006) neat turn of phrase drawing upon the metaphor of the multilayered onion, albeit in a different context, each Chaplain has “layered identities”. Through the experience of the Unit(s), the trainee’s identity is shaped in regard to issues of Denominational identity, of gender identity, CPE tradition of pastoral identity, and sometimes of a modification of the ethnic identity as well. Particular circumstances along with an individual’s personal concerns at the time mould the landscape of the construction of a particular identity, and how the layers of identities interrelate, for an individual Chaplain. White has developed useful terminology for his Narrative Therapy, which provides insight here; using Bruner (1986:21, 24, 36, 37, 61; 1990:35–6), White (2007:75-9, 103–4) illustrates how in the therapy session the client constructs a landscape of action and a landscape of identity. A similar process occurs during the training Unit for the CPE student. Through the individual and group supervisory sessions the student develops his/her own identity as a Chaplain, and each Verbatim considers the preferable approach to be followed by the student-Chaplain in the ongoing pastoral

care of the patient; the process is action-learning and learning in action. I will return to that educational aspect and the insights it offers in my final Paper.

6. Conclusion

To summarise: the CPE Unit(s) aim to educate the wise practitioner through the process of honing their judgement in the particular pastoral situation - by honing what Aristotle termed *phronesis*, Aquinas *prudentia* and Newman *the illative sense*. It is an experiential process within communities of informed judgement, persons in relationship. Not only does the Verbatim provide the tactic for honing the student's practical wisdom as a Chaplain within a community of informed judgment, but using Myerhoff's insights, it can be seen how the series of Verbata contribute to the construction of the Chaplain's pastoral identity within the both Denominational and CPE Pastoral Care Traditions, the social construction of a layered pastoral identity, and that is through the re-membering mechanisms of writing and the presentation of the Verbatim and the definitional ceremonies of the supervisory sessions with both one's supervisors and peers during the CPE Unit. Accordingly appropriate assessment of student learning is through the self assessment of the student on the one hand, along with the assessment of members of a Community of Informed Judgment represented by the supervisors of that Unit, on the other. Critical reflection is central to that process. The record of the presentation of the student Verbata may form a portfolio which records examples they have chosen of their Chaplaincy performance over each eleven week Basic Unit; I will return to that matter with further comments in my final Paper in this Portfolio. Where there is a difference between the student self assessment and the view of the representatives of the Community of Informed Judgment, then there needs to be in place a recognised appeal process whereby the student submits his or her professional work to other designated representatives of the Community of Informed Judgment for their decision. The details of that appeal process take me beyond my present project and accordingly will not be discussed here. Yet in it all, the educational project in the CPE Unit(s), as I argued in this Paper, is the education of the "wise practitioner" using Aristotle's concept of *phronesis*, Aquinas' *prudentia*, and Newman's *the illative sense*, each of which relate to intellectual judgment. Accordingly, this Paper ties in with my discussion of the concept of tertiary education in Paper Four.

Paper 7: Summary and Implications for Professional Practice, Future Directions

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Paper 7: Summary and Implications for Professional Practice, Future Directions

1. Introduction

This Paper has three sections: first, I will summarise the argument of the previous Papers and using as a lens a recent exchange in the literature on American medical education, critique the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal made in the Papers of the Portfolio. I will suggest why a “competency” model is inadequate for assessment of the professional expertise of the “wise practitioner”; as I develop my case I will suggest the implications for professional practice that are the outcome of the position favoured. Those implications will be presented in summary form. I begin by outlining the project that is the purpose of this Portfolio and then summarise the arguments of the seven Papers.

2. The Argument of this Portfolio

The purpose of this portfolio was to articulate a philosophy of education that would reflect the custom and practice of Clinical Pastoral Education as provided by the New South Wales College of Clinical Pastoral Education Incorporated, (NSWCCPE Inc.), an Inter-Christian Association for the education of Christian Chaplains for Denominational pastoral care in hospitals, aged care facilities, prisons and factories. The portfolio took as its primary focus the training of hospital Chaplains, the major work of NSW CCPE Inc. The historical origin of the CPE movement in America was a postgraduate year of professional formation of the Denominational professional Pastoral Care. It was noted that some members within the College, most recently Little (2010), have favoured a movement away from such a setting, to that of vocational training associated with Technical Vocational Education where the emphasis is upon “competence”. This Portfolio favours a hermeneutic of recovery, a recovery of the professional practice as developed by the CPE movement in its first thirty years in the United States of America, where the CPE training and formation always followed the period of graduate education in Ministry, and the CPE Units were taught at the postgraduate level. There are good reasons for a return to that historical position. The first is that the CPE methodology presumes that its student has a good grasp of Theology and Social Sciences if the Chaplain’s reflection on the pastoral conversation is to be well informed. Currently, CPE Basic and Advanced Units presume a solid grasp of Denominational Theology and the relevant Social Sciences for the reflection component in the Verbatim to be effective; moreover the curricula for Basic and Advanced Units do not include

any provision for ensuring that input where there is serious deficit. Nor is the case for a return to the postgraduate status limited to requiring a grasp at undergraduate level of those disciplines. There is also the custom and practice in other professional fields that provide a “bench mark” in general, as well as an expectation by those training as Chaplains to experience a certain equivalence in their professional training as other professions currently receive, particularly those professions alongside whom they are regularly working. And Davis notes there is a strong tendency in Australia to “shift professional training to graduate level” and he instances the example of the Melbourne School of Education (Davis 2010:80).

A postgraduate setting for professional training

It is relevant to note how other professional careers in Australia have come to require admission to their ranks through university. Thus up to the 1930s Dentistry was taught through an apprenticeship process in New South Wales (Davis 2010:70); since the mid 1960s admission to legal practice requires university study (Davis 2010:70); nursing, traditionally taught in hospital settings, by 1993 had been shifted into the university setting (Davis 2010:35), and “some forms of nursing have become so highly specialised that that they are only taught at postgraduate level” (Davis 2010:36); from 2012 at the University of Western Australia “professional courses such as law, medicine, teaching and engineering will be taught at graduate level” (Davis 2010:112). Davis (2010:36) summarises the current situation in Australia as follows: “universities have come to monopolise professional training. Around two thirds of Australian university students study professional courses, from actuarial studies to veterinary science” .

Or as Davis (2010:84) puts it more succinctly a little later, “the universities are the gatekeepers to the professions”. Just as professional practice in the education of doctors shaped Chaplaincy training in the United States of America, one can presume that the ruling professional practice in Australia will shape the expectancy around the approach in Chaplaincy training in the NSW College of CPE, one of the 137 institutions along with the 37 public and two private universities registered by the Australian Commonwealth to “offer higher education courses” (Davis 2010:114). While some tertiary students’ path to university is through a TAFE course, it is seen as a “progression” (Davis 2010:82) to a higher level of awards.

I noted earlier in Paper Two how such pressures gave rise to the Melbourne and Sydney Colleges of Divinity for the training for Ministry in the Christian Churches and that it is under the aegis of the Sydney College of Divinity that NSWCCPE Inc. offers its raft of awards. The pressure in that direction for professionalisation can be expected to become stronger as the Government

moves towards achieving the target set in response to the Bradley Review of Higher Education (2009) “to ensure that 40 per cent of twenty-five to thirty-four-year-olds have a bachelors degree or higher by 2025” (Davis 2010:107). That pressure towards uniformity of practice becomes even stronger when it is remembered that Australian public universities enrol some 94 per cent of students (Davis 2010:114). My point is that the minority’s approach can be expected to be shaped by the practice of the majority.

Before proposing a philosophy of education for CPE I noted in my Second Paper that hospital Chaplains and medical doctors share the holistic practice of seeking to “heal” the patient, an understanding developed originally in the setting of Palliative Care. That Asclepian mode was applied in the traditional custom and practice of CPE. It was noted further that the approach dovetailed well with the early Christian theological theme of “Christ, the Physician”. It was also noted how the Associate Membership of the SCD has returned the CPE educational strategy to a tertiary context. Next drawing on the contributions of the key historical figures in the development of the CPE Movement in the United States I showed what the signature pedagogy of the Chaplaincy profession is. Any adequate philosophy of education needs to be cognisant of that pedagogy of the profession. And lastly in that second Paper I provided grounds for my using an approach to reason associated with “Modernity” and outlined briefly why there is no philosophical conflict in using such a methodology in this Portfolio. The third Paper of this Portfolio argued that, as an educational programme, CPE was an initiation into a worthwhile tradition; that tradition is threefold:

- i) it is an initiation into the worthwhile pastoral care tradition of a particular Christian tradition;
- ii) at the same time, it is an initiation into the worthwhile tradition of the Clinical Pastoral Education; and
- iii) it is an initiation into the worthwhile tradition of Liberal Education that is consonant with the Religious tradition of the student doing the programme.

The strategy of that initiation, it was argued was rhetorical, where the CPE student is persuaded into the CPE tradition of pastoral care through the use of the Verbata of the student’s pastoral care visits for critical analysis in a supervisory context. It includes becoming “critically self-reflective of one’s assumptions” (Mezirow 1998:187), but contrary to Mezirow (1998:188), it was contended that critical reflection and rational discourse can include understandings based on tradition or authority. As Mezirow (1998:190) remarked: “(l)earning may be understood as the

process of using prior interpretation to construe a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of one's experience in order to guide future action".

Central to that is the educational use of the Verbatim in the supervisory context and that is the signature pedagogy of the hospital Chaplaincy profession; at the same time, it is the tactic being used for the persuasive process. The knowledge produced is warrantable knowledge, trustworthy and reasonable. It is through the Verbatim and the supervisory process that the student is initiated into the worthwhile tradition of the CPE formed hospital Chaplain. The second worthwhile tradition is the student's Denominational Christian Tradition which is not part of the CPE educational process but is assumed to have occurred because that is the background to the student's proposal that she or he undertake the CPE programme in the first place. Moreover, as discussed immediately above, the proposed context of CPE education is a postgraduate course following undergraduate studies in Theology and the relevant Social Sciences.

The other persuasive rhetorical proofs Aristotle identifies, that of feeling and the speaker's authority manifested in the speaker's own words, namely the speaker being a "wise practitioner" and a person who is not deemed hostile, *ethos* in Aristotle's account of rhetorical persuasion, also contribute to the rhetorical process at the heart of Clinical Pastoral Education. Since the CPE programme focusses primarily upon the experience of the Chaplaincy student, the primary rhetorical proof of the CPE programme is the supervisor's *ethos* through which the identity of the Christian hospital Chaplain is modelled (a rhetoric of identity), and the invitation is presented to become part of Denominational Chaplaincy practice by acting that way (an implied rhetoric of invitation to the student in the whole CPE process that carries an even stronger note because it is also a process whereby the student develops a clearer understanding of the role of the Chaplain, in brief, a rhetoric of identity). The process is deeply reasonable or rational, and therefore partakes appropriately in the characterisation of "liberal education". And that is the third worthwhile tradition into which the CPE student is initiated through participation in the CPE programme.

