The Use and Disclosure of Intuition(s) by Leaders in Australian Organisations: A Grounded Theory

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Abstract

As workers, managers, leaders, researchers and theoreticians in organisations and in society – indeed, as humans – I argue that we continue to undervalue and underplay the role of the visceral, the tacit, the silent, the shadow, the emotional and the intuitive. Non-rational influences in the public domain, in particular, the organisations that influence our daily lives, have either been ignored or seen as irrational – something to be avoided, negated, managed, corrected, punished, excluded or in the case of intuition, marginalised, hidden and silenced.

Educational institutions prepare students for an organisational life in which instrumental rationality is assumed and expected. However, the assumption that leaders in organisations are exclusively rational in their behaviour and decision-making processes is one that has come under increasing scrutiny. Research has shown that leaders use intuition frequently and consider it important to their role and effectiveness. The same research however, has also revealed that intuitions are often masked in analytical terms or suppressed. A contention of this thesis is that the cost of not acknowledging intuition or accounting for and incorporating it in work discourse and practices is high.

Intuition disclosure in organisations has never been the focus of empirical research in Australia nor internationally. Studies of intuition to date have been directed at discovering what intuition ‘is’, its powers and pitfalls, and how one can best make use of this subconscious and elusive cognitive capacity. Understanding the nature of intuition and its potential is important, however, I assert that this knowledge is impotent in application unless the social processes surrounding its use and disclosure in the ‘real world’ are also understood.

This study employed an approach informed by Grounded Theories to investigate the social processes of intuition use and disclosure at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and societal levels. Data collected from semi-structured interviews with 27 men and women leaders in significant Australian organisations was analysed using NVivo. Elite leaders were purposively sampled for their influence on, experience and knowledge of, and accountability for, organisational decision-making processes. Their exceptional communication skills provided rich, relevant and revealing data. Pursuant to the tenets of Grounded Theory, a balance of men and women were sought and (almost) achieved for the sample when early analysis revealed gender to be significant to answering the research problem.
The findings revealed that all the participants in the study considered intuition, which they defined as a feeling/knowing based on experience, to be important in their decision-making and leadership. Intuition use was found to be conditioned by the nature and context of the decision. However, the use of intuition and analysis in complementary ways was a strong theme – to the extent that the boundary between them, for many participants, was blurred.

The degree to which intuition(s) are disclosed in organisations was found to be conditioned by ‘interiority’, the core category of the developed theory. Interiority, at the intrapersonal level, was interpreted as an orientation to, and legitimacy given to, the inner realm of feelings, including intuitions. Through an analysis of responses to ‘feeling questions’ about the ‘experience’ of intuition, the women in the study were interpreted to have more highly developed interiority than the men. In addition, both the men and the women in the sample perceived that women, in general, were more ‘in touch with their feelings’ and, as a consequence, their intuition(s). Interiority facilitates the ‘surfacing’ of feelings and intuitions into conscious awareness, which renders these feelings/knowings available for expression, articulation, discussion, exploration and scrutiny.

Interpersonal interactions, organisations and societies can also be described in terms of interiority. At these collective levels interiority represents an orientation to and therefore expression of feelings and intuitions. Feelings and intuitions were perceived as legitimate and were therefore acknowledged in what I describe as integrative organisational cultures that are often led or dominated by women. In organisations with competitive, tough and punishing (assertive) cultures, often led or dominated by men, where external considerations and rational forms of knowing were elevated. In these cultures feelings and intuition remain unacknowledged and undisclosed. Thus, such assertive cultures can be said to have low interiority.

Typically, in assertive cultures, feelings and intuitions are ‘othered’ and marginalised as feminine, inferior and, therefore, illegitimate. Consequently, intuitions in these environments are suppressed and silenced, rationalised through finding or fabricating rationale or masked by terms such as ‘judgement’ and ‘experience’. Norms of expression are maintained through fear of ridicule and by rewarding those that conform. Consequently, it is only individuals who have power, status and/or a good ‘track record’ that disclose intuitions in environments of low interiority.

The grounded theory developed in this study is significant because it is the first to address socio-cultural conditions and processes that contextualise intuition use and disclosure. Important implications for theory, policy and practice, as well as research and future directions for research, are raised by this study. The findings and developed theory contribute to the rapidly-growing body of research that recognises the primacy of non-rational drivers for decision-making and behaviour in individuals, interactions, organisations and societies.
The study concluded that interiority can be developed both individually and collectively. However, the continuing dominance of men and the consequent pervasiveness of external orientation have resulted in a myopia which is only recognised by those who have high interiority and those that are marginalised (mostly women in both cases). Unacknowledged feelings can lead to hidden individual power asserting agendas, and fragmented, toxic organisational cultures and the suppression of intuitions can result in missed opportunities and exposure to substantial risk. It was concluded that future research could further examine the hypotheses developed in this study and investigate how interiority might be developed in individuals, organisations and societies to enhance transparency, cohesion, creativity and decision-making at all levels of social description.
Certification

I certify that the substance of this thesis has not already been submitted for any degree and is not being currently submitted for any other degree.

I certify that any help received in preparing this thesis, all the sources used, have been acknowledged in this thesis.

10\textsuperscript{th} February, 2011
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Chapter 1: Introduction

‘The intuitive mind is a sacred gift, and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honours the servant, and has forgotten the gift’. (Einstein cited in Vanharanta & Easton 2009, p. 425)

1.1 Background to the research

In the 1990s a number of theorists noted increasing complexity, uncertainty, discontinuous change and paradox, and their consequences for managers and leaders in organisations (Hames 1994; Cooksey & Gates 1995; Handy 1995; Parry 1996). Clearly, this trend has continued and gathered pace in the wake of destabilising world events in this new millennium. Terrorism, the military invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the global financial crisis (GFC), and rapidly evolving economic, technological and cultural globalisation and interdependency have only increased complexity and ambiguity, and perceptions of vulnerability, in global business operating environments (Caballero & Krishnamurthy 2008; Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008; Porter & Schwab 2008). As a consequence, the need for new management and leadership skills, approaches and, in particular, ways of conceptualising problems and solutions has never been greater (Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005). Despite this, educational institutions have not produced graduates with a sufficient grasp of the nature of complexity or the skills to cope with it (Cooksey & Gates 1995; Gates & Cooksey 1998).

According to Bennett (1998), this is because formal Western management theory and practice is based in rational analysis. More recently, theorists have questioned whether traditional rational models are still relevant in 21st century organisations (Eisenhardt & Zbaraki 1992; Parikh, Neubauer & Lank 1994; Sinclair, Ashkanasy & Chatopadyay 2010). Measurement and analyses of variables in the external organisational environment has become too complex and unstable. Strategic planning is problematic because things have changed before the plan is finished (Hames 1994; Mintzberg 1994; Handy 1995; Stacey 2000). Moreover, decision makers operate within a field of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1987). Reductionist analysis enables only the understanding of a limited amount of variables (de Geus 1996) and not how variables interact and impact on each other (Brockmann & Simmons 1997). As Cappon (1993) pointed out, ‘Fact based, deductive, and analytical thinking is too late; it goes after the fact. Nor is it sensitive to circumstance, or the complexity, contradictions, and variability of human nature ...’ (p. 41). Thus, reliance on analysis in organisations is problematic.

Given the limitations of rational analysis some theorists have proposed that intuition can be effective in contemporary situations because it can deal with more complexity than can our conscious or rational minds (Jung 1977; Cappon 1994a; Brockmann & Simmons 1997; Shapiro & Spence 1997; Sadler-Smith 2008). A generally accepted and commonly used definition of intuition is ‘affectively charged judgments
that arise through rapid, nonconscious, and holistic associations’, (Dane & Pratt, p. 40). Intuition has been shown to be positively associated with organisational performance, particularly in unstable environments (Khatri & Ng 2000). However, until recently, intuition has not been recognised as a valid construct outside psychology (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith 2008), nor as a legitimate or reliable source of information for decision-making, particularly in organisational contexts (Cappon 1994a; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007).

Moreover, I argue this view of intuition as unreliable in organisational contexts, and even magical and mystical, is perplexing when considered with evidence from field research, which shows that CEOs and senior executives use intuition regularly, and consider it important to their decision-making, in Australia (Robson & Miller 2006) and internationally (Agor 1984; Agor 1985; Agor 1989b; Agor 1989c; Parikh et al. 1994; Isenman 1997; Burke & Miller 1999). The study of intuition can therefore be seen as a site of contention, contradiction and paradox. Although interest and research in intuition, and its use in organisations, increased in the mid-1980s, momentum has somewhat diminished in recent years according to Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005). Given the widespread use of intuition, and its perceived importance to decision makers, I propose that a greater understanding of intuition and the role it plays in organisations is needed – particularly how intuition is used in context.

This study focuses on the use and disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations. Despite its perceived importance for decision makers and leaders, intuition has been shown to be ‘silent’ or private practice – neither commonly acknowledged nor discussed. However, the disclosure of intuition(s) has never been the focus of empirical research in Australia nor internationally. This is a significant gap in the knowledge because the unwillingness to disclose intuitions has been shown to have the potential to negatively impact on major decisions (Robson 2004). Intuition(s) will be shown to be one of a number of non-rational influences on judgement and behaviour (such as emotions and visceral influences) that, taken together, can be described as ‘feelings’ (see Section 1.5 Definition of terms). If people feel unable to openly express their intuitive feelings this can result in increased exposure to risk and an inability to fully exploit opportunities and innovation through collaborative enterprise. Consequently, the specific focus of this research is to investigate, describe and explain the social processes of intuition use and disclosure in Australian organisations.
1.2 Research problem and significance

The core research problem addressing these gaps in extant knowledge can be expressed as:

What are the social processes of intuition use and disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?

I argue that, in order to answer this main research question about the disclosure of intuition, it is first necessary to inquire into the participants’ perceptions of intuition – their interpretations and definitions, how they use it, and its significance in their decision-making and leadership. Thus, the research problem was separated into two parts:

Main question 1: How do the participants (organisational leaders) interpret, use and value intuition in their decision-making and leadership?

Main question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?

Essentially, in response to the first main question, I will argue that participants use intuition and analysis in complementary ways that cannot be meaningfully separated in actual decision-making in the field. In response to the second main question, I will argue that the extent to which intuition(s) are disclosed is conditioned by ‘interiority’. I define interiority as an orientation to the inner realm of feelings and intuitions at intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and societal levels. High interiority results in the capacity and willingness of an individual, relationship, organisation or society to acknowledge and express feelings and intuitions.

1.2.1 Significance of the research

Although there has been increased interest concerning intuition in recent decades, I will argue that the study of intuition can still be considered a nascent area, yet to attract the attention and resources commensurate with its importance. I have outlined the main gap in the knowledge and why it needs to be addressed (Section 1.1). This is not, however, in and of itself, the sole justification for the research. Certainly, the need for more research, in general, is acknowledged. However, additional motivation for this research, particularly in relation to my approach to it, stems from the recognition that there has been a dominance of competing, positivistic, psychological approaches to the study of intuition. And, moreover, that this has ‘problematised’ the conceptual development of intuition and limited the focus and nature of research. Additional significance is afforded to this study as a consequence of how I will address some of those limiting consequences in terms of philosophy, method and methodology.
More specifically, psychological research into intuition has produced an array of competing definitions arising from various research programs. Each program conceptualises, defines and assigns properties and values to intuition. Conceptualisations of intuition range from absolute truth to absolute nonsense (Westcott 1968). Clearly this is in part because intuition is a slippery, elusive and polymorphous phenomenon. However, it is also due to nature of the dominant positivist scientific research tradition in psychology which is robust not only against alternative psychological perspectives, but also against perspectives outside psychology such as the much older Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. Extant theory about intuition is thus fragmented across and within disciplines. The lack of a systematic integration of perspectives on intuition is addressed in this thesis by reconciling these disparate views of intuition within psychology, and between psychology and philosophy.

Moreover, the dominance of positivist psychology in approaches to intuition have resulted in an emphasis on understanding of what intuition ‘is’ – that is thought to be discovered through artificial and contrived research designs. Even in qualitative studies of intuition use in the field, research seeks to discover the ‘powers and perils of intuition’ (Myers 2002, p. 42), and how it can be most usefully applied but shows little regard for social and cultural context. The empirical component of this research focuses on the perceptions of decision makers at the very top of the organisational hierarchies – CEO’s, Chairs, Directors and senior executives – concerning intuition in ‘real world’ situations. While this is not exceptional in itself (see, for example, Agor 1989c), the study also investigated how participants experienced, understood and disclosed intuition(s), as well as their perceptions about the attitudes of others toward intuition. The research is significant because it shows not only how intuition is defined and used but also how perceptions impact disclosure of this use and, moreover, explains why intuition(s) are seldom disclosed.

As opposed to the deductive hypothesis testing that is typical of positivistic psychological research; this study has made use of approaches to data collection and analysis that are informed by variants of Grounded Theory. The significance of the adaptability and flexibility afforded by Grounded Theory was the discovery of gender in relation to the greater orientation of women, in general, to the inner realm of feelings. A significant contribution of the emergent theory is to show how this orientation to feelings (interiority) influences the acknowledgement and expression of feelings and intuitions at individual and collective levels. Further contributions in terms of implications for theory, as well as policy and practice, will be discussed in the final chapter.

1.3 Positioning of the researcher/evolution of the research

Researchers who interpret empirical data need to recognise their own involvement in the process. This recognition means that researchers are ‘not only required to make an appearance’ within the work but
should ‘reveal themselves, their background, their beliefs and biases, to their audiences’ (Bridges & Higgs 2009, p. 52). This is important because researchers are not separate from their interpretations. Self-disclosure of the researcher affords the reader an opportunity to interpret what is said about the data in relation to who is doing the interpreting. Self-disclosure will be featured throughout this thesis, however, for the moment, I wish to utilise this introductory section to reveal the circumstances that led to me to writing this thesis.

My motivation to study intuition first arose in the context of an interview carried out as part of an undergraduate assignment for the unit entitled ‘Leadership’ (as part of the Human Resource Development major at Southern Cross University in 2002). The task was to interview leaders with the aim of discovering what attributes and skills they considered important. I asked of one participant, ‘You deal with groups of men with different backgrounds, ages, experiences and situations – how do you know what processes or techniques to use?’ His response was, ‘intuition’.

When the opportunity to pursue an honours year arose, the topic of intuition immediately came to mind. The thesis produced from this research was entitled Australian Elite Leaders and Intuition Use: Rationale for the Non-rational. The objective of the interpretive, qualitative study was to investigate what role intuition played in the decision-making of Australian business leaders and how important they considered it to their effectiveness. In realising this goal, I sought first, to find leaders who had been deemed ‘effective’ by a distinguished panel of their peers (Boss Magazine True Leaders lists 2001, 2002, 2003). I then inquired into their use of intuition and their perceptions about the role it played in their leadership and decision-making. I concluded that intuition was considered very important to participants for their decision-making and leadership, and thus their effectiveness. However, consistent with other research which will be discussed later, I also found that intuition use was considered to be a ‘silent practice’ which was rarely disclosed to others. The current research is motivated by my personal curiosity in relation to this finding.

1.3.1 Development of the Researcher along the journey

PhD student workshop with Linda de Cossart and Della Fish, RIPPLE, CSU, Albury October 2007

PhD student weekend workshop at the ‘Research Farm’, Bowral, November 2007

PhD student workshop ANZAM, 10 & 11 June, 2008

3rd Annual Postgraduate Research Conference, UNE, July 2008

ANZAM Methodology Conference, Brisbane, July, 2008

ASCPRI course Qualitative Design, Analysis and representation 17th Jan -21st Jan, 2009
1.3.2 Publications derived from this research

As a matter of record, one refereed journal article and three peer reviewed conference papers were derived from this research:

**Refereed Journal Articles**


**Peer Reviewed Conference Papers**


1.4 Outline of the thesis

In Chapter 2, I will provide a critical, interdisciplinary and interpretive review of extant literature and research concerning intuition within and across the fields of philosophy and psychology. I will show that while there are variations of interpretations, philosophical intuition is largely considered as the direct, subjective and infallible apprehension of an ultimate reality (Westcott 1968).
Intuition in psychology, on the other hand, is characterised by a range of competing definitions and multiple uses of the term. Research concerning intuition has been dominated by psychological, neuro-psychological and neuro-scientific approaches that are driven by a desire to understand what intuition ‘is’. Intuition is many things to many people (Betsch 2008) – a connection to unconscious archetypes that may facilitate psychic growth and individuation (Jung 1978), error prone but useful (Kahneman 2003) and ‘visceral’ influences (Loewenstein 1996). Intuition is also understood as a cognitive process (Epstein 1990; Hammond 1996; Epstein 1998), individual preferences in relation to perceiving and processing information (Jung 1977; Jabri 1991; Allinson & Hayes 1996) and as an event (Bastick 1982; Cappon 1994a; Crossan, Lane & White 1999).

I will then present a model of cognition that addresses the incoherence of definitions within psychology. This model will integrate the various psychological constructs examined by conceiving of intuition as multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. I will argue that this allows these constructs to be ordered in relation to one another and in relation to analysis. Following this a fundamental disjuncture between psychology and philosophical understandings of intuition will be revealed. I will show that while both philosophical and psychological accounts construct intuition as subjective and direct process or event, in philosophy, intuition is considered infallible, while in psychology, intuition is discussed as inherently fallible at best.

I will subsequently propose a reconciliation of philosophical and psychological intuition based on my own interpretation of literature drawn from a variety of disciplines. I will suggest, after some discussion and clarification, that the two ‘intuitions’ can be reconciled by way of a stratified ontology that is underpinned by a transcendent, unifying and primordial ground consciousness. Following this, I will examine definitions of intuition as ESP or Psi, which, according to a number of theorists, is explained by the inter-connectedness implied by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum non-locality¹.

Having examined these various constructs of intuition, I will narrow the focus of the review to field studies concerning intuition use in organisations. Intuition in these studies is most commonly found to be ‘gut feeling’ or intuition that is based on past experience and draws on tacit knowledge. Evidence for the value of this expert judgement to managers and leaders is unequivocal. However, I will highlight the finding of a number of these studies that show such gut feelings are seldom disclosed or discussed by

¹ Goswami (1995) pointed out the generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics invalidated the assumptions of Scientific Realism (objectivity, strong objectivity, causal determinism, material monism, and locality). Essentially, this interpretation implies that nothing is discrete or separate – the universe is a seamless unbroken whole.
those that simultaneously acknowledge their import. While some theorists have attributed this phenomenon to intuition having a bad reputation, I will argue that no research has specifically investigated this disconnect between use and disclosure – this ‘silent’ use of intuition. I will assert that while knowledge about intuition and intuition use is important, this knowledge is more potent if the context, particularly the socio-cultural context in which intuition use occurs, is also understood. I will cite this as a primary justification for the investigation of the research problem which will subsequently be stated.

In Chapter 3 I will describe, explain and justify the theoretical framework I have adopted to serve as a structure for the analysis and interpretation of data in the study. I have chosen to use Layder’s (1994; 1997; 2005) Domain Theory, which proposes a stratified ontology in order to explain how macrological and micrological social processes interact to produce lived social reality. The principle advantage of Domain Theory is that it has the potential to draw on multiple sociological lenses in the analysis of the complex and multi-level dynamics inherent in answering the research problem. Furthermore, Layder’s stratified ontology is underpinned by the Critical Realism of Bhaskar (2002), which is based on the premise of a ground state of consciousness. Thus, philosophical congruency will be found between the theoretical framework and the way I will interpret psychological and philosophical intuition can be reconciled.

In Chapter 4 I will describe, explain and justify the methodology and methods used in the study. I will argue that an investigation of the ‘real world’ cannot occur through artificial and contrived research designs. My approach to this research reflects the belief that there have been constraints and inadequacies with the typically positivistic and controlled ways in which research on intuition has been conceived and conducted. The advantage of Grounded Theory (GT) for this study is that it is a flexible methodology that has no attachment to types of data, area of interest or discipline. GT therefore offers researchers an opportunity to develop their own variants that are congruent with the vicissitudes and context of their research projects. Thus, GT is an ideal methodology for studies, such as this one, that seek to understand the complexities and subtleties of organisational life. A dual approach to data gathering and analysis through variants of GT will be described, explained and justified.

I will assert that theory addressing the identified gaps in the knowledge is more likely to emerge from data drawn from the observations and descriptions of decision makers in the field. Semi-structured interviews with CEOs, chairs, directors, executives and leaders of Australian organisations, as well as data collection and analysis procedures, will be described and justified. I will argue that research concerning intuition disclosure must connect directly with leaders in their decision-making contexts in order to achieve a more complete understanding of the phenomena under investigation.
In Chapter 5 I will present the theoretical analyses and emergent grounded theory. I will show that intuition was experienced by participants as an internal feeling of knowing that flagged the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal. In general, participants trusted their intuition(s) and considered them highly reliable and very important to their leadership and decision-making. The analysis will reveal that participants used gut feeling in conditional yet complementary ways. Furthermore, I will show that the disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations is a complex, conditional social process that can be understood at different levels of social organisation. Whether or not intuition is acknowledged and/or expressed is conditional on the ‘interiority’ of a person, interpersonal encounter, organisation or society – all of which are interrelated. In Chapter 6 I will compare the emergent theory with the extant research and literature examined in Chapter 2 as well as new literature in order to integrate, interpret and make sense of and make conclusions about the research problem. I argue that the introduction of new literature in Chapter 6 is justified because the emergent theory discovered extends beyond the scope of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Indeed the discovery of theory grounded in the data is seen as a principal advantage of a GT methodology.

1.5 Definition of terms

**Complementarity** – Although the word complementarity has a variety of definitions under different disciplines, its adoption in this study can be seen as stemming from particle physics. Complementarity was originally used by Niels Bohr to explain the paradoxical particle nature. Bohr rejected dichotomous and dualistic interpretations of the wave/particle problem. Instead, he saw electrons as having both wave and particle natures simultaneously (wavicles) and that it was the way that one ‘looked’ for particles that determined how we ‘saw’ them (Goswami 1995). Particles cannot be accurately described as waves or particles as their ‘true nature transcends both descriptions’ (Goswami 1995, p. 43).

**Elite leader** – for the purposes of this study an elite leader will be defined as a person who holds or who has held a senior position within an organisation or charged with a significant share of the strategic decision-making of an organisation. Participants in this study were principally chairs, directors, senior managers, heads of departments and CEOs (Burton & Higley 1987; Pettigrew 1992).

**Emotion** – an intense feeling; a complex and usually strong subjective response such as love or fear (Delbridge & Bernard 1998).

**Feeling** – I acknowledge that the psychological literature discusses feelings and emotions in different and specific ways (see, for example, Damasio 1994; Bastick 2003). However, in this study, I will take the Macquarie Concise Dictionary definition. The term ‘feelings’ is defined as an overarching term intended to encompass emotions, moods, intuitions, sentiments, or desires; non-intellectual or subjective human responses (Delbridge & Bernard 1998).
Holon – Something that is a whole and simultaneously a part of a larger system (Koestler 1967; Wilber 1995).

Holarchy – A hierarchy of self-regulating holons that function as autonomous wholes and as parts dependent on higher levels of control (Koestler 1967; Wilber 1995).

Interiority – the extent to which there is an orientation to feelings, emotions and intuitions at different levels of social description (intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and societal or environmental).

Intuition – In brief, intuition is literally in-tuition - taught from the inside -as ‘knowledge’ or a driver of behaviour that is obtained without apparent effort. Intuition is discussed in philosophy as the direct, subjective and infallible apprehension of an ultimate reality (Westcott 1968). In psychological literature intuition is alluded to as a connection to unconscious archetypes that may facilitate psychic growth and individuation (Jung 1978), heuristics that are error prone but useful (Kahneman 2003), as well as ‘visceral’ influences (Loewenstein 1996). Intuition is also understood as a cognitive process (Epstein 1990; Hammond 1996; Epstein 1998), individual preferences in relation to perceiving and processing information (Jung 1977; Jabri 1991; Allinson & Hayes 1996) and as an event (Bastick 1982; Cappon 1994a; Crossan et al. 1999) (see Chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion).

Intuitive decision-making – decision-making based on a non-rational, non-linear, cognitive process that draws on tacit knowledge and that may be signalled by affective or ‘feeling’ cues (Agor 1984; Shapiro & Spence 1997).

Leadership – The influence directed to creation of willingness to achieve a future goal or state by those in an organisation (Mintzberg 1989; Parry 1996; Dubrin, Dalglish & Miller 2006).

New science – Theory and research relating to the development of non-linear and holistic understandings of universal phenomena including relativity, non-linear systems theory, chaos theory and quantum physics (Capra 1996; Wheatley 1999).

Non-linear – non-sequential or not organised in a temporal sequence of steps (Sinclair 2003).

Non-rational – non-logical or that which is not capable of being expressed as words or symbols and can only be made known by a judgement, decision or action (Simon 1987; Bennett 1998).

Organisational culture – Although it is acknowledged that organisational cultures are not homogenous (Jermier, Slocum, Fry & Gaines 1991), the use of the term organisational culture refers to an aggregate or stable and shared synthesis of the assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, values, rituals, behaviours, symbols, and mythology of an organisation (Parry 1996; Dubrin & Dalglish 2003).
Parallel processing – two independent, yet interacting processing systems (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier 1996).

Tacit knowledge – Tacit knowledge is subconscious knowledge and concerns a ‘knowing how’ that is unexpressed, understood and implicit. Its retrieval through intuition can be set against the ‘knowing what’ of explicit, active and conscious knowledge, which is known to be known (Brockman & Simmons 1997; Brockman & Anthony 2002; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007).

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the study to the reader. I described the background to the research, outlined the aims and objectives, and introduced the research problem as well as the methods by which the research problem will be answered. The research was justified and the structure of the thesis was outlined. On these foundations, I will proceed with a detailed description of the research.
Chapter 2: Critical Review of the Literature

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter served as an introduction to this study. The intention of the introduction was to familiarise the reader with the purpose, aims and objectives, as well as the methods by which these aims and objectives will be achieved. The findings and conclusions of the study were also foreshadowed. The overarching purpose of this chapter is twofold; identify gaps in the literature with respect to the use and disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations, and, to build a theoretical foundation from which the research can proceed. This will be done through a critical analysis of extant literature that was deemed relevant preceding the data collection phases.

The central theme of this study concerns intuition. However, intuition is an elusive term that has a variety of interpretations. Betsch (2008), for example, stated that, ‘[T]here are as many definitions of intuition as people using it’ (p. 3). He implies that because intuition is a faculty available to everyone, definitions will be based on subjective experience – each one unique. However, Betsch also draws attention to the multiplicity of definitions and constructions of intuition. Intuition is considered an issue of relevance for practitioners in a number of fields including mathematics, pedagogy, ethics, aesthetics, education (Westcott 1968; Fishbein 1987), medicine and the health professions (Hobart 1997), particularly nursing (see, for example, Leners 1992; Ruth-Sahd 2004), as well as in scientific method and discovery in a range of disciplines (Polanyi 1964; Fishbein 1987; Dunne 1997; Sadler-Smith 2008).

However, the specific focus of this thesis is intuition use and disclosure within Australian organisations. Studies of managerial intuition normally fall within the sub-discipline of managerial psychology, under the parent discipline of psychology and, consequently, focus on constructions of intuition within these disciplines. However, this study draws on a wider range of disciplines, and uses a more eclectic and integrative approach to intuition and how it can be interpreted. Therefore, I have chosen to locate this study within the disciplines of Human Resource Development and Organisational Development (Leadership and Management) under Social Science. While constructions of intuition under psychology and managerial psychology will be the core focus of the chapter, I will also refer to intuition as it is constructed within the discipline of philosophy (both Eastern and Western), discussions of which predate the emergence of psychology by millennia. In the spirit of my integrative approach, the review will also include literature from neuropsychology, sociology, physics and metaphysics.

What is described in the literature as philosophical intuition is seldom addressed in studies of managerial intuition and may appear tangential. However, I argue that the inclusion of philosophical intuition in this review, and in particular, how reconciliation of the philosophical and psychological can
be achieved, has led me to a deeper and more meaningful understanding of intuition as a whole. This comparison and reconciliation will be achieved in a dialogistic fashion – through understanding what psychological intuition is and is not. Moreover, the *rapprochement* of the two constructs (as presented below) will be shown to be entirely congruent with the stratified ontology of Layder’s Domain Theory, which I have adopted as the theoretical framework for the study (developed in Chapter 3). The advantage of this is a satisfying level of conceptual and philosophical congruency between my interpretation of the topic of study and the philosophical assumptions that have driven the research.

The chapter will begin with a review of philosophical accounts of intuition. While there is some variation in concepts and labels, the review will show that ancient Greek, European and Eastern philosophers hold intuition to be a subjective, self-evident, infallible direct apprehension of perfect knowledge (Westcott 1968; Hendon 2004). Following this I will present a review of Western psychological interpretations of intuition which, by comparison, will ultimately reveal a fundamental disjuncture between philosophical and psychological perspectives. While psychological accounts of intuition also construct intuition as a subjective and direct apprehension of knowledge, this knowledge is considered far from infallible. Intuition in psychology is regarded as useful at best (Hammond 1996), however, it is also seen to be error prone (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) and, in the case of ‘visceral influences’ such as addictions, can lead individuals to act against their own long-term interests, sometimes with debilitating and even fatal consequences (Loewenstein 1996).

As stated, within the discipline of psychology, literature concerning intuition is problematic because of ‘multiple uses’ of the term (Osbeck 1999, p. 229). Dane and Pratt (2007) suggested that confusion can arise because the word intuition is used to describe both a cognitive process (Epstein 1990; Hammond 1996), and a cognitive event or outcome (Cappon 1994a). I will show that the psychological literature also refers to intuition in terms of heuristics and biases, visceral influences, cognitive preference and style (Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007), and extrasensory perception (ESP and Psi) (Westcott 1968; Vaughan 1989; Radin 2009). A consequence of this superfluity of sometimes indistinct and even contradictory definitions is that it has made cross-study comparisons difficult (Sinclair 2003). Further perturbations can arise when ‘definitions specific to one specialism are sometimes applied to another’, (Cappon 1994a, p. 19). Thus, the first aim of the chapter is to show that there is not only a disjuncture between philosophical and psychological accounts of intuition, but that divergence also exists *within* the discipline of psychology.

Little focus has been given to integrating these different takes on intuition. It is worth noting that one of the most recent books focusing on psychological research into intuition (Plessner, Betsch & Betsch 2008) presented 18 different investigations without devoting any effort to integrating the diverse work into a coherent perspective. It has been suggested that it is the lack of an accepted, clear-cut definition of
intuition that is problematic (Lieberman 2000). However, I will argue that the ambition to find a single definition is misdirected and prevents the integration and understanding of findings in the literature. I will support the position of theorists who argue that intuition is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted phenomenon (such as Parikh et al. 1994) that manifests in different ways, and in relation to the orientation of the inquirer and the method of approach.

In concert with this multi-dimensional approach to psychological constructs of intuition, the second aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual framework that integrates and synthesises psychological perspectives of intuition. This synthetic approach will culminate in a model of cognition that reflects this multi-dimensionality. I will not claim that this model provides a complete or unquestionable interpretation. Rather, the model reflects my interpretation of the literature and thus can be seen as a theoretical representation of how I make sense of these diverse perspectives on intuition.

Following this, the identified disjuncture between philosophical intuition and psychological intuition will be addressed as the third aim of the chapter. Attempts to achieve an understanding of, or an explanation for, this apparent schism are rare². However, I concur with Osbeck (1999), who argued that the future development of intuition as a concept is hindered by the lack of inclusion of philosophical understandings. The model I use to interpret the reconciliation of the two apparently diametrically-opposed constructions is consistent with the expressed need for a more holistic and interdisciplinary approach in academia (Wilber 1995; Capra 1996). My interpretation of how reconciliation can be achieved is derived from a synthesis of the work of Hendon (2004), who argued for a multi-level conceptual approach, and the notion of a meta-ontology of a ground state of consciousness as proposed by a number of theorists (Bohm 1980; Bohm & Peat 1987; Hagelin 1987; Goswami 1995; Bhaskar 2002).

The fourth and final aim of the chapter is to review the field research of intuition use in organisational contexts. The review will reveal a gap in the literature and research concerning the disclosure of intuition(s) in organisational settings and their impact. I will show that field studies indicate that while intuition (constructed in this literature as a gut feeling based on previous experience) is both used and considered important by significant decision makers (Agor 1984; Robson & Miller 2006) the role that intuition plays is seldom acknowledged or revealed through disclosure. Prior research shows that if decision makers are required to justify their decisions, they are likely to ‘dress up’ their intuition(s) or, fearing ridicule, intuition(s) may be suppressed (Agor 1984; Parikh et al. 1994). I argue that any opacity or lack of transparency in organisational decision-making precludes the proper evaluation of alternatives

² Hendon (2004) and Parikh et al. (1994) are exceptional in this regard.
and consequences. Furthermore, I will show that the suppression of intuitions may result not only in lost opportunities but incur substantial risk of significant cost (both in financial and human terms) (Robson 2004; Robson & Miller 2006).

The review will propose that no research found, to date, has specifically focused on the socio-cultural processes that surround intuition use and disclosure in organisations. I will argue this is a significant omission given the importance placed on intuition by decision makers in the field. The last section of this chapter will detail the research problem and its constituent components, and justify these in relation to addressing the identified gaps in the fields of knowledge discussed in the review.

2.2 Philosophical Intuitionism

Intuition is a key concept in the discipline of philosophy and is often referred to in historical reviews (Westcott 1968). Indeed, Philosophical Intuitionism has a long history in the West beginning with ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato, followed by Spinoza and later European philosophers such as Kant, who influenced the German Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and 20th Century philosopher, Bergson. While differences exist in interpretations, philosophical intuition is construed as an unmediated, direct apprehension that accesses the realm of *a priori* laws that condition existence. Ancient Greek philosophers distinguished intuition (noesis) from discursive thinking (dianoia).

Table 2.1 below displays the essential properties of each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intuition/noesis</th>
<th>Discursive thinking/dianoia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-inferential</td>
<td>Inferential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-temporal</td>
<td>Temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grasps all at once</td>
<td>Reductionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-propositional</td>
<td>Propositional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-representational</td>
<td>Representational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infallible</td>
<td>Fallible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Hendon (2004, p. 8).

Central to the long tradition of Philosophical Intuitionism is the notion that intuition can be regarded as superior to analytic or discursive thought. In contrast to the immediate apprehension that characterises *noesis*, *dianoia* is the capacity for, or process of, analytical or discursive thinking. For Plato, it was discursive thinking that should be considered inferior because ultimately we must ‘see’ the inherent truth of something in the process of deductive reasoning (Westcott 1968). Therefore, intuition is the very basis by which deductive reasoning proceeds (Polanyi 1964). ‘... it is the vehicle of apprehension of
first principles and self-evident understandings that ground and support all knowledge’ (Osbeck 1999, p. 234). Intuition and discursive thought are seen to complement each other in the totality of our understanding. However, because intuition represents the fundamental ability to grasp meaning, in philosophy at least, it is considered primary.

Much can be learnt about philosophical intuition from examining the way philosophers distinguished it from discursive thought. According to Westcott (1968) Spinoza made a distinction between ‘knowledge of’ things (intuition) and ‘knowledge about’ things (discursive thought). Discursive thought concerns abstract concepts manipulated by the intellect in the form of representational symbols, whereas intuition is an apprehension of phenomena without judgement, comparison or symbolic representation. Intuition (inside knowledge) is attained when object and subject merge and are at one. Intuition is a holistic and unified, non-representational and an infallible appreciation of ‘what is’, or absolute truth. Intuition, for Spinoza, was the only way to absolute truth and absolute truth was God.

God may be represented by the intellect through discursive and analytical thought in various manifestations, however these are incomplete representations because they are fragmentary. In concert with Plato, Spinoza maintained that the intellect can bring the observer only to the point where intuition must occur. Ultimately, God was considered a unified whole that must be appreciated in its totality and this could only occur through the faculty of intuition (Westcott 1968). Thus, for some, intuition was conceived of as a divine connection and absolute in its significance. Conversely, discursive thought was considered mortal and fallible.

Bergson’s (1961) notion of intuition was also the direct apprehension of the absolute, which can only be arrived at through intuition. Ultimately, for Bergson, reality was not expressed as God, but ‘duration’, which he viewed as a continuous movement and an unpredictable evolution. Analysis was considered inferior to intuition because ‘analysis operates on immobility, while intuition is located in mobility’, (p. 43). Bergson argued that intuition placed oneself within an object ‘instead of adopting points of view toward it’ (p. 8). Analysis distorted, separated and reduced duration into symbols, which Bergson regarded as the tools of the physical sciences that dealt with relative knowledge of a thing. However, because this knowledge was always relative to something else, it could not be whole knowledge. For Bergson, symbols were of no use in metaphysics. Only intuition could grasp the essence of a thing in its totality, which Bergson considered was ‘over and above all expression’ (ibid).

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3 This description is remarkably similar to those given by biological systems theorists such as Capra (1996).
Bergson (1961) argued that the faculty of intuition lies between instinct and intellect on a continuum of evolutionary development, and that these are two fundamentally different forms of acquiring knowledge. He argued that, in lower species of animals, instinct facilitated adaptive behaviour in concert with duration, however, without apprehension or awareness. Thus, intellect operates within conscious awareness and this awareness (of self as separate to surroundings) allows humans to manipulate their environment. Bergson argued that while the intellect has led to progress in living conditions through the use of adaptive technology, it has simultaneously disconnected us from a more evolved and aware appreciation of pure duration.

Wild (1938) comments on Bergson’s stance:

As far, then, as our minds are dominated by intellect we are unable to grasp the nature of life and movement and, when we try to bring them under the artificial laws of science we are faced with contradiction. (Wild 1938, p. 4)

Bergson (1961) contended that the only way for one to come to absolute truth was to free the mind from logic, reason and science and bypass the ‘shield’ of the intellect.

Beyond modes of interpretation and expression, the shared fundamental premise of these conceptualisations of philosophical intuition is the notion of a transcendent domain of ultimate reality that cannot be grasped through the senses and the intellect. A transcendent domain of ultimate reality is also a feature of some Eastern philosophies such as early Tibetan Buddhism. According to this doctrine, there are nine classes of consciousness. The first five correspond to the five senses - sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. The sixth class of consciousness can be equated with discursive thought, which operates on and organises the former five. The eighth class of consciousness is an unconscious accumulation of all personal experience, while the ninth class of consciousness is interpreted as ultimate reality itself. The seventh class of consciousness is mind, which can be dualistic when oriented toward the senses, or intuitive and non-dual when oriented toward the eighth (equated with psychological intuition, which will be discussed later) and ninth classes of consciousness (equated with philosophical intuition) (Hendon 2004).

Footnote 4: Taborsky (1999, p. 159) makes a similar distinction between primary consciousness, which is a ‘state of being-in-relationship – but without the regard for, the awareness of, such a relationship’ and secondness (self-awareness) or a ‘referential duality that provides for a descriptive awareness of self-other’ (ibid, p. 164).
In Buddhism... it is argued that the mind becomes a source of error if it is oriented and directed from the universal towards the individual self-consciousness, while in the experience of the opposite direction, from the individual towards the universal, it becomes a source of highest knowledge. (Hendon 2004, p. 46)

In Buddhist philosophy, as well as other Eastern philosophical approaches such as the Vedanta tradition, there is no distinction between mind and matter (Bhattacharyya 1976). They can be seen as different substrata of the same phenomenon. It is the identification of mind with the senses that produces a dualistic state, a subject/object split resulting in the ego or the ‘self’ becoming seen as separate to the world that is perceived through the senses. However the mind directed toward the ninth class of consciousness is the enlightened and non-dual mind that intuits this separateness to be an illusion (Hendon 2004).

As stated, the transcendent domain of reality in this version of Buddhism and the Vedanta tradition can be interpreted as a kind of primal or ground consciousness, which can be distinguished from the individual human mind. A transcendent domain of ultimate reality from which layers of reality unfold is also a feature of some interpretations of quantum theory (Bohm 1980; Bohm & Peat 1987; Hagelin 1987; Goswami 1995). This idea will be instrumental to the way I interpret reconciliation between philosophical and psychological constructions of intuition can be achieved. For the present moment, however, I will present a critique of philosophical intuition by Bunge (1962), which will conclude this section.

The body of knowledge representing Philosophical Intuitionism has drawn sharp critique from philosopher of science, Mario Bunge (1962). He characterised the intuition of Spinoza as nothing but rapid inference, and the intuition of Bergson as so impotent that it has ‘not even led to fruitful errors’, (p. 23). Thus, Bunge argued that Philosophical Intuitionism has not resulted in a ‘deeper understanding of history or life’ (ibid), nor has it realised any new principles of mathematics. He claimed that ‘[N]obody, save the philosophically immature or naive, believes nowadays in the possibility of an immediate and total grasp of truth’ (p. 25).

He further argued that contemporary intuitionists are ‘dogmatic fundamentalists’, not interested in solving ‘a single serious problem’ (p. 9), but are instead, concerned with undermining the value of reason, rationalism, materialism and empiricism. Bunge’s consequent concern was that Philosophical Intuitionism inevitably leads to irrationalism, pseudo-science and ultimately authoritarianism. Bunge used the example of the German National Socialist regime, which he viewed as the kind of dictatorship that can arise through political agendas based on such intuitions. Thus, Bunge levelled the most serious allegations imaginable against philosophical intuitionists.
It is not disputed that despotism and unspeakable horrors have been justified in the name of fundamentalist dogma that has no rational defence, however, Bunge’s (1962) critique of Philosophical Intuitionism and its connection to this despotism is flawed. While he rightly points out that ‘intuitive knowledge’ (represented by words) is a contradiction in terms – that intuition is subjective and ineffable – he fails to accommodate the corollary of this in his argument. A central contention of Bergson (1961) was that ‘knowledge’ that is symbolically represented is necessarily fragmented, partial knowledge. Therefore, as a consequence, utterances to others can only be in the name of intuition and a flawed ‘map of the terrain’ rather than the thing they purport to represent.

One must, necessarily, come to such intuitive truth alone (Krishnamurti 1995; Bhaskar 2002). Obviously, Bunge is one of many, including myself, who has not. As a subjective, ineffable and, therefore, private understanding, intuitive apprehension is thus significant and directly influential only to the individual who comes upon it, or who it comes to, and in ways that can only be known to that individual. Bunge cannot claim to know another’s subjective apprehensions and therefore cannot make claims about any benefits of those intuitions.

In addition, Bunge (1962) seems to confuse or blur philosophical intuition with psychological intuition. Bunge argued that one of the values of science is that it is capable of going beyond intuitions and cites discontinuities in nature revealed by quantum physics as an example of this. However, the intuition of cause and effect, for example, is derived from our daily experience and, therefore, can be better described as a heuristic (see Section 2.4) and certainly not the perfect knowledge of an ultimate reality. A central contention of the current study is that a clear discrimination between the various concepts is essential when assessing the value of intuition(s). Lastly, I would like to point to the irony of Bunge’s use of quantum physics to argue his case. His insistence on the ‘objectivity of scientific research’ (Bunge 1998, p. 39) is now denied by science at the sub-atomic level (Goswami 1995; Capra 1996; Bell 2004).

In this section I have argued that despite the long history of Philosophical Intuitionism, consistency can be found between ancient Greek, Western and Eastern philosophical perspectives on intuition, referred to here as philosophical intuition. Philosophical intuition is seen as a mode of acquiring knowledge that is non-inferential, self-evident and subjective, ineffable and, thus, incontestable. Intuition in philosophy is transcendent, infallible, holistic and capable of apprehending an ultimate reality. As a consequence, these intuitions are considered superior to discursive thought, which is necessarily representative and fragmentary. Later in the chapter I will draw on this discussion in order to reconcile philosophical

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5 Goswami (1995) pointed out that the five claims of Scientific Realism (including the assumption of objectivity) have been invalidated by the findings of quantum mechanics.
intuition with constructs of psychological intuition. However, before this can occur, a review of intuition in psychology is required.

2.3 Psychological constructions of intuition

Psychological concepts of intuition are less concerned with ultimate reality and more ‘concerned with the means by which that which is known comes to be known’ (Westcott 1968, p. 25). While psychology was slow to take up the study of intuition, interest and research has increased in the last three decades (Cappon 1993; Osbeck 2001; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007), particularly in the domain of managerial psychology. The impetus for this increase can be attributed to acknowledgement that people are not always the fully rational creatures they were once assumed to be (Barnard 1938; Simon 1982; Mintzberg 1989).

For example, research over time has consistently shown that decision makers in organisations use intuition regularly (Agor 1984; Helliar, Burke & Miller 1999; Power & Sinclair 2005; Robson & Miller 2006). Intuition is considered most useful in rapidly changing, complex, uncertain, and ambiguous decision-making environments (Agor 1989a; Parikh et al. 1994; Burke & Miller 1999; Khatri & Ng 2000; Patton 2003; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007). In view of rapidly evolving technology, economic globalisation (Hames 1994; Parry 1996; Carliopo, Andrewartha & Armstrong 2001), terrorism, environmental depletion, the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, I argue that this increased interest in intuition is timely.

Despite this, the study of intuition remains problematic within psychology and ‘the conceptual foundation of this notion itself remains quite meagre’ (Osbeck 1999, p. 232; Betsch 2008). This is partly because of the subjective and elusive nature of intuition (Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005). However, as suggested in the introduction, it can also be attributed to the variety of approaches to intuition within psychology, from which managerial concepts of intuition flow. In preparation for the presentation of an integrating model that will follow, I will now examine the approaches to intuition from within psychology that are deemed pertinent to the present study.

2.3.1 Dual-process theories

Intuition, in psychology, is seen as a function of a cognitive system that was inherited from our animal ancestors, and that operates on pattern recognition and feeling. Humans have evolved a second cognitive system that allows us to think consciously and to analyse (Reber et al. 1991; Reber 1992; Denes-Raj & Epstein 1994; Epstein 1998). While these systems are nominally separate, they complement each other. Dual process theories explicate this relationship.
There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two (although complementary) are irreducible to one another and efforts to reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich diversity of thought. (Hammond 1996, p. 83)

System 1 operates at the sub or preconscious level of awareness, is intuitive, holistic, relational, contextual and automatic. By contrast, System 2 is conscious, controlled, analytical, rule-based, linear, reductionist and a-contextual (Epstein 1990; Sloman 1996; Stanovich & West 2000; Kahneman 2002; Kahneman 2003; Hogarth 2008). Although differences can be recognised between dual process approaches where ‘details and technical properties ... do not always match exactly... there are clear family resemblances’ (Stanovich & West 2000, p. 658). Table 2.2 below details dual process theorists and the various labels attached to each system.

Table 2.2: Dual process theorists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)/Year</th>
<th>System 1: Intuitive</th>
<th>System 2: Analytical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hammond (1996)</td>
<td>Intuitive Cognition</td>
<td>Analytical Cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogarth (2005)</td>
<td>Tacit System</td>
<td>Deliberate System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levinson (1995)</td>
<td>Interactional Intelligence</td>
<td>Analytic Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epstein (1994; 1996)$^6$</td>
<td>Experiential System</td>
<td>Rational System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollock (1991)</td>
<td>Quick &amp; Inflexible Modules</td>
<td>Intellgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiffrin &amp; Schneider (1977)</td>
<td>Automatic Processing</td>
<td>Controlled Processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posner &amp; Snyder (1975)</td>
<td>Automatic Activation</td>
<td>Conscious Processing System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koestler (1964)</td>
<td>Bisociative Thinking</td>
<td>Associative Thinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Stanovich and West 2000)

$^6$ Epstein also recognises a third system, operating in the unconscious, he calls the associanistic system. This system essentially regulates core biological functions, impulses and instinct (see Epstein & Meier 1989).
Dual process theorists, drawing on practical intelligence, characterise intuition as drawing unconsciously on tacit knowledge that is stored through a pre-conscious process. The speed and accuracy of intuition (acting as a vehicle for accessing tacit knowledge) is contingent on the depth of experience and expertise of the individual in a particular field of endeavour. Tacit knowledge is subconscious knowledge and concerns the ‘knowing how’ that is unexpressed, understood and implicit. Its retrieval through intuition can be set against the ‘knowing what’ of explicit, active and conscious knowledge, which is known to be known, and is perceived by the senses (Brockman & Simmons 1997; Brockman & Anthony 2002; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007).

There is some debate as to whether it is possible for tacit knowledge to be accessed by the conscious mind, considering that tacit knowledge, by definition, is inexpressible, ‘we know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 1966, p. 4). However, the extent to which there is interactivity or overlap between systems appears to be occluded by a dichotomous characterisation of the two types of knowledge (see, for example, Taggart and Robey, 1981; Taggart & Valenzi, 1990; Taggart, Valenzi, Zalka & Lowe, 1997).

There is also debate concerning the level of independence and interactivity among dual process theorists who have developed models of parallel systems of perception and information processing in the domain of personality and individual difference psychology. Stanovich and West (2000) regarded the two types of systems as distinct, operating in parallel interactivity, while others regard them as anchoring the poles of a continuum of cognition (Hammond 1996). However, Epstein’s Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST) suggests ‘experiential and rational thinking are not opposite ends of a single dimension. Rather, they are uncorrelated’ (Epstein 2000, p. 671). Epstein’s powerful contention was that cognition is served by separate cognitive systems whereby the experiential system underpins the operations of the rational system.

Here I narrow the focus of my discussion of dual process theories because it serves to amplify the difference between theories that I regard as more abstract than CEST, which I find more convincing. CEST is convincing not merely because of the extent of published literature (Epstein 1990; Denes-Raj & Epstein 1994; Epstein et al. 1996; Epstein 1998; Epstein 2000; Epstein 2008) but because Epstein and his colleagues, along with others (Reber, Walkenfeld & Hernstadt 1991; Reber 1992), applied an evolutionary perspective to the relationship between the two systems. In the next three paragraphs I will synthesise literature from neuropsychology and sociology as well cognitive science to explain and support my understanding of this evolutionary argument.

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7 Hammond’s work lies outside the psychology of personality and is used here as a comparison only.
The experiential or intuitive system (System 1) is seen as the older and more primitive system that evolved before the emergence of conscious functioning. Similarly, Bastick argued that intuition is the ‘older and greater part of intelligence’ (Bastick 1982, p. 77). System 2 (the rational system) therefore exists only in more evolved mammals species, and is most developed and complex in humans (Reber et al. 1991; Reber 1992; Denes-Raj & Epstein 1994; Epstein 1998). Epstein (1998) argued that the experiential system is basically the same as that of our non-human ancestors. According to Epstein, lower species of animals survive through two capacities. The first is to make connections between external events and outcomes, and their own behaviour. The second is the capacity for ‘feeling’ states. The result is implicit learning without conscious awareness, where the feeling state (pleasure or pain) is associated with certain patterns perceived in the environment.

Epstein’s (1998) description of this unconscious or pre-conscious learning in humans is supported by Lewicki, Hill and Bizot (1988). Intellectual ability, as explicit and defensible, is relatively easy to measure through standardised IQ tests. However, intuitive intelligence, as implicit, and as a construct that is slippery, elusive and contested, is far more difficult to assess. Most tests of intuition are, more correctly, tests of cognitive preference or style (discussed later). However, Lewicki et al. found that their subjects were able to non-consciously acquire information about a target whose location on a computer screen followed a complex pattern. They found that with practice, subjects were able to successfully predict the location of this target, however, were not able to articulate how they achieved this.

Subjects reported that after a time, their fingers seemed to ‘know’ what to do. Furthermore, Lewicki, et al. argued that this ‘is a ubiquitous process involved in the development of both elementary and high-level cognitive skills’ (p. 24). This finding has two important implications. First, it provides an empirical basis for the concept of tacit knowledge – humans know more than they can articulate (Polanyi 1966; Lewicki 1986; Lewicki & Hill 1987; Lewicki et al. 1988). Second, it promotes the idea of unconscious knowledge as permeating high-level cognitive skills and points towards a deeply integrated relationship between cognitive systems.

In concert with Epstein’s view, I view the two systems as separate yet paradoxically unified through stratification. The rational system, (System 2) for Epstein (1994) and Laughlin (1997), represented a subsequent evolutionary layer that was less stimulus-bound than the earlier System 1. System 2, functioning as a separate part, can thus mitigate or negate impulses stemming from the experiential system. This is because System 2 is associated with the ability of humans to think in abstract ways, using symbols that represent their environment and themselves in it. This enables the capacity for a Theory of Mind (Mead 1967), the use of tools, language and communication, and provides the ability to imagine an event or the possibility of an event, and, moreover, to judge a situation as good or bad.
Behaviour driven by System 2 can therefore be seen as arising from the conscious awareness of choice and consequence, rather than unconscious fight or flight.

Epstein’s notion of the layering of the two cognitive systems accounts for the whole and yet sometimes fragmented nature of our lived experience (Hogarth 2005). Thus, CEST accommodates being torn between feelings (instincts such as sexual desire and hunger as well as intuitions and emotions) and reason, or ‘what are commonly identified as conflicts between the heart and the head’ (Epstein 2000, p. 671). Moreover, subsequent to the display of Table 2.3 below, which gives a point by point comparison of how the experiential and rational minds ‘work’, Epstein’s (1998) layering of the two cognitive systems will also be shown to be consistent with the physical structure of the brain itself.
Table 2.3: Experiential and rational ‘minds’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiential mind</th>
<th>Rational mind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learns directly from experience</td>
<td>Learns from abstract representations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Thinks’ quickly; primed for immediate action</td>
<td>Thinks slowly, deliberately; oriented toward planning and consideration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic</td>
<td>Analytic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Thinks’ in terms of associations</td>
<td>Thinks in terms of cause and effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closely connected with emotions</td>
<td>Separates logic from emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interprets experience and guides conscious thoughts and behaviour through ‘vibes’ from the past</td>
<td>Interprets experience through conscious appraisal of events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sees the world in concrete images, metaphors, and stories</td>
<td>Sees the world in abstract symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced passively and automatically</td>
<td>Experienced actively and consciously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences events as self-evidently valid</td>
<td>Requires justification by logic and evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pays attention only to outcome</td>
<td>Pays attention to process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Thinks’ in terms of broad categories</td>
<td>Thinks in terms of finer distinctions and gradations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operates in different modes according to emotional states</td>
<td>Highly integrated and more internally consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes slowly (with repetitive or intense experience)</td>
<td>Changes rapidly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Epstein 1998, p. 71)

The debate concerning the relationship of the cognitive systems to each other is mirrored in competing theories concerning function and structure of the brain. For many, the two hemispheres of the bicameral brain are metaphorical, if not literal, containers for each system (Robey & Taggart 1981a; Simon 1987; Mintzberg 1989; Rao, Jacob & Lin 1992; Cappon 1994a; Boucouvalas 1997). Split brain theory, which was originally advanced in an influential research program by Sperry and Bogen (see, for example, Sperry 1961; Sperry 1968; Bogen 1969; Benowitz, Bear, Rosenthal, Mesulam, Zaidel & Sperry 1983), posited that the right and left hemispheres were associated with System 1 and 2 respectively (Bastick 1982; Cappon 1994a; Boucouvalas 1997; Sinclair, Ashkanasay, Chattopadhyay & Boyle 2002; Sinclair 2003).

According to Simon (1987), the corpus callosum connects the two hemispheres and allows the transfer of information from one to the other. More recently, McGilchrist (2009) claimed that it is through the corpus callosum that one hemisphere inhibits the influence of the other. Significant to later discussion, he claimed that the left hemisphere (rational) is more able to do this than the right (intuitive).
Split brain theory was used as an effective method of introducing the idea of intuitive and rational ‘thinking’ into management discourse towards the end of last century (see, for example, Mintzberg 1976; Agor 1984; Simon 1987; Harper 1989; Mintzberg 1989; Rao et al. 1992). Moreover, the terms, left-brain thinking (analytical) and right-brain thinking (intuitive) have subsequently been absorbed into everyday language through popular managerial literature such as Mintzberg’s (1976) Planning on the left side and managing on the right.

Epstein’s evolutionary perspective, on the other hand, translates well to the triune layered structure of the brain of humans as described by Maclean (1978; 1990). The reptilian brain (impulses and instinct), paleo-mammalian brain (limbic system) and neo-mammalian brain (neo-cortex, and intellect in humans) correspond well to Epstein’s associanistic, experiential and analytical systems, respectively. In concert with Epstein, Wilber (1995), drawing on Jantsch (1980), argued that each successive evolutionary stage includes and transcends the former in a holarchical8 rather than a hierarchical structure. The three brains are relatively autonomous, however, they interact with upward and downward influence, functioning together as a whole. They can, therefore, be considered as parts and a whole concurrently. A holarchical view of brain structure and function avoids the criticism levelled at split brain theory (see, for example, Goldberg 1983; Lieberman 2000; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, Claxton & Sparrow 2009; McGilchrist 2009) – that cognitive functioning is complex and not attributable to specific hemispheres and specific areas of the brain.

2.4 Heuristics and biases

The heuristics and biases approach spearheaded by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) was a very successful research program9 and, due to its influence, is traditionally associated with intuition for many decision researchers (Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007). The heuristics and biases approach acknowledges the bounded nature of rationality and conceptualises intuition as automatic mental shortcuts. Bounded rationality, the notion that humans are only partly rational, has two dimensions: first, we are subject to intuitions, emotions and automatic behaviours, and second, we are cognitively limited in the amount of information that we can perceive and process (Simon 1982; Simon 1987).

8 Damasio appears to support this notion of a holarchical relationship reflected in the physical structure of the brain ‘Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality not just on top on the brain but from it and with it’. (Damasio 1994, p. 128)

9 Daniel Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002 for his work on heuristics and biases.
The major contention of the heuristics and biases approach is that heuristics (rules of thumb) induce biases in cognition that lead to errors in judgement (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Denes-Raj & Epstein 1994; Kahneman 2002). Tversky and Kahneman, after extensive experimentation, provided evidence for three heuristics: availability – where judgements are based on the ease with which prior instances can be recalled; representativeness – where judgements are based on comparisons to prototypes, stereotypes or previously encountered patterns of outcomes; and anchoring – where initial judgements are adjusted subsequent to the perception of new information (Das & Teng 1999).

A bias is a tendency to over or underestimate the probability of an outcome depending upon certain contextual features of the problem. A simple example of a heuristic leading to a bias can be seen in judging the distance of remote objects. Someone who has experience at the task will gain expertise, however, under changing or exceptional meteorological conditions they can be fooled. While Kahneman (2002) admits that ‘[I]n general ... heuristics are quite useful’, he adds that ‘they sometimes lead to severe and systematic errors’ (p. 465). Therefore intuitions, from this perspective, should be treated with caution.

While the fallibility of heuristics is not disputed, some issues need to be taken into account when considering ‘intuition’ as framed by the heuristics and biases approach. First, it should be noted that much of the research has focused on identifying the circumstances and conditions under which these errors tend to occur and, in doing so, has contrived artificial situations where they were likely to occur. This is a point that Gigerenzer (1991) convincingly demonstrated by showing that many biases disappear if a more natural or common-sense representation of information is presented to the decision maker.

