

## CHAPTER 9

### ANTI-ORGANISATION ORGANISATIONAL THEORY: 1981 - 1990

*Anarchy does not fit neatly into a box. Neither does reality ... and that is the nub of anarchism in the study of organisations: while we ourselves are bound, we may yet free our minds.*  
(Greenfield, 1983:299)

Greenfield's curriculum vitae notes fifteen entries during these nine years. Three of these (1983a, 1983b, 1986) are major papers in the development of Greenfield's thinking - one of these *Environment as Subjective Reality* (1983b) was never published - and the four editorials for *Curriculum Inquiry*, although brief are very significant in the Greenfield corpus. In *The Man Who Comes Back* (1980:27) Greenfield declared, "I am oppressed by the sense that I have said all this before ...." This feeling largely continued throughout the 1980s. His personal life stabilised to some extent. He continued his teaching at OISE and poured much energy into his classes and his doctoral advisees. He continued accepting invitations to present at conferences in Canada, USA and Britain. In the early 1980s, Greenfield travelled three times to Australia in 1981, 1983 and 1984. In general, Greenfield's published papers extended and developed the major themes of the IIP74 paper. He worked on clarifying his subjectivist theory of organisation; redoubled his attack on administrative

science and developed his view of the role of values in administration. Clearly, teaching became a significant focus of his energies. Publication took second place. Griffiths and Willower continued, now and again, to address issues that countered Greenfield's thinking and championed their own but much of the fire had gone out of the debate by the early eighties. Within the North American readership there was a sense that it had all been said and said often. The paradigm for theory development based on the tenets of logical positivism and espoused by the Theory Movement was shifting and fragmenting. Professors of educational administration were turning their attention to consultancy in the corporate world with its promise of big money and away from education. Greenfield's public arena moved to Australia for a few years and he settled down to routine dailyness at OISE. The excitement of the late 1970s had gone and many of his papers reflected a settled ordinariness.

This chapter revolves around Greenfield's work in the decade 1981-1990. The discussion is divided into five year periods, 1981-1985 and 1986-1990 in order to show clearly the progression of Greenfield's thinking - these are the years of Greenfield's most trenchant criticisms of administrative science - the decreasing intensity in the dialogue between the three scholars, Griffiths, Willower and Greenfield and the increasing sameness in the critique

of Greenfield's work. A chronological analysis of Griffiths's and Willower's publications relevant to the study is maintained throughout.

**GREENFIELD: 1981-1985**

Greenfield's first publication of the 1980s was a review (Greenfield, 1981a) of the published proceedings of IIP78 entitled *Gems in a Dreary Landscape*. Greenfield had not been invited to present at IIP78 and it rankled him. Referring to IIP78 he had written:

the cause celebre of 1974 will apparently have no echo in the IIP78. Certainly, I have not been asked to do anything for this Canada-based conference, which is being organised largely by colleagues in this country. This comment is not to deny value in the forthcoming conference simply because I won't be part of it, but I do get the sense that my colleagues on this side of the Atlantic are not anxious to fuel any more IIP controversies. Instead, they have largely contented themselves with seeing the issues of the 1974 controversy as an unfortunate battle in rather poor taste which somehow demeans theory and the past glory of the field of study (1977/78:83).

He felt that "some people in Canada, to the extent that they were aware of the issues, were embarrassed by them. The common view was that it was unfortunate, embarrassing and so you just ignore it" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) and so Greenfield merely "watched the IIP caravanserai as it passed briefly through Toronto" (Greenfield and Ribbins, 1992: 245). He never attended another IIP conference. He "simply did not feel welcome at many gatherings" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). Donald Layton in his comments on the Canadian IIP noted that:

perhaps the greatest disappointment at IIP '78 was that no session was scheduled on the issues raised by Thomas B. Greenfield's paper at the 1974 IIP... Greenfield's paper created quite a stir ... indeed, the ensuing discussions and debates created many of the most intellectually stimulating moments at the conference. Some of the delegates were more willing to subscribe to Greenfield's thesis than others, but the result was that IIPers were discussing some fundamental epistemological issues of their field. The debate that Greenfield triggered has continued on until the present day... Initially, a few exchanges appeared to be almost acrimonious but more recently the dialogue has been more constructive. The discussion has been healthy for the field.

While there were passing references to the Greenfield thesis throughout IIP'78, there was no real substantive discussion of it. No doubt the program planners had their reasons for not wanting to reopen the debate for not wanting to reopen the debate for reargument. But several conferees expressed their disappointment that more systematic attention had not been directed toward the phenomenology discussion (Layton, 1978:8).

Greenfield's review noted that the book was "rushed into print" and "arrived dead on arrival in the readers' hands" (Greenfield, 1981:12). It had "little thematic structure", "a bewildering variety of articles", a "number of short contributions ... and a superficiality of analyses" (p12). Much of it, Greenfield declared had been heard before. However, there were some "gems intermittently studding a large and dreary landscape" - Culbertson's article was "a joy to read"; Hedley Beare's article "is fascinating"; and "the sections dealing with training of administrators and the prospects for future study contain excellent contributions". Greenfield mentioned the Hills's and Andrews' articles (1981) in this context. He reserved some mention of "a polemic from Jacob Getzels" (p13) but did not

enlarge since he was "ill-placed to criticise other polemicists". Greenfield did appreciate the ideas in the Getzels' article, "his feeling and joy in intellectual debate and clash of ideas" (p13) and wished that these could be seen more frequently in the rest of the book. He concluded the review with a recommendation of the index.

1981 also saw the publication of a paper entitled, *Can Science Guide the Administrator's Hand? A Critique of the 'New Movement' Ideology in Educational Administration*. Hodgkinson (1981:143) had asked a similar question "Can there be a science of organisation comparable to the science of physics and chemistry?" and Griffiths's 1983 UCEA seminar address at Rutgers University was entitled, *Can there be a Science of Organisations?* The focus of all three questions was "science". Greenfield's paper was a reconfiguration of sections of his 1979/80 paper. Nothing new was added.

#### *Greenfield in Australia*

In October 1981, Greenfield made his first trip to Australia and was based at Monash University, Melbourne. There he presented a paper which he had already written and presented at a conference sponsored by the Department of Administration, Higher and Continuing Education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, on July 14, 1981. The paper was entitled *Organisation as Non-natural Order: The Anti-Leadership Position*. This paper was later

revised and published under the title *Leaders and Schools: Wilfulness and Non-natural Order in Organisations* (1984). At the same time Greenfield was putting together a paper in which he was trying to express what he later called "an anarchistic view" of organisation, a draft of which he took with him to Australia and which he presented at a Faculty Colloquium at Monash University on October 5 1981. He later revised and published two versions of this paper under the titles *Against Group Mind: an Anarchistic Theory of Education* (1982) and *Against Group Mind: an Anarchistic Theory of Organisation* (1983). These four papers and an unpublished, accompanying booklet of material drawn from various sources, - poetry, literature, his own papers, the current print media, the work of Christopher Hodgkinson, and the research notes of some of his own students - some of these appear in the 1984 paper - all of which aimed at depicting the multiple faces of reality, mark Greenfield's attempt to articulate his own theory of organisation once and for all and an accompanying, appropriate framework for research. Here was Greenfield attempting to do what his critics had for years demanded. He was picking up again the "yet-to-be-written treatise on organisation as social reality" (Greenfield, 1980:38).

*Leaders and Schools* (1984) focused on schools. Schools were considered as "cultural entities" (1984:143) and "their humanness (if not their humaneness)" (p143) was emphasised. Greenfield was convinced that schools must be

considered "in context, from a sense of the concrete events and personalities within them, rather than from a set of abstractions or general laws" (p143). In a "theoretical background note" Greenfield briefly sketched "the historical evolution of science in Western thought" (p143) and answered Hodgkinson's question "Can there be a science of organisation comparable to the science of physics and chemistry" with a resounding "No". The belief was that this "God-like entity, science" and scientific knowledge

take us in a direction that no other knowledge leads: toward control of our environment, first in the physical realm, then in the biological, and ultimately in the social and personal (p144).

For Greenfield and for Hodgkinson this is an example of "misplaced faith in science" (p144). Greenfield proceeded to develop more fully and systematically than ever before his theory of organisations:

first, organisational studies should be seen as inquiry into nonnatural orders ... second, a theory of wilfulness that may help us understand organisations ... third, organisations are manifestations of culture, and we may understand them with only as much ease or difficulty, as we can understand the culture in which they are embedded (p145).

He used two metaphors to express the truths of organisational realities as he saw them in contrast to "complex quantification and "the limitations of Cartesian thought" (p145). One was a quote from the poet, William Wordsworth that concluded with the words "we murder to dissect" (p145). Greenfield cautioned against the wide-

spread tendency to "dissect", to understand the parts when dealing with "the beauteous forms of things human" (p145). Greenfield recalled (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) that the editor of the text urged him strongly to remove the Wordsworth quote because it would be "offensive to the readership". Greenfield declined but came to believe that what the editor said was true. "Some people did see my work as treacherous, unjustified, insulting and I found that, at many gatherings, I just did not feel welcome" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

The second was a long extract from V.S. Naipaul's novel, *A House for Mr. Biswas*. Greenfield wanted to make the point that:

education is a moral enterprise that inculcates values. The values come in forms that are inextricably bound up with facts and knowledge. Schools are places that distribute values in the form of information and they do so by force, a force that is expressed through figures of authority called leaders, who may resort to physical violence when the violence of authority alone does not suffice to do the job (p145).

Greenfield noted again the "inevitable combination" of fact and value" (p147) and this led into a consideration of "organisations as nonnatural order" (p147) in contrast to traditional theory that saw organisations as natural order. Greenfield quoted Habermas (who cited Hobbes as his authority) and John MacMurray in the context of the "philosophical implications of the organic metaphor and its relationship to social structure and individual freedom"



(p149). Organisations as nonnatural order or as cultural artefacts were "the products of individual action, intention and will" and were founded "in meanings, in human intentions, actions, and experience" (p150).

Greenfield believed that scientific inquiry was still possible within such a theoretical framework but a different kind of scientific inquiry from the customary. He identified two kinds of inquiry, one that characterised "the moral order that prevails in organisations and describes what happens within them" and the other that argued about "what kind of moral order is best" (p150). He wrote:

Description opens up the possibility that artistic and other nonrational modes of representation of reality might convey the meaning of social organisations as well as, or better than, the linear, concise, and highly quantified abstractions that now count as science ... and argument opens up science or rather returns it, to the realm of philosophy in which certainty comes from values that lie beyond any proof that science can offer (p150).

Greenfield believed that organisations were "systems of meaning that can be understood only through the interpretation of meaning" (p150) and upon:

... the interpretation of interpretations in a process that continues without end and without ever reaching the definitive statement, the final judgment, or the ultimate social truth (p151).

