

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

The post-Cold War environment has seen the development of a new social order in Africa that frequently motivates non-state actors to challenge the *status quo*. The failure of the post-colonial West African states to address the challenges of nation-building, and evolve a political and socio-economic system where equity, fairness, and justice are accessible to all strata of the society, and above all, where the rule of law will be respected, creates avenues for civil disorder and strife. Many African governments have demonstrated negative tendencies, especially with regard to an unequal distribution of wealth as well as lopsided socio-economic development in favour of the regions of the ruling political elites.

During the Cold War, political instability stemmed from military coups d'état which did not degenerate into civil war in West Africa. Apart from the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), West Africa was relatively stable compared to other sub-regions of the continent. The snowball effects of the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1996) heralded the beginning of a new form of instability which spread to Sierra-Leone (1991-2002), and again to Liberia (1999-2003) and most recently to Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2011). However, it is important to note that in Côte d'Ivoire case study, the thesis does not cover the dramatic events of the post-election crisis of 2011 that led to the Second Ivorian Civil War (November 2010-April 2011). The cut-off dates for Côte d'Ivoire in this thesis are from 2002 to 2010. These dates reflect the beginning of the Civil War to the "No war, no Peace" situation. These conflicts do not augur well for the future of the sub-region which was once considered as an island of peace and their flow on effects may still start conflicts in other neighbouring countries. The search for pro-active and preventive measures that would forestall such occurrences in other countries as

well as repeats within the same countries is very important for the entire sub-region. Therefore an understanding of the factors that trigger these conflicts is imperative.

1.2 Research problem

The present study examines the multifaceted factors in the civil wars in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2011). The socio-economic crises of the 1980s opened the lid on accumulated frustrations that resulted in social unrest as students and civil servants reacted negatively and sometimes violently to the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) measures that coincided with demands for multiparty elections and a vicious cycle of repressions from governments (Chabal 1998; Englebert 2000; Campbell 2001; Hirsch 2001 a; Mkandawire 2002; Grant 2005).

In Côte d'Ivoire, the economic crises led to ethnic cleavages and hatreds that divided the country, not only along vertical lines between ethnic groups in the north and south but also along horizontal ethnic dissensions between the peoples of the south (Bassett 2003; Daddieh, 2001; Bossard 2003). Thus, the study looks at how ethnic divisions broke the fragile peace and national unity that was already critically weakened by the economic predicament of Côte d'Ivoire. Politicians fanned the embers of discord by using ethnic affiliation as a weapon of discrimination and xenophobia that resulted in violent conflicts as prelude to the war (Bassett 2003; Akindès 2004; Banégas, 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). The ethnic conflict was exacerbated in the West of Côte d'Ivoire by the Second Liberian Civil War with the Liberian ethnic factions supporting the Ivorian belligerents related to their own ethnic groups (Dozon 2000a and b; Ero and Marshall 2003; Sawyer 2004).

In contrast, although there were some elements of ethnicity (for example, the Kamajoor militia's support for the government) in the Sierra Leone war, this factor was not as pronounced as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire where ethnic conflict played a major role in triggering the civil war (Bangura 2000; Akindès 2004; Marshall-Fratani 2006). Bangura (2000:553) notes that

[e]ven though the RUF rebellion is not ethnic, and the RUF (more eastern and southern in composition) and AFRC (more northern and Western Area) formed an alliance in pursuing a common goal, the conflict had strong ethnic overtones among key political elites.

The path to the civil conflict was cleared by the long misrule of the All People's Congress (APC) with the ineffective governments of Siaka Stevens and his imposed successor, former Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh who succeeded only in bequeathing a crippled economy to Sierra Leoneans (Grant 2005; Hanlon 2005). However, the lack of credible and open mechanisms of succession that resulted from protracted dictatorship and personal rule as well as the collapse of the patrimonial and clientelist system in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire worsened the situation (Chabal 1998; Englebert 2000; Campbell 2001; Hirsch 2001a ; Grant 2005).

Another complication was the involvement of the military in the politics of these countries. The armed forces, due to their undemocratic chains of command, failed to promote democracy in West Africa. In Côte d'Ivoire, the rank and file were enmeshed in the defense of their own ethnic groups (Kieffer 2000 :30-33). In Sierra Leone, the military was involved in the politics of the country and Siaka Stevens ignored professionalism to impose a selective policy of favoritism for his cronies (Hirsch 2001b; Frontier 2005). Moreover, during the APC rule, officers of the armed forces were forced to join the ruling party (Kandeh 1992a : 391-392). The armed forces were not immune to neopatrimonialism in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire and this factor increased the economic problems of these countries (Kandeh 1992 a; Hirsch 2001a ; Ouatarra 2008).

1.3 Focus of the Study

This study seeks to address the crises in Sierra-Leone and Côte d'Ivoire with a view to understanding the factors, identifying the key actors (their interests and motivations), and issues around the mechanisms for conflict leading to this violence. Essentially the study attempts to give sufficient insights into the conflicts in the two countries to support proposals for informed action and policy formulation. Contrasting these two countries also facilitates a comparative study of Anglophone and Francophone theories as to the factors of civil war and methods for the resolution of conflict.

1.5 Research Questions

A number of research questions arise for this study based on the scholarly literature review of works on the factors that lead to civil war in West Africa. The case study approach aims to examine the four following inter-related research questions. The most salient question is about the factors that trigger civil war in West Africa, especially the factors that led to the intra-state war in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

1. What role did cultural identities play as factors in triggering the civil war?
2. How did the availability of natural resources influence the war?
3. What are the commonalities and dissimilarities between the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire?
4. What are the issues concerning the relationships between economic crisis and civil war? Could better economic management have prevented the war?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This research work builds on the explanations of communal violence and intra-state conflicts by other students of Peace Studies. The study is also significant owing to the 'West Africaness' and 'newness' of the two conflicts and will unravel the reasons why these communities which have lived peacefully since independence now promote the pattern of a local belief in "them" and "us" that results in fratricidal war (Turton 1997; Easterly 2001). Moreover, recent researches in peace and conflict studies covered in the literature review demonstrate that a holistic theoretical approach is needed to fully grasp the causes of internecine conflicts. This means that there is no metatheory that completely captures the explanations of civil war in West Africa (Bujra 2002; Hugon 2006; Bodea and Elbadawi 2007).

The result of this study will be a contribution to the International Public Goods (IPGs) since such a comparative study is not yet available. It will also produce recommendations for future actions which can be discussed with United Nations officials, International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs), youth organisations and members of civil societies in the two countries.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

The study is limited by a number of constraints. Firstly, the time factor played a significant role both endogenously and exogenously. The internal factor was that the University of New England requires full-time PhD Students to complete their study within three years.

The external factor was that, due to financial constraints, the scope of the study was limited to only the most relevant countries (Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and

Liberia). I could not conduct field research for a longer period in the three countries which are the foci of this study. It could have been better to also investigate the factors resulting in these intra-state wars in neighbouring countries such as Guinea-Conakry, Burkina-Faso, and Mali as well as Libya. Investigating the involvement of Burkina Faso and Libya was important because the Burkinabè President, Blaise Compaoré and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi have been accused of supporting the rebellions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire (Ero and Marshall 2003; Bovcon 2009a). The research instruments were designed to cover the sub-regional dynamics of these civil conflicts by collecting the opinions of experts, key informants, and some of those who were directly involved with the external backers of the rebellions (warlords) to reinforce the evidence collected through secondary data.

1.7 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of ten chapters. The introductory chapter deals with the nature of civil wars in Africa and gives an insight into the subsequent chapters. It is followed by the literature review which provides the thematic conceptualisations and the operational definitions as well as the theoretical framework of analysis of the study. This chapter also reviews the alleged causative factors in civil wars in Africa with particular emphasis on the West African Sub-region.

Chapter Three explains the rationale for selecting the methodological approaches for the study within the framework of qualitative research. The chapter focuses on the rationale for data collection to complement and confirm, or even possibly invalidate some of the theories put forward in the literature. Chapter Four focuses on the Sierra Leone case study. This chapter also examines the root-causes of the internecine war, and the motives of the rebels and ancillary factors that precipitated the country into the abyss of the civil war. This section focuses on the failure of the institutions of government, especially, the economic

failure that is deeply rooted in clientelism and the subsequent social dislocations as preludes to Sierra Leone civil strife. Chapter Five analyses the perceptions of the participants on the factors of Sierra Leone civil war. The respondents' views give insights into the causes of the Civil War.

Chapter Six dissects the second Case Study which revolves around the factors that precipitated Côte d'Ivoire into war. The chapter also deals with its origins and dynamics. The chapter moves on from the historical factors in Côte d'Ivoire to an examination of current issues. The anchor point of the chapter is that clientelism coupled with a prostrate economy (that shattered the economic myth of Côte d'Ivoire as an island of political stability and economic prosperity) propped up ethnicity as a weapon of socio-political and economic discrimination.

Chapter Seven focuses on the discussions on the Côte d'Ivoire Case Study. The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the factors of the Civil War in Côte d'Ivoire according to the opinion of the respondents. The aim of Chapter Eight is to examine and compare the role of the youths in the bloodlettings in the two countries. Chapter Nine occupies a pre-eminent place in the entire thesis as it provides comparative analyses and insights into the factors of the civil wars of Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The chapter compares and contrasts the commonalities and dissimilarities of the factors of the two wars to highlight the findings of the study. Chapter Ten is the conclusion of the study. It also suggests future directions for studies and makes recommendations concerning conflict management in West Africa, and makes recommendations based on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

Political violence is episodic in the history of most organized political communities and chronic in many (Gurr 1970:317).

(...) Africa is a vast and varied continent made up of countries with specific histories and geographical conditions as well as uneven levels of economic development. The causes of conflicts reflect the continent's diversity and complexity. While some causes are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, others have a significant external dimension. Notwithstanding these differences, African conflicts show a number of cross cutting themes and experiences (Adedeji 1999:364).

2.1 Introduction

The above quotations aptly capture the intricacies in the analyses of civil wars¹ in Africa. Civil wars in Africa are not monocausal. The motivational factors vary from one internecine war to another. This study adopts a multidimensional examination of the factors in civil war to explore a comparison of the causal factors in the intra-state conflicts in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2011) that are rooted not only in the national politics of these countries but also have external dimensions because of the involvement of some neighbouring countries as well as Libya.

There had been an intermixing of both internecine and inter state war in Africa during the Cold War. In some cases, a retrospective step is necessary to understand the factors that led to these African civil wars².

2.2 Structure of the Literature Review

In order to explain the factors that lead to civil wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, a thematic approach was followed based on some of the explanatory theories for civil war. Although the main factors that lead to civil war vary from one country to another, some common factors can be found. The literature review allows us to examine the main factors that resulted in civil war in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire with a view to finding the common factors. Moreover, a comparative analysis is especially important to the field of peace research because these countries which erupted into major insurgencies were composed of indiscipline fighters. The main themes emerging from the literature review are later compared with the opinions of the respondents to show how the policies of marginalisation and economic crises (ethnicity, politics, economy, and religion) have escalated violence, hatreds, and contributed to these two civil wars. In addition, the literature review focuses on the involvement of neighbouring countries and Libya in supporting and training these insurgencies as contributing factors to these civil wars.

Gurr and Harff (1984) show that the factors that lead to ethnic conflicts are many and they are not mutually exclusive. For Nnoli (1989); (1996), Eriksen (1993), and Easterly, (2000), ethnicity is both inclusive and exclusive. Ethnicity gives confidence and mutual security. Horowitz (1985), Wallenstein and Sollenberg (1995) and Gurr (2000) argue that grievances within an ethnic group can be latent and lead to collective mobilisation actions. Furthermore, these authors state that the intensity ethnicity assumes is partially promoted by the elite and it is found in militant form in political parties (Horowitz 1985; Wallenstein and Sollenberg 1995; Gurr 2000). This applies to Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire where the politicisation of ethnicity was the basis of the marginalisation of outsider ethnic groups in these countries (Bangura 2000; Keen 2003; Akindès 2004; Marshall-Fratani 2006). These authors also argue that ethnicity is a major factor of the collapse of democracy in developing countries.

Religion has two dimensions. It can be a factor that promotes peace and unity or it can motivate division (Huntington 1996; Appleby 2001). This has been referred to as the “ambivalence of religion” (Basedau, Strüver, and Vüllers 2011). However, religious war is different from religious violence (Vüllers 2011). This difference can be seen in the Ivorian conflict where religious violence contributed to the intensity of ethnic division both before and during the course of the war (Miran 2006; Vüllers 2011).

Frustration and aggression (as well as relative deprivation in the psychological theory of conflict) can also be contributing factors to civil war as they influence collective violence (Gurr 1970; Berkowitz 1989; Aronson 1992) where frustration leads to aggressive behaviour (Goor, Rupesinghe, and Sciarcone 1996). For example, the frustration of the youth due to limited access to higher education, unemployment and poverty in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire have been put forward as contributing factors for their involvement in the Ivorian and Sierra Leonean wars (Zack-Williams 1997a; Abdullah 1998; Keen 2003; Kandeh 2004; Peters 2004; Richards 2005a; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). These factors are connected to the explanations of the economic theories of conflict.

The economic theories of civil war relating to greed, especially to the availability of natural resources to loot, together with grievances have been postulated as triggers of intra-state war (Collier 2001). Moreover, economic marginalisation can be a contributing factor to civil war where there is unequal opportunity or access to economic resources (Sen 1973). For example, unequal access and distribution of Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire's wealth and the scarcity of arable land have been mentioned as motivational factors for the two conflicts (Boone 1993; Brou and Charbit 1994; Chauveau 2000; Chauveau and Bobo 2003; Richards 2005b; Alie 2006; Bellows and Miguel 2006; Hugon 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006). Corruption and economic crisis and its consequences such as poverty and unemployment, lack of adequate infrastructure and minimal provision of services such as quality health care, potable water, and good education, especially after

the introduction of the SAPs in Africa have been put forward as causal factors for war (Campbell 1995; 2000; Azam 2002; Keen 2003; 2005; Conte 2005). It is argued that these factors can lead to frustration and violence (Goor, Rupesinghe, and Sciarcone 1996).

The political theories of conflict are linked to the lack of democracy, multiparty and free and fair elections. The ethnicisation of politics leads to ethnic conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Gurr 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Moreover, the one party state and the intervention of the military in politics, state weakness, and the weakness of institutions, ambiguous constitutions and dearth of clearly defined mechanisms of succession have been major factors in the lack of democracy in Africa, especially during the Cold War era (Decalo 1992; Horowitz 1994; Crook 1995, 1997; Clapham 2003; Fukuyama 2004, 2006).

It is apparent from the foregoing that the factors that led to civil war in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire are multilayered. Therefore, a holistic approach is necessary to understand the triggers of these conflicts.

2.3 Conceptualisation

The Economic Community of Africa (ECA) in its Aide-Mémoire (2000:2) describes one of the criteria that a conflict must fulfil to be considered as a civil war: "significant military action must take place with at least 1,000 battle related deaths per year (inclusive of civilians) [...] recorded". Bujra (2002:4) queries the rationale behind the 1000 death toll threshold the ECA chose to define civil war in

Africa. Bujra (2002) bases his argument on the difficulty in gathering data in war zones as well as the unreliability of such figures. Going by the ECA definition, the violent agitations of the ethnic minorities (bombing, hostage taking, killing of civilians and security operatives, sabotage and vandalism, intermittent ethnic clashes, etc...) in the restive and oil rich Niger-Delta of Nigeria fit this definition of civil war. While acknowledging the complexity of the task, Bujra (2002:2) asks rhetorically that if the death toll has not reached the 1,000 threshold, how are we going to refer to the conflict?

Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002:308) also define insurgency by using the threshold of 1,000 deaths for the whole duration of a civil war. Interestingly, Sambanis (2004:814-816) raises this difficulty. He starts by hinging his argument on the definition put forward by Small and Singer (1982) who point out that one of the main actors involved in the intra-state conflict must be the government in power at the inception of the civil war. Furthermore, Small and Singer (1982:214-215) highlight the fact that for a conflict to be qualified as civil war, the side that has an upper hand must record at least 5 % of the total casualties compared to the inferior side's losses. According to Sambanis (2004:823), Small and Singer (1982) rely on the cumulative threshold to distinguish between civil war and other forms of internal conflicts. Sambanis (2004:816) insists that the above definition is "deceptively straightforward" because of the inherent implications of the coding "many small conflicts that slowly accumulate death" are recorded as civil wars (Sambanis 2004:819). In order to buttress Sambani's (2004) point, the Nigerian experience can serve as point of reference. The periodic ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria in which many people die are not normally classified as civil wars. He reevaluates further the concept and highlights the unreliability of data on the threshold deaths of the Correlate of War (COW) data base.

Given that the death tolls in both Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire have sadly been in the multiples of thousands, there is no reason to doubt that these conflicts are indeed civil wars.

2.4 Multiple Factors in Civil War Causation

The factors that lead to civil war are multifaceted. The framework of this study examines some broad theories in order to explain the contributing factors to intra-state wars from a general perspective before focusing on the specific factors that lead to civil war in Africa.

2.5 Psychological Theories of Conflict

The primary source of human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism (Gurr 1970:36).

The psychological theories of conflict seek to explain the root-causes of violent socio-political behaviours by human beings in a polity. This section draws on the behavioural sciences to enrich the study by illuminating the psychological and social aspects of the stimulants that lead to aggressive behaviour. It equally allows us to understand the frame of mind of the belligerents involved in the two civil wars under review. It is pertinent also to examine the issues of ethnicity, economic crisis, poverty, and unemployment raised by some authors as contributing factors of these civil strifes (Mkandawire 1991; Kandeh 1999; Bangura 2000; Losch 2000; Lemke 2003; Le Pape 2003; Luke and Riley 2003; Keen 2003; Abdullah 2004; Akindès 2004; Rashid 2004). The discourse revolves around the twin-theories of frustrations and aggression and relative deprivation. Berkowitz (1989:60) defines frustration as one of the many psychological concepts originating in everyday speech that is all too susceptible to radically different meanings. Even psychologists have used the term in many different ways, sometimes referring to an external instigative condition and sometimes to the organism's reaction to this event (Berkowitz 1989:60).

Dollard et al (1939) in their influential work, set the tone by hypothesising that there is a close link between frustration and aggression. Aronson (1992:243) shows that the operational definition of aggression is a complex exercise “because, in the popular vernacular, the term is used in so many different ways”. After demonstrating that aggression can have multiple dimensions (assertive and destructive, intentional and unintentional), contingent upon the aim of the actor, Aronson (1992:243) defines aggression as “a behavior aimed at causing harm or pain”. An intentional or hostile aggression is an end in itself while an unintentional aggression is instrumental (Berkowitz 1989; Aronson 1992). However, Aronson (1992:268) states that it has been acknowledged that not all unfulfilled expectations lead to aggressive behaviour (Gurr 1970; Aronson 1992). In addition, Aronson (1992:273) affirms that the tendency to exhibit aggressive behaviour is influenced by the combination of frustration with fierce motivations.

As for the second part of the behavioural theories used in this study, Gurr (1970:24) explains Relative Deprivation (RD) “as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities”. Gurr (1970:8-15) argues that the predisposition to violence depends on the extent that dissatisfactions pervade the strata of a society. This is also contingent upon the blame that is apportioned to the state and its agents by the aggrieved citizens and the conditions that spur on violent actions may be latent and “become relevant to and operational in the genesis of violence only when relative deprivation increases in scope and intensity” (Gurr 1970:14). Moreover, the conditions of disgruntlement can persist in embryonic forms if the state has the monopoly of the instruments of violence. However, if the government allows the control of disgruntled people [potential rebels] to be slippery, then large-scale violence may well erupt (Gurr 1970:8-15). Gurr buttresses his point with the examples of the Hungarian and Chinese uprisings of 1956 and 1966-68 respectively.

Goor, Rupesinghe, and Sciarcone (1996:20-21) summarise the two theories and argue that they are based on the psychological analysis of collective violence.

They suggest that individuals become aggressive when they feel that something or someone is blocking them from fulfilling a strong and fair economic desire. The relative deprivation approach focuses especially on an economic interpretation of feelings of dissatisfaction. Goor, Rupesinghe, and Sciarcone (1996:21) infer that “since it concerns economic factors, it could be said that the feelings of dissatisfaction concern rational calculation”.

