CHAPTER 8

INTELLECTUAL TURMOIL: 1977-1980

> *... if educational administration administration*
> *is not in a state of intellectual turmoil, it*
> *should be, because its parent, the field of*
> *organisational theory, certainly is.*
> (Griffiths, 1979:43)

From February 1976, with the publication of *Theory
About What?* until April 1977, Greenfield had been publicly
silent. In April 1977, he presented a paper in a symposium
session entitled "Contemporary Theory Development and
Educational Research" at the AERA conference in New York.
Griffiths and Walker also presented papers at this
symposium (see Silver, 1978:31 which was discussed in
chapter 7). Greenfield called his paper *Organisation
Theory as Ideology.* The paper was not printed until 1979
(It was published in Hebrew in 1978). The text remained
largely unchanged for publication. In the Greenfield
corpus this paper is seminal since it signals a fresh
approach to some of the issues and, although he does not
use the word in the article at all, it focuses on
phenomenology as a "descriptive philosophy of experience"
(Davies, 1976:49) and clearly identifies Greenfield with
the subjectivist approach to understanding organisations.
Greenfield himself said that, in this paper, he was "able

for a while, to set aside the debate and get on with the thinking ... able to look ahead again, to resume the dialogue with myself that I had begun with the 1974 paper" (Greenfield and Ribbins, 1993:249).

This chapter details Greenfield's continuing discussion with Griffiths which was a significant part of the "intellectual turmoil" of the field and marks Willower's entry into the dialogue. The years, 1977-1980 saw the publication of some of Greenfield's most significant papers (namely, 1977/78, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 1980b) and an intensification of feeling, at least on Greenfield's part, with the presence of Willower in the scholarly triangle. The chapter follows the chronological course of the three-way dialogue between Griffiths, Greenfield and Willower.

Greenfield's conclusion to the 1975c paper stated:

> It is this process, the placing of meaning upon experience, which shapes what we call our organisations and it is this process which should be the focus of the organisation theorist's work. And unless we wish to yield to universal forces for determining our experience, we must look to theories of organisations based upon diverse meanings and interpretations of our experience (p96).

Organisation Theory as Ideology began where the 1975c paper ended with "the placing of meaning upon experience" (Greenfield, 1975c:96). The first words were:

> Experience is mysterious, for it is not entirely clear how we come to understand what we do and what is

happening to us (cf Laing, 1967:17). This article
argues that the placing of meaning upon experience is
an act of enormous importance. As it continues, the
argument recognises the interpretation of human
experience as the bedrock upon which human life is
built and upon which organisation theory should stand
(Greenfield, 1979a:97).

The focus on experience, how people come to know and

interpret experience and attribute meaning to, and deduce

meaning from experience, is the foundation of Greenfield's

subjectivism which is solidly based on Weber. The reference

to Laing, whom he first quoted in the 1976f paper suggests

an existential rather than a phenomenological foundation to

his thinking. And immediately the theme of the paper is

clear - the meaning of the individual's experience in the

organisation.

In construction and style, the paper reifies

Greenfield's thinking (1975c:91) by providing an example of

the theorist using his own experience of life and

organisations to help in understanding the reality of

organisational life. Added to personal and professional

examples from his own life, Greenfield quotes from a wide

range of literature, from the social sciences, the

humanities, philosophy, psychology and educational studies.

His aim was to outline wholly new ways of knowing beyond

those related to what he called "normal scientific truth-

making" (1979a:106) and he expanded his focus from ways of

knowing - epistemology - to a consideration of values and

the impossibility of a value-free science.

A firm and focussed critique of current theory and theory building is scattered throughout the paper and indirect references are made to the discussion/debate that was then energetically occurring around Greenfield and his work. He mentioned his critics only in the notes and the bibliography. No critic was mentioned by name in the body of the text because the paper was not a defence of his position. He did not want "to relive old battles nor become nostalgic" (p100). He wanted to address the basic question, "why do we behave as we do in social organisations?" (p100). The paper is an extension of thinking, based on his beliefs that the answer(s) to this question involves:

    a) the individual and social reality - and not a single interpretation of reality because:

> The self that lives by one set of values, by one ideology, within one social organisation, is not the self that lives by other values, within other ideas, or other organisations, though the same consciousness may connect the two realities. Even more so, then, do different people live within different realities (p99).

    b) issues of power and control, and social order that is maintained because "of ideas in people's minds about how they should treat each other" (p101):

    c) the "power of command" and the "response of obedience or rebellion" (p109), that exists:

> because people do, in the course of a day's work, simple acts that fulfil the will and intention of others whose vision of what should be - terrible or beautiful though that vision be - is thus made reality (p109).

d) the values held by individuals that determine their acting and doing in organisations, "for whatever reasons seem adequate or desirable to them" (p107). For Greenfield, as for Weber, "a value-free social science " (p103) was an impossibility.

While there was no direct mention made of Griffiths or of other critics in the text of the paper, Greenfield was consciously aware of their criticisms. A couple of examples illustrated this. The title of the paper is *Organisation Theory as Ideology*. This is a deliberate choice of words on Greenfield's part. Griffiths earlier had noted that:

> the theory movement has been perverted to an ideology and is badly in need of renovation and redirection (Griffiths, 1975:15):

and again he declared that:

> My major problem with Greenfield is his insistence that the central task is to develop "a theory which deals with organisations in ideological terms" (1976f:4-5). First, I say, go ahead and try to do it. There is far too much talk about theory and far too little doing of theory. I suggest that if he tries it, he will not have a theory at all. I suspect that he will have an ideology of organisations that may well be useful, but not theoretical (Griffiths, 1977:10).

Kendell and Byrne wrote that:

> if Greenfield, could develop a theory which deals with organisations in ideological terms and explicate the sort of inquiry such a theory would serve, then we could assess his thinking more neutrally than the positivistic conceptions will allow (1977:16).

Greenfield used this paper to answer Griffiths and Kendell and Byrne and to begin to develop further his view of theory as ideology and to describe a kind of research design that might follow from this kind of theory. To do

this he came back to something not mentioned in the
original IIP74 paper but added in the published version and
that was his belief that:

> what is needed for better research on schools is better
> images of what schools are and what goes on in them.
> 'Better' in this case means creating images of schools
> which will tell us something of what the experience of
> schooling is like. Since schools are made up of
> different people in different times and places, it is
> to be expected that images which reflect the
> experience of schooling must be many and varied
> (1975c:93).

This reminded Greenfield of Weber's subjective "method"

(1975c:85-86) to create images of reality "as actors in

social settings understand it and to show how action

consistent with these images has consequences - expected or

unexpected" (1979a:104). Understanding comes from:

> setting the images against each other ... a method akin
> to cinematography where discrete images on film create
> a point of view and show why events in the action turn
> out as they do (p104).

The images may come from "different people at one point in

time or from different vantage points over time" so

Greenfield used images from "poets, saints, charismatic

leaders, ideologues, social philosophers and even

organisation theorists" (1979a:99). He quoted from Laing,

Boulding, Pirandello, Blake, Iris Murdoch, Goffman, Weber,

Genet, Miriam Wasserman, James Herndon, Wittgenstein and

the Bhagavad-Gita and even from cloistered, monastic life

because "the iuxtaposition of meaning-laden but disparate,

images" (p109) was both a "powerful and promising method"

of understanding life in general and life in organisations.

The difficulty lay in "an ideological blind spot in recognising research" (p105) because:

> we have so schooled ourselves to see statistically sophisticated but - in Weber's term- meaningless studies as research that we are willing, and even eager, to accept their tiny but neatly packaged 'findings' as knowledge (p105).

Greenfield's answer was in looking at "wholly new kinds of routes to knowledge about schools and organisations" (p105) since the "controlled, highly empirical study is not the only road to truth about organisations". Reading, seeing, reflecting upon, experiencing, listening, asking, discovering, in literature and in one's personal experience and in the experiences of others were all routes to knowledge but:

> these nonrational views of life and action in it will not yield to analysis by quadratic equations, much less to solution by social scientists' multi-variate models that speciously compile the "facts" of existence into a benign order (p106).

The validity for this alternative research scenario came "from insight into the meaning of symbols... when individuals recognise the truth that they contain ...when individuals accept them as giving meaning and form to their own experience" (p106). And so Greenfield distinguished between forms of knowledge that are rational and non-rational and to redress a long-standing imbalance that recognised only rational knowledge, emphasised the

non-rational, non-empirical "metaphors and artistic images as keys to understanding" (p106).

This conviction about the pivotal role of experience and reflection upon experience in the formation of knowledge and his equally strong conviction that "theory usually oversimplifies the variety and complexity of human experience within organisations" (p97) fuelled his belief that it was artists who understood the "relationship between experience and ideas" (p98) and that:

> people who call themselves social scientists have
> forgotten the experiential basis of the ideas they use
> to interpret reality and are now advocates, instead, of
> a particular vision of reality that holds no greater
> truth than a number of alternate views ... systems
> theory and structural-functionalist thinking - which
> [I] see as the ideological hegemony in administrative
> studies - is demonstrably bad theory and leads to
> sterile research (p98).

This is a strong statement. The tentativeness that was present in the original IIP74 address and in the 1976 response to Griffiths has gone. The reference to "structural-functionalist thinking" might be aimed at Jean Hills's response to the IIP74 paper (Hills, 1975: passim) in which he cited Talcott Parsons as substantiation for his own viewpoints. Greenfield made his own view of Parsons' work clear later in this paper (p101). He was critical too, of "received organisational theory" (p100) on a number of counts - as being blind to:

> ideology in organisations and in theories about them,
> and ... to the experiential base of ideology and to the

struggle of the deviant notion, the radical view, and
the charismatic vision against a social reality that is
routine, patterned, accepted, and considered right and
proper (p100).

Theory ignored the mysteries in human life and thus
impoverished its own insight into social reality (p97); it
oversimplified human experience (p97); and it presented
"the views of a dominating set of values, the views of
rulers, elites and their administrators" (p103) and ignored
why ordinary individuals usually accepted and willingly
fulfilled what the organisation prescribes for them (p107).

Greenfield understood organisations "as containing
multiple meanings" (p110) - organisation is experience
(p97); organisation exists whenever people accept sets of
ideas as fit and proper guides for their own behavior and
that of others (p98); organisations are ideological
inventions of the human mind; invented social reality;
organisations are nothing other than people doing and
acting for whatever reasons seem adequate or desirable to
them (p107). For him there was no "single best image"
(p110). Theories were "expressions of ideology and moral
judgments about the world" (p110) and the choice between
theories will be a "truth-making and essentially moral task
within a disciplined process of inquiry into social reality
(p110). Theorists shared a common humanity with those
individuals whose social world they tried to explain and so
they "are bound by the same rules, possibilities and
limitations" (p102) and need to be aware of "their own

302

values, their own assumptions" (p104) and the "bond that is at once existential and moral" (p99) that they share with those whose lives they explain. The process of interpreting human meanings and understanding social reality and "its artifacts", organisations, (p109) was a "continuing process of discovery aimed at gaining an understanding of ourselves and of others" (p109).