Because the CPE student's Verbatim is the major educational method of the CPE programme, and because the Verbatim bears a family resemblance to case studies of Qualitative Research Methodology on the one hand, and to case reasoning or casuistry on the other, the Fourth Paper showed how such methods are profoundly rational. And from that it follows that the signature

pedagogy of the CPE profession does not undermine a liberal education approach as it seeks to effect its educational outcome, the wise practitioner, the subject of my Sixth Paper

3. The outcome of the CPE programme: the wise practitioner

The outcome of the CPE process, as an educational process, is that of becoming the “wise practitioner” within those threefold traditions. Through being mentored and supervised by an accredited wise practitioner, and through the peer supervision of student Chaplains also learning through the action of Chaplaincy Pastoral practice, the student’s rational judgements applying knowledge to the concrete particular situation is skilled and refined. That rational judgement has been characterised by Aristotle as *phronesis* (practical wisdom), by Aquinas, as *prudentia* (prudence) and by Newman as *the illative sense*, and their insights enhance the understanding of how central that learning is and how it is honed—by practice, and over time, and under supervised guidance. As Ericsson et al. (2007) point out, the evidence is that outstanding performance is not the outcome of innate talent or skill, but is the product of deliberate practice and coaching—the very style that is at the heart of the CPE Unit. The educational outcome is the formation of “the wise practitioner” in Chaplaincy, recognised by the practitioner’s critical reflection on his or her own practice, and the judgement of other wise practitioners, both supervisors and peers. The concern is the practitioner’s wise practice.

A few words are warranted on why a “competence model” is not the preferred way forward, particularly as some CPE supervisors, influenced by vocational training models in Technical and Vocational Education, have contended that that is the direction pastoral education should be taking. Most recently Little (2010) has made that point and examined the implications of a competence model for CPE practice. My contention is that the heart of CPE education is not the issue of competency.

a) Not a competence issue

Australia’s “vocational education and training” rests on the principles of competence-based training (CBT) which had its societal origins in Cold War America and the reaction to the perceived superiority of Russian scientists who had placed a satellite in orbit ahead the Americans (Hodge 2007:180–2) on the one hand, and on the other, the dropout rate for secondary students and its impact on the level of unemployment (Hodge 2007:183). The theoretical background to competence-based training was that of behavioural psychology and systems theory (Hodge 1998:188–96). The focus is on the imparting of common skills across

the population while education is concerned with the individual's response in a range of situations. My educational concern is the honing of a practitioner's judgement, which is greater than the sum of the competencies in themselves. Judgement is needed about the combination of competencies required by that person when faced with a particular situation. Put simply: "training aims to teach individuals to perform similar behaviours, while education seeks to develop behaviours in the individual that are singular" (Hodge 2007:197).

Such then is the purpose of CPE formation, namely to hone the practical judgement in the particular concrete situation and the effectiveness of such education is perceived by the educational outcome of a wise practitioner. The *phronimos*, in Aristotle's term, is assessed by the *phronimoi*, using what is sometimes referred to as *phronesiology*, or practical reasoning in the concrete or particular situation.

I wish now to critique the proposals of this Portfolio through the lens of recent American discussions on Medical education practices because of the insights those discussions bring to the argument of this Portfolio and because of the historical impact medical education had on emerging CPE practice in the USA.

It was noted in earlier Papers that the CPE methodology was influenced by the use of case studies at the Harvard School of Medicine and later Harvard's School of Business. In the 1970s McMaster University "introduced the storytelling method, Problem Based Learning (PBL), into their medical school curriculum" and from there PBL was used in graduate programmes in science and engineering and other universities followed as an effective way to engage students and with better learning outcomes (Herried 2005:1). As my argument unfolded, further insights were drawn from medical education. I turn now to use a recent series of exchanges in the *New England Journal of Medicine* in Editorials, letters and articles between late October 2006 and early March 2007 on the assessment of medical professionalism by Baker (2007), Bowen (2006), Epstein (2007), Hafferty (2006, 2007), Klas (2007), Norman (2006), and Stern & Papadakis (2006). A number of useful and relevant insights can be taken to critique my argument in the Portfolio and to highlight insights which have not been noted in previous Portfolio Papers.

Hafferty (2006:2151) endorsed the observation of Stern and Papadakis (2006) that

considerable learning (some think most) takes place outside the domain of the formal curriculum ... in the unwritten rules of studenthood and medical practice ... alternate, or shadow, domains of learning, whose lessons are sometimes collectively called the 'hidden curriculum' ... Included in

this are the lessons students learn as they witness conflicts between expectations and ideals articulated in professional codes and the behaviour [of individual(s)] ... and organisations as both go about the daily and concurrent work of medicine and education.

The impact of the “hidden curriculum” in CPE settings is an area warranting serious investigation, as will be noted below. My focus here though is the appraisal of “professionalism as a core standard” (Hafferty 2006:2151). I note that Hafferty (2006:2151–2) draws attention to three interrelated issues of assessment and while the issue of student assessment is not discussed in this portfolio, Hafferty’s comments raise issues relevant to an exploration of a philosophy of education for CPE.

Hafferty’s issues of assessment are:

- i. the problem to assess what is transmitted across a range of learning environments through “formal and informal, even tacit practices” (Hafferty 2006:2152).

This Portfolio has not examined the “formal and informal, even tacit practices” involved in CPE Units; that work remains to be done.

- ii. the need to assess what “may be conceived as both practice and identity” (Hafferty 2006:2152). The issue is beyond having the necessary knowledge, the skills and outward behaviour and includes “value orientations and motives ... [which] ... are in part, the product of professional learning and socialisation” (Hafferty 2006:2152).

That underpinning of value orientations and motives

provides the necessary stability and generalizability when one has to step outside the realm of textbook ... practice and confront situations of uncertainty and ambiguity—which are, after all, the defining characteristics of real-world [professional work] (Hafferty 2006:2152).

CPE pedagogical practice has always emphasised the development of the pastoral identity of the Chaplain and the Advanced Student is required to articulate that both in writing up the Verbatim and in the Supervisory sessions (cf. *Assessment for the Advanced Unit of Clinical Pastoral Education in NSWCCPE Inc.* 2004:36). Further, the Portfolio contended that the Chaplain’s identity is multiple or “layered” with one or other identity being put in the forefront as appropriate, for example, Denominational identity, gendered identity, a CPE identity, and a liberal education identity;

- iii. the need to assess both “learners and their learning environment ... There is a meaningful and measurable difference between *being* a professional and *acting* professionally ... having authentically internalised core values (Hafferty 2006:2152, author’s emphasis).

The matter of assessing the learning environment was not addressed in this Portfolio and will be included among the issues for further investigation below. Hafferty’s point stands: “It makes little sense to assess the professionalisation of students within learning environments that are hostile to its precepts” (Hafferty 2006:2152). And

- iv. Hafferty (2006:2152) notes that: personal reflection remains a core element of virtually all definitions of professionalism.

Baker (2007) supports that strategy.

The reflection on the pastoral visit from theological, ethical and social science perspectives that are part of the Verbatim report and the material for the individual and group supervisory sessions of each CPE Unit are personal reflections focussing both on the pastoral visit being examined and the development of a possible strategy for the next visit where applicable. Baker makes mention of a similar practice at the Indiana School of Medicine where faculty and students are encouraged “to record single clinical events when they occur for active reflection later ... facilitated by experienced clinicians chosen for their high standards of professionalism” (Baker 2007:966).

In educating the hospital Chaplain the desired outcome is that the Chaplain is a “wise practitioner”, a person of practical wisdom, a *phronimos*. As a way into my argument, Aristotle provides a useful beginning. In *The Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle notes the difference between making and acting.

(T)he reasoned state of capacity to act is different[ly] from the reasoned capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting. (*EN* 1140a; Trans. Ross 1963:141)

Action is based on deliberating well, prior to judgement, and making depends on skill and refers to the artisan. And it is relevant to note that Aristotle made that distinction immediately prior to his discussion of practical wisdom (*phronesis*) (Aristotle 1963 VI, 5:142). Practical judgement (*phronesis*) refers to deliberating well; competence refers to the skill of the craftsperson or

artisan. Yet, when it comes to the medical practitioner, certain aspects of medical practice refer to “action”, while other aspects refer to “doing”; thus, on the one hand, diagnostics involves deliberating well when determining the medical condition to be treated and the wiser strategy to treat the condition, and on the other, surgical procedure concerns doing the surgical intervention skilfully which is a matter of competence. Following Habermas (1972:308) the surgery reflects a “technical cognitive interest” which seeks to control the diseased environment, and the diagnostic process reflects a “practical cognitive interest” (Habermas 1972:309) which focuses on the understanding of symptoms and the likely interaction of particular medication in that situation.

It is instructive that Epstein (2007:387) speaks of “competence” which he defines in the medical setting as “the habitual and judicious use of communication, knowledge, technical skills, clinical reasoning, emotions, values, and reflection in daily practice for the benefit of the individuals and communities” . Epstein (2007:387) expands his understanding of “competence” to refer also to ongoing learning, and to include

the capacity to change, find and generate new knowledge, and improve overall performance ... Competence is contextual, reflecting the relationship between a person’s abilities and the task he or she is required to perform in a particular situation in the real world.

Epstein and Hundert (2002:226) had developed that definition of competence and had gone on to point out

(c)ompetence builds on a foundation of basic clinical skills, scientific knowledge and moral development. It includes a cognitive function—acquiring and using knowledge to solve real-life problems; an integrative function—using biomedical and psychological data in clinical reasoning; a communicative function—communicating effectively with patients and colleagues; and an affective/moral function—the willingness, patience, and emotional awareness to use these skills judiciously and humanely (Epstein and Hundert 2002:226–7).

Following Polyani (1975), Epstein and Hundert (2002:227) point out that tacit knowledge plays an important role in competence along with personal knowledge. With Schön (1983), “professional competence is defined by the ability to manage ambiguous problems, tolerate uncertainty, and make decisions with limited information” (Epstein and Hundert 2008:227).

While the language is different from that used in this Portfolio and the underpinning rationale is also different, there is a strong family resemblance between Epstein’s position and what has been

argued here. The similarity is reflected even more strongly in Epstein's comment a little later in his 2007 article, where he comments: "(c)ompetence is also developmental. Habits of mind and behaviour and practical wisdom are gained through deliberate practice and reflection on experience (Epstein 2007:388).

Habits of the mind, the context-dependence and the developmental features of competence are noted (Epstein and Hundert 2008:227–8)—matters considered throughout this Portfolio but from the perspective of practical reasoning and not of competence. My point is that Epstein needs the more accurate language from Aristotle's phronesiology to clarify his discussion; in brief, skilful diagnostics and treatment require different practice to being a skilled surgeon in the operating theatre. Yet while the concepts are markedly different, when it comes to practice there can be a movement from one approach to the other during the same event. I suggest that conceptual clarity is helped by separating the concepts of "competence" and practical wisdom (*phronesis*).