Second, Hammond (1996) pointed out that the heuristics and biases theorists contrasted analysis with these automatic processes rather than with intuitive cognition or spontaneous intuitions that are commonly referred to as gut feelings (discussed in a later section). Sadler-Smith and Sparrow (2007) concur, arguing that heuristics ‘should not be seen as equivalent to intuition’ (p. 6). Although they share many features, heuristics are induced at the will of the individual, whereas intuition, as an event or outcome, occurs spontaneously. Although both heuristics and intuition draw on the experience of the practitioner, gut feelings embrace a much wider catchment of emotions, life experiences, knowledge and skills. Therefore, criticisms of intuition based solely on the heuristics and biases literature would be misplaced.

### 2.5 Visceral factors in decision-making

Loewenstein (1996) and Loewenstein, Weber et al. (2001) challenge models of decision-making that assume rational choice based on perceived self-interest. While Lowenstein does not label visceral
influences ‘intuitions’, they sit within the heuristics and biases perspective on decision-making (Ditto, Pizzaro, Epstein, Jacobson & Macdonald 2006). Lowenstein argued that the influence of ‘visceral’ factors such as hunger, thirst, sexual desire, moods, emotions and addictions can influence behaviour and decisions significantly. In a relatively benign example, Ditto et al. (2006) found that participants were more willing to accept risk in exchange for the chance of winning chocolate chip cookies if they could see and smell the cookies rather than have them described. However, in the extreme, visceral factors are so powerful that they can cause the individual to subordinate all other objectives. This can result in people acting against their own long-term self interest, often in full awareness that they are doing so. Visceral influences can lead to behaviour that can be described as ‘out of the control’ (Loewenstein 1996, p. 272) of the conscious intention or will of the individual.

The impact of visceral influences is widespread. For example, the inability of Australians to regulate their intake of food has led to Australia becoming the ‘fattest’ nation on earth (Stark 2008). Countless careers and families are destroyed each year through succumbing to the temptation of illicit or immoral sexual desire (see, for example, Kontominas 2010). The impact of drug addiction has massive consequences for individuals, as well as the legal and health systems in Australia. In 2005, in NSW alone, it was reported that 71% of males and 67% of females cited drugs and alcohol as playing a role in the offences for which they were currently incarcerated (Kevin 2005). Between 2004 and 2005, 14,901 Australians died from the ‘decision’ to continue smoking tobacco (Collins & Lapsley 2008).

Loewenstein (1996) argued that people fail to account for the impact of visceral influences on future decisions, despite their own experience of its import. It appears that the intensity of craving leading to the relapse of the addict can only be fully understood and appreciated in that moment when it is felt. Hence recovery programs stress the ‘one day at a time’ approach where addicts are encouraged to avoid situations that may trigger cravings (Bradshaw 1996). These examples bring into question the extent to which anyone has conscious control over their ‘decisions’ and actions.

\[ \text{Mankind make for more determination through hatred, love, or desire, or anger, or grief, or joy, or hope, or fear, or error, or some other affection of mind, than from regard to truth, or any settled maxim, or principle of right, or judicial form, or adherence to the laws. (Cicero 1879, p. 89)} \]

2.6 Jung

Jung emerged as the first modern theorist to investigate and provide an overarching theory of intuition, despite his admission that he did not know how it worked (Westcott 1968; Hendon 2004). Jung’s ideas were influenced not only by Western psychology but by a wide knowledge of European and Eastern philosophical systems. For this reason, Jung is seen as a bridge between Eastern and Western thought, as well as between psychology and philosophy. However, his views were considered unorthodox and he
was often ridiculed by his contemporaries in the scientific community (Hyde & McGuiness 1992). Despite this, Jung’s views became popular in the West and eventually spawned a new branch of psychology and thus, independently influential (Westcott 1968; Hyde & McGuiness 1992). It is for this reason that I review Jung in a separate section.

Although Jung’s ideas on intuition have subsequently been applied to psychology and philosophy, they are not concerned with a theory of knowledge but with personality and behaviour in general. For Jung:

> Intuition is a cognitive event that must be accounted for. It is not an occult gift, nor reducible to the activities of the mind. Rather it is one of the four mental functions constitutionally present in all individuals. (Westcott 1968, p. 32)

The four functions Jung refers to in this quote are thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Thinking involves logical judgements and cognitions concerning the truth or ‘objective fact’, while feeling is oriented to subjective perceptions of like, dislike, pleasant or unpleasant. Thinking and feeling are therefore oppositional, not able to operate concurrently because they are different principles of evaluation (Jung 1977). Sensation and intuition are functions of perception and, rather than judgements, represent the way an individual acquires information about the world. ‘Sensation and intuition describe how we prefer to perceive what we are experiencing’ (Barger & Hoover 1984, p. 57).

These four functions, according to Jung, represent the totality of psychological possibilities for cognition, perception and judgements about the world, the dominance of which differs from individual to individual, and may change over the course of a lifetime (Westcott 1968; Jung 1977; Barger & Hoover 1984). It is for this reason that Jung’s theory is said to be concerned with and connected to the personality of individuals.

In addition to these four functions are two polar attitudes that condition them. Jung’s (1977) concepts of introversion and extroversion are to do with psychological direction of interest rather than degrees of gregariousness or sociability. Introverts are more inwardly directed to either internal phenomena such as fantasies or internal reactions to external stimuli. On the other hand, the focus for extroverts is on the external world of objects (Westcott 1968). Taken together, the three dimensions of personality combine to produce eight possible personality types that, according to Westcott, are ‘powerful and satisfying’ (Westcott 1968, p. 32).

However, not everyone is so convinced. Bastick, for example, argued Jung is ‘dead wrong’ (Bastick 1982, p. 74) in his types and subtypes both clinically and theoretically. Bastick, for example, protests that the concept of introversion has no operational definition and therefore there is no way to measure it. Despite this, Jung’s work has served as the basis for widely-used quantitative personality tests (Boucouvalas 1997), such as the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (discussed later).
As stated, Jung’s (1977) theory of intuition is primarily embedded in a theory of personality and not in epistemology (Westcott 1968). However, Jung’s conception of the collective unconscious juxtaposed against the personal unconscious represents a philosophical problem that must be accounted for epistemologically. For Jung, the personal unconscious represents accumulated personal experience and knowledge while the collective unconscious is the inheritance of archetypes that are drawn on through intuition. Jung argued for the universality of these, irrespective of ethnicity, culture, time and space. Furthermore, these archetypes are inherited not only from ‘one’s ancestral lineage’ (Westcott 1968, p. 34) but all forms of organic life (Jung 1977). Thus, the two concepts, the personal and collective unconscious, can be seen as analogous to psychological and philosophical intuition.

Jung considered intuitions from the collective unconscious as more important than those from the personal unconscious because they tap universal archetypes and basic themes of life (Jung 1971). Hendon (2004) viewed them as comparable to Platonic ideals or forms. Moreover, intuitions from the collective unconscious are critical to ‘psychic growth’ (von Franz 1978, p. 161) or individuation, and the evolution of man, which he viewed as far from complete (Jung 1978). Jung contended that access to these unconscious archetypes is hindered by civilising processes (Westcott 1968). Thus, archetypes normally only become visible in modern-day societies through art, myth and culture, except for children and highly intuitive individuals (Westcott 1968; Jung 1977). Thus, a tension can be identified between civilising processes and the processes of individual and collective psychic evolution.

There has been greater interest in Jung’s concept of intuition as a cognitive function in relation to personality than there has been for intuitions received from the collective unconscious, at least in the domain of organisational development. Jung’s work on personality types was readily taken up as a way of measuring cognitive style (Westcott 1968). Cognitive style indicators are useful for developing an awareness of alternative modes of thinking in organisations, which maximises the effectiveness of groups and provides appropriate training through style matching (Jabri 1991). I suggest this reflects the ultimate concern of business for achieving profit goals rather than psychic growth or individuation. An examination of cognitive style and the instruments that purport to measure intuition is important to this review because many of the studies concerning managerial intuition, reviewed later, utilised them. Therefore, the focus of this review will now turn to examining these instruments.

### 2.7 Intuition as a cognitive style/preference

Robey and Taggart (1981b) outline three general approaches for assessing cognitive style and preference, the first and most common being subjective self-report measures. Various instruments for assessment have been developed over the years, however, the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is the best-known and most-widely used. Other instruments include the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI)
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier 1996; Pacini and Epstein 1999; Epstein 1998), the Human Information Processing (HIP) survey (Taggart & Valenzi 1990), the Cognitive Style Index (CSI) (Allinson & Hayes 1996), the Keegan Type Indicator (KTI) (Keegan 1982), the Decision Style Inventory (DSI) (Rowe & Mason 1987) and the Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory (KAI) (Kirton 2003). These survey instruments are popular because they are cheap and easy to administer and, importantly for positivist researchers, they have established validity (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith 2003). Cognitive style indicators, however, do not measure intuitive capability or capacity, or whether the participant makes intuitive decisions, but rather purport to measure the subject’s information gathering, processing and/or decision-making preferences. Moreover, these instruments do not tell us about actual decisions nor account for the specific context and environment of the decision maker.

The second approach is neuro-physiological and draws on work with split-brain patients using an electroencephalograph (EEG) which has, through measuring brain activity, identified the left hemisphere of the brain as associated with language while the right is associated with spatial tasks (Robey & Taggart 1981b). Studies utilising brain mapping technology such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) devices continue to advance understanding of brain function, particularly with respect to intuition (see Volz & von Cramon 2008 for some recent examples) and matching cognitive styles (Williams Woolley, Hackman, Jerde, Chabris, Bennett & Kosslyn 2007). However, because of the cost of the EEG and MRI equipment, such research is expensive to carry out and not conducive to use in the natural settings of decision makers.

A third type of measure facilitates the inference of processing style based on the ability to solve different types of problems. The embedded figures test (EFT), for example, evaluates the ability of participants to locate figures, embedded in larger geometric figures. Field independent participants were those who were able to locate more embedded figures and therefore were considered more analytical. Those that were field dependent were seen to be more right brained and by implication, more intuitive (Schweiger 1983). However, this finding gives us no insight into how an individual will actually make decisions. This test is also subject to cultural bias and has been considered problematic for use outside Western contexts (Wozniak 2006). For example, recent cross-cultural psychological research found that Chinese are more ‘field dependent’ in their cognition as opposed to ‘object dependent’ (Peng & Nisbett 1999; Nisbett, Peng, Choi & Norenzayan 2001; Nisbett & Norenzayan 2002).

2.8 Intuition as a psychological/cognitive outcome or event

Intuition as an event or an outcome of cognitive process is a ‘knowing’, which the intuitive can then choose to exploit (Simon 1987; Crossan et al. 1999; Sauter 1999). Falling into two categories, these intuitions are commonly known as ‘gut feeling’ and ‘insight’, although theorists have labelled them in
different ways. For example, Cappon (1994a) distinguishes between the two on the basis of immediacy. Whereas as ‘fast track’ (gut feeling) intuition occurs ‘synchronous with perception’ (p. 303), ‘slow track’ intuition (insight) occurs subsequent to an incubation period. Similarly, Crossan et al. (1999) distinguished between expert and entrepreneurial intuition, and Hogarth (2008), between forward and backward inferences respectively. While there is divergence across the literature in terms of labelling (Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007), there is considerable agreement about the nature and characteristics of each.

Gut feeling is most relevant to managers and leaders of organisations because they are consistently presented with problems and decision alternatives where their expert intuition provides guidance (Parikh et al. 1994). This is because gut feeling is the subconscious or preconscious recognition of patterns based on past experience (Agor 1984; Behling & Eckel 1991; Cappon 1993; Parikh et al. 1994; Shapiro & Spence 1997; Burke & Miller 1999; Gigerenzer 2004). Crossan et al. (1999) refer to gut feeling as expert intuition because pattern recognition is facilitated through the development of highly complex ‘mind maps’ over a substantial period of time (years). According to Bennett (1998), ‘Experience makes people aware of very strong underlying patterns that transcend a wide variety of decision scenarios … experience is integrated, actions become second nature’ (p. 591). For example, chess is generally regarded as a time-consuming activity based in the linear analysis of potential moves. However grandmasters are able to play simultaneous games and make moves after seconds, although the player is not able to explain how s/he arrived at the move (Agor 1986; Simon 1987; Mintzberg 1989; Crossan et al. 1999).

Insight, on the other hand, refers to a sudden new understanding of a problem, sometimes with an accompanying solution or a novel idea that is sometimes referred to as the ‘Eureka factor’, ‘Eureka effect’ or a ‘Eureka moment’\(^\text{10}\). Whereas expert intuition is based on pattern recognition, entrepreneurial intuition is able to ‘connect patterns in a new way’ (Sinclair 2003, p. 15). Insight is therefore described as, ‘to do with innovation and change’ (p. 527) and creativity (Koestler 1976; Bastick 2003). The breakthroughs of Newton, Archimedes, Einstein and Pythagoras have been attributed to such insights that suddenly came to them, in the apparent absence of any mental will or conscious effort (Rowan 1989; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks 1993; Cappon 1994b). However, the notion that these creative insights occur without any effort or analysis is misleading.

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\(^{10}\) The Eureka effect (Greek meaning ‘I have found’) is named after the myth that the Greek polymath, Archimedes, having discovered how to measure the volume of an irregular object, leaped out of a public bath, and ran home naked shouting ‘Eureka’.
I argue that the role of mental effort and conscious analysis is integral and a precursor to both categories of intuition. Gut feeling is immediate, however, it is based on the experience and domain knowledge accumulated over years, which would necessarily entail analysis and reflection (Simon 1987; Sauter 1999; Novicevic, Hench & Wren 2002). In the former example of the chess it must be acknowledged that to reach the level of a Grandmaster an individual must play a lot of chess, and analyse the moves of others (Polanyi 1966; Crossan et al. 1999). This can be considered an incubation period for the generation of tacit knowledge that is later drawn on by gut feeling. Insight occurs subsequent to sustained analysis and thought about a problem (Koestler 1976; Cappon 1994a; Crossan et al. 1999) before the ‘moment of illumination’ (Cappon 1994a, p. 303). Hence, in both examples, intuitions are the product of cognitive effort. In the case of gut feeling, the conscious effort has occurred prior to the presentation of a problem or issue, whereas, in the case of insight, the intuition occurs subsequent to it. Thus, the difference is principally one of timing. Clearly, both involve intuitive processing (Cappon 1994a; Sadler-Smith 2008).

While Dane and Pratt (2007) also distinguished between insight and gut feeling they were not inclined to include insight under the label of intuition. They argued that insights can be immediately articulated (the solution to a problem for example) but gut feelings cannot. Dane and Pratt however fail to acknowledge that the entrepreneurial intuiter is unable to explain the process by which s/he came to the illuminating solution (Crossan et al. 1999). I argue that in terms of rationale for nomenclature, both manifestations of intuition share an incubation period, holism, and sub-conscious cognitive processing and affect (Cappon 1994a; Crossan et al. 1999). Dane and Pratt are therefore in conflict with those theorists who include insight as a manifestation of intuition (for example see Bastick 1982; Cappon 1994a; Crossan et al. 1999; Sauter 1999; Hogarth 2008). Moreover, practitioners in the field discuss insight as intuition (Agor 1986; Parikh et al. 1994; Crossan et al. 1999; Robson & Miller 2006), although, as Boucouvalas (1997) pointed out, perhaps not to quite the same extent as gut feeling. This is perhaps because managers and leaders in organisations (who are the participants in this study) are more concerned with decision alternatives whereas entrepreneurs are concerned with innovation and creativity.

2.9 Intuition and analysis: Hammond

Hammond (1996) focused on intuition as a cognitive process in relation to analysis rather than an outcome or an event. He argued that a dichotomous or dualistic view of analysis and intuition has led to a historical rivalry, in terms of the value ascribed to each, which continues to this day. Hammond rejected this dichotomous view and sought to reduce the tension by way of a cognitive continuum,
(discussed as Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT)), ‘marked by intuition at one pole and analysis at the other’ (p. 147) – (see Figure 2.1 below). The middle region, quasi-rationality or common sense, is seen as a blend of features of both types of cognition (Cooksey 1996a).

**Figure 2.1: Hammond’s cognitive continuum**

For Hammond, cognition is not an ‘all or nothing affair’ (either analysis or intuition) but rather as arising from various mixtures of intuition and analysis that can be ‘ordered in relation to one another’ (Hammond 1996, p. 147). Hammond considered cognition as a unified blend (unitary) as opposed to cognition as a complex interaction under Epstein’s CEST (Epstein 1990). Hammond’s (1996) view is that cognition will oscillate between intuition and analysis (alternation), sometimes even when focusing on the same decision task and that given time, the decision-making of an individual will utilise the full spectrum of potential blends. Table 2.4 below displays characteristics associated with each mode of cognition:

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11 This theme has been debated in the literature (see, for example, Allinson & Hayes 1996; Hayes, Allinson, Hudson & Keasey 2003; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith 2003).
Table 2.4: Mode of cognition characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of intuition</th>
<th>Characteristics of quasirationality</th>
<th>Characteristics of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid information processing</td>
<td>Involves aspects of both. Most frequent cognitive mode in daily life</td>
<td>Slow information processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous cue use</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sequential cue use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement processes not retraceable</td>
<td></td>
<td>Judgement process retraceable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical rules unavailable</td>
<td></td>
<td>Logical rules available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High confidence in outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low confidence in outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low confidence in process</td>
<td></td>
<td>High confidence in process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low cognitive effort required</td>
<td></td>
<td>High cognitive effort required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliance on non-verbal/pictorial cues</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reliance on quantitative cues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasises right brain hemisphere</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emphasises left hemisphere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from (Cooksey 1996a, p. 15)

Hammond (1996) also emphasised that the relative proportion of either process was contingent on the task at hand. Here Hammond is capturing Brunswik’s (1952) essential point that cognition cannot be understood without orientation to the ecological or environmental context in which it is occurring. For Brunswik, artificial and contrived experiments in the laboratory destroyed the ‘causal texture of the environment’, (Cooksey 1996a, p. 3). Indeed one of the major contributions of Brunswik’s probabilistic functionalism to psychology was the notion that ecology should be ‘given equal consideration in all areas’ (Cooksey 1996a, p. 7-8), using parallel concepts to do so.

The interrelatedness of organism and environment was a notion that ran counter to mainstream psychology at the time and is only now being fully appreciated (Cooksey 1996a; Cooksey 1996b). This is perhaps the consequence of the ascension of a more holistic approach to scientific enquiry (Capra 1996). Hammond argued that decision and judgement tasks that confront people will exhibit different types of contextual features, and that the particular configuration of these features will tend to induce a corresponding mode of cognition. Hammond therefore proposed a parallel task continuum representing the nature of the task.
Table 2.5: Task continuum characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics inducing intuition</th>
<th>Characteristics inducing quasirationality</th>
<th>Characteristics of inducing analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of task structure</td>
<td>Tasks that induce quasirationality will show a mixture of inducing elements as well as analysis inducing elements</td>
<td>Complexity of task structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– many alternatives</td>
<td>– few alternatives</td>
<td>– few cues displayed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– large number of cues displayed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity of task structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiguity of task structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>– high</td>
<td></td>
<td>– low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– unfamiliar task content</td>
<td></td>
<td>– highly familiar task content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of task presentation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Form of task presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– continuous, pictorial data cue</td>
<td></td>
<td>– dichotomous or discrete data cue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– brief time for judgement</td>
<td></td>
<td>– quantitative cue definitions that are objectively measured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– long time available for judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>– judgement process retraceable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Cooksey 1996a, p.20)

According to Cooksey (1996a) CCT is a unifying theory of social judgement. In summary, CCT is based on five premises:

1. Cognition moves on a continuum between intuition and analysis
2. Quasi rationality is the middle ground between them
3. Some cognitive tasks induce intuition while other induce analysis
4. Cognition moves between intuition and analysis over time
5. Cognition is capable of matching cognition with task

Emergent from CCT is the prediction that the functional response based on judgement achievement or accuracy can be linked to the congruence between mode of cognition and the nature of the task (Cooksey 2000). This prediction was confirmed by the findings of studies conducted by Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) and Hamm (1988), which employed specifically designed, representative decision tasks to gain insights into cognitive modes being employed by decision makers. Using the Think Aloud Protocol Method (van Someren, Barnard & Sandberg 1994), where participants gave a moment by moment narrative of their thought processes, both studies showed that practitioners
varied their mode of cognition according to the task properties and, furthermore, that efficacy, as predicted, was related to the degree of congruence between task characteristics and mode of cognitive processing.

These findings conflict somewhat with the contentions of Stanovich and West (2000). Drawing on Epstein’s CEST, they claim that each cognitive system ‘construes’ problems in different ways. Construals triggered by System 1 are ‘highly contextual, personalized and socialized’ (p. 659), whereas System 2 depersonalises and de-contextualises the task. However, if System 1 is automatic and permeates all thinking (Epstein et al. 1996) then it could be assumed that all tasks will be construed as contextual and personal, inducing System 2. However, the apparent inconsistency between CCT and CEST might be explained by the understanding that, according to CEST, System 2 can override System 1. This might depend on a number of factors such as the training and personal emotional context of the individual (including visceral influences), and interpersonal dynamics, culture and the climate of any given organisation.

While Hammond’s (1996) CCT serves to ease the tension within the analysis/intuition duality debate, I argue it still remains a less-than-comprehensive model for the whole of cognition and judgement. While CCT purports to include and equally value ecological factors realised by the task continuum, Hammond’s model is emotionally de-contextualised. In particular, CCT provides no account for personal and interpersonal dynamics, and emotional complexity. Janis (1989) pointed out a range of individual, egocentric and affiliate constraints that affect decision-making. These included personality, attitudes, the need to maintain self-esteem, the desire for prestige and the need to belong. These constraints intersect with the visceral factors discussed by Lowenstein (2001) and underpin ‘office politics’, which can have a debilitating effect on decision-making and leadership in general (Dubrin et al. 2006). In addition, CCT does not specifically account for spontaneous intuitions (gut feeling or insight). The cognitive continuum represents only intuition and analytical processes in relation to one another.

Epstein’s CEST (Epstein 1990; Epstein 2008), on the other hand, is well placed to accommodate heuristics and visceral influences within its framework because it does account for irrational fears and behaviour, moods and emotions. Epstein also places emphasis, along with other authors in a whole-of-brain approach (Robey & Taggart 1981a; Cappon 1994a; Sadler-Smith 1999; Sauter 1999), on the synergistic function of the interaction between analytic and experiential systems.

[A]t its lower levels of operation, it is a crude system that automatically, rapidly, effortlessly and efficiently processes information. At its higher reaches, and particularly in interaction with the rational system, it is a source of intuitive wisdom and creativity. (Epstein 1994, p. 715)
Hammond’s (1996) CCT, Loewenstein’s (1996) visceral influences, Kahneman et al.’s (1982) heuristics and biases and Epstein’s (1990) description of the experiential and rational cognitive systems each make significant contributions. I argue that they are not incompatible and, if viewed inclusively, have a greater chance of increasing understanding than when seen as competing depictions. Thus, I have diagrammatically represented my interpretation of how Hammond’s cognitive continuum can be expanded by synthesising it with my representation of Epstein’s CEST. Figure 2.2 below is a visual representation of Epstein’s experiential and rational cognitive systems and their relationship to each other. The figure is useful because it visually represents the overlapping relationship of the experiential and rational systems (represented by the darker shaded area) as the basis for their part/whole relationship.

Figure 2.2: Diagrammatical representation of Epstein’s (1990) Experiential and Rational Cognitive Systems

The model also serves to accommodate and represent Epstein’s notion of intuition as multi-faceted. While intuitions may be base, instinctual and automatic, the interactivity of the systems (process) may also produce higher wisdom and creativity in the form of gut feelings and insights (represented by the intersection of the two circles). Intuitions can be conceived as an emergent process/outcome not dissimilar to the process of self-organisation that is characteristic of complex systems (Capra 1996; Lissack 1997). In addition, this representation is useful because it renders Epstein’s ideas available for a visual synthesis with Hammond’s CCT (Figure 2.1) shown below in Figure 2.3:
Figure 2.3: Intuition as an emergent outcome from a dynamic, contextualised decision context

Adapted from Robson and Cooksey (2008, p. 77)

This representation has also been useful for my understanding of the literature because it has served to make relational sense of the many multifarious, confusing, contradictory definitions. The model presents intuition as a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional process and outcome through the inclusion of automatic and visceral influences. It is also presented as an event (symbolised by the red ‘splash’ symbol).

A further utility of this synthesis is the specific inclusion of decision context (represented by the surrounding oval). Incorporating Hammond’s (1996) notion of the relationship between task and cognition, and building on earlier work by Cooksey (2000), I argue that intuition can only be understood against the backdrop of the complex decision context(s) in which decision-making is occurring. This is something that researchers into naturalistic decision-making have also acknowledged (see Zsambok & Klein 1997 for examples). Decisions and behaviour are emergent from a complex interaction of influences, in terms of the nature of the decision, and also arising as a consequence of individual and interpersonal dynamics (Janis 1989). In Section 2.15, it will be shown that socio-cultural factors have been perceived as critical to the use of intuition(s) and yet remain absent from the literature.
An implication of this explicit recognition of context is that a realistic understanding of intuition that is useful to practitioners cannot be achieved in the absence of contextual knowledge and the subjective experiences of individuals in the field. Research is likely to be more meaningfully extended if multi-disciplinary and multi-paradigmatic approaches to the study of intuition and related issues are undertaken (or at least approaches with less rigid boundaries in terms of what constitutes knowledge). I will later argue that this understanding is best achieved through approaches to research that can acknowledge, and thus investigate, decision-making as a process in organisations. Towards this aim, the model depicted in Figure 2.3 above may also serve as a basis from which future research programs can proceed and feed data back into the framework. These issues will be addressed in terms of research design and methodology, which will be examined in Chapter 4.

2.10 Reconciling philosophical and psychological conceptions of intuition

The previous sections have examined literature pertaining to constructions of intuition within philosophy and psychology. I will now present the foreshadowed reconciliation of the disjuncture between intuition in philosophy (which is framed as infallible) and psychological intuition (discussed as fallible). I have provided this reconciliation before proceeding to the review of literature specific to field studies of intuition in organisations. This is because I believe that the reconciliation proposed offers a deeper and more meaningful understanding of both philosophical and psychological constructs of intuition. Furthermore, some of the ideas discussed are relevant to the way some theorists explain the accumulated evidence that is seen to support the notion of intuition as ESP, psychic intuition, or Psi, a discussion of which will also follow.

While multi-disciplinary approaches addressing the disjuncture between philosophical and psychological literature are rare, some recent works signal recognition of the need to address this issue (Davis-Floyd & Arvidson 1997; DePaul & Ramsey 1998; Osbeck 1999; Hendon 2004). Osbeck (1999) suggested that there is a need for integration of theory, because ‘philosophical analysis of intuition may usefully inform cognitive theory (and vice versa)’ (p. 229). I concur with this spirit of inquiry and suggest that a deeper and, therefore, more meaningful understanding of both constructs of intuition is realised through the recognition of their fundamental difference. I suggest that this can be achieved in a dialogistic fashion – through understanding what psychological intuition is and is not.

In addition, the rapprochement of the two constructs will be shown to be entirely congruent with the stratified ontology of Critical Realism (Bhaskar 2002), upon which Layder’s (1997; 1998; 2005) Domain Theory rests. This is significant because I have adopted Domain Theory as the theoretical framework for the study (developed in Chapter 3). The advantage of this is conceptual congruency between the basis
for the reconciliation and the philosophical assumptions, which drive the research and ultimately inform conclusions about the research problem.

As discussed, there is consistency amongst philosophers that intuition provides perfect knowledge of ultimate reality and that it is self-evident, subjective and therefore incontestable (Westcott 1968). Psychological intuition (gut feeling), on the other hand, is regarded as fallible but useful and based on personal, tacit knowledge that is gained through experience. Many contemporary reviews of intuition (particularly in business research literature) tend to ignore philosophical intuition (see, for example, Agor 1984; Isenberg 1984; Harper 1989; Hammond 1996; Anderson 2000). Those that do acknowledge philosophical intuition do so without attempting to integrate, defend, reconcile or explain this disjuncture (Osbeck 1999).

Osbeck (1999) argued that this could be attributed to a ‘number of factors consistent with the development of psychology into an empirical science’ such as ‘methodological constraints, predominant interest in everyday, ‘folk’ conceptions of intuition’ and ‘assumptions concerning intuitionism’s historical association with subjectivist accounts of truth’ (p.229). In addition, particularly in relation to managerial takes on intuition, theorists are interested in how intuition can achieve material outcomes, or at least better decision-making that can lead to usable outcomes, rather than arriving at some sort of abstract truth about universal principles. In view of the fragmentation of knowledge that occurs through the mutual exclusivity of disciplines (Bohm 1980; Bohm & Peat 1987; Capra 1996) that sometimes results in adversarial confrontations, it is perhaps not surprising that approaches to the study of intuition are so different.

However, using a novel approach, Hendon (2004) presents a convincing solution that serves to reduce/eliminate the apparent epistemological contradictions through a stratified or layered framework. She proposed a three-level model of intuition which I have duplicated here in Table 2.6 below:

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12 Rorty (2009) for example, argued philosophy can ‘debunk’ the claims of science through a ‘special understanding of knowledge and mind’ (p. 3).
Table 2.6: Hendon’s three-level framework for intuition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intuition framework</th>
<th>Personal unconscious</th>
<th>Collective unconscious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introverted intuition</td>
<td>Level one</td>
<td>Level two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extroverted intuition</td>
<td>Level one</td>
<td>Little or no awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integral intuition</td>
<td>Level three</td>
<td>Level three</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hendon 2004, p. 8)

Hendon (2004) argued that the first level of intuition relates to the personal unconscious and, therefore, to the psychological accounts of intuition. Drawing on Jung, she argued that the second level refers to intuitions from the collective unconscious, which can be drawn upon by each individual through personal intuition. Introverts, as mentioned earlier, have better access to this type of intuition whereas extrovert types (who are more directed to external objects) have less access and, therefore, less awareness of manifesting automatic phenomena through the mind, body and feelings.

Finally, the third level of intuition, or integral intuition, is the developed, mature intuition – the direct apprehension of an ultimate reality that Westcott (1968) claimed is the principal characteristic of philosophical intuition. Hendon (2004) justifiably regarded this three-level framework for intuition as the major theoretical contribution of her thesis because her multi-level approach allows for a reconciliation of these different constructs. Her essentially stratified ontological solution has influenced my thinking significantly. I noticed parallels between her model and the ontological stratification of both the Critical Realism of Bhaskar and the meta-physical arguments of particle theorists Goswami (1995), Bohm (1980; 1987) and Hagelin (1987). Consequently, I formed the view that Hendon’s proposal can be supported and extended through a synthesis with these ideas.

The foundation of my interpretation rests on the assumption of a transcendent domain or ground state of ‘universal consciousness’ from which all else arises. This proposition will be dismissed by some as ‘Eastern mysticism’, referring to traditions such as Vedanta (Bhattacharyya 1976), Taoism (Taggart 2000) and the Tibetan Buddhism discussed previously, which are seldom drawn on in the West\(^\text{13}\) in ‘serious’ discourse (see Holbrook 1981; Wilber 1995 as exceptions). However, this idea is also found in Western philosophy and metaphysics. The notion of a universal ground consciousness can be compared to ‘spirit’ in Hegel’s Absolute Idealism, Plato’s ‘The Good’ (Hendon 2004) and, more recently, pioneering particle

\(^{13}\) The paradigm of Scientific Realism insists on a substantive bottom that is matter (Burneko 1997). However, the key to understanding and resolving the problem of mind/matter, realism/idealism and, in particular, psychological/philosophical intuition, is that there is no substantive bottom.
physicist, Bohm’s (1980), implicate order (see also Hagelin 1987).

‘... the implicate order could well be called idealism, spirit, or consciousness and that the separation of the two – matter and spirit – is an abstraction. The ground is always one’. (Bohm 1980, p. 84)

Bohm’s implicate order is an unmanifest and transcendent dimension of potential (Bohm 1980; Bohm & Peat 1987). Enfolded in the implicate order are explicate orders, which contain what we experience as physical reality (matter). Bohm argues that:

‘... ordinary notions of space and time, along with those of separately existent material particles, are abstracted as forms derived from the deeper order. These ordinary notions in fact appear in what is called the “explicate” or “unfolded” order, which is a special and distinguished form contained within the general totality of all the implicate orders’ (Bohm 1980, p. xv).

Matter unfolds from the implicate order at different levels of description – hence ‘Reality’ is stratified yet, at the same time, unified\textsuperscript{14}. My interpretation is that, individual human consciousness (including intuitive processes and intuitions) emerges from the brain\textsuperscript{15} (matter) (Willmott 1999), which at a different level of description is ground consciousness. Philosophical intuition is thus apprehended when universal and personal consciousness (through transpersonal intuition) realise each other in co-presence and self-transcendence (Bhaskar 2002). My interpretation of this three-level stratification is visually represented by Figure 2.4 below:

\textbf{Figure 2.4: Three-level stratification implied by Monistic Idealism}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure2.4.jpg}
\caption{Three-level stratification implied by Monistic Idealism}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{14} This explains why classical physics can coexist alongside quantum physics. Quantum physics explains nature at a more fundamental level (Capra 1996).

\textsuperscript{15} This notion will be explained in Chapter 3 in developing the theoretical perspective for the study.
For Henzell-Thomas (2005), apprehension of the celestial prototype is ultimate self-realisation and could well be called transpersonal intuition because the individual mind transcends itself through accessing a deeper reality that is found within:

This ‘Intelect’ (universal consciousness) ... is veiled behind discursive thought or reason; nevertheless, it is essentially the same – or not other – than its celestial prototype. Through this transcendent intellect man [sic] is capable of the ‘recognition’ of Reality and of knowing the world, because the world is in fact contained within him, as the world is contained in being. (Henzell - Thomas 2005, p. 46)

This transpersonal intuition (equated with philosophical intuition) translates well to the descriptions of Bergson and Spinoza, given earlier, of philosophical intuition as ‘inside knowledge’ of a thing. This ‘inside knowledge’ can be visually represented by the ‘Two Heads’ solution which, according to Goswami (1995), actualises the rapprochement of idealism and realism proposed by Bertrand Russell and Leibnitz.

I have diagrammatically represented Goswami’s description in Figure 2.5 below:

**Figure 2.5: The ‘Two Heads’ solution**

In the first example the circular object is external to the individual consciousness of the observer – a situation that satisfies the realist. In terms of the psychological/philosophical intuition debate, this example would translate to personal psychological intuition based on experience of an external world – gut feelings and insights – and therefore ‘knowledge about’ something. However, when the realist position is placed within a larger head (ground consciousness) not only is the realist satisfied but one can be seen to have an inside ‘knowledge of’ a thing (second example). This is because ‘knowledge’ (philosophical intuition) transcends the subject/object split and is derived from a level of consciousness that is common to both the brain and the object (the meta-reality of ground consciousness).

Of course, the ‘big head’ may be interpreted as ‘God’. However, concurring with Bohm (1980), I would argue that it is neither necessary nor wise to speculate about the exact nature and name of this ground consciousness. As Taoists state, ‘The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao’ (Taggart 2000, p.11). The important point here is that the dualisms that feature so strongly in our existence – the dualisms
that divide self and other, self and the environment – as well as the ideological dualisms that divide philosophies such as idealism and realism, and consequently research paradigms, may be reconciled (Robson 2010). ‘We both step and do not step in the same waters. We are and are not’ (Heraclitus cited in Barnes 1987, p. 117).

The advantage of assuming a stratified meta-reality of ground consciousness is that dualisms can be embraced and transcended. Two important implications for this study arise as a consequence of this position. The first is that philosophical intuition can be seen as fundamentally different to individual psychological intuition because it paradoxically draws on an essence common to both the individual and the universal. The reconciliation of the two is achieved through the appreciation that individual consciousness is both the same as, and different to, ground consciousness. The second implication is in relation to the philosophical underpinnings of the study. A stratified ontology is the means by which Layder’s Domain Theory brings together the various strands of social theory that are otherwise seen as irreconcilable (structure/agency, part/whole, separateness/relatedness, individual/society), and transcends their individual limitations.

Layder’s stratified ontology is based on the work of Bhaskar (1978; 1993) and Archer (1995), particularly with reference to Critical Realism. Critical Realism is founded on the assumption of a stratified meta-reality, which Bhaskar (2002) describes as ‘beings ground state’, which is ‘synchronic consciousness’ and ‘implicitly enfolded in matter’ (p. 110). Thus, congruency can be seen between the stratified ontological solution to the reconciliation of psychological and philosophical intuition, the theoretical framework adopted for the study (Domain Theory, to be discussed later), and the stratified ontology of Critical Realism that underpins Domain Theory.

### 2.11 Intuition as ESP and psychic premonitions

Westcott (1968) dismissed the inclusion of extrasensory perception (ESP), otherwise known as Psi (psychic phenomena), in his evaluation of intuition on the grounds that it is clearly separate from both philosophical and psychological traditions. He argued that both descriptions given for ESP, where information is either (1) sent from another person (telepathy) or (2) divined from the ‘event or object’ (prescience), by definition, ‘relies on the abrogation of ordinary [my emphasis] sensory knowledge’ (p. 96). Westcott’s exclusion is puzzling, however, because philosophical intuition, as he has defined it, and Jung’s intuitions from the collective unconscious (which he did include), neither rely on the senses nor can be considered ordinary knowledge. Here we could become embroiled in definitions of what constitutes a sense and what is ordinary. I suspect that Westcott’s omission of ESP has more to do with prevailing attitudes toward ESP in mainstream psychology, which are clearly exposed in this quote from Bastick:
Of course it is the mystics, the parapsychologists, the gypsy teacup readers, the astral gazers, and generally the folks beyond the fringe dispensing their quackeries and nostrums to deprived innocents, who are responsible for bringing intuition into disrepute in the popular mind. (Bastick 1982, p. 20)

If Bastick’s views are typical, as Talbot (1992) asserted is the case, then Westcott (1968) would have been imbued with denial concerning ESP through his training and, therefore, justified in fearing the ridicule and ostracism of his peers by taking the possibility of ESP seriously in ostensibly scholarly publications. However, other theorists such as Vaughan (1979) and Naparstek (1997) discussed Psi in a way that is consistent with Westcott’s definition. While it is not clear whether Bastick or Westcott would consider Vaughan and Naparstek (both psychologists) as dwelling beyond the fringe, what is clear from their books is that psychic phenomena such as ESP are commonly referred to as ‘intuitions’. Therefore, I argue that ESP, as a concept, needs to be included in a study concerning perceptions of intuition.

Given that philosophical assumptions of Scientific Realism still dominate in research today (Goswami 1995), it is not surprising that ESP has been ridiculed by the majority of the scientific community, nor that there have been numerous inquiries investigating suspicions of fraud (Schoch & Yonavjak 2008). However, the assumptions of New Science, specifically, relativity, quantum mechanics and non-locality\(^\text{16}\), have radically changed our understanding of the Universe – and, as a consequence, the debate has intensified. Proponents of Psi charge materialist deniers (as opposed to sceptics) with refusing to acknowledge overwhelming evidence, while deniers continue to consider the claims of Psi proponents to be ‘flaky’, and their methods, questionable, particularly in terms of reliability (Alcock, Burns & Freeman 2003).

However, New Science has given supporters of Psi an opportunity to explain the 125 years of experimental evidence that has accumulated (Radin 2006; Schoch & Yonavjak 2008; Radin 2009). The principle of non-locality does not justify the existence of Psi, however, it does provide an underlying basis by which it may operate (Schoch & Yonavjak 2008). While there are different variations and approaches to these theories, in essence, they rely on the underlying oneness of the Universe, which accounts for connectedness of all things.

If the principle of non-locality is accepted, the corollary is that we are not separate, at a fundamental level, from other people and other things in the Universe. The notions of space and time lose their meaning, as do the notions of Westcott’s (1968) definitions for ESP. Nothing is ‘sent’ or ‘transferred’, it

\(^{16}\) Aspect (cited in Bell 2004) found that pairs of co-related particles are ‘communicate’ across vast distances (action at a distance). The generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Physics implies that the Universe can be seen as a seamless whole rather than comprised of discrete parts (Capra 1996; Goswami 1995).
is simply realised – an idea not dissimilar to intuitions from the collective unconscious or, indeed, the principle by which I have argued philosophical intuition may operate.

A variety of books have been written utilising the implications of quantum non-locality in relation to Psi. These have been written and published for academics (Etter 1997; Rauscher & Targ 2001; Shoup N. D.), as well as for a wider audience (Radin 2006; Jones 2007; Radin 2009; Tart 2009). In relation to Psi in business, Bradley (2007) uses non-locality to explain how entrepreneurs know to do the right thing at the right time. However, the problem for Psi researchers is that the evidence for this phenomenon has apparently not been compelling enough to convince even one mainstream psychological and managerial psychological publication.

This section concludes the critical review of constructions of intuition. Table 2.7 below represents a summary of the constructs covered. As a consequence of my understanding of how philosophical and psychological can be understood in relation to one another, I have grouped the various constructs according to whether I see them as personal or transpersonal intuition:
### Table 2.7: Summary of constructs of intuition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples of proponent(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal (psychological) intuition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual Intuition</td>
<td>Apprehension of prime reality through the use of intuition.</td>
<td>Plato; Spinoza; Bergson; Westcott; Goswami; Taggart; Eastern Philosophers and traditions such as Krishnamurti; Osho and Eastern traditions such as Buddhism and Taoism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophical Intuitionism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Philosophies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trans-personal intuition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychic Intuition, ESP, Psi</td>
<td>Information divined from remote persons or objects</td>
<td>Vaughan; Naparstek; Bradley; Radin; Schoup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As a cognitive process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heuristics and biases, visceral influences</td>
<td>Cognitive shortcuts creating biases and prejudices. The impact of hunger, thirst, sexual drive, addiction etc.</td>
<td>Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky; Loewenstein; Epstein; Gigerenzer; Keren; and Teigen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Intuition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Experiential Intuition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gut Feeling</td>
<td>Immediate knowing and sense of certainty through pattern recognition based on past experience</td>
<td>Cappon; Parikh et. al.; Agor; Bastick; Epstein, Behling et al.; Novicevic et al.; Sauter; Robson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert Intuition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal (psychological) intuition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuition</td>
<td>A construct involving preference for gathering and processing information linked to personality</td>
<td>Allinson and Hayes; Hodgkinson et al.; Jung; Myers-Brigs; Taggart; Kirton; Jabri</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.12 Gender and intuition

Lieberman (2000) asserted that no review of intuition would be complete without a reference to women’s intuition. Lieberman is justified in making such a claim considering the widespread popular belief that women have a more reliable and available intuitive faculty than men; a perception which has been noted by a number of authors (see, for example, Vaughan 1979; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005).

Indeed, the association of women with intuition has a long history. As Myers (2002) pointed out, ‘Western tradition has historically regarded rational thinking as masculine and intuition as feminine’ (p. 44). This is because men dominated early science and came to be seen as the masters of logic, reason
and rationality\textsuperscript{17} (Cappon 1993; Wertheim 1997). Moreover, because of the elevation of reason over religious intuition, as a consequence of the Scientific Revolution, women have been concomitantly assigned an inferior status\textsuperscript{18} (Dunne 1997).

The inferiority of both women and intuition can be clearly seen in the beliefs of the founding members of the American Psychological Association, including its first president (Gigerenzer 2004). In his book, \textit{An Outline of Psychology}, McDougall argued, 'Intuition works ... on a lower plane of intellectuality, exhibited by some who have limited powers of abstractive thinking, most notably women, young children and dogs' (McDougall (1923) cited in Osbeck 1999, p. 230). Perceptions of gender differences in relation to intuition can therefore be considered widespread and deeply embedded, and for some, particularly feminists, have provided rationale for continuing male hegemony in Western societies (Shields 1975).

Despite these cultural assumptions of gender difference in relation to intuition, there is surprisingly little commentary and research on the issue. This is perhaps, at least in part, due to the difficulty of assessing or measuring the capacity for intuitive ability in actual decision-making. The studies that do exist therefore rely on perceptions of intuitiveness or measurement of cognitive style. Studies focusing on perceptions of intuitiveness do support the historical association of women with intuition. Wajcman (1996) for example, found women perceived that men were reductionist in their thinking while women looked at things in a more holistic way. Similarly, Pacini and Epstein (1999) found that women are more likely than men to identify themselves as intuitive (having intuitions) and more intuitively oriented in their thinking, whereas men are more likely to consider themselves to be rational. However, these findings do not guide us as to whether women are actually more intuitive or just conditioned to believe they are.

The findings of studies identifying cognitive style in relation to gender are contradictory. Some studies (Agor 1986; Agor 1989b; Parikh et al. 1994) found greater intuitive orientation in women. Other studies (Taggart, Valenzi, Zalka & Lowe 1997; Hayes, Allinson & Armstrong 2004) found no gender difference in relation to cognitive style and gender in managers, while Kirton (1989) found that men may be more intuitive than women. However, these studies utilised different cognitive style instruments which defined and operationalised intuition in different ways.

\textsuperscript{17} Wertheim (1997) pointed out that the ‘fathers of science’ were driven by the ambition to prove the existence of God, which, should be seen as irrational under the assumptions of Scientific Realism.

\textsuperscript{18} Gigerenzer (2004) correctly argued out the historical belief in the superiority of men can be traced back as far as Aristotle and Kant.
Cappon (1993) argued that the notion of women as more intuitive is a false one. He bases this on his clinical experience with 3,000 people. However, he does not disclose the ratio of men to women or how he came to his conclusion. We are therefore forced to rely on his experienced-based intuition in this matter. Hall (1984) is an oft cited study (for example see Snodgrass 1985; Lieberman 2000; Myers 2002; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005) when arguing a case for women’s intuition. Hall’s study shows that women are better at non-verbal communication and assessing affect through non-verbal cues. This, of course, equates interpersonal skills with intuition. While this may be reasonable, the important point I wish to reinforce here is the difficulty of comparing studies where intuition is defined and investigated in so many ways.

Others approaches have sought to find a link between intuition and neurological differences between the sexes. Although men have more brain cells, females have more dendritic connections between brain cells (Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head & Alkire 2005). In addition, differences have been found in both size (Steinmetz, Staiger, Schlaug, Huang & Jancke 1995) and the shape (Allen, Richey, Chai & Gorski 1991) of the corpus callosum. The larger corpus callosum of the female increases the transference of information or data between the left and right hemispheres (Nadeau 1996), which for some, accounts for ‘women’s intuition (De Simone 1983).

The dispute I have with the conclusion above is that it promotes the physical as causal and primary and overlooks the plasticity of the brain in response to a variety of environmental influences (Doidge 2007). Plasticity is not limited to the development of neuronal connections. The brain has been shown to change physically as a result of learning a second language (Mechelli, Crinion, Noppeney, O’Doherty, Ashburner, Frackowiak & Price 2004), learning to play music (Gaser & Schlaug 2003) and intensive study (Draganski, Gaser, Kempermann, Kuhn, Winkler, Büchel & May 2006). It appears that the brain is like a muscle that develops in relation to how it is used.

2.13 Field studies of intuition in managerial and organisational contexts

Literature extolling the importance of intuition for managers and leaders in organisations has taken some time to be fully appreciated. For example, *The Functions of the Executive* (Barnard 1938), originally published in 1938 but initially ignored, became increasingly valued, is currently considered a seminal work (Simon 1987; Novicevic et al. 2002). Barnard is now considered one of the ‘fathers of decision-making analysis in management theory’ (Novicevic et al. 2002, p. 992) for his insight that executives use
both logical and non-logical processes in their daily decision-making\textsuperscript{19}. This was a significant milestone in the advancement of organisational theory because it opened new avenues for research and understanding about decision makers and their decision-making processes. Up until that time it was generally assumed that decisions proceeded by way of rational analysis. Barnard’s contributions eventually led to critical concepts such as ‘bounded rationality’ as well as current important areas of research concerning tacit knowledge, organisational learning, and systems views of organisations as emergent and self-organising (Daft & Lengel 1986; Stonehouse & Pemberton 1999; Cooksey 2001; Novicevic et al. 2002). Barnard should therefore be recognised as the first in management theory to explicate both the role of the preconscious processes and the limitations of conscious processes (in terms of amount of information and the ability to process it).

Field studies of intuition used in organisational contexts, although rare, have empirically supported Barnard’s (1968) observations concerning intuition. For example, Agor (1984; 1986), in an exhaustive study using interviews and subsequent surveys, concluded that top executives use intuition to make their most important decisions. Burke and Miller (1999), using semi-structured interviews, identified that the ‘overwhelming majority’ (p. 95) of executives use intuition daily in decision-making, particularly those who were older and had more experience.

Similarly, Khatri and Ng (2000), in a survey of 1530 CEOs and other senior officers of organisations in USA found that intuition was an important factor in strategic decision-making. Parikh, Neubauer and Lank (1994), in a significant study involving 1312 managers from nine countries, found two out of three managers considered themselves to be highly intuitive. Parikh, et al. also found that nearly 80% of respondents agreed that senior managers ‘use intuition to some extent’ (p. 66). In my own qualitative study (Robson 2004), I found that the 11 participating elite Australian leaders used intuition in decision-making and considered it important to their effectiveness.

Although the authors of these field studies conceptualised and operationalised intuition in different ways (as a cognitive styles, process and outcome, see Table 2.8), they showed that intuition is an important decision-making tool/process for decision makers and leaders in organisations. Despite this, intuition use remains under-valued in management research, particularly in comparison to the plethora of literature and research concerning analytical decision-making techniques (Hammond 1996; Khatri & Ng 2000; Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005).

\textsuperscript{19} Interestingly, Barnard’s understanding was arrived at through his own experience as an executive rather than from formal research - in an era preceding the wide acceptance of interpretivism.
In the mid 1980s there was some indication that this dominance of focus on analysis might shift. Agor (1985) correctly pointed to a surge of interest and research in intuition in organisations, particularly decision-making at the senior level, to which Agor was a major contributor (Agor 1984; Agor 1984; Agor 1985; Agor 1986; Agor 1989a). On the basis of this increased interest and because decision makers clearly used intuition, Agor optimistically predicted intuition would ascend to take its rightful place alongside analysis in business decision-making.

However, studies of managerial intuition slowed to a trickle in subsequent decades (Agor 1984; Harper 1989; Cooksey & Gates 1995; Khatri & Ng 2000). It is presumably this recognition that prompted both Khatri and Ng (2000) and Anderson (1999) to state that field research concerning intuition in management settings was ‘virtually non-existent’ (Khatri & Ng 2000, p. 57). While Khatri and Ng perhaps overstate the deficiency in absolute terms it seems that field research concerning intuition has been considered less important to researchers than to managers and leaders. Table 2.8 (below) displays selected field research concerning intuition use in organisations from Agor in the mid-1980s to my own Honours research in 2004, which was reported in 2006.
Table 2.8: A comparison of selected field research concerning intuition use by executives and leaders in organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>Qual/Quant</th>
<th>Intuition as a concept</th>
<th>Circumstances in which intuition is used</th>
<th>Experience of intuition</th>
<th>Techniques to develop intuition</th>
<th>Relevance of intuition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agor (1984; 1986)</td>
<td>A large study finding that executives use intuition regularly.</td>
<td>Qualitative and quantitative</td>
<td>Fast and accurate right hemisphere brain skill that is not fully understood by science. Insight and gut feel.</td>
<td>Where there is uncertainty, little precedent, limited data, limited time and complexity.</td>
<td>A feeling experienced mentally and physically and emotionally indicating future outcomes.</td>
<td>Taking time to relax, learn to ‘tune in’, learn to value and trust intuition, research intuition, keep a journal.</td>
<td>More important with seniority. Used in conjunction with analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isenberg (1984)</td>
<td>A study looking at the thinking of 12 executives and how they deal with daily problems and strategy.</td>
<td>Qualitative. Utilises interviews and observation.</td>
<td>Non-rational brain skill based on experience. Insight and gut feel.</td>
<td>Where there is ambiguity and complexity.</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Reflection on past decisions, meditation, journal writing, observation of others’ decision-making, taking risks, practice judgements without data, reading about intuition.</td>
<td>Sensing when and where a problem exists, to perform well-learned tasks, to synthesise data and check analyses and bypass in-depth analysis through pattern recognition. Important to daily and long term activity. Used in conjunction with analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.8 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>Qual/Quant</th>
<th>Intuition as a concept</th>
<th>Circumstances in which intuition is used</th>
<th>Experience of intuition</th>
<th>Techniques to develop intuition</th>
<th>Relevance of intuition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mintzberg (1989)</td>
<td>Management is not scientific but complex in reality. Views strategy as irregular and discontinuous. Concludes that decisions are made through both oral communication, analysis and, intuition drawing on tacit knowledge.</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Intuition as a global term for right brain processes that are yet not well understood.</td>
<td>In contemporary complex, uncertain and discontinuous business environments.</td>
<td>Experienced at the physical, mental and emotional level.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Important but contextual. Handles interpersonal relationships through reading body language. Used to synthesise data, diagnose situations and to time decisions. Intuition best used in conjunction with analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parikh, Neubauer and Lank (1994)</td>
<td>Large international survey (1312 managers from nine countries), found that managers used intuition often.</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Indirect perception by way of the unconscious. Multi-level, multi-faceted, multi-dimensional. Cites insight and gut feel.</td>
<td>Used where there is complexity, uncertainty, chaos and confusion.</td>
<td>Indicated at physical, emotional and mental level.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>For managing day-to-day complexity, change, conflict and creativity. Used to choose from alternatives. Important to innovation and in getting a feel for a problem or situation. Eases confusion and chaos. Used to create vision. Used in conjunction with analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.8 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>Qual/Quant</th>
<th>Intuition as a concept</th>
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<th>Techniques to develop intuition</th>
<th>Relevance of intuition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brockmann and Simmonds</td>
<td>Survey of 110 CEOs showed a positive relationship between industry experience and tacit knowledge/ intuition use.</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Used TKI to measure tacit knowledge and MBTI to indicate potential intuition use.</td>
<td>Where decision maker has tacit knowledge of environment and industry. In abstract, ill-defined, uncertain circumstances</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Use of tacit knowledge increases with CEO experience and propensity for intuition. Improves success rate for decisions in unstable environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke and Miller (1999)</td>
<td>Study of 60 senior executives in the USA, solicited practitioner descriptions of intuition use.</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Experience-based subconscious cognitive processing or event.</td>
<td>Used where there is uncertainty, few ‘facts’, where there is urgency and in personnel decisions.</td>
<td>40% reported intuition is based on feelings.</td>
<td>Be more attentive to decisions, reflect on past decisions and challenge decisions that do not feel right. Observe others’ decision-making, meditate and keep a journal.</td>
<td>Used more by those with more experience. Expedites decisions, facilitates personal development and promotes consistency with corporate culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.8 (concluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>Qual/Quant</th>
<th>Intuition as a concept</th>
<th>Circumstances in which intuition is used</th>
<th>Experience of intuition</th>
<th>Techniques to develop intuition</th>
<th>Relevance of intuition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khatri and Ng (2000)</td>
<td>A survey of 1530 senior managers in the USA that found intuitive processes are used often and are positively associated with organisational performance in unstable environments.</td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
<td>Gut feeling based on experience.</td>
<td>Where the environment is unstable, uncertain. Used as a check for quantitative data, where there is urgency and/or no precedent.</td>
<td>Indicated by gut feeling</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Important—especially in unstable environments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarke and Mackaness (2001)</td>
<td>A study using cognitive mapping to isolate intuitive elements within individual decision schemas.</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Intuition used as a means of going beyond the rational data.</td>
<td>Used where there are less facts</td>
<td>Not investigated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Senior managers to use a greater proportion of non-factual information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robson and Miller (2006)</td>
<td>A study of 11 Australian leaders of organisations found that intuition is perceived by participants to be very important to their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Gut feeling based on experience.</td>
<td>Used where there is complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity and for character assessment.</td>
<td>Indicated by feeling at multiple levels - emotional, physical and mental.</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td>Very important to daily decision-making. Used in combination with analysis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The lack of momentum in field studies of intuition use in organisations can be attributed to assumptions about management. The myth that decision makers are purely rational in their decision-making still pervades (Helliar et al. 2005). Where the bounded nature of rationality is acknowledged, analytical processes are perceived to be superior to intuition, which, according to Khatri and Ng, is ‘one of the most basic assumptions about management’ (Khatri & Ng 2000, p. 57). This assumption, according to Caballero and Dickinson, is driven by the need for management outcomes to be controllable and predictable using scientific approaches and techniques, and has thus been labelled ‘Scientific Businessism’ (Caballero & Dickinson 1984, p. 5).

However, I argue the problem is not the felt need for a scientific approach, rather, it is the continued, almost exclusive reliance on absolutist positivist ontological assumptions about the world that still dominates thinking in organisations (Wheatley 1999), scientific research (Goswami 1995) and thinking in general (Zohar 1990). Indeed, I will now argue that the perception that positivistic scientific approaches are superior is also seen in management research in relation to how intuition is investigated and understood.

### 2.13.1 Paradigms and methodology in field studies of intuition

Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) state that the main challenge concerning managerial intuition is to produce theory that is relevant and useful for the business world. While they do acknowledge the value of the existing qualitative research, they claim that interpretive approaches can only produce theory that is of limited value and generalisability ‘at best’ (p. 356). They consequently argue that the goal of organisational science should be to find out ‘how to study this evasive and mostly non-conscious phenomenon objectively using scientific methods’ (p. 354). In other words, they seek to understand intuition through positivist research, under the assumptions of Scientific Realism. It is, therefore, ironic that Sinclair and Ashkanasy reject research using intuitive inductive techniques when clearly they consider intuition use an under-valued aspect of management and seek to promote further understanding of it through their research²⁰.

Interpretivist approaches differ significantly from positivist approaches. Research paradigms can be classified according to the responses given to ontological, epistemological and methodological questions (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Lowe 2002). The answers given in response to these questions have consequences for ways of knowing and ways of being a researcher (Higgs & Titchen

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²⁰ Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) do suggest the inclusion of qualitative techniques in the interests of triangulation. However, it is not clear how these might be handled under positivist assumptions.
Positivist approaches rest on the assumptions of Scientific Realism including notions of researcher objectivity to predict, experiment, observe and generalise about the empirical world. Conversely, interpretivist approaches, founded on idealism, have the goal of interpreting the world through acknowledging and embracing the subjectivity of the researcher, as well as research participants, as conscious and feeling beings (Higgs, Trede & Rothwell 2007). They generally do not seek to claim generalisability.

Instruments developed through positivist approaches such as the indicators of cognitive style can be useful for developing individual awareness and development. However, I argue that to exclude the potential of inductive approaches, particularly, flexible emergent methodologies such as Grounded Theory, is paradigmatic determinism (or paradigm blindness), reductionist, and limits the potential for understanding decision-making in ‘real’ organisational environments that are often characterised by complexity and uncertainty (Parry 1996; Wheatley 1999; Carliopo et al. 2001).