For him there was "no ultimate reality in the understanding of organisations" (p151). There was only, in a sense,

individual reality as "the ultimate building block in social reality" (Greenfield, 1982:3). And:

Organisations are the facade that covers individual intention and will; they are the marionette show that dazzles and deceives an audience - an audience of people who will themselves to believe the performance. But behind the facade, are human actors who do what they want to do (Greenfield, 1984:152).

Greenfield's theory of organisations "as will and imagination":

rejects group mind and rejects an overarching social reality thought to lie beyond human control and outside the will, intention, and action of the individual; ... and acknowledges the tumult and irrationality of thought itself (p152).

His theory rested on "several short observations" (p152). These were twelve observations in the 1981b, 1982, 1983a papers. They were reduced to ten in the 1984 paper, all of which reinforced Greenfield's view that:

an organisation is a set of meanings that people act out, talk out, and back up with their own armamentarium of forces -psychological, moral, and physical (p154).

These observations are:

1. It is the individual that lives and acts, not the organisation.
2. Clearly, there is something "out there" that contains forces man does not control.
3. We live in separate realities.
4. Facts and values are closely interwoven.
5. Modern science and ancient philosophy have taught us to think that a universal logic and rationality governs the world.
6. Individuals are responsible for what they do.
7. The question is whose will is to predominate.
8. The alternative to action and probable evil is disengagement.

9. History and law should be our models for studying organisations ...
10. Language is power.

Greenfield then considered the cultural context of organisations - organisations were after all "cultural artefacts" (1975c:74, 1984:154) - and dwelt at some length on the work of anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. Geertz's description and reflection on Balinese cockfights mirrored Weber's understanding of culture as "a web of meaning we ourselves have spun" (p158) a web that we are usually unaware of "even as we find meaning of self within it" (p158). Geertz's method, Greenfield wrote, was "both descriptive and expository" based on the portrayal of "powerful images of a culture and insight into what social order means within that culture" (p158). Using a similar method Greenfield described and explained leadership in schools. He wanted to make the point that the "task of leaders is to create the moral order that binds them and the people around them" (p159) and so he quoted from "an internal monologue" of a teacher who was asked how he established order and control in his classroom and then drew out meaning about leadership and the administrative act. Greenfield advocated studies on leaders in schools similar to Geertz's study of Balinese culture. He mentioned in passing, the sociological school studies of Willard Waller and some others in the modern ethnographic tradition and delayed on Wolcott's 1973 study and Metz's 1978 study of school principals as leaders. These studies

described individual reality as it is within a specific school culture, as experienced and interpreted by specific people. That, for Greenfield was authentic research, replete with meaning and contributing to knowledge about leaders.

Greenfield concluded this paper with what he called "the antileadership position" where the emphasis was on the "collective" and where "the values and commitments of the group find expression through the leader" (p164). In this position "the leader is the person who is the group" (p164) Greenfield is indebted to Hodgkinson for much of his thinking about leadership (1978:273ff). The "anti-leadership position" recognised "a plurality of values in human society" and denied "ultimate legitimacy to any action" (Greenfield, 1984:165). In this view:

all social orders are pluralistic and there will always be struggle and contention among those who represent the conflicting values within the structure. Those who represent the conflicting values are the leaders and they are in all respects human, fallible, self-interested, perverse, dogged, changeable, and (fortunately) ephemeral. In social possibility, we are all leaders (p165).

Organisations in the antileadership view are:

contexts for the expression of individual wilfullness. They are the moral order - however complex, conflicted, or ambiguous it be - made apparent in action (p166).

Organisations "are built on the unification of people around values" (p166) and the business of being a leader

is therefore, "the business of being an entrepreneur of values".

### *Against Group Mind*

The papers of the early 1980s were important ones for Greenfield. He did, in fact, set out to write down a systematic "treatise on organisations as invented social reality" (1980b:38). The first indications of this treatise came in *The Man Who Comes Back* (1980b) where he outlined nine propositions that "try to forge a coherent but necessarily incomplete argument about the nature of organisations and the possibility of inquiry into them" (Greenfield, 1980:39). Greenfield considered these observations as "insights that are possibly helpful in speculation about organisation" (p39) and as "heuristic devices" that might be considered successful to the extent that they "stimulate argument, effort towards clarification of meaning and reflection on experience" (p39). He was adamant that:

they should not be regarded as a blueprint of organisational reality or as hypotheses that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by empirical facts alone. The claim for them is only that they weave meaningfully together what some people have defined as the limits of knowledge with what others have experienced as the reality of organisations (p39).

In the four papers dating from 1981 to 1984 and the accompanying "descriptive and expository research" material, Greenfield was taking this treatise a little further. The treatise as such, was never completed but

Greenfield continued to deepen and purify his thinking. The notion that he merely restated what had already been said and repeated countless times can be amply debated and discounted by a close analysis of his work. The theme that was occupying his thinking in the early 1980s concerned values and the moral order of organisations. Greenfield had been thinking along these lines almost since his earliest published work but, undoubtedly, his friendship with Christopher Hodgkinson, his reading of Hodgkinson's works and their interaction and communication influenced Greenfield deeply and he constantly acknowledged this debt. In thinking about values in organisations and the moral order Greenfield and Hodgkinson were in complete agreement. Hodgkinson's influence is clearly apparent in the four papers currently under discussion.

### *An Anarchistic View*

*Against Group Mind: an anarchistic view of organisation* was presented at the AERA Annual Meeting in Los Angeles in April 1981, as part of a symposium on "Researching Educational Organisations - Three Perspectives: Marxist, Anarchist, Phenomenological". *Organisation as Nonnatural Order* was presented in July 1981, and again in Australia in October 1981. *Against Group Mind* became part of this paper and was used in a symposium in Australia in 1981. 'Nonnatural Order' was later revised and was published as *Leaders and Schools: Wilfulness and Nonnatural Order in Organisations* (1984).

There were in fact two separate published versions of *Against Group Mind*, one published in the *McGill Journal of Education* (1982) and entitled *Against Group Mind: An Anarchistic Theory of Education* and a second published by Deakin University 1983 and entitled *Against Group Mind: an Anarchistic Theory of Organisation*. The latter was Greenfield's preferred version (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). Greenfield recalled that the editor of the *McGill Journal* altered the text of the article and published the paper without his permission. He changed the title to "education"- it was always "organisation"- and "tidied up what he thought was unfortunate language or imagery" (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90). Greenfield disapproved strongly but realised that his absence in Australia prevented further communication with the *McGill Journal* editor. He was still working on *Against Group Mind* in Australia and rewrote it for inclusion in a book of readings from Deakin University (1983). The whole section on Young Torless (1983:294-296) was written into this version of the text. The twelve short observations in the 1981 and 1983 versions of the text become ten in the 1984 paper.

Greenfield purposefully used the terms "anarchistic" and "anti-leadership" in a kind of "deliberate sense to shock and draw attention" (Greenfield interview, 26.9.90). Griffiths had used the term "anarchy" almost synonymously with the term "paradigm

diversity" (Griffiths, 1977,1979a, 1979b) and the Burrell and Morgan typology with its "radical humanist/anti-organisational paradigm" (1980:310) was in popular usage in academic circles, and in common parlance, the term "anarchy" was used in association with this paradigm. Greenfield did not believe that the Burrell and Morgan categorisation was a very good one. He thought it was:

It was sort of a little 'tour de force'. In a very positivistic way, it sort of summarises the whole world and it is not the way in which people working in separate paradigms characterise themselves. The fundamental differences are in the realist, positivist, subjectivist, critical theorist (Greenfield interview 26.9.90).

Griffiths actually categorised Greenfield's theory as "anti-organisational organisational theory" (Griffiths, 1988:44). Greenfield disowned this categorisation.

I don't think that analysis is very apt. I'm not anti-organisation theory. I'm anti organisation theory that leaves out a recognition of the nature of the individual and of the relationship between what we call organisation and the individual. I'm not denying the inevitability of the organisation, or that it can be good, but I am saying that there are frequently incredible prices to pay when the individual is seen as the enemy of the organisation who must be ordered, and got into line (Greenfield interview, 26.9.90) .

Greenfield's use of the term was completely different. Greenfield did not equate "anarchy" with nihilism. He was not saying that nothing mattered nor that organisations were ungovernable but was attempting to rescue the individual from theories that ignored the individual (Greenfield interview, 26.9.90). He saw anarchy as:



the possibility of choice, the choice that is compelled but never determined. It's the recognition of the free will of the individual. The system can never express, incorporate the complexity, the realities of individual experience, and however much we push the organisation together to make it a solid mass, it is never less than built out of the individual experiences that are irreducible. There is always that tension between the individual and the whole. There is no such thing as group mind as an organisational ethos. There is no entity that acts for the organisation (Greenfield interview, 21.11.90)

These papers were ones that Greenfield "rather liked" (Greenfield interview, 21.11.90) because they set out, in a very short space "an agenda, a summary, an encapsulated version of ideas that have occupied my thinking for the past ten years". *Against Group Mind* he particularly liked, "its very aphoristic style caught up all the issues" (Interview, 21.11.90) and he tried to avoid abstract and academic language and so "make the knowledge immediately available to the reader". The twelve statements of truth in propositional form were "basic to an interpretive understanding of the world where the individual is the absolute, foundational element in social reality and in organisations" (Greenfield interview, 21.11.90).

He felt sufficiently secure in himself and detached by now from criticism, especially *ad hominem* criticism, to liken himself to Jonah inside the belly of the whale. Greenfield's ninth observation (1983a:298) is "the alternative to action and probable evil is disengagement". He quoted George Orwell's use of the metaphor of Jonah inside the whale "to express the

individual's best approach to forces that are totally beyond its control". He commented that:

Detachment from events does not mean non-awareness of them ... Jonah becomes an observer who can see what others locked in the struggle are oblivious to. Because his detachment and security let him see things that remain hidden to others, Jonah as observer bears the obligation to describe what is happening and to make us aware of it (p298).

That was a further reason he objected to Griffiths's characterising his work as "anti organisational organisational theory" (Griffiths, 1988:44). He saw himself as just trying to describe what he saw. "I'm not opposed to it. We have to open our eyes to the complexities, that's all" (Greenfield interview, 21.11.90). Greenfield's conclusion to this paper was that "we must needs learn to unloosen our minds and let them run freely" (p299). This pointed to what he calls "the nub of anarchism in the study of organisations" that "while we ourselves are bound, we may yet free our minds". The choice to do or not to do is always there and then:

the role of rules becomes paradoxically liberating once one looks at them in that way, that the form that is accepted, chosen, can be surpassed and even transcended (Greenfield interview, 21.11.90).

### *Environment as Subjective Reality*

Greenfield's next major paper on organisational theory was presented at the AERA conference symposium, "School Organisations and their Environments" in Montreal, April 1983. It was revised in May 1983 and again in August

1986 and never published. The *Educational Administration Quarterly* rejected it. So too did the Canadian journal, *Curriculum Inquiry*. Greenfield was convinced of its importance and finally won a grant of money from OISE and had it printed and distributed in manuscript form to his students and to "would-be readers" from whom he invited comments. The title decided upon in the 1986 redraft was *Environment as Subjective Reality: A Retrospective View of Modern Organisation Theory and its Failure as Administrative Theory in Education and Elsewhere*.