The Rochester Conference: 1977

In May 1977, Greenfield presented a paper at a Career Development Seminar on research in educational administration co-sponsored by the University of Rochester and UCEA. Griffiths and Willower also presented papers. This was the first time the three scholars had appeared together and the stage looked set to continue the Griffiths-Greenfield debate, person to person. This did not happen. Griffiths's view was that "neither the audience nor participants thought it the time or the place but more possibly because of Willower's devastating analysis of phenomenology as a method of research" (Griffiths, in Immegart & Boyd, 1979:263). This was the first time Willower had responded publicly to Greenfield's ideas. The proceedings of the conference were published in Immegart and Boyd (eds). 1979. *Problem Finding in Educational Administration.* Griffiths's paper was called, *Another Look at Research on the Behavior of Administrators* and was a reconfiguration of his August 1976, Cocking lecture (published in the *Educational Administration Quarterly,*

1977). Willower's paper, *Some Issues in Research on School Organisations*, was a "reflective statement on research and its context" (Willower, 1979:63). Greenfield's paper entitled *Ideas versus Data: How can the Data Speak for Themselves?* extended his critique on positivistic research and developed his thinking on the nature of research and research methodology and their role in the formation of knowledge.

The printed version of the paper began with a German epigram of the poet, Goethe and its English translation:

> My worthy friend, gray are all theories -
> The verdant tree of life alone is green
> (Greenfield,1979c:167).

Greenfield began this practice of introducing his papers with literary quotations in an article entitled *Organisations as Talk, Chance, Action and Experience*, written in February 1978, published in 1979, just before the publication of the article under consideration and would continue to do so for some years. He was aware that his very style of expression could be offputting for some readers but his use of literary allusions was a natural expression of both himself and his belief in the use of multiple images to illuminate complex reality (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

The philosophical basis of the paper lay in Greenfield's conviction that the nature of research in the

social sciences was not homogeneous with research in the
physical sciences and research methodology was not
transferable from physical to social sciences. Empirical
methodologies could not be applied to the social sciences
and yield meaningful results nor, Greenfield believed,
could they contribute to answering the "major existential
question" that faced everyone -"how are we to understand
our own experience and that of others?" (p167). For
Greenfield, data and methodology were fundamentally
connected with ideas and beliefs "which give meaning to
data and power to methodology" (p167). Ideas are what
individuals use to give expression to their experience and
thus to make that experience accessible to others. Data, in
this context, are the knowledge results of "experimental
methodologies" (p168). Greenfield declared that current
methodology distinguished between "hard" and "soft" data:

> hard data are those derived in real numbers from
> reliable instruments. Soft data ... are said
> pejoratively to rest only on someone's perception
> expressed usually in words ... ill-fitted if not
> totally unacceptable for quantitative analysis (p168).

Greenfield, "by turning the tables on these categories of
thought" (p168) saw another contrast, that of "cheap" data
and "hard" data:

> Cheap data are those that researchers obtain in large
> quantities at minimal cost. Such data can be herded
> into a computer with little difficulty... It is not
> necessary for cheap data to reflect the experience of
> individuals or to illumine the quality relationships
> among them ... human interpretation of them is not
> required ... Hard data ... are difficult to identify,

handle and interpret. They speak meaningfully and
powerfully for individuals in specific situations ...
They show how individuals' sense of themselves and
their world has consequences in that world, and they
suggest how these meanings and consequences can be
expressed in typifications, symbols, or theories that
provide fresh insights into social reality (p168).

Greenfield deplored the former and outlined two paradoxes

in current theory and methodology:

1. the existence of sophisticated research techniques
   and advanced statistical methods, made readily
   accessible by computer technology, on the one hand,
   and the "emptiness or irrelevance of the concepts to
   which they apply" (p169);

   and

2. the fact that data do not test theory - quite the
   contrary! Data are judged "by accepting the theory a
   priori as the standard of validity" (p169).

Hence naturalistic research risked becoming "an ultimately

self-deluding pastime" (p170) whose task was to confirm

theory (Greenfield, 1975c:84; 1979a:170) instead of a means

to greater knowledge and understanding. Greenfield

substantiated these observations with examples of the

"current empirical research in the field of educational

administration" (p168) exhibited at the 1977 AERA

conference. Greenfield was "critic for the session" (p169)

and was struck by "the heavy reliance in the studies on

quantitative data and ... standard methodology" and the use

of "hard but cheap data". To the conference examples of

such research Greenfield added the actual "policy-oriented

research" (p172) of Summers and Wolfe whose findings about

the effect of school resources on educational achievement

ranged from the ridiculous to the common place and were of
little use for policy making. Greenfield's conclusion was
that "theory helps us see and not to see" (p173). In what
is the nub of his argument and central to his epistemology,
Greenfield declared:

> What we see depends in large measure on what we
> believe we are going to see. It may be argued indeed
> that we see, hear, and feel nothing without first
> having ideas that give meaning to our experience.
> Knowledge and learning, therefore, have to do with
> acquiring new ideas - new categories for perceiving
> reality. In trying to understand reality, we require
> concepts or categories that enable us to make sense
> of that which William James called "the blooming
> welter" of phenomena around us. As aids for
> understanding we use larger frameworks and models -
> theories, if you like - which provide us with
> reservoirs of ideas for understanding the world
> around us. These frameworks or models are images of
> reality, which we carry in our minds and which we use
> as templates to stamp meaning into the world around
> us (p173).

Greenfield was always careful to align his thinking with
the thinking of other scholars both past and present. He
never claimed the origin of ideas about social reality or
science or the self or epistemology as his own. The
particular attribution of these ideas to schools and to
educational administration, the interpretation of the
meaning of these ideas and the implications to be drawn
hence, he owned. So while he felt personally isolated by
his contemporaries (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) he was
very much connected with traditions of scholarly thought.
He quoted Greek philosophers as authorities of his
epistemological thinking (pp173-174); Laing, Weber, Goffman

307

and Mead in ontological issues and modern day philosophers and critics of current science, Kuhn and Feyerabend to substantiate his own critique of conventional science. Both argued that theory is never disconfirmed by empirical research. Kuhn declared that it is only in periods of revolutionary change that previously established notions are overturned (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) believed that science and knowledge depend on a variety of methods and that a "proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical powers" (Feyerabend, 1975:35).

This "proliferation of theories" and the iuxtaposition of images was the research methodology that Greenfield favored, the kind of research "that attempts to look at social reality from a variety of perspectives and particularly from the perspective of different actors in a given social situation" (p179) where researchers become "interpreters of social reality" and not statistical whizz ' kids. To provide something of a research model and to exemplify other ways Greenfield iuxtaposed LBDQ research with its unusually restrictive and static procedures (p178) with Cohen and March's metaphor of "the man sitting at the wheel of a skidding car" to promote understanding of the "dynamic and complex phenomenon of leadership; Beer's "science of effective organisation" (p180) with Weick's social-psychological view of organisation; and then described a number of different images from literature,

case study and the experience of individuals. The images
were chosen from references already mentioned in his
previous paper (1979a) and perceived by Greenfield as
"possible and fruitful avenues for research" (p180). So
descriptive images replaced columns of numbers and assorted
graphs as research data. The images stand for themselves
and the individual is invited to identify, question, accept
or reject. In effect, the reader becomes interpreter and
the validity of the methodology is determined by the
reader's acceptance of the truth of the image for him/her.

Greenfield was presenting a research exemplar
something demanded by his critics. He argued that "our
ideas about the world determine what procedures we will use
for creating data and what facts we will see as important
and meaningful" (p187) so methodologies needed to be "open
and eclectic". The list of images was "merely suggestive
and heuristic" because "the methodologies appropriate to
the assumptions ... about organisations are not well
developed". The implication in the title of the paper was
thus being drawn out - the data of organisational reality
do indeed "speak for themselves" but Greenfield was still
uncertain how we could let that happen.

Greenfield's Reflections on the Paper
        Organisation Theory as Ideology (1979a) and *Ideas
versus Data* (1979c) were presented in consecutive months in
1977 at different conferences with different themes. The

former focused on the experiential basis of ideas which involved the individual's beliefs and values and the latter considered some research frameworks that gave expression to ideas. Both papers developed ideas that Greenfield first mentioned in his IIP74 paper and both papers, *Ideas versus Data* in particular, overlooked defence of a position in favour of extension of an argument.

This was not one of Greenfield's favorite papers. He preferred *Organisation Theory as Ideology* which was more literary in style. He recalled some "painful memories of delivering that paper into the face of resistance if not hostility" (Personal correspondence) but would not change anything in the paper. He noted that:

> Data are ultimately voiceless without some
> interpretative framework, but, at the same time,
> there is choice among frameworks, some of which are
> more respectful of the content of what is there.
> There are some frameworks that allow us to pay
> attention to the data rather than to essentially
> reshape them or reinterpret them before we even go
> through that process of listening. I guess I would
> ask now, not can the data speak for themselves but,
> can we listen to them? Can we pay attention to them?
> (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

Greenfield pointed to a paradox in this:

> I don't depart at all from the position that there is
> something else to be seen, to be perceived, to be
> heard, to be understood, and that it may be in a mode
> that we find difficult to understand. It is not
> ourselves. There is something to be understood that is
> not ourselves. So, there's the paradox, that we can't
> see or hear unless we put the framework in place,
> which, in some ways, shapes it, but, at the same time,
> we must make the assumption and have the conviction
> that there is something there that is not us, that is

not the framework (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

Greenfield struggled with this issue over the years, most

directly addressing it again in an editorial in *Curriculum

Inquiry* (1990, 20:4). He drew the comparison thus:

> It's clear that texts don't have meaning in and of
> themselves; that there is always the release of the
> meaning of the reader. There is, in that sense, a
> reinterpretation of the text every time it's read, but
> that doesn't give us any right, or the liberty to say
> that any interpretation is correct. There is something
> to be understood, and something has to be brought to
> the data to allow them to speak - a framework that is
> consistent with what is to be said, rather than one
> that is violent in some way to the meaning that is to
> be expressed; a framework that will allow us to pay
> attention (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

Earlier in 1983, in interview with R.J.S.McPherson at

Monash University, Greenfield expressed it this way:

> This is an argument against what I would call over
> interpretation, over scientisation, over
> rationalisation of the world; against the view that
> says we don't understand anything unless we have a
> theoretical, scientific explanation of it. It's against
> what I have seen so much of in the field of educational
> administration and, indeed, in my own work, and that is
> the imposition of one set of meanings upon the world
> and insistence that the world must accept those
> meanings, must accept that imposition. The question is,
> can the data speak for themselves, can the social world
> we recognise as our world, say what it is, or do we
> need the abstruse knowledge of the theoretician, the
> academic, interpreter, to tell us what the world really
> is like? ... Let the world speak for itself. It has
> many voices, and if we remove the powerful, ideological
> statements about the world what we will hear is what
> the data, what individuals as individuals are really
> saying about themselves (Monash University Tape Series,
> number 5).

And therein lay the rationale for the iuxtaposition of

various images of life and organisations and schools that

concluded the paper. Greenfield did not argue for these

images. They stand alone. His point was to show that:

> if we shifted our mode by which we attempt to
> understand schools, we might see different things, or
> we might recognise that, at least, we're going to have
> to look for other instruments, other conceptions and
> images to help us understand what on earth is going on.
> So, I don't attempt to persuade that those are right. I
> just say, 'Look! Look how the view changes when we
> pick up one instrument or another! Isn't it plausible
> to think that some of these tell us things that we
> want to know!' ((Monash University Tape Series, number
> 5).