Interpretive approaches are particularly suitable for studying actual decision-making because interpretive paradigm researchers aim to maintain ‘contextual integrity’ (Higgs et al. 2007, p. 39). This is important in management decision-making research where ‘the knowledge needed for problem solving is distributed between the manager’s mind and the surrounding world’ (Kuo 1998, p.89). Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) acknowledged the inseparability of all things in their discussion of philosophical intuition (and by implication the redundancy of the assumption of objectivity) and yet fail to transfer this important notion to their research philosophy.

Examples of the limitations of positivist, quantitative approaches can be seen in studies that attempt to establish a relationship between intuition use and organisational performance in the field. Quantifying intuition is problematic because of the wide range of conceptualisations and because it is a subjective phenomenon. Anderson (2000) and Brockmann and Simmonds (1997) used Jungian archetypes to conceptualise intuition and accordingly operationalise these constructs with the Keegan Type Indicator (KTI) and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), respectively. However, as alluded to earlier, instruments measuring cognitive style indicate intuitive tendencies and not the actual use, nor frequency or quality of intuitive synthesis.

The justification for using instrument MBTI, according to Brockmann and Simmonds (1997), rests on the assumption that if a person has a particular talent, they will be likely to use it. However, this contention ignores other individual considerations such as the depth of experience of a particular decision maker (Sinclair & Ashkanasy 2005) and contextual features, which studies have shown condition the actual use of intuition. These contextual features include, but are not limited to, the type of industry (Parikh et al.
Quantifying organisational performance is also problematic because it can be conceptualised and operationalised in different ways. Anderson (1999), taking a rather narrow and analytical view of performance, uses simple outcome-based financial indicators. Effective managers were deemed to be those that achieved 100% of their ‘profit margin goal’ (p. 57). However, the relationship between effectiveness and achieving the stated goal could be seen as rather tenuous. There may be a range of intervening or confounding variables, both internal and external to the organisation, which would be impossible to control.

Khatri and Ng (2000), on the other hand, offer a more sophisticated, conceptual definition including indicators such as ‘quality of customer services, operating efficiency, public image and goodwill’ (p. 65). However, once again, they are attempting to quantify quality. Measuring quality can only proceed through defining and operationalising constructs, which will inevitably vary depending on the researcher, discipline and the context of the research. As well as reducing the concept and practice of quality to measurable fragments, this process frequently fails to recognise the qualitative and subjective judgements inherent in defining what fragments of quality matter.

Another key limitation of positivist psychological approaches in field research is the failure to account for contextual features. While researchers increasingly attempt to capture emotional states, attitude and disposition (Pacini & Epstein 1999; Sinclair et al. 2002; Sinclair 2003), psychological approaches, by definition, focus on the individual and the intrapersonal rather than interpersonal dynamics and culture, and the impact of these on intuition use in organisations. For example, many studies have identified that intuition is a secret or hidden practice not often disclosed or admitted in organisations (see, for example, Agor 1986; Parikh et al. 1994; Burke & Miller 1999). As will be discussed in the next section, reluctance to disclose intuitions in organisations can have significant consequences yet organisational context has never been the focus of investigations of intuition.

Organisational context was addressed in an exploratory fashion by Agor (1984), however, the approach was deductive in nature. Large numbers of participants were given the same questions in survey form. However, surveys have less flexibility and no interactivity (Neuman 2000), and consequently no facility for the emergence and iterative development of themes. I argue that interpretive approaches are more suited to the study of intuition use in the field. The human, as an instrument, is more able to capture contextual complexity, particularly where there is little known about the research issue.

I agree that any research and focus on intuition is useful and may contribute to our understanding of a phenomenon that has been shown to be used internationally (Agor 1984; Parikh et al. 1994), and is
considered important to the leaders of our largest and most influential organisations (Robson & Miller 2006). The purpose of this research is to identify themes, patterns and trends in the data in order to develop theory about intuition disclosure in organisations. Concurrently, however, it may also be the case that because each individual is unique, each individual may therefore use intuition in ways that are largely unique to their organisational and decision-making contexts. I argue that the practical understanding of intuition use can be better achieved through flexible and emergent qualitative approaches that can account for these dynamics. While findings may not be (mathematically) generalisable, their meanings and implications may be transferable or transportable. Transferability in this study is aided by the inclusion of participants from a wide variety of organisations. This discussion will be elaborated on in the methodology chapter, Chapter 4.

2.14 Contemporary perceptions and attitudes of intuition

In the section on gender and intuition I presented literature and opinion suggesting that, subsequent to the Scientific Revolution, intuition has been considered as inferior. In this section I wish to expand on this theme because, while there is divergence in the definition and interpretation of the word intuition, there is consensus that it has a bad reputation (Bastick 1982; Agor 1984; Agor 1985; Agor 1986; Parikh et al. 1994; Cappon 1994a; Burke & Miller 1999; Lieberman 2000; Sadler-Smith & Shefy 2004; Sadler-Smith & Burke 2009). This is important because in my own study I found that attitudes influence disclosure and therefore the ability to benefit from intuitive ‘knowings’.

Seen as ‘mysterious and unexplainable at best’ and ‘inaccurate, hokey, or epiphenomenal at worst ... the legacy of intuition is less than inspiring’ (Lieberman 2000p. 109). Western culture, in general, has favoured linear, deliberate, and analysable processes to the exclusion of intuition (Agor 1985; Mintzberg 1989; Cappon 1993). The downfall of intuition is, according to Cappon (1993), a consequence of ‘a Western culture obsessed with facts and science’ (p. 41). Ironically, it is also true that many of the world’s most influential scientists have advocated intuition’s importance. For example, Einstein said of intuition:

\[
\text{[T]he intuitive mind is a sacred gift, and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honours the servant, and has forgotten the gift}. \quad \text{(Einstein cited in Vanharanta & Easton 2009, p. 425)}
\]

I interpret Einstein to concur with Burneko (1997), who argued that our contemporary objective, evidence-based, rational, scientific culture disconnects humans from the legitimacy of their own subjectivity and, therefore, the veracity of intuitions (both psychological and philosophical). Burneko claimed that expressions of oneness with the Universe will be ridiculed – treated as irrational, emotional and childlike. As a consequence, Burneko argued, we look to a culture that denies our own subjectivity for making sense of the world and our identity – we have forgotten our gift.
However, cultural assumptions shift across time and space. Sorokin (1992) argued that cultural values in societies swing like a pendulum between rationality/intuitive knowledge and materialistic/spiritual values. He further states that those societies that can achieve a ‘golden mean’, possessing a balance between the two, are the most ‘enlightened’. However, Sorokin, echoing Burneko (1997), argued that societies (as a whole) are not explicitly aware of this oscillation of values that are held as assumptions, and therefore the balance is not sustainable.

While cultural assumptions are fundamental to the perceived inferiority of intuition, at least four other factors may contribute (although they overlap). First, there is the claim that intuition is regarded with scepticism because it is not understood (Sadler-Smith & Shefy 2004) or misunderstood. Agor (1986) acknowledges that intuition has been presented in a negative light. He suggests that if intuition were thought of as a ‘subspecies of logical thinking’ (p. 5), it would be more accepted. However, as discussed, early psychological research portrayed intuition as biased, unreliable and a hazard.

No one can read through the literature of social psychology from the 1960s through to the 1980s without drawing the conclusion that intuition is a hazard, a process not to be trusted, not only because it is inherently flawed by ‘biases’ but because the person who resorts to it is innocently and sometimes arrogantly overconfident when employing it. (Hammond 1996, p. 88)

However, it is difficult to know how much impact the heuristics and biases program may have had on discourse in organisations because research specifically focusing on decision maker’s perceptions of intuition use in organisations does not exist.

In the previous section I suggested that Barnard’s (1968) The Functions of the Executive was the first book\textsuperscript{21} acknowledging the role of intuition in management. Although it was written in a style that could be considered accessible for mainstream management and leadership practitioners at that time\textsuperscript{22} it was not a popular book in terms of readership. Business/management books offering alternative views on intuitive capacity did not appear, to any significant extent, until after 1980. Simon (1982) for example, drew on and extended Barnard’s work in terms of the concept of bounded rationality. Srivastva (1983) produced an edited book that included notable authors such as Kolb (1983), Weick (1983), Bennis (1983) Mintzberg and Waters (1983) and Agryis (1983). However, it was Agor (1984; 1986; 1989b), particularly

\textsuperscript{21} More specifically, it was the appendix to Barnard’s book (The Mind in Everyday Affairs) that was of direct relevance to intuition and its use in organisations.

\textsuperscript{22} Barnard did not solely focus on intuition. He included a broad sweep of many aspects of management and organisations. In particular, he was considered visionary for his views on organisations as cooperative systems.

Well-renowned management expert Mintzberg (1989) produced *Mintzberg on management: Inside our strange world of organizations*, which clearly identified the disjuncture between assumptions of rationality and the reality of management and decision-making in organisations. Taking an integrative and comprehensive approach, Parikh et al. (1994) drew from Eastern and Western perspectives as well as positivist psychology and New Science in *Intuition: The new frontier of management*. From this summary it can be seen that the availability of management literature addressing and explaining intuition, and its role in decision-making in leadership, has increased over previous decades.

Despite claims every decade that intuition is a concept that has ‘come of age’ (Agor 1984; Cappon 1994b; and most recently Knight 2007) it is not clear if the pendulum is swinging back towards belief in the veracity of intuitive knowledge. Some support for this proposition can be found in the amount of literature now available. A plethora of books were published extolling the virtues of intuition in management around the turn of the century and particularly subsequent to it (for example see Contino 1996; Morató 2000; Wanless 2002; Robinson 2006; Tesolin 2006) including a ‘blockbuster’ from well known CEO Jack Welch with the indicative title *Jack: Straight from the Gut* (Welch & Byrne 2001). In addition, academics that I have drawn on in this literature review have capitalised on their research programs by producing a number of popular management and business books, which focus on intuition (Epstein 1998; Klein 2003; Gigerenzer 2004; Sadler-Smith 2008).

There are also less academically-informed, popular books such as those from Day (1999), Tribodeau (2005) and Pierce (1997), which are more concerned with practical techniques for awakening intuition. A multitude of books, over many decades, have drawn on Eastern philosophy and are aimed at those seeking to transcend the mundane (see, for example, Govinda 1959; Krishnamurti 1964; Krishnamurti 1995; Osho 2001) in relation to philosophical or spiritual intuition. Some books cover a range of or a combination or range of conceptions of intuition including psychological, philosophical and psychic intuition (Naparstek 1997). Clearly, in the 21st century, there is no lack of choice for those interested in gaining a greater understanding on intuition.

While the availability of literature has perhaps raised the profile of intuition in the public mind, it was Malcolm Gladwell’s (2006) major international best seller *Blink* that brought intuition firmly into mainstream popular reading. Gladwell is a journalist rather than an academic and has been criticised for making a variety of mistakes and unsupported assumptions in his presentation of the evidence (Posner 2005). However, *Blink*, used storytelling and a popular-science format to deliver information about intuition in a way that was accessible and entertaining to great numbers of people.
Gladwell (2006) may well have been influential in mitigating the negative connotations associated with the word ‘intuition’, and in doing so, may have made an impact on organisational cultures that are reliant on ‘extensively quantified procedures’ and ‘hard facts and tough analysis’ (Parikh et al. 1994, p. 11). However, this is difficult to assess because, as stated, and, significant to the research problem that will be established, research that focuses on perceptions of intuition in organisations is non-existent.

A second consideration contributing to scepticism concerning intuition is its elusive, subconscious nature. Both gut feeling and insight (expert and entrepreneurial intuition), as intuitive cognitive processes, operate almost entirely below the level of awareness (Cappon 1994b; Khatri & Ng 2000) and, therefore, beyond the control of the intuiter (Epstein 1998; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007). People who rely substantively on the use of intuition (‘intuitives’) are often not able to explain how they arrived at their conclusion. While evidence may be sought to confirm or support intuitions, this may not always be possible. For these reasons, particularly coupled with the first point made in this section – that intuition has not been well understood – intuition is seen as rather mysterious and even magical. Trusting unverifiable intuitions would not be consistent with the prevailing scientific, evidence-based management paradigm that underpins decision-making in most organisations (Parikh et al. 1994; Cappon 1994a).

A third consideration concerns the connotations that might be attached to the word intuition that stem from associations with philosophical intuition and ‘enlightenment’. As a subjective, direct access to perfect knowledge, such intuition is experienced as transcending the everyday subject/object divide, where the ego dissolves and the individual feels at one with the universe (Vaughan 1979; Wilber 1995). Although I have proposed a basis by which philosophical intuition can be justified, for most Westerners educated under the assumptions of Scientific Realism (Osbeck 1999), this description would appear esoteric and mystical (Vaughan 1979), and would, therefore, likely arouse scepticism. Fourth, as discussed, pejorative connotations of intuition can be ascribed to associations with ESP and the paranormal (Agor 1986; Behling & Eckel 1991; Parikh et al. 1994; Osbeck 1999; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007).

I suggest that any one of the four factors discussed above, or a combination of them, has the potential to contribute to the apparent widespread notion that intuition is error prone, esoteric, magical, mystical and not to be trusted. However, no research, to date, has focused specifically on the perceptions of decision makers in organisations with regard to the validity and legitimacy of intuition as a decision-making tool. I argue that such research is needed because negative perceptions of intuition have been shown to modify the behaviour of those that have them (Robson 2004). The impact of negative perceptions toward intuition will now be explored.
2.15 The impact of negative perceptions concerning intuition

It is not surprising considering the nature, reputation and lack of understanding about intuition that Cappon (1993) argued that executives find it difficult to ‘sell’ intuitive decisions. It has been noted in field research that decision makers tend not to disclose their use of intuition in organisations. Thus, intuition is understood as a secret or undisclosed practice (Agor 1984; Isenberg 1984; Agor 1986; Harper 1989; Parikh et al. 1994; Cappon 1994a; Burke & Miller 1999; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007), although Parikh et al. (1994) suggested that this may be changing. Managers may suffer cognitive dissonance as a result of the tension between the way they perceive they are supposed to make decisions and the processes they have learned through experience (Isenberg 1984). An exclusive focus on analysis may stem from training and tradition and a lack of faith in their intuitions or the fear of being ridiculed by their peers (Agor 1984; Robson 2004).

Consequently, managers may actively modify the way they disclose the basis for their decisions in order for them to be more acceptable to colleagues, superiors and stakeholders (Daft & Lengel 1986; Sadler-Smith & Shefy 2004; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007). This was been found in my own research (Robson 2004) in Australia, as well as internationally (Agor 1984; Harper 1989). For example, Agor (1984) found that executives, fearing intuition would be regarded as non-scientific, irrational and illegitimate, said they would commonly ‘dress up’ their intuitive decisions in ‘analytical clothing’ (p. 38). Furthermore, a perceived culture of intolerance toward intuition may cause individuals to suppress them (Cappon 1994a).

According to Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) ‘the danger is that, if intuition is continually suppressed, it may cease to operate, or be driven underground’ (p. 80). This is because the use of intuition occurs only where it is given legitimacy and valued (Vaughan 1979). However, a lack of intuition in decision-making can lead to serious and costly errors (Grudin 1989). For example, executives and leaders of organisations reported that many of their mistakes were primarily due to not following their intuitions rather than to following them (Robson 2004).

The consequences for the individual of not following their intuitions can be devastating. For example, my previous research (Robson 2004) into the use of intuition by ‘elite’ Australian leaders revealed a reluctance to follow an intuition regarding the trustworthiness of the individuals presenting a rescue proposal to a large company in financial difficulties. The deal was accepted on the basis of the analysis presented, however, later collapsed through subsequent actions of the individuals in question, vindicating the intuition of the participant. The collapse of the deal affected the lives of thousands of people, cost millions of dollars and many jobs. The words of the participant reveal his perception that others would think him irrational if he disclosed his intuition:
But I would have to have gone to XXX and say, look, all of it looks good on paper and the objective facts are that we've got to support this position – but having looked at all of that and on the basis of my experience and my intuition about these people, I don't think it's the right thing for us. They would have said, go and have fucking counselling will you. (Robson 2004, p. 83)

Agor (1985) stated ‘that the 1980s may well become known as the benchmark period in management history when intuition finally gained acceptance’ (p. 357). Similarly, Naisbitt and Aburdene (1985) predicted that intuition will gain acceptance in boardrooms. However, it is difficult to come to a conclusion regarding perception of, and attitudes to, intuition because of the lack of research and literature.

That intuition is, or was, deemed illegitimate is sometimes implicit and appears to be taken for granted. For example, journal articles with titles such as *Legitimizing the gut feel: the role of intuition in business* (Lank & Lank 1995), and business magazine articles with titles such as *Intuition creeps out of the closet and into the boardroom* (Block 1990), do not explain why intuition is illegitimate or why it has been in the closet. The focus for research and literature consistently targets the nature, use and utility of intuition. This is despite the recognition of the importance of socio-cultural factors in relation to intuition use in organisations (Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007) and recommendations for future research in this area (Burke & Miller 1999).

There has been some research into the subjective perceptions of practitioners in terms of what intuition is, how and in what circumstances it is used, as well as its perceived efficacy. However, this research is minimal, particularly in the Australian context. Moreover, no research found, to date, looked at the context in terms of attitudes and perceptions of intuition, and how these impact on decision-making and judgement in contemporary organisations. I would argue that this is a significant omission. If individuals and organisations wish to profit from the benefits of intuition there must be a greater understanding of the process by which intuition is masked, suppressed or forced under ‘underground’, and the extent to which it occurs. I argue that the investigation of the social processes that surround the use and disclosure of intuition would best examine the perceptions and attitudes of leaders because leaders are pivotal in forming the cultural practices of organisations (Mintzberg 1989; Sarros & Butchatsky 1996; Dubrin et al. 2006; Gill 2006).

### 2.16 Research problem

A review of field studies into intuition use in organisations has shown that intuition is used and considered a valuable tool/process by decision makers in organisations. However, some of these studies also found that decision makers do not disclose their own use of intuition; rather, they keep it a secret or mask its role. However, no empirical research found, to date, addressed this ‘silent’ use of intuition.
In view of the discussed importance of transparency in organisational decision-making, coupled with the stated need for research concerning socio-cultural processes surrounding intuition use, the social processes of intuition use and disclosure in organisations has been justified as important to investigate. The core research problem addressing these gaps in extant knowledge can be expressed as:

**What are the social processes of intuition use and disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?**

The core research problem can be divided into two main research questions/parts.

The first research question addressed how participants defined, described, used and valued intuition (if they do use intuition).

**Main Question 1: How do the participants (organisational leaders) interpret, use and value intuition in their decision-making and leadership?**

The second research question directly addresses the disclosure (or non-disclosure) of intuition use:

**Main Question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?**

This division also reflects the need to first understand how participants interpret intuition in their own terms as well as how they perceive the role it plays in their decision-making and leadership before investigating issues relating to disclosure. This dual structure of the main research questions will be echoed in the way the findings are presented in Chapter 5: Analyses and Theory Development.

In the interests of intelligibility, the two main research questions are further divided, representing a drill-down exploration of key facets of each question. The first drill-down exploration within the first main question focuses on how participants defined and described intuition. This was considered important to understand given the many definitions discussed in the literature review.

- Drill down exploration 1.1: How do the participants interpret, (define and describe) intuition(s)?

The second drill-down exploration reflects the identified need for a greater understanding of the way intuition is used in the field, particularly in the Australian context. Moreover, an understanding of how participants use intuition is seen as linked to their interpretation of it, as well as the value they ascribe to its use:

- Drill-down exploration 1.2: How do participants use intuition(s) and what significance and value do the participants ascribe to their use of intuition(s) in judgement, decision-making and leadership?
Note that although participants were initially asked open questions regarding how they defined and used intuition, some of the subsequent probes pertaining to this theme were derived from the literature (pursuant to Adaptive Theory\textsuperscript{23} which will be explained and justified in Chapter 4). The approach was therefore deductive and confirmatory as well as inductive and oriented to discovery. The understanding gained from addressing the first drill-down exploration is seen as critical in developing a foundation against which the second main research question, concerning the disclosure of intuition, could be juxtaposed.

This second main research question is further subdivided into three drill-down explorations. The literature review indicated that intuition has had a bad reputation. However, no research was found that investigated perceptions of intuition in terms of legitimacy. The first drill-down exploration of the second main research question addresses this gap in the knowledge:

- Drill-down exploration 2.1: What are the views and perceptions of participants about receptivity to, and the legitimacy of, intuition(s) in judgements and decision-making in their organisations?

The second drill-down exploration is aimed at discovering if intuition use is disclosed in organisations and, if so, what words do the participants perceive are used to represent the use of intuition or to mask the role of intuition in organisations:

- Drill-down exploration 2.2: What language is used in relation to intuition(s) by participants and those with whom they associate?

Consistent with the tenets of discovery in Grounded Theory, the final drill-down exploration emerged as a consequence of the iterative process of interview and analysis. In the pilot interviews, the ‘experience’ of intuition was raised as an issue and the schedule was modified. Over the course of the first phase of interviews I discovered that the women in the sample were more willing and able to articulate their internal experience of intuitive process or ‘getting’/receiving an intuition. As a consequence, further focus was given to the participants’ internal experience of intuition, as well as their awareness of, and ability to articulate intuitions were asked of all the remaining respondents. This line of questioning can be reflected as:

- Drill-down exploration 2.4: How easily are participants able to articulate their intuition(s) and experience of intuition?

\textsuperscript{23} Adaptive Theory (Layder 1993; Layder 1998), unlike other variants of Grounded Theory, acknowledges the use of extant literature to inform questions and analysis.
2.17 Conclusion

A critical interdisciplinary review of the literature has revealed a variety of diverse constructs attached to the label ‘intuition’. In philosophy, intuition is considered a direct apprehension of perfect knowledge of an ultimate reality. Psychological constructions characterise intuition as useful but fallible spontaneous feeling/knowing based on experience (gut feeling and insight), heuristics that are untrustworthy because they can induce biases, and visceral influences that can lead to decisions and behaviour that undermine long-term self interest. Intuition is also discussed as a process and in terms of cognitive style. I have argued that these constructions should not be seen as competing and incompatible. I further argue against the quest for a single, clear-cut definition. Intuition can instead be conceptualised as a multi-dimensional and multi-level phenomenon that manifests in different ways under different conditions. Moreover, constructions of intuition vary according to nature and method of research and the predispositions of researchers. I have proposed a model of cognition whereby each of these psychological constructs of intuition can be ordered in relation to one another as different manifestations of the totality of cognition. Moreover, I have argued that this part/whole relationship is facilitated by the interaction of the experiential and rational cognitive systems. Thus, cognition can be seen as a paradoxical and dialogic synthesis of these systems that are oppositional yet complementary, the dominance and efficacy of which is determined in relation to the nature of the task at hand.

The disjuncture between philosophical intuition as ineffable and infallible knowledge, and psychological intuition as fallible is seldom addressed. However, I have interpreted that philosophical and psychological constructs of intuition can be reconciled through a transcendent stratified yet unified field of ground consciousness, in which all else is enfolded. I proposed that intuition can be seen as a multi-level phenomenon. Whereas psychological intuition is based in personal, individual consciousness, philosophical intuition is a non-dual awareness where the individual/universal, subject/object split is transcended in co-presence. Philosophical intuition is thus, transpersonal.

Studies of managerial intuition in organisations tend to focus on the nature and efficacy of psychological intuition (gut feeling), and investigating how and in which circumstances it is used. Researching these issues is useful and important, however, this knowledge of intuition is inadequate if its application in the real world and, more specifically, the social context in which it operates is not understood. I have discussed research that shows intuitions are routinely masked and suppressed by actors in organisations. I have also given an example from my own Honours research where this felt inability to disclose an intuitive feeling has lead to significant human and financial cost. However, the social processes in relation to the disclosure of intuition(s) have never been empirically investigated in Australia or internationally. I have argued this is a significant omission. The research problem presented
can be seen as a guide for the empirical component of this study, and as a response to addressing the gaps identified in the literature review, in terms of use and disclosure of intuition(s).

Such an investigation of the ‘real world’ cannot occur under artificial and contrived research designs. I have argued that theory is more likely to emerge from data drawn from investigating the perceptions of decision makers in the field, using a flexible methodology that tolerates complexity, ambiguity, contradiction and paradox. What is required is an approach to data gathering and analysis that is inductive and deductive as well as reflexive, and one that facilitates the emergence and discovery of theory based in the data in order to further the research agenda. This reflects a realisation that there have been inherent constraints associated with the typically positivistic, deductive and highly controlled ways in which research on intuition has been theorised and conducted. The critical point is that research has to connect directly with decision makers in their myriad contexts in order to achieve a more complete understanding of intuition, its use and the disclosure/non-disclosure of that use.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Perspective

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, in an inclusive and broad approach to the phenomenon of intuition, I outlined, compared and contrasted various historical and contemporary philosophical and psychological perspectives on intuition. I proposed an interpretation of how perspectives could be integrated and synthesised. The model I proposed synthesised Epstein’s (1990) notion of dual cognitive systems under CEST and Hammond’s (1996) Cognitive Continuum, which incorporated Lowenstein’s (1996) visceral factors as well as heuristics and biases (Kahneman et al. 1982). I argued that an inclusive view had more to offer in terms of a comprehensive account of cognition and judgement. I also proposed an extension of Hendon’s (2004) multi-level reconciliation of psychological and philosophical intuition through a meta-reality of ground consciousness. The advantage of these integrative theoretical models is that they distinguish between the multiplicities of conceptualisations of intuition, and yet allows them to be understood and ordered in relation to one another. These theoretical models of intuition serve as a basis from which this research can proceed.

The overarching aim of this chapter is to present, explain and justify the use of Layder’s Domain Theory (Layder 1994; Layder 1997; Layder 2005) as a fitting theoretical perspective and a model of social reality by which the findings of this social research can be analysed, interpreted, contextualised and understood. A model of social reality is necessary because the focus of the research is not on intuition itself but on the social processes that surround the disclosure of intuition use. In order to achieve this aim, the chapter focuses on three tasks. The first is to show how Domain Theory draws on and synthesises other social theorists to achieve a more comprehensive explanation of social behaviour and communicative exchange. This will be done through a critique of the work of a number of major social theorists and an examination of the advantages of a synthetic approach (according to Layder).

The second task is to show that Layder’s theory of domains is specifically appropriate to this study because its stratified ontology allows for a multi-level framework of social reality, including objective and subjective elements, and four different levels of social description. I will argue that it is through this stratification that the research problem can be more comprehensively addressed. The importance of stratification rests on the acknowledgement that while intuition can be seen as an intrapersonal phenomenon, the focus of the research is the disclosure and affirmation of intuition, which can be seen as occurring at interpersonal, organisational, and environmental levels.

The third task will be to argue that this stratified approach is consistent and congruent with the philosophical stance proposed in Chapter 2.
3.2 Domain Theory

Cooksey (2001) provides a valuable insight into the nature of how organisations operate at a human level. He argued, from a complexity science perspective, that understanding individual behaviour is complex in organisations. This is partly because organisational systems are in a constant state of flux in response to contextual factors or system dynamism, and also because organisations can be seen as multi-dimensional and multi-level – systems within systems. Cooksey therefore argued that there should be ‘multi-dimensional diversity’ (p. 77) in terms of thinking and conceptualising as well as a paradigm diversity in approaches to research.

Kuhn (1962) originally used the term ‘paradigm’ in reference to the ‘constellation of achievements – concepts, values, techniques etc. shared by a scientific community and used by that community to define legitimate problems and solutions’ (p. 44). The paradigm from which any research is conducted has implications for how data are to be collected and interpreted, and informs the researcher about which designs are likely to provide answers to the research issues or questions. It may also guide the researcher, when it is necessary, to create or modify research designs (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002) and thus provide some assistance and solace to the researcher.

The historic dominance of the positivistic ‘paradigm’ and the consequent absence of paradigm diversity in the psychological, behavioural and social sciences is well known and previously alluded to in Chapter 2. The development of interpretive and critical research traditions has challenged the dominance of positivism and offer researchers alternatives. However, the problem is that each of these alternatives constitutes a paradigm (Cooksey 2001), which ‘generate[s] boundaries that are largely impenetrable to other perspectives’ (p. 83). This is because the nature of scientific inquiry is rooted in justification, whereby these paradigms must be ‘robust against contradictory evidence’ (ibid), and therefore largely incommensurable with other paradigms.

For those who regard sociology as a broad, all encompassing inquiry, these paradigmatic boundaries are a problem for developing social theory. C. Wright Mills, for example, defined the sociological imagination as having ‘the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations (referring here to macrological and societal aspects) to the most intimate features of the human self – and to see the relations between the two’ (Mills 1959, p. 7). Habermas (1987) considered the

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24 Cooksey (2001) unpacked cross-contextual complexity in terms of intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and environmental levels.
integration of macrological and micrological, roughly equated here with the two domains of Lifeworld and System, as the most fundamental problem of social theory.

Layder (2005) argued that traditional approaches to social theory and research tend to emphasise one aspect of society over another. Social analysis featuring emphasis on the agency of the actor, where social activity is an inter-subjective phenomenon, can be seen in interpretive approaches such as symbolic interactionism, hermeneutics and phenomenology. On the other hand, macrological institutional and systemic approaches such as functionalism, structuralism and post-structuralism are concerned with identifying and analysing the underlying systemic, institutional and structural features of society in explaining behaviour (Giddens 1984; Layder 1997; Outhwaite 2003). Given that each aspect has a valuable contribution to make, in terms of descriptive and explanatory power, social phenomena will be inappropriately attributed, compressed or expanded to fit (collapsing or ‘conflating’ structure and agency), ignored, or rendered invisible or silent if there is an exclusive focus on one level over another (Layder 1997; Hartman 2005).

On this basis I argue there is a need for a theoretical framework that is capable of tolerating a multi-paradigmatic approach to social research, which includes the value of each without the distorting constraints of remaining dogmatically faithful to the ideology of a singular sociological standpoint. Multi-paradigmatic approaches to research promote increased insight and creativity as a consequence of a wider cache of conceptual tools. Eclectic use of diverse theoretical views facilitates a better understanding of the complexity, ambiguity, and paradox inherent in organisations (Lewis & Grimes 1999).

Domain Theory is an attempt to break down these paradigmatic boundaries and integrate them by drawing on and synthesising a number of social theories including functionalism, interpretivism, structural, post-structural and critical. Domain Theory advances a theoretical perspective capable of facilitating analysis at multiple levels by way of four separate but interlocking ‘domains’ of social description. The advantage of a multi-dimensional and multi-paradigmatic approach to social analysis is that the strengths of each contributing perspective can be harnessed for a more comprehensive account of social reality (Layder 1994; Layder 1997; Hartman 2005; Layder 2005).

The central focus of Layder’s theory is to provide an explanatory account of face-to-face encounters. However Layder (2005) argued that face-to-face encounters can only be understood in terms of how this interpersonal domain intersects with other social domains. Layder’s Domain Theory is therefore an excellent theoretical framework for the current study because while it focuses on the interpersonal level of exchange, the disclosure of intuition is contextualised by a view of organisations as multi-
dimensional. This is done through embracing the analytical insights that each paradigm has to offer – the ‘combined influence of both social and psychological factors’ (Layder 1997, p. 1).

Below is a summary of the domains and the social dimensions they represent:

• **Psychobiography** – the inner life of the individual including unconscious aspects
• **Situated Activity** – communicative interchanges between participants that take place in social situations
• **Settings** – where situated activity takes place including geographical locations, buildings, and organisational features such as reproduced social relations and practices, norms and social rules
• **Contextual Resources** – material, dominoative and discursive resources drawn on by individuals to produce their social behaviour

(Adapted from Layder 1997, p. 33)

These domains correspond to Cooksey’s (2001) intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and environmental levels. I have chosen to embrace Layder’s (1997) model rather than Cooksey’s because of its well-developed explication and incorporation of social theory, which will become apparent when I examine the domains in more detail later in the chapter. However, before proceeding to discuss Layder’s multi-level and multi-paradigmatic solution, I wish to first make the limitations of current stand-alone approaches clear.

3.3 The problem with current stand-alone approaches

Both structuralists and post-structuralists can be accused of attributing the micrological world of everyday experience to external macrological forces. For example, the term ‘false consciousness’ was used by Engels to denote ways of thinking promoted by institutional processes that mislead the proletariat in relation to opportunities for upward mobility (Marx & Engels 1951; Grabb 1997). Similarly, post-structuralists focused on ‘deconstructing meanings in taken-for-granted language’ (Hartman 2005, p. 31), which render the individual oblivious to the influence of discourse and discursive practices of governments and institutions.

Foucault (1979), for example, used Bentham’s panoptical prison design to illustrate his concept of ‘technologies of the self’, and a pre-modern to modern shift from the physical to the psychological in the application of discipline by institutions. Bentham’s ‘all seeing’ panoptical prison design features cells that are arranged in an arc around a central point (where a guard may be stationed) so that prisoners are potentially visible. Consequently, prisoners tend to behave as though they are visible and thus internalise the gaze of authority (Foucault 1979).
Although this example is compelling, Layder (1997) argued that structural and systemic factors such as the distribution and ‘ownership of cultural, material and authoritative resources’ (p. 4) do not wholly determine the psychologies and subjectivities of individuals nor entirely characterise their communicative exchanges and interactions. He argued that macrological and micrological concerns are deeply inter-connected, interweave and overlap, however, they cannot be reduced to one another.

A critical point for Layder, and one that he repeatedly makes, is that each realm or domain has its own independent properties, dimensions and distinctive characteristics (which will be explored further in the next section). Layder therefore stresses the recognition of the coherence and integrity of each to prevent the unwarranted prioritising of one domain over another (Layder 1997). Layder facilitated this separateness/relatedness duality through his stratified ontology and a stance of moderate objectivism informed by Critical Realism, which will now be explored.

### 3.4 Layder’s Stratified Solution

Layder’s (1997; 2005) principal concern was one of a more inclusive and comprehensive account of communication, actions and interactions in the social world through the reconciliation and integration of interpretive, structural and post-structural approaches, which are represented by separate but interlocking ontological domains. In order to achieve this, Layder, informed by critical realist Bhaskar (1978; 2002) (discussed in Chapter 2), adopted a stratified ontological position of ‘moderate’ objectivism. Here, Layder meant that social reality is constituted by objective and subjective elements of mutual influence that are conditioned by systemic phenomena. This is an acknowledgement of Habermas’ (1987) fundamental ontological division, represented by System and Lifeworld, and a switch in viewpoint from the subjectivity of the individual to the detached position of the objective observer of societal systems. ‘To say that phenomena possess objective characteristics implies they have properties that cannot be explained simply in terms of the conduct of individuals or specific encounters between people’ (Layder 1997, p. 9).

Moderate objectivism allows the researcher to be sensitive to, and account for, objective and subjective elements of the social phenomenon being investigated. The important corollary of this is the ability to

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25 This use of the word ‘ontology’ is inconsistent with Crotty’s (1998) view. As discussed in Chapter 2, ontology refers to the nature of being and, in the case of the Idealism/Realism debate, the existence or not of reality outside the mind. According to Crotty, to use the word ontology concerning the nature of social reality is ‘unexceptional’ but no longer ontology in the ‘philosophical sense’ (p. 11) but rather roughly corresponds to theoretical perspective or how one views the world.
reject the naive subjectivism that cannot reach beyond subjective and intersubjective ‘Verstehen’ and, conversely, the attribution of subjectivity to structure (Layder 1997; Layder 1998). Although Layder’s model entails four ontological domains he used Habermas’ (1987) concepts of Lifeworld (everyday world of actions and interactions of an individual) and System (the reproduced institutional features of society external to the Lifeworld such as organisations) as meta-domains. This is a division which, according to Layder, ‘penetrates into the heart of social reality’ (Layder 1997, p. 100). Layder’s motivation for this strategy was to avoid the paradigmatic boundaries of stand-alone approaches and their limitations.

The concepts of System and Lifeworld can be seen as a step toward reconciling fundamentally opposing approaches, however, there are varying degrees of agreement between Layder (1997), Habermas (1987) and Giddens (1984) in terms of the way these divisions are ordered. While there is concurrence for Layder and Habermas that System and Lifeworld can be seen as mutually influential, according to Layder, Habermas regards System and Lifeworld as too mutually exclusive, ‘as if the two had ‘lives’ of their own’ (Layder 1997, p. 78). Justification for Layder’s assertion can be seen in Habermas’ notion of a continual encroachment of System (in terms of capitalist structures) into the Lifeworld as pathological and unnatural. Layder therefore envisions a much more unitive relationship where the term ‘encroachment’ would be rendered obsolete – in that something cannot encroach on itself.

This problem of separateness/relatedness is fundamental to Layder’s Domain theory, and also to other dualisms such as part/whole, individual/collective, and mind/body. For something to be one thing and yet, at the same time, something else, appears somewhat paradoxical. Layder’s (1997) identification of both the problem and the solution is critical because it provides the philosophical foundation that allowed him to integrate the oppositional ontological positioning embedded in them.

In terms of the corollary of System and Lifeworld, Layder’s (1997) ontological approach can best be illuminated through its comparison with that of Giddens’ (1984) concepts of structure and agency. Whereas Layder and Habermas pointed to an actual ontological difference between System and Lifeworld (Layder 1997), Giddens, as a consequence of his structurated rather than stratified ontology, approached this division as purely methodological. I argue that this distinction has important consequences - first, in providing an opportunity to clarify the ontological positioning that underpins the interlocking nature of Layder’s domains and, second, to demonstrate its congruence with the

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26 The German word Verstehen can be directly translated as ‘understand’. However Layder (1997; 1998) draws on the Interpretive sociological tradition. In this context Verstehen is understood as a meaningful, empathetic understanding through putting yourself in the shoes of others to see things from their perspective (Martin 2000).
stratification of individual/ground consciousness that was proposed in my interpretation of how psychological and philosophical intuition can be reconciled.

In Chapter 2, I showed that some theorists regard matter to be, at the fundamental level, ground consciousness. Matter (biological) has evolved to the point where it produces individual consciousness via the human brain. Individual consciousness is therefore ultimately ground consciousness at a different level of description. In contrast, Giddens’ (1984) Structuration Theory proposes a view of structure and agency as irreconcilable oppositions, like two sides of the same coin or the magnetic poles of the Earth (Layder 1997).

Willmott (1999) argued that Giddens’ (1984) approach results in conflating structure and agency, fusing them ‘into one tightly-constituted amalgam’ (1999, p. 7), and that this approach can be considered a response to the legacy of Cartesian dualism that separates body and mind. By way of an analogy, Willmott suggests there are two ‘doors’ that provide an escape from ‘Descartes’ Error’ (Damasio 1994) and, in my opinion, he correctly argued that Giddens has departed through the wrong one. According to Wilmott, Giddens’ structurated solution makes distinguishing between, making sense of and, consequently, giving weightings to the importance of the different characteristics of structure and agency (objective and subjective elements) impossible when using this model for social analysis (Layder 1997; Willmott 1999; Hartman 2005).

Providing a superior solution to the problem, Layder (1997) acknowledged the influence of critical realist Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic ontological approach. According to Archer, structure and agency each have their own emergent properties – and, moreover, one cannot be reduced to the other. Analytic dualism posits the social world as stratified, with structures and actions that can only be distinguished over time. For Willmott (1999) analytic dualism, as a solution to the Cartesian mind/body schism, also posits mind as emergent from the brain. The advantage of analytical dualism for Layder is that social reality can then be seen as textured, interwoven, layered and stratified27 – where structure can be seen as emergent from agency but not reducible to it (Layder 1997; Willmott 1999; Hartman 2005). Layder’s basic ontological distinction is that Lifeworld and System should be considered as an ‘overlapping dualism’ (such as individual and ground consciousness) and not a ‘unitary duality’ as proposed by Giddens (Layder 1997, p. 109).

I interpret this to mean that Layder’s (1997) domains do not compete with each other and extend beyond complementing each other. It is through their difference that they, and the larger whole, come

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27 This is a description not dissimilar from Cooksey’s ‘Tapestry of complexity science’ (Cooksey 2001, p. 78).
into being. Just as one does not fully know the meaning of health until one has been sick, the domains mutually define each other through a dialogic process (rather than a dialectic one) as explicated by Bakhtin (1981) and Jabri (2005). For example, Bhaskar (1978) argued that it is the social structures and institutions that we actively participate in, reproducing actions through tacit pre-conditions, which paradoxically facilitates our agency. For example, a good education gained through institutional structures teaches us that we cannot only extend knowledge but can partially or wholly reject it, which, I would argue, is the hallmark of a good PhD thesis. Thus, for Layder, social reality is constituted and reconstituted through ongoing dialogistic processes²⁸.

This overlapping dialogic dualism, which is the essence of Layder’s (1997) stratified ontology, is consistent with a variety of historical and contemporary thought. For example Heraclitus suggested that ‘[A]ll things come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of things flows like a stream’ (cited in Laertius 1931, p. 415). This dialogic interaction can also be seen in the notion of Hegelian process of evolution through thesis and anti-thesis (Soll 1969), and the interaction of the intuitive and experiential cognitive systems displayed in Figure 2.2. Moreover, it is not dissimilar to the notion of unity through separation that underpins Derrida’s (1982) concept of différance that will be employed in Chapter 6.

### 3.4 Layder’s Domains

The advantage of Layder’s (1997) Domain Theory over other approaches is that it is able to draw and integrate a number of social theories, both micrological and macrological, as a consequence of a multi-layered philosophical approach to social reality. Therefore Domain Theory can be considered a particularly useful theoretical perspective for the current study because it has the potential to draw on multiple perspectives and sociological lenses in order to tease out the complex dynamics associated with the research problem at different levels of social description. The following paragraphs will outline the various domains in more detail as well as the social relations, power and practices that circulate and connect these domains (represented diagrammatically in Figure 3.1 below).

However, it would be impossible, within the constraints of this thesis, to exhaustively examine the complexities and intricacies of Layder’s work, which has progressed over decades. Indeed Layder’s product is a synthesis of the most influential social theorists including Foucault, Habermas, Goffman and Parsons. Moreover, the theory is flexible and malleable to the extent that it can accommodate the work

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²⁸ Building on the idea of liberating structures Torbert (1978) and Higgs (1993) developed a model of liberating program systems that has relevance to this debate. In this model individuals can act as purposive agents (or subsystems) within program systems (such as operate in organisations) and demonstrate personal agency, as well as co-constructing the system in which they are acting.
of yet more theorists should the need arise\textsuperscript{29}. In this sense, Domain Theory is principally a framework by which other theories can be held together to suit different research foci and contexts without contradiction. The aim of this section is to provide a map of Layder’s explication of the characteristics and features of each of the domains and their connections.

**Figure 3.1: Layder’s Domains**

Adapted from Layder (1997, p. 78)

**Lifeworld Elements**

**Psychobiography – (Intra-personal\textsuperscript{30})**

The psychobiography of an individual can be considered the inner life that is shaped by external events and their personality as they move through their day-to-day life, termed a ‘subjective career’ (Layder 1997, p. 47). Layder drew on the ideas of early symbolic interactionists Mead (1967) and Blumer (1969) about self and identity. As opposed to animals, humans are able to apprehend a separation from the external world and represent aspects of it (including the self) abstractly and symbolically. Consequently, humans are able to manipulate their environment in a way that animals cannot – although this has recently come under much scrutiny (see Santos, Pearson, Spaepen, Tsao & Hauser 2006; Martin-Ordas, 2006).

\textsuperscript{29} For example, Feminist Critical Theory will be adopted invoked in Chapter 6 to contextualise the findings.

\textsuperscript{30} The labels given in parentheses are the ones I have used in Chapter 4 (*Analyses & Theory Development*).
Call & Colmenares 2008; Taylor, Hunt, Medina & Gray 2008). Mead’s focus on cognitive consciousness in constructing self and other, however, leaves no room for preconscious, affectual, biological or unconscious influence (Mead 1967; Layder 1997; Hartman 2005).

While Mead’s theory lends itself to a duality of separateness and relatedness, Layder (1997) pursued the inclusion of a further duality in terms of conscious and unconscious elements of the self, which he considers vital to psychobiography. Layder envisaged an inclusive middle way between Freud (cited in Layder 1997), who regarded individuals as driven primarily by the unconscious, and Sartre (cited in Layder 1997), who rejected such a deterministic view and posited that people are at least partly aware of their motivations or, as Layder pointed out, are ‘aware that they are unaware’ (Layder 1997, p. 35). Consistent with the model of cognition presented (Figure 2.3), Layder therefore considered the self as whole, yet fragmented, and sometimes contradictory.

Adding further complexity to the realm of psychobiography is Layder’s (1997) inclusion of core self and multiple ‘satellite selves’ that combine to realise this continuous as well as fragmented experience of being. Layder argued that self and self-identity can be seen as an aggregate of personality characteristics that differentiate one individual from another, and also in a relation to the social environment and the people within it. Here he drew on Goffman’s (1971) view of people as actors whose behaviour varies according to their audience. In The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, Goffman revealed daily face-to-face interaction as impression management. For example, corporate ‘actors’ can be seen to adopt personas that they perceive to be congruent with the specific role they ‘play’ in an organisation.

In relation to the present study, Layder’s (1997) concept of psychobiography is appropriate to the phenomena under investigation. Although Layder does not specifically mention intuition, on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2, psychological constructs of intuition can be considered a feeling – subconscious but arising in consciousness – and therefore sits well within the definition. Moreover, Goffman’s (1971) notion of core and satellite selves will be useful in explaining findings in relation to diversity in intuition disclosure in accordance with different social contexts. Layder’s important premise is that psychobiography is dynamic and is intertwined with a given situation. This contention will now be explored further.

**Situated Activity – (Interpersonal)**

Situated activity is the level of face-to-face interaction between two or more individuals. For Layder (1997), the key was Goffman’s (1983) notion of ‘response presence’, which signified the dynamic nature of interactions where people modify their own behaviour in response to one another. Goffman argued that interpersonal relations between two or more people result in micro-cultures of negotiated meaning. This translated to behaviour on the basis of the contribution of different personalities,
cognitive style, power relations, gender and racial mix, and the familiarity of the actors with each other. This can, therefore, be seen as a social subsystem nested within the wider social system. Communicative exchanges can be seen as ‘situated’ because the exchange is carried out between particular people at a particular time and place. Situated activity is therefore emergent, synergistic and unique (Layder 1997).

Although Domain theory encompasses four domains, it is the domain of situated activity that is central to Layder because it is the site of face-to-face interaction, communicative exchange, action and behaviour. The action and interaction that occurs at this level is essentially a delivery system for the dynamics of all other domains. For example, in relation to this study, the findings reveal how participants perceive intuition is disclosed essentially at the interpersonal level. However, as will be seen in Chapter 5, this interpersonal exchange occurs within organisations and is therefore conditioned by organisational culture. Moreover, organisations are embedded in wider societal networks that condition them. In this way examining how individuals disclose intuition(s) reveals social processes at all levels.

**System elements**

**Settings – (Organisational level)**

Settings constitute the first domain of the System meta-domain. Settings include reproduced social relations and practices (cultural norms), which should be considered primary, and the geographic locations and buildings where these are carried out. However Layder (1997) contended that the two cannot be separated. Buildings, for example, cannot be considered neutral containers for social activity; they are infused with significance for the people within them. ‘We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us’ (Churchill 2003). The High Court in Canberra, for example, is an awe-inspiring building whose imposing facade and lofty interior spaces leave no doubt for the visitor that the people inside it wield unchallengeable authority. Inside the courtrooms themselves we find the bench where judges preside in an elevated position. Settings are an important bridging point for the intersection of the face-to-face encounters of the Lifeworld and macrological system features such as the justice system (Layder 1997).

Settings construct and reflect social practices and power relations that are local to a specific time and space infused with history. Demarcation between various settings can be distinct but change over time through connections to the domain of contextual resources. Hartman (2005) pointed out that the inclusion of history is a distinctive feature of both analytic dualism and Domain Theory ‘because it is argued that history bequeaths a set of inherited standing conditions which represents to a large degree reproduced social practices, whereas the present helps to shape the emergent features of social
practices’ (p. 51)\textsuperscript{31}, an idea taken from Marx (Layder 1997). As buildings are constructed, modified and replaced over time, so are the activities that are contained within them.

**Contextual Resources – (Societal/Environmental level)**

In general, contextual resources are the ‘social resources drawn upon by social actors in order to ‘produce’ their social behaviour’ (Layder 1997, p. 81). Layder discussed three categories of social resources:

- Material resources such as property, money, credit, shares and so forth
- Dominative resources securing control, authority and power
- Cultural and discursive resources such as knowledge, technical skill, interpersonal knowledge (social contacts)

Dividing contextual resources in this way enabled Layder to make another distinction regarding the degree to which the distribution of these social resources intersects with the subjectivities of individuals. The first way of understanding contextual resources is that we all have, to some degree, ‘localised activity lubricants’, which facilitate activities and allows us to get things done (Layder 1997, p. 81). In this sense the understanding is an interactionist one and therefore has a ‘cognitive emotive reality’ for actors (ibid). Second, influenced by structuralist thinking and Critical Theory, Layder recognised an uneven macrological ‘distributive pattern’ (ibid) of contextual resources. Layder posited that although resources are distributed unevenly across societies, the uptake of these resources is also dependent on the predisposition of individuals to do so. In this way Layder accounts for the social reproduction as well as upwardly mobile individuals.

**Power, Social Relations, Discourses and Practices**

Having described and explained Layder’s four domains in more detail, I will move the focus of my discussion to power, social relations, discourse and practices. It is in this examination that the duality of subjective and objective elements, and the layered and interlocking nature of the domains, is most evident. Although social practices and relations occur in the domain of ‘situated activity’ they physically occur in ‘settings’ as manifest, individual, discursive and behavioural expressions of structure (in terms of the distribution of contextual resources) and individual agency (psychobiography). Furthermore it is

\textsuperscript{31} For example, Middle Park Beach in Melbourne in the 1980s was a place where topless bathing and ‘G-strings’ were a day-to-day feature and normal behaviour. However, in an unarticulated, tacit agreement between these beach goers, no one stepped beyond the low wall that separated sand and footpath without covering up. Topless bathing is now a rare phenomenon at Middle Park beach (Duell 2009, pers. comm.).
power, social relations, discourses and practices that connect and bind these domains (Layder 1994; Layder 1997; Layder 1998; Layder 2005).

Layder’s (2005) view of power as central and multi-form can be seen as a synthesis of Habermas, Giddens and Foucault. Layder drew on Foucault to move beyond structural concepts of power as held or possessed by individuals, as an unalienable divine right (sovereign power) or as the result of the ownership of the economic resources of a society, as argued by Marx (Marx & Engels 1951; Foucault 1980; Foucault 1989; Grabb 1997). While appropriate to pre-modern societies, Foucault argued that such explanations can now be considered inappropriate for modern societies. They are replaced by a view of power that decentres the human subject. Power is no longer ‘possessed’ by individuals but exerted by shifting alliances. Regimes constituted by these shifting alliances construct discourses of truth, which are disseminated through ‘legitimate’ social institutions. According to Foucault, discourses are embedded with knowledge/power and shape the subjectivities of individuals. These discourses both enable the capacities and creativity of individuals as well as circumscribing the boundaries for what is considered to be normal behaviour (ibid).

While Layder (1997) accepted Foucault’s notion of power operating and circulating at every level of society, the problem for Layder was Foucault’s abandonment of subjectivity. According to Layder, Foucault’s view of power is totalising and therefore leaves no room for the rejection of these ‘legitimate’ discourses. Although Foucault accounted for revolt in the form of resistant discourses (Foucault 1980), which Layder does not mention, this resistance could be viewed as the product of alternative dissenting and shifting alliances rather than individual and agentic. Layder’s chief concern was Foucault’s removal of the possibility of individual revolt, the omission of individual, psychological and subjective, agentic, transformative forms of power advocated by Giddens (1984). Such individual possessive forms of power would include physical power (Layder 1997), referent power, and charismatic power, which are still included in contemporary leadership theory (Dubrin et al. 2006). Retaining the Foucauldian notion of ubiquitous and omnipresent power, Layder advocates a complex, multi-form view of power, as both personal and radiating from institutions. Layder’s domains are bound together through meshing power relations, social relations and discursive social practices that interact locally and globally in complex ways.

### 3.5 Conclusion

Selective inclusion and synthesis of historical and contemporary theorists allow Layder’s theory of domains to resolve the major tensions created by previous approaches that are characterised by singular emphases. In this way Domain Theory is able to extend beyond the ideas and thus the boundaries of the social theorists that have informed it. System and Lifeworld as a stratified dialogical
ontological synthesis facilitates the reconciliation of various approaches to social theory. Moreover, this principle of stratification is consistent with the way I have proposed philosophical and psychological intuition may be reconciled.

The advantage of Layder’s stratified ontology is that Domain theory is able to draw on various social theories, both micrological and macrological. This allows the researcher to draw on a range of social theorists in understanding and explaining phenomena. Domain Theory allows for the inclusion of subjective and objective elements, and an inclusive view of power and social relations, and, in this way, has the potential to draw on multiple perspectives and sociological lenses in order to tease out the complex dynamics associated with the research problem. Layder’s Domain Theory is a credible and valuable theoretical perspective for the current study because of its multi-layered approach to social reality, which allows the phenomena under investigation to be analysed concurrently at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and societal levels.

In addition, Domain Theory is consistent with the integrative spirit and motivation that has driven the study from the outset. Furthermore, in relation to methodological consequences, I argue that Layder’s stratified ontology provides a philosophical platform from which a rapprochement for the mixed methodological marriage of constructivist and positivist assumptions, and approaches to data collection and analysis, will be explored in further detail in the following chapter.
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Statistics are like a lamp-post to a drunken man – more for leaning on than illumination. (Gervais 2010)

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I outlined Layder’s (1997) Domain Theory and justified its selection as the theoretical perspective for this study. I have argued that social reality is complex and multi-level and that stand-alone theoretical and methodological approaches are not able to effectively deal with this without reducing or conflating phenomena. I have argued that the ontological stratification assumed in Domain Theory overcomes paradigmatic boundaries and facilitates the inclusion of multiple sociological perspectives. The application of Domain Theory to the current study is therefore appropriate because it allows the basic social processes surrounding the disclosure of intuition to be examined at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and societal levels. Thus, Domain Theory has the potential to give a more complete answer to the research problem.

In this chapter I will draw the reader’s attention to the methodological concerns of the study, the principal aim of which is to describe, explain and justify how data collection and analysis was conducted. The first task I will address in accomplishing this will be to explain and justify the two variants of GT used. The first approach was informed by Layder’s version of GT, Adaptive Theory (Layder 1993; Layder 1998), which, unlike other grounded theories, acknowledges the use of extant literature to inform questions and analysis. Although the open nature of initial questions did not preclude discovery, their purpose was to establish which of the many conceptions participants were referring to when they talked about intuition. Understanding participants’ interpretations of intuition provided a foundation for later questions concerning the disclosure of intuition(s). I will also describe and explain the second approach used, the aim of which was to discover the basic social process by which the intuitions of Australian elite leaders are disclosed and not disclosed. I will demonstrate how this approach was informed by a number of grounded theorists, principally by Strauss and Corbin’s (1990; 1998) coding paradigm and the constructivist GT of Charmaz (2006; Charmaz 2009).

The chapter will commence with a general discussion of GT in order to situate, distinguish and justify the two approaches I used in relation to other grounded theories. A core argument of this discussion will mirror one of the central arguments of this thesis – that non-rational, particularly intuitive processes are often implicit, unrecognised and unacknowledged. I will argue that while subsequent variants of GT (Schatzman 1991; Dey 1999; Corbin 2009) and particularly the constructivist GT of Charmaz (1996), have increasingly recognised the subjectivity of the researcher, the original exegesis of GT (Glaser & Strauss 1967) and Glaser’s positivistic GT (Glaser 1978; Glaser 1992) do not. I will argue that GT is increasingly
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recognised as a *rapprochement* of idiographic and nomothetic methods (specific and general approaches), inductive and deductive logic, and intensive and extensive theorising (which can be roughly equated with positivism and constructivism) (Dey 1999). I will further argue that this approach of a mixed methodological and epistemological marriage\(^{32}\) (Strauss & Corbin 1990; Strauss & Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2006) is congruent and compatible with the stratified ontology adopted in this study explicated in Chapters 2 and 3. Evaluation criteria and ethical issues for the study will then be addressed.

Following this I will proceed to outline the techniques and procedures associated with data gathering and analysis. I will describe and justify the use of purposive sampling (Patton 2002) and the recruitment of leaders of Australian organisations as participants for the study. I will argue that elite interviewing is an underdeveloped aspect of social research methodology. Moreover, I will argue that interviewing elite participants or ‘researching up’ is quite different from ‘researching down’, and, as a consequence, participants needed to be treated differently\(^{33}\). I will, therefore, describe the procedures and techniques used in interviewing ‘elite’ participants as a method and justify them with reference to both my own experience and relevant literature. Following this, procedures of data analysis using NVivo7, underpinned by the two variants of GT, will be described and explained.

### 4.2 Background and justification for the variants of GT used

The utility of GT is its capacity to capture the complexity in organisational and management settings (Locke 2001; Goulding 2002) and develop abstract theoretical explanations for basic social processes (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1998; Dey 1999). GT is therefore compatible with the stated aim of this research, which is to describe and explain the basic social processes in relation to the disclosure of intuition in Australian organisational contexts. GT’s strength is its flexibility, which is sustained by the premise that it is not a specific method or technique (Strauss 1987) and has no attachment to types of data, or area of interest or discipline. A consequence of the flexibility and malleability of the GT approach is that a number of variants have been developed since the seminal work *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Current grounded theories differ in epistemology, methodological strategies, what theory means and conceptual directions (Charmaz 2009).

\(^{32}\) Strauss and Corbin (1998) claim Grounded Theory to be a general method due to its world-wide application in social research.

\(^{33}\) I acknowledge that I will make generalisations about the relationship of professional status to knowledge and skills. However I do not wish to imply that superior knowledge and skills makes a one a more ‘valuable’ person.
GT offers researchers an opportunity to develop their own variants congruent with the vicissitudes and context of their own research (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1990; Strauss & Corbin 1998).

Perhaps because of this flexibility and utility GT has become, according to Morse (2009), ‘the most commonly used qualitative method’ (p. 13). The current study takes two approaches to data gathering and analysis – that of Layder’s Adaptive Theory (Layder 1993; Layder 1998), and a combination of Strauss and Corbin’s coding paradigm (Strauss & Corbin 1990; Strauss & Corbin 1998) and Charmaz’s Constructivist GT (2006; 2009). In order to distinguish these approaches from one another and other GT approaches, and justify the selection of these variants, I will briefly discuss the evolution of GT.

The development of the original GT as a combination of two divergent philosophical and methodological traditions can be attributed to the collaboration of Bernie Glaser and Anselm Strauss. Glaser had a background in positivism at the University of Chicago (Charmaz 2009) and Anselm Strauss had immersed himself in the symbolic interactionism of Mead and Blumer, which maintained that social research should focus on the perceptions of the actors themselves rather than on how their actions appeared to the observer (Mead 1967; Blumer 1969; Layder 1993). Developing social theory from data grounded in the experiences of the actors was a pivotal notion in Mead’s work and, after inviting Bernie Glaser to participate in a study of dying, GT was ‘discovered’.