2.6 Cultural Accelerants of Civil War

The cultural factors that shape civil war range from ethno-religious schisms to identity crises, as well as linguistic differences (Horowitz 1985; Jinadu 2003). These dynamics are often manipulated for political ends by highlighting the differences as a zero-sum contest between the geo-political entities that constitute the particular country. Consequently, the polity is heated up by those playing the ethno-regional/ethno-politics game or by opposing the *Cross* against the *Crescent* although many countries adhere to the secular nature of the state, as do Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire (Horowitz 1994; Bangura 2000; Vüllers 2011). Secularism has long engendered heated debates in the Islamic world (Lewis 1993:184-185). Ethno-religious politics have been factors of disharmony in many parts of the world (Horowitz 1985; Lewis 1993).

2.6.1 Religious Factors

According to Appleby (2001:822) determining the real function of religion in promoting or exacerbating communal conflicts is an acute problem that is subject to “intense debate”. Appleby (2001:822) contends that there is a general confusion which some authors have engendered by using terms without looking carefully into their etymological meanings. He distinguishes between the

peaceful aspects of religion and its violent manifestations (Appleby 2001:822). Otherwise, if a careful distinction is not applied to these blurred lines, “every believer is a militant, every militant a fundamentalist, every fundamentalist an extremist”(Appleby 2001:822). Appleby states that (2001:822-823),

Mainstream Muslims, Christians, and Jews object to “fundamentalism” for a different reason...in most religions, for example, there is a tension between the use of violence and its sublimation.

For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, religion was used by as a tool for peace. The religious elites founded the *Forum des Confessions Religieuses de la Côte d’Ivoire (Le Forum)* (an association of religious organisations) which was involved in many activities aiming to bring peace to Côte d’Ivoire during the crises that led to the civil war and during the war (Miran 2006; Vüllers 2011). The role of religion as a catalyst of exclusion cannot be overemphasised in the light of its importance at the communal, national, and regional levels owing to the acts of violence that have been perpetrated in the name of the promotion and instrumentalisation of religion (Miran 2006; Bassett 2003;Vüllers 2011).

Caillé (2003:6) gives an account of the force of religion by asserting that traditionally, sociologists concur that religion is a unifying belief. The upsurge in religious based violence is deep since “it is concomitant with the establishment of a global financial capitalism, a huge increase in material advantages, as well as unrestrained and deregulated financial operations that are not ostensibly stamped with any high spirituality”[Personal translation].³ This means that the consequences of economic crisis may lead to religious violence. It is notable that Côte d’Ivoire did not experience any religious violence during the economic boom (Bassett 2003; Vüllers 2011).

However, Caillé (2003) neglects the negative economic trickle down effects or adverse consequences for the global South. It is essential to note that religion is structured along systemic and systematic divisions that highlight inclusion and

exclusion and these cleavages are channelled into politics (Bourdieu 1971; Young 1993). Caillé (2003:12) makes a telling point in asserting that the nexus between religion and politics is not unproblematic.

One particular issue raised by Huntington (1996) in his much-debated work is the bitter and sometimes appalling rivalries between Islam and Christianity, which are interspersed by peaceful coexistence. For Lewis (1993:186), in Western democracies separation between the state and religion means that the state cannot use religion to strengthen its power and the state must avoid supporting the clergy. The clergy cannot promote religious interests through the state (Lewis 1993:186). Huntington (1996) takes the argument further. He underlines this religious conflict by pointing out the similarities between the two faiths. Paradoxically, these similarities result in antagonism and religious intransigence because “[b]oth are monotheistic religions, which, unlike polytheistic ones, cannot assimilate additional deities, and which see the world in dualistic, us-and-them terms” (Huntington1996:210). Following Lewis (1993:176), Huntington (1996:211) shows that other similarities include the claims by Christianity and Islam to universalism and their missionary nature as holding the one key to salvation.

In the same vein, Reynal-Querol (2002) emphasises the strongly negative effects of religion on social cohesion. Reynal-Querol (2002:42) adds another dimension to the study of cultural pluralism by highlighting that apart from Muslim-Christian dichotomies there is also the conflict between animists and Christianity and Islam that is worth investigating. She (2002:42) argues further that the results of her study show that religious cleavages are more significant than linguistic divisions.

2.6.2 Ethnicity and Civil War

“No political regime has succeeded in suppressing differences” (Ball 1971:1).

Ethnic conflict is a symptom of political instability that cannot be ignored in the analysis of many civil wars. Although it is generally agreed that there is no consensus on the exact causation of ethnic conflicts, it is essential to note that many of the different explanations which have been put forward are mutually reinforcing (Gurr and Harff 1994; Vanhanen 1999; Fenton 2003). It is argued that the manipulation of ethnicity by the elites is a major factor of division in some societies (Jinadu 2003:1). This assertion should not to be misconstrued to imply that recognising the existence of ethnic cleavages in those societies is essential to the fundamentals of the art of governance or that ethnic divisions always lead to intra-state conflict (Otite 2000; Ellingsen 2000; Renal-Querol 2002; Osaghae 2003).

Other characteristics of ethnicity include its inclusiveness as well as its distinctive and exclusive nature that results in conflict (Eriksen 1993:12). Having surveyed many theories and field studies (Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003), Eriksen (1993:12) hypothesises that there is a possibility of civil war in societies where there is a dominant ethnic group. This ethnic imbalance has been a major factor behind ethnic strife in some societies and has even led to the implosion of some, exposing the straitjacket nature of policies that hitherto held nation-states together (The Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and the Horn of Africa). Ellingsen (2000:234) explains further that: “[t]he size of the minority within a country does not necessarily reflect its true size because many ethnic groups live within two or more nation-states”. Furthermore, Ellingsen (2000:234) states that

a minority within one country may be a majority within another...Race, religion, and language that represent a group within one country do not necessarily represent a group within another.

This may be true today because the borders of African countries were demarcated by the colonisers dividing up territory on maps in Europe. Transnational affinities are easily exaggerated. Ethnic affinities notwithstanding, two groups spanning national borders do not necessarily have the same interests. This angle of the analysis is very revealing because it suggests that cross-border kinships are not the only motivating factors in the regionalisation of some conflicts.

Arguing along similar lines and basing his argument first on psychology (frustration and aggression and relative deprivation) and later on an historical standpoint, Jeong (2000:115-116) observes that grievances within an ethnic group can remain dormant until the gap between expectation and actual achievement results in “the mobilization of resources for collective action”(Jeong 2000:116). This may set off a chain reaction as “[m]obilization by one community may activate responsive countermobilization by others” (Jeong 2000:116). This was the case of northerners in Côte d’Ivoire, especially after the demise of Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993.

For Vahanen (1999:57), ethnic conflicts occur because “all human populations share the same evolved predisposition to ethnic nepotism”; therefore “people will align themselves along ethnic lines in political interest conflicts”. For example, in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire some ethnic groups could be identified by their political affiliations (Bangura 2000; Bassett 2003b; Allie 2006). In the same line of argument, Vahanen (1999:58) argues that

significant ethnic divisions tend to lead to ethnic interest conflicts in all societies and the more a society is ethnically divided; the more political and other interest conflict tends to become channelled into ethnic lines.

Ethnic consciousness is partly fuelled by the elites who are immersed in ethnic competition and it is more rampant within political parties and the elite; even the

Western world is not immune from the scourge of ethnicity (Horowitz 1985:97). The example of Côte d'Ivoire is illustrative of an African case while the Balkan War in former Yugoslavia represents a Western model.

However, it has been argued that ethnic warfare is declining although it intensified in the 1990s (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995; Gurr 2000). The ability to downgrade large-scale ethnic conflict is said to be due to new strategies in the management of ethno-nationalism (Gurr 2000:52). Gurr (2000:55) contends that the decline in ethnic warfare is multileveled. This is due to the active involvement of influential national and international peacemakers and organisations, and of course, the support of the leaders of the warring factions. Ostensibly, the overall outcome of this new bargaining strategy is to reduce ethnic wars and find lasting solutions to them (Gurr 2000:55).

Nevertheless, there is a common assumption that this new regime of managing ethnic warfare through recognising claims may lead to the domino effects of claims (real or spurious) by ethnic groups for autonomy or power sharing as well as the intensification of ethno-nationalism (Christie 1998; Gurr 2000). However, the fact still remains that this apparent decline does not mean that ethnic conflict is about to disappear. Whenever domestic political and economic systems are stimulated by the beliefs and interests of a domineering ruling ethnic group, the marginalised ethnic groups are likely to react in order to protect and defend their values and interests. This assertion can be illustrated by the Case of Côte d'Ivoire where the marginalisation of northerners led to the civil war (Bassett 2003b; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007).

2.7 Economic Theories of Civil Conflict

Collier (2001) analysed the origins of civil wars through an economist's lens, viewing insurgencies as the extreme of criminal activities whose ultimate goal is to benefit from the spoils of office when the rebels win, not as "protest movements" (Collier 2001:144). Likewise, Grossman (1999:268-281) contends that the tendency to exploit motivates "the potential leader of revolution to challenge a kleptocratic ruler for the authority to exploit the productive members of society" since, for such leaders, war is a business venture. However, Collier (2001:145) makes some clarifications pointing out that, unlike organisations of criminals, rebel groups must cultivate and polish their image. The strategy to adopt, to be attractive and sell themselves is "to develop a discourse of grievance in order to function" applying the maxim that "*grievance* is to a rebel organisation what *image* is to a business". [Emphasis added]. Moreover, Collier (2001:143) highlights the centrality of the financial viability of the rebel organisation as a causal factor of civil war, when he states that "it is the feasibility of predation which determines the risk of conflict". According to some social scientists, the availability of primary commodities and the opportunity to loot are factors that can trigger civil war (Collier 2001; Le Billon 2001; Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2001). Thus, grievance is the factor used to mobilise, motivate, and massage the ego of potential rebels. This leaves aside the question as to whether unemployed youths with no hope of finding employment or land are to be defined as possessing a legitimate grievance or as simply greedy.

Collier (2001) generated much debate. Marchal and Messiant (2002:59) note that having identified 73 conflicts, Collier analyses only 47 conflicts out of this data⁴. They query "if this data is still pertinent after an amputation of about thirty per cent⁵" (personal translation). Another shortcoming they point to is the selection criteria for the chosen conflicts. Marchal and Messiant (2002:61) argue that "the onset of an armed conflict does not necessarily imply that the conflict will be protracted or become a full-fledged rebellion⁶" (personal translation).⁶ They

(2002:65) underline that Collier's "principal thesis (rebellion as predation) should have led him at least *analytically* to take into consideration external actors that buy the loot in exchange for (for example) arms"⁷ (personal translation). Anyanwu (2004:8) argues that economic emancipation and the availability and lure of natural resources have a role in starting intrastate wars.

Marchal and Messiant (2002:65) also highlight that Collier (2001) fails to acknowledge the roles of neighbouring countries in his analysis of civil wars. They (2002:65) note further that Collier (2001) overlooks the sub-regional dynamics and international politics in broader terms and the role of sponsors of those internecine wars during the Cold War. Furthermore, some studies point to a rethink, given the facts that natural resources and greed by rebels alone do not cause civil wars but these factors rather sustain civil conflicts and also sharpen the predatory inclination of rebels (Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2001; Reno 2003; Ross 2006). Others show that the postulation that the availability of natural resources and the greed theory as triggers of civil war are ambiguous and that these theories should not be embraced holistically (Herbst 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Collier himself moved on to more nuanced theories but the catchy title of his theory survives (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

The end of the Cold War has impacted negatively on the duration of civil war because rebels rely on contraband natural resources (e.g. blood diamonds) to prosecute the war to replace previous Cold War funding and support (Ross 2006:270). The economic factor needs to be taken into account in the causation and dynamics of civil wars, especially the longevity of some of these internecine wars. It is always helpful to ask who (within the nation and internationally) has benefited from the start of the war and who still benefits from its continuation.

2.8 Development of a Global Economy

In the developing world, the systematic exploitation of natural resources is frequently carried out to the detriment of the resource hosting communities. The paradox is that these communities are compelled to live a wretched life in the midst of affluence. Gurr (2001:166-167) argues that resource exploitation is a double-edged sword that has benefited some ethnic groups and disadvantaged others. The inclusion of national economies into the global economic system often has dire effects upon and perverse consequences for the indigenous people. A good illustration is the Niger-Delta of Nigeria where the ethnic minorities (Ogoni, Ijaw, Okikra, etc) that are hosts to the natural resources on their traditional land have not benefitted from the oil boom. These communities live in abject poverty surrounded by the devastating ecological effects of oil exploitation. In contrast, governments (state and federal) as well as the multinational oil conglomerates make huge profits from the area. This explains both the intermittent violent agitations for restructuring and fiscal federation and the clamour for irredentism and inter-ethnic clashes as well as periodic communal violence in the oil-rich Niger-Delta (Omeje 2006:480).

In the second strand of his analysis of modernisation, Gurr (2001:167) identifies three generic theories that “are derived from existing theories of collective action that prod culturally distinct groups...in protest and rebellion against the state”, namely: “the *saliency of ethno cultural identity* for members and leaders of the group”; the extent of the group’s *capacities* for collective action; and the availability of *opportunities* in the group’s political environment that increase its chance of attaining group objectives through political action. He (2001:167) notes that cultural identities “based on common descent, experience, language, and belief” shape and influence the promotion of “interests in ethno cultural term(s)” and that “it is easier for leaders to mobilize them for collective action”. He (2001:168) states that the saliency of cultural identities is not static. Further Gurr (2001:168) disagrees with the proposition that “the quest for material benefits or

power... 'really' motivates the leaders and members" who share the same cultural identities. Gurr (2001:168) rather argues that the paramount determinant is the fact that ethno political groups organise around their shared identity and seek redress of grievances for the collectivity. However, it essential to point out that there is the possibility of ethnic leaders blending these subjective factors and coating them as objective factors in the pursuit of their common goal(s). These elements cannot be clearly dissociated. Contrary to Gurr's argument, Collier (2001:145-146) points out "the material benefits or the ascension to power" by using three variants of the economic theory of conflict. Collier (2001:145-146) maintains that the quest for power, combined with objective or subjective grievances, and predation are inherent in all societies. Collier (2001:145) concludes that "*it is the feasibility of predation that determines the risk of conflict*".

The logical conclusion from the foregoing is that these factors are inescapably interwoven. On the incentives for ethnopolitical action, Gurr (2001:169) defines ethno-political action as "any organized group activity in pursuit of the group's objectives, beginning with mobilization". Dissecting further and reinforcing his explanation by using the relative and progressive deprivation theories to support his thesis, Gurr (2001:169) identifies three underlying motivations that stimulate political action by ethnic groups. The tripod is as follows: accumulated and former grievances, and "the fear of future losses, and hopes for relative gains". Gurr (2001:169) affirms that "they constitute a potential for goal-directed political action". He (2001:169) identifies a set of conditions that spur on people to take "collective action" which are "collective disadvantages, loss of political autonomy, repression, and the 'frames' or cognitive understanding, they have of their situation".

The depiction of collective disadvantages is seemingly the definitional characteristic of the theory of relative deprivation (Gurr: 1970). Gurr (2001:169) states that "the greater a group's collective disadvantages vis-à-vis other groups, the greater the incentives for action", and he maintains that inequalities are

vigorous stimulants of “remedial action”. Secondly, there is the question of political autonomy which is not relevant to this study because the rebel groups involved in the civil wars did not aim at secession but rather at control of the national government and the national resources. The third one is repression. Here, the main theme of the argument is that in the long run repressive measures become counter-productive and the people believe they are unjust and they may leave “enduring legacies of anger and resentment”. As for the last: “the frames” for ethno-political action, Gurr (2001:170) contends that the “national self-determination and collective rights of minorities” can be catalysts for ethno-political movements.

Gurr (2001:171) explains the longevity of some protracted conflicts is generated by “repression and disadvantages imposed on the group because the group resisted in the past”. Gurr (2001:171) argues further that “the salience of group identity and the incentives for collective action are “indeed “mutually reinforcing”. To buttress his point, Gurr (2001:171) gives the examples of the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the recurrent Hutu and Tutsi ethnic wars and cleansing, the hydra-headed Palestinian and Israeli war, and the protracted Tamil/Sinhalese conflict. Gurr (2001:171) avers that once these conflicts become episodic, the correlation is that “they become self-generating” and as such a vicious cycle is triggered and the conflict becomes semi-permanent. Therefore, Gurr (2001:171) states that “each episode of the protracted conflict” will be a factor to identify if the new crises were stimulated “by grievances or political action”, which brings forth “the chicken-and-egg problem”.

Gurr (2001:171-172) expands the horizon of the causes of civil war by analysing another set of four factors. Gurr (2001:171) avers that geography plays an important role in rebels’ activities since the insurgents need a territorial base to launch their attacks and that rebellion is very difficult to organise for dispersed and urban groups. This observation is valid for African rebels who are helped by

neighbouring countries to launch their insurgency (Bovcon 2009b:6). The international dimension of civil war has many features. Sometimes, this depends on the nature of support ethno-political rebel groups enjoy from other states. This backing often prolongs conflicts, as was the case with the RUF in Sierra Leone and the influence of Charles Taylor on the RUF leadership in addition to the Libyan and Burkinabè connections favouring the RUF (Huband 1998; Berman 2000; Hirsch 2001b). Another aspect is the “snowballing effect” of civil war. This manifests itself in many ways, such as contagion which is possible among people who have similar goals and share ethnic and/or religious identity (Gurr 2001:177). The effects of the revolution in communication results in diffusion, which is “the direct ‘spill over’ of one conflict from one region to another, either within or across international boundaries as well as the backing of the Diaspora” (Gurr 2001:177-180).

However, the urban guerrilla aspect has two dimensions. Geography can be used to explain in part the difficulties of the Islamic Jihad in Algeria, the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA), in its urban guerrilla attacks against the government. Urban guerrillas have had relative success in Iraq, especially in Bagdad. Secondly, Gurr (2001:172) notes that a common language and “the sharing of home ground...and ...the practice of a common religion as well as preexisting social organization”, the sharing of “an economic niche”, or the overbearing influence of “a political establishment” are cohesive elements that shape the identity group. Gurr (2001:172) classifies all these facets under the generic term of pre-existing factors and nevertheless, he argues that his theory does not imply that all organised ethnic groups are inherently prone to ethno-rebellion. Gurr (2001:172) sums up that “[i]n the language of collective action theory, cohesion reduces the costs of organizing collective action”.

The formation of a coalition is also identified as an effective tool in the pursuit of ethnopolitical action because alliance formation can be used to effectively rally support for the common goal as well as to overcome the problem of ethnic heterogeneity and the promotion of sectional interests (Gurr 2001:172). The

cardinal role of leaders to mobilise followers and to close ranks is also important (Gurr 2001; Hooghe 2005). Established leaders usually have this ability by the virtue of their position (Gurr 2001; Hooghe 2005). However, Gurr (2001:173) notes that a reversal of their fortune can happen with the loss of “authenticity by wrong words”.

2.9 The West and the Global Community: Sustaining and Promoting Democracy

There are many reasons...why democratization and democracy may fail, among them the resistance of entrenched civilian or military elites, the absence of conducive social or cultural conditions, and inaptly designed institutions. In many countries of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, a major reason for the failure of democratisation is ethnic conflict (Horowitz: 1994:35).

The quest for a suitable, viable political system that promotes democratic values, a sustainable political stability (a *sine qua none* for economic development), and gives a sense of belonging to all the constituent ethnic nationalities, has become elusive in many African countries; in spite of the waves of multiparty elections of the 1990s (Inglehart 1999:218).

Nodia (1994:10-11) outlines the importance of ethnicity in shaping nationalism in Europe by acknowledging that history and conscious political efforts. (Nodia 1994:10) played determinant roles in the evolution and subsequent metamorphosis “of premodern ethnic communities into modern states”. Nodia’s (1994) thesis on some aspects of ethnicity is in concordance with that of Koitari (1989:15-44). Nodia (1994:14-15) argues that the notion of nationhood is political and it is in accordance with nationalism and that ethnicity cannot be dissociated from the aspiration to nationhood and nationalism. He (1994:15) underlines that,

Its [nationhood's] substance is irreducibly ethnic. The relationship may be expressed as one of a political soul animating an ethnic body.

The main point of divergence with Gurr is that Nodia (1994:15) believes that, if adequately managed, ethnicity may be diluted “into patriotic esteem for the institutions and achievements created by a democratic (not just ethnic) “we”... Failure to tame the ethnic flesh of nationalism can lead to chauvinism, racism or even fascism”. Nodia (1994:15) asserts that ethnicity can be integrated in the nationalistic fervour citing the American model as a pattern.