The paper is a comprehensive, scholarly and detailed gathering together of Greenfield's thinking to date. The customary, in-depth critique of modern theory and Greenfield's alternative theory that "thinks in human terms about organisations - and, possibly, humanely about them" (Greenfield, 1983b:1) were presented and an exhaustive literature review on environment and organisation was outlined. Greenfield introduced a couple of new metaphors to describe organisations. He evoked the stage, the play, the actor, the theatre in his description of organisational reality and asked Who sets the stage? Who writes the script? Who defines the roles? What restraints bind the actors and why do they bind them at all? (pp35-39). And he began to talk about "the disappeared individual" (p18). He dwelt more on values- "organisations are moral order in action" (p1); "values are pure subjective reality (p44) - and substantiated his own

thinking with frequent reference to the work of Hodgkinson. He articulated systematically some thoughts on power in organisations and quoted extensively from the humanities, from Greek philosophy and English literature - especially Shakespeare, Wilfrid Owen and Wallace Shawn - from film and current affairs.

The paper models the method he had been advocating for some time now, that of description first and then argumentation, the juxtaposing of images and then letting the images speak for themselves. Everything is there and that is probably why the paper is incredibly difficult to read. The earlier version (May, 1983) was more reader friendly. This very difficulty was one reason for non-publication. Dr Michael Connelly, then editor of *Curriculum Inquiry* sent off a preliminary reaction to the paper dated May 17 1983, in which he noted that the paper was "a thorough and thoughtful piece" but he questioned its "built-in applicability" for a journal that was clearly educational and suggested some "application to educational organisations" (Connelly correspondence, May 17 1983) so that it would look "more implicitly educational and make clear the significance of [your] theories of organisation in the quality of educational experience". "The bottom line", he wrote was "that we would like to have your work published with us". In his reply to Connelly's letter, dated May 24 1983, Greenfield agreed that the paper was, in fact, more about organisation theory than about education

and that the words "school" and "education" hardly got a mention in the text. Greenfield continued:

The core ideas in my paper argue that organisations are individuals, their purposes, and the asymmetrical power relationships among them. Organisations are, therefore, subjective realities that cannot be shaped reliably by manipulating external or 'environmental' structures. They are in people and in their values. If there is such a thing as a theory of organisation, it will be found in a science of values and in a technology of moral order (Greenfield's reply May 24, 1983).

Since Greenfield was leaving for Australia again within two weeks of writing this note, he declined to make any extensive revision since, because of time pressures and other commitments, "the result would still be a lot of organisation theory not much education and no "application" in the sense you used the term" (Greenfield' reply, May 24 1983). Greenfield talked with Connelly again after his return from Australia in September and accepted Connelly's second proposal that the paper be sent out for review. Jack Culbertson then reviewed the paper for *Curriculum Inquiry*.

Culbertson considered the May 1983 version of the paper "scholarly and imaginative" (Correspondence, 27 February, 1984) but gave the following reasons for rejection:

The paper tends to draw more heavily upon older than upon the newer literature to make its main points. It is no longer possible to view 'modern organisation theory' or 'modern theorists' in monolithic terms ... Secondly, the paper is overly extended ... there is a certain redundancy which, at times, borders on 'overkill'... Third ... the author could give more illustrations from curriculum contexts to enable

readers (especially those unfamiliar with the arguments in the paper) to see relationships between concepts and practice (Correspondence, 27 February 1984).

Greenfield challenged two points in Culbertson's assessment:

... that the issues I address were valid for an earlier period but not for the contemporary scene; and that the first 34 pages are too long because they beat a dead horse (Correspondence, March 13, 1984).

Greenfield's argument was "that contemporary transformation of the basic theory has never left the environmentalist and deterministic framework of the original theory" (Correspondence, March 13 1984). He continued:

Culbertson has clearly never bothered to establish how much my own work has impacted on the field if he believes that it is evidence of "newer ideas on organisation theory" reshaping and transforming the field. Reference to Social Science Citations will show that the largely American-based journals it scans, contain few references to my work other than the ones I make myself. Further evidence of my absence from the literature is seen in the current textbooks in educational administration. For the most part, these texts omit discussion of my work completely. Only rarely do they cite it in a footnote - usually a single footnote (Correspondence, March 13, 1984) .

On Culbertson's second point Greenfield said he would have to "transform the paper completely and extend its length considerably" to address "the wide-ranging curriculum topics he lists". His concluding remarks to Connolly were:

I think Culbertson has fundamentally misread my paper, but I recognise that you have had two essentially negative assessments of it and I will not press it further as a possibility for publication in *CI*. To me, however, your two reviewers simply demonstrate how

difficult it is for me to get a sympathetic and understanding reading of my basic theses from among the established theorists of the field. It is significant to me that those such as Culbertson, who, in other contexts, have praised my work as critical and transformative, do so by reference to nothing I have written after 1974. Culbertson accuses me of not reading the contemporary field. I wish he and others would do me the honour of reading the work I have produced regularly over the last decade. Perhaps they would understand statements like *Organisations as Subjective Reality* better, if they did (Correspondence March 13, 1984).

Glenn Immegart was editor of the *Educational Administration Quarterly* (EAQ) at the time. Greenfield recalled that the paper was submitted for review in June 1983, and rejected in August by the EAQ Editorial Board, "after deliberation that included assessment by two independent reviewers". One of these was Dan Griffiths whose comments Greenfield found "both helpful and sensible" (Greenfield correspondence). The reasons for the rejection were that "the paper was too long; contained personal references and constitutes debate in large part rather than research or inquiry" (Greenfield correspondence). The Board recommended a rewrite of "about half the present length, that eliminated examples, personal references and the critique of modern organisation theory" (Greenfield correspondence) because that had been covered in earlier editions of the *Quarterly* and "reviewers, deans, and a lot of rank and file in educational administration are tired of such critique" (Greenfield correspondence). Greenfield replied that he did not want to write "an alternative along the lines suggested" and that he saw the paper as:

critical inquiry and as another of the reflective theory-building statements that *EAQ* has, in the past, featured in its 'Perspective' section. [In my opinion] it is a disservice to the dialogue that has gone on in our field over the last ten years to designate it as debate and to reject it as inquiry. Debate it is not, if debate is taken in the usual, pejorative sense of scoring points for the sake of winning. The exploration of the issues [I] raise constitutes an obligation rather than a pleasure or a personal indulgence. What is sometimes taken as 'personal references' in my work are, as I see them, an acknowledgement of how fully self is invested in all theory building. To remove them would be to lessen an essential part of my argument, though I recognise that the theory I criticise denies the validity of this view (Greenfield correspondence).

He continued by expressing his puzzlement that:

conventional theory seems to allow ad hominem remarks both in print and out of it as a legitimate part of the defense of its own edifice. Personal references seem to be within the rules as long as they are made about others rather than applied to one's self (Greenfield correspondence).

The objection of "personal references" rankled Greenfield.

He referred to it in a footnote in the 1986 version of the paper thus:

I am conscious of the intellectually onanistic sin of quoting oneself too much and of repeatedly drawing attention to my previous writings. I do so to draw attention to the fact that the general claims I make here I have been at pains to establish in extended scholarly argument elsewhere. I do so also because these writings are scattered as publications and often better known as *causes celebres* than by first-hand study (p9).

With his reply to Immegart Greenfield included an excerpt from Gronn's monograph (1983:13) that speaks to the inclusion of "personal references" in his work. All to no avail. Greenfield did not follow the advice of the two



would-be publishers and the paper was circulated in manuscript form and re-revised in 1986. The result was an even longer version.

### *Organisation Theory with a Human Face*

The Greenfield papers of the early 1980s were uneven in terms of quality and depth of content. On the one hand there was a movement to longer, more philosophically based, in-depth consideration of the issues concerned with subjectivism, the organisation-with-a-human-face approach to organisational life and reality. On the other, there were papers that were short and some that simply rephrased old viewpoints. The length of the paper and the depth of content were not necessarily related. Some of Greenfield's shorter papers add considerably to the store of knowledge about organisational life (1983a; 1985b) while some of the longer ones (1983b; 1985c) require great constancy of purpose to read through with unflagging concentration. The four papers that complete Greenfield's output until 1985 exhibit all of these characteristics.

*Theories of Educational Organisation: A Critical Perspective* (1985a) was written for the *International Encyclopaedia of Education* and is a short, economical statement of Greenfield's position. Much is repeated from earlier papers, namely 1979b, 1979/80, 1983b; and the customary Greenfield themes are present, that is the two opposing theoretical positions on organisations, the

natural systems model and the nonnatural one; subjectivist as opposed to positivist epistemology; critique of the New Movement and modern organisation theory and Greenfield's alternative theory. Greenfield believed that the value of this paper was to be found in its account of the historical development of the field particularly in its "return to the foundational thinkers" (Greenfield interview, 28.11.90) especially to Herbert Simon and "the tracing through of his influence on the field". Greenfield had for some time been emphasising the central role of values in organisations and was coming to believe that it was Herbert Simon who was responsible for "establishing a science of administration that neutered administrative practice because it cut off valuing and purposing from the study of administration" (Greenfield interview, 28.11.90). He developed his view of Simon's role in his 1986 paper *The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration*. This paper (1985b) marked a beginning of some specific thinking about Simon's role in advocating and establishing logical empiricism as the methodology of the field. He first mentioned Simon favorably in the 1973b paper in the context of organisational goals (1973b:555), decision making (p557) and authority in organisations (p558) and again in the 1975 paper in the context of the conflict view of organisations (1975c:88) which Greenfield believed complemented the insights of Weber. He noted later (1983b:27) that Simon provided the "intellectual basis for separating fact and

value" in the study of organisations and administration. This concept Greenfield returned to as his writings focused more and more on values.

*Organisation Theory with a Human Face: The Search for Lost Values and the Disappeared Individual* was presented to a symposium at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Society for the Study of Education (CSSE), in Montreal, May 28 1985. The original title was *Putting Meaning back into Theory: The Search for Lost Values and the Disappeared Individual*. The theme of the symposium was "The Re-emergence of Values and the Transformation of Organisation and Administrative Theory". The paper was revised in December 1985 and presented in revised form at the AERA conference 1986. It was revised again in August 1986 and again in September 1988 and was never published. For some reason, Greenfield did not include this paper in his official list of publications and papers.