Building on the work of Mead and Blumer, Glaser and Strauss rejected approaches to research where findings yielded a ‘tacked-on explanation’ (Glaser & Strauss 1967, p. 4). They saw positivistic research, in particular, as speculative and deductive; driven by theories that were either ‘dreamed up (preferably while resting comfortably in an armchair)’ (Dey 1999, p. 12) or the theories of others (Stern 2009). GT was considered novel at that time because theory building was driven instead by the data itself and therefore ‘grounded’ in it.

Grounded theories are generated through an iterative interplay of data collection and analysis, and making constant comparisons between instances and groups of instances or categories (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Dey 1999). Generating theory proceeds by way of initial ‘open coding’, where the presuppositions about what may be important to the research problem are, borrowing a term from Husserlian...
phenomenology (Crotty 1998; Gustavsson 2001), ‘bracketed’\textsuperscript{34} – meaning put to one side in the mind of the researcher. This allows multiple interpretations to be attributed to data in the analysis stage in the absence of previously conceived theory. A core premise of this approach is that the researcher retains a certain objectivity because the relevance and importance of generated codes become apparent through their \textit{repetition} and relationship to other codes, and through the process of constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Glaser 1992; Dey 1999; Charmaz 2009). The application of bracketing and constant comparison can be seen as central to the emergence and discovery of theory.

The core components of GT include:

- Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis
- Constructing analytic codes and categories from data, not from preconceived logically deduced hypotheses
- Using the constant comparative method, which involves making comparisons at each stage of the analysis
- Advancing theory development during each step of the data collection and analysis

(Charmaz 2006, p. 5)

GT was first attacked by positivists, who constituted the dominant mainstream of social research, because it was not consistent with the paradigmatic validity criteria of positivism. Along with interpretive research in general\textsuperscript{35}, GT was seen as biased, impressionistic, unsystematic and anecdotal. Despite attempts by Glaser and Strauss (1967) to demonstrate the rigour and objectivity of analysis in \textit{Discovery}, and the use of language aimed to appeal to the positivist researchers, GT initially failed to become adopted as more than a preliminary exercise in most mainstream social research (Stern 2009).

Glaser and Strauss (1967) have also been criticised for the lack of codified procedures and the dense, esoteric and impenetrable nature of their writing style, which left practitioners of GT confused (Dey 1999; Charmaz 2006; Stern 2009). Responding to this, Strauss and Corbin published a guide to GT in

\textsuperscript{34} When discussing the meaning of the term ‘bracketing’ each of my supervisors referred to different ideas that largely reflected their approach to research as I saw it. The first (who had rejected positivism for interpretive approaches) talked about bracketing in a philosophical way, in terms of attempting to perceive an object directly without mediation of thought. My other supervisor (who had a background in positivist psychology) talked about excluding the bias of human influence and suggested techniques for mitigating or eliminating this, including not asking leading questions and keeping a reflexive journal. These two divergent viewpoints mirror the original Husserlian intuitive notion of bracketing and the American approach led by Shultz (as discussed in Crotty 1998).

\textsuperscript{35} Interpretive research enjoyed a brief period of popularity in the early 1960s then fell out of favour following the success of positivist natural sciences which underpinned impressive technological achievements (Stern 2009).
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1990, revised in 1998, that was aimed at both novice and advanced researchers. These texts, written in plain language, made analytical procedures more explicit through the development of a coding ‘paradigm’ (Strauss & Corbin 1990).

The new coding paradigm, first introduced by Strauss (1987), emphasised the identification of context, action/interational strategies and consequences (Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2006). Strauss and Corbin’s coding paradigm (conditional/consequential matrix) provided a high level of structure for data analysis (Goulding 2002). However, the coding paradigm was vociferously criticised by the original co-author Glaser (1992), who contended that adoption of the codified procedures of the paradigm was counter to the original spirit of creativity and flexibility. Moreover, he argued, using such a structured approach ran the risk of ‘forcing’ the data. Indeed, Wilson and Hutchinson (1996) pointed out that some researchers applied these guidelines as ‘rigid rules’ (p. 123) as well as adopting minimum sample sizes and other positivist notions.

In defence of Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998) I would argue that these criticisms are germane to the users of GT rather than to method itself. The application problems indicated could thus be mitigated by education and tutelage. Strauss and Corbin themselves argued that their book was not to be used as a ‘recipe’, and that GT remains a ‘fluid and flexible approach to data analysis’ (Strauss & Corbin 1998, p. xi). Despite the polemic, Strauss and Corbin’s texts now serve as the standard introduction to GT for students throughout the world (Strauss & Corbin 1998; Dey 1999; Charmaz 2006).

Over time GT became more widely used and accepted, and became a separate and alternative mainstream in its own right. A consequence of its increasing use amongst interpretive researchers was that it became subject to critique from them. Charmaz (2006) finds it understandably ironic that GT, once attacked by positivists, should itself be attacked for its positivist language and leanings by later users of GT. While the positivist language has been attributed simply to the desire to appeal to the positivist mainstream dominant at that time (Corbin 2009; Stern 2009) the problem of epistemology is a more subtle and complex matter.

Glaser and Strauss (1967) have been accused of ignoring the subjectivity and engagement of the researcher in the process of developing theory (Dey 1999; Charmaz 2009). For many (Dey 1999;

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36 I experienced this myself when seeking to learn how to ‘do’ GT. I read a number of books but did not feel like I had ‘got it’. I completed an ASCPRI course on Design Analysis and Representation in January 2009, however, it devoted only a couple hours from a four-day course to data analysis, and Grounded Theory was barely mentioned. I eventually found Pat Bazeley at the ‘Research Farm’, where I was able to immerse myself in data analysis using NVivo7 and thereby ‘learnt by doing’.
Charmaz 2009; Corbin 2009; Stern 2009), Glaser and Strauss imply an ‘out there’ reality and a passive researcher through their contention that the theory is ‘in’ the data. Dey (1999) claimed that Glaser and Strauss speak as if the data were self-analysing. Indeed, the notion of ‘bracketing’, and systemic constant comparison, was intended to eliminate researcher bias (Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2009). Later variants of GT, however, embody an increasing awareness of the role of researcher subjectivity in the ‘emergence’ of theory.

Schatzman (1991), for example, made the involvement of the researcher in the mysterious processes of analysis more explicit in his variation of GT, which he called Dimensional Analysis (Dey 1999; Bowers & Schatzman 2009). Dimensions of phenomena are ‘recognised’ and assigned values, along with inferences about them, as a consequence of the researcher’s ‘wherewithal to construct, analyse, and define situations’ (Bowers & Schatzman 2009, p. 97). However, he regarded this ‘natural analysis’, at least in part, as an implicit, intuitive process based on the experience of the analyst. Moreover, he regarded this process to be no different to the way people make sense of the world in everyday life situations. It is for this reason that Schatzman considered it ‘natural’. Thus, Schatzman clearly recognised the role and value of intuitive process in analysing data.

In developing a constructivist GT incorporating ‘the post modernist sensibility’ (Bowers & Schatzman 2009, p. 41), Clarke (2009) and Charmaz (2006) also sought to embrace the subjectivity of the researcher in collecting and analysing data. Constructivist GT presupposes a relativist epistemology that, according to Charmaz (2009), assumes the ‘real world exists but is never separate from the viewer’ (p. 136). However, Charmaz distinguished her constructivism from those that promote radical subjectivism where everything is contained in, and a consequence of, the mind (soplisism). The constructivism she advocates recognises that research practices and procedures do not occur in value-free contexts. Rather, they are constructed and conducted under particular social circumstances and influences such as ‘power, privilege, location and preconceptions’ (ibid p. 141) that otherwise remain unquestioned or completely ignored in the majority of studies. In response to this acknowledgement Charmaz advised researchers to become as aware of, and explicate as much of these impinging circumstances as possible. This is done through demonstrating reflexivity and by giving emphasis to the voices of the participants, and not just the analytical categories of the analyst (Dey 1999; Charmaz 2006; Charmaz 2009).

Thus, both Charmaz (2006) and Schatzman (1991) recognise that theory does not ‘emerge’ of its own volition – the data do not analyse themselves. Theory is discovered ‘in’ the data, however, through the intuitive and analytical capacities of the analyst, and in a social context. I consider this recognition of the interplay of the objective and subjective elements of analysis to be a considerable achievement and one that is consistent with Layder’s conception of moderate objectivism, discussed in Section 3.4. This theme I will expand on in the latter part of this section.
4.3 Grounded Theory under Layder’s Adaptive Theory

Layder proposed his own variant of GT as an adjunct to Domain Theory, which he called Adaptive Theory. The ultimate aim of Adaptive Theory is to explain what is going on and why ‘by means of a continuously reflexive synthesis of extant theory with emergent data’ (Hartman 2005, p. 53) (see Figure 4.1 below). Adaptive Theory is, therefore, ‘adaptive’ in the sense that it is shaped by the incoming data and extant theory that is available and relevant (Layder 1998). Thus, Adaptive Theory is both deductive and inductive through checking or confirming, as well as building on, extant theory (Layder 1993; Layder 1998; Hartman 2005).

Figure 4.1: The research process according to Layder

Adapted from Layder (1998, p.167)

Layder (1998) developed Adaptive Theory as a response to a number of limitations he saw in the approach of Glaser and Strauss (1967). He rejected the premise of ‘bracketing’ as naive objectivism, in a similar vein to Charmaz (2006; 2009). He claimed that presuppositions and theoretical assumptions are better dealt with in a transparent manner. He also rejected Glaser and Strauss’s assertion that theory can only arise through data, and asserted this is empiricist and limiting. Rejecting a core premise of the original GT, Layder proposed the use of extant theory for the purposes of informing both the research questions and analysis. He argued that open coding is wasteful since coding all data will inevitably generate ‘superfluous and irrelevant codes’ (Hartman 2005, p. 71). He countered that focus was added and wasted effort reduced by informing the interview schedule and analysis by way of extant theory.
Adaptive Theory, therefore, stands in stark contrast to the original impetus for Glaser and Strauss (1967) which was to ground theory in the data collected rather than in extant theory. Finally, Layder argued that GT fails to take account of macrological social structures and attributes all social action to the intra-personal and interpersonal sphere.

While I agree that would be naive to assume that one can entirely bracket presuppositions and assumptions (see Thomas & James 2006), I would argue that it is equally naive to think that we can fully be aware of, acknowledge and take account of them. Open coding is a time-consuming process that does result in the generation of sometimes hundreds of codes – as was the case in this research. However, to call this process ‘wasteful’ is a value judgement that can only be applied in hindsight when one has completed the analysis and developed the entire theory. Therefore I believe Layder’s (1998) contention overlooks the central premise and value of open coding.

I argue that under the more positivist and objectivist GT of Glaser (1992) presuppositions and bias are mitigated by the immediate focus of the researcher on constant comparison of the data and incidents in the process of analysis. This comparison occurs not in relation to the research problem or issue but in relation to context of the sentence, paragraph or other incident before the analyst. This technique forces the analyst to attend to what is in front of the eyes and not what is ‘behind them’, or in the mind of the analyst.

Moreover, I argue that the processes of open coding and comparative analysis are core to the discovery and emergence of theory at a high level of abstraction. Bazeley (2009), through her many years of experience teaching qualitative analysis, noted the failure of novices to rise above the descriptive level – a point also made by Strauss (1987). She argued that open coding – where the researcher examines the data word by word, line by line, and looking for what is going on – and asking questions, is the first step. However, analysis must also move to dimensions and determining under which circumstances phenomena do or do not occur. It is in this way that the data are cracked open (Strauss 1987). Minute analysis, which is strongly emphasised by other grounded theorists (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1998; Dey 1999) is thus critical, because it is more likely to produce emergent themes, new concepts and categories.

37 I acknowledge that this does ‘remove’ bias entirely.

38 I give an example of how I did this later in Section 4.7.7 under the heading ‘Axial coding’.
To conclude this section, I wish to expand, as indicated earlier in the section, on my view of GT as a convergence of objective and subjective elements. As discussed, positivist oriented GT ignores researcher subjectivity while constructivist GT denies absolute objectivity. While this may appear as a problematic and irreconcilable situation, Dey (1999) suggested a convincing view, and one that is consistent with the philosophy of this study. He argued that the generation of grounded theories is a rapprochement of inductive, deductive and abductive processes, as well as intensive and extensive theorising\(^{39}\), and idiographic and nomothetic methods. Thus, Dey’s position is in concert with Layder’s view that GT is neither strictly ‘interpretivist nor positivist’ (Layder 1998, p. 133). I support this dual and seemingly paradoxical epistemological stance in relation to GT, based on the notion of a stratified ontology (outlined in Chapter 2 and 3), which assumes that the researcher is both separate and not separate from the data, concurrently. I therefore concur with Dey (1999) that GT is a mixed marriage that results in ‘straddling of the great methodological divide’, which is also ‘undoubtedly one of the great attractions of GT’ (Dey 1999, p. 213).

### 4.4 Research design: Data gathering and analysis

My approach to data gathering and analysis took the form of two distinguishable yet interconnected approaches – one for the purpose of confirmation (Adaptive Theory) and the other in order to ‘discover’ (GT). These are diagrammatically represented in Figure 4.2 below. As previously explained, the first series of questions focused on how participants defined, used and valued intuition(s). Theory and research exists concerning these themes, including my own Honours research that focused on the importance of intuition(s) for leadership (Robson 2004; Robson & Miller 2006). The focus of the current study, by contrast, focuses on the basic social process in relation to the disclosure, or otherwise, of intuition(s) in organisations. However, before I could proceed to questions concerning this, given the many conceptualisations of intuition, I deemed it necessary to confirm\(^{40}\) what the participants were referring to when they used the word intuition (a detailed discussion of how this was done will be presented). I therefore acknowledge my knowledge of, and previous contribution to, extant theory. Consequently, the first research approach can be considered as principally informed by Layder’s (1998) Adaptive Theory.

\(^{39}\) Dey argued that intensive and extensive theorising can be roughly equated with positivism and constructivism.

\(^{40}\) Dey (1999) defines confirm as ‘establish more firmly, corroborate’ as opposed to verify, which connotes establishing a truth (p. 241).
The second approach was a consequence of a ‘tabula rasa’ situation, at least in terms of the availability of extant theory. While literature exists that discusses intuition use as a ‘silent practice’ (detailed in Chapter 2), no literature was found that specifically attempted to explore, describe or explain this phenomenon. Therefore, I can argue that the theory was ‘discovered’ as a consequence of using the principles of GT through an iterative process of interview and analysis of the interview, which subsequently generated new interview questions.

Despite the criticisms of Wilson and Hutchinson (1996) and Glaser (1992) concerning the Strauss and Corbins’ (1990; 1998) coding paradigm, I found this framework extremely useful after attempting a more natural and intuitive analysis. The advantage of Strauss and Corbins’ (1998) paradigm is that, by looking at action and interaction over time and under various structural conditions to see how they change, it gives the analyst insight into what conditions/contexts lead to certain actions/interactions and, therefore, the researcher is better able to trace the complexity of social process and, moreover, to account for variations in outcomes/actions and interactions. The constructivist revision of GT by Charmaz (2006) influenced the research primarily through my recognition that research is not value free, and that it is conducted under specific and local circumstances and contexts that foster a reflexive stance in the research process, which is reflected in the writing of the thesis.

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41 Initial analyses were done without this framework. The resultant model depicted a web of relationships and not an explanatory process. Dissatisfied with this result I put this analysis aside and as said, took a course in qualitative analysis, read Strauss and Corbin (1998) and re-immersed myself in the analysis, initially at the ‘Research farm’. Although this took a further three months, I consider the result justified the effort.
In summary, while noting contributions and insights from Bowers, Schatzman and Charmaz (Charmaz 2006; Bowers & Schatzman 2009; Charmaz 2009), the second methodological approach, oriented to the discovery of GT, was informed by traditional grounded theorists in ‘cracking open’ the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Glaser 1992). Structure was given to the analysis using the coding paradigm of Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998), which progressed the analysis to higher levels of abstraction as discussed by Clarke (2009), Bazeley (2009) and Strauss (1987). Extrapolation of categories in the analysis in terms of micrological and macrological levels of society was facilitated by contributions from Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998) (the conditional matrix), Dey (1999) (structure and agency) (Clarke 2009) (Situational Maps) and Layder (1993; 1994; 1997; 1998) (Domain Theory). Synthesis of the various
approaches to GT was influenced by Dey (1999). A more detailed account of the data collection and analysis will be given following a discussion of evaluation criteria.

4.5 Methodological soundness/evaluation

Both qualitative and quantitative researchers need to differentiate their work from ‘undisciplined journalism’ (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, p. 54). All researchers must, therefore, concern themselves with establishing trustworthiness through demonstrated methodological soundness in relation to the way research outcomes are achieved (Neuman 2000). In this section I will compare and contrast the central notions of methodological soundness in quantitative and qualitative research, and, in particular, GT under positivist and interpretivist assumptions. I will then proceed to outline the most relevant criteria to evaluate the research processes used in this study, and state how I met these criteria to achieve rigour and methodological soundness.

While qualitative and quantitative research are each frequently associated with certain procedures to establish methodological soundness, the terms (e.g. reliability and transparency) focus on methods of data collection and analysis, and carry no philosophical assumptions in and of themselves (Crotty 1998). As Sandelowski (2001) pointed out, interpretive researchers can count and do use numbers. Conversely, positivist studies regularly use qualitative methods (Bazeley 2004; Bazeley 2008). Consequently, how qualitative and quantitative research methods are employed, valued and evaluated are determined by a number of factors other than those directly associated with the unit of analysis (numbers as opposed to concepts). Criteria used to evaluate research soundness depend, in particular, on the purpose of the research and the target audience and, most importantly, the philosophical assumptions of those who might evaluate the research (Crotty 1998; Charmaz 2006).

Positivist research evaluation is concerned with validity, reliability, objectivity and rigour. Reliability is the stability of a measurement or the extent to which the research can be repeated and achieve the same results. Rigour in quantitative research is seen as adherence to planned method (Koch & Harrington 1998). Validity, on the other hand, addresses the extent to which phenomena are accurately measured and whether that measurement is consistent with the intention of the researcher (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Neuman 2000; Winter 2000). Quantitative researchers (under positivism) argue that validity is achieved through objectivity and disassociation from the research process. They therefore regard

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42 I use this term to encompass the trustworthiness of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

43 By comparison, in qualitative research rigour is about “fit” and congruence with the research paradigm and approach – changes in methods during the process are expected and needed to address emerging themes etc.
researcher involvement with the phenomenon under investigation as a threat to objectivity. Ironically, for qualitative researchers under interpretivist approaches, the lack of conscious subjective involvement with the process of research is a threat to the development and the trustworthiness of the research (Winter 2000; Maxwell 2005). Thus, approaches to credibility under positivism and interpretivism are often seen as oppositional (Lincoln & Guba 1985; Marshall & Rossman 1999; Neuman 2000; Patton 2002).

This paradigmatic tension can be seen in approaches to the use of GT. Glaser’s (1978; 1998) GT expresses his positivist antecedents and his approach is taken up by many in disciplines where positivism is dominant and expected (Charmaz 2006). However, GT cannot be evaluated by the usual criteria associated with quantitative research. It falls within the qualitative paradigm, particularly as utilised in this study. Winter (2000) warns that ‘what is certain is that qualitative research sets itself up for failure when it attempts to follow the established procedures of quantitative research’ (p. 5). Commensurately, validity and reliability are not appropriate for application to qualitative research methods because they necessarily involve the subjectivity of the researcher (Guba & Lincoln 1989; Corbin & Strauss 1990; Guba & Lincoln 1994).

Yet, while acknowledging the need to redefine and modify ‘the canons’ of ‘good science’ to fit the realities of qualitative research’ (Corbin & Strauss 1990, p. 5), some researchers struggle to completely jettison quantitative terms and the notions behind them when using GT. Parry (1998) for example, paradoxically insisted that ‘objectivity in subjectivist research is essential’ and that it is achieved by the realisation of ‘as much validity and reliability as possible’ (p. 95). The problem according to Parry is that qualitative data are necessarily collected and analysed by a researcher who is, in Parry’s terms, ‘reactive’ (ibid). Parry’s concern is therefore to reduce the ‘direct involvement of the researcher’ (ibid). Consequently for Parry, achieving objectivity will always be ‘difficult’ and a ‘weakness’ (ibid, p. 96) of GT. This approach, however, renders GT a ‘second rate’ methodology from Parry’s perspective because it can never achieve objectivity. Furthermore, reducing the involvement of the researcher undermines the potential of the researcher in developing a truly grounded theory. I therefore reject Parry’s positivist approach to GT.

As earlier alluded to, I acknowledge I am not separate to the inquiry process, nor the concepts, findings and theory generated. I accept that it is through my intuition, empathy, theoretical sensitivity, analysis and reflexivity (as opposed to reactivity) that the research has proceeded. Theory development is recognised as a co-construction of the researcher and the researched, and in relation to the specific environment where the research was carried out. As a consequence, my evaluation of the research throughout the project needed to specifically account for those factors. An advantage of qualitative research in this respect is that it has no fixed tests or procedures to establish the trustworthiness or
credibility of a piece of research. Criteria for methodological soundness can therefore be developed in relation to each unique research context (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).

4.5.1 Criteria for the evaluation of this research

Layder (1998) is himself silent in relation to evaluation criteria for Adaptive Theory. However, a number of theorists have addressed the methodological soundness of GT – each with a different but worthy and useful focus. For example, reflecting their concern with the ability of a GT to speak specifically for the populations from which it was derived, Glaser and Strauss (1967) discussed credibility, plausibility, and trustworthiness. Glaser (1978), adopting an instrumental stance, argued that the criteria of fit, work, relevance and modifiability are helpful for thinking about how useful a grounded theory is for people in their everyday lives (Charmaz 2006). Corbin and Strauss (1990) detail 10 procedures for rigour, and seven criteria against which the adequacy of the research can be judged. Chiovitti and Piran (2003) focus on credibility, auditability and fittingness as standards of rigour. Charmaz (2006), on the other hand, reflects her shift from the objectivist roots of GT through the criteria of credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness.

I have drawn from all of these theorists in the development of my GT. Hence, the set of evaluation criteria I have developed for the current study also stems from these theorists. For the researcher, evaluation criteria are used throughout the research process to monitor the soundness of the procedures and emerging findings. For the reader the information provided serves as an explication of my (self-) research evaluation as well as providing appropriate criteria for the reader’s evaluation of my work. The following table (Table 4.1) details the selected criteria, the authors from which they were derived (as many criteria overlap), as well as how the criteria were addressed within the current study.

The key evaluation criteria are:

- Credibility of process and product
- Auditability
- Resonance, fittingness
- Usefulness, originality, relevance
**Table 4.1: Evaluation criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Criteria/Procedures for Rigour</th>
<th>Application to the present study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credibility</strong></td>
<td>A distinction has been made between the use of Adaptive Theory, which is partly deductive and driven by extant theory, and the component of the research employed to discover theory in relation to intuition disclosure. Thus, the later part of the research (and the most significant) was participant driven. The consequence of this was the generation of new questions (described in Section 4.7.5) and the inclusion of an (almost) equal number of women in the sample (described in Sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2). Participants’ own words were used to assist with labelling categories and their properties, and in justifying my interpretations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate familiarity with setting or topic (Charmaz 2006).</td>
<td>Section 4.7.4 describes rapport development and the circumstances that led to participant candour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of systematic and constant comparisons in analysis (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990; Chiovitti &amp; Piran 2003; Charmaz 2006).</td>
<td>The use of systematic and constant comparison in the analysis of data for this study is described in Section 4.7.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building process into the theory (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990; Charmaz 2006)</td>
<td>Social process was built into the research question. The use of Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) Coding Paradigm facilitated process in the development of the theory. This is described in Section 4.7.7. Process is depicted in Chapter 5: Analyses and Theory Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical links between gathered data and argument and analysis (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; Charmaz 2006)</td>
<td>Logical links between gathered data were facilitated through axial coding, theoretical saturation and memo writing. These ideas/techniques are described in Section 4.7.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns and variations accounted for (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990; Charmaz 2006)</td>
<td>Patterns are described and explained along with evidence in Chapter 5: Analyses and Theory Development. Variations to these patterns are explicitly accounted for within the interpretation of data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.1: Evaluation criteria (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auditability</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrated researcher reflection and reflexivity (Chiovitti &amp; Piran 2003; Charmaz 2006; Charmaz 2009)</td>
<td>Researcher reflection and reflexivity were achieved through keeping a journal and memo writing, and was demonstrated in relation to interviewing in Section 4.7.7. The use of first person in the writing of the thesis, and an emphasis on interpretation of theory and data, also contributed. Positioning of the researcher was outlined in Chapter 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant selection – rationale and method (Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990; Chiovitti &amp; Piran 2003)</td>
<td>Participant selection is described and justified in Sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification of the researcher’s insights and criteria for category, core category selection and development (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990)</td>
<td>Insights, category and core category selection is described in Section 4.8.7. Records were maintained through memo writing and keeping of a personal journal as suggested by Bazeley (2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resonance, fittingness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of broader structural conditions (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990; Charmaz 2006)</td>
<td>The inclusion of broader structural conditions is a key feature of the chosen theoretical perspective and, as a consequence, of the developed theory. Chapter 3 is dedicated to explaining and justifying this approach. The developed theory encompasses analysis at four levels of description.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of the developed theory to the extant literature (Chiovitti &amp; Piran 2003; Charmaz 2006)</td>
<td>The function of the final chapter (Chapter 6) is to explain how the developed theory sits within and extends the extant literature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness, originality, relevance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The significance, relevance and contribution of the theory developed theory i.e. how does this research contribute to a better world? (Glaser 1978; Charmaz 2006). What are the opportunities for future research as a consequence of this research? (Charmaz 2006).</td>
<td>Chapter 6 details the significance of the findings and the developed theory in relation to theory, policy and future research. The theory generated addresses a hereto unexamined phenomenon and is therefore original.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness and relevance for participants (Glaser &amp; Strauss 1967; Glaser 1978; Corbin &amp; Strauss 1990).</td>
<td>The theory generated by this research will contribute to a better awareness and understanding of the role and importance of non-rational process in decision-making (intuition in particular). I am confident that the findings will have considerable relevance to others in similar positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6 Ethical Considerations

The research followed all requirements for approval by the University of New England’s Human Resource Ethics Committee. Written consent for each of the interviews and the recording of the interview was sought and stored on file. Permission to record the audio of interviews was also sought and achieved in all cases. The candidate applied for and received clearance to carry out the research: Approval No. HE07/187, valid to 1/11/2008.

4.7 Method: Data Collection

4.7.1 Purposive selection: Elite Australian Leaders

The selection of ‘elite’ organisational leaders in this PhD study was a deliberate strategy that will be explained and justified. While there is some debate as to who may be considered elite in business environments (Smith 2006), they are generally identified as those who control resources (Onias cited in Smith 2006) and are often associated with wealth (Odendahl & Shaw 2001). However, ‘business elite’ is defined here, consistent with Burton & Higley (1987) and Pettigrew (1992) as those who occupy formal positions of authority within institutions and organisations. In relation to the current research, I have translated this to be CEOs, Chairs, Directors and senior management in Australian public service institutions as well as private and public companies.

I acknowledge, however, that such a categorisation based on positional power may inadequately represent actual power relations and influence within an organisation. For example, Pettigrew (1992) pointed out that the power and influence of those in senior positions is somewhat mitigated by people both in and outside organisations as well as laws, traditions and culture at the societal, organisational and individual level. Smith (2006), in a post-structural approach to power relations, argued that using positional power as an organising principle ignores the shifting, transient and nature of power. Indeed at the extreme end of this debate are those complexity theorists who argue that the success or failure of an organisation is more due to external and environmental variables rather than actions of the nominated leader (Pfeffer (1977) cited in Dubrin, Dalglish & Miller 2006). However, this research is not concerned with the extent of influence each particular leader might have within an organisation. I assume only that participants have at least some influence through their decision-making.

44 This is analogous to Foucault’s (1980) notion of ‘shifting alliances’.
A purposive sampling strategy was employed in recruiting participants in order to select ‘information-rich cases’ for this study (Patton 2002, p. 230). Purposive sampling is described by Maxwell (2005, p. 88) as ‘a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or events are selected deliberately in order to provide important information that can’t be gotten from other choices’. Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that purposive sampling is consistent with interpretive approaches in that it does not suppress ‘deviant (sic) or extreme cases’ and thereby increases the ‘likelihood the full array of multiple realities will be uncovered’ (p. 40). In fact, Lincoln and Guba cite extreme cases as a justification for purposive sampling. Extreme cases can reveal information ‘that may be ... enlightening’ (p. 200). I concur with Lincoln and Guba in this regard, and argue that this has indeed been the case in the current study.

I consider Australian elite leaders as appropriate to the purpose of the study and ‘enlightening’ for a number of reasons. First, I would argue it is self-evident that through the decisions they make, business elites have a large influence in the creation of the social, financial, cultural and physical environments that shape our experiences as individuals, and in families and organisations. I suggest this is particularly relevant in today’s business driven, consumer society.

Second, elites are likely to be highly intelligent, articulate and confident, with high levels of interpersonal skills (Hirsch 1995; Odendahl & Shaw 2001). In many cases elites can be considered ‘professional communicators’ (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen & Tahvanainen 2002, p. 615). Given that the phenomenon under investigation is elusive, sub-conscious, and difficult to articulate, ‘Like grabbing a column of smoke’ (Robson 2004, p. 74), I argue such individuals would be more likely to produce relevant, rich, coherent data, which was shown to be the case (discussed below).

Third, elites are likely to have had high levels of education, experience in their jobs, and exposure to a wide variety of social and business networks, (Neuman 2000; Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Smith 2006). I would argue this qualifies them to comment on Australian business culture, specific to their roles and in general. Fourth, and most salient, I would argue that because leaders are more likely to be intuitive or use intuition (Agor 1985; Behling & Eckel 1991; Robson & Miller 2006), and also must justify the decisions they make to their boards as well as stakeholders, they would, therefore, likely be cognisant of attitudes to, and disclosure of, intuition.

4.7.2 Purposive sampling procedure and recruitment strategies

Participants were predetermined and contacted through a letter of invitation in two phases. In the first
phase, following ethics approval and my confirmation of candidature, one hundred invitations were sent out along with an information sheet describing the research. I initially used the ‘True Leaders’ lists published in *Boss* magazine\(^{46}\), 2001-2007 to identify potential candidates. These leaders were experienced, ran significant Australian organisations and had been selected by a ‘distinguished panel’ (Macken 2002) of their peers. Six participants, five women and one man were recruited from these lists. When this resource was exhausted, I identified and targeted CEOs, Directors and senior executives of major Australian organisations through their corporate websites as well as utilising management magazines such as *Management Today*. A further 13 acceptances were received in this way. In the meantime I conducted a pilot study using three individuals who were known to me that ran organisations, which allowed me to try out and fine-tune questions, and examine my own behaviour and responses in the interview.

The second phase of recruitment again targeted CEO’s and Directors found through management magazines and corporate websites which rendered a further eight participants. This group size was substantially smaller than the first phase, however, an obvious reason for this was the timing of the invitations, which were sent out subsequent to the beginning of the global financial crisis. I argue it is reasonable to assume that leaders were focused on the implications of global chaos and therefore less likely to be willing to participate in PhD research. The participants interviewed, as indicated in Table 4.2, represented a wide variety of industries/activities. It should be acknowledged that, in many cases, these individuals were well known at a national level in the business community, and currently hold and/or have held many directorships and leadership positions across diverse fields in many organisations.

I modified my recruitment strategy in this second phase of participant recruitment, which occurred in early 2008. As mentioned earlier, in the course of the first round of interviews it became apparent that female participants talked about intuition, as a concept and as an experience, in a different way than male participants. Furthermore, two of the initial participants raised gender as relevant to the disclosure of intuition(s). This was a significant finding, and one which went to the heart of the theory later developed. In recognition of the importance of gender to the research I specifically targeted women leaders in this second phase.

This strategy of targeting a specific group is consistent with the concept of ‘theoretical sampling’. Glaser and Strauss (1967) defined this as ‘the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his (sic) data and decides what data to collect next ... in order

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\(^{46}\) A part of the *Australian Financial Review*. 
to develop his (sic) data as it emerges’ (p. 45). Women participants had to be actively sought because they were underrepresented in the governance and leadership of Australian organisations. Women hold only 8.3% of board directorships and chair only 2% of ASX200 companies. Furthermore, women hold only 2% of the chief executive officer positions and 10.7% of executive manager positions (EOWA 2008). Fortunately however, women were both over-represented in the True Leaders list (relative to the former statistics) and tended to accept my invitation to participate more often than men. I was therefore able to achieve an overall (almost) equal balance of men and women by the end of the second phase of participant recruitment (13 men and 14 women in total).

Participants were between the ages of 39 and 72-years-old (the average being 54-years-old), had between 10-40 years of leadership experience (as defined by them) with the average being 24 years. Participants defined leadership experience primarily as senior organisational positions and higher, while a few defined it as being responsible for people in an organisation in some form. A more detailed account of participants will be presented in Chapter 5.

**Table 4.2: Participants by gender and industry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management consultancy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics (state)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Dept.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Institute</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not for profit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail (food)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.7.3 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were deemed appropriate as the sole method of data collection. Interviews are essentially a direct inquiry into the psychobiographies of the participants. Consistent with Layder’s (1997) thinking I would argue it is through psychobiography that we are able to access the other levels of social organisation. While access to company records may be useful in many areas of inquiry, I argue this would not be the case for this research. From a practical point of view, the generosity and limited time of the elite participants should not be undervalued and to ask for a further intrusion might generate ill will. Furthermore, the participants most commonly held multiple directorships or other roles in various organisations and it would be difficult to know which information to seek. Moreover, their perceptions were not sought in relation to one particular organisation but based on their experience of multiple organisations over periods of up to 40 years.

Semi-structured interviews combine advantages of both structured and unstructured interviews. This study utilised a series of open-ended questions that allowed for the individual and unique responses supplemented by further probes. Furthermore, because interviewees were initially asked the same basic set of questions, comparison and consensus of construction was also able to be achieved (Marshall & Rossman 1999; Minichiello, Aroni & Hayes 2008). A further advantage of semi-structured interviews was the capacity to modify the interview schedule in response to emerging theory and engage in theoretical sampling, both of which are critical to GT.

4.7.4 Interviewing elites as a method

The overwhelming majority of social research and methodology literature concerns ‘interviewing down’ and a focus on the ‘average person or the poor and powerless’ (Neuman 2000, p. 345). As a consequence, the associated literature assumes and reflects this focus. However, I will argue here that the issues, challenges and opportunities involved in elite interviewing are quite different from those involved in interviewing down (Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Desmond 2004; Smith 2006). Research focusing on elite individuals is scarce, and texts discussing elite research methodology and strategy are rarer still (Pettigrew 1992; Hertz & Imber 1995; Ostrander 1995; Thomas 1995; Neuman 2000; Welch et al. 2002; Kezar 2003) and, to an extent, inconsistent (Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Robson 2009).

Elite studies attracted a certain amount of academic interest in the 1930s, however, since then, Dexter (1970), supported later by Kezar (2003), claimed that few subsequent advances have been made in understanding and this has consequences for the few who do take such research upon themselves. Such a paucity of theory and applicable research practices necessitates a certain amount of improvisation for
those willing, interested or required to ‘research up’. Restricting the discussion to business elites, a number of aspects can be identified that separates them from the non-elite population.

**Accessibility**

Finding willing participants is commonly cited by researchers as a significant barrier (Kincaid & Bright 1957; Pettigrew 1992; Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Welch et al. 2002). Elites are likely to be very busy people, who are in constant demand and receive many invitations to participate in research (Dexter 1964). They are therefore likely to employ ‘gatekeepers’ to restrict access (Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Welch et al. 2002). Neuman (2000) added that elites value their ability to maintain secrecy and seclusion. Moreover, in the view of Hertz and Imber (1995), elites are, to an extent, defined by the capacity to insulate themselves. This combination of factors would appear to explain why elites are not studied more often.

However, in contrast to the above consensus in the literature, I found that arranging for interviews with elites was a relatively easy task. I will now detail three suggestions as to why my experience was different. First, I attempted to make it as simple and convenient as possible for the candidates to participate. Consistent with the advice of Lilleker (2003), I created a single page letter of invitation that was informative, coherent and most importantly, concise. I made it clear that interviews would likely run to an hour or less and that the participant could determine the actual length. In an attempt to establish my own credibility, which is considered by Welch et al. (2002) as more significant for elites than non-elites, I also included the letterhead of the University and the names of my supervisors, as well as my qualifications and awards.

Second, I chose to include the word intuition in the description of the research because I believed it might attract interest as an under-researched but relevant aspect of leadership. Indeed the last question in my interview schedule probed the participants for their reasons for participating and several confirmed their interest in the topic as a motivating factor for their acceptance. The third and most cited reason for participation was the desire of the participants to contribute to Australian academic business research. Participants saw this activity as contributing to the ‘common good’. As one participant pointed out, they were more likely to agree to participate in academic research rather than journalistic or commercial research.

**Power Relations**

Most elites, particularly those in formal leadership positions, are used to being in charge, and in control of interpersonal situations (Ostrander 1995). They are also more likely to be familiar and comfortable with the interview format, research techniques, and even techniques by which they may manipulate and
control such situations. Researchers have found that elites will tend to steer the discussion in the direction they wish to take it, thereby protecting their interests or those of the organisation (Ostrander 1995; Thomas 1995; Neuman 2000). Furthermore, if interviews are to be conducted in the natural setting of the participants, this can mean plush and luxurious surroundings. Collectively, these factors can lead the researcher, especially the nascent researcher, to feeling overwhelmed, intimidated and like a ‘suppliant granted an audience with a dignitary’ (Thomas 1995, p. 7). I can confirm this from my own experience in face-to-face interviews.

Asymmetrical power relations can produce a ‘halo effect’ and negatively impact on the dynamics of the interview, and therefore the quality of the data, through reluctance to appropriately probe or confront the elite subject (Ostrander 1995; Thomas 1995). On the other hand, the advantage of interviewing well-educated, intelligent, and articulate participants is the quality of data that may be elicited if the interviewer is experienced, aware, confident and capable (Odendahl & Shaw 2001). Welch et al. (2002) pointed out that elite participants are ‘more than capable of dealing with demanding and probing questions’ (p. 616). This issue had relevance for the way I delivered questions which will be addressed presently.

Business elites operate from bases of positional, referent and expert power (Dubrin et al. 2006). It is also assumed that this power will transfer onto the dynamics of the interview (Smith 2006). Desmond (2004), for example, argued that, despite any strategy employed by a researcher, an asymmetrical power relationship is inevitable. Welch et al. (2002) maintained that ‘studies on elite interviewing are unanimous in that the power balance is likely to favour the informant over the researcher’ (p. 615). Despite this, apart from the footnoted example, normal nervousness, and a healthy respect for the challenge, I seldom felt an imbalance of power relations. On reflection, I can attribute the power dynamics I experienced to four perhaps unique factors that undermined the assumptions about power articulated in the literature.

47 For one particular interview I was suddenly summoned 20 minutes earlier than the arranged time and arrived, red faced, from rushing to the top floor of a Sydney office tower with a collar that was too tight (so that the blood flowed up, but not down). Sweating profusely, and very uncomfortable, I asked the high profile participant if he would mind if I loosened my collar. His valet offered me a choice of sparkling or still mineral water as I wrestled with my collar and tie while the amused participant looked on.

48 A ‘halo effect’ is sometimes produced when the interviewer is in awe of the interviewee. As a consequence, anything the participant says is beyond question.
First, it was clear to me that the positional power of the participant is consequential only in that it identifies them as elite. Given I was not a member of their respective organisations; they held no formal power over me. Second, referent power can be defined as the power that individuals or groups give an individual, and can be seen as aligned to status and reputation (Dubrin et al. 2006). As said, a number of these elites are well known in business circles, and with the wider public through interviews and commentary in the media. However, their history, achievements and personal context were only relevant and important if they revealed it themselves in their own narrative, and in relation to the research questions. I therefore made the decision to do no research on the individuals prior to the interview, other than what was necessary to identify them. I believe that this assisted in mitigating my nervousness, which in turn, allowed me to focus more clearly on their responses.

Third, a reversal occurred in relation to expert power. Much of the research involving interviews with elites seeks to elicit information concerning the participant’s domain of expertise. However, this was not the case in my research. Participants were selected because of their assumed expertise, however, I did not seek to access their specific domain knowledge. I sought instead to gain their perceptions concerning intuition. Most had read nothing about intuition nor thought about it extensively whereas I had been researching and thinking about it for many years - I was therefore ‘the expert’. Fourth, after conducting a number of interviews either face-to-face or by telephone, I concluded that telephone interviews mitigated the discussed intimidating impact of elite environments and provided a certain anonymity for both parties (Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran 2001). I argue these factors further promoted symmetrical power relations.

Rapport and candour of participants, and authenticity

Much of the literature discusses the unique context of researching elites in relation to the challenges posed, as well as strategies proposed to maximise frankness and openness through developing rapport with participants (Odendahl & Shaw 2001; Berry 2002; Welch et al. 2002). Consistent with Ostrander (1995) and Kincaid and Bright (1957), who found it was generally those lower in organisational hierarchies who were less candid and more likely to attempt to assert power, I had no difficulty getting participants to ‘open up’. In some cases participants showed a level of frankness that was surprising to us both. One participant (Participant 2) remarked that he was ‘astonished’ at the things he was saying to

49 I often researched the participant after the interview to satisfy my own curiosity.

50 Of the 27 interviews conducted eight were face-to-face and 19 via telephone. Of the 19 telephone interviews 10 were with female participants and eight with male participants.
me. I attribute the participants’ candour to the following factors stemming from the properties of the researcher, the researched and the context of the interview.

**Researcher**

I would agree that the capacity of the researcher to be able to relate in a way that is familiar to the participant is most useful. Odendahl and Shaw (2001) argued that age is a factor in being taken seriously as a researcher. I was only seven years younger than the average age of the participants at the time the interviews were conducted. I have a varied and international work and life experience, speak two foreign languages and have two teenage children. My undergraduate degree was broad in scope (Sociology, Human Resource Development, Communication and Human Relations majors, and some Law units) and in addition, I have also been exposed to a number of knowledge and skill-developing programs as part of this PhD research.

I believe the skills, experience and knowledge gained were valuable. They provided a working knowledge of communication processes and practical skills that I often used, particularly paraphrasing (Cavana et al. 2001; Beebe, Beebe & Redmond 2005). Combined, I believe these factors contributed to the easy rapport I felt with most participants. I would not go so far as Berry (2002), however, who suggested that a good interviewer makes an interview seem ‘like a good talk among old friends’ (p. 679). In the elite context I believe one should use extreme caution with this type of approach, which could be interpreted as assuming, overly familiar, and lacking respect.

**Researched**

I concur with Welch et al. (2002) that the candour, frankness and apparent honesty of participants were due, in part at least, to the good nature of the participants51 and their outstanding communication skills, as discussed. I would regard the quality and quantity of the data as testament to the ability and openness of the participants. Many of the participants are paid celebrity speakers. Despite the demanding and introspective nature of the questions their ability to respond was impressive. For example, the first interview I conducted resulted in a total of nearly 4000 words, gained in about a half-hour session. Although Welch et al. (2002) pointed out that quantity of data does not equal quality, in my opinion, their responses were relevant, coherent and concise, and reflected superior knowledge, experience, wisdom and insight.

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51 Contributing to the common good was the most cited reason for participating in the study.
Context of interview

Taylor and Bogdan (1998) argued that in order for interviews to be considered ‘in depth’ they must be both face-to-face and repeated. However I would regard this as a quantitative prescription for a qualitative aspiration. Multiple encounters are no guarantee of depth or credibility, nor is the medium of communication. Quality of data is highly contextual and, as I have argued, depends on many things including the qualities of the researcher, the researched, and the context of the interview. The interviews were not repeated nor were they all face-to-face yet I maintain the data obtained was penetrating, highly relevant and illuminating. Using the example of the first interview I conducted (mentioned above), I suggest an honesty was achieved that would be rare in many other interviewing contexts. While I could have requested multiple interviews with the participants, in hindsight, I do not believe this would have added a great deal. Moreover, I believe a request for multiple interviews in the letter of invitation would have reduced the acceptance rate. Perhaps these interactions could better be described as ‘deep’ rather than ‘in-depth’ interviews.

As discussed, many of the interviews were conducted via telephone rather than face to face and I argue that this did not detract from the interview. The telephone is an information-lean medium (Beebe, Beebe & Redmond 1999) that excludes the visual channel and therefore precludes observation of body language. However, I would argue that, in the context of elite interviews, the interviewer is mostly too preoccupied with listening and analysing the elite participant’s dense and rapid replies to be fully aware of this in face-to-face settings.

Furthermore, the lack of a visual channel has certain advantages. As pointed out earlier, the use of the telephone provides a sense of anonymity for the participant (Cavana et al. 2001; Minichiello et al. 2008), which, I believe, was especially valuable considering the intensely self-reflective nature of some of the questions. I also found that, in a situation where I was doing 90% of the listening, the use of the telephone freed me from the social obligation to make eye contact and maintain an appropriate facial expression. I found this to be distracting and extremely draining, and therefore detrimental to my performance in the face-to-face interviews I conducted. The success of an interview should be evaluated in terms of how rich, relevant and credible the data are, and how useful they are to understanding the researched phenomena. I concur with Minichiello et al. 2008 (2008) that electronic media has the potential to both increase and decrease the success of an interview, so defined.

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52 One participant stated this explicitly.
In addition, the focus of the questions on the perceptions of participants about intuition, rather than their work, career or specific organisation, contributed to the candour of participants. This personal focus, according to Thomas (1995), decreases the need to protect the interests of the organisation and increases the freedom of participants to express themselves. The result is fewer scripted and obfuscating responses that can confound and frustrate the interviewer (Yeager & Kram 1995).

**Delivery of questions**

According to Cavana et al. (2001) interviews often run to two hours or more, allowing time to develop rapport and trust with a participant, and cover a wide range of issues and themes. With such flexibility and latitude, it should also be possible for the researcher to make multiple attempts at probing a particular issue in a variety of ways. More time and a relaxed atmosphere also give the participant the opportunity to reflect and formulate a response (should they be motivated to). Furthermore, when ‘researching down’, asymmetrical power relations in favour of the researcher should dictate that questions be as open and as tentative as possible. This strategy is employed to mitigate the tendency of participants to attempt to please the interviewer by providing responses he/she thinks are desired (Dean & Whyte 1970).

However, in elite interview contexts participants are not likely to grant interviews of longer than one hour, and sometimes less, and indeed this was my experience. It follows that the interviewer must make the most of this limited timeframe through efficiency strategies. According to Berry (2002), interviewers need to know when to further probe responses and when to continue with the interview protocol, hence, good interviewing intuition on the part of the researcher is a prerequisite (Odendahl & Shaw 2001). As good intuition, at least in part, is based on experience (Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007), Zuckerman’s (1972) claim that elite interviewing is not for the naive is justified.

My interviewing intuition (based on the experience of my Honours research) told me I needed to be as efficient, direct and clear as possible. I was not fully cognisant of this until I submitted my first interview transcript for review by an expert in the field. Pat Bazeley tactfully put it to me that my delivery of questions was ‘quite direct’ (Bazeley 2008, pers. comm.). This was an insightful comment because it forced me to analyse what I had done intuitively. On reflection, I believe that my direct manner of asking questions was appropriate to the goals of the research in view of the unique set of circumstances that circumscribed the interview. Based on the discussion above these are:

- Limited time frame for interviews
- Extraordinary self-confidence of participants
- Extraordinary intellectual and communication ability of participants
- Rapid, rich, relevant and dense data
- Ability of participants to cope with demanding and probing questions
I would argue that all of these contextual factors point to the appropriateness of a direct, frank (but not insensitive, brash or overly-invasive) approach. Indeed, Minichiello et al. (2008) supported a more directive approach when interviewing expert informants. Of course, a balance had to be maintained between avoiding tangential issues and being open to discovery or themes that may not at first have seemed important.

I argue that dynamics of interviews with elite participants are distinctly different to ‘researching down’. For example, interviews usually commence with opening rituals that serve to put the interviewee at ease and foster trust and rapport. In common with Odendahl and Shaw (2001) I found participants did not want to engage in such rituals, ‘chit chat’ or what Cavana et al. described as ‘entrance investment time’ (Cavana et al. 2001, p. 139). Furthermore, I would agree with Welch et al. that the elite participants ‘welcome[d] the opportunity of responding directly’ (Welch et al. 2002, p. 616) because my approach to the interviews gave them such an opportunity. Furthermore, I believe that being direct, concise and to the point – ‘getting down to business’ – is standard practice for business people at that level and therefore culturally consistent.

I found that a mixture of open, closed and checking questions was most useful, depending on whether I was focusing on confirmation (Dey 1999; Cavana et al. 2001) of extant theory or ‘discovering’ – exploring new areas and themes (Adaptive Theory as opposed to GT approaches). Typically, I would ask an open question informed by extant theory to see if a confirmative response would emerge. If not, my approach would become more direct, a technique Cavana, Delahaye et al. (2001) called ‘funnelling’. Alternatively, probing in the interview might use open and closed questions sequentially, which sought first to establish a response and then to elicit the thinking behind it.

The participants consistently demonstrated their ability and willingness to correct or contradict the assertions I put forward in these checking questions, which in turn led to new themes and ‘discoveries’ that may not have been otherwise uncovered. At no time in any of the interviews did I have the sense that the data were compromised, generated biased responses (Cavana et al. 2001) or that the

53 Here I distinguish my approach from Cavana et al.’s (2001) definition of leading questions, where they state that such questions are designed to get answers the ‘researcher would like to obtain’ (p. 458). I would test out hunches that came to me during the interview based on participant’s replies. The participants would then clarify their position in relation to mine. This could be done in several different ways pointed out by Minichiello, Aromi et al. (2008) including ‘devil’s advocate questions’, ‘hypothetical questions’, ‘posing the ideal’ and ‘nudging probes’ (p. 100-101).
participants were trying to please me. Concurring with Dean and Whyte (1970), I attribute this to both the discussed qualities of these elite participants and the context of the interview. Furthermore, as discussed, the techniques were used in full awareness of the potential for such checking questions to ‘contaminate’ the data.

4.7.5 Development of the interview schedule and progression of questions

As earlier discussed and diagrammatically represented in Figure 4.1, the interviews were characterised by two distinct approaches. The first approach, consistent with Layder’s (1998) Adaptive Theory, sought to confirm the concept of intuition that participants were referring to when they described and defined their own intuition. My preconceptions of the variants of intuition are detailed in Chapter 2. I asked the participants to define and describe intuition in relation to their decision-making processes. Their responses very clearly fit the extant theory on ‘gut feeling’ or experiential intuition, in some cases, a textbook definition. I was then able to probe further regarding the way and the circumstances in which they used intuition. Therefore, the aim of the first part of the interview was to establish their interpretation or definition of intuition, the importance of it to their decision-making and leadership, and the context surrounding these themes.

The subsequent questions in the initial interviews were developed in relation to disclosure of intuition(s). In the absence of extant theory, questions focused their attitude toward intuition, how they perceived other regarded intuition and language used in relation to intuition use in various decision-making contexts. The pilot interviews were useful in becoming reacquainted with interviewing. Moreover, as earlier mentioned, the ‘experience’ of intuition for participants was raised as an issue and the interview schedule was modified as a result. Consistent with the principles of GT the interview guide evolved in relation to the analysis of the responses of participants throughout the duration of the data gathering/analysis phase. The principal driver of this evolution was the interpreted difference between male and female participant responses to questions concerning their experience of intuition. The initial and final interview guides can be found at Appendix 1 and 2.

54 Although Cavana, Delahaye et al. (2001) use this term I regard it as positivist in orientation because it implies the possibility of absolute objective data.
4.7.6 Data reduction and organisation

Preparation for analysis

The interviews were recorded with the permission of the participants. Two recording devices were used in the event of a malfunction, which did occur on one occasion. The recordings were then transcribed subsequent to each interview by me as the sole researcher. I rejected the idea of having someone else transcribe the data on cost grounds and because I wanted as much familiarisation with the data as possible. Pauses, intonation, stuttering, and notes I had made immediately after the interviews (body language, the ‘feeling’ of the interview) were also inserted in parentheses throughout or at the beginning of the transcript. These transcriptions were then checked by me and by one other person for accuracy. Once I was satisfied the transcripts were verbatim, I imported the documents into NVivo7.

The completed transcripts constituted roughly 100,000 words. The primary purpose of data reduction is to reduce, organise and structure the original volume of data into manageable quantities. The use of computers and qualitative analysis software packages (QASP) are commonly utilised tools for qualitative researchers and, are suitable for this purpose. The principal advantage of software programs and the reason I chose to use NVivo7, is that a fragment of text can be easily stored under several different headings (nodes) that can represent multiple themes, categories or properties. This allows for subsequent reconstitution and recombination under new organisational principles as the researcher interprets the data and develops theory about what is going on, regardless of the complexity or volume of the data (Coffey, Holbrook & Atkinson 1996; Maxwell 2005; Bazeley 2007).

I reject Easterby-Smith et al.’s (2002) assertion that the ‘investment in terms of money, time and energy would not be justified’ (p. 129) in terms of familiarising oneself with a software program for a project with fewer than twenty participants55. I argue that justification would depend on the volume of data generated (which can vary considerably), the aptitude of the researcher, their prior experience with computer programs, and the nature and goal of the analysis. Having used both a manual method for my Honours year research and NVivo7 for this study I would argue that QASPs are not only more efficient but are far superior to manual methods. On the basis of my experience I will now review and refute some criticisms made of QASPs.

Some authors (see, for example, Coffey et al. 1996; Hartman 2005) attempt to argue that use of data management software carries with it the risk of becoming removed from the data. While this may be

55 Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) appear to assume that the researcher will not engage in any further qualitative research analysis.
true for QASPs such as Leximancer, which automatically and quantitatively analyses text based on frequency and co-occurrences of words, the use of NVivo7 does not eliminate engagement with the data. After conducting the interviews, transcribing, reading, re-reading and analysing the data twice, I believe I can claim to have had ‘prolonged engagement with the data’, as recommended by Marshall and Rossman (1999, p. 154). I would argue that NVivo7 merely provides an efficient method of organising and managing the data and thus maintains the focus of the analyst on the content of the data rather than on coping with the considerable complexities of keeping it under control.

I also reject Coffey et al.’s (1996) claim that many qualitative analysis computer programs do not offer much by way of conceptual advances upon manual methods. Coffey et al.’s claim was made 13 years previous to this research (in a different century) and therefore was not cognisant of the capacities of more recent generations of software. NVivo7, for example, enables dynamic modelling of concepts and categories, inclusion of memos, field notes, and the importation and organisation of documents, diagrams and, in the most recent version (NVivo8), audio-visual material. Of particular value is the facility of ‘matrix coding queries’, which allow the researcher to test out hunches by comparing two categories of participants in relation to a particular theme. Each matrix enquiry, done manually, would take many hours, even days.

4.7.7 Description of the practices and procedures of data analysis

Open coding using NVivo7

Coding in NVivo7 commences by opening the transcripts and highlighting selections of text (incidents or themes) and then saving these into ‘free nodes’. As engagement with the data commenced through a microscopic line-by-line analysis, I attached codes that described or represented what I thought each section of the text was about. The aim of open coding is to produce concepts that appear to fit themes identified in the data. Initial codes are tentative and provisional because certain free nodes will be discarded later in the light of further data collection and analysis. Therefore more than one code can be generated from one fragment of text. The aim of the process is to open up the inquiry rather than narrow it down (Strauss 1987).

Constant comparison was carried out as coding proceeded, which, at this stage involved the comparing of incidents. After a time, many of these incidents (free nodes) are generated. At various points in the analysis I compared the content of the free nodes to decide how they were similar or dissimilar and asked questions of the data: Do they represent the same or different concept? Where were they seen to be different? If so, the categories could be left as they were. Where the incidents were seen as the same, two nodes could then be merged into one. It was also possible that two separate categories could be united at a higher level of abstraction, and by doing so, create a category with two sub-categories or
properties. A further consequence of this process was that some concepts became redundant (because no further incidents were found) while others became denser through repeated discovery of similar incidents. Important concepts/categories were indicated by multiple incidents. It is for this reason that grounded theorists argue that the theory is grounded and driven by the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Strauss & Corbin 1998).

However, it should be noted that this process of discovery occurs in conjunction with the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher, which refers to the orientation of the researcher and the awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data, and is therefore a personal quality of the researcher rather than a procedure. Theoretical sensitivity is grounded in the knowledge and experience of the researcher, which is developed by ongoing reading and reflection throughout the research process. Theoretical sensitivity enables the researcher to ‘see things’ in the data as significant and relevant (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Glaser 1998). The combination of ‘seeing things’ as relevant in the data as a consequence of theoretical sensitivity, and the frequency of occurrence of these themes or incidents, represents a mixture and a rapprochement of epistemological subjectivity and objectivity referred to earlier in the methodology section.

**Axial coding**

Although there is some overlap between open coding and axial coding in the practice of analysis, they have different aims and can be conceptually differentiated. Axial coding involves the analyst focusing on the relationships between categories, specifically the building of a ‘dense texture of relationships’ around a single category (Strauss 1987, p. 64). Using the coding paradigm developed by Strauss and Corbin (1987; 1998) axial coding assists in the discovery of categories, their properties and dimensions. Identifying the dimensions of a category then enabled me to identify the conditions under which these dimensions were activated.

For example, if a participant said ‘in order for me to make a decision I like to have all the information’ the label attached might be ‘amount of information’, which implies the polar dimensions of no information or all the information. It is then that questions about *conditions, consequences and strategies and/or interactions* can also be asked. Under which circumstances might there not be all the information? What are the consequences of not enough information (or enough information), and what strategies might the participant employ when there is not enough information? Through this process of enquiry the data were ‘cracked open’ and discoveries were made. While these discoveries may be described as ‘emergent’, the interaction and engagement of the researcher with the data was clear. This process is described with a greater or lesser degree of explicitness by Bazeley (2007), Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998).
Memo writing

Memos are considered integral to the development of a GT and may be generated at any time in the process but are especially useful in the early stages of open and axial coding (Strauss & Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2006). Charmaz regards memo writing as ‘partial, preliminary, and provisional’ (p. 84), where the researcher can explore categories, distinctions between categories, and their relationships. Although memo writing can be considered an intermediate stage between initial analysis and writing-up findings, in my case, they were not written for the purpose of others viewing them. Memo writing pointed to possibilities and potentials rather than conclusions and, thus, was often free flowing, based on ‘stream of consciousness’, and represented the reflections and insights I was having at the time. However, the memos I wrote were always about the data or made reference to the data and the focus of the writing was as analytical as it was creative. It could be regarded as the product of a ‘disciplined imagination’ (Dey 1999, p. 242) and, therefore, contributed to the development of the theory.