Zakaria (1997) draws attention to a ‘counterfeit democracy’, which he rightly labelled “illiberal democracy”. Illiberal democracy is known for its tendency to violate human rights (Zakaria 1997:22-23). He (1997:42-43) notes that “[i]lliberal democracy gains legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably democratic”. Zakaria (1997:42) avers that this type of democracy portends a threat to democratic values.

Horowitz (1994:35-36) and Zakaria (1997:35) both discuss the dangers of ethno-politics and the politics of exclusion through elections in divided societies. Horowitz (1994:36) observes that the democracy is both inclusive and exclusive. Still, in this electoral game, the change of political guard is considered a transition or transfer of the state machinery above all from one ethnic group (a rival) to another (new) ethnic group. Likewise, for Zakaria (1997:35) “elections require that politicians compete for peoples’ votes” and in divided societies the hurdles are multifaceted.

Galtung (2004:56) underscores the tendency of some politicians to be involved in democracy because of the rewards that can be derived from office. Galtung (2004:56) stresses also that dictatorship is an obstacle to democracy in the developing world. All things being equal, economic stability and prosperity are stimulating factors for democracy to thrive (Baum and Lake 2003; Fukuyama

2006). This argument is not new, as this set of factors had been underscored by Lipset back in the 1950s (1959:75).

Fukuyama (2006:129) strengthens the explanation on the grounds that

[f]or countries close to or above the \$6,000 per capita threshold, economic development drives political development, but for countries well below it, political development drives economic development.

Fukuyama (2006:129) concludes that “[t] here is no theory of how and why political development occurs in very poor countries”. Fukuyama (2006: 129-130) argues further that a factor that triggers political development lies in competition as well as spill over effects from other societies where workable economic and social policies have been successful. Fukuyama (2006:130) restates that “[a] final driver of political development lies in the realm of ideas” as the model of liberal democracy is a dominant ideology in the contemporary world. To this, one may add that the political will to carry out reforms is also an important tool in political development.

The foregoing has serious implications for developing nations and the sustainability of democracy in the Third World. Democracy is hindered by the negative effects of globalisation that pervade most Third World economies (Goodhart 2001). This is the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where countries are not appropriately endowed to compete in the global market and suffer under the powerlessness of the government in certain areas of their jurisdiction (Goodhart 2001:542). Apart from its raw materials, SSA is marginalised and became increasingly irrelevant after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Goodhart (2001:542) explains that two schools of thought are in contention over the impacts of globalisation on democracy: the state reinforcers and the cosmopolitan democrats. The former advocate that the state should claim back its rightful place from the jaws of globalisation and be a centric force for democracy; the latter underlines the centrifugal inclination of the state vis-à-vis democracy (Goodhart 2001:542).

The argument so far shows that while democracy is an ideal political mechanism for regulating the political process, certain elements that are vital for lubricating its engine must be bolstered. Fukuyama (2004:60) argues that democracies cannot be “created anywhere and everywhere by sheer political will”. It is important to note that in his critique of the neo-conservatives’ model of exporting democracy, Fukuyama (2004:60) cautions against excessive confidence in bringing democracy to countries across the world as the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq have shown.

2.10 Civil–Military Relations

The incursion of the military elite into the political arena in the developing world was often a part of the politics of the Cold War (Luckham 1998; Hutchful 1998). The armed forces became the de-facto opposition party that replaced the ruling party in many developing countries despite the undemocratic natures of army rule. The involvement of the military in politics as in Côte d’Ivoire has fundamentally eroded *esprit de corps*, discipline, and republican values wherever the army ruled to the detriment of the professionalism of the armed forces (Ouaterra 2008:161). The hierarchy of the military emerges morally bankrupt, and riddled with the cankerworm of corruption in Côte d’Ivoire and in Sierra Leone (Kandeh 1996; Ouatarra 2008). Moreover, in most cases, the ruling elite from the army has succeeded in promoting ethno-regional cleavages and national disharmony in its consolidation of power and sectarian interests and unguarded promotion of self-centred politics such as during the Momoh regime or the Guéi regime (Kandeh 1996; Ouatarra 2008) . The armed forces emerge blemished from violating their own statutory roles (Hutchful 1998; Kieffer 2000; Ouatarra 2008). This disqualifies the military establishment from being an alternative in forging national unity, a viable agent of positive economic transformation, or a role model in the nation-building project when the politicians fail the country. This does not mean that the military is irredeemably or universally perverse in the developing world.

The influence ethnicity carries in the shaping of many military establishments in the developing world cannot be over-emphasised. The ethnic imbalance of the armed forces has been a powerful factor in the partisan politics of the post-colonial state (Horowitz 1985:443). Unlike the army in some western countries where the armed forces are remembered for cementing national unity and patriotism; their counterparts in the Third World have been displaying both mitigating functions and aggravating roles in the domestic political life of these countries, especially when ethnicity is involved. Here, the colonial patterns of recruitment have prolonged negative effects in post-independence years. Horowitz (1985:445) notes that often the colonial pattern of ethnically biased recruitment was carried over into the post colonial state and he is even more categorical on the significant drawbacks of recruitment along ethnic lines.

2.11 A Multifactorial Analysis of Civil War in Africa

Deciphering the origins of civil war in Africa, Bujra (2002:10) scrutinises a broad spectrum of factors that lead to civil war and points out many elements that precipitate the postcolonial African state into intra state war: (i) a very weak government;(ii)a deterioration and deep malaise of the economy, unemployment, illiteracy, abject poverty especially among the youth and “poor groups who are easy targets for war;(iii) the state and its few institutions are the sole means of accumulating wealth;(iv) the availability of and control by the state of easily exploitable natural resources;(v) deep divisions in a stratified society based on ethnicity, race, religion, and cultural and economic oppression of various groups by a ruling class/group. The consequence of these factors for the central government is that it can collapse. The worst, harrowing scenarios emerge for the generality of the citizens because

often the government collapses leaving behind a dangerous vacuum (Bujra 2002:10).

Michailof, Kostner, and Xavier Devictor (2002) also note that the causes of civil war in Africa are multidimensional and these authors distinguish between the long and short-term causes of intra-state conflicts on the African continent. This is discussed below.

2.12 Long-term Root Causes of Civil War

The authors are of the view that the twisting of historical facts and rewriting of history are factors in creating antagonisms and moreover they stress that “it is often the interpretations of history rather than history itself which is at the base of the conflict (in Rwanda)” (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor 2002:3). In addition, there is the problem of unprecedented rapid demographic increase with mass rural exodus to urban areas (Kaplan quoted in Hugon 2006:261). There are many concomitant effects of this situation:

The degradation of fragile ecosystems is threatening the economic survival of local cultures (e.g., the Tuareg), and the perception of land scarcity-either because of a demographic increase in already highly populated areas (Burundi, Rwanda) or because of rapid and massive foreign immigration (Central and Western Côte d’Ivoire) is fuelling resentments and political violence...competition for scarce water resources is creating tension (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor 2002:3).

The authors stretch the above argument and aver that this state of affairs is aggravated by widespread unemployment and illiteracy and abject poverty; outstandingly among the youth and moreover “poor groups are easy target for war recruiters and political extremists” (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor 2002:3). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, land issues have been important factors in discrimination resulting in violence between groups and these conflicts are influenced by ethnic divisions. This relates to the scarcity of arable land and massive migrations from other parts of the country to the south-west together with international migration of farmers and labourers from the northern neighbours of Côte d’Ivoire again to the South West of the country because it has good agro-climatic conditions that favour the plantation economy.

2.13 Short-term Causes of Civil War

Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor (2002:4) argue that in Africa, policies of exclusion from economic gains based on ethno-regional cleavages in an atmosphere of “high ethnic and linguistic fragmentation” breed deep-rooted resentment. Furthermore, they argue (2002:4) that the control of economic resources by a small but powerful and corrupt clique that maladministers the state throw it into “widespread poverty...profound inequalities that trigger resentment and political instability”. The governing elite strive at all costs to preserve a firm grip on “economic rents” which “is often at the heart of conflicts” (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor 2002:4).

Similarly, other pathologies that are characteristics of the post-colonial African state are the inadequate provision, even non-existence of, basic social amenities and the corrosion of the state in achieving effective rule over its entire territory in an ambience of declining security. However, the regime may owe its survival to a dreaded and well-equipped security force, and in most cases, the presidential guard or militia that are selected for their ethnic affinities (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor 2002:4).

The insecurity created by the ever increasing number of refugees and other man-made disasters (famine, massacre) are threats to the stability of the neighbouring countries and their ecosystems (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor, 2002:4). This is in addition to the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) that has significantly changed the problem of insecurity and civil conflict in Africa (Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor, 2002:4). Child soldiers are possible because light weapons are indeed light.

Hugon (2006:256) argues that armed conflicts in Africa have many international dimensions. These intra-state wars are intertwined in sub-regional and international networks and, contrary to the realist theories; these conflicts are not always a power game in which states pursue their rational objectives. Moreover, some of the rebels operate without any control, especially in the west of Côte d'Ivoire or some of the RUF fighters in Sierra Leone who committed atrocities (Abdullah 2004; Ero and Marshall-Fratani 2003; Bøas 2007). Moreover, the origins of the new conflicts are in their majority deeply rooted in the crisis of "underdevelopment...exclusion and...poverty" (Personal translation) (Hugon 2006:257)⁸. These factors are sources of insecurity and under-development. In addition, Hugon (2006:259) gives a panorama of intra-state war in Africa:

We can differentiate in Africa those wars that are linked to oil rents (Angola, Congo, CAR, Sudan, Chad), those that are related to diamonds (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC), the wars whose origins are precious gems (gold, coltan in Bunia in DRC), as well as those conflicts that are engendered by narco-dollar, and those where stakes are land issues (Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, Rwanda) and those linked to the control of water resources (Nile riverine) or forestry resources⁹. (Personal translation).

Hugon (2006:260) reveals that oil or mining multinational corporations fuel and secure their interests in these conflicts by giving financial support to the warring factions. The strategy is often to finance both the government and the rebels. Hugon (2006:260) notes that the French oil conglomerate Elf supported both President Dos Santos and *União Nacional para a Independência de Angola* (UNITA) rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in Angola and Denis Sassou Nguesso and Professor Pascal Lissouba in Congo. As will be discussed below, Hugon's views on the causes of Sierra Leone war can be contested.

2.14 Examining the Economic Causes of Civil War in Africa

The lack of strong democratic institutions increases the risk of political violence in Africa. However, this should not be generalised. The Casamance rebellion in Senegal is a case in point. Senegal has a democratic culture that had started

during the Cold War. The opposition came to power with the advent of President Abdoulaye Wade (Ottaway 2003; Williams 2003b). Furthermore, authors (Ottaway 2003; Williams 2003b) make a case that sound policies and the establishment of virile economic and political institutions prevent the occurrence of war. They are right up to a certain point, but that is with the proviso that the social contract that sustains peace does not collapse (Murshed 2002:388). The local industries cannot compete at an equal level with the multinationals simply because they lack the financial means, the technology and, worse still there is a flagrant lack of a research and development base in the home economy. These are some of the reasons why the indigenous economic policies of the 1970s in Nigeria and in the early 1980s in Côte d'Ivoire which were implemented to protect the nascent domestic industry failed woefully (Aluko 1977; Hoogvet 1979; Bienen 1990; Chevassu 1997).

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the combination of ethnicity and the policy of political exclusion led to civil war. Sen (1973:6) asserts that there is an intrinsic link between economic marginalisation (inequality) and rebellion. This argument is in consonance with the Lumpen Proletariat (Galy 2004; Abdullah 2004; Van der Veen 2004) thesis as a one of the triggers of Sierra-Leone conflict since the marginalised and deviant youth provided a ready pool of recruitment for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Buhaug (2006:692) notes that the majority of civil war research has overlooked the linkage between ethnic and territorial conflicts. This may partly explain the spill over and cross border effects of some fratricidal wars in West Africa. Examples include Guinea Bissau and the protracted Casamance unrest in Senegal, the Liberia, Sierra-Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire intra-state wars¹⁰ as well the alliances in the Great Lakes Region¹¹ (Clapham 1998:4).

It is a truism in Sub-Saharan Africa that ethno-linguistic ties extend beyond the post-colonial boundaries of African states that “are characterized by borders of questionable legitimacy”(Lemke 2003:124).The result of this overlapping is that

ties of kinship are still strong despite borders. In some cases cross-border ethnic solidarity may strengthen the chances of insurgents in waging war as in the west of Côte d'Ivoire (Ero and Marshall-Fratani 2003:97-98). It will be interesting to investigate the reasons why, after carving out for themselves a *de facto* state¹² in Côte d'Ivoire and running their own government and external relations the rebels weakened. This may be a case of the conflicts within the rebellion. Buhaug (2006:694) further claims that the capability of the rebels to challenge the existing order can also be a source of civil war. Buhaug (2006:694) refers to a previous study with Cederman, Buhaug and Roed (2006) and states that the relative and numeric strength (size) of a marginalised group vis-à-vis the ruling ethnic group is also a determinant that can kick start a civil war; where the potential rebel group has the requisite power and resources to confront the ethnic group in power. In addition to questions of institutional capacity, some authors (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) assert that weak and poor countries are prone to civil wars. This seems contradictory because if the economy is not viable, this should be a disincentive for 'greedy' rebels. However, a closer observation reveals that gaining access to the seat of power is often equated to an avenue for reaping the spoils of office for elites in Africa, which is enough motivation, especially if the benefits are high and the risks minimal. However, regime change has taken place (in the form of a coup d'état) when the economic stakes were not really attractive, such as in Burkina-Faso, Mali, and Togo (McGowan 2003:345-349). Even in a poor state, access to state power will always bring tangible benefits.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) draw upon many of the works reviewed so far. They (2003:75-80) agree with the ingredients of civil strife put forward by analysts (such as nationalism, ethno-religious cleavages, grievances, low per capita income, weak states, political instability, "lootable resources", terrain, foreign government assistance, support from the Diaspora). However, Fearon and Laitin (2003:76) still emphasise that relying on some commonly cited elements in the literature on civil wars such as ethnic antagonism, nationalist sentiments, and grievances-is too simplistic. A notable addition to this discourse is the

Francophone dimension. Fearon and Laitin (2003:86) hypothesise that the withdrawal of external backing (France's support) from the weak Sub-Saharan African Francophone regimes may result in political instability in the capital. The withdrawal of the French security support had a negative impact in Côte d'Ivoire for the former President, Henri Konan Bédié whose call for the French to intervene in his favour did not receive any positive consideration (Ogunmola 2009:240). Fearon and Laitin (2003:75) revisit the causes of domestic war and argue that:

The main factors [influencing which countries and groups have experienced civil war]...are not cultural differences and ethnic grievances, but rather the conditions that favor *insurgency*.

Adedeji (1999:12) takes a panoramic view of the causes of civil war as he argues that the struggle for political power among the elite is often to appropriate economic resources and production for self-enrichment by the governing political elite and this is central to the causes of internecine conflicts in Africa. Adedeji (1999:12) continues the stock-take from the zero-sum international economic order where liberal economic ideology virtually disempowers the peripheral economies and dictates a situation in which, for the foreseeable future, the African state is a pathetic, passive and pitiful spectator. This inauspicious situation is compounded by worsening climatic calamities such as drought, especially in the Sahel Belt of Africa (Adedeji 1999; Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor 2002).

On economic liberalism, it is argued that the triumph of market ideology marks the era of post-modernity which heralded the end of the welfarist state where the citizen has to be "responsible for himself and herself" and "nation-state governments have been shrinking and shedding functions" (White 2002:54-55). However, most African governments could never satisfactorily fulfil these functions. This "shedding of functions" by government has serious implications for Africa. The withdrawal of government subsidies in the provision of services (health care, education, water, electricity) and some essential goods such as fuel, and imported rice, supported by the international financial institutions, has been

highly damaging (Williams 2003a:346-349). These policies have seriously affected Africa and increased poverty. For example, they caused social unrest in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone (Alie 2006; Bellows and Miguel 2006).

Another key to deciphering the factors that result in internal war in Africa is provided by Azam and Mesnard (2003:455-456) when they state that scholarly economic studies on civil war have opened new opportunities to understand the origins of civil conflicts through the combination of economic theories and the application of econometrics. They (2003:455) also argue that ongoing research has demonstrated that, contrary to previous assumptions in the civil war literature, other factors (abysmal failure of the state in the economic realm, fragile and inefficient institutions of the state) have submerged the ethnic thesis as a factor of insurgency in Africa. Emphasis is thus now laid on the study of economic motives as triggers of civil war. This does not mean that the difficulties associated with the management of ethnicity have disappeared from the African scene. Azam and Mesnard (2003:461-466) shed more light on the twin problems of "commitment failure" on the part of the state and the inherent problematic of "asymmetrical information" about the real strength (fighting capabilities) of insurgents. The failure of state commitment lies in not redistributing national wealth (by providing some basic socio-economic amenities) to deprived citizens nor taking remedial action to satisfy or give a sense of belonging to aggrieved sections of the society (Mkandawire 1991; Azam and Mesnard 2003; Williams 2003b). This setback can lead to credibility and image problems for the government; simply because the social contract will no longer be effective and efficient as collateral for sustaining durable political stability. According to this line of thinking, the attendant costs may lead to fratricidal war.

The consequences of high military expenditure (MILEX) cannot easily be over-emphasised for a developing country for the reason that other sectors will be subjected to financial difficulties in order to protect the advantage of the defence sector. Azam and Mesnard (2003:461-463) note that when a certain level is

reached, servicing a high MILEX becomes more expensive “than accepting the risk of a civil war”. Thus, inadvertently, the commitment failure on the part of the state may lead to war (Azam and Mesnard 2003:461-463). Leaders have to balance choosing economic policy options which will at a minimum avoid increasing poverty levels whilst maintaining the security of their regimes (Azam and Mesnard 2003:461-463). Still, the focus of military expenditure is often unsuited to protecting the government from potential rebel attacks due to linkages with corrupt arms deals.

The roles of mineral resources as factor in intra-state war are strongly debated. Results of quantitative data studies are contradictory and confusing. In two thought-provoking studies on the etiology of mineral resources as ingredients of internecine war and these conflicting results, Ross (2004:341-342) and Fearon (2005:4) suggest that dissimilarities may stem from the different data bases scholars use in their analysis of the causation of civil war. Besides, Ross (2006:265) argues that recent studies have found that the correlations between resources and high intensity conflicts “have not been fully pervasive” and that they have been hindered by “measurement error, endogeneity, lack of robustness, and uncertainty about the causal mechanisms.”

If the availability of diamonds is not necessarily a catalyst of civil conflict (as in peaceful Botswana), in Sierra-Leone’s case what then spurred the RUF to launch guerrilla warfare against the Sierra-Leonean state? ¹³ Were the rebels only motivated by the lust for power, or were they driven by the consequences of the economic crises such as unemployment and poverty? These points are discussed in chapters Five and Six.

Still, we should not forget the premise of Davies (1962: 7)¹⁴ that

(...) abject poverty drives people to be submissive rather than turns them into revolutionaries.

This assertion is reinforced by Collier’s axiom (2001:152) that

Rebellion seems not to be the rage of the poor...if anything rebellion seems to be the rage of the rich.

For Aronson (1992:271) “hopeless people are apathetic people” and he illustrates his assertion by stating (without evidence) that:

The Ugandans, under the tyrannical, repressive, and wantonly violent dictatorship of Idi Amin, dared not dream of improving conditions Aronson (1992:271).¹⁵

In other words, the survival instinct of the underprivileged prevails. Was the war an altruistic fight on behalf and in defence of ‘the impoverished masses’ of Sierra Leoneans, or was this just the demagogic rhetoric of rebels? These questions lead to another one. Why did the rebels hold tenaciously to the ‘useful portions’ of the country (the most economically viable parts) which are rich in gem stones, especially the diamond fields? If grievance was a *leitmotiv* for the initiation of hostilities, what grievance are we referring to? Were the rebels motivated by socio-economic injustice that was the lot of Sierra Leoneans in spite of the tremendous natural resources of the country? Or, the greed and grievance of the RUF sponsors, or the “*greediness and grievances*” of the RUF leadership in spite of the peaceful negotiations organised by the international community in the course of the series of Peace Accords (Collier 2001:146)? These questions will be explored in the subsequent chapters.