The use of the first person in both the 1979a and 1979c

papers was conscious and deliberate and would continue in

most of his work from this point on. Greenfield's world

view was the view of the individual-qua-individual. His

papers were written very definitely from his individual

viewpoint and graphically expressed his convictions and

doubts and, in some cases, his pain and hurt and sense of

rejection. The use of "I" also expressed his own

detachment and freedom from the prevailing school of

thought and from academic conventions. Greenfield never

followed a movement. On the contrary, he often felt

isolated and alienated from the academic community in North

America and after 1974, did not identify with any group or

school. In the late 1970s and perhaps, for the remainder

of his working life he scarcely identified formally with

OISE. He came to enjoy the image of the lone,

unconventional, enigmatic intellectual. Some of this image

was imposed on him from without. Some he fashioned for

himself. The use of the first person in these papers in

the late 1970s was the initial expression of some kind of

emancipation and as Gronn called it, a "sense of intellectual liberation" (Gronn, 1983:13).

Griffiths and Willower at Rochester

By 1977 the Griffiths-Greenfield debate was a subject of interest in some quarters of the academic world of educational administration. There had been some expectation that the debate would continue, face-to-face, at this conference. According to Griffiths (in Immegart & Boyd, 1979:263) it did not resume. Griffiths's paper at that seminar, *Another Look at Research on the Behavior of Administrators,* (in Immegart & Boyd, 1979:41-62) outlined his personal view of the difficulties in research on administrator behavior and focussed on three major matters of concern - "the level at which research is done, the problem of transferability of research findings from one field of administration to another and theory development" (p41).

Griffiths had grave concerns about the quality of research done in educational administration. In blunt, clear language, he lamented the fact that such research "was not a robust child ... not a robust adolescent ... and that the prognosis for a vigorous adulthood is dismal" (p41). The major reasons "for this progression of sickly stages" Griffiths believed, was that "too few professors of educational administration have the interest or the competence to do research" (p41). Greenfield agreed about the poor quality of research but alluded to other causes.

Griffiths began his "personal view" of the difficulties by
focussing on the language researchers used and in this
context, he mentioned Greenfield by name, for the only time
in the paper:

> I have been concerned about doing research and
> developing theory on the 'real' behavior of 'real'
> people for a long time, but only recently did I become
> aware that my colleagues and I use a rather abstract
> language to talk about administrator behavior. This was
> first brought to my attention by Thomas B. Greenfield
> in Bristol, England, when he called for a
> phenomenological basis for research in administration
> (pp41-42).

There was no reference to Greenfield in the bibliography of
the paper. Griffiths mentioned the influence of Denton on
his thinking in phenomenology and moved on to outline his
new awareness about the ordinary experience of individuals
being expressed in ordinary terms. In the process, he
cited two examples of research that could be called
"phenomenological", following Denton's, not Greenfield's
explanation that education is a "first-person experience"
and must be talked about in terms of the experience of
individual people" (p42). The first example was a
descriptive piece from Kearns' biography of Lyndon Johnson
and the second was a few days' entry in the diary of a
university dean. His main point was to "deplore the
abstractness that is now the vogue" (p47). The paper
continued to discuss the other two themes and the latter
sections were a remake of his article, *The Individual in
Organisation: A Theoretical Perspective* (1977).

Greenfield maintained a professional openness of mind to Griffiths. He was "hopeful of Griffiths" (Greenfield interview, 26.9.90) because he saw signs of a shift in thinking in Griffiths's writings a "breakthrough", a recognition that "the old model, the hegemony of the old model had been destroyed not just loosened, but gone!" Griffiths acknowledged, Greenfield believed, "the prevailing eclecticism in the field - things don't have to follow a single mode" (Greenfield interview, 26.9.90). He agreed with Griffiths's use of the term "paradigm diversity" to describe the situation and saw it as "an acknowledgement that things done in different ways now have to be accepted and simply, the dominance of that positivistically driven, science mode of inquiry has been removed" (Greenfield interview, 26.9.90). Greenfield was "pleased" too, "that, in the long haul, there had to be some recognition given to me and to my thinking and people like Griffiths and Culbertson have given it" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

Greenfield believed also that "issues were much more clearly addressed in Griffiths' writings than in Willower's. He said:

> I'd much rather read Griffiths than Willower because, at least, it's coherent and consistent. There isn't that egotistic name dropping, nor that habit of speaking *ex cathedra* about issues (Greenfield interview, 11.12.90) .

Greenfield and Griffiths shared a professional, academic

difference of viewpoint. Greenfield experienced a deep, personal animosity towards Willower that extended over many years and coloured his attitude and interpretation of Willower's work. The animosity seemed to be mostly on Greenfield's part. He considered Willower's arguments as aimed always "at the man" and not primarily "at the idea" (Greenfield interview, 10.12.90). Willower seemed to be fairly indifferent. He considered Greenfield "a good scholar, with a big ego"; one he ranked "very highly: obviously their star in those years who felt his ideas were startlingly different and that he had to pay for that" (Willower interview, 3.12.90). He mentioned Greenfield in his 1977 seminar paper in Rochester because:

> I have always been sympathetic to the qualitative, to the non-statistical type of analysis. I thought of Thom as, especially coming out of Alberta in those days, as a systems oriented statistician - well, not statistician, but the statistically quantitative type. When this debate got going, since I was pretty well trained in it, I thought I'll just raise a few questions, because it doesn't seem that they're dealing with this stuff in a very sophisticated way. I felt that this was a little mixed-up. I understand where Greenfield is coming from, but I think he ought to clarify some of it (Willower interview, 3.12.90) .

Willower continued to criticise Greenfield's work but, in this first published reference to Greenfield, he mentioned him once by name and, in the references at the end of the paper, he noted Greenfield 1973, 1975, 1976, and Griffiths, 1976. He was cognisant of the Greenfield-Griffiths papers in the debate to date.

Willower declared that his seminar paper was a
"reflective statement on research and its context"
(in Immegart & Boyd, 1979:63) and commented upon the amount
of "pontification in educational administration with regard
to theory and research". He considered it was time for "a
less introspective, more pragmatic perspective" and
focussed on research methods (in which he discussed field
methods and quantitative approaches and phenomenology);
theory and research; and inquiry and practice. He was
"quite comfortable with the present paradigm" (p264)
although he believed that "in the search for useful ways of
doing research on school organisations ... many approaches
are needed not one orthodoxy" (p71). He remained positive
about the theories currently in use and the research that
had resulted from these theories although he pointed out
that much more research on these theories still needed to
be done (pp71-77) and he lamented the fact that "theory and
research were not extensively used in the practice of
educational administration" (p77).

Willower mentioned Greenfield in connection with
phenomenology and dismissed his case in three sentences:

> Greenfield, who proposed the use of the
> phenomenological perspective in research on school
> organisations in one paper, did not mention the word
> phenomenology in responding to a criticism of that
> paper. He did make a strong critical statement
> concerning the reification of the idea of organisation.
> That suggests a philosophical nominalism, but it is
> unrelated to phenomenology, since the objects
> experienced via phenomenological reduction need be
> neither particular nor existential (p70).

The identification of Greenfield with phenomenology was

unfortunate. Greenfield realised his error in using this

term in the IIP74 paper and avoided its use thereafter. In

the published version of the paper, he referred to the

"alternative view" and its:

> awkward name, phenomenology ... though it might with
> equal justification be called the method of
> understanding, as it is in the work of Max Weber ...
> What we call the view is not important ... (1975c:74-
> 75).

Willower was originally trained in philosophy and studied

at Buffalo under Martin Farber. He was appalled at

Greenfield's "simplistic view of phenomenology" (Willower

interview 3.12.90) although he agreed with a lot of things

Greenfield was saying. What Greenfield was saying, was not

phenomenology. It was subjectivism and Willower wanted to

set the record right so, in this critique he focused

narrowly on Greenfield's interpretation of phenomenology

and made what Griffiths called "a devastating analysis" (in

Immegart & Boyd, 1979:263). Greenfield responded

feelingly to this narrow focus.

Organisations as Talk, Chance, Action and Experience

1977-1980 were years of high activity for

Greenfield, years of development, expansion and

consolidation of his thinking and years that were not

without pain. The memories of IIP74 were dimming or

assuming folklore proportions in the minds of some. Other

scholars could not care less. After twenty years of the

Theory Movement Griffiths himself wrote:

> It is time for a new paradigm for the study of
> educational administration. Modern theories are not
> adequate to describe or predict the behavior of people
> in organisations (1985:99).

The field was facing, in Susman and Evered's term

(1978:582) "a crisis of epistemology" as several other

influences began to be felt in theory development in

educational administration, namely Marxism, ethno-Marxism,

environmental considerations and the interests of minority

groups (Griffiths, 1979:55-58). Greenfield's attack on

positivism and championing of a subjectivist approach to

knowledge development reached a growth peak during these

years. There were a number of significant conference

presentations, a couple of these platforms he shared with

both Griffiths and Willower. There was a flurry of

publications and responses and between 1978 and 1980,

Greenfield had two papers published in the *Educational*

Administration Quarterly, (1978, 1980). These were the

only two of his papers ever published in this journal. In

the USA the debate/discussion begun in 1974 with Griffiths

continued and peripherally involved Willower. In Canada

Greenfield felt singularly ignored by his colleagues -

"there was no generally known or readily identifiable

circle of scholars with whom one could make a connection;

few people I could talk to about the relevance of the work"

(Greenfield interview, 4.10.90). One of those people with

whom Greenfield did share deeply was Professor Christopher

Hodgkinson from the University of Victoria, British
Columbia. The friendship between Greenfield and Hodgkinson
began around 1978 and lasted until Greenfield's death.
Greenfield first referred to Hodgkinson in his *Reflections
on Organisation Theory and the Truths of Irreconcilable
Realities* (1978b). Hodgkinson was particularly influential
in Greenfield's thinking on values and the moral order
within organisations and schools. During this period of
intense scholarly activity Greenfield turned more from
epistemology to focus on values.

The quality of the published works of this period
was fairly uneven. Greenfield wrote *Organisations as Talk,
Chance, Action and Experience* (1979b) for publication in
German – he did not write the German text himself – in
February 1978. The text began with a quote from Ludwig
Wittgenstein whose preoccupation with the scope and limits
of language on one's perception of reality attracted
Greenfield. The quotation led in to Greenfield's belief ˙
that organisations were not separate from life but "come
into existence when we talk and act with others" (1979b:1).
In simple terms:

> People do what they have to do, what they can do and
> what they want to do ... Concrete, specific action is
> the stuff organisations are made of. In both their
> doing and their not doing, people make themselves and
> they make the social realities we call organisations
> ... Organisation, then, is the self-imposed order which
> brings regularity and routine to our lives ... Above
> all, organisations are patterns of living, ways of
> seeing the world. ... They are the rules we choose to
> live by; they are also the rules which others have

chosen for us and which we accept. Organisations are
the meanings we find in our lives, regardless of how
those meanings come to be there (1979b:1).

In contrast to these images Greenfield iuxtaposed the work

of Stafford Beer (see 1979c:180-182). Beer represented for

Greenfield "just about all that is wrong about modernistic

approaches to the study of organisations" (Greenfield

interview, 11.10.90):

> He wants to mechanise, computerise the whole thing.
> He's the proponent of systems theory married to a
> positivist, technical base. He has that overriding
> notion of the reality of the organisation, the reality
> of the system. He insists that its processes can be
> represented in finite, objective details and that it is
> all, in some way, open through this scientific
> technology, to control direction, greater productivity
> and effectiveness (Greenfield interview, 11.10.90).