Consistent with her constructivist GT principles Charmaz (2006) was not only interested in theory but how one arrives at that theory. As Charmaz pointed out, sensitizing concepts can ‘reverberate’ throughout a memo. Therefore, for Charmaz, memo writing is also a reflective (contemplative) and reflexive (modifying perception and action) practice. While application of theoretical sensitivity in data naming has been cited as an intuitive process (as described earlier by Schatzman (1991), memo writing caused me, as the analyst, to become aware of, externalise and justify the coding process through explicating the reasons for the choices I made – how and why I made sense of the data. This is a process described by Locke (2001), which could be considered an example of a good balance of analytical and intuitive thinking in action. Leaning on Charmaz’s approach, I consider my memo writing acted as a catalyst to the self-aware and reflexive development of ideas about concepts, categories and their relationships, and provided documentation of the thinking that ultimately drove the organisation and further collection of data.

Theoretical sampling and saturation

Open and axial coding, in conjunction with memo writing, brings the researcher to the point where tentative theoretical propositions are formed and relationships between categories, as well as the categories and their properties, emerge and indicate a tentative story. It became clear after the analysis of the first interviews that gender was going to be a key for understanding the story behind the nature of intuition disclosure in organisations. To this end, as said, women were actively sought as
participants\textsuperscript{56}. Theoretical sampling, according to Charmaz, entails ‘seeking and collecting pertinent data to elaborate and refine’ emerging theory (Charmaz 2006, p. 96).

Theoretical saturation is typically claimed if no new patterns, properties or insights are found when analysing fresh data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss & Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2006). While saturation can be disconnected from sample size, it can be considered contingent on the scope of the research, the extent to which the research contradicts extant theory, and the weight of claims that are being made (Charmaz 2006). Already we can see that theoretical saturation is not absolute but contingent on circumstance and can never be claimed. In my opinion, absolute theoretical saturation is a logical fallacy because there might always be a ‘black swan’\textsuperscript{57} in the next interview. Theoretical saturation is something to aim for, an ideal rather than a goal that must be achieved. Corbin and Strauss (1990, p. 14) argued that:

\begin{quote}
A poorly developed category is one for which few properties have been uncovered in the data or for which a subcategory contains only a few explanatory concepts. In order for a theory to have explanatory power, each of its categories and subcategories must have conceptual density. When this is lacking, the analyst can return to the field, or to field notes to obtain data that will allow gaps in the theory to be filled.
\end{quote}

I concur with Corbin and Strauss but argue that this is also an ideal rather than something that must occur. Clearly, data collection must cease at some point and the practical limitations of a research project in terms of time and money must also be considered. In a complex and exploratory research project involving a relatively small sample such as the current one, the researcher makes implicit or explicit decisions about which categories or themes might contribute to explanatory power and therefore merit theoretical sampling. Paramount in this research was that the evidence and logical connections underlying the core of the theory were well supported (multiple incidents), and shown to be strong through data display.

**Theory building through selective coding and core category selection**

Whereas open and axial coding through theoretical sensitivity, engagement, immersion and familiarity with the data could be likened to pattern recognition (Strauss and Glaser 1970; Charmaz 2006), theory building through selective coding could be regarded as pattern creation (Higgs 2009, pers. comm.).

\textsuperscript{56} The mechanics of this are detailed in the previous section, on the purposive sampling procedure (Section 4.7.2).

\textsuperscript{57} The term black swan comes from the 17th century European assumption that all swans must be white. Subsequent to the discovery of black swans in Western Australia in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century John Stuart Mill used the term to discuss such a logical fallacy and connote that a perceived impossibility may actually come to pass (Taleb 2007).
Selective coding is the final step in the analysis process and causes the researcher to synthesise, arrange or organise data in new ways to limit and develop theory. Memo writing, sifting and sorting as described by Charmaz (2006), and particularly dynamic modelling, as described by Bazeley (2007), assisted this process greatly. NVivo7 allowed me to ‘drag and drop’ nodes into the modelling window so that they could be visually and actively manipulated. Whereas working with nodes and fragments of data is essentially a reductionist, linear process, dynamic modelling is a holistic and non-linear representation of the emerging elements of theory and their relationships. Dynamic modelling allowed me to arrange and rearrange the elements of the theory, where the only limitation was the extent of my insight and creativity.

The term ‘selective’ in ‘selective coding’ denotes the decision of the analyst in promoting a single category around which other categories can be integrated (Locke 2001). Before the selective coding stage, the analysis had reached a point of maximum complexity. While axial coding, dynamic modelling and the conditional/consequential matrix had assisted in creating some shape and order, the models generated at that point in time were conceptually fragmented at different levels of social description (intrapersonal, interpersonal, organisational and environmental). My ‘Eureka moment’ came after reviewing the words of a few of the most insightful participants after taking a break from the analysis for a few days. I realised that the acknowledgement and articulation of feelings, which featured so strongly in the interviews with women, could also be applied to other levels.

For example, interpersonal interactions can involve the disclosure of feelings or not. Similarly, according to participants, feelings were articulated in some organisations, but not others. I was therefore able to use a single concept ‘interiority’ (to denote the extent to which there is an orientation to feelings, emotions and intuitions at these different levels), as the core concept around which other categories could be organised. The concept of interiority enabled me to integrate the theory at each and all levels of social description. Thus, the concept of ‘orientation to feelings’ evolved from a provisional category in open coding, to a substantive category in axial coding, and to its selection as the core category in selective coding/delimitation of theory.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the methodological issues associated with the current study. A dual interconnected approach to data gathering and analysis through two variants of GT was justified as appropriate to this research. The first was principally informed by Layder’s Adaptive Theory, which was

58 The concept of interiority will be fully explored and explained in part 2 of Chapter 5.
used to ascertain the conceptualisations that participants used when they spoke of using intuition. The second variant was principally informed by Strauss and Corbin’s GT paradigm and was used to describe and explain the basic social processes in relation to the disclosure of intuition(s) by individuals in organisations. Purposive sampling of Australian elite leaders was described and justified. The use of semi-structured interviews, mostly conducted over the telephone, as well as the use of direct and checking questions was deemed to be appropriate, considering the researcher, the researched and the context of the interview. Evaluation criteria for the emergent grounded theory were presented along with corresponding details of how methodological soundness was achieved in the study. Analysis of the data proceeded on the philosophical assumption that meaning communicated by participants can be interpreted, at least in part, through the intuitive processes of the researcher, encapsulated by terms such as ‘natural analysis’ and ‘theoretical sensitivity’, as well as the more objective method of ‘constant comparison’. Consistent with the assumption of stratification assumed by this study, GT was conceptualised as a mixed marriage of objective and subjective elements. Descriptions of the data preparation, analysis, memo writing and theory building were given and the use of a QASP was justified.
Chapter 5: Analyses & Theory Development

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter described and justified a dual interconnected approach to data collection and analysis by which the research problem and issues were addressed. The first approach, informed principally by Layder’s Adaptive Theory (Layder 1998), sought to confirm or disconfirm extant theory in relation to how participants in the study described, defined and used intuition(s) in their decision-making. The second approach, informed by the Grounded Theory of Strauss and Corbin (1990; 1998), Dey (1999) and Charmaz (2006; 2009) sought to discover and develop theory in relation to intuition disclosure. The previous chapter also detailed the practices and procedures of data collection and analysis used in this research including the purposive sampling of Australian elite leaders, the delivery of questions, and the use of NVivo7 to assist in data management, analysis and theory building. Evaluation criteria and ethics were also addressed.

This chapter will present findings in relation to each of the research questions culminating in a grounded theory of the use and disclosure of intuitions in organisations. The chapter will begin by providing additional information about the participants in terms of their age, gender, leadership experience and their area of activity. Following this the research problem will be restated. Congruent with the two-part nature of the research problem and dual methodological approach, the findings will be presented in two parts. Accordingly, the first part of the findings section will display data and theory in relation to how participants defined, described and used intuition and the second part will attend to data and theory with respect to the social processes that condition intuition disclosure.

Part 1 of the findings section will show that participants experienced intuition as a received internal, holistic, subconscious or preconscious sense or feeling of knowing that was informed by experience. Importantly, I will show that participants distinguished the ‘feeling’ of intuition from emotion. The analysis will further show that participants used intuition conditionally, depending on the nature and context of the decision. Participants used intuition primarily for decisions of a qualitative nature and in complex, ambiguous decision-making contexts where there was limited information or precedent and where they had significant experience or domain knowledge. Furthermore, the participants used intuition and analysis in complementary ways by verifying their intuitions, where possible, through their own research and analyses presented by others.

In Part 2, I will show that the disclosure of intuition(s) is a complex, dynamic and conditional social process. I will analyse the views and perceptions of participants concerning attitudes and language surrounding the use of intuition, as well as the internal, subjective experience of intuition(s). I will show
that the disclosure of intuition(s) is dependent on the extent to which individuals, interactions, organisations and societies are oriented to the inner realm of feelings and intuitions. I will label this orientation ‘interiority’ and argue that this concept (as the core category developed in the study) can be applied at all four of these levels of social description, and, in this way, serves to integrate the theory.

The analyses will feature few references to extant literature. Comparison of the emergent theory with extant literature will occur in the following chapter – Chapter 6, Discussion, Conclusions & Implications.

### 5.2 Participants

Table 5.1 below displays details of the age, sex, leadership experience as defined by the participants\(^{59}\), the position held in the organisation through which I located and contacted them and, the category of activity or industry of that organisation. This table should be seen as an adjunct to Table 4.2 which is displayed in the previous chapter.

The participants (14 female; 13 male) were between the ages of 39 and 72 years-old\(^{60}\) (the average being 54 years-old), had between 10-40 years of leadership experience (as defined by them) with an average of 23 years’ experience.

\(^{59}\) Leadership is a contested and elusive construct that is therefore difficult to define (Dubrin et al. 2006). Thus, I relied on the participants to interpret the length of their leadership experience. Most defined leadership as a senior position in an organisation, while others included leadership roles such as ‘School Captain’.

\(^{60}\) Age at the time of interview (2007-2008)
### Table 5.1: Participant characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant No.</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Leadership experience</th>
<th>Title/Position Held</th>
<th>Area of activity</th>
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<td>Dept. Head</td>
<td>Arts</td>
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<td>Director</td>
<td>Finance</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>Law</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Politician</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Director</td>
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<td>Chair</td>
<td>Transport</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5.3 Research problem and associated issues

The research problem and sub-questions were derived from a critical examination of the literature in Chapter 2. They are repeated here for the convenience of the reader.

What are the social processes of intuition use and disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?

The core research problem can be divided into two main research questions/parts.

Part 1

Main Question 1: How do the participants (organisational leaders) interpret, use and value intuition in their decision-making and leadership?

- Drill down exploration 1.1: How do the participants interpret, (define and describe) intuition(s)?

- Drill-down exploration 1.2: How do participants use intuition(s) and what significance and value do the participants ascribe to their use of intuition(s) in judgement, decision-making and leadership?

Part 2

Main Question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?

- Drill-down exploration 2.1: What are the views and perceptions of participants about receptivity to, and the legitimacy of intuition(s) in judgements and decision-making in their organisations?

- Drill-down exploration 2.2: What language is used in relation to intuition(s) by participants and those with whom they associate?

- Drill-down exploration 2.3: How easily are participants able to articulate their intuition(s) and experience of intuition?
Part 1: How do the participants (organisational leaders) interpret, use and value intuition in their decision-making and leadership?

5.4 How do the participants interpret, (define and describe) intuition(s)?

Participants were asked to describe and define intuition in relation to judgement and decision-making in their leadership role(s) in their organisations.\(^{61}\)

5.4.1 The nature of intuition

5.4.1.1 Interior, internal feeling or sense of knowing

Participants commonly described intuition as ‘gut feeling’. Labels and descriptions typically portrayed intuition as an internal, interior feeling or sense of knowing. For example:

*Participant 27 Male (M)*

... it’s something inside of you that gives you that feeling.

*Participant 12 Female (F)*

Gut feel ... appeals to you as being correct, something you should go with, like a bit of a force, an internal force.

5.4.1.2 Received from the subconscious

Participants used the words intuition, gut feeling, gut feel and gut instinct interchangeably to define intuition. Intuition was something received rather than actively sought after – the receiver is therefore passive/receptive, at least in the first instance.\(^{62}\) Respondents reported that intuition(s) ‘comes to you’ (Participant 22 M; Participant 19 M) and is therefore preconscious or subconscious – initially below the level of awareness and not readily accessible by the conscious mind. As a consequence, the experience of receiving intuition was therefore difficult to describe. However, some respondents were more willing and able than others to provide descriptions (the ability to ‘surface’, and articulate intuitions, and the experience of intuition will become a major theme in the analysis in Part 2):

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\(^{61}\) Consistent with the language of the participants, the expressions ‘gut feel’, ‘gut instinct’ and intuition will be used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated in this section.

\(^{62}\) The subsequent active role of participants will be revealed and examined in later sections.
Participant 2 M

... there is an instinctive thing that kicks in that I can’t control and sometimes I know that it’s telling me that I should go left and I’m told I should go right.

Participant 13 F

... you could spend an hour actually intellectually pulling it apart. It is subconscious, there’s no doubt about it.

Participant 23 F

I get a sense of something ... it’s not a conscious process, it’s just the sort of gut feel that something else is going on here ...

Participant 18 M

When you first start out in positions of leadership you do take time to develop those processes but once you do develop them ... you are using the process without necessarily consciously knowing you are doing it.

5.4.1.3 Not emotion

’Feeling’ was a word participants often used in their descriptions of intuition. A few participants did use the word emotion, however, many also made a discernable effort to make it clear to me that they did not consider intuition to be an emotion or based in emotion. I attribute their use of the word ‘emotion’ to a number of factors: the said difficulty of describing the experience of intuition (because it is received from the subconscious and therefore ‘fuzzy’); because of the semantics of what constitutes an emotion; the lack of English words that can describe interior experience (feeling words); and finally, because intuition was consistently described as multi-sensational or multi-dimensional, experienced mentally and sometimes physically, and at an internal feeling level (discomfort or comfort) or a combination of all of these. For example, in this interview sequence, the participant can be seen to struggle for an appropriate word. She first uses the word emotion and then later rejects it:

Interview sequence

Participant 8 F

[Pause] the feeling of uncomfortable is ... [pauses to think and mumbles] partly what you would definitely call mental ’cos you just think ... ahhh ... but it’s a feeling it’s sensation if you like. I don’t know how you would describe the feeling ... it just doesn’t feel right. Something isn’t right, something is nagging at me at the back of my mind says somewhere in the past you know that ... its sensation. I suppose it’s a sensation.

Martin

So it is obviously difficult to describe or give words to.
Participant 8 F
Yes. I know it when I feel it.

Martin
Can you distinguish it from an emotion, you see that it is a feeling, but is it different to an emotion?

Participant 8 F
Yes it’s definitely not an emotion. It’s logical because you are thinking, actually what goes through your head. Do you call feeling uncomfortable an emotion? ... So it starts off being slight, but I am talking fractions of a second, feeling emotional. You can almost feel your shoulders shudder or you shake your head at something and then very quickly goes on to, there is something illogical here there is something, something doesn’t tie up and you’re not sure what it is at that stage. This is probably completely articulate on a Friday lunchtime!

Indeed, intuition as an emotion or based in emotion was a notion that that was almost offensive to some participants (given the tone of the response). For example:

Interview sequence

Participant 13 F
... people make decisions then based on ‘will this make them happy’ or ‘is this the sort of thing she wants’ ...

Martin
So, you make a distinction between, once again, between feelings and gut feeling?

Participant 13 F
Yes I do, indeed I do. The guts one is connected to the head and feelings are just inappropriate ...

One participant observed that leaders would not want to be perceived as emotional in their decision-making because of its ‘connotations of weakness’.

Participant 15 F
To turn around and say it’s emotional actually has to me a connotation of weakness. ... Umm and I don’t think you’d find too many people in senior positions rushing to say that intuition is emotional.

One participant avoided using the word ‘feeling’ when talking about intuition because she perceived it might be interpreted as in some way connected to emotion:
Participant 16 F
I guess I’m careful using the word feeling. That’s why I prefer to call it a deep knowledge ... I think there is a view that it is connected to emotions.

This reluctance to use the words ‘feeling’ and ‘emotion’ will be important for later analyses, particularly in relation to the perceived association of intuition with women and the inferiority of both (see section 5.8.1.1). However, for participants, the feeling component of intuition was important because it was perceived to be a ‘signal’ that something needed their attention. The feeling that participants described was interpreted to be a sense or feeling of discomfort, which participants then sought to resolve. For example:

Participant 23 F
It’s actually trying to find a solution to the discomfort.

This complementarity of feeling and knowing, and, as a result, intuition and analysis (in resolving the ‘something’), will feature strongly in later discussion.

5.4.1.4 Based on experience

Without exception, participants stated that their intuition was based on or informed by their experience and/or knowledge gained over many years. In relationship to leadership, most referred to their experience gained in their organisational roles. For example:

Participant 4 F
... I think intuition, for me, is not something that is ... a gut reaction or just a reaction. Intuition comes from many years of experience.

Participant 25 F
The very reason you are chosen as a non-executive director is the sum of your experience and ideally the breadth of that experience from all your business career, which you are expected to draw on for decision-making and counselling at that level. So it is a fundamental prerequisite for the job.

Participant 6 M
Well I suppose at the end of the day it’s pretty hard to describe what intuition really is. I would say it’s ah ... it’s testing the proposition that’s before you against accumulated experience, training and history. It is very hard to have gut feeling in an industry or a sphere of activity you are unfamiliar with.

Consequently, participants stated that they would not give as much credence to intuitions where they had less experience. The issue of fallibility, reliability, trust and intuition will be taken up later. Other participants included general life experience as contributing to the development of their intuition. For example:

Participant 5 M
It comes from life experience, which you can’t really quantify or you can’t really put down on a piece of paper in some cases. It’s the experience of having done something like this before and having got it wrong and identifying what are the lessons that I have learnt from this experience and how can I
avoid them. In other cases it’s from reading the newspaper, talking to friends, just really being out there and experiencing life to the full I think.

5.4.1.5 Native intuition/part of being human

While participants emphasised the importance of their knowledge and experience as informing their intuition(s), some participants perceived intuition as an inherent capacity and therefore something that everyone can draw on in making sense of information. For example:

Participant 27 M
... it’s probably an in-built skill.

Participant 3 F
I do think it’s an innate skill. One of my young daughters, she just instinctively knows how to ask the right question.

Participant 4 F
I think it’s part of humanness actually [laughing].

Intuition was seen by some as a native or inherent capacity that was developed or honed by experience. For example:

Participant 3 F
I think it’s often categorised as experience. I think you can experience intuition even if you haven’t been in that situation before. I think intuition is honed by experience.

Participant 27 M
... it’s probably a combination of experience and, you know, almost an instinct, part of your genes or set up or whatever.

5.4.1.6 Holistic

Participants tended to describe intuition in terms of connections and associations between things, ideas and people, which was often referred to as pattern recognition. For example:

Participant 1 F
I have become more sensitive, I think, to actually reading patterns in information and I think constantly sort of, form hypotheses, you make patterns and form hypotheses from information and you’re constantly checking against new pieces of information, whether that informs and supports the pattern that you’re forming or whether in fact it’s causing noise and static on the line and you, and you need to form a different pattern.

Participant 8 F
... it’s recognition of patterns you have seen before and therefore are very familiar to you.
Intuition was also described as a holistic, subconscious appreciation and appraisal of complex information. For example:

**Participant 22 M**

It’s just an innate ability to get all of the information and shuffle it, deal with it and bring it altogether in a coherent decision, which provides an additional overlay of weighting each of the elements. But that is, I think, probably that's where the intuition, you know with all these variables – that one is less important and that one is more important – but you're not consciously sort of ascribing a numerical weight to those different elements. ... somehow you are able to align all of those variables with the objective and the end result is a decision that you take.

**Participant 15 F**

... what has actually happened in the past. It’s a weighting, you know, you go through a mental weighting process.

The previous experience of these leaders allowed them to recognise patterns they had seen before (although this occurs subconsciously) or appraise patterns of information presented to them. This was important because it enabled participants to make sense of complex situations and ‘wicked’ problems (Rittel & Webber 1973).

**5.4.1.7 Interpreted definition/description of intuition**

Although there were some differences in the words used and individual emphases on how intuition was labelled (deep knowledge, gut instinct, gut feeling, intuition, sense of knowing) and experienced (emphases on either on the mental, feeling or physical components or experienced as a combination), definitions of intuition for participants were remarkably consistent. Based on the above discussion of responses from participants a definition is given here in relation to the nature of intuition:

**Participants experienced intuition as an internal, received, holistic, subconscious sense or feeling of knowing or mental signal. Intuition as a feeling/knowing flags the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal, the timeliness of a decision and/or caution, and the need for action – particularly further investigation.**

**5.5 Other variants of intuition**

As stated above, participants’ descriptions and definitions of intuition in their leadership and decision-making were consistent, in terms of intuition as a ‘gut feeling’. Subsequent to questions concerning how

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63 ‘Wicked problem’ is a phrase originally used in social planning by Rittel and Webber (1973) to describe a problem that is extremely difficult to solve because of incomplete or changing information and the potential to create other problems through attempting to solve it.
participants defined, described and used intuition in their decision-making and leadership I probed whether they understood intuition in any other way, by any other label, or knew of any other varieties or types of intuition or had heard the word used in any other way. Some mentioned psychic intuition or gave descriptions that fit the definition of psychic intuition. No other definitions or descriptions were offered as a result of this initial probe. A typical scenario was as follows:

............................................................................................................................................................

Interview sequence

**Martin**

Well that’s great, I have covered a lot of ground here. There are a couple of other questions that I want to ask you in terms of the different kinds of intuition. We have talked about gut feeling, are you aware or have you experienced any other distinctly different kinds of intuition?

**Participant 10 F**

Like, for example, having very strong thoughts about a particular person and then discovering later on that, at the time that you are having those very strong thoughts about that person, some major life events was happening to them, that sort of thing?

**Martin**

Yes. Would you describe that as psychic intuition?  

**Participant 10 F**

Well I don’t know what I would call it but it is a bit spooky [laughs].

Following responses in the negative, I asked if I could ‘run some other constructs of intuition past them to see if they ‘could relate to them’. These constructs were discussed in Chapter 2 as entrepreneurial intuition or the ‘Eureka effect’, psychic intuition and philosophical intuition.

### 5.5.1 Insight

All participants that were asked said they experienced insights to some degree. However, none of the respondents said they would define or describe this as intuition. For example:

**Martin**

OK. Look, I want to give you some examples of how other people have talked about intuition to see if you can relate to them. Some people talk about the Eureka effect where you have been thinking about something for a while and you’ll be taking the dog for a walk and the answer will pop into your head. Something like that? Can you relate to that?

---

64 I have justified the use of direct and leading questions in Chapter 4.
Participant 12 F

I can, but I wouldn’t think that is intuition.

Participants talked about insight in terms of the ‘penny dropping’ and making connections. For example:

Participant 14 F

And it’s to do with a progressive thought pathway, nothing else, so whether you call it intuition, whatever, the Eureka moments come because you’ve been using your brain intensively about connections.

Participant 3 F

Yes I do sometimes have Eureka moments but I would more call it the ‘penny dropping’, but I do think that Eureka moments are an insight in a more common way, just reflecting on something or looking at body language and you think, aha, that all fits into place now.

One participant understood insight in terms of having a clearer understanding of an issue after a night’s sleep:

Participant 11 M

I mean I’ve had situations where I’ve been … really struggling with something for several weeks and then, you know, wake up in the morning and sort it out in half an hour.

Some participants said they seldom experienced insights or that insights were of little significance to their leadership. Some of these participants attributed this to their personality type and training. For example:

Participant 6 M

Look, my background and my training is as an engineer and I would have to say I am a very deductive, logical sort of person. Other people might have the light globe that flashes and sort of transports them across some dramatic shift in their thinking on a particular issue … You know, I try to force alternative evaluations or alternative scenarios, but I don’t have a lot of what I’d call experience about light-bulb moments … I might come to a different view but I tend not to dart from one to the other; more like an oil tanker turning.

Others considered insight as important in terms of gaining new perspectives and solutions to problems or situations in the workplace. For example:

......................................................................................................................................

Interview sequence

Martin

And would you call that intuition?

Participant 8 F

No not really. In my case it is usually because a fact presents itself, or a way of looking at it suddenly changes, and shifts the paradigm or shifts the focus.

Martin

New connections?
Participant 8 F

Yes, a new way of looking at it or a new idea comes up or changes the balance or you look at things through a different perspective.

Martin

And it is that important to you in your role?

Participant 8 F

Yes, because at relatively senior levels in business and organisations, quite often, the decisions you will have to take are extremely complex ... they are made up of different things and potentially have very different ramifications. So, yes, it is important to me.

Interview sequence

Participant 10 F

What happens with me is that I think about things for a protracted period of time and then I forget about it for a while and then a couple of days later, this new thought that sort of pulls it all together will come into my head ...

Martin

And does it play a role in your work?

Participant 10 F

Yes it does. I am quite sure sometimes it is infuriating to people because, you know, I’ve been thinking and worrying about something, and not necessarily be able to contribute to the solution to a particular problem, and then I will come back a couple of days later and say, I was thinking about that issue and I reckon if we did it this way all of that will be much more useful.

Given its importance for most participants, it was interesting to note that none offered an explanation for this phenomenon. They appeared to accept that insights and background cognition occurs, were intrigued by it, but seemed to regard it as part of the mystery of being human (Participant 14 was an exception in this regard. She described it in terms of neural connections and networks in the brain).
5.5.2 Psychic intuition

Psychic intuition was not considered an important component of decision-making and leadership for participants. However, 13 (eight female and five male) participants from 25\(^{65}\) said or agreed that they had personally experienced what could be described as psychic intuition. Examples were not asked for, but some were given. Typically participants reported these occurrences happened ‘enough times for you to notice’ (Participant 22 M). For example:

*Participant 22 M*

... there are occasions when I think about somebody that I hadn’t seen in years and they will either ring me, write to me or I will see them in the street. And I don’t know if that is intuition or how you explain that, but it happens.

*Participant 4 F*

I had a car accident a few months ago and just that very morning I was thinking about having a car accident [laughs].

One participant described prophetic dreams predicting a colleague would be promoted, another cited prophetic dreams accurately predicting the time of death of her grandfather, and the birth dates and times for multiple family members (Participant 15). Another (Participant 2) said he had accurately predicted the death of the boyfriend of an acquaintance. Some participants were reluctant to put a label on their experience, especially as a ‘psychic experience’. For example:

*Participant 3 F*

I must say that there had been one or two things that have happened that have made me wonder but I have attributed it to [pause], I have kind of dismissed it I think. So I don’t know about that.

5.5.3 Spiritual Intuition

An inquiry into intuition as philosophical intuition or ‘enlightenment’ or ‘knowledge of’ something was difficult to phrase. In a similar way to questions about psychic intuition, I initially felt that these were inappropriate questions to be asking elite Australian business leaders (although less so). Indeed, none of

\(^{65}\) Psychic intuition was discussed in the literature review, however, I initially asked no questions in relation to this construct for two reasons. First, because there was no reference to it in the extant management literature and, second, because I considered psychic intuition to be a ‘fringe’ construct – something that was out of the ordinary experience of most, if not all, individuals (myself included). I feared that participants would perhaps feel that the study was not a serious one and that this might affect their responses. This fear was supported by many participants’ emphatic insistence in their initial definitions and descriptions that their intuition did not come ‘out of the blue’, but was based on their many years of experience. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, psychic intuition (discussed in Chapter 2 as ESP or PSI) spontaneously arose in one of the first interviews. I therefore felt it was necessary to put my fears aside. However, I did not dwell on this theme, given the already tightly-packed interview schedule.
the participants referred to this construct of intuition when asked to define intuition. However, as part of ‘running some descriptions past’ participants, I typically phrased the question as such:

The other one [variant of intuition] is more of a mystical, divine insight, higher conscious connection with the life force, the cosmos, the universe, a sense of calling, a sense of spirituality, an experience of something greater than yourself. Have you experienced anything like that at all?

Twelve out of the 23 participants who were asked reported or agreed that they felt a connection to a higher power, ‘the cosmos’ (Participant 26 F), a religious entity, to the earth, or to a ‘foreign field’ (Participant 9 M). Some participants immediately interpreted the question in terms of whether they were religious or not and replied they were atheists. Two participants said they felt a connection to God and considered themselves religious. However, some participants interpreted the question more broadly and responded to the question in their own way. Interconnectedness was a theme for this group (mostly women). For example:

**Participant 2 M**

I also know at a really simple level that I have tried, for the last 20 years, never to do anything that I can’t offer as a gift to a higher being. And if I can’t offer it to the higher being then it’s morally wrong and I shouldn’t do it and I know that.

Interview sequence

Martin

Do you feel that connection to a higher being ... strongly?

**Participant 2 M**

Mmm, I do.

**Participant 3 F**

In a decision-making context it’s, it’s more about having a core set of values and assessing what’s before you conforms to those and whether it is honest.

**Participant 15 F**

[after much hesitation] My position is that we are connected to a life force, whatever that is.

**Participant 16 F**

I have a sense of the universe as being so much greater than myself. That is, the universe as the whole system of life and planets and stars, the whole universe, there is not another word for it, I think. I have a strong sense of that as being huge and powerful, and enormous and ongoing, relative to the ... insignificance of me as an individual and the decisions that I am making, no matter how momentous I might think they are. I am very aware of that kind of quality – and I think that does have a bearing on the way I think – but I don’t see it as an active force.

**Participant 25 F**

I think it does come from a sense of ... looking at the stars and knowing but much more than that. It comes from the knowledge of the universe how complex it is and how enormous it is and how interrelated all the things are and how one thing in the universe impacts on another thing in the
universe and nothing happens in isolation. Not one of us exists as an entity on their own, we are all totally part of this enormous system, and to varying degrees, and interdependent on that system.

As discussed, time constraints and a focus on intuition as gut feeling prevented further inquiry into alternative definitions of intuition. The purpose of these questions was not to fully understand or explain these variants but to establish if they had any significance for participants. The significance of insights has been discussed. Religion and a sense of interconnectedness were perceived to be significant for relationships with other people, relationship to the natural environment (as well as the cosmos as a whole) and, as a result, significant in shaping values. One participant also cited religion as significant for seeking strength in times of crisis or stress. For two participants, an intuitive spiritual connection was considered an integral part of daily leadership (in terms of values). These findings are important because researches about psychic and spiritual intuition are largely absent from the mainstream managerial and organisational literature. I therefore argue that the investigation of these variants of intuition would be a fertile area for future research.

5.6 How do participants use intuition?

The previous sections described how participants defined and described intuition. The analysis of the data collected reveals that participants recognise, relate to, and sometimes use or experience, variants of intuition put to them as insight or the ‘Eureka effect’, psychic intuition and spiritual intuition. However the descriptions and definitions given in the first instance by the participants were, without exception, consistent with the construct of gut feeling. A definition of gut feeling, as experienced by participants, has been given. This section now analyses participants’ responses in relation to the use of intuition.

My analysis of the use of intuition by participants takes two approaches. The first (Section 5.6.1) is an abstract approach revealing that the use of intuition occurs most often in conjunction with analysis and is conditional (depending on the nature and context of the decision or judgement). At the conclusion of this section I will present a diagrammatic representation of this conditional and complementary use of intuition. This is followed by a more concrete approach (Section 5.6.2), which details the examples given by participants and is organised in relation to the situations or ways in which participants found intuition to be useful.

It should be noted that these descriptions of use occurred before questions concerning other variants of intuition and therefore refer to gut feeling.
5.6.1 Complementary use of intuition

The following analysis will reveal that all leaders considered gut feeling to be fallible but reliable in areas where they possessed significant domain knowledge and experience. In areas where participants lacked significant knowledge and/or experience, leaders would, where possible, check their intuitions in a complementary way with analysis (often further research and inquiry).

5.6.1.1 Fallibility and reliability

None of the participants considered their intuition to be infallible. However, all participants viewed it, at the very least, to be fairly reliable. A typical response was:

*Participant 18 M*

Yeah, [it is reliable] on the whole but that’s not to say it is reliable 100% of the time and I don’t think anybody’s is.

One participant pointed out that because intuition is based on experience, it could be biased, prejudiced and therefore misleading:

*Participant 10 F*

But I think I was saying that your intuition is informed by your experience and it might be that you draw up all of these things from your past, similar sorts of circumstances. Where you have a particular prejudice, I think you are still using your intuition, but you are drawing from those sorts of experiences to justify what you want to do or what your intuition tells you now. I don’t think intuition is verily always a positive thing.

Many participants pointed out that the reliance on intuition is inevitable in senior leadership roles to some extent because decisions must be taken where there is inadequate information, and in complex, uncertain and ambiguous circumstances. As an example:

*Participant 6 M*

... am I comfortable about making a gut-feel decision? Sometimes not – but you know, you’ve got to call it one way or another. You can’t sort of have a quid each way, if you know what I mean.

5.6.1.2 Trust through use

A common theme for participants was learning to recognise the ‘voice’ of intuition and to place trust in it. Many of the participants had been highly trained in the statistical and analytical techniques that they otherwise used. However, over time, and through experience, participants had learnt that not all situations were conducive to analysis. For example:

*Participant 25 F*

I do think it is important [intuition] because I think that, at the end of the day, you often, you know, have to make decisions on imperfect information ... So I think, in the end, you have to have confidence in your wisdom and judgement, which I guess is what it comes down to.
Participant 15 F

Does everyone have intuition? Probably. Do they have good intuition? It depends whether they engage with it or trust in it.

Participants said that they had also, over time, become more aware of their feelings in decision-making and the need to pay attention to these feelings. This was difficult for some participants who had scientific training. For example:

Participant 11 M

I couldn’t really put my finger on whatever it was ... My better judgement said don’t do this, just go back to square one. All the rational interview techniques ... assessments and tests said ... this guy is fantastic ... but because I couldn’t put my finger on it, I made a wrong call.

The most common reason for ignoring or overruling intuitions was being dissuaded by other people. For example:

Participant 26 F

Oh an advertisement once, that my staff showed me, and I hated it and I thought, this is going to get us into strife, and they all explained to me very rationally how it was a good advertisement and it would sell the product, and it cost a lot of money ... and I thought ok, I’ll risk it ... Within 48 hours of it going to air we had massive complaints. I had to take it off the air and I’ve never ever let them forget it ever since [laughter]. So whenever they show me an ad and my gut says this isn’t going to work, I remind them of the last time I ignored my gut – they hate me [laughter].

Learning to use their own intuition effectively, and feeling comfortable in doing so, was described in terms of a personal journey of discovery for some participants (mostly women). Intuition use was seen as an iterative and evolving process of trusting their intuition, taking decisions, analysing outcomes and reflecting on them. For example:

Participant 16 F

I am aware that I rely on intuition more now than I did before, 10 years ago, 15 years ago.

Participant 20 M

[On trusting intuition] I think by recognising it and by using it. You can actually probably say it’s a skill that can be enhanced and perhaps developed. And again, it comes back to the whole self-awareness thing, recognising what it is ... and being somewhat analytical about it ... and actually going through a review process, after the fact, when something’s happened and saying well ... what was my intuition, how did it influence what I did ... where did we end up ... what was good about it, what did I learn, being pretty pragmatic ...

Participant 23 F

If you’ve got intuition and you rely on it over a period of time, your experience of relying on your intuition tells you that you can go with that.

Participant 15 F

For me, hearing the voice, but having the experience to validate it, so there’s a reason to trust it. ... for me there has been a process of establishing an equilibrium ... between the knowledge and experience and the intuition, and it’s great, there is a complementarity there ... I think my intuition came first and then my experience as a leader has actually, has deepened, has evolved.
The limitations of analysis in making judgements and decisions were perceived by participants as: the inability to be certain that all variables could be known; what variables should be known; contradictory information; the possibility of inaccurate information; the impossibility of accurately weighting all variables; and, the possibility that variables and their appropriate weighting might change. In contradiction to expectations imbued by their business education, decision-making for many was perceived to be uncertain and messy. For example:

**Participant 1 F**

... when I went to Uni, all the problems were presented in a very neat and tidy way. This is the problem and this is how you solve it ... and my experience as a manager was my life was always messy and the problems presented to me and my work were always messy.

However, because participants also considered their intuition to be fallible, most decision-making was therefore perceived to be an ‘act of faith’ (Participant 22 M). In response to this perceived inherent uncertainty of decision-making many participants said they used intuition and analysis in complementary ways. Participants strongly emphasised that they would do as much as possible, particularly for important decisions, to verify their intuition through research and analysis. For example:

**Participant 6 M**

... you’ve got to make sure that it’s not all gut feeling and you’ve got to have analysis

**Participant 16 F**

I would never say that I would just go with intuition ... I would always endeavour to try and understand cognitively or intellectually, using the evidence that is available, and I would try and link that up to what my intuition is telling me.

Participants thus reported they would often use intuition ‘hand-in-hand’. The complementary use of intuition and analysis was a repeated theme in the data. For example:

**Participant 11 M**

... it would be along the lines of that combination of cognitive, in other words, facts I have on the table, and intangible experience and knowledge of the broader environment, so it’s a combination of intangible, knowing gut stuff with the left brain knowledge of the facts. Mostly leaders are operating with 80 per cent facts and they need to pull in all this other stuff at the same time.

This finding is significant for later discussion because it shows that the boundary between intuition and analysis can become ‘blurred’ in daily decision-making in the field. For example:

**Participant 15 F**

I think now after all these years, there’s no defined edge. To me it’s a blurred process in that there’s osmosis between that intuition and the decision-making in the more structured sense of leadership. Does one precede the other always or do they take it in turns? I believe there’s no set way of doing it.
5.6.2 Conditional use of intuition

On the basis of the preceding discussion I have interpreted that participants both distinguished the role that intuition plays in their decision-making, and recognised that there was an element of intuition in most of their decisions and judgements. The extent to which intuition played a dominant and distinguishable role in judgement and their decision-making, according to participants, was dependent on both the nature and context of the decision.

5.6.2.1 Nature of the decision

Participants reported that analytical decision-making techniques were most appropriate for matters involving quantitative variables such as budgets, inventory and so on. On the other hand, intuition was perceived as most useful for assessing qualitative factors – those elements that were intangible. Typically, these tended to be judgements and decisions concerning people.

Participant 3 F

... there are themes and factors that aren’t measureable that you take into account when making decisions.

Participant 6 M

... it’s important that we take account of A, B and C. And the fact that ABC came up is, might be qualitative aspects. It might be the different cultures of the organisation. It might be the strength of character of the leadership of the other organisation or it can be a whole variety of things. At the end of the day they come into the category of qualitative factors, which may impinge on the business, and you make that judgement about those qualitative factors and you try and quantify it if you can, but you know, they can be show-stoppers.

Participant 22 M

... there are other variables, intangibles that are less readily determined, and you’re making decisions on a lot of those issues. If it was purely objective ... you don’t need to apply any intuition or judgement, on those facts.

5.6.2.2 Context of the decision (contextual conditions)

However whether or not intuition was likely to play a role in decision-making and judgement was also seen as conditional upon the perceived gravity of the decision, the level of experience and/or domain knowledge of the decision maker, precedent and the amount of information available, complexity and ambiguity, whether or not there is urgency and whether the decision is about business or private matters. These elements will now be examined in further detail.

5.6.2.3 Perceived gravity

In more routine decisions or decisions of lesser import, participants were more likely to ‘go’ with their intuition without further research or analysis. For example:
Participant 27 M
... in daily decisions that don’t have the magnitude ... you’re more comfortable simply using it without even thinking about it.

However, where consequences were perceived to be more severe, participants were reluctant to rely on their unsupported gut feelings. For example:

Participant 4 F
... but I wouldn’t for example make a huge decision about legislation that’s going to be affecting lots of lives just based on intuition or a sense, so I would want to have that kind of decision very much backed-up by what experts say, by what the science says, by what the facts are.

Participant 23 F
Again it would be depend on how serious the decision was or how serious the issue was to how much I might feel comfortable.

5.6.2.4 Level of experience

As previously stated, participants perceived that their intuition was informed by their years of experience and/or knowledge of a particular domain. Consistent with this perception, some leaders said they would not have or not trust their intuition in areas where they lacked this experience or knowledge. For example:

Participant 8 F
Quite often I would say my intuition probably comes from knowing something really well and therefore I would be more likely to make intuitive decisions in a business, for example, where I have been working for a long time than in one where I haven’t been.

5.6.2.5 Precedent and amount of information available

However, in decision-making contexts where there was a lack of information or precedent participants said they were sometimes forced to rely heavily on their intuition. For example:

Participant 21 F
There was none! [precedent and information]. There was a television program, which they didn’t see, and there was a sort of story behind it and that was it really, a proposition.

Participant 16 F
Now if there is not enough evidence or, if it runs counter to what my intuition is telling me, I would tread warily, I would proceed very warily. I would make sure there is plan A and plan B in place.

Participant 20 M
... if you didn’t have the opportunity to do the analysis and have all of the information it would be a sense of knowing what’s right.
5.6.2.6 Complexity and Ambiguity

Intuition was often the deciding factor in complex decisions where there was too much information or conflicting information. For example:

Participant 7 M

It comes up [gut feeling]. Often when it’s to the point where a decision can’t be made, because something is so complex and is very difficult ... I’m not quite sure of the ramifications of this piece of legislation, but I have a gut feeling ...

Participant 20 M

[use of intuition] perhaps more so where the complexity of the evidence makes it very hard to say ... it’s just too complex to be able to tell ... in a line-ball decision I would probably err on the side of my intuition.

Participant 22 M

There is an additional ingredient [intuition] that plucks you one side or the other. And it’s a very fine line very often.

5.6.2.7 Urgency

Where there was not enough time to gather evidence and properly research a decision, participants said they were also forced to rely on their intuition(s). For example:

Participant 9 M

Often decisions can’t wait and you will go with your gut, and 99.9% of the time your gut is going to be right.

Participant 25 F

Particularly at times of crisis, time is often of the essence and you can’t afford to be forever spinning wheels trying to get more information to make the decision.

5.6.2.8 Business/private

Many participants said they were more comfortable relying solely on their intuition in personal matters rather than business matters. For example:

Participant 4 F

But in other contexts, particularly on a personal level ... around your family, around your friends, around your life, I would be very comfortable and probably do make lots of decisions based on intuition in that context. It is a contextual thing.

This business/private dualism is important because it indicates a potential cleavage in relation to intuition use in terms of settings. This is a theme that I will return to later. Figure 5.1 below synthesises the above findings in a model of conditional and complementary intuition use.
Figure 5.1: Conditional and complementary use of intuition

5.6.2.9 Explanation of the model

Figure 5.1 diagrammatically represents the analysis presented in the previous sections in order to make the conditional and complementary use of intuition and analysis more transparent to the reader. As discussed, the nature of a decision (represented by the orange rectangles) will invoke more reliance on intuition or analysis. However, a decision will always have a context (represented by the blue rectangles), which will also contribute to the tendency to use one or the other. Viewed from this perspective, decisions can be seen as a rich, complex, dynamic interplay of decision conditions. For example, a proposition involving variables that can be measured and quantified would invoke an analytical response. However, not all of the information that is seen to be required for a straightforward analytical decision might be available or considered reliable, accurate and/or unambiguous. In addition, the urgency of the decision might dictate that no more information can be generated or accessed.

Conversely, participants expressed a tendency to rely on their gut feelings where a decision was perceived to be qualitative in nature. However, in view of the fallible nature of intuition previously discussed, participants said they sought, wherever possible, to verify their intuition(s) through engaging in supplementary information gathering. This was considered particularly relevant where participants had little experience and knowledge of similar situations, where there was precedent to draw on, where there was perceived gravity, where there was less urgency, where the decision related to business rather than private concerns, and where there was an adequate amount of less complex and ambiguous
information. Consequently, much decision-making, according to participants, could be described as a mixture of both analysis and intuition. For example:

**Participant 20 M**

... while I’d say it’s [intuition] an important part of my decision-making process, it’s always there ... I am also very diligent about ensuring that there is due process as well ... sometimes your intuition can be wrong, and it could end up being very costly and you want to make sure that you don’t end up in that situation.

This finding is significant because it demonstrates the extent to which intuition and analysis are entwined and enmeshed for daily decision-making and leadership. As a consequence of their nature and context some decisions might be dominated by one mode or another, however, the analysis of data reveals intuition and analysis are not mutually-exclusive processes. Participants had intuitions about their analyses, conversely, they also analysed their intuitions. Moreover, participants sought to align their intuitions and analyses. Thus, most decision-making was perceived to be a mixture of intuition and analyses to the extent that, as stated, the difference between them became ‘blurred’.

### 5.6.3 Examples of conditional and complementary use of intuition and analysis

Participants offered many examples of how they used intuition in their daily leadership. In the pursuit of clarity I have categorised these examples of intuition use in five ways: in assessing alternatives; in assessing judgements and weightings of others; as a prompt for enquiry or caution; in making judgements about people; and in relation to interpersonal dynamics. However, I acknowledge that these categories overlap.

#### 5.6.3.1 Assessing alternatives, proposals, data and information given

Participants commonly cited their use of intuition in relation to a feeling of knowing about whether something would work or not work (potentially a proposition or strategy or a choice between alternatives). For example:

**Participant 27 M**

... you listen to alternatives and to the scenarios and you get a certain feeling about ... what you think is right and you go for it. So it’s a feeling you get by listening to the options you have.

**Participant 25 F**

It’s a sense that it feels right or it doesn’t feel right, or there is something that is causing you a niggle or unease or a concern, even if you can’t quite put your finger on the specific issue immediately.

**Participant 6 M**

At the end of the day, it’s pretty hard to describe what intuition really is. I would say it’s ah ... it’s testing the proposition that’s before you against accumulated experience, training, history and, where you’re uncertain, what others might contribute to the discussions.
5.6.3.2 Assessing the judgements and weightings given to various data, propositions, presentations and perceptions given by others:

Participants were often in the position where they needed to rely on information presented by others and found intuition useful in assessing the information they received. For example:

**Participant 22 M**

*It may be that the person presenting the evidence was too risk-averse in the situation. So, you weigh that up, put a different weighting than that person did and that might be because you’re in a position to weigh the risks. I mean we are dealing with a lot of abstracts. It is not, as I said before, not readily determined fact. But at the end of the day, no matter how good the business case, if you go with the business case without making any further judgement … it’s not your judgement. You’re saying well, these guys know what they’re doing, so we will follow them.*

**Participant 1 F**

*We had the numbers and we went through a very rational process of doing a forecast every quarter and things, but just from kicking the tyres and wandering around, each of us was saying, these are the numbers and this is a forecast and we’d stick with the forecast, but I said … my sense is we are going to do better and he said, ‘yeah, my sense is too’.*

Participants pointed out that the information they relied on was never complete, nor was separate from the individuals that provided the information. Participants said they developed a ‘feel’, over time, for where there was missing data, incorrect data, and detecting the ‘spin’ others might place on data. Moreover, intuition was perceived to be useful in piercing the intentions of the messenger. Intuition was therefore acknowledged as a powerful and indispensible tool at the intersection of the subjective and objective (people and information). For example:

**Participant 3 F**

*As a leader, you do get filtered information and it’s unintentional, it’s just human nature. Everyone has their own perspectives and I think one of the key things in making a decision is assessing what are the key drivers, intentions and desires of the people that are providing you that information so you can recalibrate it accordingly, before you make the decision. I think that is a key step.*

**Participant 10 F**

*I guess the other thing is that, over a period of time when you’re working with people, you form judgements about how upfront they are with you. I’ve got 11 people who directly report to me, I can pinpoint those who will front up to me and give me every piece of information that I could possibly want and more, and others who perhaps have motives of protecting staff or something is going on, that means that they don’t necessarily tell you the information unless you specifically ask them.*

**Participant 6 M**

*There is a lot of snake oil salesman out there and some of them are very good at selling it.*

As a consequence of the importance of people in the construction and delivery of ‘information’, some participants placed a priority on face-to-face meetings wherever possible. For example:
Participant 3 F

So making a decision just on written submissions, I don’t think is the optimal way. I’m a big believer in face-to-face meetings etc. Not because people are lying or trying to do something fraudulent, but how they present the information and how they react to questions, how other people in the room respond to it as well, which in turn feeds into intuition.

Participant 9 M

... physically going down and having a look and smelling it with your own nose ... and seeing it, and get a sense of whether or not it’s right.

5.6.3.3 Intuition as a prompt for enquiry or caution

Participants indicated a reflexive use of intuition. A consistent theme in the data was intuition as a signal or warning that something was not right. Participants said they felt/knew that something was wrong, suspicious, did not add up or that the situation was not as it appeared. This would cause them to seek further information in order to confirm or deny their feeling. For example:

Participant 4 F

My intuition told me something, but it took me a week of testing that, of talking to people, of thinking about it and of reflecting on it and I came back to ... what was my first intuitive reaction to making that decision.

Participant 10 F

It will perhaps guide me to ask further questions. But for me it’s not a conscious process, it’s just the sort of gut feel that something else is going on here that I need to dig around a bit to satisfy myself.

Participant 23 F

I get a sense that something is not right or I get a sense, for example, that we need to go and dig and ferret a bit more for some information because I have got the sense that it might end up on a political agenda or it might hit the media or something like that.

Alternatively, intuition could cause participants to be cautious and/or develop alternative strategies in case their intuitions were proven correct. For example:

Participant 16 F

If my intuition was telling me that something was not going to work out the way that people were presenting it to me based on evidence, I would not totally ignore my intuition. I would not fully launch into a plan of action which denied my intuition. I would probably make some allowances for it, and I would take it in smaller steps.

5.6.3.4 Assessing people

The use of intuition was often discussed in relation to judgements about people. Participants placed a high priority on these judgements because they perceived that people were intertwined and critical to the success of all aspects of organisational strategy. A common example given was assessing an individual either for a position in the organisation or some other involvement or engagement with the company. Curriculum Vitae and other ‘evidence’ were considered in making these judgements,
however, not solely relied on because ‘sometimes the picture painted on a piece of paper is rosier than the reality, so you’ve got to see through that’, (Participant 19 M). For example:

**Participant 8 F**

*Is this person going to be detailed, make decisions, going to be an irritant, going to be a ‘mood Hoover’?*

**Participant 18 M**

*... if you don’t have their chemistry judgement in a positive sense in the first 30 minutes I don’t think you’ll go too far down the interview.*

Interestingly, the only participant from the sample, who said he regarded intuition with some scepticism, contradicted himself by subsequently admitting that he used intuition in staff selection and, moreover, that he considered this task to be central to his role as a leader:

**Participant 19 M**

*I suppose if I was to use intuition, and I certainly consciously don’t do it, but the area in which it’s most defined for me is in judging people. I’ve spent more time picking people to carry out tasks, than almost anything else.*

Female participants, in particular, placed a high value on their intuitive ability to identify individuals that were articulate but incompetent, dysfunctional, deceitful, corrupt or a potential ‘organisational psychopath’. For example:

**Participant 1 F**

*... and then I met him and I said to my fellow directors and to the managing director, I have a terrible sense about this man. I said, he can’t relate to me ... he gives me the sense of being slippery, shonky, whatever. And I don’t know why I felt that ... I just like, I just felt that. I said, look, I can’t give you chapter and verse but this man gives me the creeps. This man has trouble written all over him. And subsequently we had no end of trouble. He sued us, he did this, he did that ...*

**Participant 15 F**

*I was one of the board-panel that was interviewing for a new CEO. I wasn’t chair, I was the deputy chair. And the person came in and they were interviewed and there were saying all the right stuff, but something was telling me this guy wasn’t the right one ... And at the end of it I said, I can’t tell you why, and I’ll say to you it’s not if, but when this person fails we’re going to have to move quickly. And I said to them at the time that is just my intuition telling me that this is the wrong person. I have nothing to substantiate it because on paper this person looks fine. They hired this person and unfortunately he had to be removed fairly soon afterwards.***

**Participant 26 F**

*I’m not sure if I can tell you exactly what it is I’m responding to but I’ve been doing it long enough to know whether that person in front of me is real and can pull it off or they are full of the proverbial ... I’m almost always right.*

Assessments were also made in relation to their ‘fit’ with the culture of the organisation. This was perceived as very important because sometimes ‘good people were just not right for a particular job’ (Participant 22 M).
5.6.3.5 Interpersonal relations

Participants described how intuition was useful for interpreting the dynamics of interpersonal relations, particularly within the organisation. Intuition would often give participants insights into hidden agendas including moods, attitudes, desires, needs, motivations, and tensions between individuals (sexual or otherwise) – all of which may contradict written or spoken information. Commonly spoken of as reading subtext, participants described intuition as useful in sensing subtle signals – typically body language, intonation, gestures, or just picking up on a ‘vibe’ in an individual or organisation. As a consequence, participants would form rational strategies in response to these intuitions, sometimes in conjunction with further intuitions about what would and would not work. For example:

**Participant 2 M**
I don’t put it in terms of intuition but I put it in terms of body language and I put it in terms of subtext. If the physical language is denying what’s being said to you, which you believe?

**Participant 23 F**
I think it’s [intuition]) having the capacity to read between the lines [of what someone is saying].

**Participant 26 F**
Particularly in the context of where intuition means … what are the vibes in this organisation about how people are feeling? I mean, people will use words like, ‘what’s the temperature in the organisation’, you know ‘you need to listen to what’s not said ...’, ‘what are we not hearing right now’, and we do talk about that. We do use that kind of language in our executive group.

Some leaders perceived intuition to be useful for maximising the potential of individuals and groups within the organisation through sensing how to develop and match the skill sets, personalities and attributes of staff, as well as motivate members within a team. For example:

**Participant 8 F**
I come from a finance background, so let’s look at the composites of the assets. I mean you actually do want your assets working for you so that you’ve got an optimum outcome and output. You do not want those ... pieces or those resources working as a liability.

**Participant 15 F**
As a leader, you actually have to understand what you need and how you actually strategically engage and motivate to get the delivery that is required ... enabling people to feel they can actually contribute to it and understanding the various ways they will contribute.

Some participants said they intuited the implications of their decisions and how others might react. For example:

**Participant 3 F**
... there are themes and factors that aren’t measureable that you take into account when making decisions. I think also that ... thinking about how will this decision play out, how will employees feel about this, how will management feel about this, how will I feel about this, will the directors feel challenged by this? So thinking about the different perspectives of the stakeholders involves intuition.
Furthermore, intuition was reported by one participant to be useful in sensing how best to approach people and ‘construct a conversation’ (Participant 23 F) on a sensitive topic or emotionally-charged issue.

5.6.4 What significance and value do the participants ascribe to their use of intuition(s) in judgement, decision-making and leadership?

As a consequence of the uses discussed in the previous sections, all participants\(^{67}\) considered intuition(s) important to judgement and decision-making in their leadership roles. Participants explicitly stated their perception that intuition was an important component of their decision-making. A few examples are displayed below:

\textit{Participant 16 F}

... I think we don’t use intuition enough and I think we don’t understand enough about what generates intuition, and I think it’s incredibly important.

\textit{Participant 4 F}

... intuition is an important part of decision-making – or it is for me anyway.

\textit{Participant 9 M}

It’s when you overrule your gut ... you come unstuck

\textit{Participant 20 M}

I may be overstating this but I get the sense that it plays a big part in a lot of people’s decision-making ... from what I have observed.

\textit{Participant 24 M}

Oh it’s the key to the whole exercise ... It’s all done by intuition and human relationships basically.

\textit{Participant 15 F}

... there’s an osmosis between that intuition and decision-making in the more structured sense of leadership.

5.6.5 Gender and the use of intuition

As I have already stated, questions concerning gender and intuition were not included in the original interview schedule. However, the first female participant interviewed raised the significance of gender to intuition for her. Consistent with principles of Grounded Theory, the interview schedule and the sampling strategy evolved in response (as described in Chapter 4). Gender and intuition became a

\(^{67}\) One participant considered intuition important only in making judgements about people. This exception will be discussed in Section 5.8.1.
central theme in answering the research problem in terms of the disclosure of intuition. However, here I restrict the analysis of data to responses concerning perceptions about gender and intuition use.

Participants (equally both men and women) perceived that women were generally more intuitive or had ‘better’ intuition both in terms of quality and frequency. For example:

**Participant 26 F**

Practically none of my male executives have got it [intuition] and one or two of my female executives have got it, and one I recognise as being at the same sort of level that I have.

**Participant 20 M**

I have very strong opinions on this. I actually think that women have fantastic intuition.

Many respondents perceived that women had superior intuition, particularly in making judgements about people. For example:

**Participant 9 M**

I think that female beings have infinite advantage in terms of their instinct ... I’m specifically talking about chemistry. They have a sense of chemical makeup ... where they can sense a situation very quickly ... [or] a sense of discomfort with a particular person.

**Participant 26 F**

I think it’s a gender thing [intuition] ... maybe I’m also talking about people skills too and sensitivity to people’s feelings but I don’t observe intuition or sensitivity to ... interpersonal energy, which is what I think intuition is, is very strong amongst my male executives, and I’ve got a 50/50 split in my executive team.

Participants also reported that others perceived women as being more intuitive. For example:

**Participant 3 F**

I think you would have to talk to other women directors but, in general, women are known for their intuition.

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**Interview sequence**

**Martin**

It’s interesting that you say it might be a feminine quality.

**Participant 16 F**

Yes, I hesitated before I said that ... I think it is seen as on the feminine side of the ledger... Women are perceived as being more intuitive.
Furthermore, it was perceived by one participant (Participant 15) that intuition was ‘feminine’ and historically, a ‘domain of women’:

Interview sequence

**Martin (paraphrasing)**

... are you implying there’s a difference in relation to attitudes to intuition or the practice of intuition in terms of gender?

**Participant 15**

I think that that’s historical. I think that women were allowed to because it was expected of them to explore other sides ... So it was seen as a feminine trait.

Some participants believed that women were more accepting of the concept and the word in terms of attitude (which will be explored further in Part 2). For example:

**Participant 15**

I think you’ll find that, more often, previously women ... have used the word. And used the word to say I am intuitive or I’m not intuitive.

**Participant 12 F**

Women accept it [intuition], men don’t. That’s my experience [laughs].

**Participant 16 F**

It’s more acceptable to women generally.

Some female participants also perceived that women were more interested in, and had a greater intuitive sensitivity to their social environment. For example:

**Participant 13 F**

I do think that women pick up more cues about the environment than men.

**Participant 23 F**

... women work more on these subtleties for a range of different reasons and can probably tune into people.

Moreover, this sensitivity was based on concern and a sense of responsibility for the impact of their decisions had on other people. For example:

**Participant 14**

You [referring to men] don’t actually examine the reaction, and it could be instantaneous, of your decision on somebody sitting opposite you and, what’s more, you don’t care. Well I think women really do care about that ... I think women understand that environment is very important because decision-making is not an isolated event ...
Importantly, many participants attributed the perception that women had better intuition to a greater sensitivity to, or greater awareness of, their intuition. For example:

**Participant 16 F**

*Men can be absolutely as intuitive and rely on intuitive knowledge to exactly the same degree as women ... I think men do tend to not seek it out to the same extent, except some men, so that’s why they prefer to just round it all off in a word like judgement, where it’s included but not so well articulated.*

This participant perceived that men generally have good intuition but tended not to acknowledge it as such, labelling it ‘in my experience’, and ‘in my judgement’. The issue of sensitivity to, and consequent capacity for the expression of intuition(s), was found to be fundamental to answering the second main research question and will therefore explored further in Part 2 of this chapter.