This paper was the precursor to the *Decline and Fall* paper and Greenfield was never really satisfied with it. The role of values in the organisation was the focus of the paper, values versus the scientific view of administration advocated by Herbert Simon. Greenfield analysed Simon's influence on the field and completely discounted Simon's "great, if mistaken, achievement of recasting administration in the image of science and removing it from the sphere of art and morality"

Greenfield, 1985d:10). Simon was the one "who took the field down the path of scientific administration that bled administration of will and choice" (Greenfield interview, 28.11.90). He explored Simon's thinking extensively and throughout the paper juxtaposed Simon's view with Hodgkinson's. In the area of values Hodgkinson was Greenfield's mentor. It was Hodgkinson (1978a) who pointed out that "the astonishing failure of modern administrative science is that it hardly deals with administration at all. It deals instead with organisations", (in Greenfield, 1985d:11). It was Hodgkinson who wrote (1978b:105) that "facts may be true or false but values are facts of another kind. They can never be true or false, only good or bad" (in Greenfield, 1985d:15). And it was Hodgkinson who, in Greenfield's judgment made the most powerful and persuasive case for values among modern theorists" (p18).

The headings used by Greenfield to outline his case indicated the pattern of his thinking. The sequence is thus: - the promise of modern administrative science (1985d:3-6); the failure of modern administrative science (pp6-9; the separation of facts and values (pp10-12); and the administrator as active moral agent (pp12-15). The risk for Greenfield was that the administrator:

becomes one of the many disappeared individuals who have been crushed and absolved of responsibility for their actions by the greater reality, the organisation (p2).

The final heading was, the future: towards science or morality in administration. Greenfield concluded with two observations on the study of educational administration and its future. The first was an answer to his critics, namely Willower and Griffiths with some mention of Hoy and Silver. The second point was a reflection on his own position of critic within the academic community. He complained that:

- \* [I have] become infamous in the field of educational administration;
- \* for the most part, [my] writings are simply not read by people in the field; ... [my] writings are, for the most part, not cited in the standard literature and, oftentimes, when they are noted, they are discussed under code words like 'phenomenology';
- \* when the defenders of modern-day science in educational administration address the issues [I] have raised, they barely mention [my] name in their main texts, and instead relegate it to the safety and obscurity of a footnote;
- \* [my] opponents cite [my] work incompletely, or cite it in manuscript versions when published versions of the text exist;
- \* [I] have found it difficult to advance a discussion of the issues beyond those [I] raised a decade or more ago (p23).

He wondered why and decided that:

[I] am regarded as someone who has been disloyal to the organisation: [I] have questioned its basic tenets and the appropriateness of the means it has chosen to achieve its ends. [I] have behaved exactly as Simon said an administrator should not. I have looked at the values inherent in the field and questioned their validity. Worse, it appears, I have been disrespectful to the persons who have advanced those ideas (p24).

His justification for continuing these themes was that:

there are great ideas in the field ... but we can know nothing that we do not put to the test of opposition ... we must subject what we think of as truth to ... the illumination that comes from juxtaposing conflicting truths. ... It is time our field looked for new values to guide inquiry into questions that are of fundamental theoretical importance and immense practical significance (p24).

Hodgkinson and Holmes also presented papers at this symposium in 1985 and Fazal Rizvi then of Deakin University in Geelong, Victoria, responded. Rizvi's comments on Greenfield's presentation focused on his clear account of Simon's positivism overtaking Barnard's concern for morality in administrative issues, resulting in the field "becoming defined in the narrow terms of bounded rationality" (Rizvi, 1985:1 unpublished version). He agreed with Greenfield's contention that administrative ideas based on Simon's epistemology represented the interests of the status quo (p2) but thought that Greenfield "pictures individuals abstractly" (p4) and that "in view of his subjectivism Greenfield also needs to tell us what the ideas of moral authority and moral criticism might consist in" (p5). Hodgkinson provided a value paradigm with which to wrestle with moral problems and conflicts which administrators inevitably confronted in their daily work (p5). Greenfield considered that this was "a good and accurate comment" (Greenfield interview, 28.11.90).

### THE 1986 REVISED VERSION

The 1986 revision of *Putting Meaning back into Theory* became *Organisation Theory with a Human Face*. It contained all of the original paper plus extensions and clarifications and some long addenda. It seemed that Greenfield wanted nothing that needed to be said against the case for a science of administration to be left unsaid. He noted in a long postscript that was added on, that he found "addition easier than deletion" (Revised edition, 1986:35). And he reflected further on the discussion about the reception of his critique of theory in educational administration. He decided to let it stand for two reasons:

First the controversy over my critique serves as a concrete illustration of the theoretical points I have attempted to make about the nature of organisations and about the centrality of values in the administration of them. Secondly, I venture to record my views of it (p36).

Greenfield added:

If there is error in my work, it lies in an implication some are too quick to draw from it: that since social reality lives through individual action and experience, the individual is free to invent social reality at will. Such an implication is not one I would wish to make. Even my good friend, Christopher Hodgkinson, has said to me, "You ignore the reality of culture"... There is a special reality to the organisation. I do not doubt this. If I have not sufficiently acknowledged the implications of this special reality, I do so now.

The point I have made again and again is that the reality of social organisation is not in things and not in nature, although things, nature, and certainly other people may be part of that larger reality. That reality

is a social construction, not simply an individual achievement. It is a value-saturated reality around us. It is culture. Such culture - cast in symbols and language though it be - powerfully affects the individual, although ultimately it cannot and does not exist except through acting, thinking, feeling individuals. We are not alone. We must act together, speak to each other, command or obey another, and have ideals we strive to achieve with others and through others. We love some persons and some things better than others, and we try to foster and preserve them. The basic questions then are moral and ethical (p36).

### *Trial by what is Contrary*

Moral and ethical issues were also the focus of Greenfield's two pieces of editorial comment for the Canadian journal *Curriculum Inquiry* entitled, *Trial by what is Contrary* (1985b;1985c). Greenfield had alluded to "the test of opposition" (1985d:24) in his 1985 presentation in Montreal. He was associate editor of *Curriculum Inquiry* 1984-1989. This was his second experience in the role of editor. He had edited the *Canadian Society for the Study of Education (CSSE) News* from 1974-1979 and found it "a lot of fun and a lot of work" (1979d:8) and equally enjoyed his editorial role on this journal. His first published editorial picked up three interconnected themes, the reality of being an editor; the peculiar power of the journals over would-be contributors; and the nature of truth.

For Greenfield, the editor:

... is like the coxswain in an 8-oared racing shell. He or she does nothing to propel the boat, but does everything to determine whether the craft founders or speeds to its target and, indeed, everything to determine the target and how it is to be achieved (1985b:1).



The task "is nothing less than deciding what ideas should appear in print" (p1). This theme was significant for Greenfield who, in the last three years had had two significant papers rejected for publication, one by the journal for which he was now associate editor. His first editorial articulated his own freshly reflected-upon experience placed up against his firm belief that "we can know best by juxtaposing contrary ideas" (1985c:113). Editors, he believed:

must discipline themselves so as to countenance different visions of the truth and to enter dialogue with those who espouse conflicting, even antagonistic ideas and systems of thought. To do so requires that editors and authors choose pain over comfort and that they be prepared to put at risk the very ideas that they regard not only as true, but as morally right (1985b:1).

The editorial contained some autobiographical details (pp3-4) on Greenfield, editor and author. One of the lessons he drew from the experience was that:

... one of the greatest contributions an editor can make to the search for reliable knowledge is to refuse to participate in the search for heretics, to pursue steadfastly the examination of ideas, and to place conflicting claims for truth in forums where those claims can be subjected to the most stringent tests (p3).

Another lesson had been "how commonly reviewers of manuscripts identify contrary opinion with error" (p3). So, what is truth? Greenfield had no specific answer here. Truth is one of "the existential realities that make the worlds we live in" (p2); something to do with "choice" (the

meaning of the Greek root in our word "heretic"). Truth is "chiefly fashioned from words and metaphor, from pure invention and linguistic charade backed by institutionalised power" (p3). Or is truth "an opinion with its own journal"? (p3)

And what of the role of the journals? Do they seek to promulgate the truth? Reflecting on this question Greenfield addressed the "larger and more common danger of self-censorship that arises when bodies of professional opinion become enshrined as truth" and when professional journals:

transform themselves from forums that seek the truth, into mechanisms for suppressing it ... Instead of engaging in the search for truth, they become instruments for promulgating the particular truths the editors know to be true or that they recognise as congenial to dominating professional opinion in the field (p1).

The journals, in fact, "excommunicate those who do not agree ... that is they refuse to publish their work" (p3). They proclaim their own brand of truth and stifle opposition. Greenfield stated a contrary view. The role of the journals is "to pursue steadfastly the examination of ideas and to place competing claims for truth in forums where those claims can be subjected to the most stringent tests" (p2). Then the ideal "that is every editor's goal" (p5) may be in sight and that is to engage the "readers' thought and even passion about issues they recognise as important, compelling and clearly stated" even though they

may not accept the positions taken by authors. Thence "can we strengthen our own ideas and know better what the truth of the matter might be" (p6) and thence might we have "the uncertain emergence of new truths by trial of accepted wisdom".

### *A Veiled Apologia*

Greenfield expanded his editorial musings on truth in the second *Trial by what is Contrary* (1985c) and in simple language, using the articles in that particular edition of the journal, described his own epistemology. The reflection considered the way "active knowledge arises from the opposing wills of other people and from ideas contrary to our own" (Greenfield, 1985c:113) and how "the contest between titan ideas is never marred by mere personal antagonism nor *ad hominem* remarks" (p114). The question he asked was "what should we do with what we know and immediately value and knowledge issues were raised. Quoting from a long line of philosophers and social scientists beginning with Kant and Schopenhauer (p114) Greenfield noted that "while the individual may not make the object of reality, he or she does create the object of knowledge" and "the impact of the knower can never be "cleansed" from that which is known" (p114). If anything is known, according to Greenfield:

we come to know it through ourselves and by our own creativity. But one person's truth is another person's dangerous error. All the more reason for competing truths to speak to each other. Indeed, proponents are

therefore under a heavy obligation so to speak with each other. Truth is not truth until it becomes apparent not only to those who perceive it, but also to those who deny it (p115).

Greenfield continued to uphold his belief that "we are better off as knowers because of ... oppositions" (p115) and he noted the impact of such thinking "in the practical world" especially if we believed that:

research in education gives some insight into truth and that truth provides some basis for deciding what we should do ... and if we believe that what we know shapes who we are and what we do (p115).

And:

knowledge, whatever it is, is not a tool ... but a condition within people. It does not give us certainty ... but becomes an exploration of different visions of personal truth; it becomes a search for openness... many approaches to truth are better than one, for each adds something that the other cannot. Thus what ends the dreams is pluralism, if not eclecticism (p116).

Later, drawing on his own reflection-on-experience again he outlined his own theory as ideology:

... we all have an obligation to speak about the truths we see and to explain how we arrived at them. More importantly, however, we have also the obligation to recognise and answer the challenges that may be advanced against them. It is not enough to advance our own truth claims and immediately depart the forum of contest thereafter. After advancing our truth claims, we need then to put them to the test. A powerful, possibly dangerous, and even fatal test is trial by what is contrary. I have recently come to understand vividly that these values upholding the testing are not held universally in the academic community. When one claim to truth stands in opposition to another, the fact of opposition is often simply ignored by one side - usually, of course, by the most powerful and previously successful side. I have seen instances recently where the proponents of a truth claim acted as if a challenge to it had never occurred. Would the

honoured professors reply to the challenge made to their work? No (p118).