Leach (2002:243) endorses Epstein and Hundert's (2008) attention to the habit dimension of competence and its developmental nature and contend that the six competencies (patient care, medical knowledge, practice-based learning and improvement, interpersonal and communication skills, professionalism, and systems-based practice) required by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education and the five stage model of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) which characterise the development of professional competence as a progression "from rule-based behaviours to context-based behaviours" (Leach 2002:243). Fraser and Greenhalgh (2002) contend that medical education needs to move beyond enhancing competence to enhancing "capability", by which the authors mean "the extent to which individuals can adapt to change, generate new knowledge, and continue to improve their performance" (Fraser and Greenhalgh 2002:799). Aristotle's phronesiology addresses those matters with clarity and simplicity of concept that provides an explanation of the process of reasoning involved. And so I turn to consider the matter of clinical reasoning in medicine.

b) Clinical reasoning

There is one further matter of interest in the articles and letters on professional medical education I have been examining, that is the issue of "clinical diagnostic reasoning" or "how doctors reason in the clinical environment" (Bowen 2006:2217). Bowen refers to recognition of patterns in the presenting medical condition as using "non-analytic reasoning" as distinct from analytical reasoning; both are often used together (Bowen 2006:2220) and it is important to

move the reasoning process beyond being “a lucky guess” (Bowen 2006:2220). Bowen reviews current literature on how doctors reason; Bowen (2006:2224) stresses the importance of context and the use of diagnostic reasoning processes, something that also is encouraged in the section of the CPE Verbatim devoted to reflecting upon the pastoral conversation at the bedside of the hospital patient. In that context I note the comments of Norman (2005) in his review of fifty-three research publications on clinical reasoning for over thirty years. Norman noted that there are three broad traditions:

- i) a focus on the process involved;
- ii) reasoning related to the role of memory and knowledge; and
- iii) research on the use of semantic qualifiers, scripts, and exemplars in the knowledge representation.

Norman (2005:423, 426) concluded that there was no evidence of a “reasoning process that accumulated with expertise ... There is no such thing as clinical reasoning; there is no one best way through a problem”.

Norman (2006) contends that the development of Clinical reasoning has at its heart, the building on experience—“extensive experience ... overlaid on a formal knowledge structure” (Norman 2006:2252). That observation resonates with CPE programmes extending over 400 hours for each Unit, and the “Reflection component” of each Verbatim, which draws upon the knowledge structure of the relevant elements of Denominational Theology and the Social Sciences as noted in Paper Two. If the CPE student lacks that “formal knowledge structure”, it means that the experience cannot be interpreted accurately by the student reflecting upon the conversation with the patient; hence the wisdom of CPE programmes being offered after a relevant undergraduate programme, a custom no longer widespread. The approach favoured throughout this Portfolio is a return to that historical practice, or a hermeneutic of recovery. Should the College choose to implement a vocational training model for CPE, then a curriculum needs to be formulated which teaches the formal knowledge structure of Denominational Theology and Scripture Studies, along with the relevant knowledge of the Social Sciences so that the CPE student may do well the required reflection that rounds out each Verbatim. In brief, without such formal knowledge structure, the signature pedagogy of CPE cannot but collapse. Relevant curriculum development, curriculum implementation along with curriculum assessment need to be put in place if such a new educational direction is to be adopted by the NSWCCPE Inc. And that is a separate project.

Meanwhile Hafferty's (2007:966) comment to medical education applies with equal force to CPE programmes: "(e)fforts to monitor the workplace for issues of professionalism should ... be not only organised and proactive but also hypervigilant ... Outsiders need to be involved in the monitoring process ... The ultimate goal is high-quality patient care".

More recently Little (2010) drawing upon Eraut (1994) and Flyvbjerg (2001) has proposed that their insights be used to develop "an assessment scale of achievable competencies" (Little 2010:5–7). But "competence" applies to the skill shown in making or doing something, and that is something different to the judgement of practical wisdom. The practice of medicine can combine both competence and skill in doing and the use of wise practical judgement in the diagnostic process.

The point is illustrated well in the humorous anecdote of Yashashri Choudhari, a specialist registrar in obstetrics and gynaecology at the Mater Hospital Belfast and reported in the *British Medical Journal*. The doctor recalled how at the end of a day of ten deliveries and performing four caesarean sections, a patient arrived who needed almost immediate caesarean section. After explaining to the patient and her husband the need for the procedure and the risks involved, both the patient and her husband went into the operating room. The husband followed operative procedure with keen attention complimenting the obstetrician on her operative skills throughout the procedure.

He [the husband] praised my speed of opening the abdomen, technique of delivering the baby, detailed knowledge of the anatomy, meticulous haemostasis, handling of instruments, tying of knots, and cosmetically beautiful closure. Although tired, I was delighted with his explicit and generous compliments ... With his knowledge of abdominal organs, I was sure that he belonged to the medical profession but could not tell what branch of surgery he was in. In my experience, surgeons are rarely so appreciative of other surgeon's technical skills, and I was pleasantly surprised by his kind gesture (Choudhari 2001:803).

Later when the husband approached the obstetrician to thank her, she inquired if he were a doctor and what was his specialisation. Slightly embarrassed, he replied, "Oh no. I'm a butcher" (Choudhari 2001:803).

The obstetrician's skill had been observed by one who needed somewhat similar skills but in a very different field. What received the compliments was not the practical judgement of the doctor, but her skill, her competence. And when it comes to the Chaplain in CPE programmes,

the issue is his or her practical judgement and its wisdom, and more than skills are required if the practitioner is to attract the label of “wise” Chaplain. Accordingly, the concept of competence while applying to some aspects of medicine does not apply with similar force in the work of the Chaplain. Further, from a different perspective, while both Chaplain and medical personnel are involved with the patient in the hospital setting, their goals in that involvement are different. I turn now to examine that difference and to provide further evidence for my central argument that CPE is focussed on educating the “wise practitioner” concerned for the healing of the patient being visited. I will be drawing upon insights from Palliative Care Medical practice.

c) The two faces of medicine

Hutchinson et al. distinguish “two faces” of medicine—curing and healing;

(c)uring is an action carried out by the health care practitioner to eradicate disease or correct a problem, while healing is a process leading to a greater sense of integrity and wholeness in response to an injury or disease that occurs within the patient, which can be facilitated by the health care practitioner. The roles of the patient and of the health care practitioner in curing versus healing are not just different, they are diametrically opposed (Hutchinson et al. 2009:845).

The difference is clear from the patient’s perspective: in the curing situation, the patient’s goal is survival “of all that the patient has learned to identify as himself ... the goal is to avoid change” (Hutchinson et al. 2009:845). But

(h)ealing on the other hand comes from the acceptance of change. This acceptance allows the patient to grow to a new sense of himself as a person (perhaps with a disease) with a new experience of integrity and wholeness that is different from the old status quo.

In curing, the expertise of the medical practitioner is all-important whereas, in healing the patient uses his or her own resources. In the curing mode the power lies with the medical practitioner, who, using French and Raven’s (1959) taxonomy of social power, is using expert power. In contrast, in the healing mode the power resides in “the patient who will make the healing journey” (Hutchinson et al. 2009:845), accompanied by the medical practitioner. Curing relates to physical pain; healing, to borrow the terminology of Kearney (1996), relates to “soul pain”. It is relevant to note that Kearney’s concept of “soul” is shaped by the writings of the Jungian psychologist James Hillman and Kearney’s experience as a medical practitioner in palliative care (Kearney 1996:57). Dame Cicely Saunders, the British founder of the modern hospice and palliative care movement in her Foreword (1995) to Kearney’s book, endorses Kearney’s

terminology and characterises “soul pain” as “a pain that comes from the depths of a person’s being” (Saunders 1995:12). A further difference between the curing and healing faces of medicine lies in the underlying epistemologies. In the curing mode the knowledge is scientific and evidence based; in the healing mode what counts is the relationship between patient and medical practitioner and the personal characteristics brought to that interaction. Hutchinson et al. (2009:845) suggest that the epistemological difference can be summed up as science as opposed to art. Good holistic medical practice is seen as integrating the two complementary roles (Hutchinson et al 2009:846).

In the present context of hospital Chaplaincy then, the Chaplain is involved in the “healing mode” in association with the medical practitioners (Hsu et al. 2008), bringing spiritual and religious perspectives to bear on the personal experience of suffering. Egnew (2005) in his qualitative inquiry using in-depth open ended, semistructured interviews of seven allopathic physicians chosen for both their expertise and established reputation in the field, proposed as an operational definition of ‘healing’ in a holistic sense as ‘the transcendence of suffering’. An extended quotation summarises and clarifies further the point I am emphasising:

(i)ll persons undergo transformations in which they are unable to be the person they once were. This threat generates suffering and involves the physical, social, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of personhood ... Suffering is an inherently unpleasant experience, a perception of helplessness. It may involve pain, but it is an anguish of a different order from pain that alienates the sufferer from self and society. Suffering engenders a crisis of meaning, a spiritual consideration of life’s importance, and is reflected as an intensely personal narrative ... the ability of [evidence-based] medicine to resolve suffering is limited. Suffering is inherent to the human experience, and some types of suffering are beyond the purview of medicine. Still, suffering can be transcended by accepting the necessity to suffer and by finding meaning in the threatening events. ‘Suffering ceases to be suffering in some way’ Frankl observed, ‘at the moment it finds a meaning’.

It is there in that healing that the hospital Chaplain may play a role. Essential to that is wise judgement in the concrete setting, and that is different from the use of a skill.

From that perspective, the role of the Chaplain has as its goal that of healing and Aristotelean phronesiology offers a better explanation of the reasoning process involved there, as this Portfolio has contended.

The aim of the CPE Units is to reinforce the Student's following the traditions into which the Student is being initiated so that the student is a "wise practitioner". It has been stressed that in the Student's Verbatim the focus is the student's judgement in the concrete particularity, applying insights from Theology, and Social Sciences in the interest of the Denominational pastoral care of a particular patient. In the Verbatim the student uses critical reflexivity which focuses upon the relationship between the patient and the Chaplain, but more is involved; following Rallis and Rossman, it is "caring reflexivity" which seeks to "engage in critical reflection or ethical dialogue with participants to ensure an account that honours the work of the participants" (Rallis & Rossman 2010:497). The decisions the Chaplain makes in the pastoral conversation and in her or his reflecting upon it, are "the product of reflexive moral reasoning" (Rallis & Rossman 2010:498). The process of becoming a Denominational Pastoral carer takes place within a community of practice and that also needs to be acknowledged. The CPE Unit occurs at an accredited CPE Centre where the accredited supervisor functions, and the "social context" in which the Chaplain's expertise is being developed in the individual and group supervisory sessions need acknowledgement. Viskovic (2006:325) remarks

(e)xpertise is relational to a particular workplace or community of practice; is embedded in social practice over time, requires competence in the community's discourse, activities, ways of behaving; is reciprocal, as people shape and are shaped by the community of practice; and requires pertinence knowing what behaviours are acceptable.