**5.7 Personality types/ cognitive styles of individuals**

Initially no questions were asked in relation to cognitive style or types. However in the early interviews it emerged that participants often perceived the people they dealt with in terms of analytical or intuitive personality types. This construct will be referred to as cognitive type from this point. Both male and female participants talked about distinctly different types of individuals in relation to how they approached and talked about decision-making, regardless of gender. This is significant for later discussion and for the research problem because it will be shown that perception of the other (in terms of type) influenced how people talked about problems and decisions.

**5.7.1 Analytical types**

Participants described analytical types as people whom they perceived to be linear, methodical, disciplined, analytical, slow, logical, wooden, black-and-white and rigorous. I have highlighted these properties within the text of each quote below instead of displaying them under separate headings. This is because some of the utterances contain more than one characteristic or indicator in each:

**Participant 27 M**

*... from their personality style, they’re highly analytical people.*

**Participant 23 F**

*I think it does get back to, as I said earlier, personality type traits in people. I don’t consider myself to be black-and-white, I consider that I am, most the time, operating in the grey and I think that people who operate more in black-and-white type style or type approach would be less inclined to be intuitive.*
Participant 23 F

You lay out the facts to him and that’s what you do, you lay out the facts in a logical, disciplined approach. He is only responsive if that’s the kind of conversation.

Participant 14 F

... I did have a very black-and-white thinker. I mean she was from the financial world and cause and effect was always a linear equation ... people have got their brains hardwired in different ways, and they’re not just being bloody-minded, it’s just that they can’t see what you can see.

Participant 27 M

... then there’s the more analytical people, who just never feel comfortable only applying intuitive decisions. They just need the reassurance of some kind of logical thing ... and I don’t blame them ... that’s just their set up.

Participant 1 F

You know some people are very ‘wooden’ and they probably hide themselves away in a technical area because I think people choose, and there are some people who we’ve got who are terrific technically, you know terrific accountants, but you know they’re best left really with spreadsheets in the background ... they’re black-and-white.

Participant 15

I have had instances of people who have worked for me and have been incredibly analytical ... I have for example, people who are very analytical, very methodical, go through the steps rigorously, one, two and three.

5.7.2 Intuitive types

In contrast to analytical types, intuitive types we perceived to be more rapid or quick in their deliberations. However, according to participants, speedy decision-making should not be equated with rash decision-making. In terms of continual information gathering through communication, for intuitive types, decision-making was always ‘on’ (Participant 15) and adding to an information bank, and making connections in a holistic way that they were receptive to. For example:

Participant 15 F

My decisions can look as though they’re very quick ... that I’ve just come to a snap judgement. I said, what you have to understand is that I actually go into decision-making mode a lot earlier than you realise ... when you are actually continually communicating, you are actually always sourcing information. So it’s the ‘Sarah Lee’ effect I call it. I’m actually building up levels of information and knowledge all the time so that when I do have to make a decision, I actually have an information bank that I can refer to very quickly ... I look to everyone around me as an adjunct to mental processing capacity. So my ... mode of decision-making is on all the time.

Participant 18 M

I don’t set out to be, but I have the make-up to be a prompt decision maker.

Participant 26 F

... my decisions are based on the accumulation of a multitude of things that I have read, people I’ve talked to, conferences that I’ve been to, it all seems to synthesise together to a point where I just know that this will work or I just know it’s not going to ...
**Participant 14 F**

I’m certainly not getting into everyone’s business, but I actually have **continual communication** ... I’m a **connector** of ideas and a **connector** of people ...

**Participant 1 F**

Now I tried to explain to her [an analytical type] what that meant, and the best thing I could think of was that I was **picking up information** ... I have become more sensitive, I think, to actually reading **patterns in information** and I think constantly, sort of, form hypotheses, you **make patterns** and form hypotheses from information and you’re constantly checking against new pieces of information, whether that informs and supports the **pattern** that your forming.

**Participant 8 F**

... usually it’s **recognition of patterns** you have seen before and therefore are very familiar to you.

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**Interview sequence**

**Participant 23 F**

So I definitely listen more and observe more.

**Martin**

So it’s a **receiving** thing?

**Participant 23 F**

Yes. So when I talked before about being critically aware, you can’t be critically aware if you are focused on yourself and doing the talking I think.

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### 5.7.3 Conditions for types

Many participants who perceived distinctions in cognitive types amongst the people they worked with attributed the difference to the **personality** of the individual and their professional **training**. For example:

**Participant 6 M**

Look, my background and my training is as an engineer. And I would have to say ... I am a very deductive, logical sort of person.

**Participant 20 M**

... I think your own situation, training and experience in personality does influence a lot of your intuition. You know, I talk to people in the risk management area and they get horrified about the fact that you would even talk about intuition.

**Participant 17 M**

... we have a male head and a female deputy and I’m an English teacher and XXX is a chemist. And XXX has publicly said that her role is to keep my feet on the ground while my head is in the clouds [laughter].
One participant believed that these types were not fixed and that people could potentially be retrained:

Participant 27 M

... for them it's really difficult, because they probably have been trained ... more than others, in using logic and science to come to decision-making ... but I think with a bit of training they can redevelop these skills.

Interestingly, participants did not refer to gender in relation to cognitive types. In fact, some of the female participants, all of whom acknowledged their use of intuition and its importance to them, described themselves as intellectual and rational. Therefore, gender was not seen as a relevant condition to cognitive type. Figure 5.2 (below) diagrammatically represents cognitive types, their associated properties and antecedent conditions.

Figure 5.2: Properties of analytical and intuitive types

5.7.4 Summary of Part 1

Part 1 displayed and interpreted data concerning the way participants in the study defined, used and valued intuition in their decision-making and leadership. When prompted, some participants said they could relate to or did experience psychic intuition, ‘spiritual’ intuition and particularly insight. However,
when initially asked for their definition of intuition in relation to their role as leaders, participants overwhelmingly referred to intuition as a ‘gut feeling’. More specifically, participants experienced intuition as an internal, received, holistic, subconscious sense or feeling of knowing. Intuition was valued by participants as a feeling/knowing that flagged the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal, the timeliness of a decision and/or caution, and the need for action – particularly further investigation.

None of the participants considered their intuition to be infallible. However, all participants viewed it, at the very least, to be fairly reliable. A common theme for participants was learning to pay attention to and place trust in their intuitions when confronted with contradictory or ambiguous information and/or the strong views of others in a decision making process. Intuition use was seen as an iterative and evolving process of trusting their intuition, taking decisions, analysing outcomes and reflecting on them. The complementary use of intuition and analysis for decision making was a strong theme in the data to the extent that the boundary between them could become ‘blurred’. Despite this, a strong view emerged that whether intuition played a dominant role in judgement and decision-making, was, according to participants, dependent on both the nature and context of the decision.

Participants reported that analytical decision-making techniques were most appropriate for matters involving quantitative variables whereas intuition was perceived as most useful for assessing qualitative factors. Typically, these tended to be judgements and decisions concerning people. Whether or not intuition was likely to play a role in decision-making and judgement was also seen as conditioned by the perceived gravity of the decision, the level of experience and/or domain knowledge of the decision maker, precedent and the amount of information available, the complexity and ambiguity, urgency of the decision and whether the decision related to business or private matters.

Examples given by participants revealed five general categories or ways in which they used intuition. These were: assessing alternatives, proposals, data and information given; assessing the judgements and weightings given to various data, propositions, presentations and perceptions given by others; as a prompt for enquiry; in assessing people in relation to prospective involvement, and for judgements about interpersonal relations and dynamics.

Many participants, both male and female, perceived that women were generally more intuitive in terms of the quality and the frequency, particularly in judgements concerning people. However, some female participants believed that men were equally intuitive but did not acknowledge their intuition use to the same extent. Many participants also observed differences in approach to problem solving and decision-making irrespective of gender (cognitive type). The analysis showed that people with an analytical cognitive type were characterised by participants as linear, methodical, disciplined, analytical, slow,
logical, ‘wooden’, ‘black-and-white’ and rigorous. Participants also described people who were continually gathering information through communication, adding to an information bank of connections that they were intuitively receptive to. Participants attributed this difference to personality and training.

**Part 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?**

In Part 1 I examined the responses of participants in relation to how they described, defined and used intuition in their leadership and decision-making. In addition, I described and discussed the circumstances and contexts under which participants considered intuition use appropriate and gave examples of the ways in which they used it. I also indicated the importance of intuition for the participants, and participants’ perceptions of cognitive type and conditioning influences were displayed. Part 2 will present findings in relation to the following research issues:

- Drill-down exploration 2.1: What are the views and perceptions of participants about receptivity to, and the legitimacy of, intuition(s) in judgements and decision-making in their organisations?
- Drill-down exploration 2.2: What language is used by participants and those with whom they associate in relation to intuition(s)?
- Drill-down exploration 2.3: How easily are participants able to articulate their intuition(s) and experience of intuition?

Following this, models will be presented that integrate the findings from Part 1 and Part 2 in order to address and answer the research problem identified in Chapter 2 (Section 2.16).

**5.8 What are the views and perceptions of participants about the legitimacy of, and other people’s receptivity to, intuition(s)?**

**5.8.1 Attitudes of participants toward intuition**

All participants considered intuition important to their judgement and decision-making (Section 5.6.4). While this might suggest that all participants would accordingly have a positive attitude toward intuition, this was not entirely the case (discussed earlier in Section 5.6.3.4). Early in the interview, Participant 19 M suggested that ‘people do things without fully analysing them’ and that gut feel was used by people ‘as an excuse for inadequate analysis in some cases’. Moreover, later in the interview, he equated the expressions gut feeling and intuition with ‘muck and mystery’. This is despite the fact that
he admitted making intuitive judgements in relation to selecting people for roles in his organisation and, furthermore, that this task was central to his role as a leader, and one he considered core to the success of the organisation:

**Participant 19 M**

Well I suppose it is an interesting word [intuition] and I haven’t thought a great deal about it. My decision-making process is all about understanding where I am, understanding where I want to be, and the points in between and getting there. I suppose, if I was to use intuition, and I certainly consciously don’t do it, but the area in which it is most defined for me is in judging people, and ... I’ve spent more time picking people to carry out tasks, than almost anything else.

While he appears to contradict himself in the interview, I argue that this can be understood by delineating two arguments that Participant 19 M made. First, when Participant 19 M stated that people ‘use the word intuition as an excuse for inadequate analysis’ he did not imply that intuition was illegitimate, in and of itself, but suggested that the word, ‘in some cases’, can be used as an excuse for lack of effort and thus can be a ‘justification for guesswork’. The fact that he admitted using intuition in judgements about people suggests that he does accept a case for ‘legitimate’ intuition and its use.

Second, although Participant 19 M equated intuition with ‘muck and mystery’ he later stated his view that (his) intuition is ‘based on analysis and experience’. The participant gave an example of this in relation to people:

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Interview sequence

Martin
Would you say that you have a feel for somebody, would you use that expression? Or a gut feel about somebody? How would you describe it?

Participant 19 M
How would I describe it? Yes suppose that is a way of describing it. It’s certainly a judgement about somebody. You kind of look at them and listen to them and see how they relate and whether or not they can live up to the promise. So yes, I suppose yes, a feeling about them is quite right ... I think you get a feel for people that goes with all the other analysis as to whether or not the people are what either they or others say they are.
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The participant’s description of ‘judgement’ is consistent with the definitions of intuition offered by other participants: that it is based on previous analysis and experience, and that it involves a feel or feeling, which is then compared to other information available. In addition, I argue that the participant’s contradicting statements should be considered in the light of his admission that he had not thought
much about it. His discomfort with acknowledging intuition use should also be viewed in relation to the view that intuition can be perceived as mystical, esoteric and unscientific. This was a common theme when participants were asked for their perceptions about the attitudes of others to the concept of intuition. Attitudes to the concept of intuition will now be explored.

5.8.1.1 Perceived attitudes of others to the concept of intuition

The analysis revealed that participants had experienced significant diversity in relation to the receptivity of others toward the concept of intuition and the use of intuition in decision-making. Some participants linked attitude to intuition to cognitive type (discussed in Section 5.7). For example:

**Participant 15 F**

*I think that will, again, go back to the type of style that they have. Some will say its complete rubbish, others will say, look I don’t generally believe in intuition but there have been instances when … and others say, sure. You’ve got the whole spectrum there.*

Most participants however, believed there was not a general acceptance of intuition, rather, a high level of scepticism in individuals and organisations. Reasons given for this lack of acceptance of intuition, or the use of the word intuition, were that participants believed it carried with it connotations of being esoteric, unscientific and non-business-like.

**Participant 1 F**

*… they think it’s a bit wacky … it doesn’t make sense. … there’s been a lot of pressure on making management seem very scientific and it [intuition] seems to be tantamount to crystals.*

**Participant 10 F**

*It’s generally belittled. I think people think of intuition as something that’s a bit off with the pixies. There’s still not a wide acceptance in society today about intuition.*

**Participant 2 M**

*Oh, it’s shit, it’s crap. It’s why you don’t trust intuition. You can’t put a dollar sign against intuition. You can’t quantify intuition. It’s one of those things that you can’t say nine out of 10 for intuition … and yet it is the most valuable commodity.*

**Participant 4 F**

*Because it is not scientific, because it’s not necessarily based on fact, it’s not able to be backed up by research … Because it sounds … fluffy, non-business-like.*

Moreover, as indicated earlier, some female participants perceived that intuition was not accepted, and considered as inferior to analysis, because it is generally associated with emotion and women.

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68 Later in the analysis (Section 5.13) it will be shown that individuals with low ‘interiority’ are less aware of their feelings, and as a consequence, their intuition(s).
Participant 12 F
I think that gut feeling people can live with, but generally, it has a prefix – women’s intuition ... and it’s poooh poohed ... people think that if women get pregnant their brain fails out of their head. People think that if women make decisions based on intuition then it has no factual basis, it’s unsupportable, it’s just, you know, girl talk.

Participant 16 F
I think there is a view that it’s unreliable. I think there is a view that it is connected to emotions. I think there is a view that it is maybe a feminine characteristic and, with the enormous push to rely on some evidence, that it is moving away from evidence-based thinking, science, research ... I think it has been ... not a word that has a full acceptance, even just a titch condescending or derogatory to rely on it.

Participant 4 F
Because it’s voodoo, because it’s weird, because it’s a girl thing.

This finding can be considered significant because it was one that was repeated by the women in the study. Some participants, both male and female, as suggested earlier, believed that this association of women with intuition had a historical basis:

Participant 15 F
I think that that’s historical. I think that women were allowed to [talk about intuition] because it was expected of them to explore other sides ... and that was safe and let them have their intuition because it never actually impacted on anything that was significant. So it was seen as a feminine trait, again because it was esoteric ...

Participant 7 M
Their socialisation over millennia is very different and I think it [intuition] is a resource that they [women] use.

Participants perceived a need to justify and account for the decisions they make in a scientific, evidence-based, rational and business-like fashion, which conflicted with the nature of intuition.

Participant 1 F
There’s been a lot of pressure on making management to seem very scientific and it [intuition] seems to be tantamount to crystals.

Participant 27 M
... sometimes you have to justify why you made the decision you made and there’s still not a wide acceptance in society today about intuition.

Participant 5 M
Yeah, there is certainly ... [a general suspicion of intuition] and it comes back to this idea that you’ve gotta be able to rationalise and verbalise, articulate your assumptions and your reasoning processes, and if you came forward and said, well, I’ve got an approach which is based on something you can’t see, you can’t touch, you can’t articulate, you know, trust me ... it wouldn’t fly.

Participant 26 F
So at the end of the day the numbers stack up and we should have written it off, but my gut feeling was that we would get through this. That’s not what people want to hear.
Thus, on one hand, participants perceived intuition(s) to be legitimate for their own decision-making and this was a consequence of their own experience. However, they also perceived that many others considered it illegitimate. Participants explained this perception of illegitimacy in terms of education and training. Attitude to intuition and antecedent conditions are represented in Fig. 5.3 below:

**Figure 5.3: Attitudes toward intuition and antecedent conditions**

![Diagram showing the relationship between intuition, antecedent conditions, and trust through use.]

**5.8.2 Consequences of negative attitudes**

As a consequence of this disjuncture, most participants (men and women) suggested that there might not be a great willingness to admit use of intuition, especially in formal business settings and larger organisations.

*Participant 16 F*

'It’s not usually referred to in the discussion ... You talk about the evidence, what is the evidence, and you ask people what they think etc. How does that make sense to them and I guess that’s where you’re calling on your intuition ... But it is interesting, because in those formal kinds of meetings, particularly business meetings, the word is seldom used.'
Participant 8 F
I have not heard anybody, in my experience, ever stand up and admit to it [intuition], with the possible exception of entrepreneurs ... big corporate businesses, they would shy away from it.

Participant 9 M
I think your intuition isn’t generally shared. I don’t know why. I think intuition is a very private thing.

Participant 6 M
I think it’s understood rather than talked about.

Some participants suggested that attitudes to intuition were negative enough to invoke ridicule:

Participant 12 F
... no female in the boardroom would ever want to have her decisions referred to as ... based on women’s intuition. You would die a thousand deaths if you thought anybody thought that’s what you were doing.

Participant 15 F
If you can’t rationalise your ... intuition, then you’re frightened of being ridiculed. Whether you are correct or not, you’re still frightened of being ridiculed. Perhaps it’s a hangover from the old witchcraft days. What I have noticed is that when someone turns round and says, ‘I’ve got a feeling but I don’t know why or I can’t justify it’, I think that they feel apologetic for their feelings. And that’s because I think they’re afraid of ridicule.

Participant 22 M
People don’t want to think that they are going to be seen as wacko, psychic.

Participant 27 M
Probably a lot of people will look at you and give you that funny smile.

5.8.3 Changing perceptions of intuition

As seen in the previous section, many participants perceived significant scepticism towards intuition as a concept, as well as the use of intuition in business decision-making. Nevertheless, some participants said they had noticed a shift in attitudes over recent decades toward increasing receptivity. For example:

Participant 16 F
I think it is changing quite furiously [the collective attitude to intuition].

Participant 14 F
I don’t think anyone would come out, like they might have five years ago, and say it’s ‘hocus pocus’.

Some participants attributed changing attitudes to increased diversity in the workplace and a need to embrace this diversity through a more inclusive and all-encompassing approach to leadership. For example:

Participant 15
We are undergoing a lot of change ... It’s probably being led by the gender and diversity initiatives ... you’ve actually had to evolve your leadership style because you’ve got to engage all the people who
work for you. And a lot of people have gone kicking and screaming, and some people are still kicking and screaming over it. But there is a general recognition that there is a broadening of a human skill base.

Participant 20 M

Yes it’s changing but it is very slow. The whole organisational culture, trying to break down barriers and getting people to collaborate more, to try to create more freedom of expression.

However, some women in the study were adamant that attitudes to intuition had not changed in the term of their career.

5.9 What language is used by participants and by those with whom they associate to talk about intuition(s)?

5.9.1 Disclosure of intuition(s)

As a consequence of perceived negative connotations of the word intuition, many participants said they would not disclose the role of intuition in their decisions. This was particularly relevant in the construction of statements issued to the public. For example:

Participant 3 F

I’m sure you know how much time goes into the wording of public statements ... it often is how you express it ... my gut feeling was that we would get through this, that’s not what people want to hear. Once again it’s how it’s phrased and sold, um... I think the media would think you are being wishy washy if you expressed it that way.

Participants perceived that the words experience and particularly judgement were acceptable in business contexts. For example:

Participant 1 F

I suppose it’s more comfortable for people to talk about judgement than to talk about intuition.

Interview sequence

Participant 3 F

If you had to classify it you would probably say experience, because that’s what people want to see.

Martin

Or you might say judgement?

Participant 3 F

Yes, that’s right, judgement. I think that comes back to judgement in the corporate and legal ambits of decision-making ... I think it’s always been around and valued but perhaps just talked of in different terminology.

Martin

In terms of judgement and experience?
Participant 3 F
That’s right. I just think it’s, I just think it’s people’s level of comfort with different language and what they’d better relate to, in terms of communicating a concept, they will talk about something that is perhaps more precise and descriptive about what they are trying to encapsulate. It might be just the vagueness of the term.

As pointed out by one participant, judgement is consistent with Section 181 of the Corporations Act (2001) where the term ‘business judgement’ is defined as any decision to take or not take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation’.

Many participants acknowledged that for them, intuition was an integral part of judgement. However, this was implicit and understood rather than explicit. For example:

Participant 6 M
I think it’s understood rather than talked about [intuition]; this is not somebody we ought to be doing business with, that’s judgement.

Participant 16 F
When we talk judgement, maybe everyone around the room realises that intuition is a part of judgement. In fact, intuition is maybe a dominant part of judgement that makes you end up in one position as opposed to another, where you can’t always necessarily articulate why you’re there totally, confidently, not with science or a rational argument … I think it’s a very subtle and subconscious part of judgement.

Interview sequence

Participant 12 F
You would have no concern if you thought people thought you are making decisions based on life’s experiences and your business experience because that’s what you are there for. But wrapped up in that, I think, there is always a bit of intuition. But it is unacknowledged and remains unacknowledged.

Martin
So if you said it’s my judgement that would be okay?

Participant 12 F
That’s fine.

Martin
But if you said it’s my women’s intuition?

Participant 12 F
Not fine.
Participant 16 F

... people say ‘what does your experience tell you ...’ I doubt that a journalist or an analyst would pursue the basis of that judgement to the extent that intuition would ever be mentioned. And then it would be spelled out as experience rather than intuition.

Therefore, using the words judgement and experience allowed participants to articulate their intuitions in an acceptable way without explicitly acknowledging the role of intuition.

5.9.2 Gender difference in the expression of intuition(s)

Although participants, in general, did not explicitly disclose their use of intuition, particularly in public statements, it was also found that women were comfortable with words that reflected the feeling of knowing associated with intuition. The women in the study perceived that they and other women were, in general, more comfortable with using words like ‘my feeling is’, ‘my sense is’, ‘this doesn’t feel right’, particularly amongst other women. For example:

Participant 12 F

‘I don’t know about that, it just doesn’t feel right’, that’s often an expression that women use when their intuition is saying, have another think.

Participant 4 F

I mean I often say, for example, that my sense is ... It’s a term I use a lot. My sense is that this is the right thing to do, or my sense is we have got a problem here. I use that term quite frequently, and I think, when I think about it, that’s probably based on an intuitive reasoning.

Participant 16 F

I think women are willing to admit that they are using intuition much more than men. And again, I think this is where it comes back to that men would prefer to use the word judgement because they think it’s more rational and less emotional.

Some participants argued that women, in general, used different language than men; often more feeling based (depending on the context, which will be explored later). Many participants (both men and women) attributed this to women being more ‘in touch’ and comfortable with their feelings, including intuition(s). These participants claimed their language reflected a greater sensitivity to, and awareness of, feelings, emotions and intuitions. For example:

Participant 8 M

I think women are more attuned to, in general, the emotional stuff around discussions.

Participant 12 F

I just think that women, women have a deeper sense of... of how we feel about things. We’re more, more in touch with feeling okay, feeling not okay, and we express those views. We talk about feelings with our colleagues, our mates etc anyway. We use different words – I don’t like that, that doesn’t feel right to me, that sort of thing. That’s how we get comfortable with it. So I think it is a bit of self-awareness ... In a decision-making process around the board table where there are all women, nobody really minds if you interject and butt in and we tend to finish each other’s conversations etc. It’s more inclusive in terms of listening to what people have to say ... I can’t recall whether the word [intuition] was actually used but it’s quite clearly around the discussion. The way in which things are talked
about is more around feelings, I think all this feels right to me, I think we should give it a go, why don’t we have a go at that sort of thing, it’s very different language.

However, one participant observed that ‘gut feel’ or ‘gut feeling’ was a term that was increasingly used by men because of its visceral, physical and muscular connotations that might appeal to men and because it appears to be distinct from the feminine and emotional connotations of the word intuition:

Participant 15

I’m noticing men starting to use it more and more now, you know, I have a feeling or my intuition told me, or the gut said. Often they’ll put it into the physical because I think the physical is more comfortable for men and they will turn around and they will say my gut reaction is.

This distinction in relation to gender and the ability and willingness to express intuitive feelings was a strong theme. In the following sections I will argue that this perceived difference is important and one that can be observed by comparing utterances of men and women in the study.

5.10 How easily are participants able to articulate their intuition(s)?

In previous sections I showed that women were perceived by many participants to have better\(^69\) intuition(s) than men, to be more likely to use intuition and that they would be more likely to use the word intuition or words that can be seen to imply intuition, particularly ‘feeling’ words. I also found that many participants, both male and female, believed that women were more aware of or ‘in touch’ with their feelings than men – more comfortable with the interior world of feelings and intuitions than men. Moreover, in relation to this study, women were perceived to be more willing and interested in articulating their feelings, including intuitions. For example:

Participant 26 F

... the women want to talk about what they’re feeling and experiencing and the blokes want to talk about [starts laughing], you know, they get very irritated by this process because they don’t want to talk about this stuff.

Significantly, some female participants perceived that this lack of awareness of feelings resulted in a failure to acknowledge the role that intuition played in their judgement and decision-making. For example:

Participant 12 F

I don’t think men are close enough generally, to deal with intuition. I don’t think they acknowledge it particularly well, some do, but generally, they don’t – they like the facts, they like the data, they like statistics.

\(^{69}\) Better intuition in terms of quality and frequency as perceived by participants.
**Participant 16 F**

*I think men are less aware of the fact of intuition in their thinking – less aware of it. But I think it is there and I think they do rely on it. But they just don’t call it that and they don’t necessarily... they haven’t thought it through, what it is that is driving their thinking.*

This finding is highly relevant for addressing the research problem because if men are less in touch with their feelings and do not acknowledge intuition as well as women then they are consequently less able to articulate their intuition(s). The degree of awareness of ‘feelings’ (which would include intuitions and emotions) and the extent to which individuals are interested in, and willing and/or capable of articulating this internal awareness is a concept that I will now begin to develop.

### 5.11 Interiority (core category)

I contend that the perceptions displayed in the previous section in relation to gender and intuition are supported by a comparison of responses by participants to questions about their internal experience of intuition. Based on the data displayed in Table 5.2 (below) I suggest that the responses of the female participants imply a greater orientation to, awareness of, and/or a more developed ability and willingness to describe and articulate their subjective experience of intuition. Furthermore, this difference can be observed irrespective of age, experience and activity/industry.

Moreover, female rather than male participants considered the realm of feelings (including both emotion and intuition) to be important to acknowledge in decision-making. I do not mean to assert that the male participants are not aware of their intuitions or that they do not use intuition as often or as effectively as the women. Rather, my interpretation of the evidence is that the extent to which these men and women are aware of and acknowledge the feeling component of intuition is different. Put simply, the data in the table suggests that women are indeed ‘in-touch’ with their feelings. High interiority represents, at the intrapersonal level, a greater orientation to the inner realm of feelings and intuitions, and consequently a greater awareness and willingness to more effectively articulate and perhaps utilise them. In the words of one female participant, ‘I just think that women, women have a deeper sense of... how we feel about things’ (Participant 12 F). Interiority became the core category of the analysis and core concept of the thesis that will ultimately be used to answer the research problem.

Table 5.2 (below) displays the utterances of male and female participants for the purpose of comparison. Column 1 contains responses to questions concerning how participants subjectively experienced intuitions. The quotes are arranged in such a way (male/female alternately down the page)

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70 This theme emerged during the pilot interviews.
so that a comparison is easily made. The columns to the left indicate participant identifier, gender and whether I consider the participant has indicated a high degree of interiority. I contend that a comparison of the data in Column 1 supports the perceptions of participants, which are displayed in Column 2, that male participants, in general, were not as willing and/or able to describe their internal experience. However, the last rows of the table display data from two male participants who I deemed to have intrapersonal interiority. These participants will be discussed in Section 5.11.4.

The utterances contained in the table will show that some of the male participants appeared to avoid the question. Others did not understand the question, thought it was a strange question or gave minimal responses. Indeed, one male participant (Participant 19 M) began tapping his fingers on his chair indicating some discomfort and/or tension. In contrast, the female participants were both willing and able to articulate their internal, subjective experience of intuition. This was even more remarkable considering the subtle and elusive nature of the phenomenon.
Table 5.2: Contrasting capacity and/or willingness to articulate the internal experience of intuition(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant No.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Interiority</th>
<th>Column 1: Responses to questions concerning their internal experience of intuition</th>
<th>Column 2: Perceptions of participants in relation to gender, awareness of feelings and intuition(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>... I think intuition, for me, is not something that is not just necessarily a gut reaction or just a reaction ... it comes from thinking deeply about ... experiences in your life ... for me intuition is almost a physical reaction ...</td>
<td>I think women know themselves a lot better than men do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>[avoiding or not understanding the question] Well my view is, quite often, there is a person putting forward a proposition or a couple of people. If they can't explain clearly and define and talk about the risks and ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>[long pause] the feeling of uncomfortable is ... [pauses to think and mumbles] ... partly what you would definitely call mental, 'cos you just think ... ahh ... but it's a feeling ... its sensation if you like. I don't know how you would describe the feeling ... it just doesn't feel right. Something isn't right, something is nagging at me at the back of my mind ...</td>
<td>I think women are more attuned to, in general, the emotional stuff around discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Well, it either feels right or it feels wrong – it's black and white.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>It's ... what would I liken it to? It's a sense of accomplishment, like preparing a good meal where you know it's a really good meal and you know that people are going to be satisfied ... it's a bit like that.</td>
<td>We've just had a change of CEO ... The former CEO was a male and a scientist and a lawyer, and our current is a female and a social worker and a criminologist. It's much easier to have those sorts of conversations [intuitions and feelings] with her.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2: (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant No.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Interiority?</th>
<th>Column 1: Responses to questions concerning their internal experience of intuition</th>
<th>Column 2: Perceptions of participants in relation to gender, awareness of feelings and intuition(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Have you read, I’m sure you have, a book written by Malcolm Gladwell? [apparently avoiding the question]</td>
<td>You know the male of the species ... all six of us or all seven of us would be marching down one way and there is a couple of women on the team saying ... do we need to think about this in a different way ... and whether it’s coming from left-field thinking, I don’t know, left brain-right brain stuff or just the emotional side, but I really trust their judgement [women].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[Following a second attempt] Ahh, typically its, ahh, how does it feel to me? Ahh, [pause], when it’s not there, ahh, it’s evident it’s not there. In other words, a certainty of non-knowledge, so the absence of it is interesting!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>... it’s just, um, an innate view that you just form. It’s a bit like you meet somebody and you like this person or you don’t like this person, and it may well just be a feeling that you get from words that they use, whether they stand too close you or they don’t ...</td>
<td>Women are more in touch with their own feelings than men are. Not all men, I am not categorising the male of the species this way but, often, women are more in touch with their feelings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>I don’t think it is an experience ... Well, I suppose if you look at me, I don’t spend a lot of time thinking about it ... these things come to you ...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Not physical, and that you don’t feel like it’s a blow or a bit of a wrench or anything, it’s just unsettling in the guts, a level of discomfort in the guts, which probably moves to the brain because I do, I spend a lot of time in my head.</td>
<td>I would never suggest that men aren’t intuitive, I just think that women work more on these subtleties for a range of different reasons and can probably tune into people because they have to do that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>I don’t see that it’s an experience. I wouldn’t say that it’s a huge sensation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2: (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant No.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Interiority?</th>
<th>Column 1: Responses to questions concerning their internal experience of intuition</th>
<th>Column 2: Perceptions of participants in relation to gender, awareness of feelings and intuition(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>[pause] I guess you go back, and to some extent it is a cliché but a gut feeling is probably not a bad way of describing it. It's a sense that it feels right or it doesn't feel right, or there is something that is causing you a niggling unease or a concern, even if you can't quite put your finger on the specific issue immediately. Usually working away at it you can probably uncover the source of it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>... you still yourself and you kind of wait for the inner turmoil to kind of settle, like stirring up the mud in a pond or something and if you just sit with it, you can be clear about what it is that you are experiencing, if you allow yourself to be truly present both to the yourself and to the other person ...</td>
<td>I've got a 50/50 split in my executive team. And it creates some difficulty because the women want to talk about what they're feeling and experiencing and the blokes want to talk about (starts laughing), you know, they get very irritated by this process because they don't want to talk about this stuff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>... you listen to alternatives and to the scenarios and you get a certain feeling about what you think is right and you go for it.</td>
<td>The respondent observed that he thought that women had better emotional intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>I think I like to call it a deep knowledge because they think you are looking into the depths and it is there that you find it.</td>
<td>Men can be absolutely as intuitive and rely on intuitive knowledge to exactly the same degree as women. But it comes back to ... actually seeking it out ... I think men do tend to not seek it out to the same extent, except some men, so that's why they prefer to just round it all off in a word like judgement where it's included but not so well articulated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5.2: (concluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant No.</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Interiority?</th>
<th>Column 1: Responses to questions concerning their internal experience of intuition</th>
<th>Column 2: Perceptions of participants in relation to gender, awareness of feelings and intuition(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>I’m not sure that I would [describe the experience of intuition], quite frankly, I’ve never thought about it in those terms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Just being silent and still is wonderful and that’s when things speak to you ... well intuition is sort of like trying to suss out what is not being said, the sub-text if you like, the body language, the kind of the important stuff that is not being expressed that probably is more important than the stuff being expressed. It’s a process and the trick is to read that as well as the overt agenda.</td>
<td>[in response to a question about intuition use and gender] Well, gender is a kind of very interior thing ... I think men have the feminine side, which is probably the intuitive side, and women have the feminine side, which is the intuitive side. But it’s not so much to do with gender, it’s to do with the balance of yin yang, it’s to do with the balance of how they are at that time. I see it as male within the context of male-female as one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>My profession or training is very technical and analytical, so I guess I would like to think that the process is an intellectual process, but it ends up being what you call gut feel. But often I think that there is a strong emotive element to that. I need to be careful that the emotive part doesn’t take over the intellectual part ... intuition is most powerful in the cool of the day and you can separate out all the other influences on you. And you can sit there and sort of say, well, how do I really feel about this and draw on all of those elements rather than just sit there and be angry or upset.</td>
<td>And I am probably generalising here but in general they [women] are better at self-awareness of intuition and there is probably a stronger emotional context to their intuition than in men.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.11.1 The need for a new concept

As can be seen in Table 5.2, participants often struggled to find appropriate words for their subjective experience of intuition. I attribute this, in part, to the lack of language descriptive of the internal realm of feelings. Moreover, I purport that no English word currently expresses the fullness of the concept I seek to develop here, and this has motivated my adoption and adaptation of the word interiority. I will subsequently present the properties that I wish to attach to the use of the word interiority in the context of this study and display evidence that justifies the inclusion of these properties. However, for now, I will focus my analysis on the terms participants did use and through this analysis argue that these terms are unsuitable and/or inadequate.

‘Self-awareness’ was a term participants used in relation to a critical assessment of their own qualities and limitations. For example:

Participant 23 F
... self-aware in terms of what your own limitations might be ...

Participants also used ‘self-awareness’ in the sense of being aware of internal process, emotions and feelings, and in relation to the qualities and experience of an individual’s interior life. For example:

Participant 20 M
... that whole self-awareness bit is critical because often people ... aren’t even aware of all of the things that are going on inside them.

However, in my view, the interiority extends beyond these two usages. At the intrapersonal level, it would include reflexivity, or acting on their internal awareness in decision-making contexts. For example:

Participant 3 F
Yes, I think the more you are self-aware the better you are able to weight it [intuition] appropriately amongst other considerations in the decision-making process.

Some respondents used the expression ‘emotional intelligence’ to describe the relation to this reflexivity based on their internal awareness. For example:

Participant 13 F
I think I have developed my own personal emotional intelligence to a fairly high level. So, I can extract ... my personal feelings from decisions.

However, emotional intelligence is defined as the ability to reason about and manage emotions in oneself and others (Mayer, Roberts & Barsade 2007; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso 2008). The concept that I wish to develop differs from emotional intelligence in a number of ways. I intend interiority to extend beyond emotions to encompass all feelings, including intuitions, which could be equated with the
experiential cognitive system explored in Chapter 2. Moreover, emotional intelligence places *primacy on reasoning* about and *managing emotions*, whereas I place primacy on the *orientation* and awareness of feelings. I consider the ability to reason about feelings as a consequence and an advantage of interiority. This important distinction will be further explored in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.3.5).

There a number of definitions given for the word ‘interiority’. In general interiority is defined in geometric terms referring to the interior space or qualities of an object or thing (see, for example, Little, Fowler & Coulson 1965; Delbridge & Bernard 1998). However, interiority is also defined in terms of consciousness\(^1\) (Wilber 1995) or the inner or psychic, subjective life of an individual (see, for example, Olkowski & Morley 1999) as opposed to exteriority, which pertains to the physical, material world ‘out there’. I now present a more detailed examination of the qualities (e.g. internal awareness) described by the participants that, I argue, are the properties associated with intrapersonal interiority.

### 5.11.2 Properties and importance of intrapersonal ‘interiority’ for leadership, decision-making and intuition use

I propose that the properties of interiority are: **self-knowledge**; the ability to be aware of and **acknowledge emotion**; the ability to **distinguish between intuition and emotion** and the ability to ‘**surface**’ intuition(s). Although some of these concepts have been referred to previously, I present them more fully here. Following this, I will detail how participants used interiority to their advantage in their judgement and decision-making.

#### 5.11.2.1 Self-knowledge/awareness

Many participants indicated an understanding that all individuals come to decision-making with a frame of reference based on culture, experience, education, personality and so on. Participants acknowledged that their own approach to decisions is necessarily circumscribed by the limitations associated with that frame of reference. Interiority, in terms of the awareness participants had about their own personality, biases and predilections, mitigated the impact of these limitations through an ability to remain open to alternative points of view presented by others, as well as sources of information that may conflict or contradict those of the participants. For example:

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\(^1\) Wilber (1995) uses the word interiority to denote the evolution of consciousness that occurs synchronous with outer biological, physical evolution, which Wilber accuses systems theorists of omitting. As biological evolution proceeds to higher levels of complexity, so does the concomitant ‘depth’ of consciousness.
Participant 3 F

Look, I think it’s crucial to recognise that everyone has blind spots. My intuition will say what needs to be done from a business perspective. I also am on the board of a not-for-profit and I have to remind myself that I am much more financially driven and commercial-outcome driven than many on the board of the not-for-profit. So being aware of that helps me in making the decisions I might make. Everyone has their own biases.

Participant 25 F

I think having an insight into your own character and approach to issues, because equally you need to be very open and mindful of other views, particularly if they’re important decisions. So self-awareness in terms of being not closed down to other sources of information ...

Participant 23 F

self‐aware in terms of what your own limitations might be, or what you might invite in or what you might not invite in, in terms of contextual information or what you might have blocks to actually seeing or not seeing.

I argue that the self‐awareness these participants refer to can be distinguished from an awareness of the qualities and dimensions of their own inner feelings and emotions. What they describe is a quality of ‘objective’ self‐awareness – an awareness of themselves as others might see them rather than a subjective self‐awareness which, is encompassed by following sections.

5.11.2.2 Acknowledgement of feelings

As earlier stated I have defined feelings as an overarching term to represent, consistent with the Macquarie Concise Dictionary psychological definition, ‘consciousness without regard to thought’ (Delbridge & Bernard 1998, p. 405). This definition is also consistent with the experiential cognitive system (Epstein 1998) and, more importantly, how participants used the word. Feelings would therefore include emotions, visceral influences and intuitions. Interiority and awareness of intuition will be addressed in later sections. Orientation to feelings has been discussed. This section addresses how participants with high interiority described and placed value on the ability to be aware of and acknowledge the ‘feeling’ or emotional context of a given decision context. For example:

Participant 8 M

I think, at the end of the day, successful business people need to be relatively self‐aware because you need to be able to discount the emotion around something.

Participant 25 F

Well, I don’t think that in a business context it is generally appropriate for a leader to be very emotional in their decision‐making. It is appropriate to recognise there will be a level of emotion around different situations but I think, at the end of the day, having a very clear head and having a clear mind in making decisions is pretty important.
5.11.2.3 Distinguishing intuition and emotion

In relation to intuition use, some participants reported that it was important not only to acknowledge and account for their own emotions but also to differentiate between feelings that arise, particularly in stressful decision-making situations. I argue that individuals with high interiority, because of their orientation to their feeling life, are more aware of and more in touch with their feelings. And, as a consequence, these individuals have developed greater ability to discriminate between them. I argue that individuals with high interiority are able to recognise, discriminate between, and categorise their feelings. For example:

*Participant 20 M*

And if I think about the example that you just gave, really acting in an angry situation, I wouldn’t say that is intuitive ... intuition is most powerful in the cool of the day and you can separate out all the other influences on you. And you can sit there and sort of say, well, how do I really feel about this, and draw on all of those elements rather than just sit there and be angry or upset ...

*Participant 13 F*

Most of those things I have managed to get rid of in my life. If someone’s rude to me, I will put them in their place. So for me intuition is not about my own personal emotional state but the feeling I have around the circumstances of decision ...

As will be discussed in the next section, the advantage of this for participants could be described as a self-mastery that allowed participants to draw on their feelings in a way that prevented being driven unconsciously by them. For example:

-----------------------------------------------

*Interview sequence*

*Participant 13 F*

... bringing your own personal stuff to the thing, which is jealousy, competition, something or other ... and a sense of I've got to please somebody. So, those are the sort of downsides to feelings.

*Martin*

So, it sounds like, as you mentioned before, that you need a degree of self-knowledge to be able to distinguish between those things [feelings]?

*Participant 13 F*

I do.

-----------------------------------------------

*Interview sequence*

*Martin (paraphrasing)*

So you are saying that some people can’t differentiate between intuition and emotion?
Participant 20 M
Yes. I think it’s that self-awareness issue.

5.11.2.4 Surfacing of intuition(s)

Intuition has been previously discussed as a phenomenon that is received, rather than sought, that comes to one from the subconscious, without any apparent will on the part of the recipient. However, some female participants reported that they were not only aware of their gut feelings, but were able to further ‘surface’ their intuitions. These participants described how they were able to bring into consciousness the rationale, the background, the information or the experiences that had brought them to their intuitive understanding. For example:

Participant 15 F
It’s as though that comes up and then you’ve actually received that warning, and it’s enough that you realise, oh this is significant. And it’s an iterative process I guess and then you actually start interrogating the intuition.

Participant 26 F
I think a huge proportion of my judgement is around whatever intuition actually means but the sense of it feels right and then reflecting, well, why do I think that, and then kind of after that immediate response, then arranging the information that I’ve got in my head that has led me to that conclusion ...

The surfacing of intuition can be seen as a paradoxical active/receptive process whereby participants were ‘active’ in choosing to be receptive. In this way intuitions could come forward or mature, develop or emerge from the sub-conscious into consciousness. Here I assert that the dichotomous nature of the English language fails to adequately represent participants’ experiences.

Participant 1 F
I think in the early stage ... you get a sense ... only as it matures does it become more conscious and rational. So I think in the early stages it’s about just being. I think I’m pretty experienced in this kind of role, and it’s just sometimes waiting for more information. You’ve got a sense of something and it’s waiting until more information comes.

I would like to draw the readers’ attention, in particular, to the remark, ‘it’s just about being’. I argue that this is a significant statement and one that indicates the participant’s subjective orientation and the absence of analysis or reasoning about her feeling. The participant was comfortable to ‘sit’ with the feeling, or perhaps ‘was’ the feeling. Orientation therefore indicates a state where the feeling and the participant are not separate, in the absence of conscious thought ‘about’ it.

Two participants said they would seek time alone and in quiet environments where they could allow their feelings to mature and come forward into consciousness. For example:
Participant 16 F

I think that the active pursuit is self-awareness and taking the time and the reflecting, which quite often means stepping aside, being on your own – taking time out just to try and get the whole thing in perspective and to get all of that kind of deep knowledge to come to the surface and to be part of the active decision-making.

I argue this receptive/active dynamic can be seen as a continuation of the intuition/analysis theme of complementary use discussed in Section 5.6.1.

The participants, who I have previously deemed as high in interiority, perceived the necessity of receptivity for the maturation process of intuitions and this had consequences for their leadership by way of creating time for quiet reflection where possible. For example:

Participant 16 F

Quiet, and time for reflection, and being in a place where you can reflect. And so, I think it’s often good to make sure that there is time to insist that, okay, this is where we’ve got to today. But if we don’t absolutely have to make the decision now, let’s just regroup tomorrow or this afternoon or in an hour’s time when we’ve had time to reflect.

Quiet time alone according to these female participants assisted in allowing intuitions to ‘surface’. For example:

Participant 26 F

... You still yourself and you kind of wait for the inner turmoil to kind of settle, and you can gradually, you know, like stirring up the mud in a pond or something, and if you just sit with it it’ll settle and you can be clear about what it is that you are experiencing ... If I pause long enough I can explain what it is that’s led me to that conclusion.

These participants indicated that their awareness of their inner state (interiority) had evolved or increased over time. This can be seen in connection to a personal maturation process or evolution that had deepened over time. For example:

Participant 16 F

I think I’ve become much more aware of it, and maybe I wasn’t aware of it 20 years ago.

Participant 1 F

I think, in terms of self-awareness ... I mean I suppose, in terms of monitoring my own personal state, as I got older I became much more aware ...
One participant observed differences in others in terms inner orientation and personal maturation through self-knowledge and self-awareness:

**Participant 26 F**

I think there are some people who are not terribly well developed human beings in terms of personal maturation. I don’t say that pejoratively or critically, it just is. They don’t reflect very deeply, they don’t know themselves very deeply.

### 5.11.3 Advantages of interiority

The advantages of a high degree of interiority for participants were five-fold. First, participants perceived that if they were able to acknowledge the emotional context of a decision it would be less likely to impact their own decision-making process, regardless of whether it involved intuition or analysis. For example:

**Participant 3 F**

... I think good leaders are able to separate the emotion, take it into account in making decisions ... it’s one of those factors, you definitely consider it but it doesn’t drive you ...

Second, according to one participant, the ability to distinguish between intuition and other feelings (such as visceral influences) allows individuals to recognise when their motivation is greed rather than intuition. For example:

**Participant 20 M**

I think people just use it [the word intuition], particularly in the financial world, when intuition is related to greed. People will say, well, this is a great thing to do and they are purely influenced by greed. And they will say, I know it’s the right thing to do.

Third, the ability to surface or externalise intuitions is that they become more available to the rational mind rendering the intuitions able to be articulated, evaluated and weighed up against other considerations. For example:

**Participant 20 M**

I think to be able to recognise it [intuition] and to be able to put it to one side, but at the same time be able to use it, is certainly very important

**Participant 3 F**

I think the more you are self-aware, the better you are able to weight it [intuition] appropriately amongst other considerations in the decision-making process.

**Participant 15 F**

It’s a weighting, you know, you go through a mental weighting process. And I have had instances of people who have worked for me [who] have been incredibly analytical and been wrong, and the person who was intuitive, without any back-up, was right. So you take that experience into account.

Fourth, interiority allowed participants to externalise the tacit knowledge they had built up over many years and to transfer or share this knowledge with other members of the organisation. For example:
Participant 26 F

If I pause long enough I can explain what it is that’s led me to that conclusion. And I do quite a lot ... particularly with junior staff who haven’t been in a management positions as long as I have ... I will explain to them why I have come to this conclusion as a very conscious teaching moment. Cos just telling them, trust me, do as I say ... that’s no good.

Fifth, one participant (below) suggested that a lack of an awareness of the internal drivers of decision-making could lead to erroneous and resource wasting activities. Interiority in responding to occurrences in organisational life was therefore considered important in order to mitigate this possibility.

Participant 10 F

I think that particularly if you are in a senior position, if you are not aware of what is going on internally and how you are reacting to things, you can lead people on a wild goose chase. You have got to think about where this is coming from, why am I feeling in this way at about a piece of work that comes to you.

5.11.4 Male participants with interiority

On the basis of the data presented in Table 5.2, I have argued that only two of the male participants in the study possessed a high degree of interiority. Assuming that the reader concurs with my interpretation of the data in relation to this concept, I now wish to explore competing hypotheses for these divergent cases in relation to the male/female disparity in interiority.

It could be proposed that both men and women enjoy interiority to an equal extent and that the finding of gender difference is attributable to the relatively small sample size used for this study. However, I consider this explanation unlikely because so many of the male and female participants perceived that women, in general, were more ‘in touch with their feelings’, and have a greater capacity to share them. Alternately, the lack of ‘feeling’ in the descriptions of the experiences of men could be attributed to their use of heuristics which, according to Sadler-Smith and Sparrow (2007), do not have an affective component. While I acknowledge this could well be the case for some of the male respondents, I argue this cannot account for the whole of the sample because the data shows that, while many men did acknowledge a ‘feeling’ component, they were not willing, or did not have the capacity, to elaborate on it or about it (see section 5.4.1.1).

While I claim that all women participants displayed a high degree of interiority in comparison to the men, who on the whole did not, two divergent cases (men with interiority) suggest that interiority is not necessarily dependent on the gender of an individual. I propose that interiority can be developed in contexts and cultures where it is useful, acknowledged, accepted and valued (social conditioning and contextual utility). For example, Participant 2 M was the only male participant whose leadership role was in the Arts. I would suggest a long and successful career in drama has engendered an orientation toward, and sensitivity to, his feelings. Moreover, the ability to express feelings is an actor’s stock-in-trade. In other words, this is an occupational arena where interiority is not only useful it is essential.
The second male participant, who I interpret as demonstrating high interiority (Participant 20 M), led a department in a large financial institution at the time of interview. This, in itself, was not unusual in relation to the other male participants. However, when asked to comment on his perception in relation to gender and intuition, he offered the following:

.........................................................................................................

Interview sequence

Martin
... do you think that gender plays a role in this whole discussion [about intuition]?

Participant 20 M
Look I do. I have very strong opinions on this. I actually think that women have fantastic intuition.

Martin
This is based on experience?

Participant 20 M
Yes it is, and I will put a caveat around that right up front – there is probably an element of bias in this, in that my life has been dominated by women. And what I mean by that is, my father died when I was very young, my mother was a very strong character, I had two sisters – I was the oldest surviving male in my immediate family at the age of 14. I had two grandmothers and I now have a wife and three daughters. So women have played a very large part in my life ... And I am probably generalising here but ... in general, they are better at self-awareness of intuition.

.........................................................................................................

I have highlighted this participant’s final words because I wish to suggest that interiority should be seen as associated with women but not specific to women (use of the words ‘in general’). Furthermore, I hypothesise that his high degree of interiority is attributable to his upbringing which was ‘dominated by women’, where feelings and intuitions were articulated, acknowledged and valued (social conditioning). Thus, interpersonal interactions and cultures can be said to have ‘interiority’ and, moreover, based on the above discussion, intrapersonal and interpersonal interiority condition each other. Having established a basis for intrapersonal interiority, interiority at other levels of social description, will now be explored.

5.12 Interiority and Domain Theory

I propose that interiority at the interpersonal level translates to the extent of expression and communication about feelings, including intuitions, in an interpersonal interaction. Thus, I argue that interpersonal interiority can be seen as an extension, consequence and exteriorisation of their intrapersonal interiority. Thus, interpersonal interiority could paradoxically be labelled exteriority.
However, I believe this would confuse or conflate content (whether expression is about feelings or not) with settings\(^{72}\) (interaction occurs in the ‘out there’ world).

I argue that the orientation of the discussion distinguishes interiority from exteriority (feelings as opposed to things in the case of both intra and interpersonal interiority). Thus, the degree of interiority, at the interpersonal level, refers to whether participants discuss topics external to themselves (such as the weather, sports results or the performance of the company) or the interior world of feelings (such as how the weather, sports results or company performance makes them feel). High intrapersonal interiority adds an interior dimension to interpersonal interactions, which occur in settings, which can then be labelled interpersonal interiority.

I further argue that, where the expression of interpersonal interiority is widespread in an organisation (where feelings are acknowledged and disclosed), the organisation can be said to have organisational interiority. This could stem from a majority within an organisation who have high levels of intrapersonal interiority or from the influence of powerful people in the organisation, particularly leaders who encourage expression of feelings and intuitions (see Section 5.15.3). Consistent with Layder’s (1997; 2005) Domain Theory, intrapersonal, interpersonal and organisational interiority can be seen as mutually influential, interdependent, intertwined and interlocking. Interiority will be fundamental to answering the research problem because, as a multi-level concept, it answers the research problem comprehensively at all levels of social description.

In the next sections I will present theory, supported by evidence and models, in relation to the social process of intuition disclosure at these different levels of social description. I will begin with the intrapersonal level. Following this, I will present new evidence and develop further theory in relation to intuition disclosure at the interpersonal and collective levels (organisational and societal).

**Synthesis of findings**

**5.13 Intrapersonal interiority**

Drawing on the concepts developed thus far in the analysis it is now possible to represent social processes by which intuitions are acknowledged, masked or suppressed at the intrapersonal level.

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\(^{72}\) Here I refer to Layder’s (1997; 2005) use of the word ‘settings’ as discussed in Domain Theory. Layder discussed settings as the physical location where interactions occur.
5.13.1 Disclosure of Intuitions at the intrapersonal level

Disclosure to self, or better said, the realisation of intuition at the intrapersonal level can be seen as complex, however, it hinges on the interiority of the individual. As a consequence, the interiority of the individual can be seen as the best starting point for interpreting this model. In Part 1 it was found that the use of intuition was conditioned by cognitive type (conditioned by personality and training – see Section 5.7.3) and attitude toward intuition (see Section 5.7). Attitude toward intuition, in turn, was found to be conditioned by education, training and personality\(^73\) (see Section 5.8.1.1). I will argue here that attitude to intuition and cognitive type also condition interiority. In Part 2, it was proposed that interiority was conditioned by socialisation (including gender) and contextual utility (see Section 5.11.4).

A low degree of interiority, by my own definition, means low orientation to feelings and thus a low awareness of, or sensitivity to, feelings and intuitions. As a consequence, the feeling associated with an intuition may not be ‘felt’ enough to be consciously acknowledged and the individual may be oblivious to it (silence). Alternatively, an individual may acknowledge a ‘feeling of knowing’ associated with a problem or situation but may not be willing, interested, or able to introspect (surface) this feeling to any extent. Action therefore becomes automatic.

If there is internal dialogue (in the absence high interiority) with respect to intuitive knowing, I suggest it is, first, likely to be attributed (internally) to ‘judgement’ or ‘experience’. Second, the feeling may also be attributed to emotion, considered illegitimate, and thus rejected (silenced). Attitude to intuition is redundant in these examples because there is no recognition of an ‘intuition’. Third, an intuitive feeling may be acknowledged but considered illegitimate on the basis of attitude to intuition and consequently rejected (silenced). The disclosure process in these latter two examples is equivalent to self-censorship and is a conscious activity. Alternatively, individuals with a higher degree of interiority will be oriented to their feelings and will therefore become aware of their feeling of knowing as it ‘surfaces’ from the subconscious into conscious awareness. They are able to distinguish their intuition from emotion and other feelings and will therefore refer to the feeling as a ‘gut feeling’ or an intuition (internally). Thus, individuals with high interiority are more likely to disclose their intuitions as ‘intuitions’, and talk more (self-talk) in terms of feelings such as ‘my sense is’, ‘my feeling is’ and so forth as previously discussed. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.4 below:

\(^73\) In order to reduce the complexity of the model, these elements will not be duplicated here.
5.14 Interpersonal interiority

I proposed earlier that interiority, at the interpersonal, level refers to the extent of communication about feelings and intuitions in an interaction – the extent of an interior dimension within an interpersonal interaction. From the analysis of the interviews, at least four conditions were identified that influence the interiority of an interaction. These are: perception of the other (in terms of their interiority); personal familiarity (levels of intimacy); whether the context of the conversation, in terms of content and location, is business or personal; and, if it is business related, then in what type of industry. Figure 5.5 below displays these conditions:
5.14.1 Perception of the other

Assuming that an individual has high interiority, the degree to which this individual will disclose feelings and intuitions is related to the perception of the interiority of the other. For example:

Participant 8 M

*It depends on whether I know the person or how well I know the person ... whether or not I think that person themselves is intuitive or not.*

Participant 23 F

*... you lay out the facts in a logical, disciplined approach. He is only responsive if that’s the kind of conversation.*

As discussed earlier, intrapersonal interiority is conditioned by (although not limited to) cognitive type and attitude to intuition. **Attitude** to intuition was considered by some to be related to the perceived **cognitive type** of the other because individuals that were seen as ‘black-and-white’ were considered less likely to engage in conversations concerning feelings and intuitions. I interpret Participant 23 F below to imply that some professional **training** (occupations dealing with ‘objectivity’ and quantitative matters) is more likely to produce ‘black-and-white thinkers’ than others (often person-centred occupations). Participants (see below) perceived this as impacting on receptivity to opinions based on feelings, which are considered nebulous, esoteric and unscientific. Here we see a specific linkage to macrological or cultural interiority (organisational and societal) that will be discussed later.
Participant 23 F

The former CEO was a male and a scientist and a lawyer and our current is a female and a social worker and a criminologist. It’s much easier to have those sorts of conversations [intuitions and feelings] with her ... she is quite receptive ... but he is a scientist through and through.

Participant 1 F

I think probably most people probably wouldn’t say it [their intuition], at least people reporting to you because they think it’s a bit wacky and maybe they didn’t hear me say it, and because I’m seen to be a very intellectual, rational sort of person.

5.14.2 Familiarity

The development of trust over time through repeated interactions facilitates a sense of familiarity. Familiarity conditions interpersonal interiority through the development of an understanding of how the other might react to certain disclosures. In this sense, familiarity can be seen as having a reciprocal relationship with perception of the other. Fear of ridicule may delay disclosure of intuitions until attitudes to intuition are known, either through explicit statements or through implication. Examples linking intuition disclosure and familiarity are displayed below:

Participant 8 M

To some degree it [disclosure of intuition] is to do with the person themselves, whether I have a good relationship with them or not.

Participant 1 F

We’ve been working together for two-and-a-half years. I think we’ve learnt how to work together. I’m not inhibited about saying I have a sense or a gut feeling.

Participant 10 F

I think that to someone who didn’t know me and had to front up with me about something, it is quite possible that they would be apprehensive about owning up to some sort of intuitive approach to dealing with a particular problem or an issue.