This challenge from "opposing wills that make different choices and create different knowledge" (p119) was for Greenfield, the only check upon error and a vivid reminder "of what we know, of how we know it, and of the consequences of acting in accord with it" and so "we may sense the limits of our knowledge and become more cautious in stating our claims to truth and in declaring our certitude about them" (p119).

The study turns now to a consideration of the relevant Griffiths and Willower papers that were published from 1981-1985.

#### *GRIFFITHS: 1981-1985*

The Griffiths-Greenfield debate, if ever there was one, had lost much of its fire by the early 1980s. Griffiths, quoting Herda, has said that "the debates were no big deal because Griffiths was no positivist and Greenfield was no phenomenologist. She was right about our theoretical orientations but the debates were significant enough to get her a PhD" (Griffiths, 1994:2). In a note to his 1983 paper Griffiths acknowledged the contribution Greenfield had made "in bringing educational administration into the modern era of intellectual thought" and commented further:

The Griffiths-Greenfield debate is usually misunderstood: it is not a debate on the merits of

positivism vs. phenomenology, but rather a critique of organisational theory from two viewpoints (Griffiths, 1985:91).

Later on he preferred to refer to the "intellectual dialogue" he had with Greenfield which took the form of "joint platform appearances, papers in journals and finally an hour-long video tape which was called a discussion" (Griffiths interview, 13.11.90). Kendell and Byrne (1977:7) called it "the Greenfield-Griffiths discussion" and quoted Thomas Kuhn (1974:109) to describe how Greenfield and Griffiths were "talking through each other". Allison believed that:

it was more a case of expanding upon arguments or defending positions. It certainly was not a kind of Hegelian dialectic with a hope of synthesis coming from it at all (Allison interview, 13.12.90).

Whatever the interaction is called the discussion lost momentum in the early 1980s. Griffiths continued to refer to Greenfield in most of his papers at this time and was constantly rethinking his own position, undergoing his own, personal paradigm shift. In 1994 Griffiths said that "In the twenty years since IIP74, my theoretical position has changed greatly, due in part to the jolt I received that hot afternoon in Bristol" (Griffiths, 1994:1). In the early 1980s Dan Griffiths was approaching retirement after what Greenfield called "a lifetime of quite extraordinary service to the field" (Greenfield interview, 28.11.90). In August 1982 he presented a paper at the Fifth IIP

conference in Lagos Nigeria, entitled *Theories in Educational Administration: Past, Present and Future*. The theme of the conference was "Educational Administration and Planning at the Crossroads". The paper traced the development of scientific theory noting the pendulum swings between the extremes of logical positivism (the past) to "the scientific knowledge as a social phenomenon approach" of scholars like Kuhn, Feyerabend and Hanson in which, according to Suppe (in Griffiths, 1986:257) "science became a subjective and to varying degrees, an irrational enterprise", the period in which "we are acknowledging the weakness of positivism but have not yet entered the period of post-positivism" (p258). Griffiths called this period, again following Suppe, "chaotic" (p262) caused, he asserted by "the inadequacies of present theories to account for what is observed in organisations". Of the efforts to order this chaotic situation, Griffiths preferred Burrell and Morgan's analysis with its four paradigms, interpretive, functionalist, radical structuralist, radical humanist (Griffiths, 1986:264-268). He declared that "virtually all the theory we teach and use in educational administration is in the cell called Functionalist Organisation Theory" (p265). He observed that Burrell and Morgan noted that "no one appeared to be studying organisations in the radical humanist mode, but if anyone does, the result will be "anti-organisation theory" (Griffiths, 1986:266). In the only mention of Greenfield

in this paper, Griffiths placed him within the "radical structuralist" paradigm once more (see Griffiths, 1979:14) coupling Greenfield with ethno-Marxist approaches to theory on the grounds that:

The central idea of social construction/production is that people are continually constructing the social world, which is Greenfield's major thesis (p267).

Regarding the future Griffiths projected "some directions that are now in evidence" (p269) and talked about the era of "paradigm diversity" in which:

the criticism of the work of the functional structuralists will mount and there will be heated refutations. Research and theorising in the functionalist mode will continue, but it will soon become clear that this work is changing ... theories will be closely related to the sociocultural context ... new questions will be researched ... non-functional research will increase ... non-functional literature ... will either have to give way to significant research and theory-building, or cease to exist (p269).

Secondly, "the semantic conception of theories" (p270) would change dramatically so paradigm diversity and an increase in semantic analysis give hope to the field.

In 1983 *Evolution in research and theory: A study of prominent researchers* was published. Griffiths wondered if it was possible to discern "an evolutionary trend" (Griffiths, 1983:202) in research studies and in administrative theory. To answer the question he selected "four sets of prominent researchers" from the late 1950s and early 1960s and four sets from the late 1970s and early



1980s. The selection was arbitrary but Griffiths believed that they represented the "best work being done in both periods" (p216). The studies chosen in both time frames were done in the positivist mode.

Griffiths mentioned Greenfield in conjunction with Bates noting that "the current situation in the British Commonwealth was somewhat different" (p208) from that in USA. The majority of Commonwealth studies reported in Bates's 1982 article were "violently opposed to traditional theory and supportive of alternative approaches" (p208). Griffiths concluded:

At one end of the present continuum is the belief that the effort to study administration and organisational life through the behavioral sciences is nonsense, and at the other end is found the supporters of traditional theory. The struggle, at times, assumes highly emotional levels. As one reads and listens to Bates and Greenfield, one gains the impression that they consider advocates of traditional theory to be idiots at best and pathological at worst. These expressions are often reciprocated (p208).

Griffiths noted that the research methodology of the two periods was similar and that the researchers were all working within structuralist functionalist theory so there was little difference between "the two sets in the nature of the theory they espouse" (p217). Bates and Greenfield were mentioned again in their contention that "there cannot be theories of educational administration in any scientific sense" (p218). It seemed to Griffiths that:

scientists now are much more concerned with the

successful pursuit of knowledge than with the form of research ... and that the term 'theory' appears to have little or no meaning at the present time (p219).

Cecil Miskel (1984) and Yvonne Martin (1984) wrote responses to the Griffiths article. Miskel wanted to correct "three specific criticisms" (Miskel, 1984:111) of his own work and concluded with the hope that, "in the current ... nonproductive climate of carping about the "correct paradigm and method" Griffiths's closing comments might be "well taken and provide a renewed optimism for researchers in educational administration" where scholars may engage "in the successful pursuit of knowledge using the paradigm with which they feel most comfortable" (p113).

Martin commented on Griffiths's "lament on theoretical pluralism - a retrogressive quality of the current status quo, as he sees it" and his observation "that the prevailing methods of researchers have lagged behind their intent in both periods of time" (Martin, 1984:15). She concluded with her own lament on "the disquieting effects of the current theoretical turbulence for researchers and teachers of educational administration caught in the crossfire". She noted that there is currently wide acceptance that the "traditional paradigm is badly flawed" that the field is in "a transition period" or perhaps as Deblois (1979) argued, that there is now a "dual paradigm" (p16) and that the field has so far, had

"scientific pretensions". In conclusion she highlighted:

an elusive quality about Griffiths' position on theory development ... although intellectually, he appears to have accepted (his own admission), the limitations of the traditional approach to the study of educational administration, he seems emotionally pilloried to it when he laments theoretical pluralism (p18).

She is confused by this seeming ambivalence. "Is he still searching for a crystallised form; the one best way? Or was his lament a rhetorical one?" (p19).

In 1983 Griffiths retired as Dean of the School of Education, Health, Nursing and Arts Professions at New York University and was honoured in April of that year at the UCEA Career Development Seminar at Rutgers University. At that conference he presented a paper entitled *Can there be a science of organisations?* where he said he joined Willower, Bates, Greenfield and Hoy who had also addressed the question (Griffiths, 1985:84). The question was raised in terms of possibility, "Can there be, not should there be". His summing up of the situation was:

Greenfield contending that because of the [ethno-Marxist] assumptions he holds there can be no theory; Bates apparently believing that theory can be developed, but not with a base in behavioral science; Hoy holding as closely as possible to logical positivism in his theoretical outlook; and Willower staunchly advocating theory based on social science and science (p85).

Bates and Greenfield were considered together again:

Bates paraphrases Greenfield as saying, 'A theory of educational administration that divorces fact from

value, theory from practice, rationality from common sense, and education from administration is unlikely to be capable of guiding the administrator's hand'. I certainly agree with the statement. But who ever put forth such an asinine position? Certainly no one I know supports such a theoretical posture (p85).

Greenfield answered this question (Greenfield, 1985d:20) with "Herbert Simon ... and his latter day scientific disciples in educational administration". Griffiths agreed and added "and so does everyone else" (Griffiths, 1985:86). Griffiths then grappled with the meaning of Greenfield's statement that "when his assumptions are applied, there cannot be a theory of organisation" (p87). He decided that one interpretation might "because Greenfield does not speak clearly on this issue" stem from the work of Wittgenstein, who seems to say that a science-type theory of organisations is impossible (p87). Griffiths finally declared Greenfield's observation "a useful one, because in examining it we must become more precise in our thinking" (p88) but he did not agree with this interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument. So, is it possible to develop a scientific theory in the sense of theory in mathematics and physics? Griffiths asserted that the answer is "clearly and unambiguously, no." (p90). This did not mean however, that there could not be scientific theory in educational administration. "Theories can be constructed with limited generalisability ... to specific types of organisations which exist in carefully defined contexts" (p90). Hodgkinson (1981:143) had asked the same question and came

to the same answer. He was surprised that "such questions are still seriously put". Hodgkinson's final comment was Griffiths' admirable reflections and his painstaking self-analysis (1979) again leave the door open for the intrusion of philosophy and will" (p143).

Willower, Culbertson, and Iannacone also gave presentations at this conference at Rutgers. Greenfield was present too and noted that Griffiths was changing some of his positions and was giving "substantial recognition to work done in Commonwealth countries". Greenfield believed that Griffiths was saying that:

we are seeing in effect, a transformation of the field and a transformation being carried out no longer in the national setting in which it was originally generated, but by traditions in different countries who have freed themselves, in one way or another, from the ideological theory that was the impetus and beginning point of the whole movement itself (Videotaped interview with R.J.S. McPherson July 5, 1983).

Later in 1983 Griffiths was Visiting Scholar at Monash University Melbourne, Australia. Greenfield preceded him in July 1983. In 1985 Deakin University published a collection of Griffiths's papers entitled *Administrative Thought in Transition* introduced by Griffiths and containing seven of his significant papers dating from 1969 to 1983.