Non-formal learning and the acquisition of tacit professional knowledge have their place (Eraut 2000) and research into that in a CPE setting would provide insight for practice. Further the CPE Unit/Course offered at an accredited CPE Centre is an example of "collaborative learning". Lee (2003:79) offers a useful description:

(c)ollaborative learning mobilises the social energy that resides within a group of co-learners engaged in a dynamic process of shared inquiry. Through dialogue, learning as a shared inquiry evolves by critically exploring the perspectives of others. New dimensions of interpretations are fuelled, issues clarified and interdependence valued. There is an ongoing negotiation of roles among the community of learners.

Macmurray (1957:xxi) comments that it is a "serious mistake to think that rationality has only to do with our intellectual capacities. On the contrary, our feelings and emotions have reference to the real world, just as our thoughts do". Pascal expressed the same point aphoristically—*(d)eux exces: exclure la raison, n'admettre que raison* [Two extremes: to exclude reason, to admit

reason only. *Pensees IV*. 253; Trans. Troller 1941:90]. Accordingly the Portfolio noted the role of *pathos* as a rhetorical proof, while still favouring a methodology consonant with Modernity and its privileging “reason”. Moreover, it reflects in a CPE context what Mezirow (1998:185) nominated as the central concept to “how adults learn to think for themselves rather than act on the concepts, values, and feelings of others ... namely critical reflection and particularly ... critical reflection of assumptions”.

Emphasis has been placed on “initiation” in the proposed concept of CPE education, but that presumes it is an ongoing process which continues beyond the initial experience. The critical reflection on particulars remains a lifelong process once it has been learned. Harrison (2003) contends, that informal learning is integral to lifelong learning; accordingly research is needed on the level of informal learning effected through the use of Verbatims during the NSWCCPE Inc. sponsored professional training days for trained Chaplains.

I turn now to examine briefly two ways of conceptualising the role of the Denominational Chaplains who provide pastoral care, namely, as stewards of the profession and as followers of the threefold CPE traditions.

d) Chaplains as Stewards of the Profession

Mention was made in Paper Two of the rhetorical strategy used and how the tactic which effects that is the use of the Verbatim which reflects critically upon the pastoral conversation. Mention was also made of the rhetorics of identity on the one hand and of invitation on the other used in educating the Denominational Chaplain; the focus is the preparation, not primarily of leaders, but, to adapt Golde’s (2006a; 2006b) phrase for doctoral students, “stewards of the profession”. Golde (2006a:5) explains that the “steward” is “someone who will creatively generate new knowledge, critically conserve valuable and useful ideas, and responsibly transform those understandings through writing” .

From another angle, one might speak of developing the followership of the Chaplaincy Student who is being initiated into the worthwhile traditions mentioned, for it is followership within a broad tradition. Useful in that context is the work of Kellerman (2007, 2008) of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and which is a departure from leader-centric approach to leadership and organisational management.

Followership

Kellerman's approach moves away from highlighting the role of the leader to centre attention on the follower and how the follower can create change and contribute to shaping organisational leaders. As Kellerman notes (2008:23):

in the real world followers have an impact. They have an impact if the role they play is a supporting one, or if they break rank, or even if they do nothing. For this good and simple reason, thinking leadership without thinking followership is not merely misleading, it is mistaken.

Clearly, the concept of leader implies a concept of follower. Kellerman (2008:241) is arguing six broad points, that

- i. followers, while an amorphous group, share common interests;
- ii. followers enjoy power and influence in the organisation;
- iii. followers can be agents of change;
- iv. good followers promote good leadership and obstruct bad leadership;
- v. followers who do something in the organisation are to be preferred over followers who do nothing; and
- vi. followers can join with other followers to create change, even against the wishes of the leader.

In light of that, Kellerman (2007, 2008) has developed a new typology of followership based upon the level of engagement or participation in the life of the organisation: followers can be characterised as

- i. *isolates*, that is the follower is “completely detached...knowing nothing and doing nothing” (Kellerman 2008: 86); they are “totally detached...there to do what they must do and no more...uninformed, uninterested, unmotivated, unengaged” (Kellerman 2008:91);
- ii. *bystanders* who observe but do not participate;
- iii. *participants* who are engaged in some way;
- iv. *activists* who are eager, energetic and engaged; or again
- v. *die-hards* who are prepared, devoted completely to what they deem worthy.

A good follower is one who contributes to the group or organisation and, accordingly, *isolates* and *bystanders* do not attract the label of “good followership”. Kellerman (2008:93) notes that the usefulness of the typology of followership comes from its offering “another lens, another

way of seeing things that is from the bottom up...and all of us follow some of the time. It is the human condition”.

The qualities of stewardship and followership encouraged in CPE student programmes are important in themselves, but particularly so for four other reasons relevant to an educational process which is seeking to transmit traditions but which can also be critical of aspects of the broader society and culture. The educator needs to be alert to those contrary influences. A tradition remains a tradition to the degree that there is a certain continuity of approach between generations. I acknowledge that I am presuming that the members of the tradition welcome such continuity of what they deem “worthwhile”, a trait I proposed, following R.S. Peters, that was important in the concept of education. Yet there can be influences abroad that undermine the tradition being taught and effective teaching needs to take cognizance of such influences and I turn to consider some such influences.

4. Cultural influences that might undermine CPE programmes

I note four contrary influences abroad that may impinge on the encouraging participant followership among the custodians of the profession of chaplaincy; these can be characterised as follows.

a) Secularisation

There is the impact of the trend of secularisation present in the broader culture, which is not automatically supportive to a Christian Church perspective. One can reasonably expect a tendency, similar to that which has occurred in the United States of America, (Burtachaell 1991, 1998; Johnson, et al. 1993; Johnson 1992) of a disengagement of Tertiary Colleges and Universities from the Christian Churches that founded them. That secularisation trend in the USA included both Protestant and Roman Catholic institutions. (I believe that I have seen indications of that during my period on the NSWCCPE Inc. Executive in instances where certain approaches were welcomed but whose proponents were arguing for a rejection of the Christian position; the specific instance was the unexamined interface between Jungian Psychology and Christian spirituality). Further, Frame (2009) has drawn attention to a similar phenomenon in Australian society since 1950 and identified reasons for that; it is sufficient to note the social fact and its curriculum relevance for the education of pastoral carers both from the perspective of the givers of that care and its recipients.

b) The *La Perruque* phenomenon of late Western Capitalism

Following the French Cultural theorist, de Certeau (1925–86), there is in the everyday life of late Western Capitalism, a phenomenon that de Certeau designates *La Perruque* or “wig wearing” where appearance covers the true reality just as the wig gives semblance of a headfull of hair; thus appearance is more important than the reality. An extended quotation from de Certeau outlines well the social and cultural phenomenon being targeted in his description:

(l)a perruque is the worker's own work disguised as work for his employer. It differs from pilfering in that nothing of material value is stolen. It differs from absenteeism in that the worker is officially on the job. *La perruque* may be as simple a matter as secretary's writing a love letter in 'company time' or as complex as a cabinetmaker 'borrowing' a lathe to make a piece of furniture for his living room. Under different names in different countries this phenomenon is becoming more general, even if managers 'turn a blind eye' to it in order not to know about it ... [The worker] cunningly takes pleasure in finding a way to create gratuitous products whose sole purpose is to signify his own capabilities through his work and to confirm his solidarity with other workers or his family through spending his time this way. With the complicity of other workers ... he succeeds in 'putting one over' on the established order on its home ground (de Certeau 1984:25–6).

As Fiske (1989:40) notes, it becomes an expression of power by the weak. But de Certeau (2000) extends the concept, beginning with political commitments before extending his observations to religious commitments. Such self designation may be no more than a word without underpinning substance and the implied beliefs are no more than ornamental (de Certeau 2000:119). Such a self description amounts to no more than “personal spin” in Warren's (2003:520) phrase. It is there that a programme of educational *praxis* acts as a counter strategy eliciting personal commitment, and accordingly, initiation into C.P.E. tradition can contribute to going beyond on ornamentalising self description.

c) Liquid modernity

Bauman (2005, 2007, 2010) has identified a further feature of late Western Capitalism by what he terms “liquid modernity” that I suggest could subvert the educational purpose in CPE programmes. A short comment is warranted.

The Sociologist Bauman (2007:1) characterises the feature of late Modernity as “liquid modernity” to indicate

the passage from the 'solid' to the 'liquid' phase ... a condition in which social forms (structures that limit individual choices, institutions that guard repetitive routines, patterns of acceptable behaviour) can no longer (and are not expected) to keep their shape for long ... Forms ... cannot serve as frames of reference for human actions and long-term life strategies because of their short-life expectations.

A more recent quotation gives a better understanding of the cultural change that Bauman is identifying and warrants an extended quotation. Bauman (2011:11–12, 13) writes:

I use the term 'liquid modernity' here for the currently existing shape of the modern condition, described by other authors as 'post modernity', 'late modernity', 'second' or 'hyper' modernity. What makes modernity 'liquid', and thus justifies the choice of the name, is its self-propelling, self-intensifying, compulsive and obsessive 'modernisation' as a result of which, like liquid, none of the consecutive forms of social life is able to maintain its shape for long. 'Dissolving everything that is solid' has been the innate and defining characteristic of the modern form of life from the outset; but today, unlike yesterday, the dissolved forms are not to be replaced, and nor are they replaced, by other solid forms—deemed 'improved' in the sense of being more solid and 'permanent' than those before them, and so even more resistant to melting. In place of the melting, and so impermanent, forms come others, no less—if not more—susceptible to melting and equally impermanent ... culture is now able to focus on fulfilling individual needs, solving individual problems and struggles with the challenges and troubles of personal lives ... Culture today consists of offers, not prohibitions; propositions not norms ... with luring and seducing, not with normative regulation, with PR rather than police supervision.

It is a society of infinite and indefinite possibilities (Bauman 2005:79) where people belong to "cloakroom communities or carnival communities" by which is suggested that spectatorship is the key to a sense of community. There is a new individualism where "(h)uman bonds are comfortably loose, but for that same reason unreliable, and solidarity is difficult to practice as its benefits and even more its moral virtue, are difficult to comprehend" (Bauman 2005:24).

And again:

(a) modernity which was 'heavy' has become 'light', what was 'solid' has become 'fluid', 'liquid', what was 'condensed' has become 'diffused', what was 'systematic' has become 'network-like' (Bauman 2005:25).