2.15 Social Fractionalisation¹⁶: The Babel Tower of Africa

Osaghae (1992:219) contends that the multi-ethnic composition of a country does not imperatively engender conflicts. Easterly (2000) supports Osaghae’s assertion of the positive aspects of ethnic diversity. Easterly (2000:5) states that “[e]thnic conflict has a peaceful political dimension as well as the more politicized violent dimension”. Renal-Querol (2002:29) explains that “not all ethnically divided societies evolve into civil war”. It is the politicisation of ethnicity that leads to conflict; and the phenomenon is exacerbated when the ruling elite is entangled in the trap of ethnicity (Chabal and Daloz 1999:28). The

ruling elite can manipulate the ethnic factor to play a dominant role in the economic life of a country. The unfortunate citizens of Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone have experienced ethnic marginalisation and this is a contributing factor to war (Kandeh 1992a; Crook 1997; Bangura 2000; Toungara 2001; Keen 2003; Langer 2005). Nnoli (1989:2) emphasises the exclusive character of ethnicity. He (1996:216) explains that ethnicity can be a unifying factor that gives credence to mutual security in the defence against perceived injustice.

Ethnic unity can break down at a regional level. This is true when the hegemonic group can no longer lubricate the machinery of clientelism. When this happens realignment or new alliances across ethnic divides cannot be ruled out. Minority ethnic groups or those that are dissatisfied will eventually form new alliances still based on ethnic affiliations. Often, the hegemonic group considers the ethnic alliances as a pact with the wrong group (s).

Reynal-Querol (2002:29) notes that "social and ethnic conflicts are recurrent phenomena affecting many countries" although "ethnicity is at the centre of politics of divided societies". There are also experiences of good relationships among individuals of different cultures within a country. Reynal-Querol (2002:31) highlights Muslim-Christian dichotomies, and dissects the rapport between animist religion and the two faiths. Reynal-Querol (2002:40) states that "animist cults...which are very typical of sub-Saharan countries" are more often than not lumped together with Christianity in causal analyses.

Azam (2001:430-431) scrutinises another facet in the instrumentalisation of Western education in the political calculus of the African countries, which is the cooption of the educated elite along ethnic lines into a mainstream political governing elite "whereby the state purchases loyalty...groups through their educated urbanite 'delegates'".

The rising rate of unemployment, unabated poverty, overpopulation in the periphery of urban cities, with colonies of marginalised people, and rising urban violence, not only provide ready pools of recruitment for insurrection but also the ingredients for participation in violent political protests/rebellion (Kandeh 1992a; Konaté 2002; Abdullah 2004; Galy 2004). Moreover, the demagogic incentives of rebels' leadership, in conjunction with the prospects of looting and stealing will manifestly spur on those idle and itching hands into action. The *Lumpenproletariat* phenomenon in Sierra Leone has its replica in Côte d'Ivoire with the *Loubards* or the *Loubardisme* factor (Kandeh 1992b; Konaté 2002; Abdullah 2004; Galy 2004). If there are insuperable difficulties in absorbing a sizable number of the educated "as may sometimes happen in times of budgetary restraint, or under dictatorial regimes" these measures "are often perceived by social groups as a process of exclusion from the benefits of the modern sector" (Azam 2001:437). Also on another level, the notion of ethnic consciousness has expanded to include the opposition between populations of Non-African origins (Asians, Arabophones) and the Nilotic peoples (Kenya, Northern Tanzania, Southern Sudan, and Uganda) and pastoralist and agriculturalist peoples (Mbembe 2002; Michaiolf, Kostner, and Devictor 2002; Hugon 2006).

Azam (2001:437-438) demonstrates that there is an intricate connection between the redistribution and sharing patterns of state resources through networks of elite groups (ethnic representatives) and ethnic solidarity. It is a trickle down mechanism for redistributing the loot, and ethnicity serves as a factor. He recalls that this method is known in Francophone parlance as "the phenomenon of the 'good pupil republic' in Francophone West Africa". Its Nigerian version is popularised by the sharing of 'the national cake'. Azam's redistributive state is redolent of what is termed "*les dépouilles*" or "*systèmes de dépouilles*"¹⁷ (cf. Tessy Bakary 1991). The same vice is labelled by some scholars as clientelism or neo-patrimonialism (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2003).

Neo-patrimonialism is a predatory system that was affected negatively by the economic crisis of sub-Saharan Africa since it drastically reduced the scope for patronage of the majority of African governments (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Chabal 2002; Bayart 2006). Furthermore, Chabal (2002:451) states that

In the African neo-patrimonial system access to governmental assets is a paramount, struggle for power intensified. Second-and this is critical-the neo-patrimonial system was essentially inimical to economic development as it took place in the West, or later in Asia. This is because it failed to foster, and in many ways totally undermined economic growth, the prime basis for sustainable development.

Across the continent, the Somali Civil War is a good example to demonstrate that internal war is still possible where there is ethnic homogeneity. Siad Barre manipulated and instigated clan warfare from 1980 onwards (Adam 1992:17). In addition, the introduction and perpetration of vigorous centralisation in order to emasculate peoples who were nurtured in the 'freedom' associated with decentralisation had adverse effects on national cohesion, thus paving the way for the warlords and their reign of terror that eventually led to the collapse of the Somali state (Ahmed and Green 1999:116-117). Ahmed and Green 1999 (114-115) debate the extensive representation of the Somali people as a culturally homogenous entity and they observe that the reality is that these people are divided along north-south dichotomies with "nomadic pastoralist in the north and southern agro-pastoralists".

It is not infrequent that religious cleavages within ethnic groups result in divisions (Horowitz 1985:51). Religion may transcend ethnic affiliations. The empirical evidence is provided by Eritrea when the "Eritrean movement has had Christian and Muslim units that have fought pitched battles with each other" (Horowitz 1985:270) and Nigeria where "conflicts between 'Christians' and 'Muslims' momentarily override any other attribute, whether ethnic, regional or social"(Chabal and Daloz 1999:27). However, across West Africa the north-south divide is a persistent religious occurrence. In Côte d'Ivoire, cooperation between the religious elites has been a factor that reduces religious violence (Miran 2004; Vüllers 2011). This shows the possibility of a peaceful dimension of religion in a

divided society. Collier (2001:152-153) argues that ethno-religious heterogeneity can stem conflict and that it is the matching of religious and ethnic divides that makes a society prone to conflict. The instrumentalisation of religion can also take on a messianic tone at the national level. To be precise, Paulet (quoted in Otayek 1997:183) highlights the fact that

[i]n Côte d'Ivoire, the prophetess of the syncretic Independent Dehima Church, Marie Lalou, had made as one of her central themes, the celebration of the Ivorian nation and its leader Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who was "a prophet sent by God", according to the prophetess (Personal translation)¹⁸.

In addition, the politicisation of religion cannot only exacerbate regional (North-South) conflicts but it can also be seen as a real or imagined reason for insurgency. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) typifies the instrumentalisation of religion as a basis for civil war. The LRA's case is exceptional. Unlike other civil wars in Africa, the first casualties of the LRA were its own northern Acholi people whose 'interests' the rebels were allegedly defending (Eichstaedt 2009:28). The LRA's ideology (a mixture of witchcraft, superstition, and religious beliefs that systematically misrepresent Christian values) combines and exploits the underdevelopment, neglect, and marginalisation of Acholi land in northern Uganda.¹⁹ The longevity of the internal strife is also due to the exteriorisation of the conflict since the rebels enjoy from time to time a safe haven in Sudan whose government has accused Uganda of harbouring the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and also to the persistently low morale within the Ugandan armed forces (Acker 2004:337).²⁰

2.16 Democracy in Africa: The Quest for Credible Leaders and Legitimate Governments

In Africa South of the Sahara...political discrimination is often more severe than economic discrimination (Gurr 1993: 53).

It is generally agreed that the contributing factors for civil war in Africa transcend the often-mentioned consequences of many ethnic-nationalities and the problems of managing ethnic diversity and conflicts (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Collier

and Hoeffler 2002). It is also argued that ethnic conflict is declining globally (Gurr 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002).

Some patterns of political instability in Africa are discernible. The main elements that precipitate the African state into political turmoil are political and economic marginalisation (Mkandawire 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999). These factors result in acute poverty based on regional dichotomies that translate into dictatorship by the ruling elite or the personification of power in the president (Mkandawire 1991; 1998; Williams 2003a). The consequences are the reduction of political rights; the weaknesses and failure of political institutions; and the politicisation of the ethnic balance of the state. In order to understand the democratic deficit culture as well as the problems of democracy in Africa, a retrospective look is not unhelpful. It is a truism that the colonial enterprise was overwhelmingly characterised by hegemony and not designed for the promotion of democracy. Moreover, Panter-Brick (1995:89) indicates that

[n] either pre-colonial nor colonial antecedents can be said to have laid a firm foundation for democracy in the postcolonial state.

Thus, the postcolonial African state was often a parody of democracy through the one party state's organised 'elections' in which the incumbent president was regularly returned in those elections that lacked credibility and legitimacy. (S)elections were erroneously rationalised in the belief that those "African governments were responding to a set of functional imperatives" (Panter-Brick 1995:89). One party was considered to be the best political system by African governments with the tacit support of the Cold War alliances which maintained and serviced inept and corrupt African governments (Panter-Brick 1995:89).

Cold War international politics led to the support of authoritarianism as the response to African realities; and then the vehement opposition to representative or liberal democracy which was said to be unsuited to those pertinent African realities such as tribalism, ethnic-politics and regional cleavages (Otayek 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Liberal democracy was taboo to the leaders. The one

party state was a one man show provided for the head of state (Bayart 1983: 97). Spence (1994:678) argues that the failure of the one party state to perform to the satisfaction of the citizens resulted in military interventionism. This phase is aptly captured in a general overview by Fukuyama (2006:126) as follows:

[l]ike economic development, theories of political development began to crumble in the 1960s in the face of coups, insurgencies, corruption, and authoritarian setbacks.

However, the military also were not free from corruption. van de Walle and Simiddy (2000:41-57) note that the 1990s decade marks a watershed in Africa as the one party state political system became progressively anachronistic with the new democratic dispensation. The new democratic governments are not free from neo-patrimonialism. Some political transitions resulted in “pseudo-democracy”²¹ which led to the prolongation of the rule of the leader of the former all powerful single party. The new political parties were often unable to overcome polarisation and dissensions (de Walle and Simiddy 2000:41-57). Waves of democratisation in the post-Cold War era impacted on Africa. Otayek (1997:798) argues that economic and political liberalisations are anchored to “market democracy”²² (personal translation) linked to the conditionalities of donors. Donors insisted on the need for multiparty elections and economic reforms before financial assistance would be given to some African governments (Otayek 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999).

It has been argued that a democratic system is hampered when there is a gap between cultural and religious heterogeneity (Otayek 1997; Chabal and Daloz 1999). The lack of legitimacy and credibility (which characterises most African governments) can be a source of conflicts when state institutions are subverted to personalised rule (Bodea and Elbadawi 2007:9). The issue of the legitimacy of Laurent Gbagbo arose as a result of the 2000 presidential elections and the ethnic violence that followed (in which many northerners were killed in Abidjan) was one of the factors that led to the civil war (Bassett 2003b:24). With the exceptions of Ghana, Senegal, and Botswana (Otayek 1997:807), and post-Apartheid South Africa and Namibia, democracy has generally seen three steps forward and two

steps backwards in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bodea and Elbadawi (2007:9) conclude that: “credible democracy reduces the likelihood of civil war”. Therefore, the lack of democracy is a contributing factor to civil war in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire as the interviews show. However, the case of Casamance’s insurgency in Senegal shows that in some circumstances national level democracy can co-exist with localised civil war.

2.17 The Military in Africa: A Tale of Constitutional Violation

The Army does not rule (Nkrumah 1966 quoted in Turkson 2000b:4).

The previous discussion of the military illustrates the tendency of the armed forces to intervene in politics (Gutteridge 1970; Calvert 1980; Adekanye 1992). The military play an important role in political instability in Africa frequently intervening in politics (Gutteridge 1970:369). One of the factors that facilitated military intervention during the Cold War was the monoparty political system that had facilitated autocracy (Gutteridge 1970:370).

Other reasons for the military’s inclination to intervene in African politics are the configuration of power and the monopoly of the forces of coercion that the military are able to utilise together personal ambitions for political power (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993:126-163). The ethnicisation of the military and its resultant antagonisms; as well as the instability of the institutions of democracy are also contributing factors (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993:126-163). The armed forces in Africa often play the role of “the arbiter” despite the fact that this unwanted “arbiter” disorganises the rules of the game, becomes a player and operates through what the seventeenth century French fabulist Jean de LaFontaine would rightly call “might is right”²³. The challenge facing the fragile SSA states is how the political class will make the military remain subservient to the constitution (Gutteridge 1970, 1985; Adekanye 1992; Fukuyama 2006). Bah (2005:4) states that

in actual fact, the post-colonial army did not have any vocation for cohesion, for the defence of the interests of the people in the effort of nation-building and development, and, in contrary, the army was an arena for the expression of multiple contradictions”²⁴ (personal translation).

Moreover, in the decade following 2000, military interventionism is still part of the contemporary political history of Africa and notably, the military take-overs in 2005 in Togo, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau (Bah 2005:1).

The prolonged survival of the militarisation of national politics in Sub-Saharan Africa is also connected to the protection of Western economic interests²⁵ (Turkson 2000:5). The biased ethnic composition of the armed forces has been a powerful factor in partisan politics and also has been counter-productive for cohesion and strength in the ranks and file of the military. Hutchful (1998:599-617) and Horowitz (1985:443) show how the ethnic character of the armed forces leads to instability.

African leaders tried to find a formula to prevent military adventure into politics by supporting legitimate governments. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) resolved at its 1999 Algiers Summit that henceforward Presidents that emerge through coups d'état would not only be stigmatised but would also be ostracised by the supra-national body (Moyanga and Vogt 2000:31). However, the problem of legitimacy is more complicated since some African Presidents are 'elected' in a questionable manner.

Demilitarisation is more difficult than decolonisation as the possibility of the military coming back to power cannot be excluded (Gutteridge 1985:78). For example, the military came back to power in Nigeria to overthrow the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1983 after disengaging from political power in 1979 (Ekeh 1999:74). The military reintervened in Guinea-Bissau in 2003 to remove the civilian government of President Kumba Lalà who had been elected in 2000 (Clark 2007:153).

This study aims to explain the factors behind internecine war in Africa. The question is: why do some countries have civil war and some do not? In addition to the assumption provided by Collier (2001) that “loot and grievance” may spur on rebellion, Bodea and Elbadawi (2007:19-20) postulate that

countries that have a history of coups will be more likely to see rebel movements evolve into large-scale civil wars...countries with a history of violent protest are at risk of coups and escalation of violence into civil war.

There are certainly numerous countries that witnessed military coups d'état and later were/are the scene of civil war (Nigeria, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Liberia, the two Congos, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire). However, it is extremely difficult to explain why some countries that have experienced coups still do not go on to internecine war even in spite of the fact that episodic violence is a feature of their political life (Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia). Notably, in West Africa Ghana has survived a series of coups d'état without experiencing civil war. Bodea and Elbadawi (2007:23-24) remark that: “[n]ot all political instability result in domestic war”. In the final analysis, it appears that Fearon and Latin's assertion (2003:88) that the causal factors of domestic wars are “the conditions that favor civil war” is only a start. Although it prompts us to try and generalise about causation, it is better to look at situations on a case by case basis.

2.18 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that it is unlikely that the causal factors of civil war in Africa can be fully captured by a one single metatheory. It can rather be explained by individual sets of factors due to the particular nature of some of these conflicts that are robbing Africa of its most valuable potential and making post-colonial African stagnate. Analysing from deduction and from the above premises, marginalisation can be seen to trigger civil war in Africa. The main

factors that contribute to intra-state war in Africa will be discussed further in relation to the two case studies presented below.

Chapter Three

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The principal focus of this study is to identify and examine the relative causal factors of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire and juxtapose these factors in comparative analyses. The aim of this chapter is to outline the methodology, research design and procedures used to study the primary and secondary factors in the two internecine wars.

This chapter details the data collection, analysis, credibility, and reliability of the research instruments designed for the study as well as the justification for choosing these methods. The research instruments were designed according to the themes that emerged from the literature review and feedback from scholars and fellow students from the School of Humanities' Peace Studies and History Seminar Series at the University of New England, and Australian, and international conferences at which aspects of this study were presented.

3.2 Theoretical Framework

The basic theories underpinning this study are premised on two assumptions: the economic theory of war (Grossman 1999; Collier 2001), and frustration and aggression theory (Dollard et al 1939; Gurr 1970; Berkowitz 1989; Aronson 1992; Goor, Rupensinghe, and Sciarcorne 1996). In addition, there are some further factors that converged in some cases to trigger conflicts. These theories and concepts were listed in the research instruments and tested in the field according to the understanding and perceptions of the participants.

It is essential to note that a preliminary investigation has shown that relying on quantitative data on the relative factors that lead to civil war can often be misleading. The results of the statistical studies on the economic factors are not only contradictory but also confusing (Ross 2004; Fearon 2005; Bodea and Elbadawi 2007). The field research provided a good ground to test the theories and conceptual foundations of this study in order to validate or invalidate them, and lend reliability to the present study.

3.3 Methodological Strategies

Research methodology is the *modus operandi* that is used to carry out research. The purpose, postulations, and significance of the study influence the choice of methodology used to examine a particular problem (Taylor and Bogdan 1998; Babbie 2010).

Babbie (2010:394) defines qualitative methodology as

[t]he nonnumerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. This is the most typical of field research and historical research.

Research methods vary according to the purpose of the research, and this influences the selection of the appropriate methods. The choice of qualitative research is reinforced by considering the opinion of qualitative researchers. Taylor and Bogdan (1998:9) state that qualitative methods are “designed to ensure a close fit between the data and what people actually say and do”. Denzin and Lincoln (2000:10) argue that qualitative methodologists believe that the qualitative method allows researchers “to get closer to the actor’s perspective through detailed interviewing and observation”. Denzin and Lincoln (2000:10) argue further that it is unusual to have these insights with quantitative researchers as they “are seldom able to capture their subjects’ perspectives because they have to rely on more remote, inferential empirical methods and materials”.

Babbie (2010:92) states that generally there are three purposes of research: exploration, description, and explanation. The aim of exploratory research is to investigate the reasons why a particular phenomenon happens and whether it is worth researching it. Saunders et al (2000 cited in Gray 2004:32) suggest that exploratory studies may be carried out in three dimensions which are “a search of the literature, talking to experts in the field, and conducting focus group interviews”. Babbie (2010:92) explains that exploratory research implies that the researcher is involved in a study which is comparatively new in its subject of inquiry. This assumption conforms to the subject of the present study, which involves comparing and contrasting the causes of the civil wars in an Anglophone country and a Francophone country as well as the dynamics of these wars. Babbie (2010:92) notes further that exploratory studies are good to investigate phenomenon that happens repetitively. Given the fact that civil war has become a major feature of political instability in West Africa since the end of the Cold War it is good to explore the factors that lead to these intra-state wars.

Descriptive studies refer to the observation of events and it is necessary to describe events accurately and specifically in order to provide precise answers (Gray 2004; Babbie 2010). Dane (1990:7) states that explanatory analyses aim to answer mainly the reasons why a particular phenomenon happens and they involve the examination of the relationship between the causes and valid explanations for the problem.

Therefore, the study attempts to fulfil the three purposes of such studies viz to identify, examine, and explain the reasons why these countries experienced civil war. Moreover, Neuman (2006:46) observes that in qualitative research such methods are suitable and useful for field research because they allow the researcher to directly observe the study population and to take notes in a natural milieu for a predetermined period. Moreover, the interpretive method is used in this study because interpretation can orient and it “is conditioned by the substantive resources and contingencies of interaction” since meaning is

constituted at the nexus of the *hows* and the *whats* of experience” (Holstein and Gubrium 1997:121). Gray (2009:36) states that interpretive studies

seek to explore peoples’ experiences and their views or perspectives of these experiences. Interpretive studies are, typically, inductive in nature and often associated with qualitative approaches to data gathering and analysis.

An interpretive methodology is appropriate to this study because the comparative review of the literature on the factors in the Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire civil wars revealed that there were multiple factors that triggered the conflicts. Thus, the views of the respondents are necessary to complement the literature review. It is most appropriate to use a multifaceted approach to the analyses of the factors that triggered these intra-state wars.