#### **WILLOWER: 1981-1985**

Greenfield and Willower never engaged in dialogue as Griffiths and Greenfield did. There was never anything

like a Greenfield-Willower debate because their exchanges were really a progression of criticism-response-defence-criticism. Willower was not present at IIP74 and made his first reference to Greenfield in his 1977 paper delivered at the University of Rochester UCEA seminar (Willower, 1979). The Greenfield-Griffiths dialogue was intellectually based. These two scholars differed on substantive issues in theory and research methodology and articulated these differences in print and presentation over a number of years. While there was difference there was a mutual respect for the other's stance and scholarship. Towards Willower Greenfield felt and expressed a personal antagonism. The ill feeling, on Greenfield's part, can be traced to somewhere around the early 1980s. The late 1970s were difficult, emotionally draining years for Greenfield. Some of his friends and colleagues recalled a deep sense of isolation about him, both personally and professionally, almost complete nervous exhaustion. He recounted (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90) his own feelings of troubled anguish as he faced life-changing decisions in his personal life and remembered his own self-absorption. In the face of rejection and hostility from some colleagues he "cocooned" himself like Jonah "with yards of blubber" protecting him from the outside (Greenfield interview, 17.10.90).

Willower remembered (Willower interview, 3.12.90) being selected by the Ontario Council for Graduate Studies

in 1981/82 to conduct an evaluation of OISE. At that time he did a lot of these things *pro bono*. They didn't pay much. The time was set for the review. He talked with Michael Fullan and thought no more about it. Greenfield, he recalled "was very upset about the evaluation". This became evident when some time later, Willower received a number of calls from colleagues in Canada asking what was going on. They had had angry letters from Greenfield asking them to intervene in the evaluation process and declaring that Willower was to conduct the evaluation and that that must be stopped. One of Greenfield's colleagues at the time recalled that "Greenfield's campaign was quite maniacal. He was totally absorbed in himself. There was no thought for his colleagues" (House interview, 7.6.94). Willower was "aware of Greenfield's big ego" and "wondered what is wrong with this guy?" (Willower interview, 3.12.90)

Professor Ed Hickcox was Chair at OISE, 1977-1986. He remembered this as "a very ugly incident":

It was a cyclical review and one of the things I had to do was to get external examiners to come and talk to the department and write a report. I wanted to have Willower and suggested his name. When Greenfield heard about that, he almost got me deposed from the chairmanship, because he thought that Willower was against him, not because of his ideas, but because he was gay. He kept referring to some incident in Australia where Willower had made some comment. Finally, we had him here and I even engineered a meeting between Willower and Greenfield and Willower invited him to come down to Penn State and teach summer school. Nobody understood why Greenfield had withdrawn. (Hickcox interview, 1.11.90).

The incident in Australia occurred in 1981 when Willower was addressing a gathering of lecturers in educational administration at Monash University, Melbourne. One of those present recalled that:

The keynote address was given by Don Willower. About every two/three minutes, he departed from his set paper to give some little flourish. Every flourish was to take Thom Greenfield off at the knees (Interview, 3.5.91).

Stories abound as to audience reaction and response and some interpretations of the occurrence have found a place in educational administration folklore. Greenfield was in Australia a couple of months later and heard the story. His antagonism towards Willower was refuelled. He often recounted the story. He was of the view that Willower spoke "ex cathedra about philosophical issues" (Greenfield interview, 10.12.90); that Willower was:

dismissive of other world views ... he was not part of the response [to the IIP paper], until considerably later. He didn't go to IIPs. He wasn't involved in the initial controversy. He came to it later, so he says, 'The field awaits my judgment. I am the theoretician and researcher. So, all of that that went on without me, is worthless' (Greenfield interview, 10.12.90).

Willower and Greenfield just did not communicate at all. If Griffiths and Greenfield "talked through each other, Willower and Greenfield talked past each other. They merely fired salvos at each other which, most of the time, missed the mark. During these years of the early 1980s Greenfield ceased to respond to criticism. Henceforth "he



wrote primarily for those who were willing to listen for posterity and for himself" (Allison, 1994:8).

The presentation given in Australia in August 1981, was entitled *Educational Administration: Some philosophical and other considerations* (Willower, 1981). In a section entitled *Ruminations on educational administration* Willower did as he has done previously (1979b:28-29) and criticised Greenfield's work under the generic "phenomenology" stating that he had "many reservations" (Willower, 1981:116). These reservations stated that Greenfield:

- \* fails to pursue questions of philosophy;
- \* does not discuss his epistemological position;
- \* is more interested in the literary side of things, pathos and poignancy, than in philosophical investigation;
- \* has no answers to questions like "What is knowledge" and "How do you know"?
- \* sees inquiry as a restricting monolith;
- \* is silent on substantive ethical matters;
- \* does not present a conception of the good school;
- \* cannot be labelled a philosophical phenomenologist;
- \* errs in equating Marxism with the writings of Marx while neglecting the political context that has made Marxism into a kind of religious faith (pp116-119).

The latest Greenfield paper referred to in this article was *The Man who comes back* (1980).

In May 1982, Willower addressed the UCEA conference on Educational Leadership at the University of Texas to honour Jack Culbertson. His paper was called *Some 'Yes, But's' and Educational Administration*. Willower made passing reference to Greenfield in a section called *A Simplistic Dichotomy*. Having expressed a danger that

"philosophic arguments advanced in educational administration will not be sufficiently informed philosophically" Willower proceeded to give an example of:

... the simplistic positivism-phenomenology dichotomy. Greenfield, for instance, lumps views he opposes under the positivistic label whether they belong there or not and his position has been labeled phenomenological, even though it has only the faintest relationship to philosophical phenomenology (Willower, 1982:2).

This for Willower was "nonsense" (p2). Again the Greenfield reference was the 1980 paper "and his other work cited therein" (17). Greenfield was mentioned again in a section entitled *Facts as Straw Men* (p3). Here the issue was "as Greenfield formulates it, whether facts are independent of theories" (p3). This was something that irked Greenfield:

... the citation of the text almost never occurs. In fact, I would guess that it never occurs. He never says, 'As Greenfield says ... He's too busy telling people what I say eg 'Greenfield believes there are only two views ... as Greenfield formulates it ... (Greenfield interview, 10.12.90).

Willower declared that such a view "is a naive one not held by many modern philosophers" (p3) so to attack such a view that there is a world that is independent of our theories about it, is to attack a "straw man". In one other section *Phenomenological Possibilities*, Greenfield was mentioned in association with "phenomenologically-oriented scholars" (p4). Willower had made this generic association in previous articles (1979a, 1979b). He believed that such

scholars could make a "substantive contribution" to educational administration "if they took phenomenology seriously" (p4). Willower advocated a "variety of concepts and theories" because he believed that "a conceptual array is a first step towards wisdom in administration" (p15).

In *Evolution in the Professorship: Past, Philosophy Future* (1983) Willower saw Greenfield as:

... illustrative of the new wave of despairers. Their complaint is that theory and research are essentially ideological and irrelevant. Their talisman is less science and more human sensitivity (Willower, 1983:184).

This in contrast to Halpin and Hayes who he saw as "the old wave of despairers" whose complaint is that theory and research have not resulted in substantive and verified knowledge. Their talisman is better science" (p184). Willower believed that "most of the larger issues currently being disputed in educational administration are in the end, philosophical" (p187) and that:

In discourses on these issues, it is essential to avoid the naive misconception that modern philosophical positions boil down to positivism versus phenomenology (p187).

He then outlined his own position which was "a blend of naturalism, instrumentalism, empiricism and pragmatism" (p187).

Willower's next paper to mention Greenfield was the paper presented to the UCEA conference on Thought and Research in Educational Administration at Rutgers

University, April 1983, to honour Griffiths. The paper was entitled *Mystifications and Mysteries in Thought and Research in Educational Administration*. The "mystifications" are "confusions" in discussions about "paradigms, epistemology and related topics" (Willower, 1983:1) and the "mysteries" are "several areas of potential theorising and research" (p1). Greenfield was mentioned only in two footnotes, in reference to "qualitative methods along with a derogation of quantitative ones, at least in some quarters" (p2) and in reference to "blends of phenomenological and existentialist thought and even Marxian critical theory [that] have found some proponents in educational administration" (p2). By implicit identification Greenfield was one of those who "are not serious students of phenomenology but who use it to attack what they label "positivism" (p4). Again the criticisms of Greenfield's work are implicit rather than explicit and generic rather than specific.

Nothing new is added in Willower's *Towards Philosophic Choice* (1985). The criticisms of Greenfield were those which readers had seen in previous papers. Greenfield was mentioned by name as having "articulated a subjectivist position" and being "labeled a phenomenologist (Willower, 1985:124). Willower continued:

I believe I was the first to point out that, while his views could be called phenomenologically- oriented, they bear little or no relationship to the philosophical phenomenology that derives from Husserl (p124).

Greenfield's comment on Willower's criticism was:

I don't think he sees the issues in live, vivid, critical depth. I just find there's nothing there at all. He certainly does not look at the complexities of the issues (Greenfield interview, 10.12.90).

Willower's last paper of this period, 1981-1985 which commented on Greenfield's work was *Philosophy and the Study of Educational Administration* (1985b). Mention of Greenfield was brief and made the point again that while Greenfield's work might be regarded as "phenomenologically oriented" it is "definitely not philosophical phenomenology (Willower, 1985b:21). Willower added that "in any case he [Greenfield] seems to have dropped the term" (p21). It was ten years after the publication of the IIP74 paper in which Greenfield had written "what we call the view is not important" (1975c:74) when Willower wrote that. Greenfield had not used the word "phenomenology" to refer to his work since then. He had also made it clear in his 1977/78 paper that "the paper was not about phenomenology as American critics have tended to insist it is" (p89). Yet Willower insisted on making Greenfield's so-called phenomenology the nub of his criticism of Greenfield's work. In this 1985b paper Willower referred to Greenfield as "the leading spokesman for subjectivism from the beginning" (p17) and focused on what he called Greenfield's "dichotomised view of the world of ideas" (p17) which suggested a kind "of tunnel vision" which "could inhibit advancement in educational administration if it were a dominant way of

thinking" (p21).

There was no meeting of minds between these two scholars and little scholarly exchange of views. They did in fact, talk past one another and neither made any effort to improve the dialogue. Their lives differed. Their views of the world differed. Their theory differed.