In that “liquid modernity”, “networks replace structures ...the never ending sequence of connections and disconnections replace determination, allegiance and belonging” (Bauman 2011:14). Bauman likens the Culture of “liquid modernity” to a gigantic department store with

its shelves changed on a daily basis...calculated to awaken irrepressible, but by nature momentary whims ... To sum up, the culture of liquid modernity has no ‘populace’ to enlighten and ennoble; it does, however, have clients to seduce (Bauman 2011:16)

The contrast of “liquid modernity” is reflected in the “solid” culture in Charles Dickens’ Mr Dombey’s comment about his son Paul in Charles Dickens’ *Dombey And Son*: “(t)here is nothing of chance or doubt in the course before my son. His way of life was clear and prepared, and marked out before he existed”. Liquid modernity which has a “society of infinite and indefinite possibilities” (Bauman 2005:79) carries a strong contrast to “solid” modernity. “Liquid” modernity has “existential anxieties” (Bauman 2007:16) and is accompanied by a fear “saturating daily existence” (Bauman 2007:17). A lengthier quotation brings out even more clearly how the newer cultural phenomenon “raises a series of challenges never before encountered” (Bauman 2007:10).

The virtue proclaimed to serve the individual’s interest best is not *conformity* to rules (which at any rate are few and far between, and often mutually contradictory) but *flexibility*, a readiness to change tactics and style at short notice, to abandon commitments and loyalties without regret and to pursue opportunities according to their current availability, rather than following one’s own established priorities (Bauman 2007:4; author’s emphasis).

Moreover there has been a redefinition of the public sphere with the “colonization of the public sphere by issues previously classified as private and unsuitable for public venting” (Bauman 2005:70); that is reflected well in Tony Blair’s 1999 lament that political discussion in the UK had been “diminished to a gossip column” (cited in Bauman 2005:70). Accompanying that has been a double shift, firstly a shift from satisfying a need to the promotion of desire, and then a shift to a world of satisfying every wish where the aim of the liquid modern world is to “take the waiting out of wanting” (Bauman 2005:76).

My point is to note that that change in the broad culture can undermine the CPE programme both in its educational aspect in seeking to transmit professional traditions, and also for the recipient of that pastoral care in the hospital setting. Alertness to the cultural influence provides an opportunity to consciously adopt a countercultural strategy.

The need for that awareness is further heightened by the impact of the cultural revolution of the 1960s that was centred in the United States from about 1958 to about 1974 (Marwick 1998); Kimball (2000:2634) argues that the sixties in America saw the “mainstreaming of radicalism” of the “Woodstock generation” (Kimball 2000:173). By “the 1970s ... [the change] had become mainstream” (Kimball 2000:27). I turn now to discuss that Cultural Revolution.

d) The “Sixties”—the American Cultural Revolution

Following Marwick (1998:15), the phrase “cultural revolution” refers to the “entire process”, not the activities of the minority but “what happened to the majority”; it refers to a period of “social and cultural transformation” (Marwick 1998: 801) that occurred during “the long sixties” (Marwick 1998: 802) of the twentieth century and which had “continuous, uninterrupted, and lasting consequences (Marwick 1998:802). It refers not only to the “ideas expressed but also to a way of life” (Kimball 2000:222). Historically, the ideas of the Sixties’ revolution have their intellectual ancestry in the writings of Rousseau, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud (Kimball 2000:18). Yet the American cultural revolution of the Sixties “succeeded by insinuation rather than insurrection” (Kimball 2000:258) in a process that was largely “unnoticed because [it was] ubiquitous” (Kimball 2000:222). Yet the University of St Andrew’s historian De Groot (2008:449) uses the metaphors of religion and myth to describe the impact of the Sixties. De Groot (2008:450) comments:

(t)he [Sixties] decade brought flowers, music, love, and good times. It also brought hatred, murder, greed, dangerous drugs, needless deaths, a warped sense of equality, a bizarre notion of freedom, the decline of liberalism, and the end of innocence. Bearing all that in mind, the decade should seem neither unfamiliar nor all that special (in history).

But my concern here is not the historical influence of the events of the Sixties but the impact of its dominant values beyond that decade not only in America but also in Britain and France (Marwick 1998) and which had an influence in Australia (Bowman 2007:51). Marwick (1998: 16–20) lists sixteen characteristics of that “unique era” of the Sixties, seven of which have relevance to CPE programmes of formation and training because their presence could subvert the educational process on the one hand, and on the other, may be reflected in the patient’s conversation at the bedside. Those seven characteristics are:

- a. the formation of subcultures or movements “critical of or in opposition to, one or more aspects of established society” (Marwick 1998:17);

- b. the new individualism of “doing your own thing”;
- c. the influence of the young in popular culture;
- d. upheavals in race, class and family relationships;
- e. a “permissiveness” that brought with it changes in public and private morality along with a “frankness ... in personal relation and modes of expression” (Marwick 1998:18);
- f. “developments in elite thought ... associated with the structuralists and poststructuralists” (Marwick 1998: 19);
- g. the greater use of “measured judgement” in regard to contentious issues particularly in regard to the “new feminism and gay liberation”. At the same time there was a new awareness of multiculturalism as a facet of society (Marwick 1998:20).

Those seven cultural characteristics are likely to be present in any broad cross section of CPE students and an effective CPE programme ignores their presence at the peril of its own effectiveness because the characteristics may undermine the very traditions into which the CPE programme is seeking to initiate its students. It is instructive and relevant that the researchers from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York at the end of their five year investigation into the causes and context of sexual abuse of minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the United States, 1950–2010, contended that the context of the problem was the unmonitored impact of the cultural revolution of the Sixties. The research did not excuse the criminal activity, but it drew attention to the need for wise leadership and prudent supervision of those working pastorally if such behaviours are to be prevented and the vulnerable are to be protected (Stephens 2011; Weigel 2011).

Over and above those cultural issues there is a further psychological issue that impinges on the educational context. The learning situation has two impulses that tend to be opposed for the student; here I am following Felmab (1982), an educationalist and psychologist who was drawing upon Socrates and Freud. The first impulse the student is responding to is to learn what is not known, which is why the student enters the learning situation. The second impulse is a desire, at times even more intense, not to know certain matters of the learning situation. In brief there is within the student an internal resistance to the learning situation—“a passion for ignorance” (Warren 2005:219). It is there that the psychological dynamics of Klein, Bion and Winnicott applied in the context of the action-research dynamic of the Group Supervision setting allow the student to process the resistance to the learning situation and allow the new knowledge to be learnt.

Accordingly, to summarise, it is contended that the philosophical dimension of the CPE programme is to initiate a student into the worthwhile traditions of CPE on the one hand, and of Denominational pastoral caring on the other. The process is profoundly rhetorical involving both a rhetoric of identity and a rhetoric of invitation to commit personally to those traditions. Moreover, the effective CPE programme needs to attend to the impact of the context in which the CPE programme takes place, for example, “liquid modernity” and the “Sixties’ cultural revolution”. A fuller elaboration of those and other contexts lie beyond this project. Yet the process of the formation of a pastoral identity of the Denominational Chaplain is part of the outcomes of the CPE programme and I turn now to that.

5. Pastoral identity of the Chaplain

Following Pearson’s (2006, 2009a:332–43, 2009b:62–3) terminology, admittedly developed to the different situation of Australian Aboriginal cultural identity, the individual’s identity consists of a number of layers, each important and contributing to the complexities of a particular identity. Thus the pastoral identity of a particular Chaplain is comprised of a number of identities, including the gendered, Denominational and CPE identity components. Pearson (2009a:342) acknowledges parallels between his concept of “layered identity” and Sen’s concept of “religious affiliations” (Sen 2006:59–83) and their role in developing pluro-monoculturalism which is a different reality to a multicultural society. Just as the Aboriginal identities are “robustly plural” (Pearson 2009b:19), so too, can be the layers of the Christian Chaplain’s pastoral identity and at times there can be legitimate competing “identities” (Pearson 2006, 2009a, 2009b) or “affiliations” (Sen 2000) for an individual.

6. Liberal Education and ethical formation in a tertiary context

This portfolio has characterised CPE within the approach of liberal education. Following Newman (1976:371), emphasis is placed upon “the imperial intellect” including under its purview “all sciences, methods, collections of facts, principles, doctrines, truths” (Newman 1976:372). That does not include moral and ethical guidance. Yet, as Davis (2010:42) notes:

(s)ome argue for a further mission for universities, that of developing moral judgement in students. The timing is good—for young students in particular, university coincides with growing into adulthood ... Campus is a place to work out who, and what, we want to be.

In responding to recent world economic troubles at national and international levels, some Western academics have urged universities to accept responsibility to develop a moral or ethical

sensitivity in the tertiary student. I turn now to examine two proposals: that of Robert Sternberg, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Tufts University (Drucker 2006:1) and that of Vice Chancellor Steve Schwartz of Macquarie University, critiquing their respective positions against Plato's view, the response of Aristotle and then the view of Newman; from there a suggestion will be made for an application in the context of this Portfolio, the education and training of hospital Chaplains.

a) Three views

i. Sternberg

Sternberg contends that more is needed in the tertiary student than critical reasoning; Sternberg (2007:8) comments:

(m)any of the leaders who have gotten the world into its current messes ... attended prestigious universities. [Three are instanced] ... The problem is not that those leaders aren't smart; they are. The problem is that they lack ... certain important skills, attitudes and values.

From that position Sternberg, speaking to the American model of university education, urges the use of assessment measures developed at Yale and Tuft Universities to select university graduate and postgraduate students who show the needed "wisdom, intelligence and creativity, synthesized". This then is proposed at the point of entry in order to assure the educational outcome of "good citizenship and leadership" (Sternberg 2007:11). "Wisdom related skills are as at least important [as memory and analytical skills] or more important". (Sternberg 2004:166).

Wisdom is characterised as "knowledge balancing interests" (Stenberg 2004:165); that requires the "infusion of values" which in turn, influence the judgement's reaching towards the common good (Sternberg 2004:168), yet there is "no easy path to wisdom" (Sternberg 2004:173).

That view is similar to Plato in *The Protagoras* (352 c; Trans. Guthrie 1972:89) where

knowledge is a fine thing quite capable of ruling a man, and that if he can distinguish good from evil, nothing will force him to act otherwise than as knowledge dictates, since wisdom is all the reinforcement he needs.

But Plato immediately counters:

(b)ut I expect you know that most men do not believe us. They maintain that there are many who recognise the best but are unwilling to act on it. It may be open to them, but they do otherwise ...

Well, said Socrates, it's by no means uncommon for people to say what is not correct (*The Protagoras* 352d–e; trans. Guthrie 1972:89).