The contributions of respondents were valuable to my research because they provided useful information on some theories as to the causes of these wars. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone, three key informants said that the availability of mineral resources was not a contributing factor to the triggers for the civil war. For them, diamonds were not the motives for the war. They rather stated that diamonds prolonged the war (SLI1, SLI2, and SLI3). The opinions of the respondents reflect their understandings of what happened. As such they have value in their own right. In reality, the opinion of the respondents is in agreement with some authors cited in the literature review that the availability of diamond prolonged but did not cause the civil war (Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2001; Reno 2003; Ross 2006). The gatekeepers interviewed were selected because of their knowledge of the history, politics, and socio-economic aspects of Sierra Leone. I double-checked the views of these key informants with some respondents from the general public and vice versa to find out if their views were valid. The key informants’ views were corroborated by the respondents. A similar scenario happened in the Côte d’Ivoire case study with the issue of religion. Some key informants were convinced that religious differences were not an intervening factor that triggered the Ivorian war. However, the literature review shows that religion was sometimes a factor when it was linked to violent incidents in the Ivorian civil war (Bassett 2003b; Vüllers 2011).

Babbie (2010:195) explains that there is a difference between a respondent and an informant. Babbie (2010:195) defines an informant as

someone who is well versed in the social phenomenon that you wish to study and who is willing to tell you what he or she knows about it.

While a respondent is

a person who provides data for analysis by responding to a survey questionnaire (Babbie 2010:254).

It is worth noting that the views of the participants (key informants and respondents) were valuable contributions to the outcome of the study as they validated some of the pre-field work assumptions and disagreed with some theoretical views on the causative factors of the civil conflicts in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The participants' views together with the facts that emerged from the literature review support the axioms of qualitative methodologists who emphasize that all shades of opinion are valuable to be examined since the objectives of qualitative research is to study phenomena from diverse points of view (Taylor and Bogdan 1998; Bryman 2001; Corbetta 2003; Gray 2004; Sarantakos 2005; Neuman 2006; Babbie 2010). The respondents confirmed some of the main concepts of conflict theory as factors that caused these intra-state wars. Concepts such as exploitation and inequality as a result of economic mismanagement and socio-economic marginalisation were recurring themes that appeared during the field research in both Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. In addition, power struggles between the ruling elite leading to the politics of exclusion and alienation as well as ethnic cleavages were also identified as contributing factors. The respondents pointed out that frustration is an important explanation for the factors of the two internecine wars. However as will be discussed below, the participants' opinions disagreed with the economic theory of the causes of war as regards greed and grievances.

3.4 Use of the Case Study

The approach that was chosen was that of the dual comparative case study. Payne and Payne (2004:30-31) define a case study as “a detailed study of a single social unit” constituted of people who are the target group of the research and they are generally in a defined place. For Gerring (2004:342) a case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”. Gerring (2004:342) states further that

[a]unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon-e.g., a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person-observed at a single point in time or over some delimited period of time.

A formal unit is composed of, but not limited to, an organisation, group, or country and it is used for in-depth examination while an informal unit applies to other units that are secondary to the study, and as such, they are not rigorously examined in the case study (Gerring 2004:344).

The case study approach supplements information gathered through the literature review. Gray (2004:123-124) notes that a case study allows the researcher to explore many thematic aspects of a study by widening the scope of investigation of a phenomenon and using many sources of data according to the theoretical framework established. Mitchell (2006:26) shows that the aim of the researcher using the case study approach is to draw “theoretical conclusions from it”. Therefore, the case study allows the researcher to establish linkages between theories and realities according to the experience of the participants. These conclusions framed the findings of the study.

Stake (2000:436) states that a case study is a purposive and integrated system whose selection depends on the aim(s) of the study. Jaccard and Jacoby (2010:49) assert that a case study usually involves using primary and secondary source data by conducting in-depth interviews and carrying out archival research. The reasons for choosing a case study approach are many. Sarantakos (2005:216) observes that the selection of a case study allows the researcher to undertake a

comprehensive examination of the study, to have a personal understanding of the research and to have direct information because it involves working in the appropriate environment and in close contact with the respondents.

Moreover, the literature review showed that the proposed study had many correlations with features of the case study method that establish “causal relationships” by using exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive methods (Gray 2004:124). The literature review was valuable in the identification of respondents because the factors that triggered the wars were good indicators to know the target population to focus on in the field. These groups of people chosen as respondents included government officials, warlords, women, and academics, as well as members of civil society, the clergy, and the youth. These groups were also categorised according to the thematic approach used to identify the factors examined in the review of literature.

Stake (2000:446) argues that it is good to use purposive or judgemental sampling for fieldwork in qualitative studies. Purposive sampling is a technique used deliberately by researchers to use their judgement to choose the target populations they believe are significant to the study (Sarantakos 2005; Babbie 2010). A technique that I used to identify key informants was snowball sampling. The respondents were chosen according to the level of their knowledge, involvement as fighters and perpetrators of violence, and their reasons for taking part in the war as well as the victims, and some Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Corbetta (2003:222) notes that snowball sampling is useful when the target population consists of “social groups whose members tend to hide their identity for moral, legal, ideological or political reasons”. Snowball sampling was relevant because of the fear of persecution by government or rival groups within the rebellion in the two countries. Seidman (2006:43) states that

When interviewers try to contact potential participants whom they do not know, they often face gatekeepers who control access to those people.

The assistance of the members of staff of the African Studies Institute at the University of Sierra Leone and other key informants that served as the gatekeepers was particularly useful in identifying respondents.

I also used the services of an interpreter who understands *Krio* and who is also familiar with Peace Studies. I had to follow these procedures because some potential respondents would not feel confident enough to take part in the interviews or answer some questions in the English language. Moreover, the interpreter was useful because Sierra Leone's *Krio* varies from the Nigerian *Pidgin* English. This procedure was suitable because it allowed avoiding ambiguous answers that could have resulted in misrepresentations or misunderstandings.

Moreover, the technique of using gatekeepers was very useful in Liberia where I investigated the level of the implication of former Liberian President Charles Taylor in Sierra Leone's war. This is because my interviews coincided with the days he appeared before the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague in January 2009 for his roles in Sierra Leone War and some respondents who had initially accepted to be interviewed refused to give their opinion on Charles Taylor's involvement and/or support for the RUF. The same fear of harassments and persecution were raised later on when I returned to Sierra Leone to continue my interviews because some of the respondents who were former RUF combatants were uncomfortable to talk during a focus group discussion in Waterloo near Freetown where some of the RUF fighters live. Some of these former RUF combatants believed that Charles Taylor was being persecuted while Sierra Leone's former president Ahmed Tejan Kabba was exonerated from war crimes associated with his support for the pro-government Kamajoor militia. In Côte d'Ivoire, the warring factions had similar apprehensions and had the wrong notion that I was an informant of the government. This also happened in Sierra Leone. I was able to reassure them as to my role.

I also took cognizance of the fact that information had to be generated from different perspectives to reduce the prospect of misrepresentation (Stake 2000:443). The research instruments were designed to verify whether these theoretical and conceptual frameworks were relevant and appropriate for the study.

3.5 Development of Interview Protocols

The interview instruments were sketched out primarily by relying on the information gathered through the literature review. The thematic approach designed for the study allowed a comprehensive sorting out of the relevant areas that were developed in the research questions. The research instruments were the main platform for data gathering, by taking into accounts the objectives and nature of the study. It was ideal to supplement and strengthen the information gathered through the literature review by adding the voices of the participants to the study and by conducting in-depth interviews in the target countries. The interview schedule was designed following a semi-structured interview protocol because this allowed flexibility as the researcher and interviewees interacted and elucidated some points to avoid misinterpretation and ambiguity. This was done to reinforce the reliability and credibility of the study by testing the major assumptions made during the theoretical phase that was based on the review of literature.

The same set of research questions were drafted for Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Liberia. The Liberian phase of the field research was important to gauge perceptions of the level of involvement of former President Charles Taylor as his participation was considered to be a destabilising factor in the political instability of the Mano River Union and Côte d'Ivoire crises. I translated the research questions administered to Côte d'Ivoire's participants from the English language into the French language. However, I conducted the interviews in both English

and French depending on the lingua franca the participants mastered best to avoid any ambiguity and misunderstanding. The research instruments are attached as appendices (4a, 4b, 5). Another strategy adopted to increase the reliability and credibility of the study was to test the research instruments by piloting the interviews.

3.6 Ethical Considerations and Guidelines Underpinning the Study

Ethical issues are very important and sensitive matters in research, especially when the population of study involves human beings. Neuman (2006:412) acknowledges that researching social lives raises ethical issues. Among the principal aims of ethical considerations are privacy, anonymity, and protection of confidentiality (Gray 2004; Neuman 2006). It is necessary to follow guidelines in order to get the approval from the appropriate authorities. The following steps were taken in order to comply with the rules of ethical practice.

Once the research instruments were duly approved by my supervisors they were submitted to the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of New England for approval. A letter of information bearing my institutional affiliation, which explains the aims of the study, and a consent form were issued with the approval No HE 08/112 and permission was granted to conduct the interviews. The documents were explicit that participation was voluntary, and that anonymity and confidentiality would be protected and the data collected would be used only for the objective of the present study. Moreover, the participants were assured that no form of deception, coercion, or inducement would be used to elicit answers from them. The participants were also told that no harm would result from the interviews because anonymity would be strictly adhered to. This information created a good atmosphere and confidence during my introduction to the participants. However, I had to read out and explain the purpose of my study

to some respondents who were semi-literate or illiterate in order to avoid confusion and ambiguities. These documents were attached to the letter of my institutional affiliation in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The facilitator in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) through the networks of his research institute contacted some gatekeepers in Liberia who were his colleagues and arranged for my interview schedule in Liberia.

3.7 Management of Interview Bias

According to Maykut and Morehouse (2004:85), it is good to conduct brainstorming sessions before the development of the questionnaire. Following this suggestion I had brainstorming sessions with my supervisors in order to generate ideas that might help to understand the focus of the study. The first draft of the questionnaire was reviewed by my supervisors. Corrections were made according to their suggestions and advice. The second draft was also submitted for their examination. The issue of bias in qualitative research is complex. Taylor and Bogdan (1998:109) point out that qualitative researchers may be more interested in conducting their studies from various perspectives than looking for "truth *per se*". One recurring issue among the groups of respondents in Côte d'Ivoire was ethnic division, which reflected their concerns regarding the issue of misrepresentation of the opinion of the members of their own ethnic group and the favouring of the rival groups. This initial mistrust indeed highlights the depth of the cleavages between rival ethnic groups. I reassured the respondents of the objectivity and impartiality of my research as well as reminding them of the ethics guiding the research, which were spelled out in the letter of information for the participants. The suggestions by Minichiello et al (1995:182-183) regarding the issue of trust and misperceptions as well as insider/outsider argument helped in successfully managing bias of ethnic groups. The suggestions proved useful while I interviewed members of some ethnic groups that were at war in Côte d'Ivoire. I explained to the respondents that I was virtually an insider (since I was

born in Côte d'Ivoire and had part of my education in the country) looking at the causes of the conflict from an outsider's perspectives. Furthermore, Neuman (2006:309) states that interview bias may result from factors such as age, race, the setting where the interview takes place, gender of the respondent, and the attendance of other members of the group. Therefore, the selection of the respondents cut across these demographic groups and the face-to-face and group interviews took place in quiet places with only the respondents and myself; and sometimes, as in Sierra Leone, the interviews were conducted in the presence of an interpreter who understands *krio*, and he is a student of Peace Studies.

Another bias which could have resulted from ambiguous cultural meanings of the interview guidelines was successfully managed by translating the research instruments from the English language into the French language for Côte d'Ivoire participants. The interviews in Côte d'Ivoire were conducted both in French and English. The wording of the semi-structured research instruments for the interview was drafted in clear and understandable terms to avoid the problem of misinterpretation that may result when the respondents understand different meanings and implications regarding the questionnaire (Neuman 2006:310). In one instance, I noticed that the presence of members of other ethnic groups altered the answers provided by a respondent. I had to do a follow up face-to-face interview later with the respondent alone. I also observed that the views of the respondents varied significantly depending on the primary roles (perpetrators or victims of violence) they played during the civil strife. I conducted the field research in the cities and rural areas that had been the scenes of the civil wars to avoid having only the opinion of one category of citizens and to make the results of the study more reliable and credible by having diverse views resulting from the interviews. I managed the issue of hierarchy credibility by interviewing the respondents according to their social classes which implies having the opinion of the powerful and the vulnerable. I was also conscious of the gender of respondents in the selection of the interviewees to ensure representativeness of their opinions.

3.8 The Pilot Study

Sarantakos (2005:256) describes a pilot or feasibility study as “a small-scale replica and a rehearsal of the main study”. I conducted a pilot study to pre-test data collection methods to evaluate the costs and duration, the efficiency, weaknesses and accuracy of the research instruments as well as the adequacy of the methodology of the study (Sarantakos 2005:256). The research instruments were pre-tested twice in New South Wales and Côte d’Ivoire. The research instruments were not initially pre-tested in the natural settings they were designed for because of budgetary and time constraints. The alternative solution was to interview some Sierra Leoneans and Liberians living in Armidale and Sydney in order to clarify any grey areas before leaving for fieldwork. Some potential respondents refused to be interviewed stating that they did not want to comment on their country of origin. I did not encounter any problem concerning the wording, understanding, and order of the research instruments.

The research instruments were piloted exhaustively again in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone during the first phase of my fieldwork with a more representative population of study. This proved very useful and the respondents did not show any sign of restiveness, or misunderstanding of the meaning of the questionnaire. However, the respondents suggested that term *loubardisme* should be expunged because it is a mode of violence and gangsterism that is outdated and not a relevant factor in the factor of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. However, the review of literature shows that some youths, the *loubards*, were involved in the political violence that preceded the war and became members of militia groups during the war (Konaté 2002; Galy 2004). Therefore, I kept the term *loubardisme* because it was useful to the explanation of youth violence in Côte d’Ivoire. The respondents urged me to be objective in my research because of the sensitivity of the questions and the issues raised, especially, ethnicity and the land issues.

In Sierra Leone, the interviewees objected to the inclusion of stealing as a contributing factor during the preliminary study. The respondents revealed that stealing among the youth was not a factor that contributed to the war. But stealing is rather linked to urban violence. Consequently, questions on stealing were removed from the research instruments. The pilot study not only allowed me to have a uniform questionnaire framework that later made the analysis of the data easier for cross-case comparability, it also gave me the opportunity to be more familiar with the interview protocols.

3.9 Conducting the Study

3.9.1 Site

There were three countries Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia where interviews were conducted and secondary data researched. Firstly, the field research was conducted in the three countries between December 28, 2008 and February 28, 2009. Secondly, the dynamics of the “no peace, no war” situation, the fact that a key informant revealed during the end of my first fieldwork in Côte d'Ivoire that ethnic violence was more rampant in the west of the country than the north-south ethnic cleavages was the rationale for carrying out the second phase of interviews in Côte d'Ivoire between December 10, 2009 and February 2, 2010.

3.9.2 Participants

The participants in the study consisted of the perpetrators of these conflicts (government and rebels), the victims, members of the impartial forces and the clergy, diplomats, civil society, and non-governmental agencies. The fieldwork focuses on respondents in the west of the Côte d'Ivoire because of the roles of Liberians and former Sierra Leonean fighters, and violence between ethnic

factions across the borders of Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Ero and Marshall 2003:90-93). Furthermore, the need to investigate the role of the youths and their motivation according to the frustration and aggression theory and the mushrooming of youth movements and militia in the Ivorian conflict as well as the atrocities they perpetrated were also among the factors that resulted in the second stage of interviews (Marshall-Fratani 2006:28-31). These were reasons for conducting the second stage of field research in Côte d'Ivoire in order to spread the representativeness of the population of study and also to give more reliability to the study.

3.10 Data Collection

The collection of data from the field mainly involved interviewing the participants. Taylor and Bogdan (1998:98) define an interview as a “form of social interaction”. Consequently, I interacted with the participants in order to familiarise myself with the settings and facilitate the interview sessions. Face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions or focus interviews were used alternatively depending on the number of respondents. Neuman (2006:301) asserts that the advantages of face-to face interviews are a high response rate and that they are good for relatively long and opened-ended research instruments. The other side of the coin is that interviews are costly in time and effort in addition to the bias that needs to be successfully managed. The face-to-face interview was generally within the time frame anticipated during the development of the questionnaire and the pilot study (25 minutes to one hour) using the semi-structured interviewing approach. The duration of the focus interviews depended on the number of respondents and their level of understanding of, and reaction to the research instruments, and interaction between them either to confirm or correct an opinion of one of the respondents. Focus interviews were used because they allowed the researcher to gather data more promptly and are less expensive than individual interviews; and they are revealing as the respondents can interact or react to issues raised during the conversation (Taylor and Bogdan 1998; Minichiello et al 1995).

The letter of information with the letter head of the University of New England bearing the names and signatures of my supervisors and mine gave more credence to the research so doubts were dissipated. However, this was not always the case during the first phase of the data collection, for example when I interviewed some rebels in Côte d'Ivoire who did not understand the reasons why they should be interviewed because I was not a journalist. A government soldier who just arrived from the war front and some factional ethnic leaders in Côte d'Ivoire raised similar doubts. At one point during the field research, a respondent asked me if I was not collecting information for the French. Also, in Sierra Leone, former RUF fighters wanted to know the implications of the research for their security and had to hold a meeting before I was allowed to conduct the interviews. I conducted in total fifty-eight individual interviews comprising twenty-eight interviews in Sierra Leone, twenty-five in Côte d'Ivoire and five in Liberia. In Sierra Leone a further twenty-eight respondents, some of whom were youths, took part in the two focus group discussions. One female took part in the second focus group discussion and I interviewed two female RUF combatants individually. In Côte d'Ivoire twenty five respondents took part in the two focus group discussions. Basic background information on the individuals interviewed is provided in Appendix 9.

Furthermore, I also had e-interviews with two respondents in Côte d'Ivoire. The first was a missionary who was unavoidably absent during the field research and a key informant who consented only to fielding questions through the internet. He highlighted the ethnic conflicts in the West of Côte D'Ivoire. The information provided by this key gatekeeper led to an understanding of the causes of the ethnic conflicts in the West of Côte d'Ivoire. This information corroborated the previous view of another respondent. I had one e-interview in Sierra Leone.

Apart from these three exceptions all the interviews were audio-taped. As Bryman (2001:321) puts it "in qualitative research, the interview is usually tape-recorded and transcribed". The interviews were mostly conducted in quiet

settings without outside interferences which could have affected the quality of the tape recording and invasion of privacy which may worry the respondents (Bryman 2001:317-318). Minichiello et al (1995:98) outline the advantages of audio-tape recording as follows

[i]t can enhance greater rapport by allowing a more natural conversational style. The interviewer is free to be an attentive and thoughtful listener. The raw data remains on the record. Therefore, all the material is available for analysis when the researcher has the time to concentrate fully...A more accurate picture remains because both questions and answers are recorded. Validity is enhanced by this preservation of authentic data.

The negative side of tape recording is that some participants may feel unsafe, lack confidence, or may be unfamiliar with audio-tape recording technique (Hayes and Mattimoe 2004:362). Other reasons why some participants refuse to be audio-taped are the problems associated with inhibition, loss of concentration during the interview session because of the use of tape, or the misinterpretation of data in the absence of the interviewees when data are analysed by the researcher (Minichiello et al 1995:99). However, these fears and apprehensions were anticipated so that I explained to the participants the reasons why the interviews would be audio-taped in order to create confidence and trust, in addition to providing them with the letter of information which was quite explicit on the objectives of the present research.

I listened analytically to the participants during the interview sessions and this strategy allowed me to take field notes that served as complementary references by observing the participants' mood or reaction to each question. Although I adopted the strategy of listening to the participants, I was not passive as I had to contribute by asking the participants to clarify a point or to be more explicit because as Minichiello et al (1995:101) rightly mention that

the researcher needs to fully participate in the initiation, maintenance and closing of the in-depth interview but at the same time to sustain a critical inner dialogue.

This approach gave enough time and confidence to the participants to elaborate on their own participation in the civil war, their experience, knowledge, and observation depending on the roles they played during the conflict as a fighter, victim, keen observer or analyst. I used the research instruments as a guide to maintain and direct the flow of the interview. The size of the tape machine, which is a mini-pocket digital audio-tape recorder, contributed to the confidence-building strategy as the participants did not have the impression that they were being grilled.