**GREENFIELD: 1986-1990**

Griffiths retired in 1983 from the Deanship at New York University to become Special Assistant to the Chancellor 1983-1986. 1985-86 he was Chairman of the National Commission on Excellence in Educational Administration (see Lasch's comments in Greenfield, 1989:7-8). UCEA sponsored and supported the Commission which was a response to wide-spread community cries for education reform in USA. Ultimately the reform agenda focussed on change in the way schools were organised. The twenty seven member Commission examined the quality of educational leadership in America and "to broaden its scope, scholarly and creative papers were commissioned from a worldwide group of provocative thinkers" (Griffiths et al. 1988:xiv) Greenfield was one. The idea was "to present commissioners with new ideas and alternatives to current American practice" (pxiv). Greenfield's paper entitled *The Decline and Fall of Science in Educational Administration* was first published in *Interchange* 1986. The Commission's report and a collection of papers were published in 1988 under the

title *Leaders for America's Schools*. In a long and scholarly article Greenfield expounded on the nature of administrative science and traced its history over a forty year period - the "rise" largely through the work of Herbert Simon "whose thinking transformed the field" (Greenfield, 1986a:57) the promise and popularity of the New Movement and the failure, fall and decline in the present. In two previous papers (1985a, 1985b) Greenfield had begun to analyse Simon's influence on administration and in this paper, he extended his analysis and critique (pp57-63) showing the difference and complementarity of Simon and Barnard. Simon "offered a method of value-free inquiry into decision making and administrative rationality (p58). Barnard was:

essentially a moralist ... for him the heart of administration lay in the leader's creation of cooperative effort and commitment to institutional purpose among members of an organisation (p58).

Building the moral order was, for Barnard the task of the leader. Simon's work established "the methods of positivistic science as the only ones by which scholars might gain reliable knowledge of administrative realities" (p58) and thereby overthrew:

the past wisdom of the field - a wisdom that derived from the experience, observation, and reflection of writers who were administrators, not scientists (p58).

For Greenfield the crux of the matter was a value-free science which:

can deal only with facts and which does so by eliminating from its consideration all human passion, weakness, strength, conviction, hope, will, pity, frailty, altruism, courage, vice and virtue (p61).

Simon's "administrative man":

... had to disappear as a value-bearer and willful and unpredictable choice-maker ... and emerged in a devalued, dehumanised and technologised form (p62)

For Greenfield there was no such entity as "a neutered science" (p62) which denied:

both responsibility and personal choice in the making of everyday decisions and in the making of decisions in the powerful world of organised reality (p63).

In this context of choice and responsibility Greenfield gave the example of Boethius, "scholar turned administrator" (p63) nearly fifteen centuries ago caught in the moral dilemma of choice between personal values and organisational politics. Boethius's life, Greenfield stated (p64) encouraged administrators "to reflect upon [our] values" so that (quoting Hodgkinson, 1978b:172) the "act of choice [is] individual; and if free and conscious, then moral". A discussion of moral choice in organisations led Greenfield (p74) to a consideration of power and powerful people, a discussion he had begun in previous papers (1983a, 1984, 1985d). Greenfield outlined his alternative (pp71-73) and moved on to his agenda for the future that involved a new conception of science. He asked:

Would the world be the worse without an administrative science? Probably not. But the issue is not simply science versus something else - versus the humanities,



philosophy, or doing nothing at all. The issue is rather 'What kind of science?' (p75)

Greenfield's "kind of science" was one "that can accommodate the view that values pervade the entire realm of administration and indeed, constitute the proper focus of study". It was "a science with values and of values". Finally, Greenfield suggested a seven point, possible research agenda of the new science.

The paper brought together and restated some of Greenfield's oft repeated convictions about administrative science. "I have been over that ground many times, too many times before" (p60) he wrote. He used extracts from earlier papers (1973b, 1975c, 1979/80, 1981b, 1983b; 1985b 1985d) and there was much new thinking as well. He was still developing his thinking about values and was writing more about the nature and role of power in organisations. Here too, he made explicit a research agenda, something his critics had long awaited. So this paper acted as a watershed for his papers of the 1980s. It gathered up much of what had gone before and set the direction for future thinking.

Professor Mark Holmes, a colleague of Greenfield's at OISE responded to this paper (Holmes, 1986:80-90) agreeing with Greenfield that a science of educational administration could not be developed "outside a framework of values" (p80); that "attempts to produce valid

generalisations applicable to educational administration have failed" (pp81-82); and that, if the former two points were valid, it was impossible to train administrators. He disagreed with Greenfield about the nature of knowledge, of truth (pp84-86) and about the nature of educational administration (pp86-90). Dr. James Ryan also from OISE, wrote in interchange with Holmes (Ryan, 1988b:68-70) declaring that Holmes's position "is remarkably similar to that of Herbert Simon's" (p68) and noting that Greenfield's exclusive focus on the individual precluded "analyses of collective enterprises" (p69). He had difficulty too with Greenfield's refusal to endorse any program of values and his assertion of "perpetual detachment" (p70). Holmes replied to Ryan (Holmes, 1988:71-75) and addressed Ryan's charge that he was in fact "a closet positivist" (p71). John Clarke from Massey University New Zealand, responded to Holmes (Clarke, 1989:68-73) in an attempt to iron out some "philosophical muddles" (p68) that had occurred, in particular the distinction between absolutism and relativism, the nature of science and the fact-value relationship. Holmes had the final word (Holmes, 1989:74-79). He took Clarke's arguments and made specific application to educational administration emphasising his belief in the existence and role of absolute values in educational administration.

Some of Greenfield's thinking based on themes already present in the 1986 paper, was outlined in five

editorials Greenfield wrote for *Curriculum Inquiry* between 1986 and 1990. The first of these short, highly focussed pieces was *Waiting for an Answer* (1986b). The question was "What is truth?" and the issue was related to Greenfield's new science and the struggle between a scientific view of truth and a values view of truth. The two views clashed in education which "is nothing if not a moral order" (Greenfield, 1986b:240) whose truth claims "can never be verified by science". He mentioned Schumacher's distinction between descriptive sciences "which can deal with values" (p241) and instructional sciences which are "impotent in the face of them" (p241). The former enabled one to grow in awareness of one's own values, "to reflect upon them and to gain deeper insight into them". The attention was on the people who held these values. The latter asserted the values that must govern education but never examined these values. So Greenfield asked (p242) "where does science get its values and what can it say about the truth of them?" He had a definite answer but found the issues "many, complex, promising and fascinating" (p243).

*The Headache and the Crown* (1986c) focused again on values, this time the clash of values, the right of one person to impose values on another and ultimately, the clash of values between the school and the individual and the school and community. This issue was part of Greenfield's agenda for the future (1986a:76). The title

came from a poem of Stevie Smith, several lines of which Greenfield quoted. Ultimately we choose our values (Greenfield, 1986c:359). Research has little to say about this because "the problem lies beyond the powers of purely empirical inquiry" (p359). "Value conflict is endemic in education and research yields no ready solution to it" (p360) because the question of better values is purely philosophical. Greenfield referred frequently to Hodgkinson in this editorial.

*Writers and the Written: Writers and the Self* (1988) considered two difficult issues for those who would be writers and revealed a little about Greenfield, the writer who, in one instance, illustrated from his own experience with editors (Greenfield, 1988:249). The issues were the place of self and the use of "I" in academic writing and "authors dealing with the self in each other" (p245).

The first was a non-issue for Greenfield in his own writing. He was always at home using first person. He did however, note the difficulties this use had for both writers and editors (1985b, 1986:76, Note 2). Greenfield believed that "the self always is present in the text whether the first person pronouns are used or not" (p246). The issue was not the use of the first person pronouns but "whether self can be transparently present in the text without denial of its presence". At the same time

Greenfield cautioned against the overuse of the pronoun and recalled Julian Barnes's saying "The author in his book must be like God in his universe, everywhere present and nowhere visible" (p247). The absoluteness of this rule was inappropriate but it was "worth pondering".

The second issue highlighted "the problem presented by different texts and different selves especially when one set of text and self was in conflict with another (p248). Greenfield addressed the problem of *ad hominem* comment, "comment directed to the person rather than to the ideas advanced by the person" (p248). He noted that "the line between person and idea is often delicately fine" (p249) and that:

no arbitrary restriction should be placed upon the serious scholar's right of expression. Within certain limits, the final right of expression (and the responsibility for it) should rest with the author (p249).

This led Greenfield to note that the "world of literary criticism" seemed to be much more comfortable with "plain-spoken differences of opinion than is the world of social science" (p250). Modern science looked to "a single, objectively truthful reality" but the humanities were content with "ambiguity and incompleteness in promulgating truth. Or at least, they have tolerated diversity ..." (p251). Greenfield observed that "humanists seem more willing than social scientists to take the risk of cutting close to the bone, of delving closer to the line that

separates self and idea" and in words that reflected his own experience and learning Greenfield declared the ideal:

In the pursuit of understanding, they [humanists] leave bone and self intact, though they acknowledge that ideas are never separate from the human being who advocates them and that the clarification of ideas invariably involves another mind, another person. Thus the clarification of idea is never accomplished except as the idea is set in a human context and seen as a relation between self and idea. Therefore to understand an idea is also to acknowledge its relationship to a person. Critique of an idea cannot fail to involve the person who holds it (p251).

Self and idea needed to be separated and the first step in this separation was "to acknowledge the relationship between self and idea" (p251) so that the idea is made plain and *ad hominem* comment can be avoided. Ultimately the argument gets around to truth and values since the search for truth demands dialogue that "confronts and challenges matters not only of fact, but of taste and value as well" (p252) and what is attacked is "a literary accomplishment and its writing style, not the writer" (p252).

*Still Waiting for an Answer* (1989) again puzzled over the nature of truth and asked the question, "is truth beyond us or in us? What should we do about it?" (Greenfield, 1989:1). The first is an epistemological question; the second a political one. In encouraging thinking on these issues Greenfield outlined the idealist and the relativist positions, Platonic idealism and Protagorean relativism, in approaches to truth. The

differences hinge upon the understanding of the word, "perceive". One view perceived truth as ideal and objective: the other as relative and subjective. And Greenfield asked, what of verification and falsification? We are still waiting for an answer! What of faith? "Does not that notion put the search for truth on a different plane?" (p4). How can truth be proved or falsified? Greenfield again asserted that values, like truth lie "beyond the empirical" p5) and beyond "the plane of pure reason" (p8). We might argue about them and "assert them or enforce them but not verify or falsify them as we do with facts" (p8).

The last of the editorials, *The one thing needful* was published in 1990. The title was taken from a short story by Robert Louis Stevenson, "Thrawn Janet" in which the one thing needful was "that the proper text be read and that it be properly understood" (Greenfield, 1990:360). The editorial addressed the reading "rightly" of texts where "the interpretation and use of knowledge gained by reading is the heart of the matter, not simply the power to read" (p359). Greenfield's thinking about interpretation of text and meaning of text revolved around the following ideas:

- \* Knowledge is never its own end (p360);
- \* all text - or at least all of potent text - is dialogue (p360);
- \* all readers are learners and interpreters of text (361);

\* unless there is someone to respond to the meaning of a text, however veiled or ambiguous that meaning might be, the text is meaningless, literally dead (p360);

\* ultimately, reading involves creating and re-creating meaning (p360).

His answer to the question "what is the meaning of any text?" was that:

it means what we make it mean, what we insist that it does mean. The text and its meaning lie *out there* waiting to be discovered; its meaning to me lies *in here*, requiring my knowing and understanding. And so, there is no end to inquiry into the meaning of text; nor is there an end to its interpretation or to the implications for action that flow from such interpretation (p366).