5.14.3 Business or private

The interiority of an interaction is greater if the interaction is situated in a private context or is about private matters. In business matters participants said they felt a responsibility to be seen (or rather heard) to be dealing with other peoples’ money in an appropriate way. Given the view that intuition may be perceived as esoteric and emotional coupled with the need to justify decisions in a business context, participants perceived that intuitions might be considered inappropriate in business contexts. These points are captured in the quotes below:

Participant 20 M

I would feel more comfortable using it in a personal situation very openly than I would in a business situation.
5.14.4 Industry type

Participants perceived disclosure of intuition(s) to be more appropriate to some settings (sectors) rather than others, i.e., more appropriate in creative domains and human services where there is less emphasis on analytical techniques and tangible, (quantitatively) verifiable evidence. For example:

*Participant 8 F*

I think if you're a marketeer I think you might get away with it but I think that investors and analysts, they want more rationale.

*Participant 16 F*

I have been working with women and men and doctors and midwives about understanding ... birth, pregnancy, and birth and the impact it has on individuals. And in that context I have used the word intuition quite a few times.

*Participant 23 F*

Someone who might operate more in an Arts context might not approach the same sort of situation with the same level of forensic analysis ...

5.14.5 Intuition disclosure at the interpersonal level

The interiority of an interaction will depend on the four conditions identified above. As discussed, interactions high in interiority are necessarily characterised by the acknowledgement and disclosure of feelings. Intuitions will be disclosed as **gut feeling, intuition, my feeling is**, and other related expressions. However, if an individual high in interiority has an intuition in a perceived **low interiority** interpersonal context, they might either silence or suppress it. Alternatively, these individuals might strategically express their intuition as **judgement** and/or **experience** in order to avoid appearing esoteric, feminine, emotional or non-business-like. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.6 below:
As indicated in the quotes below, participants said they might ‘dress up’ their intuitions or seek to find evidence or rationale:

**Participant 1 F**

*I think we would probably dress it up ...*

**Participant 26 F**

*I wouldn’t probably publicly say, my gut instinct is that we need to spend $40 million [laughs]. I would dress it up.*

One participant said he had **fabricated** rationale for his intuitive judgements in order to satisfy the expectations of others in the organisation:

**Participant 27 M**

*You normally find some rationale even if you make it up to satisfy some more analytical people in teams in your environment ... sometimes I even go back with my team and say, right, let’s just invent something that satisfies the colleagues ... or ... really analyse why we think it’s right. That’s my personal experience.*
5.14.6 Intervening condition: Power

Power can be seen as an intervening variable in interpersonal contexts where the prevailing conditions would normally lead to low interpersonal interiority. A more powerful person may request or demand disclosure of feelings to the extent that the other is capable of doing so. For example:

............................................................

Interview sequence

**Martin (paraphrasing)**

So you will ask people, what do you feel about this, what is your gut feeling on this?

**Participant 18 M**

Absolutely – right down to the lowest levels.

............................................................

5.15 Organisational interiority

I propose that the level of intuition disclosure in organisations is not simply dependant on collective intrapersonal and interpersonal interiority. The extent of organisational interiority is additionally aligned to other dimensions or properties of culture. Many participants, particularly female participants, perceived a polarity in relation to these properties of organisational culture based on their experience of organisations over many years. For example:

**Participant 8 F**

I think it varies [intuition disclosure] ... if you are in a big corporate organisation ... it is not exactly pejorative but if you said to somebody ... I just intuitively think this is the right thing to do, some organisations might say 'bollocks to that'. Other organisations that might be more creative ... less structured, are probably more open to that sort of thing.

I have labelled these distinct cultural types assertive and integrative cultures:

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74 I have adopted these labels from Capra’s (1996) discussion of two sets of values and thinking that represent the paradigms generated by classical physics and new science. I acknowledge that organisational cultures are seldom monolithic and more often fractured and characterised by micrological cultures (Jermier, Slocum, Fry & Gaines 1991; Schein 2010). However, I argue that theory relating to organisational interiority would be sustained for each micrological culture as well as for the aggregate or dominant culture of an organisation. I do not assert that cultures can be neatly classified as either assertive or integrative, rather, cultures and sub-cultures may be represented on an assertive-integrative continuum. Moreover, I acknowledge that organisational cultures change over time.
5.15.1 Properties of assertive organisational cultures

Participants perceived that assertive cultures were often led and/or dominated by men\textsuperscript{75/76}. These organisational cultures are characterised by the need to appear scientific, rational and objective. Social organisation, power and the right to speak are determined by strong hierarchies and leadership style. Assertive cultures value strong and active decision-making, evidence and economics, and tough, assertive interpersonal relations where mistakes are punished and feelings are unacknowledged. Assertive cultures can therefore be described as having low interiority. Figure 5.7 below displays the properties of assertive cultures:

**Figure 5.7: Properties of assertive organisational cultures**

\textsuperscript{75} This can be seen as linked to formal and informal leadership via role modelling.

\textsuperscript{76} In some cases the population may be female-dominated (e.g. in some health professions) but the politics and therefore the power and reward structures are based on science, rationality and male dominated culture.
Each of these properties of assertive cultures is now examined in more detail along with data from which these categories or properties were derived.

5.15.1.1 Strong hierarchies

Strong hierarchies influence the extent to which the unique capacities of an individual can be represented in organisational discourse. A top-down leadership style can tend to reinforce the status quo in terms of organisational values and restrictive communication. For example:

**Participant 15 F**

I think it again depends on the kind of hierarchy and the type of leadership. So if you actually had a leadership style that engages, then you are actually providing a safety in the leadership structure to allow people to participate in the way that they feel that they can optimally participate. If you are hierarchical yourself ... speak when I ask you to speak ... or you’re not the most senior person in the room, so I’m not going to listen to you, then you actually have closed that off. But you’ve also closed yourself off to fact. So you haven’t closed yourself off just to intuition ... you’ve closed yourself off to all fact, all input, all communication. That is the problem with that type of style.

**Participant 18 M**

... where you’ve got hierarchy you’ve got layers of management and all the rest of that. If you are in a certain layer and you have an intuition and you want to reflect, and you don’t have the right attitude around you and the environment you are operating in, the intuition will fall on deaf ears.

5.15.1.2 Analysis, evidence and economics

In some organisations participants had perceived an expectation for analysis based on evidence and economics. For example:

**Participant 23 F**

It has to actually be facts and figures and very evidence driven.

**Participant 16 F**

You talk about the evidence, what is the evidence.

**Participant 6 M**

... you’ve got to, at the end of the day, bring this down to an economic analysis.

Participant 10 F perceived a strong reliance on numbers in these organisations and, moreover, a cultural assumption that numbers could ‘explain’ phenomena:

**Participant 10 F**

So you’ve got to be able to justify any position that you take with numbers, and it seems as though there is a part of that culture that numbers explain everything. In this organisation, there is such a strong reliance on data, which is not bad, it’s absolutely essential and it’s fine, so long as it’s not to the exclusion of absolutely anything else ... I think it was deeply embedded when economic rationalists were in power and certainly still within government [NSW], Treasury still holds sway.
5.15.1.3 Tough and punishing – active, strong decisions

Participants perceived that some organisations were characterised by tough interpersonal relations where leaders are expected to make active, strong and rational decisions. Moreover, failure to be seen to adhere to these values could result in reprimand and punishment. For example:

**Participant 15 F**

I think unless people sometimes see that you’ve actually gone through this rigour or the crunching or the sweating, they’re not sure that you’ve actually given enough merit or meat to the decision and that’s not necessarily true ... there should be an analytical act other than someone’s looking at it.

**Participant 8 F**

... even if that was the result of you thinking that was the right thing to do at the time [an action or decision], they will beat you mercilessly until you have explained it to them in a rational sense.

5.15.1.3 Feelings unacknowledged – appear rational and scientific

As a consequence, emotions, intuitions and visceral influences are not acknowledged in such assertive cultures. For example:

**Participant 26 F**

They [corporate actors] need the business case and they need it in the format that they expect.

**Participant 13 F**

I have always laughed when women are accused of being emotional. Many of the men I work with use emotion – anger, depression, emotional blackmail, subtle violence and withdrawal – but, because they don’t cry, these are not observed.

**Participant 16 F**

I think women are willing to admit that they are using intuition much more than men. And again, I think this is where it comes back to that men would prefer to use the word judgement because they think it’s more rational and less emotional.

Moreover, the non-rational elements of organisational life, including the use of intuition(s), are rationalised or made to appear rational and objective. For example:

.................................................................................................................................................................................

**Interview sequence**

**Martin (paraphrasing)**

So you think there is a cultural imperative to be rational...

**Participant 2 M**

To appear rational, yes ...

.................................................................................................................................................................................
Participant 22 M

I think that ... frequently what happens is people reach decisions and then they go about justifying them.

Participant 17 M

I will use a fairly objective definition, in terms of they did not match our selection criteria as well as the preferred applicant, you know something like that, making it appear objective.

Participants perceived that this approach gave stakeholders reassurance through intelligible cause and effect relationships and scientific explanations. For example:

Participant 1 F

You know I think it’s sort of, you know, there’s been a lot of pressure on making management to seem very scientific and it [intuition] seems to be tantamount to crystals.

5.15.2 Properties of integrative organisational cultures

Participants also described organisational cultures, often under the leadership of women, whose characteristics were very different, perhaps oppositional, from those of assertive cultures. I argue that these organisations can be said to have integrating values and a focus on developing a supportive, inclusive, democratic cultures that are tolerant of mistakes and characterised by open language, where feelings, including intuitions, are consequently acknowledged. Figure 5.8 below displays the properties of integrative cultures:
Each of the properties of integrative cultures is now examined in more detail along with data from which these categories or properties were derived.

### 5.15.2.1 Democratic, supportive culture

Participants spoke about the importance, as leaders, of developing an open, democratic culture where members feel free to speak on the basis of what they feel they can contribute and not from their sense of position, seniority or power. For example:

**Participant 13 F**

... you create a culture of people being free to speak by the way you lead a team. And so you create an environment where people feel free to say whatever they like, and it's the ideas that I look for.

**Participant 21 F**

... so you've got to set the culture right, and then people will feel comfortable about being open and honest.

**Participant 14 F**

I think the way we go about our decision-making here would be very different, it's not hierarchical, it's teamwork, it's involved teamwork, what I call dispersed leadership.
5.15.2.2 Tolerance of mistakes

Many respondents approach decision-making with a recognition that ‘the unfortunate truth is that you are not going to get every single one of them right’ (Participant 14 F), and that ‘the only way you’ll know as to whether the decision was a right decision is through the benefit of hindsight’ (Participant 22 M). In addition, some participants perceived that there is often ‘more than one right way to do something’ (Participant 8 F). Thus, decision-making, for this participant (below) decision-making was thought of in terms of establishing a direction, which was perceived as critical for individuals and the organisation as a whole:

Participant 8

... businesses are about making decisions and moving on ... If, in fact, you don’t make a decision you can paralyse businesses, you can’t move forward because nobody knows where to go.

Tolerating mistakes was considered vital, first, because mistakes are inevitable and, second, because it encouraged people to ‘have a go’. For example:

Participant 21 F

I want to know when they do something wrong, not to punish them, because I never blame people ... But if I don’t know about it we can’t fix it. But it’s all right to make mistakes, because if you don’t make mistakes you’re not taking risks; you’re not having a go.

Participant 15 F

And I said to you before that I’ll make decisions, I may be wrong and I accord myself the right to correct the decision, well I’ve got to accord that right to anyone else in the organisation. So my culture is such that they have a go.

And, as one participant pointed out (below), tolerance for mistakes should be demonstrated and not merely espoused:

Participant 27 M

I mean, you hold them responsible but you don’t punish them. And you have to prove that. A lot of people talk about it today and then, if the first mistake happens and big trouble starts ... the blame session begins ... you must not do that because the credibility of your message gets lost.

5.15.2.3 Feelings acknowledged

A supportive culture that allows people to take risks is beneficial to individuals and the organisation as a whole because it utilises and develops the skills and abilities of individuals, as well as individual and collective experience (tacit knowledge). Some participants perceived this as important for the creative evolution of the organisation. For example:
Participant 15 F

I ardently believe that mistakes are part of the creative process, and unless you actually afford people the chance to have a go you won’t grow, you will stagnate.

Acknowledging, integrating and allowing full expression of individual talents, for some leaders, meant an open language where all feelings and ideas could be expressed, including emotions and intuition(s). For example:

Participant 27 M

Basically, those first two things, intuition, gut feeling, emotions, we talked about emotional intelligence and stuff like that, just, you know, follow your feelings sometimes, don’t be too scientific about things because you know, with the experience a lot of people have, and their personal skills, they can make a decision. If it feels right, it is right, you know, in many cases, and if not, there is still a way to correct it at the second attempt ...

Participant 13 F

I don’t care where people say they come from – we just want the ideas on the table. But I have to build an environment of trust so people can feel brave.

Moreover, an open language and the capacity to express feelings are also conducive to building a robust organisation where members are committed to it’s the success. For example:

Participant 21 F

... people just bonded together so hard that when an issue would come up I would call for a staff meeting in 20 minutes, and they would all turn up and we’d go through it all, and we were crying and we’d laugh ... and they would do anything for each other and they would do anything for me ... And they weren’t scared to say anything in front of everybody. And because of it, we were highly successful financially, in really tough times

5.15.3 Conditions for organisational culture

I interpreted three conditions that influenced the development of organisational cultures. These are: the nature of the industry, examples of which were given under interpersonal interiority; national cultures (for international corporations); the size of the organisation, where large organisations are seen to be more highly regimented and formalised in their approach to decision-making; the contribution of the attitudes of individuals in the organisation (discussed earlier); and, in particular, the actions and behaviours of leaders. In addition, the relative proportion of men to women or gender mix was interpreted to condition organisational culture. Figure 5.9 displays these conditions.
Figure 5.9: Conditions for organisational culture

These conditions will now be examined in more detail.

5.15.3.1 National culture

One participant, who led the Australian division of a German organisation, commented that what might work in Germany might not transfer to the Australian marketplace. However he was not always able to satisfy the expectation for rationale, which he perceived to be stronger in Germany than in Australia:

Participant 27 M

We do a very strong reporting line back to xxxx and, in many cases, when we change things here in our local organisation in Australia, the question is, why do you do that? ... and sometimes my answer is as short as, because it’s right, and it’s right for Australia ... And then you get into this conflict of having to explain why you think it’s right? ... they want more science behind it.

5.15.3.2 Size

Some respondents perceived that larger organisations relied on formulaic and rigid structures were less flexible in response to the individual capacities of its members. For example:
Participant 20

[in small organisations] I think you tend to rely on the individual a lot more to use everything they’ve got. Whereas, I think in a lot of large organisations, where people are undertaking a lot of processing activity, they are trained to behave in a certain way and to think in a certain way and to respond in a certain way ... those organisations are probably much more structured about how they want people to behave and make decisions.

5.15.3.3 Leader

The leader of the organisation was perceived by many participants as critical to the development and maintenance of organisational culture. Participants saw the power to implement systems and procedures, as well as the power of role modelling for behaviour and decision-making processes as significant influences. For example:

Participant 27 M

I mean, that is the unsaid part of the hierarchical system ... You never have full freedom in an organisation, that’s for sure ... but you get more freedom, the higher you climb, to implement belief and culture. So for me it was important to really encourage people ... we need to make quick decisions in sales and marketing, that’s critical. It has a lot to do with psychology and intuition and just go for it, and if we get it wrong together, let’s see how we can correct it. ... it took about two years to get it through and now I think, everyone feels pretty comfortable and confident about it.

..............................................................

Interview sequence

Martin

And what is the receptivity generally to that kind of talk [expression of intuitions].

Participant 26 F

In this organisation, fairly high, given that it's the way I talk all the time [laughter] and i’m the boss!! [laughter]

..............................................................

5.15.3.4 Gender mix and/or leadership

Given the disparity between men and women in terms of intrapersonal interiority, it follows that the proportion of women and the gender of leaders would influence organisational interiority. Indeed this logic was seen in the perceptions of participants. For example:

Participant 10 F

[on the disclosure of intuitions] ... that is about the culture of organisations and the presence of leaders who are able to have that sort of conversation.

Participant 11 M

You know, I mean, I have worked very hard in diversity in senior leadership teams and I have just found female intuition, and different backgrounds and ethnicity, as a huge richness for getting decisions right. You know, the male of the species, all six of us or all seven of us would be marching down a way and a couple of women on the team are saying, there is something, do we need to think
about this in a different way, and whether it’s coming from left-field thinking I don’t know, you know, left brain-right brain stuff or ... just the emotional side, um, but I really trust their judgement.

............................................................................................................................................................

Interview sequence

Martin
Could you imagine being in a boardroom full of women and the culture being different?

Participant 12 F
Absolutely, been there ... and the culture is totally different. The conversation is more open, intuition, whilst I can’t recall whether the word was actually used, it’s quite clearly around the discussion ... The way in which things are talked about is more around feelings.

Martin
It sounds as though there’s a pretty stark difference between men and women in these situations is it really that stark ... is it really that different?

Participant 12 F
I think it is absolutely. Yes, that’s my personal experience.

............................................................................................................................................................

5.15.4 Consequences for disclosure of intuition(s)

In concert with the model presented for interpersonal level intuition disclosure, intuitive individuals in integrative cultures high in interiority will disclose their intuition(s) through expressions such as my intuition is, gut feel, gut instinct, my feeling is, this doesn’t feel right and so forth. However, high interiority individuals in assertive cultures will either silence their intuitions or seek strategies to present opinions based on intuition by finding or fabricating rationale, or dressing up their intuitions analytically. Alternatively, expressions that are culturally congruent and that mask the role of intuition, such as ‘my experience’ and ‘judgement’, may be used. Figure 5.10 (below) illustrates this process.
5.15.5 Intervening conditions for disclosing intuition(s)

Participants acknowledged there were circumstances (intervening conditions) in which individuals might go against cultural norms of expression. Individuals will disclose intuitions in assertive cultures under certain conditions such as in high-risk ventures, where there is no precedent (entrepreneurship), where they have power, status, and especially where an individual has established a track record. In addition, intuitions may be disclosed where the individual is about to retire or where the leader has high self-confidence. In the words of one participant:

*Participant 20 M*

*I don’t think your intuition will change, but the context in which you are presenting it will change how you present it.*
5.15.5.1 Power, status and reputation (track record)

I have previously shown that leaders implement and enforce cultural norms in assertive organisational cultures that mandate rational modes of expression. However, power is the currency of influence not only in defining cultural norms but also underpins the ability to act in contradiction to them. The power to disclose intuitions was perceived to be derived from a formal position, and status achieved from a record of successful decision-making that protects individuals from ridicule. For example:

**Participant 5 M**

So I think, at the very senior level, people can get away with saying that's my instinct or intuition, um, at anything other than the senior level I think that people would be suspicious of it and would require a view to be explained and rationalised.

**Participant 20 M**

Again, coming back to the point we made earlier, if you are in a position of power with a track record, yes. If you’re not, they’re probably much more sceptical.

**Participant 27 M**

Yeah look it’s easier if you talk out of a position of strength ... than from a position of weakness [laughs], because you’ve got proof that it [intuition] works somehow.

**Participant 8 M**

... if the individual having the intuitive idea or some comment on gut instinct has got a good successful track record behind them, then I think people are more likely to accept it as well.

5.15.5.2 Confidence/self acceptance

Fear of ridicule about disclosing the use of intuition was also mitigated by the self-confidence and self-acceptance indicated by some participants. For example:

**Participant 15 F**

Well, I think I have spoken about it previously in a number of interviews that I’ve done, in that I said that I do trust my intuition. I myself resile from it ... I don’t find it embarrassing or a bit of witchcraft or whatever, it’s worked for me [mutual laughter].

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

**Interview sequence**

**Martin**

Would you feel comfortable admitting intuitive judgements to parents or to stakeholders or to people?

**Participant 17 M**

[interrupts] Yeah, because I think what I am is what I am ...
5.15.5.3 High Risk Ventures/No precedent/Entrepreneurs

Consistent with emergent theory concerning complementary use of intuition and analysis, participants perceived that decision-making, where there is meagre information or evidence, tends to be dominated by intuition. In such contexts, making decisions was often referred to as tantamount to gambling and therefore intuitive guidance was seen as better than no guidance. Entrepreneurs operating in these contexts were therefore perceived as having given license to express strategies based on their intuition(s) or the disclosed intuition of others whom they trusted. For example:

Participant 8 M

... people wouldn’t talk about it. I have not heard anybody, in my experience, ever stand up and admit to [intuition], with the possible exception of entrepreneurs.

Participant 21 F

Look, I think entrepreneurs take those sorts of punts ... there was none [precedent] ... I suppose they’re pretty entrepreneurial too. I mean xxxx has certainly taken his risks [laughter], some of them have come off, some of them haven’t ...

5.15.5.4 Retiring soon

In addition one participant perceived that those who are soon to retire (or those who do not care) might be prepared to reveal their use of or trust in intuition(s):

Participant 7 M

I don’t know that many politicians would necessarily wish to unravel themselves on that level [intuition and emotion]. I think they are very guarded about how they appear ... [pause] unless you don’t give a damn or you are going to retire soon ...

5.15.6 Paradoxes of assertive/integrative cultures

According to my interpretation of the data, integrative cultures do not jettison or reject rationality, evidence and analysis nor do they ignore economic concerns. These things are still valued, however, not as exclusively as they are in assertive cultures. Indeed, not acknowledging intuitions can result in adverse outcomes. This is because failure to acknowledge the feelings and emotions that accompany organisational life can result in the dominance of a negative covert organisational dimension. In this shadow dimension the aims and goals of the organisation become subordinate to individual power-asserting agendas of individual actors. Therefore, the exclusive drive for rationality can, paradoxically, result in irrational behaviour to the detriment of the organisation and its members. For example:

Participant 21 F

They sat round the executive table and were very competitive with each other; they didn’t work together as a unit at all. They didn’t actually know each other and some of them had been working together for four years, and they didn’t know each other. It was quite extraordinary, and as I only thought I was going to be there for three or four months, ended up being six, I thought, what I could do, as a new person, was to try and change the culture. And at my last executive meeting last week I
said to them look, this is what I set out to do, do you think we’ve got somewhere, and they all agreed that we had. They are now much more open with each other, they trust each other more, and there were a couple of huge issues where the trust was right out the window … they communicate better. They’ve actually had a couple of proper discussions where people were taking the organisational line … rather than their own portfolio, and that was a big breakthrough. … So, you’ve got to set the culture right, and then people will feel comfortable about being open and honest. At my first executive meeting, after it finished, three different people came in and burst into tears and said, ‘that’s the first time we’ve heard truth and integrity and those sorts of words around the table in five years’. And so that was a really big breakthrough for them – and sure we went backwards a couple of times but they kept moving onwards, it was a two-steps forward, one-step back sort of situation.

The analysis revealed a further paradox in relation to leadership, values and culture. The term ‘assertive culture’ might, at face value, be interpreted as a culture whose members are self-assured and self-confident. However, if the organisation is assertive and forceful in imposing values through restrictive communication and punishment as a consequence of hierarchical power relations, then I argue that the opposite condition can often be generated. Assertive cultures may engender sycophantic and compliant homogeneity in accordance with its values and the predilections of the leader. Moreover, this will function to crush the individuality, intuition(s) and creative potential of members. Paradoxically, integrative cultures appear to function to enhance the assertiveness of each individual through integrating their views.

Participants 21 F

... if you get the people right and the culture right you’re there, you don’t have to manage the business – they manage it for you or it manages itself.

Integration does not necessarily mean acting on the intuitions of members but rather acknowledging them to the extent that each feels they have the right to speak, and an obligation to participate and contribute what they feel is pertinent, legitimate and fertile. For example:

Participants 15 F

I may be wrong and I accord myself the right to correct the decision, well I’ve got to accord that right to anyone else in the organisation. So my culture is such that they have a go.

5.16 Societal/environmental interiority

5.16.1 Properties of Australian societal culture

As shown above, assertive organisational cultures are characterised by strong hierarchies, active and strong decision-making and the need to appear scientific, rational and objective with a focus on evidence and economics. Assertive cultures also feature tough interpersonal relations where mistakes are punished and feelings remain unacknowledged and not disclosed. I have also shown that assertive cultures are often lead by men. In Chapter 4 it was shown that only 2% of Australian organisations are lead by women (CEOs). Although factors other than leadership have been shown to condition the
culture of organisations, taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that the majority of Australian organisations are characterised by these properties.

It is acknowledged that societal culture is not homogenous and furthermore, that the views of these participants do not reflect the multiplicity of perspectives that I suspect might be available from other samples. However, the organisations and institutions represented in the sample (commercial, legal, educational, political and governmental) have enormous influence on people through shaping values, discourse and practices. Thus, it could be argued that we, as a society, live in an assertive rather than an integrative culture.

However, a significant finding of this research was the business/private dualism with respect to decision-making (Section 5.6.2.8) and interpersonal interiority (Section 5.14.3). I therefore propose that this business/private dualism conditions interiority at the societal level. This significance of this cleavage is illustrated in Figure 5.11 below:
Figure 5.11: Social process of intuition disclosure at the societal level

The questions posed to participants and, therefore, the participants’ replies were focused mainly on the preceding levels of social organisation because they were the central concern of this study. Although participants occasionally made reference to the wider society, there was not enough data to support an analysis to the same degree as intrapersonal, interpersonal and organisational levels. The proper analysis of societal interiority would be complex and should involve the comparison of perceived Australian values with those of other cultures, which was, unfortunately, beyond the scope and resources of this study. However, a number of themes could be identified in relation to intuition use and disclosure, and the assertive values that many of the women in the study said dominate Australian organisations.
5.16.1.1 Core values of the Australian business community: strong = active and external

One participant, as already noted, pointed to the importance of active and strong decision-making:

Participant 15 F

I think unless people sometimes see that you’ve actually gone through this rigour or the crunching or the sweating ... there should be an analytical act other than someone's looking at it.

I would suggest that this comment contains the essence of what is considered to be of value in decision-making in organisations and more widely. Strong (good) decision-making in assertive cultures is assumed to be active in the scientific, rational analysis of measurable quantities, and evidence external to the self, particularly numbers. I propose that action based on external considerations underpin public culture in general and business culture in particular. For example:

Participant 3 F

I think stakeholders and the media want to see strong decisions.

Participant 10 F

... on the whole I think the public does expect us to work with facts, to work with evidence, it’s a real catch-cry.

Participant 17 M

And I think one of the phenomena we’re dealing with at the present time is the great credence that we place on the scientists, and so on objective, rational thought, and even rationalism as it penetrates into economics and other areas of the study of human experience.

Participants perceived an increasing trend toward risk aversion and the application of analytical approaches to the management of risk, which I would argue is underpinned by these core values. For example:

Martin (paraphrasing)

So there’s cultural imperative towards explicit rationale?

Participant 26 F

Yeah, I think it’s part of the whole ... culture of managing risks, as if you can manage risk in some kind of scientific way ...
Interview sequence

Participant 15 F

... we’ve almost come to a society where ... we will not accept that there’s an accident. There has to be a reason, you know there has to be something to blame or someone to blame. Um, so if that’s the case then it’s a known and if it’s a known, then why did it happen? So if it’s a risk then you remove it. And that, I think, is a disabling approach because it will take us into a black-and-white decision-making process, rule process, societal process, and people aren’t black-and-white.

Martin

So that’s almost a domination of rationality the way you describe it?

Participant 15 F

No, [pause] no, I wouldn’t say that, because I think if you are rational you will allow for the provocation of accident, mishap, risk etc.

I think what it is, is it’s fear and it’s a necessity of control, so it’s fear and control.

I interpret that this (Participant 15 F) participant suggests that active and external approaches to risk management are inadequate because people are not ‘black-and-white’ but driven by complex internal and sometimes contradictory motivations that cannot be meaningfully measured or predicted. Moreover, in relation to interiority/exteriority, risk management can be seen as active strategies that are implemented in order to control the external environment in response to internal feelings of fear.

However, because the external environment cannot be completely contained, risk management strategies will continue to be less than adequate. As a consequence (if internal fears are not acknowledged, and not directly addressed) stronger external actions will be proposed and implemented. Such an approach to risk management is rational if the sole criteria for evaluating success are exclusively external (i.e. profit, standard of living in terms of wealth, number of hospital admissions etc.). However, according to some participants, extreme and ‘black-and-white’ decision-making processes have a ‘disabling’ effect for quality of life. For example:

Participant 21 F

... the world is more and more risk averse. This is one of the problems at the moment I think. If you take that too far you just close down and don’t do anything or don’t do anything new or anything exciting or anything that pushes the boundaries.

As a consequence, one participant observed (below) a potential tension between risk aversion and individual expression (which can ultimately contribute to the external):
Chapter 5: Analyses and Theory Development

Participant 15 F

... is our culture such now, that we are actually allowing, within the business context, people to actually exhibit more of their personality? ... and often it is the person that makes the difference, and each person has different strengths and skills and ways of seeing things. So is it allowing, and even though I caveat this with saying my concern is we are going to a more risk-averse society, are we at the same time allowing the expression of individualism to enhance the bottom line? Are we allowing that more and more these days? I think that would be a good thing.

5.16.2 Disjuncture between societal values and intuition

I have argued that strong (good) decision-making under assertive cultures in male dominated Australian commercial, legal, educational and political organisations is assumed to be active in the scientific, rational analysis of external concerns. I further argue that these properties are incongruent with the properties of intuition. Thus, the comparison of these two sets of values or properties (achieved in table 5.3 below) reveals a fundamental disjuncture. Moreover, this disjuncture between the dominant external orientation of public and business cultures and the internal orientation of interiority (at all levels) will have implications for theory that will be discussed in Section 6.6.

Table 5.3: Comparison of societal values and intuition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Properties of (dominant) public culture</th>
<th>Properties of intuition (and feelings in general)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Internal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational-analytical</td>
<td>Non-rational (feeling based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male orientation</td>
<td>Female orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Receptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>Non-scientific (perceived as)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.16.3 Perceptions of change

Some participants perceived a concurrent trend toward placing emphasis on the non-material, and the recognition of feelings and emotions, as an emergent focus for public and private life. Thus, a tension between these two movements can be identified. For example:

Participant 14 F

... soft elements of management, that’s how it’s described and textbooks are coming to the fore. That’s because people have realised there is such a thing as emotional intelligence, it’s not just all intellectual intelligence, and it’s very real and it’s the only thing that will allow involvement and happiness of work. I mean happiness has become a big play ... And people need to have meaning in their lives, and the way they get it is not through slaving away to make a few more bob for the shareholders or the masters that be ... they need another dimension to their lives.

Participant 10 F

[on the disclosure of intuitions] that is about the culture of organisations and the presence of leaders who are able to have that sort of conversation. Will that become more so in the future? It’s really hard – the evidence, numbers-based group certainly are in the ascendant.
Before I conclude the chapter I will present an illustration that represents how I have interpreted the models can be viewed in relation to one another. Figure 5.12 (below) demonstrates how the core category of interiority integrates explanations for the social process of intuition disclosure at the four levels of social description discussed. As mentioned earlier, at the intrapersonal level, expression is best thought of as ‘self talk’ rather than actual expression.

**Figure 5.12: Overall social process**

5.16.4 Summary of Part 2

The analysis revealed that most participants believed there was not a general acceptance of intuition and intuition use, rather, that there is a high level of scepticism in individuals and organisations. Some female participants perceived that intuition is considered inferior to analysis because it is generally associated with emotion and women. Most participants (men and women) suggested that there is a reluctance to admit use of intuition, especially in formal business settings and larger organisations. Participants perceived that the words ‘experience’, and, particularly ‘judgement’, are more acceptable in business contexts. However, it was also found that women were perceived to be, in general, more comfortable with words that reflected the feeling of knowing associated with intuition. Moreover, the
female participants in the study demonstrated a greater orientation to the inner realm of feelings and intuitions through their willingness and ability to describe the subjective experience of receiving an intuition.

The inner orientation displayed by the women in the study was labelled interiority. High interiority results in the ability to be aware of, discriminate between, articulate and utilise intuitions and other feelings. However, the existence of two male participants who similarly demonstrated a high degree of interiority indicated that intrapersonal interiority could be uncoupled from gender. Instead, high interiority was attributed to social/ gender conditioning and contextual utility. As a consequence, intrapersonal interiority can be seen as something that can be nurtured and developed, and available to both men and women. Individuals with low intrapersonal interiority are less oriented and therefore less ‘in touch’ with their feelings. Consequently these individuals will be less likely to fully acknowledge their intuitions and express them. While individuals might act on their intuitive knowing, those who are more externally oriented will likely attribute their knowing to analysis and/or experience.

The concept of interiority can also be applied to interpersonal interactions, organisations and whole societies. At the collective level, interiority translates to the extent to which interactions are oriented to the interior (feelings) or the exterior (things). Thus, where there is high interiority, feelings and intuitions are more likely to be expressed. At the interpersonal level, interiority is conditioned by perception of the other, perceived familiarity, whether the interaction is about business or personal matters, the setting of the interaction (industry or activity) and power relations. Organisational interiority is conditioned by the relative proportion of women to men in governance, the size of the organisation, national culture, and in particular, power relations and the interiority of the leader. Integrative organisations with high interiority are characterised by a focus on culture, have democratic power relations, are tolerant of mistakes, are supportive of members and have open communication. Expression of feelings is conducive to learning, collaborative decision-making, the development of the individual potential of members and building trust between them.

Conversely, assertive organisational cultures are characterised by tough, interpersonal relations where mistakes are punished. The right to speak is determined by strong hierarchies, and expression is shaped by the need to appear scientific, rational and objective – thus feelings (including intuitions) go unacknowledged. Intuitive individuals in these organisational contexts will silence or suppress their intuitions or choose expressions such as ‘judgement’ and ‘experience’ that mask the role of intuition in their decision-making. Alternatively, intuitions may be ‘dressed up’ to sound analytical or, alternatively, rationale for decisions may be found or even fabricated in order to align with cultural norms. However, disclosure of intuitions in assertive organisations is facilitated through a number of intervening variables – where the intuitive individual has a good decision track record, has formal or informal power, has high
self-confidence, operates in entrepreneurial environments or if their retirement is imminent, or if they just do not care. At the societal/environmental level, strong (good) decision-making in male dominated Australian commercial, legal, educational and political organisations is assumed to be active in the scientific, rational analysis of external concerns. Thus, a tension was identified between these values and the properties of intuition as non-rational (feeling based), associated with women, received and non-scientific (perceived as).

5.17 Conclusion

All participants stated that they considered intuition to be valuable to their decision making and leadership role. Intuition use can be seen as a complex process conditioned by the nature and context of the decision as well as the individual(s) making the decision. The analysis showed that the disclosure of intuition is a complex, conditional social process that can be understood at different levels of social description. The social processes for intuition disclosure and antecedent conditions have been described and explained for each level. However, it is acknowledged that, consistent with Domain Theory, these processes are intertwined and interdependent.
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Implications

*Our difficulty is not that we have developed conscious attention but that we have lost the wider style of feeling which should be its background.* (Watts 1991, p. 7)

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 of the thesis I introduced the study and located the research problem within a broad field of literature. The introduction also served to familiarise the reader with the purpose, aims and objectives, as well as the methods by which these aims and objectives would be achieved. I discussed the structure of the thesis with reference to how each chapter would contribute to the thesis as a whole. The research problem was then presented and justified in terms of the need to understand the social and cultural contexts that impact on intuition use and disclosure in the real world of organisations.

Chapter 2 presented a critical, interdisciplinary review of extant literature concerning intuition and intuition use. I proposed that the conceptual development of intuition had been slow and confounded by a plethora of competing and sometimes contradictory definitions within and across a number of disciplines. I showed that, in philosophy, intuition is credited with the apprehension of perfect and infallible subjective knowledge of an ultimate reality. Within psychology, a wide variety of approaches to, and definitions of, intuition were reviewed. Incoherence within the psychological literature in the construction of intuition, as well as a disjuncture between psychology and philosophical understandings of intuition, were revealed.

An integrating interpretive model of intuition was subsequently presented and discussed. I argued that conceiving of intuition as multi-dimensional and multi-faceted enabled the various psychological conceptualisations to be ordered in relation to one another, and in relation to analysis. The disjuncture between philosophical and psychological constructs of intuition was reconciled through a stratified ontology and a unifying, transcendent ground consciousness. Following this, I reviewed intuition constructed as ESP or Psi, which, according to a number of theorists, is explained by quantum non-locality.

A subsequent review of field studies concerning intuition use in organisations established that, although intuition (conceived as ‘gut feeling’) was regarded as a valuable tool by executives and managers, intuition(s) were seldom disclosed in organisations. While some theorists had attributed this to intuition having a bad reputation, I argued that no research found, to date, had sought an explanation for this phenomenon. I provided evidence from my own previous research that the unwillingness of leaders to disclose their intuition(s) had resulted in significant financial and social cost. Thus, I argued that while
research into the nature and properties of intuition is important, this knowledge is impotent unless the context, particularly the socio-cultural context in which intuition use occurs, is also understood. I argued that this gap in the knowledge is most appropriately addressed through the investigation of the following research problem:

**What are the social processes of intuition use and disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?**

In Chapter 3, I developed the theoretical framework for the study, which was informed by Layder’s Domain Theory (Layder 1994; Layder 1997; Layder 2005). I showed that Domain Theory had the potential to draw on multiple sociological lenses in the analysis of complex and multi-level (micrological/macrological) dynamics associated with the investigation of the research problem. Furthermore, I argued that the stratified ontology underpinning Layder’s Domain Theory was philosophically congruent with the way I proposed that psychological and philosophical intuition could be reconciled (Section 2.10).

Chapter 4 outlined the methodology and methods used in the study. I argued that the gap in the knowledge concerning the disclosure of intuition(s) in Australian organisations was ideally investigated by using flexible emergent methodologies that utilised both the analytical and intuitive capacities of the researcher. I argued that a research strategy informed by grounded theories was suited to capturing the complexity, ambiguity and dynamism of organisations. A dual yet interconnected approach to data gathering and analysis through variants of GT was described and justified. Semi-structured, ‘deep interviews’ with CEOs, chairs, directors, executives and leaders of Australian organisations, as well as the data collection and analysis procedures used, were explained and justified. Evaluation criteria for the grounded theory generated were presented along with corresponding details of how methodological soundness was achieved in this study.

Chapter 5 presented the analyses and emergent grounded theory. I found that intuition was experienced by participants as an internal feeling of knowing, which flagged the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal, the timeliness of a decision, and/or caution and the need for action – particularly further investigation. I showed that participants used gut feeling in conditional, yet complementary ways. In general, participants trusted their intuition(s) and considered it to be highly reliable, and very important to their leadership and decision-making. Furthermore, the analyses showed that the disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations was a complex, conditional social process that can be understood at different levels of social organisation. Whether or not intuition was acknowledged and/or expressed was conditional on the interiority of a person, interpersonal encounter, organisation or society.
This final chapter (Chapter 6) has four primary aims. The first (to be achieved in this introductory section) is to summarise the previous five chapters. The second is to establish to what extent the emergent theory arising from the current study is consistent with or diverges from relevant extant theory and research. The comparison will also contribute to the third aim of this chapter, which is to interpret, integrate and make sense of the findings of this study, and show how the study has contributed by extending and/or reframing existing knowledge. The fourth aim is to show the implications of contributions generated by this study for theory, policy and practice, and future research. The limitations of the research and the researcher will also be addressed in this chapter.

As mentioned in the introductory section, the emergent grounded theory discovered in relation to the disclosure of intuition(s) extends beyond the scope of the literature originally reviewed in Chapter 2. Indeed, discovery is seen as the principal advantage Grounded Theory has over deductive hypothesis testing (Glaser & Strauss 1967). As discussed in Chapter 3, while communicative exchange occurs at the interpersonal level, it occurs under the combined influence of social and psychological factors (System and Lifeworld) (Layder 2005). Thus, new literature will be introduced in this chapter at these levels. At the Lifeworld level, new literature will include neurological, psychological and sociological research findings in relation to the awareness and expression of feelings, including intuitions. This research will be shown to sustain the concept of interiority developed in this thesis and its relationship to intuition disclosure. At the System level, Post-structuralist Feminist Critical Theory will assist in extending and reframing the grounded theory detailed in Chapter 5. I will now introduce the concept of *différance* that will be employed throughout the chapter to anchor the discussion and the conclusions that will follow.

### 6.1.2 Différance

The reconciliation of apparently oppositional/antagonistic dualisms through stratification has been a repeated theme in this study. In this chapter, I argue that grounded theory generated in this research concerning intuition disclosure in organisations is most appropriately reviewed within a context of gender dualisms. Post structuralist feminists use Derrida’s concept of *différance* to show how gender is a system of relational meaning making (Ely & Padavic 2007). Derrida (1982) invented the word *différance*, which embodies the double meaning of ‘differ’ and ‘defer’, to express how meaning arises through the privileging of one aspect of a dualism over another (Calas & Smircich 1996; Alvesson & Billing 1997). *Différance* is therefore consistent with the philosophy of reconciliation through stratification given that ‘*Différance* separates but it also unites because it represents the unity of the process of division’ (Gherardi 1995, p. 101). Similarly for de Beauvoir (1972), the creation of the ‘One’ and the ‘Other’ is fundamental – necessary for the definition of subjectivity and therefore all knowledge. Meaning is not ‘out there’ to be discovered but is created via the consciousness of the individual through attention to,
and deferral of, certain particularities. Thus, for Gerhardi, de Beauvoir and Derrida, the concept and process of *différance* is profound because it is the ‘historical and epochal unfolding of Being’ (Derrida 1982, p.22).

I will employ Derrida’s term *différance* to interpret and make sense of the grounded theory I have developed in this study. In relation to the first main research question I argue that making distinctions between intuition and analysis in cognition and decision-making is a process of deferral. Consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I argue that intuition and analysis can indeed be regarded as separate and oppositional processes and modes of cognition. However, I also argue that cognition is whole or, more accurately, a holon, which cannot be reduced to intuition or analysis. I consequently conclude that we create a division in the process of inquiry through giving attention to one or the other – our value structures then defer one or the other, by way of *différance*.

I will show that *différance* is also pivotal to answering the second main research question. This is because post-structuralist critical feminists embrace *différance* and pay close attention to processes of privileging and deferral in the construction of dominant ideologies, values, discourse and practices that, taken together, constitute ‘Being’ in modern Western societies (Ely & Padavic 2007). According to these theorists, gender is a relational system where masculine and feminine are mutually-exclusive categories defined by their opposite. Thus, they rely on each other for their meaning (Alvesson & Billing 1997; Ely & Padavic 2007). Consequently, gender is not static but an ongoing process – one that is shaped in relation to standing historical conditions and shifting alliances of power that constitute and reconstitute knowledge and practices (Foucault 1980; Alvesson & Billing 1997; Connell 2005; Layder 2005; Ely & Padavic 2007). *Différance* is useful in deconstructing how this process operates in a hierarchical way that serves the interests of men (Putnam & Mumby 1993; Gherardi 1995; Ely & Padavic 2007).

Although increased participation by men in the domestic sphere can be ascribed to the rise of feminism, I argue that the aim of liberal feminists (achieving equality) has not been achieved. Men continue to dominate the globe politically and economically (Barry 2010). As a consequence, it is men who continue to determine what is privileged in meaning making through their control of social and commercial organisations, and institutions of governance. Traits of idealised masculinity are elevated in these institutions through the dissemination of the ‘hero’ archetype (Connell 1983; Sinclair 1998). Masculine

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77 Here I refer to intuition in the broadest sense (the automatic and unconscious processes referred to in Figure 2.2).

78 This is not unlike wave/particle complementarity described in the definition of terms under ‘complementarity’.
ways of thinking and being are normalised through the ‘persuasion of the greater part of the population’ by mainstream media (Donaldson 1993, p. 647). As a consequence, gendering processes are rendered invisible. Hence, asking men (and women79) to acknowledge their own masculinised conditioning is like asking fish to acknowledge ‘the water in which they swim’ (Stivers 1996 cited in Sinclair 2005, p. 27). In this way, idealised masculine traits have become infused as the frame of reference from which whole societies operate;80 considered both normal and natural (de Beauvoir 1972; Heckman 1999).

Men give attention to and privilege (elevate) certain values, traits, beliefs and thought forms and defer others. Traits that are not consistent with current ‘culturally exalted’ (Donaldson 1993, p. 647) forms of idealised masculinity are ‘othered’, denied and projected onto women (Gherardi 1995; Ely & Padavic 2007). In relation to decision-making, thinking, reason and analysis (rationality) are set against feeling, emotion and intuition (emotionality81) as binary opposites. Rationality is elevated through positive descriptors (orderly and objective) and claimed as masculine. Conversely, emotionality is constructed as subjective and chaotic, and is consequently assigned to the feminine (Putnam & Mumby 1993). In addition, because hierarchy is an elevated trait of the masculine in the West (Wilber 1995) what is constructed as ‘the feminine’ is marginalised and subordinated along with divergent and resistant masculinities (Calas & Smircich 1996; Connell 2005).

More specifically, the contribution of Post-structuralist Feminist Critical Theory to this study is to show how masculine, assertive organisational cultures elevate rational forms of knowing ‘while simultaneously marginalising emotional and intuitive experiences’ (Putnam & Mumby 1993, p.43). In masculine assertive organisational cultures it is tacitly understood that intuition(s) will be met with suspicion because it is constructed as esoteric, emotional and feminine and therefore inferior. As a consequence, intuition(s) are ‘othered’ and silenced, or masked in terms more congruent with the values of idealised masculinity – such those found in this study – ‘judgement’ and ‘experience’.

79 I would argue that women, through upbringing, education and training, are also conditioned to live in a ‘man’s’ world. Many women, in my experience, are aware of male domination but not aware of its pervasiveness in everyday life (hegemonic masculinity).

80 Notions of what is masculine vary across time, space and, between individuals and groups (Sinclair 1998; 2000) – here I refer to dominant masculinities of a given society at a particular time.

81 I will later conclude, on the basis of the data and literature reviewed, that intuition is not emotion. However, they are both feelings, and, moreover, both seen as ‘feminine’ and therefore ‘othered’. Thus, I argue that Feminist Theory concerning the deferral of emotion is as relevant for intuition as it is for emotion.
Studies underpinned by Critical Theory typically set out with the intention to explain phenomena by exposing asymmetrical power relations with the aim of emancipation (Crotty 1998). Indeed, Ely and Padavic (2007) argued that it is usually women and feminists that have identified androcentric biases with the intention of liberating women (Calas & Smircich 1996). I am not a woman, nor would I have described myself as a feminist at the inception of this research. The use of Post-structuralist Feminist Critical Theory was driven by the conviction that it provided a powerful theoretical tool and the most appropriate conceptual framework to make sense of the grounded theory developed in this study. Emancipatory implications for theory, policy and practice discussed at the end of this chapter are a corollary of the conclusions generated.

6.2 Conclusions about main question 1: How do the participants (organisational leaders) interpret, use and value intuition in their decision-making and leadership?

Participants described intuition as an internal, received, holistic, subconscious sense or feeling of knowing informed by experience. Thus, participants’ descriptions revealed a strong correspondence to intuition as ‘gut feeling’ as described by literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (Agor 1984; Agor 1986; Parikh et al. 1994; Dane & Pratt 2007; Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007), otherwise known as expert intuition (Crossan et al. 1999) and fast-track intuition (Bastick 1982; Cappon 1994a). The findings also confirm the importance of intuition to decision-making in organisational contexts that has been found in other studies (Agor 1984; Agor 1989c; Parikh et al. 1994; Robson & Miller 2006). While these findings are consistent with the literature, I argue that a focus on intuition as distinct from analysis encourages the interpretation that intuition can, in fact, be meaningfully separated out. I argue that while the findings are useful, they need to be understood in relation to, and in view of, the deferring nature of all inquiry.

For example, from the outset, I have characterised intuition as distinct from analysis. The title of the research, the invitation to participants and the questions asked of them assumed a binary opposition of intuition/analysis, which paid particular attention to intuition. It is therefore not surprising that this analytical distinction was reflected as an empirical distinction in the findings. Participants were able to describe and define intuition as something different to analysis. However, as the interviews proceeded, it became increasingly clear that intuition was always enmeshed, in some way, with analysis.

Intuition was used hand-in-hand with analysis by acknowledging it as a signal for caution, which instigated further research. Participants ‘had’ intuitions, however, they attributed them to past experience, analysis and reflection. They also applied research and analysis to their intuitions, as well as intuition to their analyses. Indeed, it was through analysis and reflection on their use of intuition that
participants came to trust it. Moreover, some participants perceived the boundaries between intuition and analysis to be ‘blurred’ in the experience of decision-making. Thus, I argue that while intuition and analysis can be spoken of independently, there also needs to be a recognition that this distinction is ultimately an artificial one created in the act of asking questions about ‘intuition’ or ‘analysis’ (creating meaning).

I do agree that oscillation, and alternation between intuition and analysis, that is a feature of Hammond (1996), Epstein (2000; 2008) and Pepper (1942), particularly in relation to the task at hand, does occur. Indeed, this is illustrated in Fig. 5.1 that depicts the conditional and complementary use of intuition by participants in relation to the nature and context of the decision or problem. Furthermore, I believe Hammond was correct when he argued that lack of attention to one aspect of cognition over the other fails ‘to capture the rich diversity of thought’ (Hammond 1996, p. 83). However, I conclude that both cognition and decision-making are holarchic processes, which are essentially characterised by complementarity\(^{82}\) rather than merely complementary processes as concluded by, for example, Hammond (1996) and Sinclair et al. (2010).

Participants also perceived that individuals could be described as different cognitive ‘types’ – intuitive holistic types and, in opposition, analytical black-and-white types. This finding is consistent with psychological theories of personality that underpin the cognitive style instruments discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.7). However, I argued in Chapter 2 that cognitive style instruments make no accommodation for context, task mode or complexity and ambiguity within the cognition of the individual or alternation within cognition. Again, applying Derrida’s (1982) notion of différance, the act of selecting an answer, as a participant in such a test, defers the role of the ‘other’ mode of cognition. In this sense, I argue that cognitive style instruments also underplay the synergistic and holarchic nature of cognition as a whole.

Consistent with the stratified ontological position consistently taken in this thesis I argue that cognition is paradoxical. Cognition is experienced as a fragmented yet simultaneously whole experience (Epstein 1990; Epstein 1998; Epstein 2008). I argue that this experience is representative of actual structure. Intuition and analysis are independent, oppositional and antagonistic – there is a tension between them. By way of an analogy, batteries have two poles; however, these poles are meaningless on their own. It is the tension between them, a property of neither, rather a transcendent property of their relationship

\(^{82}\) In the same way, I would argue that the human condition can be accurately described by such paradoxical statements as: what each of us has in common is that we are all unique, and, we are here on this earth alone together.
that is significant. It is this antagonistic/complementary relationship, in my view, that is the powerhouse for the whole of wisdom, insight, creativity and the potential of human consciousness in its myriad forms. This is a contention I share with Pepper (1942).

### 6.2.1 Insight, Psi and spiritual intuition

Consistent with findings from previous field research, participants agreed that they did experience insights (Agor 1984; Agor 1986; Khatri & Ng 2000), otherwise known as ‘slow track’ (Bastick 1982; Cappon 1993) or ‘entrepreneurial intuition’ (Crossan et al. 1999), which they found important to their decision-making and leadership. Participants, however, did not consider these experiences as intuitions.

It was noted that participants did acknowledge their capacity for background processing that led to insights (labelled ‘abdominal computing’ by one participant), however, they had no theory to explain this. Participants appeared to accept these insights as part of the mystery of being human. I suggest this is perhaps because of the lack of information and discourse surrounding intuition and intuitive processes in managerial education, and in education in general. This conclusion is supported by the finding that nearly all participants related their understanding of intuition to their own personal experience.

Both intuition as ESP or Psi, as well as what I have discussed as in Chapter 5 as ‘spiritual intuition’, were considered relevant for half of the participants. However, in common with insight, these participants only agreed that they did have, or could relate to such experiences after the construct was offered to them.\(^{83}\) Clearly, given that these alternative constructions of intuition were relevant for participants (Section 5.5), the role of insight, Psi and spiritual intuition in organisational leadership provides fertile ground for future investigation. I therefore argue the inclusion of these constructs in organisational studies, and the dissemination of the knowledge gained, is needed.

### 6.3 Conclusions about main question 2: What are the social processes of intuition disclosure by Australian leaders in organisations?

#### 6.3.1 Intrapersonal interiority

The category of interiority was discovered and selected as the core category of the emergent grounded theory in relation to intuition disclosure that was described and explained in Part 2. At the intrapersonal

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\(^{83}\) No further inquiry was made about insight, ESP or Psi and spiritual intuition because the participants themselves did not consider these as ‘intuition’. This was because the research was designed to focus on the disclosure of participants’ constructions of intuition, which, by their own definition, was gut feeling.
level of description, interiority was interpreted as an inward orientation to the inner realm of feelings, including emotion and intuitions. This inward orientation resulted in the acknowledgement, articulation and expression of feelings and intuitions. Interiority, it was found, was conditioned by gender, context, utility and attitude. The differing ability of individuals for awareness and expression of feelings is a phenomenon that has been found in a number of studies in different disciplines. Craig (2004) for example, in a neuropsychological study, found that some people are more aware of, or have better access to their feelings. According to Craig, introception, or a ‘subjective awareness of inner feelings’ (p. 239) was localised to the rAI (right anterior insular) part of the brain, which activates during ‘feeling’ experiences.

Craig (2004) demonstrated that subjects with damage to the rAI experienced a loss of this subjective awareness. Moreover, he found that subjective ‘introceptive’ awareness is correlated with ‘both activity and physical size of rAI’. Thus, according to Craig, people with a larger and more active rAI have greater ‘emotional depth and complexity’ (p. 241). The scope of Craig’s research however, did not encompass potential gender differences in the size and activity of the rAI nor the possibility of plasticity. Craig’s research clearly demonstrated that differences exist and that these differences are mirrored physiologically.

According to Schulz (2005), the brains of men and women are ‘hard wired’ in fundamentally different ways. Men’s brains are more compartmentalised, as opposed to women’s brains, which are more connected between cells and between hemispheres. As a consequence of this, women speak using both left and right hemispheres, which connects words and feelings. Conversely, for men, talking about feelings is like ‘eating ground glass’ because men are ‘biologically primed to talk more about things than feelings’ (p. 27). Consistent with my findings, Schulz argued that women are more able, and therefore more likely, to be aware of and talk about their feelings, hunches and intuitions. Moreover, this man/woman, external/internal84, thing/feeling dichotomy of expression has been found in other studies in other disciplines (see, for example, Hill & Stull 1987).

Schulz’s (2005) thesis initially appears to be biologically essentialist because she accounts for this difference in expression through biological priming, which would preclude individual variation and variation within each gender. However, she argued that these gender differences are not clear-cut and apply only to what she describes as ‘traditional’ male and female brains. As a consequence of a variety of non-traditional, culturally-driven ‘opportunities and pressures’, individual brain ‘gender’ varies widely

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84 Hill and Stull (1987) found that men tend to disclose more about topics external to themselves such as sport, cars and politics whereas women disclose more about feelings, weaknesses and their relationships.
and that ‘masculinisation and feminisation of brain regions may vary ... within one brain’ (p. 23). Thus, an individual may ‘throw like a boy’ but ‘talk like a girl’ (p. 23). Schulz distinguished gender from the characteristics associated with it, through brain plasticity in response to changing demands and consequent activity. I argue that this proposal is consistent with my findings because she notes general differences between men and women (gender conditioning), as well as individual variations as a result of non-traditional contexts and the utility of adapting to these contexts.

In a psychological study investigating emotional awareness and expression Booth-Butterfield and Booth-Butterfield (1990) developed the construct of Affective Orientation (AO) which I now argue is similar to the category of intrapersonal interiority that has been developed in this study. According to Booth-Butterfield et al., AO has two dimensions. The first dimension entails an awareness of affective information, while the second concerns the inclination to consider affective cues as a legitimate guide for actions. In these ways AO can be considered similar to Jung’s (1977) concept of introversion which, as described in Section 2.6, is an inward, rather than an outward direction of interest.

AO can be considered consistent with the concept of intrapersonal interiority because affectively oriented individuals are more inwardly directed to their feelings and, as a consequence, are more able to distinguish between and label them. In concert with the concept of low interiority, people who are not affectively oriented either do not attend to or are not aware of feelings because they are focused on or oriented to phenomena that are external to them. Indeed, Bastick (2003) also noted research that suggested a focus on the external phenomena reduces the sensitivity of individuals to internal feeling cues. Furthermore, confirming the conditioning relationship found between attitude and interiority in my findings, Booth-Butterfield et al. (1990) found that individuals who are not affectively oriented consider feeling cues to be either superfluous or something to avoid.

Booth-Butterfield et al. (1990) also distinguished gender from characteristics associated with gender through the inclusion of the constructs of masculinity and femininity as measured by Bem’s sex role inventory (BSRI). Underpinning the BSRI is the assumption that everyone has ‘the potential to embody both masculine and feminine characteristics’ (Pringle 2008, p. 112). While Booth-Butterfield et al. found that women were more affectively oriented than men in general AO was more specifically related to femininity rather than masculinity. They found that individuals who reported traits consistent with the construct of femininity were more likely to be guided by their feelings and have more complex forms of expressing them (high interiority). This finding was subsequently confirmed by Conway (2000). In common with the concept of intrapersonal interiority, AO recognises an inward orientation to feelings, legitimacy given to those feelings (attitude), and a capacity to label and express feelings. Moreover, AO was found not to be specific to women, but more common in women.
6.3.2 Awareness of feelings

In psychology, much of the research into awareness and expression of feelings stems from studies leading toward the development of Emotional Intelligence (EI) as a construct. The Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) was designed to measure the ability of people to be aware of emotions in self and others and the ability to express this awareness (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker & Zeitlin 1990; Barret, Lane & Schwartz 2000; Croyle & Waltz 2002; Ciarrochi, Caputi & Mayer 2003; Ciarrochi, Hynes & Crittenden 2005). Consistent with this study, women were found to achieve higher LEAS scores (Lane et al. 1990; Barret et al. 2000; Ciarrochi et al. 2003) and displayed more ‘complexity and differentiation in their articulations of emotional experiences than did men’ (Barret et al. 2000, p. 1027).

Emotional awareness and expression (EI) is considered relevant to intuition disclosure because if individuals have a greater awareness of what they feel then they would also have better access to their intuition(s) (Goleman 1995; Goleman, Boyatzis and McKee 2002). Bastick (1982; 2003) placed a good deal of emphasis on introspection, self-awareness and sensitivity to feelings for facilitating intuition(s). He acknowledged that ‘we do understand intuitively through our feelings’ (p. 260). Bastick (1982) also acknowledged that women have an advantage, in terms of better access and application, particularly for interpersonal intuition(s).

However, only one study was found explicitly confirming the link between emotional awareness, gender and intuition (which was published as this final chapter was being written). Sinclair et al. (2010), in a web-based, decision-simulation study of business students, replicated Booth-Butterfield et al.’s (1990) finding that the women in the study had greater AO than men. Sinclair et al. also reported a positive relationship between AO and self-description as intuitive and actual intuitive decision-making. Moreover, Sinclair et al. concluded that women in the study were guided more by their intuition because ‘they can access it more easily through their heightened awareness of emotions’ (p. 393).