Apart from conducting face to face interviews, and carrying out archival research in the library of the University of Abidjan, the *Centre Culturel Français* (CCF), and the University of Fourah Bay College's library in Sierra Leone, I also attended a seminar organised by the peace studies students of the University of Fourah Bay College. Coincidentally, the speaker was an Ivorian and a UN official working in Freetown. He accepted to be interviewed in his office the following day.

Once adequate raw materials had been collected from the field, I decided to disengage from the field work. I explained to some of the participants that disengaging did not mean the end of the research and that I could still contact them through the telephone or via e-mail to clarify some issues during the analysis of the raw materials. Most of the interviewees, especially the members of focus groups in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire were happy that such research was also conducted in the rural areas instead of the researcher staying only in the urban areas. The next phase was to process the information into data.

3.11 Aide-mémoire, Observation, and Field Notes

3.11.1 Aide-mémoire

The second level of data collection involved using an aide-mémoire. I developed a research diary to facilitate my field notes taking and observations. According to Minichiello et al (1995:216)

The researcher is also an observer. Information is collected about the facial and physical expressions of the informant, the details of the setting and perceptual impressions.

Griffiths (1996:29) states that “diaries act as an aide-mémoire in interviews”. Furthermore, Barbour (2003:1020) notes that another advantage of using an aide-mémoire is that it allows the researcher to critically review “the research practice and to strive toward improvement”. Some steps were taken to ensure that every phase of the field work was covered.

The aide-mémoire was particularly useful during piloting because it was essential in assessing and reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the research instruments. Moreover, the research diary has some characteristics such as regularity in the order of dates, entries, and being contemporaneous (Alaszewski 2006:2). In addition, I used a face sheet for demographic information on the characteristics of the interviewees at the beginning of each interviews as well as noting the settings.

This approach allowed me to check the authenticity of the accounts given by the participants as well as testing the theories in the field for their validity and noting the core elements that supported the opinion of the participants. The research diary allowed me to double-check information and compare the commonalities and differences among the various shades of views given by the participants while I analysed the respondents' views.

3.11.2 Observational Notes and Field Notes

My observational notes reinforced the mental pictures I had of the participants, their attitudes and frame of mind, the atmosphere around the sites, before and during the interviews and thus enriched and underpinned the discussions and analyses of the data. Jotted and mental notes were also taken depending on the situation and locations, sometimes comparing the links between the causal factors of the two civil wars.

The strategy of using such a documentary approach was useful as I was able to compare my field notes, observation notes, and dates of appointments with my entries in my diary. A provisional summary of the activities of each day was summed up to determine the next site for interview according to the characteristics of the respondents and the focus of the target group.

3.12 Data Management and Analysis Strategies

The management of data and their analyses involves three interrelated core tasks: data display, conclusion drawing and verification (Weitzman 2000; Gray 2004; Babbie 2010). Furthermore, Miles and Huberman (1994:12) assert that data collection and analysis is “a cyclical process” that allows the qualitative researcher to weave back and forth between data display, and preliminary conclusions and verification of the raw material collected. The analyses of the respondents’ views were organised according to the thematic approaches, and theories used for the case studies because as Babbie (2010:394) points out, there is “a continuing interplay between data collection and theory”. The dissection of data involves categorising their elements such as identification, and examination of the meaning of themes, interpretation, and classification of the data in a transcript file (Minichiello et al 1995; Bryman 2001; Corbetta 2003; Neuman 2006; Babbie 2010). The process of data gathering had started with the literature review

that allowed me to categorise the factors suggested according to the emerging themes drawn from the secondary data and this provided the opportunity to familiarise myself with the themes of the research instruments. Ryan and Bernard (2003:274) acknowledge that “coding is the heart and soul of *whole-text analysis*”. I also used some descriptive tables to explain the factors of the two civil wars. The tabular description was done for clarity and easy identification purposes (Pettigrew and Roberts 2006:172-173). The next phase was to display the data.

3.13 Data Display

Data display is an integral part of analysis. According to Weitzman (2000:806) data display refers to the method of “placing selected or reduced data in a condensed, organized format, such as a matrix or network, for inspection”. In addition, Miles and Huberman (1994:111) state that data display “permits conclusion drawing”. The characteristics of data display are structured summaries, synopses, charts, and graphs (Weitzman 2000:806). Furthermore, Miles and Huberman (1994:11) state that data display is a template of the qualitative method to sort out and overhaul (in a rational and understandable manner) the processed data. Therefore, data display was carried out by further outlining, summarising, organising, and harmonising the primary and secondary data according to the themes that were identified using the research instruments, the participants’ views, and field notes as guides in the analyses. The logical and last step of the methodological procedure of display is conclusion drawing and verification that allowed the researcher to make inferences and draw substantiation from the themes, conceptual frameworks, and theories of the present study.

3.14 Preliminary Conclusion Drawing and Verification

Weitzman (2000:806) notes that conclusion drawing/verification is a process whereby the researcher subjects the data displayed to a rigorous examination in order to substantiate and validate the findings. Miles and Huberman (1994:11) state that conclusion drawing may be in an embryonic and tentative form from the beginning of data collection. This can be systematically done by paying attention to the recurring patterns of the themes, the fundamental flow, in which the themes appear and are explained (Miles and Huberman 1994:11). A cross-case examination of the causal factors that appeared from the field research was used by analytically checking the dissimilarities and commonalities between the data on the themes to draw conclusions. The conclusions were later subjected to substantiation. The verification process was done to evaluate review the findings.

3.15 Conclusion

This chapter has examined and outlined the research methods that were applied to the study. Semi-structured research instruments were used to conduct in-depth interviews. These methods are appropriate for qualitative methodology. The chapter also touched on the theories that were examined in the research instruments which are the economic theory of war (greed and grievances) and the psychological postulations (frustration and aggression) as well as the role of ethnicity among other factors that could explain the reasons for the wars and the motivations of the actors. The participants provided their perceptions of the causal factors related to these two civil conflicts. This chapter shows the steps taken to ensure that the instruments of research were as reliable as possible in the circumstances. Later chapters will focus on analyses of the information as provided by the participants.

Chapter Four

The Sierra Leone Case Study

4.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine to what extent and by what mechanisms socio-economic injustice, cronyism, and warlordism resulted in the Sierra Leone Civil War. The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) was the most ruthless in the annals of West African insurgencies which have erupted after the conclusion of Cold War rivalries between communism and capitalism as acted out by proxies in Africa. This extreme violence resulted because the combatants did not follow the laws of war (international humanitarian law). This added new terms²⁶ to the atrocities of war and the killing of innocent civilians (children, women, and the aged) and using children as soldiers contrary to the fact that this group has legal protection under many international conventions. For the rank and file of the rebels, Kamajors and even the government soldiers illiteracy and lack of formal training meant that very few would have been aware of legal provisions for the rights of combatants, civilians and children. In contrast, many would have been familiar with sometimes brutal traditional practices.

Further, the chapter looks at the interlocking and contributing factors that resulted in the civil war. The ethnicisation of politics and the armed forces by the ruling APC marginalised other ethnic groups (Kandeh 1992a; Bangura 2000; Keen 2003). The politics of marginalisation also affected the educational system in which “prospective students’ patronage ties and ethnic identity” were criteria necessary to have access to government scholarships and education (Kandeh 1999:357). Moreover, Kandeh (1999:357) explains that the

anomaly of ‘admission without scholarship’ and ‘scholarship without admission’ expressed precisely the sort of injustices that alienated the vast majority of Sierra Leone youth.

This situation became more complicated because of the increasing inability of the government to provide employment to the youth or even pay salaries of employees (Kandeh 1999: 357-358). The mismanagement of the economy and the crises and deepening poverty which followed the introduction of IMF conditionalities, the predation of the elite and lumpen banditry were factors that contributed to the Civil War (Luke 1988; Reno 1995; Peters and Richards 1998; Kandeh 1999; Bøas 2007). In addition, the involvement of external leaders such as Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, Charles Taylor, and Houphouët-Boigny in supporting the rebellion contributed to the war (Bangura 2000; Abraham 2001; Abdullah 2004). One can only speculate as to what the course of events would have been in the absence of this external intervention.

The Sierra Leone War that started on March 23, 1991, was a deep reflection of the beginning of the geographic spill-over of instability in the West African sub-region-even apart from the myriad of problems caused by refugees in some countries, and especially, in the towns bordering neighbouring war affected countries (Ero and Marshall 2003; Abdullah 2004). Although the proximate causal factors are intrinsically linked to issues of maladministration, marginalisation, and neo-patrimonial policies that resulted in wide spread poverty, the external dimensions are linked to the snowball effects of the first Liberian Civil War, (1989-1996) led by Charles Taylor. The Sierra Leone conflict reveals the interconnectivity between endogenous and exogenous variables as triggers of internal strife.

The causative factors of the long drawn out Sierra Leone internal strife (1991-2002) have many entry-points and their internal and external dynamics are intertwined. Despite its rich endowment in natural resources such as diamonds, bauxite, rutile, and iron ore, Sierra Leone suffers from the so-called paradox of plenty, otherwise known as the “resource curse” (Ross 2004:350) which is the trademark of the minerals boom in many African countries²⁷. In fact, Sierra Leone

has consistently and conspicuously been listed among the poorest countries of the world (for example by the World Bank and in the UNDP's Human Development Index). Generally, two main traits are outstanding as the result of the exploitation of natural resources in Africa (oil exploitation and diamond mining in this case). The exploitation of natural resources has led to economic breakdown and political instability which leaves the masses as poverty stricken victims. This irony is encapsulated by this revealing fable on Sierra Leone²⁸

At the time of creation, it is said, God created a tiny country rich in mineral wealth, with diamonds, gold, bauxite, rutile, iron ore, chromite and platinum; an abundance of off-shore fish; relatively fertile land; and plenty of rainfall. People from the neighbouring territories became furious and demanded equal treatment. God however, cautioned them with the caveat that they should wait and see what kind of government would rule over Sierra Leone (Zack-Williams 1990:22).

This study uses state elitism²⁹ as a guiding theory to explain how the ruling elite in Sierra Leone mismanaged the economy and disempowered the people. The misgovernance was carried out through bad socio-economic policies that promoted social injustice and mortgaged Sierra Leone's future by trapping the populace into the carnage, affliction and other concurrent effects of civil war when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) used atrocious violence on its helpless and often innocent victims. Bad governance and inequitable sharing of the wealth provoked rebellion which resulted in war which yet further impoverished the population.

The external connections of the Sierra Leone civil conflict began with Liberia in 1989 when Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an insurgency in Liberia against Sgt. Samuel Doe's regime. Since then several of the West African countries lost their political stability (Appendix 1). The form of instability that was associated with violent regime change was the intervention of the military elite in the governance of their countries leading to quasi-anarchy or civil war³⁰.

4.2 Sierra Leone: A Mosaic of Ethno-linguistic Groups

The sociological configuration of Sierra Leone is a complex web of indigenous ethnic groups combined with a density of those descended from settlers who had had experience of the Western world during the slave trade. Alie (1990:6) explains that the ethnic configuration of Sierra Leone is made up of seventeen ethnic groups that can be divided into three main ethno-linguistic groups, namely the “Mande, Mel, and others”. The Mande ethno-linguistic group comprises the “Mende, Loko, Kono, Vai (Gallinas), Soso, Yalunka, Koranko, and Madingo”; while the “Temne, Sherbro (Bullom), Krim, Kissi, and Gola” ethno-linguistic category form the Mel group; and the third grouping consists of the “Limba, Fula, Kru, and Krio” (Alie 1990:11). Quoting Alie further, it is worth noting that the Limba are recognised among the earliest inhabitants of present day Sierra Leone, and the Bullom are among “the oldest inhabitants of the Sierra Leone coast” (Alie 1990:12). Numerically, the Temne and the Mende are the dominant ethnic groups in the demography of the country (Ogunmola and Badmus 2006:82). According to a 2007 estimate Sierra Leone has a population of 6,610, 267 people (World Bank 2009). The statistics of the ethnic composition of Sierra Leone are as follows: Temne 30%, Mende 30%, other smaller ethnic groups together represent 30% while the Krio make up 10% of the population (World Bank, accessed on August 28, 2009).

Like other parts of coastal Sub-Saharan Africa, the shores of Sierra Leone became anchor points for the slave trade. The ethnic landscape changed noticeably when the British decided to look for an outlet for returnee slaves and bought a piece of land from Koya Temne chiefs to resettle some of the victims of the slave trade who were known as creoles or Krio. Young (1993:91-92) observes that the coast of Sierra Leone was used as a place of settlement for the freed slaves and “a hinterland was attached which had no relationship to the returned slaves, partly acculturated by their residence beyond seas”.

With this arrangement,

freed slaves...who represent less than 3% of the population became part of the ethnic configuration in Sierra Leone. The Creole, with their vantage position and background in education, became politically and historically dominant in Sierra Leone's life (Ogunmola and Badmus 2006:83).

However, the land issue became controversial and pushed the Temne to be opposed to the colonists as it appears that the Koya Temne chiefs had a different understanding of the terms of the agreement. For the Temne believed that "land had only been leased, not sold". Moreover, in Temne customary law "land was not saleable" (Alie 1990: 62).

There were at least five successive waves of settlers in Sierra Leone who had been brought back by the Sierra Leone Company, an association of British philanthropists. Osae and Odunsi (1973: 41) state that

[t]here were the original settlers who had been brought from England in 1787 and their descendants. Secondly; there were the Nova Scotians, Negroes who had fought on the side of the British during the War of Independence [because they had been promised freedom and land to fight alongside the British]. After the war was over, for fear that these Negroes might be victimized by the newly proclaimed United States of America, the British Government had removed them to Nova Scotia [in order to fulfil their promise].

The third wave was the Maroon slaves who ran away from Jamaica after their revolt against the Jamaican government. They were later subdued and taken to Sierra Leone Colony via to Nova Scotia (Osae and Odunsi 1973:41). There was also a panoply of Africans who migrated to Sierra Leone. The fourth contingent which was the largest wave consisted of the "recaptive slaves" or [Liberated Africans] (Hirsch 2001a:23) who were mainly of Nigerian descent and were Yoruba and Igbo. Osae and Odunsi (1973:42) indicate that "[d]uring the 1820s and 1830s thousands of fresh captives were brought to Sierra Leone. Many of them were Yoruba and Igbo from Nigeria. It is said that there were as many as seventeen main distinct ethnic groups of captives in Sierra Leone...The captives from Yoruba-land in Western Nigeria, known as Aku, formed the dominant group". A

large number of the recaptives found solace in monotheism while others still clung to the worship of traditional deities such as the Yoruba god of thunder *Sango* (Alie 1990:74). Some elements of Yoruba cultural and traditional values still remain and are noticeable in contemporary Sierra Leone (Personal observation, January 2009)³¹.

Armed with the effects of western civilisation as a way of climbing the social ladder and equipped with western education Krio influence transcended Sierra Leone and spread to West Africa as well as to the administrative machinery of British West Africa (Osae and Odunsi 1973; Crowder 1977; Wyse 1991). Furthermore, in the political terrain of Sierra Leone, the Creoles became a power base to be reckoned with as they were represented in the Executive and Legislative Councils at the time.

In 1898 a turning point took place in the Colony. In order to protect British trade and ward off the looming French threats, after Samory Touré and his armies were defeated with his capture in 1898, and to provide a secure naval base for its ships, the British government empowered the government of the Colony to sign new treaties with the indigenous chiefs and a protectorate was proclaimed (Osae and Odunsi 1973:47). The colonial power's political strategy had been to sideline articulate and progressive Sierra Leoneans and co-opt traditional chiefs who were more receptive of colonial policies and thus the chiefs became the beneficiaries of the colonial administration (Alie 2006:8) under the Indirect Rule System. However the chiefs remained suspicious of the educated new elite.

In time, the Creoles' political domination began to wane and finally became moribund with the emergence of political consciousness among the elite of the larger ethnic groups coupled with the policy of political exclusion by British authorities against the Creoles (Hirsch 2001a:24). Unlike many African countries where ethno-politics had resulted in acute regional cleavages that had already

undermined the unity of the country as the sun set on colonialism, in Sierra Leone, it was the acrimony which the issue of citizenship/nationality generated: particularly the Creole question brought about by the distinction between the people of the Colony and the Protectorate (Alie 2006:35).

On the economic front, commerce became one of the salient aspects of the Creoles' power base. Osae and Odunsi (1973:43) note that the recaptives, owing to their commercial acumen, and emboldened by handsome returns from their trade surmounted many challenges.

The socio-economic configuration of Sierra Leone changed considerably with the discovery of alluvial diamonds in 1930 in Kono and Kenema Districts. Saylor (1967:59) argues that the scramble for spontaneous wealth and the diamond exodus adversely affected agricultural output. The viability of agriculture was further reduced by the low prices the Marketing Board was offering to farmers, while on the other the discovery of new diamond mines attracted "an estimated 50, 000 to 100, 000 Sierra Leoneans [who] left their farms and jobs to prospect, both legally and illegally" for diamond's "in spite of mass deportations, and in defiance of legislation enacted to restrict such movements" (Saylor 1967:59). This was a forerunner of the disastrous and criminal neglect of the agricultural sector in the post-colonial period. Alie (2006:17) explains further that, in order to avert a major social crisis, the colonial government was compelled to import substantial quantities of rice to supplement domestic production.

This neglect of agriculture would perennially plague post-independence Sierra Leone. For example, Hirsch (2001a:27) states that "local agriculture was severely hit in the Kono region as many workers were drawn to mining". Already in the early post independence years, Sierra Leone's status had changed from being an exporter to an importer of rice, coupled with the reality that the land issue became a real handicap for the agricultural sector as farmers had to struggle with

miners for arable land that was also useful for alluvial mining activities (Zack-Williams 1990:23). In the twilight of colonial rule, the vital land issue was compounded by the introduction of new export crops (coffee and cocoa) which made traditional rulers more influential as they collected money for land use as well as rents from the mining areas (Zack-Williams 1982:79-80).

4.3 Post-colonial Sierra Leone: The Failure of Political Leadership

Immediately after independence, the new Sierra Leonean state was enmeshed in a series of political crises and vendettas that impacted severely on nation-building. The first casualty of the inconsistent policies was the education sector. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Sierra Leone was the admiration of African intelligentsia owing to the high standards of its educational system, and the country was rightly seen as the “Athens of West Africa” (Hirsch 2001a:13). The signs of institutional decay were rapidly quite discernible. Wyse (1991:110) notes that the victory of the Sierra Leone’s People’s Party (SLPP) under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai at the 1961 presidential poll was keenly contested by the All People’s Congress (APC), this obliterated the Creoles’ political ambitions but that victory “did not destroy the Krio people”. It is acknowledged that “the Mendes of southeastern Sierra Leone traditionally provide the bulk of support for the SLPP” (Zack-Williams 1999:150).

Initially, there was a crisis of succession, generated by the death of Sir Milton Margai, on April 28 1964. Regrettably, he had failed to enshrine mechanisms of succession in the constitution (Alie 2006:40-41). Although other party stalwarts were interested in the political leadership of Sierra Leone, the younger brother of the late Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai emerged to the detriment of the unity of the party because many influential members of the SLPP felt offended by his rise to power (Alie 2006:41). Moreover, Sir Albert Margai did not help matters by failing to pacify the dissident members of the party who later stood as

independent candidates, and he painfully tried to push through his bill for a one party system that was virulently opposed by the APC (Alie 2006:51). Therefore, it was on very slippery ground that the SLPP went to the 1967 Parliamentary elections. Although the Prime Minister tried to cling to power, the SLPP lost to the APC.

Subsequently, the Governor-General appointed the leader of the APC, Siaka Stevens, as Prime Minister. However, a crisis ensued and the democratic process was halted by the military when a faction loyal to the SLPP led by the Army Commander, Brigadier David Lansana, struck on March 21, 1967 when the new Prime Minister and some of staunch members of the APC fled to Guinea-Conakry (Alie 2006 :53). However, the junta was short-lived as a group of majors overthrew the regime. The counter coup of the March 23 1967 was apparently a vendetta within the military against their superior officer: Brigadier David Lansana (Alie 2006:60-62). A third coup carried out by non-commissioned officers on April 17, 1968 reinstated Prime Minister Siaka Stevens. It is instructive to note that Siaka Stevens had originally left the SLPP to create the All People Congress (APC) on the ground that the SLPP was “overly conservative and elitist” and still under British tutelage³² (Smillie, Gberie, Hazleton 2000:43).