Guthrie (1975c:258, cf. 453) uses Euripedes' *Medea* to illustrate how powerful passions are stronger than reasoned judgement.

ii) Schwartz

Vice-Chancellor Steven Schwartz began from a similar position, namely, the problem of “educated leaders making choices lacking in wisdom” (Gilmore 2010:3; Hare 2010:22; cf. Schwartz 2010a:7–8). Schwartz's proposal at Macquarie University was “capstone courses” in the final year where students not only draw together both the practical and theoretical matters they have studied along with a key capstone course in practical wisdom using the three Confucian methods of reflection, imitation and wisdom (Gilmore 2010:6).

Professor Schwartz suggests that to be successful - in professions, in life - students need also to learn how to think, how to make decisions in difficult circumstances, how to be wise before and during the event. They need in short, what Aristotle called ‘practical wisdom’ (Davis 2010:43).

Vice-Chancellor Schwartz (2011:28) contends that

(e)ducation is, or should be, a moral enterprise ... so graduates ... take up their role in their society and contribute to the good of everyone ... (O)ur [modern] universities teach students, but they do not even pretend to make them wise.

The aim would be to “build character” partly through course work, and partly through involvement in “a community or work project outside the university ... to develop a concern for others” (Schwartz 2011:28).

At the time, Schwartz's proposal was received with caution. *The Sydney Morning Herald* (2010:8) editorialised that the proposed course would be better named “Practical Virtue, or Practical Excellence” along with favouring a well-rounded education. The comment of retailer Gerry Harvey was that what is needed is a mixture of wisdom and experience; “it is impossible to learn experience without venturing into the real world” (Gilmore 2010:6). A longer quotation from the American academics Schwartz and Sharpe (2010:271–2), using an Aristotelean perspective, brings out that point even more forcefully:

(p)ractical wisdom is not something which can be taught, at least in the narrow sense of listening to classroom lectures, reading books, and doing exams or papers. And it can't be learned as an

isolated ‘subject’ or even as a general skill that we can go around ‘applying’. Practical wisdom is embedded in the actual practices of being a lawyer or a teacher or a doctor or a banker or a military officer or a violence counsellor ... It can’t be learned outside of those practices. Moral skill and will, like technical skill, are learned by practising the craft. That, of course, is why wisdom is associated with experience. But it is not just any experience. Experience must be structured in ways that ‘cause wisdom to be learned’.

Or again, more concisely, “(w)e’re not teaching good judgement ... We’re causing it to be learned” (Schwartz and Sharpe 2010:271). And this portfolio has argued *wisdom can’t be taught*, but CPE programmes can “cause it to be learned”.

Farrelly (2010:13) has stressed strongly the importance of experience: “if wisdom means anything, it is the kind of slow-knowledge that comes not from [academic] knowledge, but from experience”. It is one thing to teach how to make good and wise decisions in the abstract through the use of case studies but it also requires an approach that is honed through practice in a realistic situation and under a wise mentor. Following Aristotle, it is a mixture of reason and desire in a real situation, and I will return to that point shortly. More is required than skilful intellectual judgement, a point well made by J. H. Newman and which warrants consideration.

iii) Newman

Three quotations from Newman summarise well that very point. Firstly:

(t)hinking much of intellectual advancement, they are much bent on improving the world by making *all men* intellectual; and the labour to convince themselves, that as men grow in knowledge they will grow in virtue (Newman 1997:144; emphasis in original);

secondly, using a more vivid metaphor:

(q)uarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason to contend against those giants, the passion and pride of man. (Newman 1976:111);

and thirdly:

(i)f virtue be a mastery over the mind, if its end be action, if its perfection be inward order, harmony, and peace, we must seek it in graver and holier places than in Libraries and Reading-rooms (Newman. 2004 [1874]:268).

For Newman, the university “is not a Convent, it is not a Seminary; it is a place to fit men of the world for the world” (Newman 1976:197; cf. Newman 2001:240).

Newman contended that moral or ethical formation in a tertiary setting occurs in a setting other than that of University Teaching. For Newman that formation occurred in the University Colleges. In his proposed Catholic University of Dublin, Newman envisaged small halls of residence where a group of some twenty students (Ker 1990:412) lived under the guidance of tutors. Newman was concerned with student discipline “in that most difficult and least docile time of life” (Newman 1896:35–6), but

the young for the most part cannot be driven , but ... are open to persuasion, and to the influence of kindness and personal attachment; and that in consequence, they are to be kept straight by indirect contrivances rather than authoritative enactments and naked prohibitions ... [in] a period of training ... to launch the young man into the world ... to maintain a persevering gentle oversight, to use minute discretion ... to adapt your treatment to the particular case...with no suspicion of partiality ... Personal influence requires personal acquaintance (Newman 1896:36, 38, 39).

It is there that the College tutor effects “that union of intellectual and moral influence, the separation of which is the evil of the age” (Newman 1896:120).

It is not the role of university teaching to form moral and upright citizens by reason of the curriculum taught. Newman is correct in dissociating the formation of the imperial intellect from the formation of the ethical mindset and insisting that both do not take place at the same time in the same setting. In the present context I am contending that the CPE Centre with its Supervisors on the one hand, and the CPE Students enrolled in that CPE Unit on the other, and whose numbers in a particular CPE Unit rarely reach double figures, approximate to the smaller environment Newman favoured for the ethical formation at a tertiary level. And that is distinct from the University setting for the formation of the imperial intellect. But Schwartz (2010:1 ff.) contends that ethical formation belongs to the setting of University education and he claims Newman as his authority “(a)s Newman said, practical knowledge is a deal of trash. Our goals should be moral and spiritual ... Newman’s vision” .

Yet as I have shown throughout this Portfolio that vision is not in Newman’s writings. The most casuistry or case reasoning can do is provide a setting to develop an ethical solution to a case and articulate the reasoning involved. That is an intellectual skill which does not imply a personal commitment; it is a knowledge but that does not automatically involve an evocation of a desire

for that end. Further, I have argued consistently that practical wisdom is “honed” in the context of experience, not taught in a lecture hall or the seminar room. Further support for that position can be drawn from Aristotle’s views on moral weakness.

b). Ethical formation/education in a tertiary context

Aristotle focuses attention on moral weakness rather than on vice. Hutchinson (1995:215) summarises Aristotle’s perspective thus:

(v)ice and moral weakness are different conditions, although they sometimes lead to the same results. Moral weakness is aware of itself, but vice is not; it involves regret, but vice does not. Moral weakness is easier to cure because the man with vice has got his priorities so thoroughly wrong that he cannot be persuaded out of his false opinions. Vice is thorough badness, but moral weakness is only partial badness.

Accordingly I suggest, that Aristotle’s view of *akrasia* (moral weakness) offers a useful insight for the present discussion. Bostock (2006:33 n2; 123) prefers the translation for *akrasia* as “lack of self-control” in contrast to “self-control” (*enkrateia*), pointing out that the terminology “strength of will” and “weakness of will” might suggest “that Aristotle recognises the existence of a mental faculty called the will, which clearly he does not” (Bostock 2006:123; cf. Rorty 1980b:n1). The older terminology in English translations was that of “continence” and “incontinence”; in English “incontinence” refers to “wanting self restraint, especially with reference to sexual appetite” (Little et al. 1959a:983), a classic example of the phenomenon of *akrasia* that Aristotle is describing in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, a “state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion” (Chase 1930:284, n. p.144, 1.27) as the grounds for the choice (*prohairesis*), rather than reason. Aristotle’s focus is primarily on the person and only secondarily on the action. Moreover as Rorty (1983:175) notes: “(a)ctions are not vectorial outcomes of a person’s occurrent beliefs and desires: they are also formed by habit, by imitation and by social pressure” .

Aristotle characterises *prohairesis* or “purposive choice” (Kenny 2002: 65) as implying “both reason and desire...desire guided by reason, and reason fired by desire” (Ross 1960:200). In *akrasia* or lack of self-control, Aristotle is not suggesting a model later espoused by Kant of “an unsuccessful contest between rational will and wholly non-rational desire or passion” (Gill 1995:13). Good practical choice “is composed of two elements, true reasoning and correct desire” and accordingly, and as previously mentioned, following Natali (2001:15), such human behaviour falls into four possible categories:

1. true reasoning + correct desire: *phronesis*, good practical knowledge;
2. true reasoning + incorrect desire: *akrasia*, weakness of will;
3. erroneous reasoning + correct desire: *kakia*, wickedness;
4. erroneous reasoning + incorrect desire: inability to act.

Aristotle is concerned with practical reasoning and “is distinguishing between a form of practical, truthful rationality, which is naturally in harmony with desire, and a form of scientific, purely contemplative rationality” (Natali 2001:19).

The difference between an instance of self control and an instance of a lack of self-control is that

(t)he person who exhibits moral weakness desires what they do, but it does not represent their moral conclusion (*prohairesis*); the person who exhibits self-control, by contrast, acts on their moral conclusion, not in accordance with desire (*EN* 111b1214, Trans. Hughes 2001:166).

And, as Hughes (2001:166) notes, Aristotle is not explaining how the choice was made, only describing what happens. In the minor premise of the practical syllogism the irrational desire or impulse of the appetite replaces the reason. Vella (2008:137) points out that:

(b)y nature ... we develop habits that lead to a state of character; but there is no one way in which all of us develop ... it is inevitable and necessary that we develop through habit, certain states of character ... the habits we form shape the person we become. Aristotle’s great insight here is that to some extent the habits we form are up to us.

That state of character is the outcome of “consistent and repeated actions” (Vella 2008:140). Virtues of reason come through teaching while virtues of character arise through habit (*EN* 1103a15–20). In brief, we learn to be virtuous by doing just as we learn to play a musical instrument or to practise a craft by doing (*EN* 1103b6–20). Aristotle concludes:

(i)t makes no small difference then, whether we form habits of one kind or another from our very youth; it makes a great difference, or rather *all* the difference (*EN* 1103b23–5. Trans. Ross 1963:29; emphasis in original; cf. *EN* 1104b9–13).

Hence Newman’s emphasis upon the small residential college environment for the students makes sense because the focus is the development of virtues of character through habit and influence. That is markedly different from the development of the imperial intellect, the focus of university education. Yet, lack of self-control (*akrasia*) always remains possible throughout one’s life. The problem remains how the individual can act “contrary to his *knowledge* of how

best to live” (Price 2006:248; his emphasis). Plato, as discussed above, held that no person could act that way. Aristotle contends that one acts without self-control when knowledge in the strict sense is present.

It is not genuine knowledge that is ‘dragged about like a slave’, for knowledge is of the universal whereas the emotional influence ... allows only a sensual awareness of the here and now which is the trigger of action (Guthrie 1981f:366).

The person of self control (*enkrateia*) “knowing that his appetites are bad refuses on account of his rational principle to follow them” (*EN* 1145b13–14). Or again, Aristotle notes in the *De Anima* (433a7–8): “(f)or the self controlled, though experiencing desire and appetite, yet do not do the things that they desire, but defer to the intellect” (Aristotle 1986:213; Trans. Lawson-Tancred).