Beer and Weick, another systems thinker, represented the

theory world from which Greenfield was fleeing. Then,

having set the context, Greenfield added little he had not

said before. He rearranged sections of earlier papers

notably the 1973b, 1975c, 1977/78, 1979a and 1979c papers.

The last section of the paper did introduce some further

thinking. "Chance" was the opposite to "the regularities

and the overriding patterns of human affairs" (p15) and

addressed the issue of generalisations and universalities

versus specifics or "unique, existential realities".

Quoting Carl Jung (p16) who declared that much of life is

irrational and determined largely by chance, Greenfield

declared:

> If events are formed largely by chance, they must be
> understood for themselves, in and of that time, and by
> the people involved. Self knowledge becomes more

important than abstract principles of general
knowledge (p16).

Greenfield was considering the fact that at many times, on

many occasions, perhaps the most important thing is the

irregularity rather than the regularity. Jung pointed to

the Chinese, in his introduction to the *I Ching*, a people

to whom chance is most important and that reminded

Greenfield of the importance of culture in determining

one's understanding of the world. Once the incidence of

chance is recognised so too is the idiosyncratic, the

individual and chance is, in that sense, "an avenue for

liberation" (Greenfield interview, 11.10.90). The freedom/

liberation theme becomes significant in the later papers.

Greenfield's Response to Rochester

The 1977 AERA conference in New York and the 1977

UCEA Research seminar at Rochester placed in the public

domain two significant Greenfield papers which did not

appear in print until 1979 (1979a;1979c). After these

presentations, Greenfield wrote his response to the British

symposium, *Where does Self Belong in the Study of*

Organisation? (1977/78). While the publication of this

response preceeded that of the 1979a and 1979c papers the

ideas expressed in them were already circulating within the

academic community. Greenfield alluded to both these

papers and to the Griffiths and Willower critiques from the

Rochester seminar in *Where does the Self Belong* (1977/78).

This paper was Greenfield's promised reply (Hughes, 1976:ii) to the British Symposium published in *Educational Administration* (1976). It was long in coming. The original publishing date was Autumn 1977 but there were difficulties in getting it out. Greenfield recalled that "for a multitude of good and bad reasons" he delayed in writing a response, one significant reason being that he was "reluctant to be drawn into debate because the discussion was focussing on philosophical abstractions" (Greenfield interview, 4.10.90). The continuity of interest had been maintained by the publication of several articles in subsequent editions of the journal (as discussed in chapter 7), namely Tipton and Ribbins, Best and Jarvis (Spring 1977) and Hobbs and Bruce (Winter 1977/78). Two years had elapsed since the publication of *Theory About What*? (1976f) which was a factual counter argument to Griffiths's 1975 paper. Greenfield's response to the symposium was written with much feeling. He was angry. The language is fiery and some of the images are of warfare. Straightway Greenfield was on the attack. He talked about "the breaking of an academic cartel" (Greenfield, 1977/78:81); "the slings and arrows of academic warfare" (p86); the "unfortunate battle in rather poor taste" (p83) of the IIP74 controversy and, in a metaphor similar to one used in the Kendell and Byrne paper (1977:7) he commented that:

> Griffiths and Willower are in one corner with the
> champion, Theory, and I am in the opposite with the
> plucky but doomed challenger, Phenomenology. The crowd

will be mildly interested when the knockout blow is
delivered ...   (p83).

Greenfield had a few things he wanted "to get off [my]

chest" and after addressing differing perceptions of the

IIP74 paper from Griffiths, Crane and Walker, Bone and

Russell, he detailed his major frustrations "stemming from

IIP74 and from some subsequent experiences connected with

it" (p83). The chief of these came from:

> seeing the paper largely ignored on this side of the
> Atlantic or interpreted by persons who simply discount
> or misread most of what it has to say (p83).

The first of these frustrations referred to Greenfield's

omission from the invited speakers at IIP78 held in Canada.

"The cause celebre (a term used by Deborah Hart in

reference to the Theory Movement and quoted in Kendell and

Byrne, 1977:8) of 1974" would have "no echo in the IIP78".

Greenfield was hurt by this perceived rejection by his own

colleagues and fellow citizens and while he did not deny

"value in the forthcoming conference simply because [I]

won't be part of it" (p83) he saw his rejection as the

intention to avoid fuelling any more IIP controversies.

> The crowd ... are not looking for a rematch and are
> largely uninterested in what the fight is about or in
> the implications of its issues for their own work
> (p83).

Allied with this frustration was his perception of the

belittling of his work as if he were dealing with non-

issues and with "straw men" and this by "most of my

colleagues on this side of the Atlantic" (p83),

particularly by Griffiths and Willower whom Greenfield

felt "look very selectively at the papers" (p83) and

consequently "miss the point (p84). Neither scholar

acknowledged the complex questions raised in the IIP74

paper which were:

> What is organisational reality? How should people
> construe it? How do they behave with respect to it and
> what are the consequences of their actions? What truths
> about organisations can research discover if its theory
> and procedures rule out the possibility of alternative
> interpretations of social reality? (p85).

Willower recommended a stance of "sceptical open-

mindedness" (p85) while Griffiths disallowed "these

questions and me at the same time" (p86). Greenfield was

feeling very much the victim, rejected and ignored. He

wrote:

> It is hard just to be written off, ignored or buried.
> In making this comment I am simply drawing attention to
> the personal basis of knowledge and to the crises of
> understanding and perception, which are involved in
> making truth and making theory. The self conceives
> the idea, but it is others' acceptance of it which
> makes it true (p87).

He explained the meaning of the word "new" in the title of

the IIP74 address, the use of which was roundly criticised

and gave a succinct and simple statement of his thinking

thus:

> What we see as organisation depends in large measure on
> self and upon all the social processes by which the
> self is formed; it depends on who we are and upon what
> others around us are thinking and doing. We will go to

some lengths to convince others that our own ideas are
not only right, but are indeed in line with objective
reality. Accepting organisation as invented social
reality requires that theorists give up the search for
the best single representation of social reality. These
subjectivist assumptions mean that organisation theory
must not only describe the process people use in
construing reality; it must also somehow be that
reality with all the possibilities which the human mind
reads into experience. Theories about organisations
cannot be fixed even for short periods of time. they
will show the same variety, inconsistency, and
complexity of reality itself. Social and
organisational theories are thus perhaps best seen as
visions of the world which people act out (p87).

Greenfield continued his reflections about himself and his

feelings about the 1973b and IIP74 papers and claimed a

personal detachment:

Both the IIP 1974 paper and an earlier attack on
traditional theory were written in a kind of poetic
frenzy. The image is deliberate... I feel about these
papers in somewhat the way an artist might about his
work. Certainly, writing them was easy: there was no
labour such as I have had to put into writing this
statement. And I feel as though those papers are no
longer part of me, though I might want to defend them
as one might like to defend children from abuse. They
are able to stand on their own now and must answer for
themselves ... I do not claim that the papers are works
of art; I merely say they express in a fervent and   ·
passionate way the sense I could make of several years
of struggling with organisations, theory about them,
and the life which pulses through and around them
(p87).

Detachment there was but the sense of work trivialised and

himself rejected remained. There was some satisfaction and

that came from individuals beginning to think for

themselves about "how their organisational world is put

together, what their part in it is and how things might be

different" (p89).

326

The remainder of the paper discussed specific issues with reference to particular participants in the symposium. Probably motivated by Willower's critique, Greenfield expressed his reluctance to "be drawn into a battle over philosophical abstractions" which "remain well apart from issues of practical importance" (p89) and his contention that philosophical debates hardly ever end. He noted that he was not a philosopher but that he had been "considering [my] life and the part organisations play in it" and writing about this. Firstly, however, he must "set at rest the ghost of phenomenology" (p89). The paper was not "about phenomenology as American critics have tended to insist it is" (p89). Critics, particularly Willower, had stuck on the term and missed the implications, according to Greenfield.

He then addressed "the thorniest problem raised by critics" (p90), the issue of reality and the freedom of the individual in defining their own reality. Greenfield was on "the subjectivist side ... (p90):

> certainly something is out there, but who is to say
> which of its multiple faces are real? ... Reality does
> not come pre-labelled with the categories man must use
> to understand it ... We learn. Slowly. Painfully (p90).

Conflict in organisations occurred because people imposed interpretations of reality upon others and regarded their "man-made reality as immutable" (p92). Greenfield quoted Laing again, as he was wont to do when raising issues of

reality (see 1976f, 1979a, 1979b) on the centrality of
experience, thus :

> our behavior is a function of our experience. We act
> according to the way we see things... (p92)
>
> I cannot experience your experience. You cannot
> experience mine ... The nature of experience is
> mysterious ... it is not an objective problem.
> There is no traditional logic to express it. (p98)

Hence the need for debate and Greenfield's belief in the
real value of the IIP74 paper being the debate itself.

The issue of reality led on to organisational
reality and mention of Weber and his "concern for science
and the exploration of rules and methodologies which make
sense in our subjectively perceived worlds" (p94). Weber's
method of understanding and concept of ideal types are
briefly discussed for their role in making sense of a
"multi-faceted, ambiguous reality" (p95). The emphasis on
"specific people in specific situations" (p96) countered
the belief in "sociological generalisation" and implied the
acknowledgement of "contending and even inconsistent
generalisations about social reality" and the acceptance of
"heretofore non-approved methods and rules for establishing
reality and truths about it" (p96).

Greenfield's answer to the question asked in the
title of the paper is that the self belongs at all levels
of the organisation and everywhere. As he wrote elsewhere:

> the self cannot escape organisations. Indeed, self is

organisation in a profound sense, though the self may
behave and feel quite differently as it moves from
organisation to organisation, from fragment to fragment
of its personal world (1979b:2).

The personal basis of knowledge is intrinsic to

Greenfield's understanding and what he called "making truth

and making theory" (1977/78:87). His own experience

grounded his theorising. It was his reality check and the

source of learning for him was in struggling to make sense

of years of living in organisations.

The Truths of Irreconcilable Realities

The first of Greenfield's two papers published in

the *Educational Administration Quarterly* (EAQ) was in

Spring 1978. He had had great difficulty getting any of his

papers published in this journal. This publication came

about through a "young executive assistant working at UCEA

on a two year appointment, one of whose jobs was to edit

the *UCEA Review*" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). He

asked Greenfield to reply to the Hills (1977) and Kendell

and Byrne (1978) articles and when he saw the paper in

draft form "he was adamant that the place for this article

was the *EAQ* and he arranged it" (Greenfield interview,

17.10.90). Greenfield was unsure how this was achieved

because he did not submit the paper to the *EAQ*. He felt

that:

    there has been a kind of ambivalency in the EAQ to my
    works, at the best of it, but they are very aware of
    the impact of my work, because the best selling issues
    they have had, were the ones in which my articles

appeared. In terms of requests for back issues, those
were the ones that sold out (Greenfield interview,
17.10.90).