In his anxious moves to strengthen his personal power and the survival of his regime during his seventeen year rule (1968-1985), Prime Minister Siaka Stevens used the one party state and the manipulation of the electoral process together with ruthless methods such as the involvement of youth as political thugs to harass his opponents, and muzzling of dissenting voices within the armed forces, the judiciary, and the political class often by co-opting its members into his system (Wyrod 2008:72). In 1971 he made himself President with sweeping executive powers; and co-opted some of his political opponents³³, all firmly rooted in his patrimonial and clientelist systems (Luke 1988; Reno 1995). The alleged abortive coup of 1970 had resulted in the execution of Brigadier Bangura (who had previously led the successful pro-democratic coup of 1968 which originally put

Siaka Stevens in power as prime minister) and gave Stevens the opportunity to further consolidate his single-handed grip on power (Wyse 1991:119). That the installation of the one party system was carried out after Stevens had virulently opposed the SLPP's attempt at one party rule was just one of the many contradictions of President Siaka Stevens³⁴ a man who described himself in his autobiography as sometimes acting against his own character (Luke 1988; Reno 1995).

A section of the country, in the Pujehun District, a political base of the SLPP near the Liberian border, rebelled against the rigging of the results of the 1982 elections by the APC. This was known as the *Ndorgbowusi Bush War* and government forces had to use extreme violence to quell the insurgency (Alie 2006:99). This rebellion and its suppression would have serious national security consequences for Sierra Leone nine years later.

4.4 The State and Chiefdoms, Land Ownership in Sierra Leone

The politics of patrimonialism and clientelism with their associated corruption have characterised national politics and the mining of diamonds in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately for the less privileged Sierra Leoneans, who bear the brunt of the mismanagement of the national wealth, the mineral resources boom has become a source of doom by generating despair for the down-trodden whilst diamond mining created wealth for the powerful with the 'right' connections (Zack-Williams 1995; Davies 2000).

Diamonds were discovered in commercial quantity in the 1930s. The principal diamond deposits are found in the forests of the south and east in Kono and Kenema districts near the Sierra Leonean borders with Guinea and Liberia (Clapham 2003:17). Diamond mining began in strength after World War II (Richards 2001:69). In 1934 the colonial government empowered the Sierra

Leonean Selection Trust (SLST), an off-spring of De Beers to mine diamonds exclusively through a lease for ninety-nine years (Hirsch 2001a:27). However, this policy alienated Sierra Leoneans as they were denied the opportunity to extract and benefit from this wealth. The colonial government reinforced the control of land and its ownership by the paramount traditional chiefs through the Indirect System (Keen 2005:12). This policy reinforced the pre-colonial hierarchical political system that was deeply rooted in the predominance of the ruling families who derived their wealth from land through the Protectorate Native Law Ordinance of 1905 (Fenton cited in Richards, Bah, and Vincent 2004:2). The policy made the position of chief much more alluring and rewarding. The ruling families competed for chieftaincies because of the benefits and influence they could derive from the control of land. In Mende and Kono regions, ownership of land is hereditary and land could be leased (Fithen, cited in Keen 2005:13).

Furthermore, Richards, Bah, and Vincent (2004:3) explain that

The ruling families divided into “treaty chiefs” recognized by the British, and others who rejected British rule. Those who rejected British rule were especially notable in the Liberia border region, and some border chiefs (of Gola and Kissi background). For this reason, Kailahun district has retained its reputation as a “difficult region” even to this day, and the RUF exploited some of the grievances of those “excluded” families.

Richards, Bah, and Vincent (2004:6) conclude that “land stands at heart of the system”. Of course, this is true when natural resources abound in the land or it is suitable for agriculture or peasant farming as well as grazing. As a Yoruba proverb tells us “he who owns the slave owns the luggage he or she carries”. By implications, the ownership of land made the paramount chiefs *de facto* owners of natural resources in their domain and not the people who are their subjects. Another backlash from colonial policy was the controversy surrounding the re-demarcation of Sierra Leone’s borders in 1911. Richards (2004: 6) mentions that

[c]olonialism divided many border families, and excluded some from chieftaincy, resulting in a long history of dissidence by certain local land-owning groups...A number of chiefs in Kailahun District, for example refusing to recognize British overrule in 1896, and prevented from contesting colonial chieftaincy elections, developed a nomadic existence, in villages strung across the Liberian, Guinean and Sierra Leonean borders.

Another source of grievance against the traditional chiefs was that the paramount chiefs in the rural zone can overrule land owing families and in most cases their decisions are final (Unruh and Turray 2006:2). This shows the supremacy of the paramount chiefs to the detriment of the people despite the fact that post-independence government was diametrically at variance with the chieftaincy system. The post-colonial political class found it difficult to alter this policy for 'selfish interest' and political calculations and manipulations. Most importantly, the Kailahun and Pujehun districts were the political catchment areas of the SLPP and the APC government ensured the effective marginalisation of these 'stubborn Districts' because of its inability to place them under its sphere of influence as Richards (2004:13) points out

Opposition in Kailahun and parts of Pujehun Districts in 1970s to the regime of Siaka Stevens caused Freetown to cut back on normal investments in road repairs, schools and salaries, in the hope of coercing political compliance. Chiefs came to be seen either as Freetown stooges, or predatory on young people as they sought to make (sic) the loss of revenue and services from central government.

In addition, the prolonged neglect and isolation of the rural areas created profound grievances and bitterness against the APC ruling elite. Davies (2000: 354-355) notes that

Stevens's regime aggravated isolation of rural Sierra Leone-home to 80% of the population and producing much of the country's wealth. The railway linking the rural area to Freetown was dismantled in the early 1970s while no road net-work replaced it in the rural areas.

The RUF used the perceived accumulated injustices against the people of the hinterland to recruit rebels. Alienation by government and traditional authorities alike set the population and especially the youths who were at the 'receiving end' of bad policies against the ruling class.

One of the issues the RUF raised in its political propaganda was the land problem. This was intrinsically linked to the dismal output of the agricultural sector

because “the acquisition of land for mining purposes reduced the availability of arable land” (Zack-Williams 1995:181). The insurgents claimed that one of their aims was a policy of rural restructuring (Richards 2004:16) and they wanted accountability for Sierra Leone’s “misappropriated mineral wealth” (Richards 2001:73). The communities who live-in the gemstones areas live in abject poverty amid huge deposits of mineral resources that are the economic life line of the country and ironically, they are economically incapacitated by the very wealth whose benefits they cannot enjoy, such as in the case of the Niger-Delta in Nigeria (Omeje 2006:478-479). Instead of emancipating the people, “[p]oliticians, powerful chiefs in the diamonds-rich chiefdoms, and Lebanese traders made a fortune, but the ordinary Sierra Leoneans’ standard of living continued to decline throughout the 1980s” (Zack-Williams 1999:148). Reno (1995: 56-57) draws attention to the fact that many chiefs had been involved in diamond mining during the colonial era as a result of the indirect rule system. This created a ferment of frustration and resentment. Such antagonism was often in the form of migration to Freetown (to swell the colony of urban unemployed youth) or out migration to neighbouring countries.

Besides, Clapham (2003:14) notes that

(...) diamond miners were excluded from the ‘official’ lines of communication, directed through the paramount chiefs, through which the formal politics was conducted, and on which its politicians largely depended to extract their rent from diamond mining.

However, the SLST ceded large mining areas to the Sierra Leonean government in 1955 but kept the rich diamond areas around Yengema and Tongo Fields (Keen 2005:12). In 1956, a new scheme, the Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance and Rules gave Sierra Leoneans mining rights under certain conditions (Saylor 1967:127-134). Subsequently, this provided the opportunity for the most affluent to profit from the liberalisation. Those who could afford the licenses and the necessary rudimentary equipment were often chiefs, politicians, and most importantly traders (Keen 2005 12:13). “Capital was supplied by a Lebanese trading Diaspora” (Richards 2001:69). Richards (2001:70) notes that “the central figures in Siaka Stevens’ APC system had well-established stakes in Kono

diamonds” to the detriment of budding politicians who had to explore “less well-known deposits including those along the Liberian border”. Richards (2001:69) explains the pattern and division of labour in mining alluvial diamonds as follows

[a] typical small-scale alluvial diamond mining operation is likely to involve a Lebanese “supporter” in partnership with a landowner or a political protector from the national elite...A trusted mine manager will supervise a team of diggers in the bush. Laborers are generally known as “sand sand boys.

The alluvial nature of some of Sierra Leone’s diamond deposits makes predation easy. Silberfein (2004: 215) is of the view that “alluvial diamonds attract “casual miners who dig pits in river beds and pan for diamonds” with its concomitant hasardous effects coupled with the fact that they are at mercy of landowners and entrepreneurs.




Figure 1: Actors in Sierra Leone Licit and Illicit Alluvial Diamond Mining.
Source: Ogunmola 2009.

Cartwright (1978: 34) also highlights the peculiar nature of Sierra Leone diamond deposits, which are alluvial and do not need sophisticated equipment for digging.

Davies (2000: 353) states that Siaka Stevens contributed to the rush to the diamonds mines by pledging “free-for-all mining if elected” during the 1967 general elections and this promise led to the explosion of illicit mining when he came to power in 1968. Keeping this electoral pledge would exacerbate of the perennial problems of contraband gemstones being exported to Guinea and

Liberia that dates back to the colonial days (Saylor 1967: 59). Neighbouring countries with minimal deposits of their own became major diamond exporters

Often, the diggers are young unemployed males who are sent to sweat in the bush and not to school. The feeling of bitterness which is associated with diamond mining is not new. It had already been noticed that as part of the prologue to independence the political tone “was filled with feelings of “relative deprivation” that political parties vented against the chiefs (Reno 1995:59).

4.5 Post-Colonial Era Sierra Leone: An Economy Under Siege

Sierra Leone had no reason to be poor (Luke 1988:73).

The above aphorism aptly captures the abysmal failure of the political leaders to emancipate the citizens. Siaka Stevens wove his network of patrimonial relationships to lubricate his clientelist regime to the detriment of the development of Sierra Leone (Adebajo 2002:81). Luke and Riley³⁵ (1989:134) observe that

[t]he consequences of this pattern of politics are to be seen in a range of arenas, skewing development efforts and undermining the mobilization and redistribution of resources for public benefit.

Reno (1995:143) argues that the Sierra Leonean economy was virtually under the tutelage of the Lebanese businessmen who were filling the gap created by the inability of the Siaka Stevens' government to control vital economic resources as the Head of State “was himself becoming deeply involved in business”. Most of Sierra Leone's economic systems as bequeathed to the post-colonial state were gravely mismanaged during the protracted rule of Siaka Stevens. The sub-standard economic programmes and poor performance were due to both exogenous and endogenous factors. The former include unfavourable terms of international trade, the oil shock, the debt overhang and its crippling effects

which are not peculiar to Sierra Leone. The latter included inconsistent economic policies, ineffective monitoring of the mineral trade, and serious lapses that encouraged the illicit mining of natural resources (Luke 1988; Reno 1995). There was also the widespread smuggling that was the hallmarks of the gemstone trade, and the collapse of basic infrastructure (Luke 1988; Reno 1995). Zack-Williams (1999:145) notes that Siaka Stevens institutionalised “the ‘shadow state’ in his quest to control the diamond-rich Kono district” by using the “informal market”. Moreover, President Stevens held firmly to the most productive sector of the economy: the diamond fields through the use of proxies (Reno 1995:78).

The presence and strong influence of Lebanese and other expatriate traders was a conduit pipe for Stevens and his cronies to drain off Sierra Leone’s natural resources (Reno 1995: 96-132). According to Luke (1988:74) the Lebanese were “seen by many as an exploiting minority with undue and excessive influence—through the patronage network as providers of spoils—in the country’s affairs”. The Lebanese were deeply involved in contraband diamonds “it has been estimated that as much as half of the country’s diamonds were still smuggled out, largely by Lebanese” (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton 2000:43). Reno (1995:131) claims that this state of affairs was referred to as “Black Colonialism” by some Sierra Leoneans. Moreover, there were growing concerns and criticisms from Sierra Leone civil society as to the state of the country (Reno 1995:93). After a long reign, the octogenarian President Stevens retired from office in 1985. He hand-picked and imposed the Army Chief, Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh, through a stage-managed process to rule the Sierra Leoneans (Luke and Riley 1989:133). The succession was carried out in an atmosphere of serious economic decline as revenues accruing to the government from diamond sales fell dramatically (Reno 1995:133).

The result of this situation was that “Momoh...inherited a predatory regime that was steeped in corruption, opportunism, cronyism and sycophancy” (Kandeh 1999:352). President Momoh’s power was precarious. Keen observers of Sierra

Leone believed that the 'change' that had brought General Momoh to power could lead to conflict (Reno 1995; Kandehe 1999).

4.6 Joseph Saidu Momoh's Government

Although President Momoh promised Sierra Leoneans a "New Order" (Luke and Riley 1989:133), it was manifest that he lacked the political clout, overbearing influence, and authority of his predecessor over the APC and cabinet members in particular, and the political class in general (Reno 1995; Kandehe 1999). Moreover, Momoh had to contend with two major obstacles to his authority. According to Reno (1995:157) these were

(...) to establish his own authority, he had to break the economic stranglehold of deeply unpopular Lebanese "strangers" and their politician allies, which he had inherited from Stevens's political network. [The dearth of] support from creditors to defend his own interest independently of Stevens' Shadow State network. Both saw Lebanese-politicians collaboration in the "private economy" as a threat, though for different reasons. Momoh feared their political capabilities while creditors identified Lebanese dealers as products of "bad policies" and informal-market evasion of state revenue collection.

Momoh's policy to sideline the old political brigade (who had been influential politicians and ministers during Siaka Stevens' reign) nearly proved fatal for his regime on 23 March 1987 with a coup plot in which some senior members of his cabinet were involved, revealing the cracks within the ruling APC (Reno 1995; Adebajo 2002). President Momoh's years were noted for bad governance and political repression was unrestrained. There was also the apprehension that he was not fully in charge of the affairs of the state³⁶. The economy disintegrated, even further amid wide dissatisfaction with his regime (Kandehe 1999; Ogunmola and Badmus 2006).

On the economic side, Momoh's progress was as depressing as his gloomy political performance. After an initial attempt to revamp the economy through some reforms largely engineered by creditors (Reno 1995:155-156), Momoh's 'New Order' was a return to the Stevens' 'Old Order' but even worse due to the

ineptitude of his government (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton 2000:45). The reasons were many, obvious and seemingly terminal for the Sierra Leone economy. With unrestrained looting and endemic, systemic and systematic corruption, entrenched neopatrimonialism, sustained illicit diamond mining, a weak and neglected agricultural sector, the economy was under siege, and finally collapsed (Reno 1995; Kandeh 1999). Sierra Leone was at the mercy of rapacious cabals branded as the “Binkolo Mafia” and “Ekutay organization”³⁷ (Kandeh 1999:353). Kandeh (1999: 353) provides a graphic account:

[b]y the time Momoh was ousted from power in 1992, the state’s extractive and allocative capacity had all but disappeared. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had fallen from \$1.1 billion in 1980 to \$857 million in 1990 and -5.1 per cent (1991-95). International reserves, which stood at a paltry \$31 million in 1980, dipped to an all time low of \$5 million under Momoh. Average GDP growth rates in the last five years of the Stevens dictatorship (1980-85) hovered around 3.0 per cent but dropped to 1.1 per cent in the first five years (1985-90) of the Momoh government. From 1990 to 1995, not a single economic sector or activity registered any growth, with exports showing the sharpest decline.

One of the major economic decisions that had negative social consequences was the Momoh government’s implementation of the IMF and World Bank conditionalities. The removal of subsidies on oil and rice worsened a very bad situation as the prices of basic commodities skyrocketed. Amid government bankruptcy and the informalisation of the economy, the black market dealt severe blows to revenues accruing to the government (Alie 2006:125-129). Sierra Leone was on the verge of economic collapse. In the words of Reno (1995:165)

[c]rude oil sat in ships off shore in wait for cash payment. Suppliers no longer extended credit to this government, as bills for earlier deliveries had gone unpaid. Commerce halted and transport ceased as petrol prices reached \$10 per gallon in the informal market.

The country was in a critical economic situation and the government seemed incapable of reversing the ugly trend while economic hardship became the lot of the majority of the citizens. A loss of confidence in government led to growing frustration in Sierra Leonean society due to total government ineptitude in any field other than corruption. Kpundeh (2004:91-92) states that:

[t]he deepening systemic corruption since the 1980s, evidenced by the lack of accountability and transparency, produced the proximate cause of the rebel war: exclusionary politics, violation of rule of law, rural

isolation leading to ethnic and regional grievances, extreme centralization, economic decline and high unemployment.

All of these shortcomings were exploited by the RUF as motives to draw the people to them, at least at the inception of the war. The inescapable consequence is that the citizens, especially the less privileged, bore the burden of maladministration, as the provision of basic infrastructure was lacking.

The end of the ideological war between the bipolar hegemonic East and West blocs had some effects on totalitarian regimes and indeed it represented a watershed in African politics. The free fall of communism heralded the end of the search for client states (Chabal and Daloz 1999:36). The new fervour has become the war against extremist Islam, especially since September 2001. The support for the one party state waned inexorably with the emergence of the unipolar system and the triumph of liberal ideas and ideals (Ogunmola 2009: 237-240). The 1990s decade was a turning point in the history of multiparty elections in Africa and there were signs that the one party state system was becoming anachronistic in Africa. Sierra Leone was no exception to the wave of democracy. After his initial procrastinations, President Momoh was compelled by creditors and civil society to accept the return to multiparty elections scheduled to be held in the early 1990s (Clapham 2003; Keen 2005).

4.7 The Making of a Rebellion: The NPFL and Its Domino Effects

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)³⁸ began an insurgency in Liberia from his rear base in neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire against the regime of Samuel Doe. Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe had seized political power through a bloody coup in 1980 in which President Williams Tolbert of the True Whig Party (who ruled from 1971 to 1980) was assassinated (Ellis 1995; Berman 2000). The rebellion heralded a long period of anarchy not only in Liberia but also civil war in the riparian countries (Sierra Leone and Côte

d'Ivoire) plus a stark threat to destabilise "unsympathetic" government (Guinea) opposed to Charles Taylor's "cause (Bach 2007; Ogunmola 2009). The availability of diamonds in commercial quantities made the extension of the Liberian war to Sierra Leone by proxy feasible (Reno 1997; Collier 2001; Gberie 2002) although some analysts believe that diamonds sustained and prolonged the civil conflict (Ross 2006; Alie 2006).

After his escape from Sierra Leone and subsequent detention in Ghana, Taylor resurfaced in Burkina Faso where he met with other Liberian dissidents (civilians and military officers of the Quiwonkpa's faction of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), notably Prince Yormie Johnson) opposed to Samuel Doe's dictatorial rule (Ellis1999:69). This group of Liberian military officers helped Captain Blaise Compaoré to seize power in a bloody military coup in Burkina Faso in which President Thomas Sankara was assassinated in 1981³⁹(Ellis1999:69). In Gberie's (2005) opinion Charles Taylor was a willing tool in the hands of Colonel Gaddafi and he (2005:54) contends that the actual motive of Charles Taylor "was to spread destabilization in the region for the broader hegemonic control, in which Gaddafi would emerge as the new, shadowy master of West Africa".

Furthermore, Ellis' (1999) account of Libyan, Burkinabè relations shows that Compaoré introduced Taylor to Colonel Gaddafi and "convinced the Libyan leader of his [Taylor's] revolutionary credentials...Gaddafi took interest in these West African intrigues in pursuit of his own vast revolutionary ambitions, which extended to the whole of Africa" (Ellis 1999:69). Moreover, "[t]he Libyans had for some years espoused the Pan Africanist cause" with Gaddafi erroneously considering himself to be the heir of Kwame Nkrumah, [without the visionary approach to African politics of the late Ghanaian leader] (Abdullah 2004:382). Above all, Samuel Doe was enmeshed in an America intelligence plot to end Gaddafi's rule in Libya. Colonel Gaddafi vehemently resented Samuel Doe's cooperation with the Reagan administration⁴⁰ (Posthumus, cited in The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, www.conflict-prevention.net). Charles Taylor,

known widely as “superglue”⁴¹ was able to consolidate his guerrilla movement with the support of the governments of Libya, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire who supported him by providing financial assistance and logistics (Ellis 1999: 72).

There are many reasons for Charles Taylor’s vindictiveness against the Sierra Leonean authorities.