Polansky (2007:512) notes that in that Aristotle distinguishes the human from the animal. Further it is a matter of virtuous action.

Virtuous action must be based on virtuous purpose. Purpose is reasoned desire so that if purpose is to be good both the reasoning and the desire must be good. It is wisdom that makes the reasoning good, and moral; virtue that makes the desire good (Kenny 2004a:272).

Aristotle clarifies his point:

(p)ractical wisdom...is linked to virtue of character, and this to practical wisdom. Being connected with the passions also, the moral virtues must belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human; so, therefore, are the life and happiness which correspond to these (*EN* 1178a16–8; trans. Ross 1963:266).

Nussbaum (1986:304) summarises neatly Aristotle’s thought on the matter: “[a] well formed character is a unity of thought and desire, in which choice has so blended these two elements, desire being attentive to thought and thought responsive to desire, that either one can guide and their guidance be the one and the same”. Kenny (2004a:273), through the metaphor of marriage, makes the same point more succinctly: (t)he wedding of the two makes intelligence into wisdom and natural virtue into moral virtue.

So good choice is morally informed when there is “correct passional response”. As Nussbaum (1996:304–5) contends:

(t)he passion is one constituent of the virtuousness and goodness of the choice, the one thing that makes it more than merely self-controlled...the passions are intelligent and educable ... to have serious internal struggle between reason and passion is to be in a condition of ethical immaturity, to be in need of further training .

Burnyeat (1980) makes the same point. Still the problem how the *akratic* person “went wrong” requires some explanatory comment.

c) How does the *akratic* person go wrong?

There is nothing in Aristotle that suggests that there is a blurring of the understanding or belief

when the desire for sensual pleasure frustrates the operation of deliberative desire ... The charge that Aristotle confines deliberate wrong doing to cases of being overcome by passion seem well founded (Gosling 1990:47).

Yet, Aristotle continues to provide useful insight in the present situation through his concepts of practical knowledge and the practical syllogism.

The concern here in the matter of self-control or lack thereof, is practical knowledge that leads to action, not a judgement about what is to be done—“the wise man rationally bent on acting well and achieving practical success” (Natali 2001:189). In that, Aristotle contends that *phronesis* plays a central role.

The aim is not to suppress the passions. As Nussbaum (1986:310–11) has argued within an Aristotelean framework:

(a)bstraction of the practical intellect from the passions loses us not only their motivating and informing power but also their intrinsic worth ... The standpoint of the person of practical wisdom is criterial of correct choice.

The focus is upon the particular and on action. There still needs to be an elaboration on how deliberation takes place in that context; and it is there that a way forward comes through an understanding of the practical syllogism, the deliberation that leads to action.

The nomenclature, “the practical syllogism”, is not found in Aristotle but it provides a useful insight into clarifying the issue. Grigic (2002) contends that the syllogisms in Book 7 of *The Nichomachean Ethics* are not practical syllogisms but they have an epistemological function in explaining the akratic’s actions. It is Aristotle’s belief that “it is impossible ... to possess

phronesis and be akratic” (Grigic 2002:257) Given Aristotle’s silence on the matter of the practical syllogism, it is reasonable to suggest that Aristotle understood that deliberative reasoning is syllogistic, just as theoretical reasoning is. His illustrative uses of practical reasoning are syllogistic in form, albeit artificial and simplified (Bostock 2006:140). But unlike theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning is not deductive but “suggests or supports an action ... [but] there is no reasonable sense in which it compels an action” (Bostock 2006:141). Kenny (1979:166; cf. Kenny 1966) points out that because the purposive choice that is the conclusion of the practical syllogism flows from both a belief (*doxa*) and a desire (*orexis*), the akratic error is due “to the inoperativeness of a desire as well as the inoperativeness of a belief”; further because that desire is “derived from reasoning from the original...intellectual desire for the end, the inoperativeness of this desire *is* a weakness of the will” (Kenny 1979:166; author’s emphasis)

Gottlieb (2006:218) contends that

there is such a thing as a syllogism that is practical and of specific ethical import, that it is analogous to the correct theoretical syllogism in an important way, and that the practical and ethical nature is found in the much-neglected part of the minor premise that reveals the agent to have the virtue salient to the situation in hand.

I will now follow Gottlieb’s argument closely, point by point, considering firstly the practical dimension of deliberation, then the analogy between theoretical and practical syllogism, and next, the formulation of its so-called middle term and its relationship to virtue.

The practical side of deliberation

The goal of deliberation is practical, the outcome of action. The reasoning is not to a conclusion as with other disciplines. It occurs in a situation when things are not set in advance and yet there are parameters in place around the options possible. The goal is set by desire, but it is possible to deliberate about what relates to the goal.

We deliberate about not ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, nor a statesman about whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else about his end (*EN* 1112b12–14; Trans. Ross 1963: 56).

But what is related to the goal is deliberated and chosen (*EN* 1113b3–4; trans. Ross 1963: 59). It is not a matter of rational justification but a deliberation drawing on a knowledge from perception and experience, either one’s own or that of another (*EN* 1180b7–12; Trans. Ross 1963: 275).

The analogy between the Theoretical and the Practical Syllogism

Aristotle in his *De Motu Animalium* c7 in response to his own question—“but how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not” (Aristotle 1978. Trans. Nussbaum. 40), develops the parallel between theoretical and practical reasoning using the language of “premises” and “conclusions”, language associated with the demonstrative or theoretical syllogism. The same is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN 1147a26-8; trans. Ross 1963:166) - major premise, minor premise and conclusion, which here “is the action” (Aristotle 1978 *De Motu Animalium* c7. Trans. Nussbaum 1978:40). The universal premise, which is the major, is the outcome of deliberation while perception gives the minor premise’s content. As Gottlieb (2006:226, 230) notes

(t)he part of the minor premise which refers to the agent not only licenses the move from premises to conclusion, but it also explains why the agent acts the way she does ... the minor premise of Aristotle’s practical syllogism shows how and why one cannot have practical wisdom without ethical virtue and vice versa (En 1178a16–7; Trans. Ross 1963:266).

The “snippets of syllogising” (Gottlieb 2006:224) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN 1141b18–21; Trans. Ross 1963:147; EN 1142a20–2; Trans. Ross 1963:150), suggest “the more specific information one has, the better able one is to act” (Gottlieb 2006:225). It is important to recognise that in order to act the agent “must be a certain type of person and apply his know-how to himself here and now” (Gottlieb 2006:230).

Nussbaum (1978:182) suggests that Aristotle’s purpose in paralleling practical and theoretical reasoning is “to suggest both are equally valid patterns”. The practical reasoning begins with the agent’s perception of the good or apparent good and the conclusion of the practical reasoning is never a proposition but an action. Aristotle’s practical syllogism attributes to the agent both a desire and a belief about what must be done to realise that desire (Nussbaum 1978:201). Aristotle gives a central place in the good life to emotions and actions.

There is, as far as we know, no “true life-plan” just as there are no ideal pianos or heavenly tuning forks. There are nevertheless, pianos that are well and badly tuned according to a public and (let us suppose) generally agreed standard (Nussbaum 1978:219).

The Middle Term and Ethical Virtue

The ethical agent is presumed in the minor premise but it is not being proposed that “the first part of minor premise is the middle term of the practical syllogism” (Price 2006:227). The “how” of the practical syllogism parallels the “why” of the scientific syllogism but it can be

derailed, so to speak, by the inadequate virtue of the Agent; good character is the explanation whereas “recalcitrant desire” renders the moral agent “akratic”. As Price (2006:229) points out: “(o)n Aristotle’s account, having the right motivation is part and parcel of doing the right thing ... At the very least she lacks the first part of the minor premise of the correct syllogism” .

Accordingly, practical wisdom demands the presence of ethical virtue. Recently, Kalis et al. (2008) reported an integrative research project examining examples of *akrasia* and psychopathological phenomena in decision-making which links insights from Psychology and Philosophy, but further research is needed before integrating the findings at a practical level.

To summarise: Aristotle’s reply to Plato’s contention that the heart of *akrasia* is ignorance is to introduce the distinction between “the possession and the exercise of knowledge” (Kenny 2002:117); the passionate desire focuses upon the pleasant rather than the good (Kenny 2002:21) and the akratic decision cannot be characterised as a Kantian style “unsuccessful contest between rational will and wholly non-rational desire or passion” (Gill 1995:13). The explanation of the akratic choice seems to be found in failure in the agent’s character development: “the belief and desire patterns that motivate action have not been fully brought into line, through character development, with those which the person herself recognises as the right (reasonable) one” (Gill 1995:13). Thus, to quote Rorty (1980: 282), the akratic person

has come to value the activity for the pleasure instead of seeing the pleasure dependent on the character of the activity. Even the best of men runs the danger of *akrasia* under those circumstances.

The origin of the personal ethical problem lies in the individual’s ethical formation; Rorty (1980b: 281) observes:

Aristotle differs from Socrates in his diagnosis of the cause of the *akrates’* ignorance: he emphasises the character sources of the akratic condition, viewing it as resting on badly formed habits concerning pleasures. Such failures have an intellectual dimension without necessarily being caused by intellectual error ...The *akrates* is precisely the sort of person who is conflicted because his moral development is uneven. His knowledge of general principles is at a different level of actualization from his habits of perception and his habits of action (Rorty 1980:281, 283).

Accordingly Aristotle places great importance on ethical habit formation from an early age: “(i)t makes no small difference then, whether we form habits from our very youth; it makes great

difference, or rather *all* the difference” (*EN* 1103b24–; Trans. Ross 1963:29, Emphasis in original).

Given then the importance of virtuous behaviour being “made perfect by habit” (*EN* 1103a25; trans. Ross 1963:28), in terms of professional formation, it is not a matter of intellectual input but rather by doing good deeds, developing that habit, for “we learn by doing” (*EN* 1103a30–1103b1; trans. Ross 1963: 28–9). It is something acquired by “the non-rational process of habituation” (Engberg-Pedersen 1983:187, 189). The person of self-control acts on an ethical conclusion rather than following through on desire (*EN* 1111b14; Trans. Ross 1963:53), a moral conclusion that is not in accordance with desire. Aristotle “sees the end of ethics as not ‘salvation’ or scientific sureness, but a constantly evolving rational agreement among competent and serious men” (Nussbaum1978:220).

In the context of tertiary education, the problem is how to continue to develop that habit of self-control. The phrase “continue to develop” is intentional for the presumption is that the habit of self-control has its beginnings before tertiary education has commenced and, further, that the habit of acquiring self-control is a work-in-progress. Still, two matters warrant comment, first what the focus is in the formation process, and second, the environment or size of the group in which that formation process could be attempted with some likelihood of reasonable success.