However, Sinclair et al. (2010) appears to equate or at least associate intuition with emotions rather than feelings more generally. I would reject this because affective information, as described by Booth-Butterfield, is more akin to my definition of feelings as an overarching term associated with System 2. Thus, I argue that Sinclair et al. found that women were more ‘in touch’ with their feelings and, as a

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85 Although emotions and intuitions can be distinguished, intuitions have an affective component and have both been defined as feelings in this thesis (see Section 1.5 Definition of terms).
consequence, their intuitions. Therefore, on the basis of the discussion in this section, I argue there is significant empirical support for the concept of intrapersonal interiority developed in this study.

6.3.3 Interpersonal interiority

The findings in this study suggest that interpersonal interiority, that is to say the orientation to and thus the extent of disclosure of feelings and intuitions in an interpersonal interaction, is conditioned by perception of the other, familiarity with the other, whether the conversation is about business or personal matters and, if it is business related, in what type of industry. I argue that extant research confirms these discovered connections.

For example, in relation to perception of the other, several studies found that the emotional disclosures of both men and women varied according to the gender of the disclosure recipient – both men and women were more likely to disclose their emotions to women (Snell, Miller & Belk 1988; Blier & Blier 1989; Snell, Miller, Belk, Garcia-Falconi & Hernandez-Sanche 1989; Bleier 1991; Dindia & Allen 1992; Brody 1997). I argue that if women generally have higher intrapersonal interiority, and interpersonal interiority is conditioned by perceptions of intrapersonal interiority in the other, then higher emotional disclosure (intrapersonal interiority) would be a logical consequence where women are a party to an interaction.

Conversely, people who are not affectively oriented (mostly men) are more focused on logic and ‘objective’ facts (Booth-Butterfield & Booth-Butterfield 1990), and men are more likely to communicate about things external to themselves (low interiority) (Hill & Stull 1987; Schulz 2005). Thus, the finding that interactions between men are generally not characterised by emotional self-disclosure (low interpersonal interiority) is not surprising (Lewis 1978).

The relationship of interpersonal familiarity to interpersonal interiority (emotional disclosure) found in this study is also supported by research (Jourard & Landsman 1960; Dindia & Allen 1992) as well as being somewhat self-evident. Reciprocity, particularly reciprocity of self-disclosure, is a fundamental characteristic of interpersonal relationships because it builds mutual trust and intimacy. The more one discloses in a relationship the higher the expectation that the other will do the same, particularly where the disclosure is intimate. Failure to reciprocate self-disclosure is typically a threat to the relationship (Lynn 1977; Beebe et al. 2005).

The business-public/personal-private duality found in relation to interpersonal disclosure and expression (Section 5.14.3) is also supported. Consistent with numerous theorists, the domestic, private sphere is perceived as a more appropriate context for disclosure (see, for example, Parkin 1993). As Fineman (1993) pointed out, our emotional life and emotionality is not removed in organisations, rather, it is
rationalised or is played out covertly. I will further develop this discussion in Section 6.3.5 in relation to organisational interiority.

As seen above, the constructs of both intrapersonal and interpersonal interiority have raised issues of connections to the macrological–system context. Psychological studies are focused on the intrapersonal level of analysis. However, as Layder (2005) suggested, an exclusive focus on one level over another in social analysis can result in phenomena being inappropriately attributed, conflated and appearing absolute and independent of macrological context, or rendered invisible or silent (Layder 1997; Hartman 2005).

Alternatively, deductive, positivistic studies, may ‘tack on’ a causal macrological or structural explanation that, while plausible, remains speculative and dependent on further research for confirmation (Dey 1999). However, later sociological studies may have different motivations, philosophical assumptions, methodological approaches and methods. Therefore reconciling how the psychological intersects with the sociological is difficult.

For example, extant researches from both sociological and psychological studies grappled with the discovered links between System and Lifeworld in relation to interiority. Booth-Butterfield et al. (1990) for example, in their positivist psychological study, speculated that AO can be attributed to the expectation in society for women to ‘focus on their emotions and act upon them’ (p. 456). Brody (1997), in a sociological study, speculated that gender difference in emotional expressivity is dependent on situation and culture. Barret et al. (2000) concluded that gender differences found in emotional awareness and expression are stable and highly generalisable. They speculated that these ‘differences might be inherited, due to differing socialisation processes for boys and girls or some combination of the two’ (p. 1032). Barret et al. consequently advocated further research into cultural context in relation to these differences. I argue that a significant contribution of the multi-level approach to research adopted in this study is that explanations for macrological social processes were not speculative; they were grounded in the data.

I found that intrapersonal interiority was not conditioned by the gender of the participant, but by gender socialisation, context and utility. In agreement with this contention, Ciarrohi et al. (2005) found that men’s scores on the LEAS could be improved to match those of women’s through providing motivation (utility). Ciarrohi et al. hypothesised that the superiority of females in LEAS scores could be attributed to years of practice through the conditioning of gender roles requiring empathy, nurturance and emotional expression. Their hypothesis is supported by other theorists (Maio & Esses 2001; Simon & Nath 2004) and by studies that have shown that the emotional expression of men engaged in primary childcare resembles what is stereotypically associated with women (Hanson 1988; Radin 1994).
Many studies that attribute differences in emotional awareness and expression to gender socialisation however, do so in a way that is unproblematic – gender socialisation is described uncritically. One must assume that the authors are either oblivious to gender relations literature or that they support a functionalist position of gender relations as asserted by Parsons (1955; 1964). Parsons argued that the division of labour in modern societies required men to take an instrumental role outside the home and women an expressive role caring for others, which he considered as functional for the maintenance and well-being of the family. However, Feminist Critical Theory disputes whether this arrangement is functional for women and indeed for society as a whole (Sinclair 1998). Typical male socialisation encourages a lack of sensitivity to feelings that is a ‘health hazard’, and an ‘emotional numbness’ that is deleterious to social and family relationships (Sinclair 1998, p. 59). Moreover Feminist Critical Theory describes how the construction of gender at the individual level (Lifeworld) is interwoven with macrological System features. Thus, Feminist Critical Theory complements Domain Theory in unravelling the linkages discovered in the grounded theory developed in this thesis. These linkages will now be examined further.

6.3.4 Cognitive bias in EI research – System/Lifeworld connections

Dominant masculine thought forms have consequences for research (Hekman 1990; Oakley 2000). Hence theorising in male-dominated positivist research, which assumes neutrality, can be critiqued (Ely & Padavic 2007). I now argue that the development of the construct ‘Emotional Intelligence’ has been constrained by a masculine cognitive bias. My critique will make important distinctions between EI and intrapersonal interiority which, will clarify the concept of interiority and explicate how masculine cognitive bias may operate in research.

I have interpreted interiority as an *inward orientation* that gives *primacy* and legitimacy to feelings. Interiority has consequences for decision-making and behaviour through the ‘surfacing’ of feelings and intuitions into conscious awareness, which renders these feeling/knowings available for expression, articulation, discussion, exploration and scrutiny. EI, on the other hand, places primacy on *reasoning about* emotion (Mayer et al. 2007; Mayer et al. 2008). This separation of the feeling from the feeler exemplifies what Oakley (2000) describes as the corollary of positivism, where subjectivity is objectified and exploited. Whereas the primary focus of interiority is inward orientation and receptivity, ‘I think in the early stages it’s about just being’ (Participant 1 F), the primary focus of EI is the *use* of emotion for problem-solving and managing emotions to attain specific goals (Mayer et al. 2007). Hence, while the construct of EI acknowledges the interior, I argue that its orientation remains exterior.

In this way the significance of the interior (feminine) is *subsumed* by the primacy given to reasoning (masculine). Thus, the interior is rendered inferior or given an ancillary role in much the same way that
intuition is occluded in traditional decision-making models. From a critical feminist perspective, the primary focus on reasoning in EI is a consequence of the unspoken cognitive bias of the researchers under masculine institutional values. Fineman (2000) pointed out that EI is presented and ‘packaged’ in a way that can be ‘sold’, especially to the corporate world (p. 102), so that emotions can be managed. I would argue that the motivation for ‘product’, an instrument that can be employed and applied, is consistent with an external orientation. However, Rafaeli and Worline (2001) pointed out the contradiction of this approach, ‘... managing emotion is an oxymoron. The more it is managed, the less it feels truly emotional’ (p. 116). Thus, I argue that the construct of EI has succumbed to the latent masculine cognitive bias in Western society towards reason, objectivity, the active and the exterior.

The consequence of the development of EI as an individual intelligence that is defined as reasoning about emotions is threefold in relation to the findings regarding intra and interpersonal interiority as discussed. The first is that because EI is defined as reasoning about emotions it precludes actions that stem directly from feelings such as compassion and empathy. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary (Delbridge & Bernard 1998) defined empathy as ‘entering into the feeling or spirit of a person or thing’ (p. 363). One could argue that action based on empathy is not an analytical process; one does not reason about the strengths and weaknesses of assisting someone in dire need; one simply acts. Indeed, reasoning may inhibit action based on empathy if the principle rationale is self-interest.

Thus, elevating rationality is precarious and contentious because rationality is not an ‘objective immutable state. It is socially constructed’ (Putnam & Mumby 1993, p. 55). Rationality is rather an organising principle that expresses tacit assumptions about what is perceived to be important by a particular individual or group at a particular time and place. Consistent with the business/private dualism found in this study, feelings of empathy and compassion are rationalised away in organisations through slogans such as ‘it's not personal, it's business. Don't be emotional’ (Rafaeli & Worline 2001, p. 101).

Second, I argue that transpersonal intuitions must be excluded. As discussed in Chapter 2, transpersonal intuitions are not emotions, nor are they able to be reasoned about because they cannot be symbolically represented. Intrapersonal interiority, in contrast, places primacy on subjectivity and would therefore include transpersonal intuitions. Osho comments on consequence of external orientation in traditional science in relation to self discovery that, in view of the context of his philosophy, could be equated with self-transcendence:

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86 In a similar way, emotion, in the concept of emotional labour, is appropriated, managed, and used for instrumental ends (Mumby & Putnam 1992).
... the scientist, deep down, does not believe that there is anything inner. He may say so, he may not say so, but his whole training, his whole education, makes him trust only objects which he can dissect, which he can observe, which he can analyse, which he can compose, create, uncreate, find out their basic constituents. His whole mind is object-oriented, and subjectivity is not an object. So if he wants subjectivity to be put before him on the table, that is not possible; that is not the nature of subjectivity. So the scientist goes on finding everything in the world except himself. (Osho 2010)

As Osho (2010) and Wilber (1995) have argued, the denial of the inner is not consistent with ‘new’ scientific knowledge that posits duality as a fundamental and universal principle (Bastick 1982; Capra 1984; Mainzer 1996). If there is an outer, there must be an inner. Science predicated on the assumptions of Scientific Realism is precluded from ultimate knowledge because, according to many theorists, this knowledge is found within (Bergson 1961; Bhattacharyya 1976; Krishnamurti 1995; Wilber 1995).

Third, I argue that EI is constructed as an individual ability unrelated to other levels of social organisation. However, a core proposition of the emergent grounded theory is that the concept of interiority can be applied to individual and collective levels. Moreover theory that includes how System and Lifeworld elements intersect is essential because, according to Layder (2005), they are mutually constitutive.

6.3.5 Macrolological/System/Organisational cultures

Through purposive sampling techniques, I advocate that this study has amplified the voices of women as a consequence of their disproportionate representation in the sample in relation to their representation in senior leadership positions. Many described a dualism in relation to their personal experience of organisational cultures in Australia. Two distinct types of organisational cultures were discerned – assertive cultures, predominantly under the leadership of men, and integrative cultures, mostly under the leadership of women.

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87 Traditional psychology acknowledges the psyche but not the spiritual. Psychiatry and western medicine, in general, views the physical as primary in diagnosis and cure (Bastick 1982). The inner – feelings, values and beliefs – are considered secondary and are generally ignored. Wilber (1995) also argued that contemporary systems theories ignore the evolution (complexification) of consciousness which he views as inseparable from biological evolution.

88 Goleman (1995) discussed ‘emotionally intelligent’ organisations, however, he does so without reference to research; he simply extends the idea conceptually.
I argue that the findings discussed in Section 5.15.3 are consistent with literature that asserts organisational cultures are systems of meaning that are shaped by numerous influences. These include social institutions and educational systems (Hofstede 1991), as well as individuals in, and particularly leaders of organisations (Lord & Maher 1993; Schein 2010). The conditioning effect of gender on leadership style and consequences for organisational culture is also acknowledged; particularly in gender studies literature (see, for example, Eagly & Johnson 1990; Sinclair 1998; Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt 2001).

I have interpreted that assertive cultures often are characterised by the need to appear scientific, rational and objective, hierarchical power structures with tough, competitive interpersonal relations where mistakes are punished (Section 5.15.2). These properties are consistent with traits that are considered masculine, i.e. autonomy, competitiveness, objectivity, forcefulness, aggressiveness and ambitiousness (Sargent 1983; Connell 1987; Connell 2005; Ely & Padavic 2007), and agentic leadership and behavioural styles, which, according to Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001), are ascribed to men rather than women. I argue ‘assertive’ is an apt label because individuals seek to assert themselves and promote their individual ego interests over the interests of others and those of the organisation. A hierarchical power structure therefore represents a formal validation of this way of being and doing.

I argue that the extent of orientation to rational analysis, as opposed to the feelings of self and other, constitutes a fundamental dimension of organisational culture that conditions the expression of feelings and, specific to the research problem, intuition(s). Moreover, I conclude that assertive cultures characterised by low interiority dominate commercial and public institutions in Australia. This is supported by Sinclair (2000), Gherhardi (1995) and Ely and Padavic (2007), who argued that the importation of masculine derivations of meaning and being means that organisations are both gendered and gendering. I further conclude that this dominance of low interiority is not readily apparent because, as an aspect of culture, it operates below the level of awareness (Lord & Maher 1993; Sinclair 1998; Connell 2005). It is only those who have been ‘othered’ that are aware of a différance. Thus, it is not surprising that it was almost exclusively the women in the study that pointed to the properties of assertive cultures.

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89 My discussion of organisational culture is predicated on the assumption that cultures are not homogenous nor do they have uniformly accepted values that characterise the entire organisation (Jermier, Slocum, Fry & Gaines 1991; Fineman 2000). Clashing subcultures exist (Fineman 2000; Schein 2010) as well as a recognisable and stable synthesis of the assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, values, rituals, behaviours, symbols, and mythology of an organisation that underpins what people do (Parry 1996; Dubrin, Dalglish & Miller 2006; Schein 2010).
6.3.5.1 Intuition disclosure in assertive cultures

In contradiction to traditional assumptions, men and organisations are far from unemotional (Hearn 1993; Fineman 1993). Feelings are pervasive and contextualise all social interactions (Forgas 1982). Organisations can therefore be considered emotional arenas where, ‘the very essence of ... work concerns what people do with their feelings’ (Fineman 1993, p. 9). In male-dominated organisations the construction of norms governing expectations in relation to gender roles – who occupies positions of power within the organisation – and to ways of knowing and the control of emotional expression (Parkin 1993) occurs in relation to idealised masculinity (Calas & Smircich 1996).

In concert with this feminist analysis of the disclosure of feelings in organisations, the findings of this research show that participants perceived that intuition was generally associated with emotion and women. Moreover, rationality was elevated while emotionality, and therefore women, is/are viewed as negative\(^90\) (Putnam & Mumby 1993). Intuitions were, as a consequence, considered inferior, unprofessional and non-business-like (Section 5.8.1) and therefore inappropriate to instrumental areas of life such as in organisations. Participants perceived a need to justify and account for the decisions they made in a scientific, evidence-based, rational and business-like fashion in communications to other members as well as to stakeholders and the media. Thus, in agreement with feminist theorists (Parkin 1993; Fineman 2000; Rafaeli & Worline 2001) norms in assertive organisational cultures were found to constrain emotional disclosure through tacitly-held understandings.

As a consequence, intuition(s), it was shown, is suppressed or silenced in order to avoid ridicule. Alternatively, participants invoked language to mask intuition in analytical terms that were consistent with norms of assertive cultures. Expressions such as ‘my experience’ and especially ‘judgement’ were used because of their consistency with the properties of assertive cultures (Section 5.15.1). Participants said they would use these words in the knowledge that intuition was, at least in part, a component of their experience and judgement. Masking the intuitive in such a way is attractive to organisational actors because norms of expression and disclosure are reinforced through rewarding those that conform and punishing those who do not (Connell 1987; Putnam & Mumby 1993). Putnam and Mumby (1993) pointed out that people manage social impressions in order to avoid embarrassment. It is for this reason that assertive organisations are characterised by low interiority.

\(^90\) However, certain forms of emotional expression consistent with masculinity, such as anger, are sanctioned (Sargent 1983; Hearn 1992; Mumby & Putnam 1992; Parkin 1993).
Disclosure of intuition(s), in assertive cultures, is therefore restricted to those in the organisation who have enough power and status to be immune from ridicule and otherwise punitive measures. Felt and expressed feelings (including intuitions) are therefore not necessarily consistent (Fineman 2000). This, in turn, has implications for intrapersonal interiority because, if the suppression of authentic feelings is sustained, people will lose touch with their feelings or become alienated from them (Putnam & Mumby 1993; Rafaeli & Worline 2001). I argue that in this way intrapersonal and collective interiority can be seen as inextricably enmeshed and interwoven.

Moreover, disengagement and alienation from emotions enables acts devoid of compassion and empathy. Parkin (1993) argued that corporate actors would do things they would not consider outside of their organisational frame of reference. Therefore the victimisation of others, environmental degradation, and, for example, the dubious practices that led to and followed the GFC can be seen a consequence of the same business/private-personal dualism that conditions the disclosure of intuition (Section 5.6.2.8) and interiority (Sections 5.14.3 and 5.16.1). Here we see a fitting application of Goffman’s (1971) notion of core and satellite selves (discussed in Section 3.4).

### 6.3.5.2 Intuition disclosure in integrative cultures

The findings revealed that organisations under the leadership of or dominated by women are, in general, characterised by a supportive, inclusive, democratic cultures that are tolerant of mistakes and characterised by open communication (Section 5.15.2). While some post-structural feminists argue that there is no essential ‘femininity’ (Calas & Smircich 1996) these properties are consistent with the values of ‘sensitivity, emotional expressiveness and nurturance which represent the authentic feminine values outside patriarchy’ espoused by radical feminists (Calas & Smircich 1996, p. 226). In addition, Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001) also ascribed communal characteristics to women rather than to men and list these as ‘affectionate, kind, interpersonally sensitive, nurturant and gentle’ (p. 783).

Post-structural Feminist Theory can account for the integrative organisational cultures found in this study by way of the local power of leaders (potentially both men and women) to defer dominant masculine values and discourse and constitute resistant feminine alternatives (Ely & Padavic 2007). This is supported outside feminist theory by Hofstede (1991) who pointed out that feminine cultures arise where women work together and Eagly and Johnson (1990) who suggested that women develop their own leadership style rather than imitating those of their male counterparts.

These perspectives are consistent with my interpretation of the data with respect to leadership and gender mix and as conditions for organisational culture (Section 5.15.3). Many participants (predominantly the women in the sample), said they expressed their intuitions freely and affirmed the intuitive expressions of others in the organisations they lead. However, this did not necessarily mean
that intuitions (nor analyses) would be acted on – rationality was not abandoned. I interpreted that the intent of open language and communication, for participants, was to foster a democratic and participative culture (Section 5.15.2). Moreover, such a culture is conducive to the expression of ideas and emotions, and, specific to answering the main research problem, intuitions.

I argue that ‘integrative’ is a fitting descriptor because interiority, as a dimension of culture, can contribute to a cultural cohesion and integration. Feelings are universal to the human condition (Damasio 1994) and their acknowledgement and expression facilitates a sense of interrelatedness, mutual understanding and community (Fineman 1993; Putnam & Mumby 1993). Thus, organisational interiority can bind diverse and disparate individuals in an organisation. Indeed, the findings have shown that a sense of community, gained through emotional expression, can strongly motivate people toward the goals of the collective rather than those of the individual (Section 5.15.2).

The disclosure of feelings maximises the likelihood that the needs of organisational actors will be mutually fulfilled (Brody 1997). If feelings are repressed, people may attempt to meet these needs through Machiavellian strategies that can undermine cohesiveness and, moreover, act as a contagion and infect the entire organisational unit (Damasio 1994; Goleman et al. 2002). It is through interiority that organisations avoid destabilising interpersonal dynamics (Goleman et al. 2002). Thus, I argue that intrapersonal, interpersonal and organisational interiority are interrelated and pivotal in unearthing and preventing deleterious interpersonal dynamics and emotional undercurrents.

Bakhtin’s (1981) core idea was that people only become aware of identity through engagement in communication with the other (Jabri 2010). Higher levels of interiority therefore facilitate a more authentic and complete self-understanding and self-actualisation. Emotionality helps people adapt to different roles and the changes in work conditions that are inevitable (Brody 1997). The failure of organisational research to include interior aspects of organisational life, outside maximising employee utility, is therefore a significant omission (Parkin 1993).

6.4 Alternatives to feminist explanations of dominant rationality

Feminism is not the only body of knowledge to recognise and offer an explanation for the ascendancy of rational ways of knowing. In Jungian terms, thinking and being are represented by the archetypes of Eros (feminine) and Logos (masculine). Jung argued that Western culture has been disastrously suppressed by the pre-eminence of Logos (Rowland 2002). More recently, McGilchrist (2009), taking a neuropsychological approach, argued that there are two broad ways of interpreting the world which correspond to left brain and right brain ‘thinking’ (in a similar way to Epstein 1998). In an explanation comparable to Derrida’s différance, McGilchrist argued that our lived reality is generated at the point of
intersection of the mind and what is outside the mind. Thus, he attributes our current state of affairs in the West – decontextualised, fragmented and devoid of feeling and meaning, to the supremacy of the left hemisphere ‘take’ in this creation process. Hence, McGilchrist argued that we have produced a left-brain culture.

Drawing on Gebser (1984) and Habermas (1979), Wilber (1995) charted the evolution of cultural consciousness or our ‘social worldview’ (p. 119) in the West from archaic to magical (animistic) to mythic (tradition and religion) to rational (scientific truth) to pluralistic (post-modern, multiple realities) to integral (where the truth in former world views is acknowledged). Wilber’s contention was that mainstream culture has been in transition away from the scientific, rational values of the modernist era (which have dominated for centuries) to the post-modern\(^\text{91}\) and, in some individuals and groups, to integral values. Moreover, Wilber argued that evolution of individual and collective consciousness involves recognition of, and connection (through meditation) to, the ‘within’ of things. This thesis is strikingly similar to that of Parikh, who argued:

> We have been evolving through geological, biological and ideological revolutions and it has been suggested that we are transiting towards what is described as a ‘consciousness’ revolution. This implies that we are collectively moving towards a greater awareness about, and access to, our inner dynamics, our ‘inner space’, or consciousness. Intuition from this standpoint is viewed as a higher or deeper level of consciousness in which a different kind of ‘knowing’ takes place. (Parikh et al. 1994, p. 3)

Thus, convergence can be seen between Jung (cited in Rowland 2002), McGilchrist (2009), Wilber (1995) and Feminist Critical Theory in that they all acknowledge the current dominance of rational forms of knowing; they differ only by way of explanation. McGilchrist attributed the dominance of rationality to neuropsychology (the dominance of the left hemisphere), Jung to the dominance of the masculine archetype, while Wilber attributed the dominance of rationality to Scientific Revolution as a necessary developmental phase in the ongoing evolution of consciousness. Thus, I do not regard these explanations mutually exclusive. Importantly, they all contribute to an awareness of the pervasiveness and impact of ‘rationality’ for us and our world. I argue this is particularly important in view of the said difficulty of being aware of conditioning, of being aware of the ‘water’ in which we ‘swim’\(^\text{92}\).

\(^{91}\) Wilber (1995) argued that post-modern values have predominated at the leading-edge at Universities, liberal politics and social services for almost 30 years.

\(^{92}\) I referred earlier to the difficulty of men and women to acknowledge their own ‘masculine’ conditioning (Stivers 1996 cited in Sinclair 2005, p. 27). In concert with this notion, McGilchrist (2009) argued that the ‘left-brain’ (which dominates our thinking) is ‘unaware’ of the influence and importance of ‘right-brain’ influence.
The advantage of Feminist Critical Theory for this study, however, is that has contributed to revealing how the domination of male leadership in Australian organisations constitutes what is considered to be natural and neutral organisational practice. The conclusions affirm the assertion of feminist theorists that gender is a crucial yet neglected area of organisational analysis (Gherardi 1995; Collinson & Hearn 2003; Ely & Padavic 2007). Feminist Critical Theory also enabled me to connect masculine cognitive bias in theorising (as discussed in Section 6.3.4) and ‘gender blindness’ in organisational theory (Reed 1996, p. 48). I argue this relationship is reifying because organisational research has been largely conducted by, for and about men (Calas & Smircich 1996). Moreover, this reifying relationship contributes to the appearance of gender neutrality (Mumby & Putnam 1992; Ely & Padavic 2007), which legitimates the continued male domination of most organisations (Collinson & Hearn 2003).

6.5 Conclusions about the research problem

The empirical research component of this thesis contributes to the growing body of literature highlighting the significance of non-rational aspects of organisational life. Intuition was interpreted to be experienced as an internal, received, holistic, subconscious sense or feeling of knowing. Intuition as a feeling/knowing flags the rightness or wrongness of a person, choice, strategy or proposal, the timeliness of a decision and/or caution, and the need for action – particularly further investigation. Thus, participants’ descriptions revealed a strong correspondence to intuition as an event ‘gut feeling’. The findings also confirm the importance of intuition to decision-making in organisational contexts which was used in complementary ways with analysis. Participants ‘had’ intuitions, however, they attributed them to past experience, analysis and reflection. They also applied research and analysis to their intuitions, as well as intuition to their analyses. Moreover, for some participants intuition and analysis were seen as ‘blurred’ in the experience of cognition itself. Thus, I concluded that while intuition and analysis can be spoken of, there needs to be recognition that this distinction is ultimately artificial and a consequence of différence. I therefore concluded that both cognition and decision-making are holarchic processes that are characterised by complementarity.

The principal contribution of this study was to describe and explain the disclosure of intuition(s) as a complex, conditional social process that can be best understood at different levels of social description. Whether or not intuition is acknowledged and/or expressed was concluded to be conditional on the interiority of a person, interpersonal encounter, organisational culture or society. The core category of interiority developed in the study represents an orientation to the inner realm of feeling and intuitions. High intrapersonal interiority is characterised by both a greater sensitivity to intuition(s) and a willingness to surface, give legitimacy to and utilise intuition(s).
The finding that some people are more inwardly oriented than others, particularly women and those whose activity relies on the awareness of feelings and their expression, is supported by the psychological constructs of AO and EI. However, I argue that the construct of EI was constrained by the predominant external orientation of male-dominated Western research cultures that privilege reason over emotion and other feelings, including intuitions. Emotions are acknowledged in EI, however, they are subsumed by the primacy given to reasoning. Moreover, EI instruments are often applied in organisations in order to advance a commercial exterior agenda where emotions become a ‘commodity’ to be managed and exploited (Fineman 2000; Putnam and Mumby 1993). Orientation and sensitivity to feelings, which I have labelled intrapersonal interiority, was interpreted to be important for participants (particularly the women) because this orientation allowed them to ‘surface’ feelings and bring them into conscious awareness. Although intrapersonal interiority is not necessary to be aware of and utilise an intuition, interiority gives better and deeper access to the feeling realm and therefore a better capacity to distinguish between intuition, emotion and other feelings, to label them and utilise them.

At the organisational level, the findings suggest that organisations led or dominated by men are often characterised by low interiority. In assertive cultures the expression of intuitions and emotions is suppressed and only disclosed by those who are immune to censure. These findings sit well with Post-structural Feminist Critical Theory utilising Derrida’s concept of *différance*. These feminists elucidate the processes by which rational forms of being and knowing are privileged through the male domination of economic and social institutions. Male-dominated organisational cultures elevate that which is consistent with the values of idealised masculinity, and deny or project that which is not onto the feminine and women as inferior. Alternative masculinities, women, intuition and feelings are devalued, marginalised and silenced through norms in relation to what is expressed, by whom and when. Post-structuralist Feminist Theory has thus provided a convincing explanation as to why participants in the study perceived a need to find or fabricate rationale for intuitions or present them in analytical terms more consistent with the properties of assertive cultures.

The explanations of social processes that I have argued to answer the research problem rest on the interiority/exteriority dualism developed in this thesis. I have justified this in terms of the findings, the view of the Universe as binary in nature and, moreover, the recognition of holarchy (wholeness through stratification) and unity in the process of division (*différance*). However, I also wish to emphasise that individuals, interactions and cultures cannot be characterised in simple dichotomies. They, like Schultz’s non-traditional brains, are better seen as a complex ‘soup’ of many, and sometimes contradictory, dimensional properties. Nonetheless, I conclude that the interiority/exteriority dualism provides a valuable tool to deconstruct social dynamics in a way that can explain phenomena, such as intuition
disclosure, at different levels of description. Indeed, the interiority/exteriority dualism can be used to understand and explain social phenomena that are not encompassed by the research question. These theoretical implications will now be examined.

6.6 Implications for broader theorising

In Chapter 2, I presented a model of cognition (represented by Figure 2.3) whereby seemingly diverse psychological constructs of intuition can be ordered in relation to one another. In addition I proposed that philosophical and psychological constructs of intuition could be reconciled through the unifying meta-reality of ground consciousness from which all else unfolds. This is interpretation of the literature is represented by (Figure 2.4). I argue that both of these models contribute to a deeper and more integrative understanding of intuition in view of the competing and interdisciplinary constructions of intuition.

One implication of this philosophical stance, detailed in Robson (2010), is that a stratified yet unified ontology provides a basis from which to transcend ‘paradigm wars’ and the long running realism/idealism positivism/constructivism debate. Many researchers retreat within their traditions, eschewing mixed methods on the basis of philosophical incompatibility (Bazeley 2008). For this reason, contemporary mixed methods research is now often done under the banner of pragmatism (Bazeley 2004) that is silent on ontology or posits an indeterminate reality (Charmaz 2009) in order to get the work done. Bazeley (2008) argued that this philosophical dilemma remains unresolved. However, if it is accepted that these apparently contradictory philosophical positions merely represent a deferral and elevation of one of two ways of describing aspects of a unified whole, then a more inclusive and less conflicted and divided approach to social research is possible – one that is capable of integrating multiple methods without philosophical contradiction.

The grounded theory developed in this thesis has generated a number of theoretical implications specific to the immediate parent disciplines of management, leadership and organisational

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93 Another interesting implication is that if this ‘ground state’ is some kind of primordial ‘consciousness’, then the whole Universe is alive. This renders questions like ‘How did life start?’ obsolete (through différance, humans elevate what appears to be animate in deciding what is alive and what is not). Thus, as a consequence of the tendency of the Universe to complexify or evolve (Capra 1996; Wilber), ground consciousness has evolved to different degrees through the various manifestations of life of which it is a fundamental holonic constituent. One could even argue that this consciousness may come to know itself through the capacity in humans for philosophical intuition. As said, this is where universal and personal consciousness realise each other in self-transcendence, and co-presence (Bhaskar 2002). The realisation that one is part of this process of cosmic realisation gives meaning to life.
development, which have been discussed in the previous sections. The importance of gut feelings for leaders in Australia on a day-to-day basis was highlighted, particularly in view of the increasing complexity and uncertainty of contemporary business environments. Figure 5.1 showed how participants used intuition and analysis in complementary ways. This and the accompanying explanatory grounded theory contribute to extant literature about intuition use.

In Chapter 5, a grounded theory was developed which, I argue, addressed the research problem in relation to the use and disclosure of intuition(s). In this chapter, the grounded theory was positioned relative to the literature examined in Chapter 2, and other literature, particularly Feminist Critical Theory, which was deemed valuable in making sense of the findings within a broader scope. The emergent theory contributes to the field of organisational studies through an exploratory/explanatory understanding of the social processes that constrain and enable the use and disclosure of intuition(s) in Australian organisations. I have addressed the research problem by showing that intuition is unacknowledged, unexpressed or masked where there is predominant external orientation, individually and collectively. These contributions are a corollary of answering the main research question in relation to the use and disclosure of intuition(s) in organisations. However, the grounded theory developed in this thesis, particularly the core category of interiority, has a number of theoretical implications that extend beyond the scope of this thesis.

The exterior/interior dualism can be applied to leadership. The hero archetype as leader simultaneously creates followers, who unconsciously surrender their agency in the expectation that leaders will solve their problems (Sinclair 1998). However, I argue that the archetype of the heroic leader as a saviour ‘... needs to be confronted as a powerful unconscious force, as much a product of followers’ fantasies as leaders’ delusions’ (Sinclair 1998, p. 31). This is because atrocities are not committed by megalomaniac leaders themselves but carried out by those who follow them. Starkey (1996) regarded this dependency on the leadership of others as infantile, and a refusal to take responsibility for one’s own living conditions and general well-being. I concur and add that abdication of the power afforded to individual citizens in democratic (sic) states fertilises the eternal cycle of hope and disappointment through the appointment of leaders who promise the Earth to attain power but predominantly deliver to themselves, their families and their allies who keep them there. Thus, I argue that this orientation to the exterior in relation to leadership is a fundamental problem for humanity.
Many lament the state of contemporary affairs and blame ‘society’. However, society, viewed as a holarchy (Wilber 1995), entails the recognition that each individual is, at the same time, society (Krishnamurti 1991). This recognition is powerful because it raises awareness of the possibilities and responsibilities of each of us. An interior orientation to the concept of leadership might draw attention to how people can get in touch with their own intuitions in the broadest sense of the word – finding guidance from within rather than from without. This idea is somewhat embodied in Cooksey’s (2003) concept of ‘learnership’. Cooksey’s concept extends beyond ownership of process and outcome to a place where learners evolve to become leaders in and of themselves (Cooksey 2003).

The interiority/exteriority dualism ‘discovered’ as a result of this research has implications for theories critical of management and wider society. It can be situated alongside concepts such as hegemonic masculinity (Connell 2005), left-brained/right brained culture (McGilchrist 2009), Sorokin’s (1992) notion of oscillating cultural values, and, to a lesser extent, Hofstede’s (1991) masculine and feminine cultures. These perspectives have different emphases, explanations and implications for the ways of knowing and being that shape societies. However, a common feature is the recognition that societies are ‘unaware’ of the dominant assumptions that drive knowledge production. As a consequence, the knowledge produced mirrors and thereby reinforces and reifies the assumptions that shaped it. The interiority/exteriority dualism facilitates the exposure of the dominance of external orientation at individual and collective levels.

For example, I have shown that awareness of emotions has been ‘exteriorised’ in the development of EI through the primacy given to reasoning. In a similar way, books such as Pinker’s (2005) *A Whole New Mind: Why Right Brainers Will Rule the Future,* promote the value of interior, ‘right-brain’ processes such as empathy, intuition, meaning-making and creativity. However, the motivation for developing these capacities appears to be exterior – the pursuit of materialism, consumerism and, as reflected in the title of the book, future ‘domination’. The author talks about deeper meanings to life, however only in relation to its enhancement in relation to products and services. Thus, I would argue that Pinker’s book advocates leveraging interior qualities in the pursuit of exteriority.

The concept of hegemonic masculinity shows that we are unaware of our bias. The concept of interiority acts as a tool to uncover how external orientation creates problems, and how we subsequently construct and devise solutions to them. For example, I argue that a number of problems are created through an external orientation in the way societies assess themselves in terms of Gross Domestic

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94 In a similar way to Foucault (1980; 1989), who critiqued grand narratives with his own grand narrative, I am left ‘hanging’ here. My own knowledge production, of course, reifies my conditioning and assumptions.
Product (GDP). GDP can be defined as the total market value of all final goods and services produced in a country in a given year. It could be argued that underpinning GDP is a tacit assumption that material wealth will translate to happiness. However, research has shown that the rich report being only slightly happier than others (Csikszentmihalyi 2005; Graham 2010). As Carnegie (1948) pointed out, ‘Happiness is from within; it is not a matter of externals’ (p. 140). GDP thus reflects an external orientation to success that disregards how people feel about their lives and the society they live in. GDP ignores the human cost of stress, depression, mental illness, and alienation from family relationships that might arise as a consequence of the longer working hours in the pursuit of financial (external) success. Ironically, increased hospitalisation from work-related illnesses would increase GDP – there would therefore be an assumption the populace was happier because of it.

Moreover, while it is rational to seek a certain amount of physical (external) security, unbridled materialism is irrational when this becomes a threat to the planet. This is self-evident, however, the assumption of GDP growth is seldom questioned (see Bastick 1982; Jackson 2009 as exceptions). Unimpeded growth has come at an environmental and social cost that is still not considered seriously by governments. This has led to a paradoxical situation where efforts designed to increase physical security (increased food and goods production) have lead to a decrease in physical security (obesity and environmental degradation) (Epstein 1998; Egger & Swinburn 2010). Even as ecological disaster looms, the ideology of economic expansion still dominates mainstream discourse and practice (Jackson 2009).

Moreover, environmental and individual degradation can be constructed as external problems to be dealt with by external solutions when applying the dimension of interiority-exteriority developed in this thesis at a higher level of abstraction. Technological strategies such as desalination plants, recycling and reuse, and more efficient devices are promoted to ‘combat’ the problem that is ‘out there’. However, the issue can also be constructed as one of interiority/exteriority. Hegemonic masculinity denies and defers spiritual and emotional dimensions of being and I argue this can be connected to the sense of lacking and emptiness that is, according to McGilchrist (2009), Burneko (1997) and Callenan (2004), experienced by many in modern society. More to the point, I argue that because the interior is denied, the perceived cause of this sense of lacking is projected onto the exterior. Compensation is therefore sought by means of the exterior – more food, more money, more everything!

I claim that the problems confronting the world are primarily of an interior nature, and arguably will only be addressed through acknowledgement and the development of interiority.

‘... can we live on this Earth peacefully, without killing each other endlessly. I think that is the real issue we are now facing. And we think the crisis is outside us, but it is in us, in our consciousness’. (Krishnamurti & Salk 1996, p. 11)
6.7 Implications for policy and practice

‘What the world needs today is not more competition but woman’s native genius for sympathetic co-operation’, (Meyer 1953, p. 397).

I have concluded that intuition is not something that augments decision-making but is an integral to it. Hence, to ask how important intuition is to decision-making is analogous to asking how important inhalation is to breathing. Yet, despite this, intuition, at least for the participants in this study, remains a mysterious phenomenon. Given this, intuition, as well as non-rational influences, clearly needs to be given more attention in management education and, in education more generally (Hogarth 2001; Hogarth 2005). Non-rational elements need to be fully acknowledged so that people are better able to understand their own processes of decision-making, judgement and behaviour. In particular, a greater understanding of how intuitive synthesis provides a more holistic understanding will enhance the ability of individuals to cope with complexity, uncertainty and change:

‘It is noted that whereas much attention has been paid in the past to helping people make decisions in deliberate mode, efforts should also be directed toward improving ability to make decisions in tacit mode since the effectiveness of decisions clearly depends on both’ (Hogarth 2005, p. 2).

Gut feeling draws on a wide variety of tacit domain knowledge and experience, therefore building and extending this knowledge and experience through broad education would be beneficial. In an age where tertiary education has become increasingly vocationally oriented and narrow some universities are now beginning to advocate the benefits of a more well-rounded education (Schwartz 2010).

The development of interiority in individuals and organisations increases the capacity for sensitivity to, and the articulation and expression of feelings and intuitions. The benefits of this have been discussed in various sections throughout this thesis. Therefore developing interiority in individuals and in organisations is recommended. At the intrapersonal level there are therapies\(^{95}\) that emphasise the importance of feelings and thus promote attending to them. Similarly, transactional analysis, encounter groups, and sensitivity training stress the value of ‘getting in touch with oneself’ and acknowledging the effect one’s behaviour has on others (Booth-Butterfield & Booth-Butterfield 1990). Self-sensitivity and, in turn, receptivity to intuition may also be developed through body movement exercise (Bastick 2003).

Meditation is seen by some as a methodology for self-insight and increasing self-awareness (Booth-Butterfield & Booth-Butterfield 1990; Osho 2010) and, because the cosmic is contained in the self,

\(^{95}\) Booth-Butterfield et al. (1990) give Rogerian and Existential therapies as examples.
access to knowledge of the Universal (Wilber 1995; Osho 2001; Henzell-Thomas 2005). However, meditation as a pathway to ‘enlightenment’ has been challenged. Krishnamurti (1964; 1991; 1995) argued that any meditation motivated by the desire to transcend the mind is itself a product of the conditioning. For Krishnamurti, transformation can only occur through austere moment-to-moment attention to the limited and mechanical nature of thought (habit) and its consequences for relationship (to everything and everyone). Krishnamurti asserted that when this is fully understood, the mind becomes quiet, and one can ‘see’, for the first time, ‘what is’.

Nevertheless, meditation is recommended as a means to calm the rational mind in order that (psychological) intuition(s) can come to the fore (Vaughan 1979; Agor 1985; Agor 1989c; Wierzbicki 1996; Bastick 2003; Suzuki 2002 cited in Sadler-Smith & Sparrow 2007). Indeed, many of the participants in this study reported that engaging in calming activities such as painting, walking the dog, and especially showering, often facilitated insights. Moreover, as said, some participants actively sought quiet time as a way to get in touch with their intuition when faced with difficult decisions (Section 5.11.2).

Given the conclusions of this research, I argue that increasing the proportion of women in leadership roles could enhance organisational interiority. It has been shown that democratic and less hierarchical leadership styles leads to more teamwork, intrinsic motivation and ultimately creativity (Dezso & Smith 2008). Moreover, the inclusion of women on boards is correlated with higher performance and financial outcomes (Sinclair 1998; Joy, Wagner & Narayanan 2007; Desvaux, Devillard-Hoellinger & Meaney 2008). Clearly however, the existence of this evidence has not been enough to inspire change. Organisations remain reluctant to promote women to the highest levels of leadership in Australia (EOWA 2008) and globally (Desvaux et al. 2008). The status quo is perhaps also maintained as a consequence of the reluctance of women, given the properties of assertive cultures, to seek leadership positions.

An important finding of this research is that the level of intrapersonal interiority is independent of gender. Moreover, leadership needs only to promote an integrative culture rather than necessarily be led by women. Putman and Mumby (1993) argued that education and training may be used in organisations to help employees understand and deal with the complexities of organisations as emotional arenas. They advocated education in understanding of the ‘link between emotional expression and human action ... and introduce alternatives for handling situations’ (p. 50). However, the challenges associated with asking men in organisations to become more ‘in touch with their feelings’ and relationships should not be underestimated. Sinclair (2000), for example, detailed the resistance of
male executives to exploring ‘masculinities’. In a similar vein, this study has shown that for many men, talking about feelings is neither easy nor a comfortable experience. Nonetheless, if men can be persuaded to develop their interiority, this, according to the findings, would, increase organisational interiority.

Another hypothetical possibility, drawing on Radical Feminist Theory that embraces differentiation between the sexes (Wilber 1995; Calas & Smircich 1996), would be to mandate the appointment of equal numbers of men and women to boards. I suggest boards could meet in gender-based groups as well as a collective. The evidence discussed in this study suggests that each gendered group would develop its own culture and, when combined, would operate in a similar way to the right and left hemispheres of the brain – antagonistic yet complementary. I concur with Wilber (1995) that the problem is not masculine values in and of themselves but their dominance. Such an arrangement would, arguably, ‘naturally’ bring about a balance of the rationality and emotionality. As Putnam and Mumby (1993) conclude:

*Organizations do not need to abandon instrumental calls for productivity, or rationality to develop alternative modes of discourse. Emphasizing work feelings calls for an end to what is currently ignored or marginalized in organizational life ... Rationality and technical efficiency, however, should be embedded in a larger system of community and interrelatedness. Perhaps organizations of the future could offer society a new alternative, one shaped by emotionally-connected creativity and mutual understanding as necessary elements for human growth. (Putnam & Mumby 1993, p. 55)*

It has also been argued that the absence of empathy and compassion in modern societies can be attributed to the shift from tribal and communal social organisation to ever more complex and, in particular, a more fragmented social structure. Marx argued that it was this shift that brought about class conflict (Marx & Engels 1951). I concur with Marx and would add that empathy and compassion are more easily aroused for those with whom we have a personal relationship. Social fragmentation reduces emotional expression between those of different classes and, therefore, empathy and compassion. Both intrapersonal and organisational interiority could be increased through either reducing the size of organisations or increasing and promoting human relationships in organisations through electronic communication.

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96 I also find it difficult to access, understand and express what I am feeling.

97 It is interesting to note the empathy and compassion CEOs demonstrate when they work ‘undercover’ in their own organisations (Devadas & Jones 2010). It is through hearing the stories and backgrounds of workers that CEOs get to know employees as individuals – as fellow human beings rather than just names or numbers.
However, I emphasise that the development of individual and organisational interiority should not occur without a concomitant attempt to take societal interiority into account. This would be, again, leveraging individual and organisational interiority in the pursuit of societal exteriority (materialism) resulting perhaps in more rapid environmental destruction. In terms used by advocates of systems thinking (Preismeyer 1992; Senge 1994) I argue that as a society we must question not only how we go about achieving goals (single loop learning) but also question the goals themselves and why we want to achieve them (double-loop learning).

As a society, I argue that we need to reject material wealth as the overriding measure of personal and collective success and adopt or include alternatives. Bastick (1982), for example, has developed objective and subjective measures for individuals to assess their personal and professional lives. The Government of Bhutan has rejected GDP and attempted to acknowledge interior values and the wellbeing of individuals through the development and implementation of Gross National Happiness (GNH). A balance of exterior/material and interior/spiritual values is achieved in Bhutan through the four goals of economic self-reliance, environmental sustainability, cultural promotion and good governance. Good governance is critical for the achievement of the other three goals and this can only be achieved if the happiness of others is central (Thinley 2004). In the poem below, taken from the official website of the Kingdom of Bhutan, it is asserted that it is the quest for happiness of others that paradoxically brings happiness to the self:

*Whatever joy there is in the world
All comes from desiring others to be happy
And whatever suffering there is in the world
All suffering comes from desiring myself to be happy
*(Bhutan N. D.)*

Egger and Swinburn (2010) argued that a new way of thinking is required in order to avoid the inevitable disastrous consequences of individual and collective expansion and consumption. Professor Ian Lowe (cited in Barclay 2009) asserted that a change in thinking would need to be underpinned by a new philosophy or spirituality. However, I would suggest that the words thinking, philosophy and spirituality reflect a Cartesian split that separates mind from body (and feelings). I claim that what is required is a shift in orientation of being; from the exterior more toward the interior, at all levels, from which thinking, philosophy and spirituality would flow. Such a shift would realise the assumption that the Universe and everything therein, cannot be separated from us (consistent with the ontology detailed in Section 2.10). It is only then that damaging the Earth and other individuals would not just be thought but felt as harmful to us. I suggest that this shift is both timely and sorely needed. Unfortunately,
according to systems theory, r/evolutions occur as a consequence of the stress a system experiences when it no longer fits a changing environment (Capra 1996) – be it from an ecological, meteorological, social or financial crisis or more likely crises.

6.8 Limitations

Limitations are those considerations that are seen as limiting the research, which became apparent during its conceptualisation and progression. These include reflections on the decisions taken, compromises or ‘trade-offs’ that inevitably occur as a consequence of the limited resources of the PhD researcher (Perry 1998). Interestingly, Perry views limitations as an optional section in a PhD. Taking an instrumental view, he argued that ‘too much discussion here will make the examiner think the research was poorly designed’ (p. 40). Conversely, Mullins and Kiley (2002) asserted that good PhD researchers are critical of themselves and their own work. In my view, a cognisance and acknowledgement of the context and constraints that surround all research enhances its value through transparency and, therefore, credibility. This is particularly relevant for research that acknowledges the participation of the researcher in co-constructing knowledge. Therefore I will detail the limitations that I became aware of in the process of planning and conducting the research.

6.8.1 Methodological limitations

Telephone interviewing

In Chapter 4 I justified the use of the telephone for interviews. I argued that the use of the telephone provided a sense of anonymity for the participant, which was especially useful given the intensely self-reflective nature of some of the questions. It also provided me with a sense of anonymity that mitigated my nervousness, stress and the ‘halo effect’, which is often associated with elite interviewing. Considering the diverse locations of participants, and costs and time involved, the use of a telephone did allow me to interview more participants, however, I acknowledge that it also precluded observation of body language. As Kincaid and Bright (1957) suggested, interviewing in tandem might have better exploited the interview context. Alternatively, the interviews could have been filmed rather than sound recorded. This was considered, but not pursued in the interests of attracting as many elite participants as possible.

98 Systems become more chaotic (negative entropy) when stressed by their environment. If the system arrives at the point of maximum chaos it will either evolve to a higher level of complexity or will dissolve, depending on the energy available. According to Capra, energy, for social systems, is information.
I have argued that the participants displayed candour and authenticity in their responses. Despite this, I cannot rule out that responding to an unknown researcher in a telephone interview, for some participants, may have impacted on the extent to which they were prepared to reveal themselves. Future research could include different data gathering methods such as participant observation and/or interviews with members of the organisation that work with the participant leaders on a regular face-to-face basis. However, for the reasons specified in Chapter 4, I remain convinced that telephone interviews served the purpose of collecting rich, relevant and revealing data.

**Participant recruitment**

I argued in Chapter 4 for the purposive sampling of elite leaders for this study. While I remain convinced of their suitability, I nevertheless recognise some limitations in my strategy. In the interests of recruiting as many as participants as possible, my invitation to participate requested only one interview (in view of the demands on their time and the limitations on my resources). Ideally, more feedback about the emerging theory and its resonance for the participants might have added value. In addition, the relatively small sample limited the range of organisations, in terms of activity or industry that could be included. This limitation was somewhat mitigated by the fact that participants themselves had extensive leadership experience of a wide variety of organisations. Nevertheless, I believe more participants from a broader range of organisations might have been beneficial to the study.

I have also noted in Chapter 4 that I chose to include the word ‘intuition’ in the description of the research as part of the letter of invitation because I believed it might attract the interest of participants. While I have already detailed evidence to suggest this did contribute to the rate of acceptance, I suspect that this statement may have also deterred sceptics of intuition. I made this decision both for ethical reasons, in being truthful about the nature of the research, but also because the research could not proceed without these elite interviewees. I note in Chapter 5 that only one participant considered intuition to be illegitimate, yet other participants believed that suspicion of intuition was common. Therefore I have reason to believe the sample was not representative in this regard. More time to recruit a larger sample and perhaps an alternative wording of the invitation to participate in the research may have addressed this limitation. However, I do not believe this significantly detracted from the development of theory. Certainly perceptions of illegitimacy are well-represented and accounted for.

**Usefulness and relevance of the theory for participants**

Ideally, participants would have been provided with information about the theory developed in the study in order that they could then comment on the usefulness and relevance for leadership. Summaries of the theory were sent out to participants and some replies indicating resonance for participants were
received. However, there was not sufficient evidence to draw supported conclusions about usefulness and relevance of the theory.

### 6.2 Limitations of the researcher

One of the strengths of this research, as I see it, is also its greatest limitation. As previously mentioned, I took an inclusive and interdisciplinary approach to the study of intuition use and disclosure (because I believed it was the best way to address the research problem). As a consequence I was exposed to new bodies of knowledge that presented me with many steep learning curves throughout the candidature. My undergraduate generalist training in Social Science was useful in both assimilating and synthesising large amounts of complex information from diverse disciplines. I argue that this would have somewhat mitigated paradigmatic ‘blindness’. However, I have no formal training in psychology or philosophy, both of which were central to the research. Therefore I recognise that my understanding might not be as deep as that as that of a specialists.

I attempted to strengthen my work in this regard through the recruitment of three supervisors from diverse backgrounds. In addition, I have published one journal article and presented three conference papers on critical areas of the study in order to obtain feedback. However, in view of the depth and complexity of some of the issues, I argue that this research, ideally, should have been carried out by a team of researchers or, alternatively, done over a greater length of time. I do not regret or resile from my approach to this research (because I maintain it was the best way to answer the research problem), nor do I think it is inadequate. However, I do hope that the hypotheses developed in this theory will be taken up and explored in further researches.

### 6.9 Future directions for research

The grounded theory developed in this study should be considered explanatory, basic research. However, it carries with it a range of hypotheses in relation to intuition use and disclosure, as well as a number of theoretical implications for theory that could be explored. While there has been some research into emotional awareness and expression at the individual and interpersonal level, only one study was found that specifically linked this to intuition use and no studies were located that specifically addressed the disclosure of intuitions in organisations. Consequently, the emergent grounded theory provides a foundation and guide for further research in diverse areas and disciplines as well as specifically in relation to intuition disclosure.

In Chapter 5, I detailed evidence suggesting the investigation of intuition as insight, philosophical intuition and Psi in decision-making of leaders was justified. Future research could also explore the relationships of interiority to gender conditioning, context and utility that emerged in this study.
Moreover, research could focus on the consequences and implications of high and low interiority, in terms of access to and disclosure of intuition(s), emotions, and visceral influences at the individual level. While the concept of EI has been a useful development in this area, it has not paid specific attention to intuition and, as I argued earlier, has evolved with an exterior bias. Therefore, future research could more fully explore the ways in which people could enhance their decision-making, leadership, effectiveness and wellbeing through interiority.

More specifically, future research could investigate of the kind of intrapersonal active/receptive techniques described by participants. The hypotheses generated by this study point to fertile ground for further research in organisations. The findings imply that the domination of men at the highest levels of governance undermines the capacity for organisations to achieve maximum potential. I argue that this should be seen in terms of quantitative and financial outcomes, and also in relation to culture, climate, innovation, quality of work-life, and the development of individual agency and interiority. The theory generated by this study may assist in future research seeking to understand why organisations led by women perform better (Sinclair 1998; Desvaux et al. 2008) and are perceived to perform better with women in top management (Welbourne, Cycota & Ferrante 2007).

A core finding of the study was that the women in the study were more comfortable expressing their feelings and intuitions than the men. The use of discourse theory might be a useful way of interpreting the findings. It could be argued that men and women invoke different discourses in relation to intuition in the context of being interviewed about intuition. Discourse about intuition in this sense could be seen as gendered. The use of discourse theory would, to some extent, address the limitations associated with self-reports through interviews that were identified in the previous section, particularly if it were used in conjunction with additional methods of data collection.

Similarly, a core finding was the difference between most men and women in relation to attitude to emotion. While many men discounted emotion in organisational contexts, many women sought to acknowledge and take emotion into account. Although intuition can be seen as distinct from emotion, emotion was associated with intuition. Moreover emotion (as a feeling associated with a knowing) can be seen as part of the process or experience of intuition for participants. Future research could extend the findings of this study by teasing out what appears to be a staged process – from the events (decision context), to the awareness of a feeling, to the intuition itself and its implementation.

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99 Or more accurately, the masculine ways of being and doing that dominate as a consequence of male leadership.
The conclusions of this research suggest that, for real and meaningful r/evolution to occur, further inquiry needs to critically examine the assumptions on which organisational cultures and practices are based, as well as the assumptions under which research and theorising proceeds. These conclusions point to gender blindness in organisations, and to gender myopia in the societies in which they are embedded. The principal contribution of this research is to show that there is diversity in being, doing and expression that, in the context of intuition use (or non-use) within organisations, is marginalised, masked and suppressed. The full extent of this, as well as the implications, cannot be uncovered and explored unless diversity in research and theorising about organisations becomes a fundamental feature of future investigations.
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Appendix 1: Initial interview guide (pilot interviews)

Intuition: What is it?

How many years of leadership experience in organisations would you say you’ve had roughly?

Do you feel comfortable in your role as a leader?

How important is decision-making to your role? Why?

How do you typically go about making decisions? Does this vary and why?

How would you define or describe intuition?

How reliable is intuition?

How does intuition or intuitions play a role in your decision-making?

Can you give me some examples?

How important is intuition to your leadership role? Why?

What do you think informs your intuition?

Are there any techniques you use to enhance your intuition?

Intuition in context

Does everyone have good intuition? Why?

How do people get ‘good’ intuition?

Are there circumstances in which you are more likely to rely on intuition? (explain)

How can you enhance your intuition? Do you have any techniques or methods?

Do you have to defend your intuitions? If so how?

How receptive do you think the people you deal with regularly are people to intuition as a decision-making tool - how do you think it is regarded?

How do you talk about intuition to your peers - if you do?

How do the people you deal with on a regular basis talk about intuition, if they do?

How do you feel intuition is regarded by your stakeholders; wider community; media?
Why do you think this is? Is it justified?

Would you be comfortable admitting your intuition(s) publicly or to stakeholders or media? Why? Why not?

How have you come to your views on intuition?

Can I ask you why you consented to this interview?
Appendix 2: Final interview guide

Intuition: What is it?

How many years of leadership experience in organisations would you say you’ve had roughly?

Amongst the various aspects of leadership, how important is decision-making to your role? Why?

How would you define or describe intuition?

How does intuition or intuitions play a role in your decision-making?

Can you give me some examples?

What informs your intuition?

How do people get ‘good’ intuition?

How reliable is intuition?

How important is intuition to your leadership role? Why?

Do you think everyone has good intuition or not? Why?

What are the circumstances in which might rely on intuition?

How do you experience intuition - what does it feel like to you?

(back-up question) How would you describe the experience of intuition on a physical/ emotional/ intellectual/ spiritual level?

How do you distinguish intuition or intuitions from thought, feelings, sensations or emotions?

How are people different in relation to the way they go about making decisions?

(back-up question) Are there different types?

How important is self-awareness in relation to intuition?

How do you think monitoring your own internal state plays a role in using intuition?

How can you enhance your intuition? Techniques?

Have you experienced, or are you aware of different kinds of intuition?

If so, how would you describe them or label them?
Intuition has been described and written about in the following ways, have you experienced, or can you relate to:

- The ‘Eureka effect’ or a sudden insight into a problem or situation
- Gut feeling, or a sense of certainty about a choice or situation
- Prediction or a sense of a specific future occurrence (prophetic dreams, psychic phenomena, ESP)
- Divine insight, enlightenment, higher consciousness or connection with the life force, cosmos, universe etc.; a sense of calling, a sense of spirituality, a mystic, religious or an experience of something greater than yourself?

(run each construction past the participant individually)

**Intuition in context**

How receptive are people to intuition as a decision-making tool? Explain.

How do the people you deal with on a regular basis talk about intuition? How do you think it is regarded?

Would you be comfortable admitting your intuition(s) publicly or to stakeholders or the media? Why? Why not?

How do you feel intuition is regarded by your peers, stakeholders, wider community and media?

Do you have to defend your intuitions? If so how?

Why do you think this is? Is it justified?

How does your track record or status, position or track record play a role if you want to talk about intuition?

Can you tell me about the relationship of gender to intuition use, receptivity and disclosure?

How does context – for example, whether it is about business or personal matters play a role?

Are attitudes toward intuition are changing? If so, why?

How have you come to your views on intuition?

Can I ask you why you consented to this interview?