Greenfield declared that this paper was his "last public
comment on the debate as debate" (1978:5). The initial
poetry quotation focused on the passing of time and changes
in meaning and after a masterly beginning which again
invokes images of battle, "The medium is the message, the
massage, the machete. Choose you words; choose your
weapons" (p1) the paper settled down into repetition and
rearrangement of material from past papers. Greenfield
revisited the IIP74 paper and neatly summed up its intent
thus:

> it challenged systems theory's ideological hegemony
> in the study of organisations ... questioned a
> prevailing belief [about a general science of
> organisations] ... argued that social reality ... is
> based upon human invention of social forms ...
> focussed upon long-standing questions about the meaning
> of science in a subjectively construed world (p1).

There is a clear relationship between some sections
of this paper and the *"Self"* paper (1977/78). Critics of
the 1975c paper are mentioned in a wide sweep and
Greenfield's main frustrations are repeated especially that
his views "have been transmitted secondhand" to audiences
in USA and Canada through responses and criticisms of his
work rather than through original papers. Greenfield saw
this paper as an instrument of redress. He demonstrated to
an American readership "that there are substantive issues
in the debate and that the furor rests on something more

330

than wounded sensibilities" (p4). The counter argument to

Griffiths and Willower (pp5-7) was repeated from the *"Self"*

paper (1977/78). Greenfield said that this was because he

feared that American and Canadian readers would not have

read a British journal. So, "repeat the information in an

American journal!" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). This

involved raising again the criticisms of:

* dealing largely with nonissues or at best with straw
  men (p5);
* his contention that organisations are not 'real'
  (p5);
* the lack of research by Greenfield (p6);
* the nature of theory and the process of theory
  building (p7).

And Greenfield repeated his view of "the methods of

empirical, mindless, logical positivism that relied more

heavily on the scientific method: controlled

experimentation" as a means to "better theories" (p7). He

moved on to a withering analysis of the Kendell and Byrne

position which he had not addressed before. He saw their

division of the issues into academic and political as a

serious distortion (p8) and with much feeling proceeded:

> .. let me say once again that a major implication of
> the subjectivist thesis points to the process of
> truth-making in the academic world and suggests that
> it does not differ materially from what goes into
> truth-making in the world at large. Truth is what
> scientists agree on or what the right scientists
> agree on. It is also what they can get others to
> believe in. All else is politics, dirty politics,
> and should be driven out of the academy, especially
> when it is a view advanced by persons outside its
> ideological hegemony (p8).

This brought Greenfield to a consideration of the "line

between fact and value" (p8) and the act of "valuing'. In
that context he continued his analysis of Kendell and
Byrne's paper, frustrated that "more UCEA Review readers
have read about what Kendell and Byrne call the 'cause
celebre'" (p10) than have read the paper itself. He was
angry that they and Griffiths (1979a:17) continued to refer
to the unpublished version of the IIP74 paper and that
"Kendell and Byrne quote from the IIP74 paper without page
references or indication of source" (p10) so that the
version referred to "is impossible to gauge. The interest
was on the "conflict with Griffiths" rather than on
Greenfield's stance on "organisational theory in general"
(p10). The situation was so different in Britain and all
of this was "grist for [my] theoretical mill: realities in
the academic world, as elsewhere, are socially created and
maintained" (p11).

In as close as Greenfield comes to an *apologia pro
vita sua* up to this point, he wrote:

> Since an initial paper in 1973, I have continued to
> revise and extend the ideas that so startled listeners
> at Bristol in 1974. In this process, the comments of
> critics have provided an important stimulus and often
> the practical occasion for extending the work. Those
> who looked back over my papers of the last four years
> or so will not find a line of completely smooth and
> consistent development, but I would hope they might
> note an evolution of thinking and a basic concern for
> important issues that have traditionally received
> little emphasis in the field of study. Though
> reaction to my papers has included *ad hominem* comments,
> my response was to link these comments to theoretical
> issues in the papers themselves. I have tried to avoid
> debate for the sake of debate and to do more that what
> Kendell and Byrne thought was simply making "a point of

intellectual disdain for the view held by the other"
(p11).

Greenfield admitted that his "theoretical position is
incomplete" (p12) but did not budge from his central
contention that theories about organisations:

> should not be seen as supreme or as the best estimate
> of truth even for short periods of time. They should
> instead show the same variety, inconsistency, and
> complexity of reality itself (p12).

If theorists accepted and acted upon the belief that they
too were part of the social reality they speculated about,
then they "may both warm up the debate and improve the
theory" (p13).

In the two following sections on methodology and
chance, Greenfield revisited old thinking, in the former
case, from the 1979a and 1979c papers and in the latter,
from the 1977/78 and 1979b papers. The remaining section
was a response to Hills's *Perspective on Perspectives*
(1977) which Greenfield believed "does in the end come down
on the side of scientism and pledges faith to the
possibility of rational explanations for what we call
social reality" (p17). The neatness and harmony which
Hills found among the perspectives worried Greenfield
because he believed that "at close quarters ... we are
likely to find that the forces at play in the conflict are
inconsistent with each other or even irreconcilable" (p17).
In this context Greenfield quoted from a letter to Hills

333

from Christopher Hodgkinson which considered the

argument from the "realm of connotation" (p18).

Greenfield concluded in reflective fashion. Where

does self belong in the study of organisation? This is a

"puzzle worth spending some time on" (p19) because:

> the personal and academic are intimately and perhaps
> inextricably intertwined. Our values show in the
> theories we defend, and our theories shape the lives we
> lead and the way we lead them (p19).

Greenfield warned against "academic schizophrenia that

bedevils our understanding of ourselves and of others" and

explained his own position simply thus:

> In our search to understand social life, I argue simply
> for more observation of, reflection on, and
> contemplation about the mysteries before us and within
> us (p19).

And then, almost as if in after thought, he addressed the

issue of little research in the subjectivist mode to

support the theories. Such research "is certainly under

way ... but we must learn to recognise them" (p19). These

studies work with:

> the unique, the specific, to reach larger insights that
> carry conviction and meaning beyond themselves. The
> process involved is like the formulation of the
> artistic image that, though it is based on unique
> experience, becomes a symbol expressing the life and
> experience of others (p19).

Addressing an American and Canadian audience in particular,

Greenfield tried to cover the major points of dissension

with Griffiths, Willower and Hills. In this attempt he
felt he was like the "householder who brings out of his
treasure what is new and what is old" (Matthew 13:52). In
his "last public word in the debate" (p5) there was both a
repetition of past thinking and an introduction of a couple
of new themes. As always the focus is subjectivist. Truth
is not a unitary thing and, for Greenfield:

> it is not a matter of truth but truths: that the
> realities we live in may be incompatible with each
> other: the truths of a given reality may be quite
> incompatible, even irreconcilable with the truth of
> another reality of a different person and of an
> individual, and of a different consciousness (Interview
> 17.10.90).

Among the Honoured Scientific Pigeons

In March 1979, Greenfield presented a paper at the
British Educational Administration Society (BEAS) seminar
on research in Educational Administration at the University
of Birmingham. Professor Meredydd Hughes was the seminar
chairman and he had produced the edition of *Educational
Administration* (Autumn, 1979) in which the seminar
proceedings appeared. The title of Greenfield's paper was
*Research in Educational Administration in the United States
and Canada: An Overview and Critique*. Greenfield was
always more comfortable, more at ease in the British world
of educational administration. The cultural scene was
different from that of USA and Canada and he somehow felt
more accepted and supported. The paper contained none of
the introverted defence statements of some of its

contemporaries (see 1977/78; 1978; 1979b;) nor any of the exasperated frustration that flowed from Greenfield's feeling that he was "having a conversation with the deaf" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90.) and see Greenfield, 1977/78:86; 1978:7). Contrary to the Americans and the Canadians, the British heard and listened. Greenfield indulged in some reflective musings in this paper and enjoyed it.

The paper was an exploration in some detail of the theoretical structure of the system that Greenfield had been criticising publicly for years and of the inadequacies of the research that flowed from that structure. Some people would wonder why Greenfield was invited to attempt such a task since such action "is tantamount to setting a fiery-eyed radical cat among some honoured scientific pigeons", Greenfield declared (1979/80:208). Critique there would be but Greenfield made it clear from the beginning that his focus was on the "theoretical foundations" of the New Movement in educational administration and that he "cannot fault the integrity and good intentions" (p208) of those American and Canadian researchers who had "attempted to pursue administrative research within a strong scientific framework over the last two decades or more". His critique was something he has pushed earlier and continued to labour vigorously in this paper and that was the inadequacy of theory and the research that flowed from it.

Greenfield's platform was that positivistic social science had failed to produce substantive knowledge in the field. Research stemming from that paradigm had:

> too often ignored the cultural forces which condition the findings ... and been too quick to promulgate a universal set of truths about the nature of organisations and how they work (p207).

After twenty years of the New Movement, the substance was not there yet, curiously:

> the faith of the scholarly community in theory-based research remains virtually unshaken ... the more the research fails, the more do the scholars ... defend theory and the more do they proclaim ... that theory and research in educational administration provide the soundest and most reliable guide to practical action, and offer ... a general understanding of organisations and how they work (p210).

Using a closely argued run through history and an examination of a variety of reviews of research that appeared in the literature Greenfield identified the cause of this anomaly. The starting point was:

> that point in time in the intellectual history of America when a small group of social scientists shocked and disturbed practising school administrators during the 1950s by telling them that rigorous, theory-based research would shortly make obsolete the knowledge on which they based their profession (p209).

Greenfield commented on the "hubris, the intellectual arrogance ... the scientists' attitude of disdain" (p209) towards the practitioners' knowledge. One of these scientists was Andrew Halpin. Greenfield engaged in a long excursus on the significance of Halpin for the Theory

Movement emphasising particularly Halpin's growing

disenchantment for and loss of faith in the aims and claims

of the movement. By 1969 Halpin "had shifted from

messianic fervour to iconoclastic condemnation" (p212) of

the value and validity of administrative theory. Greenfield

considered that "no one has written more incisively nor

used Simon's ideas more penetratingly than Halpin"

(Greenfield interview, 11.10.90). Greenfield was

interested and puzzled that Halpin whose scholarship and

literary style (not unlike his own) he greatly admired and

whom, he believed, had "a brilliant mind" (Greenfield

interview, 11.10.90); who was "clearly aware of the

shortcomings and the problems of Grand Theory"; who raised

questions about these ideas right at the beginning and who

"ruminates on the idea that the way that scientists know is

not the way that administrators know" stopped asking these

questions and put all his doubts aside and became "a

committed convert, a disciple to the new movement of

thought" (p212). Greenfield himself had faced a similar

decision in the early 1970s and had taken another direction

as the 1973b and IIP74 papers signify. It continued to

puzzle Greenfield that:

> Shrinking faith among academics about the validity of
> administrative theory and their growing doubts about
> even the existence of such theory have not served to
> shake their commitment to research conducted in the
> name of that theory (1979/80:212).

He came to that question again years later in the Ribbins

338

interviews - "why a science that does not work is still

hailed as science" (Greenfield and Ribbins, 1993:251). His

answer focused on "the science of effectiveness" and "a

world of cheerfulness and certainty" (p252) where:

> the alternative is conflict-ridden and uncertain,
> opening up the pain that comes with recognising the
> different realities we live in, of confronting the
> value chasms that confront us... (p252).