In terms of what the focus needs to be in the formation process to cultivate the ethical character, again Aristotle offers a useful insight. Kraut (2010:2) comments that in Aristotle’s view “if one has the special mental condition he [Aristotle] calls practical wisdom, then one cannot be, nor will one ever become, an akratic person” (*EN* 1152a6–7; Ross 1963:182; cf. *EN* 1144a11–b32).

The wise person (*phronimos*) by definition is both wise and virtuous. Natali (2001: 188–9) in an extended quotation describes how that operates:

(p)hronesis brings about an agreement of reason and desire that finds itself in good deliberation. Practical truth features in this agreement between the intellective faculty and the emotions. It would be more accurate to say that reason in the practical field is ‘dipped in desire’; if we do not have the right desires, reason cannot even start its analytical job. The agreement of reason and desire depends on the object: the same thing is judged both good and desirable, contrary to Hume’s argument that claims that the two faculties have different objects.

That characterisation presents an account of “the wise man rationally bent on acting well and achieving practical success” (Natali 2001:189). Nonetheless past action does not automatically

guarantee future performance because *akrasia* continues as a possibility. As noted above, Aristotle contends that the practically wise person by definition enjoys the character that precludes *akrasia*; that is a logical conclusion, not an assertion of ontological impossibility or what in Christian Theology is referred to as “impeccability”. Not only is the akratic response possible, but there is also the possibility of the Student Chaplain or the experienced Chaplain deliberately doing what s/he knows to be wrong, a situation that Aristotle did not consider at any length (Coplestone 1956a:339).

Three strategies contribute to holding the *phronimos* on track: ongoing self-vigilance, the mentoring and support of other wise persons, and “the rule of Law”. That phrase, “the rule of Law” is a nineteenth century British coinage (Bingham 2010:3) and here is used in the sense of the Australian Parliamentary and Common Law that protects the freedom of the citizen. As Britain’s former senior Law Lord, Tom Bingham (2010:174) observed: the Rule of Law “remains an ideal, but an ideal worth fighting for, in the interest of good government and peace, at home and in the world at large”.

In the context of Chaplaincy training and practice, ongoing self-vigilance and the mentoring of other *phronimoi* is effected principally through supervision. The educational strategy there is not the “sage on the stage” but “the guide on the side” with a different relationship to that of teacher on the one hand, or of employer on the other. Accordingly the supervisory relationship for the student is less threatening and allows greater frankness in presenting their work for supervision and self reflection. Peer/Group supervision operates in units significantly smaller in size than the university lecture hall. The older Australian public universities have an average of 27,000 students (Davis 2010:108), their counterparts in Britain average 15,000 students while Japanese universities average 4,000 students (Davis 2010:109). There are universities elsewhere whose enrolment dwarfs the Australian university—Phoenix University in the USA has 440,000 students (Davis 2010:115), and Guangzhou University in Southern China expects to enrol 200,000 students when completed (Davis 2010:25). Against those figures, the enrolment of the NSW College of Clinical Pastoral Education with its “Centres” where the CPE teaching takes place, approximates to the scenario Newman favoured both for the intellectual teaching and the formation of character—the small University College or Residential Hall. Given the fact that the NSWCCPE teaches through its individual centres and that the number of students involved in a CPE Unit rarely reaches double figures, sheer size would favour the adoption of Newman’s model, far more so than teaching students practical wisdom, as favoured by some Australian

universities, as part of the mission of the universities (Davis 2010:42–3) and that for two reasons. Firstly, as proposed here, the heart of CPE formation is in the postgraduate context where practical wisdom in the context of Chaplaincy practice is what is being taught through supervised professional experience; secondly, the size of the teaching unit and the process of supervision which normally continues beyond CPE graduation provide a context favouring ethical professional conduct.

In that, CPE education stands in contrast to Australian public and private universities whose undergraduate student numbers are large, and being undergraduates those students are not yet in their professional environment. At most, final year undergraduates can only be involved in exercises of casuistry where the appropriate ethical principles are used to explore an ethical way forward in a conflicted ethical situation. The situation remains theoretical and the situation does not impact upon their desire, something essential from within an Aristotelean framework for the action to be virtuous on the one hand, and on the other to ensure that it is under self-control avoiding akratic behaviour. For Aristotle “practical intelligence (*phronesis*) is shown in the grasp of truth in agreement with right desire” (*EN* 1139 a30; Trans. Ross 1963:139).

Accordingly, the context of practical intelligence is the real world, not the lecture hall or seminar room, the very reservation expressed by one business leader to the proposal of Vice-Chancellor Schwartz of Macquarie University as noted above. Aristotle points out that “virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means” (*EN* 1144a7T9; Trans. Ross 1963:155). Aristotle, in Hardie’s (1980:225) summary, characterises,

practical thinking as the thinking which proceeds by deliberation and terminates in choice; hence it is concerned with the particular thing to be done (*EN* 1142a 23-30; Trans. Ross 1963:148–9; 1143 a35–b5 Trans. Ross 1963:153–4) and within the conceptual framework of end and means, the particular action is the taking of means to an end (*EN* 1144 a24ff., Trans. Ross 1963:156–7).

In brief, Socrates was correct in thinking that practical wisdom and virtue cannot be separated out, one from the other (*EN* 1144 b21–32; Trans. Ross 1963:157–8). The interdisciplinary work of Kalis et al. (2008) in the context of decision making such as *akrasia* are of limited interest and await more extensive research before being applied in professional practice.

At a more general level I suggest that ethical supervision of practitioners by the Profession needs to be in place through effective custom and practice on the one hand, and through the “rule of Law” on the other. And equally important, is the lesson of history. Human history indicates that

constant vigilance is always needed. I move now to examine implications in this Portfolio for the Chaplaincy profession and the areas needing further research

7. Implications and further research.

I conclude with some observations on the likely implications that flow from this Portfolio. Clearly the views developed in this Portfolio need to be submitted to the Chaplaincy Profession of the NSWCCPE for their professional judgement on the insights developed and their usefulness in ordinary practice. Only then will the proposals attract the professional support needed to begin to effect the change in the professional practice. Still, more is needed than ideas to bring about organisational change, and that belongs to another project.

If the Chaplaincy Professionals as a group, or a critical mass of practitioners, accept the argument developed here, then the following implications may follow for their professional practice:

- i. there will be greater clarity around the aims of each CPE Unit—the honing of practical wisdom (*phronesis*) in applying the insights of theology and social science in chaplaincy praxis;
- ii. the relationship between medical practice and chaplaincy, and their interrelationship will be clarified;
- iii. there needs to be developed an agreed curriculum of Theology and Social Sciences relevant to the chaplaincy profession and which is a prerequisite for CPE Units. That curriculum development needs also to include the interface between the Disciplines of Theology and Social Sciences. Related to that is the need for Supervisors to be taught Curriculum implementation along with formative and summative curriculum evaluation;
- iv. research methodology needs to be taught at least in the CPE Advanced Unit so that research within the Chaplaincy profession may be more widely practised and the research published;
- v. there needs to be a serious exploration of the use of Qualitative Research Methodology in Chaplaincy work, including longitudinal studies and perplexing or intriguing pastoral cases. In that way the professional knowledge of the Chaplains will be enriched with further trustworthy knowledge that is also being made more widely available;

- vi. the NSWCCPE Inc. needs to establish its own journal, either in print format or online, to promote greater understanding of professional matters among Chaplains. Linked with that is the setting up of a professional Archive of Chaplaincy Vebatims to showcase professional work;
- vii. the curriculum requirements for Advanced CPE Units, as well as Supervisory Units might stipulate the publication of student work as a broader strategy to “grow” a “research culture” within NSWCCPE Inc. The importance of such a “research culture” is consequent upon the College’s associate membership of SCD and the ability to award a raft of tertiary awards to Doctoral level;
- viii. Chaplains need to be encouraged to explore relevant disciplines and areas of research within them for useful Chaplaincy praxis. That has taken place already in NSW in disciplines such as History, Educational areas of appraisal and entrance requirements, and aspects of Counselling and Psychology, but more is needed; for example useful professional insights might be drawn from Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Batten 2011). In the area of student assessment useful insights might be gained from the Scottish school project “Assessment is for Learning” (AiFL) in the use of “formative” and “summative” assessment (Clark 2010) on the one hand, and on the other a wider use of the Portfolio in student assessment. Another area warranting close research for insights for educational programmes in CPE is the sociology of Teaching Centres, particularly around tacit and informal learning curricula;
- ix. it might be appropriate to explore the formation of a professional association of Chaplains along the lines of the Australian College of Educators, or alternatively, seek to establish a professional niche within an already established group;
- x. if the argument of this Portfolio is accepted then the issue of awarding grades to CPE students would cease to be an occasion of concern among CPE Supervisors. It would not be a matter of “grading”, but whether a group of wise chaplaincy practitioners (*phronimoi*) deemed the record of the Student Chaplain’s work as “good enough” to characterise the Student Chaplain a “wise practitioner” (*phronimos*). At the same time there needs to be ongoing review of Student assessment strategies;
- xi. the NSW College of CPE might establish a Panel of Wise Practitioners in the Chaplaincy Profession, answerable to the College Executive, to supervise and mentor matters of Curriculum development, implementation and evaluation on the one hand, and of student assessment on the other. That strategy would contribute to

maintaining standards and offset a centrifugal tendency in the College for the Teaching Centres to operate independently of the College structure; and related to point viii is

- xii. a need for research into the organisational dynamics of the College as an educational organisation that offers a raft of tertiary awards.

Research is needed in the following areas to build upon the insights explored in this Portfolio:

- i. cooperative research projects could be explored between Chaplains, Medical Doctors, Nurses, Social Workers and Allied Health Professionals into aspects of holistic medical care for patients within a hospital setting - Palliative Care is one area of holistic care that comes to mind. That may also improve the likelihood of attracting the necessary funds for the research;
- ii. another relevant research project would be a series of sociological studies on the professional role of the Chaplain and the impact of the setting in which the Chaplain is working. Such evidence-based findings bring greater understanding of the context of Chaplaincy and that has its implications for teaching CPE programmes;
- iii. there is a need for research into the elements of hidden curricula and styles of informal learning and tacit learning in the Teaching Centres on the one hand, and on the other hand, in the hospitals and other Chaplaincy workplaces where the Student Chaplain is doing the CPE units. That need for research is urgent because it continues to be unexplored and the evidence has implications for effective CPE programmes.

The list is far from being exhaustive and it does signal the range of implications that could flow from this study. But unless the implications attract the professional imagination of fellow Chaplains, then clearly the implications will not eventuate from this study. At the broadest level this Portfolio might contribute to furthering the professional conversation within the NSWCCPE Inc. on developing good theory at the service of Chaplaincy. And as Kurt Lewin (1951:169) remarked sixty years ago: “there is nothing so practical as a good theory”.

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