In another context (Personal correspondence, 16 April 1991) Greenfield wondered was there such a thing as a "correct" answer to such a question and continued:

I resist endorsing the post-modernist view that texts are inherently meaningless until they are deconstructed and interpreted, but the need for understanding and interpretation is plain. I prefer to put that view in the context of hermeneutics, where the multiplicity of meanings does not deny a meaning, even an inherent meaning ... The curious thing about texts is that they are independent of their authors, and, if they are not, they are the worse for that ... the authority of a text must lie in the text itself, not in the author. That too, is the hermeneutical view.

One of Greenfield's frustrations was that he was better known than anything he had written (Greenfield, 1985d:23).

In musing over this matter he wrote:

My struggle has been to write with clarity and to make my ideas accessible from the text alone ... Transparency to the idea itself is a quality I have



striven to give my writing. If I have succeeded in that purpose, it is only in limited measure, for it seems to me now that most of my writings could be jettisoned with little loss. Recently however, a former student wrote to me to say that a student of his compared reading one of my articles to "gliding on ice", by which I think he meant that movement through it could hardly be stopped once it was started. I take that as a great compliment (Personal correspondence, 21 March 1990).

Greenfield's persuasive literary writing style enabled the text of these five editorials "to stand alone". He skillfully combined the nature of the editorial to introduce the featured articles with the initiation of new thinking on some of his own strongly felt issues and experiences.

### *The Doing of Research*

Between 1986 and 1990, apart from the editorials Greenfield had one other paper published. *The Doing of Research* was written for a doctoral seminar at the University of Alberta and published in the ED ADM 511 Research Methods booklet (pp1-13) and also in the *CASEA Newsletter* (1987). At first reading it is deceptively simple yet it compels the reader to chew over the words to get to Greenfield's meaning. He saw research as having much "to do with truth-making" (p9) and distinguished between "reSEARCH and re-search", the former being "to discover truth or a new sense of it and to avoid saying in different words what others had already said" (p9); the latter being to reinvent the wheel. Greenfield noted the

difference and interconnectedness of methodology and method - "methodology is ... a logic that justifies the methods and procedures of the research" (p11). Methods will vary; the requirement for methodology, "understood as a process" (p11) and understood as "doing the right measurement" should not vary. He mentioned two experiences from his own earlier life that taught him something about research, advocated Ribbins's critique of research (Ribbins, 1985) and cited examples of qualitative research from Gronn (1983) and Ball. Subtly Greenfield juxtaposed positivistic research and humanistic research and while he never explicitly declared his own preference, the reader is left in no doubt as to Greenfield's preferred option. The student was left to choose his/her own research methodology and Greenfield made patently clear the implications of the choice.

### *The Antidote to Scientism*

In March 1990, Greenfield wrote the foreword to Christopher Hodgkinson's book, *Educational Leadership, the Moral Art*. He called Hodgkinson "the antidote to scientism and specious science in the study of administration" (1990:9). In an academic sense Greenfield and Hodgkinson were kindred spirits. They both opposed positivism and administrative science although Greenfield wrote mainly in educational administration and Hodgkinson more broadly in public administration and business administration as well as educational administration. They both emphasised the

role of values in organisations, Hodgkinson in a more systematic and sophisticated way than Greenfield. Both were subjectivists, humanists, idealists - Greenfield more existentialist; Hodgkinson more philosophical. Their writing styles were somewhat similar. Hodgkinson believed that Greenfield was "the single best writer in the field of educational administration" (Hodgkinson interview, 7.9.90); that "his writing has literary value, literary flair and a gift of expression which deserves to be recorded rather than lost in journal articles". Greenfield on Hodgkinson's writing style wrote that:

... some readers find his writing abstruse or perversely complex ... if there is difficulty in reading Hodgkinson, it arises from the unfamiliarity of his vision. The source of this alienation lies not in Hodgkinson, but in the contemporary field itself that happily and consciously turned its back on wisdom both ancient and modern to embrace an invention of recent times: the science of recent times, the science of administration (1990:4).

Greenfield admired Hodgkinson's prose style and noted that:

The difficulty with Hodgkinson's prose is that to read it, one must be prepared, as with T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, to think not only with English in its most potent and subtle forms, but also to deal with the reservoirs of meaning and cultural experience of the major Indo-European languages from ancient to modern times. However, there is no apparently abstruse word in Hodgkinson's text that is not precisely and beautifully chosen to convey the meaning it is to carry. To read Hodgkinson one needs a good dictionary - or several - by one's side (Personal correspondence, 3.11.91).

Greenfield wrote the *Foreword* to Hodgkinson's (1991) book.

Hodgkinson wrote the *Foreword* to the Greenfield and Ribbins

volume. Greenfield was the artist and iconoclast. Hodgkinson was the philosopher and "unashamed anti-modernist" (Gronn, 1993:31). While each had influenced the other's thinking significantly and while, as Hodgkinson said that "philosophically [we] are one", (Hodgkinson interview, 7.9.90) Greenfield and Hodgkinson never formally collaborated.

Greenfield's memory and appreciation of Hodgkinson's friendship was clearly and poignantly recounted in his interview with Ribbins (1993:247-248;263-265). He acknowledged his debt to Hodgkinson thus "he offered the steel of intellectual argument and the hand of friendship" (Greenfield and Ribbins, 1993:247). In almost every paper since 1978 Greenfield quoted from Hodgkinson's work, frequently and often at length, using Hodgkinson to substantiate his own thinking. Hodgkinson first mentioned Greenfield in *The Failure of Organisational and Administrative Theory* (1978a) where he stated:

It would make an interesting case study in the sociology of knowledge to investigate the reasons why Greenfield hath little honour in his own country, but is applauded and acclaimed on the other side of the Atlantic (Hodgkinson, 1978a:275).

Hodgkinson then juxtaposed an extract from the *Administrative Science Quarterly*, "that authoritative source" and an extract from Greenfield (1979b) and concluded that:

... I for one, am convinced that the latter type of approach opens new fields of exploration which promise insight and help towards both theory and development and the advance of humane administrative praxis (p276).

Hodgkinson (1988:28) declared himself among Greenfield's "followers". In a 1990 address to a similar conference held in Victoria entitled *Folie et Maladie dans L'administration Educationelle*, Hodgkinson noted that Greenfield was "a prophet not without honour in his own country" (Hodgkinson, 1990:13) and in a note to the paper wrote:

... although honoured more elsewhere, perhaps. Certainly in Europe and Australia. A recent graduate student from mainland China reported that Greenfield's work was well-known and admired in the educational administration intelligentsia of the P.R.C (p3).

Later he enlarged on this point:

He's not without honour in Canada. Even his critics in USA honour him. In a sense, he's without honour in the leading journals in the field and the people in high ground in the sociology of knowledge, so to speak, don't give him the audience and the public exposure he fully deserves. He's had some. He's noted, of course, for disturbing the waters. There's been long years of polemic, debate and so forth in USA. USA is the home of the new philistineia. This is where the Philistines are all assembled and congregated and they do exert their power so that the Hoy and Miskels of the world can be contented that they really represent the conventional view, the established orthodoxy. Greenfield's against that ... he's perhaps feared by some of them (Hodgkinson interview, 7.9.90).

Greenfield's contribution to the field of educational administration, according to Hodgkinson was that:

He is the one who, with his own particular genius and

flair for language and administration, brought to the level of consciousness within the discipline, the dialectic which is unresolved still, despite protestations by Walker and others that you can marry the two schools of thought. These schools of thought have not been married and the reason they are not married is that the dialectic, of course, is unresolved. It's still a lively dialectic and seems to depend for its liveliness on the continuous contribution of Greenfield (Hodgkinson interview, 7.9.90).

Hodgkinson, like Greenfield, was adamant that a "science of organisation" was impossible:

You can't have a science of human beings because a human being is imponderable. You can't have a science of psychology. A human science is just a bit of an oxymoron. Administration is an art form, sometimes I say, the ultimate art form, because it is the art form that determines the shape and texture of history. Its innate character transcends both our own science and it's philosophical. The resolution, synthesis of the dialectic between science, on the one hand, and art, on the other, is philosophy. That is my position, and it is a position with which Thom is sympathetic. We are much more intellectually sophisticated in educational administration now, than we have ever been and this is largely thanks to Greenfield's work. He has been the initiator of what sophistication we do have (Hodgkinson interview, 7.9.90).

Hodgkinson gave Greenfield a copy of his 1978 book *Towards a Philosophy of Administration*. The hand-written inscription said, "To Tom, a valued friend, a great scholar and a good man". Their friendship was:

... counterpoint to scholarly dialogue and dialectic. Our views of the realm of discourse known as organisational and administrative theory paralleled complemented, and supplemented each other. Some of these views were radical. All of them were independent. For my part, throughout this long interchange, I was sustained and enriched by Thom's intellectual wealth and vitality ... I rightly call him a social philosopher. Analytical, reflective, caring (Hodgkinson, January 1993, *Remembering Thom*).

Greenfield's *Foreword* (1991a) achieved multiple purposes. It acknowledged Hodgkinson's contribution to the philosophy of administration as opposed to the science of administration - "[he] offers art and morality in place of science and certainty" (Greenfield, 1991a:4); [he] pierces to truths that challenge the received wisdom of the contemporary field" (p4).

It placed (and praised) the book within the context of Hodgkinson's thought - "the insight he affords into the heart of administration" (p3); "Hodgkinson restores a vision of administration. His title lays out the central issues. Administration is a moral art" (p7); Hodgkinson's view of administration allows us to see in new directions, towards the world of the valuable, the right, the justified" (p8). And Greenfield revisited some old, favorite themes of his own, the errors of "the putative science of administration" (p7); and the central questions of administration being questions of values and morality. Greenfield gathered some thoughts from earlier papers (1979b, 1979/80, 1981b, 1985d, 1986a, 1987) and quoted some propositions of Hodgkinson's from an earlier work (1978) as he had been wont to do in earlier papers of his own (1983a, 1983b, 1985b, 1986a). Greenfield's *Foreword* illustrated the interconnectedness of his thinking with Hodgkinson's and his firm conviction that "the increasing focus in [my] work upon values is a reflection of the Hodgkinsonian position" (Greenfield interview, 16.1.91).

## *Conclusion*

This chapter considered Greenfield's work from 1981-1990. By the end of the decade his writings revealed a significant change in tone and direction. He had ceased to defend his position and chose instead to continue to expound his theories to whomever was interested. By and large he was now able to ignore criticism. Griffiths had retired and while still very active in the field, had turned his energies elsewhere. He published less in the late 1980s and his interest in Greenfield's work had significantly waned. Willower continued to write on a variety of issues and pursue his research interests. Griffiths's and Willower's publications have been considered up to 1985. Because of the decreasing number that mention Greenfield and the increasing sameness of the critique, all of the remainder are dealt with in Chapter Ten. The focus moves to Greenfield's retirement from OISE and his last two papers written during 1991.