In this paper Greenfield named the earlier influential

works at the beginning of the Movement - Halpin

(1960;1966) wherein he expressed "qualms about the role of

theory" (Greenfield, 1979/80:213); Campbell and Lipham

(1960); Griffiths (1957) who considered that "the only

limitation" on the role of theory was "its inapplicability

in the world of values" because for Griffiths, "science was

in and of itself ethically neutral" (Greenfield,

1979/80:215). The trouble for Greenfield and for Halpin

was "in the neat separation of fact and value" (p215).

Halpin suggested that theorists look to "the heritage of

the humanities" (1966:296). Greenfield declared that:

> critics of research in educational administration as
> Hodgkinson (1978b) and Greenfield (1979b) see
> philosophical and value questions as constituting the
> heart of administrative action (Greenfield,
> 1979/80:217).

And so,

> From this perspective, no theory of administration
> or methodology of research can be adequate unless it
> comes to terms with that condition of human life which
> inextricably interweaves fact and value (p217).

Greenfield constantly developed this theme in succeeding
papers and substantiated much of his own thinking on the
impossibility of the separation of fact and value from the
writings of Christopher Hodgkinson. This 1979/80 paper
asserted Greenfield's firm belief in the total inadequacy
of the Theory Movement to achieve its aims and his
bemusement that a "flawed science continues to exist"
(Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

He proceeded to summarise the major reviews of
research in educational administration beginning with
Halpin's 1969 review (p220) which detailed only "five major
research contributions until 1969". Greenfield questioned
why the "famed Getzels-Guba model" (p221) would be accepted
as research. Griffiths had called this model "the most
successful theory in educational administration"
(Griffiths, 1979:50). Greenfield mentioned the triennial
reviews conducted by the AERA in their journal *Review of
Educational Research* from 1958-1967. He quoted from
selected articles in these *Review* editions - in the 1958
Review, Griffiths and Iannaconne "demanded cogent theory
and stringent research from the studies they reviewed and
found these qualities generally lacking" (p222); Lipham's
article in 1964 "sees important gaps to be filled" (p223);
Briner and Campbell noted that "a science of administration
is emerging" (p223) and took "administrators and teachers
to task for their slowness in adopting innovations" (p224).
In the 1967 review, Brown and House comment on "a

surprising shortage of quality research" (p224). This was

underscored by Donald Erickson's paper in the same edition

of the *Review*, although he maintained some optimism in

research and in another critique of research (1977a),

expressed a preference for "practical studies" (p228).

After the 1967 edition, the *Review* discontinued the

practice.

Greenfield next cited Immegart's 1977 review (in

Cunningham, Hack and Nystrand, 1977:298-326) as "the most

succinct and comprehensive review of research in

educational administration" (p225). This volume contained

the proceedings of the 1975 Ohio State University

conference entitled "**Educational Administration Twenty**

Years Later: 1954-1974". The major conclusion Greenfield

drew from this review was that:

> methodology is becoming an end in itself in
> administrative studies and the realisation of the great
> promise of the theory movement seems as far away as
> ever (p226).

He mentioned then the UCEA 1977 conference on "**Theory and**

Research in Educational Administration" at Rochester twenty

years after the UCEA and Midwest Administration Center of

the University of Chicago seminar on the role of theory.

Greenfield noted that at this seminar "Griffiths repudiated

the paradigm of the past" (p227) and:

> to hear Griffiths' voice [objections] means that one of
> the pioneers of the New Movement in administration has
> conceded that, twenty or more years after its

inception, the New Movement is still struggling to find
a theoretical base from which to launch productive
research (p227).

Greenfield did not mention Willower's seminar paper.

Greenfield turned his attention to "texts used in

training programmes for educational administration" (p229)

and, from a sample chosen unscientifically (he mentioned

six texts) he noted that:

the overwhelming emphasis ... is upon theory and
explanation. Critical attention to research is notably
absent in all but one text ... In all of the texts,
research where it appears is invariably used to support
and confirm the theories presented (p230).

The texts presented a picture of administrative science "at

sharp variance with the scholarly reviews of research"

(p230) a view which demonstrated that:

administration is a science, or, at least, that it is
more science than art and that a substantial body of
knowledge exists that will make those who master it
better administrators (p230).

A different approach altogether was presented by Hodgkinson

(1978a) who distinguished between administrative theory and

organisation theory where "the central questions of

administration are not scientific at all" (p231) but

philosophical. Greenfield set against this thinking the

views expressed in the 1978 edition of Hoy and Miskel's

text, *Educational Administration: Theory, Research and*

Practice which was dedicated to "educational administrators

who want to make their administrative practice less of an

art and more of a science" (in Greenfield, 1979/80:232)and

which does not refer to:

> values, philosophy, conflict, the 'hidden injuries' of
> school, the debate about phenomenology, or to what
> Daniel Griffiths now describes as the 'turmoil' in the
> field of educational administration (p232).

This dedication continued to rankle Greenfield for years

as did his failure to rate a meaningful mention in the

Hoy and Miskel text. Greenfield is mentioned in a footnote

in the second edition of their text (Hoy and Miskel,

1982:24); in one sentence in the third edition (1987:27)

and in the fifth edition once in a reference to the IIP74

paper and twice in connection with the Greenfield/Ribbins

publication (Hoy and Miskel, 1996:21,24,44). In some

circles Greenfield remained *persona non grata* and he felt

this keenly.

His 1979/80 paper concluded with a comment about

the future of research. Firstly he likened the academic

study of educational administration to "life under a bell

jar ... sealed from the larger world but the barrier is

noticed by virtually no one in the oppressive, airless

environment" (p233) and warned against:

> the methods of the positivistic science in studies of
> administration which too often make us see and believe
> in what is not there or is of little importance if it
> is there (p233).

Scientists are, Greenfield implied, out of touch with

reality. Secondly, the move towards research into policy

studies and "practical issues" seemed to Greenfield "a little faddish" (p235) and difficult to achieve. He wondered about the link between social science and policy making and its relevance to "the practicalities of the outside world" (p236). It seemed like another case of "life under the bell jar" to him. A similar fate awaited "practical studies in administration". There were too many variables and because the paradigm rested on the assumptions of positivistic science, no notice was given to "all that lies in the domain of value and will" (p237). The issues involved in the connection between "effective administrators and efficient organisations" (p237) Greenfield declared are "philosophic not scientific".

He offered two suggestions to guide further research. These were to place greater emphasis on the specific and to consider the relationship between "the unique event and the context in which it exists" (p238) that is, to consider case studies and the emphasis they place on the existential realities of the players and to engage in comparative, historical studies. These suggestions were made in answer to critics who accused Greenfield of destroying "existing achievements" (p237) but offering no replacement. For him "the act of destruction is also an act of creation" (p237).

CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE

Contemporary Theory: Griffiths

During the late seventies Griffiths and Willower were also keen to play a part in the development of educational administration as an academic field of study, Griffiths with his abiding interest in theory development and Willower with his range of interests that combined both a theoretical and research focus. They were the two most prominent American scholars of the day. Griffiths believed that the Greenfield critique should not be ignored because Greenfield was telling professors of educational administration that:

> the social sciences are undergoing tremendous changes and that the philosophical and methodological bases on which the movement was founded (logical positivism), are now considered by most philosophers of science, and many social scientists, to be outmoded (Griffiths, 1985:6).

Griffiths believed that a new approach to research and theory was in the process of emerging at that time; that it was difficult to say just what the approach is but that it was different (Griffiths interview, 13.11.90); and that Greenfield's great value was that "he signalled a change in thinking in the social sciences" (Griffiths, 1985:7). Griffiths believed that "it should have sparked a detailed analysis of educational administration but it did not" (p7). He continued to initiate thinking and to respond to criticism of educational administration. He believed that his responses to Greenfield in publications and at

conferences gave Greenfield a public exposure which he

otherwise would not have had among Americans

(Griffiths interview, 13.11.90) "because people, by and

large, think it's a lot of nonsense and that's a pity."

Elsewhere Griffiths wrote:

> To say that American scholars in educational
> administration have paid little attention to Greenfield
> (it's a pity they have paid little attention to other
> critics as well), does not say that Greenfield is
> correct in all of his positions. In fact, I think he is
> wrong in a number of instances (1985:7).

In two papers written at this time Griffiths continued to

point out where Greenfield was wrong. The first

chronologically, was entitled *Contemporary Theory*

Development and Educational Administration published in the

British journal, *Educational Administration* requested by

the editor, Meredydd Hughes, as a follow-up to Greenfield's

1977/78 paper. Griffiths's paper did not mention Greenfield

by name but Greenfield's critique formed the backdrop to

Griffiths's thinking. The article focused on Griffiths'

contention that:

> the paradigm presently used in educational
> administration is neither useful nor appropriate
> because it is no longer fruitful in generating powerful
> concepts and hypotheses, does not allow us to describe
> either modern organisations or the people in them, and
> as a result, is not helpful to administrators (1978:80)

The article repeated much from Griffiths's 1977 paper which

was the published version of his 1976 Cocking lecture, *The*

Individual in Organisation: A Theoretical Perspective.

and echoed some of his 1977 Rochester seminar paper (published in 1979). By implication Greenfield might be numbered among the "phenomenologists" (p88) but Griffiths added nothing new to already familiar material.

The second Griffiths's paper was one which Greenfield looked forward to (Greenfield 1979/80 :210). It was his 1979 AERA address entitled *Intellectual Turmoil in Educational Administration* (1979). Greenfield believed that even the title reinforced his own point of view that something is "not quite right in American and Canadian research in educational administration" (1979/80:210) and Griffiths was agreeing with him. The paper was very significant for Griffiths because its focus was "the major criticisms of theory that pertain to educational administration ... and implications for research" (p1) and that entailed for him "a certain sadness" (p2) because "it is not possible to do the job without challenging virtually all of the premises that [I] have accepted during my career". He used a phrase from Charles Perrow to describe the process. He was "trying to think [himself] out of a paradigm [he] had lived with, even contributed to" (Perrow, 1978 in Griffiths, 1979:2). He declared that he had "long had an uneasiness about the assumptions underlying organisational theory" and that the time was right to articulate some of this uneasiness. The paper was an effort "at a comprehensive critique of both substance and method" (Griffiths, 1985:8).

In characteristically blunt language Griffiths
began the address:

> the title of this paper may be an exaggeration. But if
> educational administration is not in a state of
> intellectual turmoil, it should be, because its parent,
> the field of organisational theory, certainly is
> (1979:1).

The "intellectual turmoil " was evidenced in such papers as
Greenfield (1975c); Griffiths (1978); Kendell and Byrne
(1978); Culbertson (1980); and Erickson (1979). Griffiths
identified some of the "awakening of criticism in
educational administration" (Griffiths, 1979:43) which
suggested:

> putting the concept of organisations as rational
> instruments of announced goals at the periphery of
> theory and replacing it with the view that
> organisations serve many functions (p45).

He proceeded to discuss the disregard for the plight of
women and minorities and unions and the effect of the
environment on the organisation; loss of faith in the
universal applicability of organisational theories; the
Marxist critique; the "complete disarray" (p16) of
leadership theory and the attack on positivism. Greenfield
was mentioned in this section of the paper as one of those
who attacked positivism and offered other approaches to
learning about organisations, but for Griffiths:

> what is learned ... is not scientific knowledge, it is
> not generalisable, and often, it is of little value to
> anyone other than the individual using the approach
> (p59).

Griffiths interpreted Greenfield interpreting Wittgenstein
to conclude that there could not be a "scientific theory
concerning organisations". In the face of such criticisms
the next steps for Griffiths were (pp61-63), to clarify and
come to some agreement on the epistemological question: Can
there be a science of organisations comparable to the
science of physics or chemistry; to develop much more
"restricted theories" that are distinctively educational;
to be clear about the nature of theorising since theories
are not "homogeneous and monolithic" (p61); to decide just
what in the research and theory on organisations is useful
in education and do not discard it; to deepen the
complexity of current theory making to include
environmental and their sociocultural contexts and to
develop an "intellectual framework so that those criticisms
that survive close scrutiny can be incorporated into a new
paradigm" (p63). The paper marked a shift in Griffiths's
thinking and an intellectual opening out to new ideas and
to wider possibilities for theory building and
development.

Ideology and Science: Willower

Professor Don Willower presented the State of the
Art lecture at the AERA conference in San Francisco 1979,
the same conference where Griffiths raised the issue of
intellectual turmoil. The interest in theory building,
paradigm shifts and multiple paradigms sparked by the

continuing discussion between Greenfield, Griffiths, Hills
and others had caught his interest and in this paper
(1979b) Willower set out to explore the "non-scientific
side of certain theories" (Willower, 1979b:21). He
selected a number of "alternative general orientations" to
facilitate this analysis of three theories, Marxism,
phenomenology and the garbage can model. Greenfield was
identified with phenomenology and as he stated before
(1979:70) "Greenfield's version of phenomenology is bereft
of any connection with philosophical phenomenology" (p29)
but it does share with "phenomenologically oriented social
scientists" (p28) an "opposition to positivistic science
and its operationalism, quantitative emphasis, and
behaviorism, along with a desire to come to grips with
human experience" (p28) and added nominalism. Willower
cited Greenfield's 1978 paper where Greenfield claimed that
research had been done in the subjectivist mode contested
the labelling of such "students of school organisations"
(p29) as Waller, Lortie, Jackson and Cusick as
subjectivists and used this to illustrate that "terms like
subjectivist, phenomenology and phenomenological have been
applied variously and often loosely" (p29). Willower
explained the problem:

> phenomenological approaches to organisations ... rely
> on a general perspective rather than developed theory.
> Hence, opportunities for obscurity abound, and
> theoretical explication is necessary if the
> phenomenological view is to contribute grounded
> explanations concerning educational organisations (p29).

Willower distinguished between "philosophical

phenomenology" and "phenomenological social science" (p29)

and considered Greenfield a phenomenological social

scientist, although he did not explicitly say this.

Greenfield fits easily into Willower's description of

phenomenological social science. So while Greenfield

himself has discounted the use of the term "phenomenology"

to categorise his thinking and did so much earlier (1975c:

74), Willower still attached that label to Greenfield.

One of the points of contention between Willower

and Greenfield concerned the nature of knowledge. Willower

made his view clear:

> ... knowledge results from public procedures aimed at
> disproof ... knowledge is the product of inquiry ...
> not based on authority, faith, or intuition ...
> neither transcendent nor absolute. Knowledge is
> temporary and inquiry is self-correcting. Science
> cannot be equated with positivism, used as a straw
> man by phenomenologists, Marxists, and others who
> picture science as mechanistic and inhumane (p33).

He believed that inquiry, as a path to knowledge, has two

sides, "the creative and the critical":

> The creative side has to do with curiosity, conjecture,
> and the invention of concepts, ideas, and explanations.
> The critical side has to do with scepticism, doubt, and
> the process of verification ... The creative side is
> grounded in the desire to explain and is nurtured by
> imagination. It is loose, with little structure,
> and it can be very private. The critical side is
> more structured, aimed at refutation, and its
> procedures must be public (pp33-34).

Herein was his major difficulty with phenomenological

social scientists and presumably, with Greenfield. They

disclaimed inquiry as a path to knowledge but did not

produce alternative paths that honoured both the creative

and critical sides of science. Phenomenological research,

for Willower, was not much more than "social psychology

with a mission" (p35). He deplored "shifts ... from

curiosity and detachment toward ideology" (p37) and in

what sounds like no little frustration asked:

> Must one be a phenomenologist or systems theorist
> or whatever? Shouldn't individuals use whatever
> theories speak to the problems that interest them, if
> they can do so competently? (p37).

After all, the main task of those interested in the study

of educational organisations was "the free search for

ideas, and their critical examination" (p37). Perhaps,

Greenfield was implicitly numbered among the latter.

THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION

The incursions into the discussion on contemporary

theory and research by Canadian scholars in published

papers were remarkably few. Hills made the earliest

response to Greenfield's IIP74 paper in the *CASEA*

Newsletter in 1975 and again in the *UCEA Review* in 1977 and

later wrote *A Critique of Greenfield's 'New Perspective'*

(1980). The motivation for the article was Greenfield's

contention in his 1978 paper that the "conflict between

himself and Griffiths received more attention than the

issues that underlie the conflict" (Hills, 1980:20). Hills

presented "as searching an analysis and critique of Greenfield's views as the constraints of a journal article will permit" (p20). He classified Greenfield's views under seven headings - beliefs prevalent in the field; the nature of and requirements for organisational theory; the proper subject matter of organisation theory; the nature and characteristics of the "natural systems" view of organisations; the nature and characteristics of the "phenomenological" view of organisations; the "role" of the social sciences and the implications of all the above for research, theory and preparation programs in educational administration. Then he presented a personal view of the defensibility of the views expressed.

He used Greenfield's 1975c paper as the basis of his critique. The analysis is exhaustive. The conclusions are few but wide-ranging. The only benefit that Hills could see in Greenfield's work was "in its discussion-stimulating qualities" (p42). He could not accept the premises on which Greenfield built his argument that a single theory of organisations was impossible. Hills believed that the conclusion was correct but the argument was faulty. Greenfield's conception of theory was unclear. His treatment of the "Harvard functionalists" was inaccurate (p43). His "rejection of statistical relationships was quite incomprehensible" (p43). Greenfield's view of knowledge based in experience, was narrow and his "new perspective" was far from new.

THE MAN WHO COMES BACK

Greenfield responded to Hills's paper in *The Man Who Comes Back through the Door in the Wall: Discovering Truth, Discovering Self, Discovering Organisations* (1980). In the same edition of the journal, Willower had an article *Contemporary Issues in Theory in Educational Administration*, which contained some specific criticisms of Greenfield's work. Greenfield incorporated his response to Willower in this 1980 article.

Contemporary Issues: Willower

Willower's paper was based on one given at the UCEA-University of Wisconsin co-sponsored Career Development seminar, March 1980. In the paper, Willower dealt with three contemporary issues - "one is epistemological, the second has to do with abstraction and the concept of system and the third is concerned with values and ideology" (Willower, 1980:1). After some comments on substantive theory in which he noted that "theories are simply not used very much in the realm of practice" (p2) and that this indifference together with "the limits of science and especially social science, and the difficulties of application" (p2) had contributed to some "disenchantment" with theory, he briefly explained the major, current theories and their applications to schools - role, leadership, bureaucratic, general systems, contingency, garbage can and loose coupling theories. He continued with "some criticisms of the critics" (p6) and

once again included Greenfield among the "phenomenological approaches" and "the phenomenologically oriented critics" (pp6-18).

Willower was critical of Greenfield's epistemology. He could not distinguish whether Greenfield's criticism of science was "genuinely epistemological" or "narrowly methodological" (p8). He was unsure whether Greenfield had a genuine theory of knowledge and asserted that the issues "should be addressed in a straightforward manner" (p8). For Willower the present situation "furnishes an excellent example of unclarified presuppositions". He criticised Greenfield's use of "the tale of a novice nun" (p14) to "provide insight on the domination of people in organisations". The point of the criticism was that:

> Greenfield attributes enormous power to organisations, more than many systems oriented theorists would, yet he eschews the very theoretical frameworks that explore the topics of his concern - order and control, conformity and deviance. This might be an unintended consequence of his intense ideological commitments. He dislikes organisations because he thinks they are oppressive and he identifies with the individuals who are oppressed. Hence, he shuns theories that deal with organisations and calls for studies of individual 'realities' (p14).

In Willower's mind Greenfield discarded those very theories that seemed most likely to promote understanding.

Regarding what he called a "political" (p15) stance on values, Willower identified Greenfield with "some non-Marxist critics" who argued that schools were "oppressive

organisations" and quoted from Greenfield's 1979a paper
(1979a:107). His response was to state that there was
nothing new here, "the Marxist position is shopworn ... and
Greenfield's concerns about schools echoed those of many
past works of which Rousseau's *Emile* is but one example"
(p15). Willower constantly linked phenomenology and
Marxist analyses of organisations. There was nothing new
also in Greenfield's belief that studies of topics like the
"hidden injuries of learning, teaching and being an
administrator" (Greenfield, 1979/80:20, in Willower,
1980:16) were needed. Such studies "must work with the
unique, the specific to reach larger insights that carry
conviction and meaning beyond themselves". Willower
interpreted these statements as a "call for research,
probably using field or interview methods". He cited
studies by Waller, Hollingshead, Wolcott and a study of his
own with Hugh Fraser which involved telephone interviews
with school superintendents concerning their feelings about
their work where he "barely resisted the temptation" (p17)
of announcing "a phenomenological breakthrough".

In these criticisms Willower named Greenfield. In
fact Greenfield was cited more often in the notes to the
article than in the actual text. In other implicit
criticisms in this article Greenfield was included among
"phenomenologically oriented writers" (p12). Willower's
summary judgment was that there will not be "much
substantive theory" nor "much research that will be

different from the qualitative research" (p17) now in

existence, that is if "the critics main concerns are

methodological". If they are philosophical then, according

to Willower, they "are covering old ground but with new

zeal" (p17). Willower is at ease in the belief that

"theories and methodologies will come and go but the

process of questioning, exploring and testing remains"

(p18). For him, the answer to current controversies was

the unalterable fact that "theoretical advance requires the

articulation of well drawn explanations that are both

logically coherent and empirically viable" (p18).

Through the Door in the Wall

Greenfield declared that it was difficult to frame

a response to Hills and Willower (1980:28). Simply, he had

had enough. He wrote:

> I am oppressed by that sense that I have said all this
> before and that others have said it time and time
> again. What I have said is a matter of record. What
> others have said I have tried to acknowledge in my
> writings. Readers of this paper will see how heavily
> the ideas I expound are dependent upon others and upon
> a long-standing tradition of scholarship and
> philosophy. If I can do nothing else in this paper, I
> would like to abdicate from the role of spokesman for
> the Greenfield school of organisation theory. It is not
> my school. It is not my theory ... (1980:27).

Greenfield merely wanted to show that:

> the study of organisations provides a rich source of
> ideas and experience for those who explore human action
> and would ask how we might best understand it and learn
> from it (p27).

In the process he did answer his critics "point by point"
but made "a larger and more coherent argument" (p31). At the
heart of their differences, Greenfield believed, lay the fact
that:

> Hills and Willower live in one world while I inhabit
> another. We argue from different premises and, therefore,
> see different facts in the world and build very different
> interpretations even though we may agree on occasion as to
> what the facts are (p28).

For Hills and Willower facts "stand separate and independent
from theories about the facts" (p28). For Greenfield "the line
between fact and value is at best blurred and what we see as
facts is in large measure determined by the ideas in our heads"
(p28). Knower and known blend together (p29) so how can truth
be validated "by means that are independent of the person
seeking the truth"? (p28) Hills and Willower asserted that
"ideas are a different sort of thing than facts" (p29). Theories
are ideas; "facts are realities that lie strewn about their
world as pebbles lie on the seashore" (p29) to be picked up,
considered, put back, "without changing them significantly or
modifying the perception that another observer may have of them"
(p29). Greenfield did not believe that truth was only
objective nor that science was "an immaculate standard for
truth-making". Greenfield asked, "what can objective truth mean
in a world that can be perceived only subjectively?" (p30)
because, for him and many other philosophers and social
scientists (some of whom are named) "the impact of the knower
can never be 'cleansed' from that which is known" (p31).

Greenfield quoted Hodgkinson demonstrating how facts blur into

values (p31) and asked:

> what is science then, if fact and value cannot be
> distinguished and if most of what we want to know about
> in a world of action is suffused with value? (p31)

With that as context, Greenfield proceeded specifically in his

response to Hills and Willower.

Already in this article Greenfield had counted himself

among thinkers in "subjective philosophy and interpretive social

science" (p27) and now to best advance his arguments, he

outlined "a set of themes that recur in interpretive social

science and that are relevant to the analysis of organisations

from the subjectivist perspective" (p31). These, he believed,

offered a "new" and useful framework for the study of

organisations" (p31). In the notes on the article, Greenfield

commented on his use of "new" and the criticism it received. He

acknowledged that the ideas were not new, but:

> what is new is that old ideas when applied to the normal
> science of organisation call the achievements of that
> science seriously into question ... There is a new challenge
> to the school of thought that holds that administration can
> be understood from an established science of organisation.
> That challenge can be met only by dealing substantively and
> adequately with the ideas and criticism offered (p56).

The foundation of these ideas is ontological and Greenfield

immediately focused on this:

> we want to know what is in the world, but our very act of
> inquiry into it denies us that knowledge ... we cannot
> discover it without acting and bringing to bear upon the
> inquiry our own interests, attitudes, and values (p32).

Quoting from such disparate sources as Bacon, Machiavelli, Huxley and Giddens, Greenfield introduced Marx's concept of *"homo faber*, man the producer, who creates not only things but the social world in which he lives and who shapes that world out of personal interests in it" (p33) to point out that "social truth is created by the active knower; it depends on self". This "moral order lies within us" and so "is not everywhere the same and people will disagree as to what it is and as to what it ought to be" (p33); "the social order that links people together in loosely-connected common action is simply a reflection of the moral order" (p34). How then, asked Greenfield, was it possible "to scientise the study of organisations that are but the reflection of an inner order?" (p34) Hills and Willower saw the world in scientifically objective terms and rejected Greenfield's view. Ultimately, for Greenfield:

> the judgment rests on an act of belief, an act of
> faith in objective science as opposed to the placement of
> faith in human ability to create social reality and to
> interpret its meaning (pp34-35).

Hills and Willower claimed "theory and empirical facts ... and the power of science to determine objective truth" (p35). Greenfield claimed "insight, perception and unruly humanity". They sought to explain action in the world scientifically and generally. Greenfield concentrated on the perspective of the individual involved in the action and sought understanding by iuxtaposing individual's understanding and interpretations. They saw science as helping to provide "general truths about social reality" and moving toward "control of social action" (p35).

Greenfield saw science as:

> argument where one wants to make a point and looks for
> those ideas, facts, and meanings that will increase the
> completeness, intensity, and persuasiveness of the initial
> insight (p35).

To know reality there is the method of science and "all the ways

of knowing that rely upon intuitive, self-oriented, and non-

rational perception" (p37). Quoting Huxley, Greenfield asserted

that systematic reasoning in itself, was not adequate for

understanding the world. He supported this reasoning with

reference to Kuhn and Feyerabend, both of whom agreed that

"science moves not only on systematic reasoning but also by

creative upheavals in thought ... where advance depends ... upon

a 'mixture of subterfuge, rhetoric and propaganda'" (p37).

Greenfield's proposed nine propositions which, he said,

"may make the pump handle for an alternative approach to the

study of organisations" (p38). He called them a "prolegomena"

(p38), a preliminary discourse for a new study of organisation.

They were "prefatory comments for a yet-to-be-written treatise

on organisations as invented social reality" (p38). The nine

propositions are:

1. That organisations are accomplished by people and people
   are responsible for what goes on in them.
2. That organisations are expressions of will, intention and
   value
3. That organisations express becoming, not being.
4. That facts do not exist except as they are called into
   existence by human action and interest.
5. That man acts and then will judge the action.
6. That organisations are essentially arbitrary definitions
   of reality woven in symbols and expressed in language.
7. That organisations expressed as contexts for human action

can be resolved into meaning, moral order, and power.

8. That there is no technology for achieving the purposes organisations are to serve.

9. That there is no way of training administrators other than by giving them some apocalyptic or transcendental vision of the universe and of their life on earth (pp39-49).

These propositions form the major arguments of the paper and with their neat summary form provide a new lens for considering Greenfield's view of organisations. His subjectivist view of reality is reflected in each proposition and in the title of the article. *The Man who comes through the Door in the Wall* was taken from Aldous Huxley. He used the phrase in the context of some musings about "transcendental experience" and the perception and interpretation of reality. "The Wall" was Huxley's metaphor for everyday reality and the door referred to escape into transcendence by whatever means, "by art, religion, saturnalia, drugs both artificial and natural, liquor and tobacco" (Huxley, 1960:63-64 in Greenfield, 1980:36). The point of the title and its evocative images concluded Greenfield's proposition about the training of administrators:

> The Man who comes back through the Door in the Wall will never be quite the same as the man who went out. He will be wiser but less cocksure, happier but less satisfied, humbler in acknowledging his ignorance yet better equipped to understand the relationship of words to things, of systematic reasoning to the unfathomable Mystery which it tries, forever vainly to comprehend. The man who comes back can appreciate better the world as it is, can see reality differently (Greenfield, 1980: 49).

Greenfield concluded the paper with a brief discussion of some of the problems which his position left unresolved. He mentioned the problem of self and others (p49); the problem of

order (pp49-50); the problem of truth and mind (p50); the
problem of meaning and self (pp50-51); and the problem of
language (p51). Very briefly, he addressed "the gulf that
separates" (p52) Hills's and Willower's approach to the study of
organisations and his own (pp51-55). He focused on both
writers' belief and adherence to the scientific study of
organisations above all others. Willower's claim that "science
is superior to all other ways of 'fixing belief' because its
claims are open to disproof" (p52) was likened to Karl Popper's
"falsification theory" (in Greenfield, 1980:52). He mentioned
both writers' assertion that the value of his writings was in
their "discussion-stimulating qualities" (Hills, 1980:42),
agreed that the discussion was useful but continued to disagree
that "the controversy can now be regarded as settled" (p53).
Greenfield, unlike Hills and Willower, did not see research,
quantitative and qualitative, "as fitting within a single
paradigm of unified science" (p53). The paradigm that
Greenfield advocated "admits the many voices of truth and
recognises them as attached to self, to individuals" (p55) and
his chief argument is against those "who would fit all truth
about organisations into a single, objective, non-political,
self-less truth called science" (p55).

Reflections on The Man Who Comes Back

This paper was "a paper from the heart and not just from
the head" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) and was particularly
meaningful for Greenfield. The Man who comes back is, in one
sense himself, although he hoped that "other people could see

themselves in somewhat the same situation" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). He had at last come to terms with his homosexuality and drew some strength from this "newly understood experience" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) convinced that he had something to say to those who would listen about fundamental matters. The man who comes back perceives reality differently. Greenfield was able to let a part of himself that he had earlier suppressed, "speak freely" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) and for readers who would listen, "who were sympathetic", he set out "to build a framework of sound understanding into the truth and action of life in organisations" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90.).

He never finished the "yet-to-be-written treatise on organisation as social reality" (Greenfield 1980:38). "There are elements of it, hither and yon, scattered through, but no consistent, mature text" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). The paper was written to answer those who said "You destroy but you don't offer anything". Greenfield added:

> I do think that I never destroy without putting something back. I could see that maybe that 'putting back' was lost, so I attempted right in the same place to say, "Well now, if you've missed it elsewhere, here is what I'm saying", and I do that without an attempt to criticise, to destroy. These are assertive statements about the nature of the world that we are dealing with (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

Answering his critics was only secondary in this article. Greenfield was aware that some were reacting to his work in the belief that "he-has-said-it-all-before". Here his primary purpose was to advance the argument.

POSTSCRIPT

By the end of the 1970s Greenfield wrote:

> I am coming not to know what educational administration is,
> and to doubt that it ought to continue an existence as an
> independent field of inquiry. In its place, I am beginning
> to believe in basic studies in the humanities ...
> (1979/80:238).

He had already noted (1978:96) that "artists, poets, saints and philosophers" have been interpreting social reality for many years and continued to include the humanities as sources of knowledge in his own epistemology. In 1980 in the *Canadian Journal of Education*, he wrote a comment (four other scholars did too) on an article by Leroy D.Travis, entitled *Hinterland Schooling and Branch Plant Psychology: Educational Psychology in Canada Today.* In a comment which he called, *Is It True What he Said about Educational Psychology?* Greenfield asserted that Travis's "bad news" applied with equal force to "all those who think of themselves as social scientists trying to understand Canadian education and to do something helpful about it" (Greenfield, 1980:87). The "bad news" honed in on two of Greenfield's constant themes. Firstly Travis urged "Canada as hinterland" to liberate itself from "metropolitan culture and knowledge" (p87), ostensibly American and the consequent need of "Canadian intellectuals and artisans" to test themselves against "international standards by which they mean any standard that is not their own" (p87). Secondly, Travis launched an attack on psychology as science. This gave Greenfield another opportunity to make the point that "there is not a single reality, but rather a number of realities, each with competing claims for

validity" (p89).

He declared that Travis's questions were not new and needed to be explored in psychology and education. These questions required that the Canadian "hinterland" of scholars and practitioners think through "what a non-imperialistic, non-universal social science might look like" (p89). The liberation of hinterland psychology in Canada could best be furthered, according to Greenfield in recognition of other "forces" that also yield understanding into the human condition as "literature, art and philosophy" (p90). Greenfield believed that it was to "these doors of perception that the social sciences must turn if they are to find good earth and clean rain to nourish their withering roots" (p90).

The importance of this short article is in its Canadian publication. Since Greenfield's "Gestalt switching" in 1973/74 only one paper of his (1979a) had appeared in a Canadian publication. This comment provided an opportunity to join his own critique of the use of the social sciences to Travis's critique of educational psychology for Canadian readers of educational journals and gave him an opportunity to express his own strong nationalism.

By the end of the decade there had been close to seven years of vigorous and, at times vehement published discussion and debate that focused on Greenfield. Some of his most thoughtful papers were published and he was developing a naturally graceful literary style in which he articulated his

thinking about organisations and defended his alternative view.
His positivistic days were well and truly behind him and he was
exploring his subjectivist approach to theory and knowledge more
fully. During this decade that was in the context of argument
and counter argument firstly with Griffiths, and to a lesser
extent, with Hills and then, most vehemently with Willower. The
years ahead reveal a more settled person and a much less
beleaguered scholar. Chapter Nine proceeds to a consideration
of the years 1981-1990.