1. His failed attempt to use the Sierra Leonean territory (the Pujehun District) to launch his rebellion against the Samuel Doe’s government (Alie 2006)
2. His subsequent arrest and brief detention in Freetown in 1989 (Gberie 2005; Alie 2006)
3. The involvement of Sierra Leoneans in the NPLF’ insurgency (Adebajo 2002:82)
4. The interference of the Momoh’s government in the first Liberian Civil War (1989-1996) by allowing ECOMOG to establish a base in Sierra Leone to attack the NPLF’s position, (Smillie,Gberie,and Hazleton 2000; Abdullah 2004)
5. “To force the pulling out of ECOMOG from Sierra Leone, and Sierra Leone from ECOMOG and install a puppet RUF government” (Adebajo 2002: 82).

These are some of the factors that might have resulted in Charles Taylor’s decision to state that “he would teach Sierra Leoneans the bitterness of war” (Alie 2006:132).

Furthermore, Gaddafi also resented the boycott of the 1982 OAU summit in Tripoli by President Momoh and this “embittered the Libyan leader against the APC and its leaders” (Gberie 2005:49). The antagonistic Sierra Leone government posture was a risky venture owing to the unpredictable

temperament of the Libyan Jamariyah leader. There are some reasons that might have motivated Colonel Ghaddafi to support the rebellion in Sierra Leone:

1. The APC's leaders' non-cooperation with Libya was despite the fact that the Libyans had been building networks, especially in civil society in Sierra Leone since the 1970s and they had infiltrated the leadership of students in Fourah Bay College through the cell of the adepts of the tenets of Colonel Gaddafi's Green Book (Abdullah 2004; Richards 2004). The Green Book became the gospel of radical students, and school drop outs as well as marginalised youth of East Freetown that incited them to control or/and take political power; and Siaka Stevens had to use 'self-help' by instrumentalising APC's thugs, some unemployed youth of East Freetown, to harass that group of students (Abdullah 2004; Richards 2004). These youths had read, but it seemed that they did not digest, the fundamentals of the political works and theories of some of the Third World's great thinkers (Clapham 2003:15).
2. Siaka Stevens' visit to Libya was facilitated through the connections the Libyans had made in civil society and religious organisations, and the influential diamond dealers; while Ghaddafi had allegedly assisted financially Sierra Leone in hosting the 1980 OAU (Abdullah 2004:49-51).
3. Some students (mostly the radical leaders of the Student Union) were expelled over the allegation that they were agitating against government at the instigation of Libya (Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005; Richards 2005c). However, the threat was not credible.
4. The expelled students underwent military training and were brainwashed ideologically through the rhetoric of the *Green Book* at the Mathabh al-Alamiya World Revolutionary Headquarters in Libya (Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005).
5. Another group of students and drop outs, and individuals including Foday Sankoh had trained in Libya after a sojourn in Jerry Rawlings' Ghana which had become a relay station for Libya through its Accra Peoples' Bureau (Abdullah 2004:56). Foday Sankoh had undergone

military training in Libya with Charles Taylor in 1987 and 1988 in Benghazi (Gberie 2005:52).

However, the credentials of these individuals were confined to the Fourah Bay College and they lacked credible influence outside the university and the Libyans failed to appreciate that fact (Abdullah 2004:52). Some of the nucleus of this student group that was consistently harassed by the Sierra Leonean government would eventually give an intellectual texture and a revolutionary fervour to the RUF. While preparing for his insurgency, Taylor recruited Foday Sabaynah Sankoh and some of the expelled students (Abu Kanu, Rashid Mansaray) who had undergone military training in Libya joined him in the Burkinabè military camp in Po where potential NPFL insurgents trained (Abdullah 2004; Gberie 2005). In addition, it is acknowledged that the responsibility of Libya and Burkina Faso “in training and arming a core group of the RUF, has now been established beyond dispute” (Clapham 2003:15). Abdullah (2004:57) states that “some of the insurgents had acquired military training in Libya”. Davies (2000:351) argues that “the critical factor that triggered [the Sierra Leone] civil war was Libyan finance and training for the rebellion”. His argument is that the would-be rebels would not have launched any insurgency without these strategic facilities at their disposal.

The NPFL rebels who launched their attack on Liberia were a heterogeneous group of dissidents and adventurers from different areas of selected West African countries (Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Senegal) and the anti-Doe forces (Verschave 1999:207). Their common dominator was that they had had a stint in military training in Libya and Burkina Faso. Besides, Côte d’Ivoire was also involved in logistics support for the RUF (Berman 2000; Davies 2000). Subsequently, some of the Sierra Leoneans who had participated in the Liberian Civil War became the arrow-heads of insurgency in Sierra Leone’s fratricidal war. They eventually gave rise to the phenomenon of recycled warlords in West African conflicts by appearing also in Côte d’Ivoire’s internecine war. Sam Bockarie, one of the RUF commanders, also known as General Mosquito or Skinny

who was eventually killed along the border regions between Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire was the archetype of these merchants of death⁴².

4.8 The Anatomy of the RUF

"Pass war cam before Salome go bete, but way war cam we belch full quick".⁴³

Some authors traced the origin of the civil war in Sierra Leone to the procrastination of Joseph Saidu Momoh on provisions for the liberalisation of the political space through multiparty elections coupled with the overwhelming damage done to the economy (Gershoni 1997:56). Others argue that the process of economic decay in Sierra Leone had started during the protracted maladministration of Siaka Stevens with his "shadow state" (Luke 1988; Reno 1995). In addition, there was the end of the protection that Cold War hegemonic politics had provided for Siaka Stevens' dictatorial regime and this galvanised the opposition to ask for multiparty elections and the end of one party politics (Luke 1988; Reno 1995).

The ferment of deep-seated frustration was already embedded in Sierra Leone society due to the APC maladministration that had resulted in inadequate infrastructure, poverty, and rampant unemployment especially among the youth. The central government had become weak and virtually abandoned its duties and responsibilities to the citizens while the economic crisis was overwhelming (Reno 1999; Abdullah 2004). Moreover, "Siaka Stevens's despotic rule from 1968-1985 engendered deep seated grievances widely believed to be the root cause of Sierra Leone's rebel war" (Davies 2000:352).

Consequent upon their training in Libya and before Taylor's recruitment drive for fighters and insurgents in Liberia, the core members of the nascent group that would start the rebellion went into 'revolutionary limbo' having no clear-cut

action plan to drive home their revolution agenda or mobilise fighters (Abdullah 2004:54). However, the RUF originally came into being in 1990 with the aim of putting an end to the APC's rule by establishing a training camp for its fighters in the forest zone of Yele; however the idea was dumped because of the security risk (Abdullah 2004; Richards 2005).

As a movement the RUF had no clear leader to direct its affairs, but Foday Sankoh alias Papay, Abu Kanu, and Rashid Mansaray formed a loose and sometimes close triumvirate depending on their immediate objectives while looking for new recruits and opportunities to launch an insurgency. Those who argue that the Sierra Leone conflict was essentially an inter-ethnic dispute need to explain why it was that Sankoh had a Temne father and a Loko mother, whilst most of the RUF fighters were Southerners [This point was strongly made by respondents – see below]. Those who set up Sankoh had misjudged his ability “to think and act politically” because of the level of his education (Abdullah 2004:54-55). This error of judgment would be fatal for his comrades as the Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray were executed by firing squad on the orders of Foday Sankoh because of their opposition to indiscriminate killings and sexual abuse by the RUF fighters (Abdullah 2004; SLI1). Sankoh's links with Libya and his association with Charles Taylor could have been major determinants for his emerging as the leader of the insurgents (Clapham 2003:15-16).

The RUF combatants' baptism of fire really came when some of their members fought on the side of Taylor's NPFL (Richards 2005:381). To all intents and purposes, Taylor and Sankoh's alliance was a marriage of convenience. Abdullah (2004:56) notes that

Sankoh met Charles Taylor in Libya in 1988, who then invited him to join the NPFL...By mid 1989 a deal had been struck: Foday Sankoh and his group would help Charles Taylor 'liberate' Liberia, after which he would provide them with a base to launch their armed struggle.

Furthermore, it appears that Taylor felt it a moral obligation to give back the support he had gained from the 'Sierra Leonean contingent' by assisting the 'boys' to overthrow the APC government (Richards 2001:74). The RUF launched its campaign in Sierra Leone

accompanied by Liberian and Burkinabe "special forces". The Special Forces were responsible for some of the worst atrocities against civilians...young people who spoke in thick Liberian accents, or even French. Many of the early guerrillas were Sierra Leoneans but residents for long periods in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (Richards 2001:74).

This is quite reminiscent of the Great Lakes civil wars. For example, Yoweri Museveni backed Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels after the latter had supported his insurgency: the National Resistance Army (NRA) in succeeding in his war against the Ugandan government in 1986. It is instructive to note that Yoweri Museveni had also benefited from Colonel Ghaddafi's support (Abdullah 2004:52).

One of the foremost field commanders of the RUF was General Sam Bockarie. With a father who was a Mende diamond miner, Bockarie was a former "san san boy" (an illicit diamond miner) in Kono, and many of the RUF rebels were more or less ex-illicit diamond miners (Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton 2000:49). (...) "diamond diggers are ever gamblers, even to the extent of gambling with their own lives", therefore a "secret army of gravel sifters was quick to heed the call" (Richards 2001:74). A school dropout, Sam Bockarie was born in Koidu, in Kono district and

(...) having embarked on a series of coping strategies-diamond miner, hairdresser, waiter, disco dancer-before he started his career as a rebel when he joined the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1990 (Bøas 2007:40).

Most of the RUF chiefs belonged to the Diaspora of Sierra Leoneans in Liberia who ran away from Siaka Stevens' repression of the people of the boundary zones (Richard 2005:382). This, rather than any ethnic bond, was their common link. The rebellion started its recruitment drive "among thoroughly marginalized diggers

working the “border-zone limbo-lands”, intimate with the process through which the magic money sustaining national politics is made and angered by social marginalization”(Richards 2001:74). Another group of RUF rebels was the contingent of youth ‘volunteers’ from “the most isolated parts of the populous Kailahun district and in border villages in Pujehun” whose adhesion was motivated by the fact that their districts were ravaged by scenes of political violence and the “operation of an unofficial anti-smuggling force during the 1980s” (Richards 2004:6). A study conducted by Richards et al (cited in Richards 2004:10) reveals revolt against some aspects of customary practices enforced by traditional rulers compelled some youth to leave their village and join the RUF “ [i]f you refuse they [the chiefs] cause more problems for you than even being in the bush as a rebel” .

Two thirds of RUF youth fighters were either primary school drop outs or peasants working on farm lands in the rural areas with the majority of the combatants being illiterates (Richards 2005:40). It is noteworthy that a number of the child soldiers were “children and who [could] hardly carry an AK 47 rifle”⁴⁴ (Davies 2000: 358). Further, although 87% of RUF recruits said that they had been kidnapped, the majority of them were quite familiar with the political objective of the rebellion which was originally to overthrow the corrupt and autocratic APC government (Richards 2005:41). Hence the RUF slogan “No more slaves, no more masters, power and wealth to the people” (Richards 2005: 582). The pattern of recruitment of the RUF, which was mainly carried out along the Sierra Leonean and Liberian borders, included the enlistment and training of young girls and the insurgents even established “*combat wives units*” Richards et al (1997 as cited in Richards 2005b:41). On the recruitment of urban youth, Richards (2005b:41) asserts that

If the urban youth took part in the Sierra Leonean conflict, it was mainly on the government side, not with the RUF. Post-conflict data on the life of the combatants do not confirm the discerning form of the urban gang pattern of the war (Personal translation)⁴⁵.

In a nutshell, the RUF was a heterogeneous group that included many individuals from the bottom of the social ladder, united by the desire to overthrow the APC government. Both and internal and external factors shaped its emergence.

4.9 The Topography of Sierra Leone War

One factor that facilitated the RUF's incursion back into Sierra Leone was the geography of the border region between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The insurgents used this terrain to their advantage as the hilly forests were convenient sanctuaries for a hit and run guerrilla strategy. Richards (2005c:381) argues further that the vital transborder proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) was facilitated by the porous borders and hilly forest reserves which form the Gola North reserves.

This was coupled with the fact that the area is endowed with diamond deposits which translated into capturing some of the most important 'useful parts' of Sierra Leone that would assist the RUF to prosecute the war, especially, the Gola North forest. Richards (2005c:381) gives more details

[t]he three contiguous Gola reserves constitute a boundary wilderness occupying the middle one-third of the international border with Liberia. This connects to the Kambui reserves, which run northwards through eastern Sierra Leone along the ridge, interrupted only by a pass that gives access to the town of Kenema.

This topography suggests that, apart from providing a safe haven for the rebels, access to strategic mineral resources through the forest could also have motivated the choice of entry point by the rebels (SLI2). Richards (2005c:381) explains further that

[a]t its northern extremity the Kambui forests connect with the Kangari Hills, a forest upland traversed by the main road linking the northern provincial towns and the Kono diamond fields. Kambui North reserve directly overlooks a second important alluvial diamond mining area known as Tongo field. The Sierra Leonean forest reserves thus constitute

a set of hilly, unpopulated “corridors” leading from Liberia into the diamondiferous heart of the country, connected by forest paths known only to specialist hunters. The forests offered a medium for the subsequent spread of the RUF and shaped eventual counter-insurgency responses.

Once the rebels were able to control the diamondiferous areas, the government was cut off from its main source of revenues which obviously drastically weakened its economic muscle to prosecute the war. However, the effective control of these naturally well-endowed regions of Sierra Leone also became a weak point as it exposed the predatory nature of the rebels desire to exploit those resources. This development exposed the RUF as a rapacious and greedy movement that was no different from the predatory ruling elite they were trying to overthrow. The rebels had started out with a desire to rid the country of a predatory government but once they had access to the diamond wealth they too were corrupted. Not having succeeded straight away, they needed the diamonds to trade for arms and they also enjoyed the wealth that they brought. Moreover, the RUF's reputation and image were tarnished by the atrocities committed on civilians. Peters and Richards (1998:184) argue that “[t]he brutal terror tactics of the Liberian ‘special forces’ alienated local populations”.

4.10 Conclusion

Sierra Leone's internecine war was triggered by deep seated domestic factors in conjunction with multiple exogenous factors. Domestically the elite would neither share the spoils nor provide the barest of basic necessities to the people and this led to violent reaction. Everyone knew that the country was rich in diamonds yet both the poor and the middle class were suffering significant deprivations. The elite were not sufficiently wise nor united enough to recognise that in order to maintain their privileged positions they had to provide some benefits to the mass of the people. Thus, the politics of exclusion alienated many rural areas as well as the youth with dreams but no prospects and this led to massive frustration which the RUF used to excellent effect to recruit its fighters.

Chapter Five

Analysis of the Findings of the Sierra Leone Field Study

5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the respondents' views on the factors of war in Sierra Leone focusing on the participants' own perspectives. The roots of the civil war in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire are multilayered. The main methodology of this study is the case study approach. The critical analysis of the findings is based on interviews, focus group discussions, field notes, and personal observations often informed by informal discussions with the author's relatives and friends in the two countries. The data was derived from the field work that was conducted in urban, suburb areas and down-town Freetown and Abidjan as a well as in the hinterland of Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

The questionnaires were derived from the literature review. The one-on-one interviews were complemented by the focus group discussions (FGDs) that reveal some of the hidden motives of the participants because some of the respondents openly disagreed with other participants on some issues. Factual explanations were then obtained by probing the participants who voluntarily became more explicit in their comments. The composition of the focus group members was deliberately made heterogeneous according to their backgrounds, activities, and gender as well as if they were actors or victims of violence. This composition provided a unique opportunity to have divergent views on some salient triggers of the internecine conflict.

The roots of the Sierra Leone civil conflict are multifaceted according to the empirical evidence collected in the field. Respondents have different worldviews/perspectives on the factors of the internal war which reflects differences in their level of education, level of exposure to conflict and violence

as well as their primary roles, either as perpetrators, armed combatants, or victims of the attacks of the war. Some of the factors are interrelated and could be grouped under one convenient label. I wove my analysis around the most prominent causes that triggered the war without totally neglecting the minor factors. Although the respondents believed that ethnicity and religion were not contributing factors to the civil war, the findings showed that ethnicity influenced the course of the war with the support of the Kamajoor to the government and that religion was used as a tool to appeal to the warring factions in Sierra Leone. Therefore, they will not be accorded a lengthy analysis.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the common points that emerged from the voices of the interviewees in Sierra Leone using the thematic taxonomy that emerged from the literature review and the research questions to provide in-depth understandings of the causes of the civil war. The previous chapter dealt with a historical analysis of events and situations leading up to the war. This chapter deals with Sierra Leoneans views as to the causes of the war. These people who were directly involved may not have a perfect understanding of events but their knowledge and beliefs are a vital part of the picture. To ignore their views would be neo-colonial to the extreme.

Dealing with historical events rather than laboratory experiments, it is always difficult to determine 'causes' and, as the literature review has amply revealed, causation is almost always open to debate. The aim of data analysis here is to develop themes, concepts, and propositions by continuously testing my and others' theories on the basis of data collected (Taylor and Bogdan 1998:141).

The Sierra Leonean War was the second episode in a series of civil wars in the West African sub-region. Compared to other post-Cold War conflicts in West Africa, the Sierra Leone Civil War was the most merciless as the fighters committed monstrous atrocities on their victims who were in most cases civilians.

The field research revealed that, in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans, economic underdevelopment, with all its consequences, as well as the weak government institutions with the interference of the military in governance are the major factors that triggered the war. The participants were mostly concerned about issues of poverty resulting from bad governance, and a dismal lack of provision of basic necessities to the majority of citizens while a few individuals and cabals of the ruling elite were the beneficiaries of the state-as the secondary sources also revealed (Luke 1988; Reno 1995; Kandeh 1999; Keen 2003; Alie 2006).

5.2 Religion: A Contentious Issue in the Sierra Leone Conflict

Religion has been more of a unifying factor than a basis of division in Sierra Leone. Religious tolerance is one of the positive and enduring aspects of the culture of Sierra Leoneans and this characteristic is evident in the inter-faith marriages of the people that cut across the strata of the society (SLI2, SLI, and SLI). Religious balance in the allocation of ministerial portfolios has been a factor of stability. For example, a respondent buttressed this point by stating that the former Sierra Leonean president Ahmad Tejan Kabba married a Christian despite being a Muslim (SLI2). The Sierra Leone model of ethnic tolerance is reflective of the peaceful aspect of religion underlined by Appleby (2001:822-823). A respondent states that:

Sierra Leone is a country that thrives on religious tolerance... members of some families are both Muslims and Christians...Even in governance attempt is always made to ensure that there is balance, religious balance not only ethnic balance.
(SLI6)

Another participant says bluntly:

Religion to us is a fact that matter, and we have never allowed it to interfere with our politics.
(SLI2)

Moreover, in Sierra Leone, religion has a positive connotation:

It [religion] was a social capital that helped to bring the war to an end.
(SLI8)

The leaders and followers of the RUF were not influenced by their religious convictions.

For some participants, the contributing factors to the internecine war are simply not clear. For example, in a site (Sumbuya village) that I chose for a Focus Group Discussion because the village was virtually razed by the rebels and here a lot of amputations were carried out seemingly because ECOMOG soldiers were stationed in the village, the head of the village and some prominent members of this community could not really fathom nor explain the genesis of the internecine war.

I don't really know what caused the war. I just saw the events unfolding. I don't know what had motivated the rebels to launch this war that brought a lot of hardship and destruction.

(SLFGD2)

As far as religion is concerned, we have no problem in this country. Sierra Leoneans are religious people and the two religions cohabite together.

(SLFGD1)

Only the rebels can tell you why they caused so much hardship to us.

(SLFGD2)

The rebels were fighting for the common cause, for patriotism.

(SLI4)

I think it is because people were not happy in general... There was also a lot of frustration. It is only the people in government who can explain that to you. A lot of people were not happy with what they were doing with our money.

(SLI5)

Lacoux, Crombie, and Macrae (2002:311) note that religion was not a determining factor even regarding the selection of victims for the amputation and other forms of extreme violence perpetrated by the RUF. In unison, the participants agreed that religion was not a factor that influenced the belligerents.

5.3 Ethno-religious Cleavages as Factors in Sierra Leone's Civil War

The view of the participants was that ethnic division was not relevant because the composition of the rebel groups cut across ethnic and regional groups (SLI1; SLI2, and SLI3). According to a Sierra Leonean scholar “[t]he war was not ethnicised” (SLI2). Grant (2005:264) notes that “ethnicity was not a contributing factor to the causation of Sierra Leone civil war”. This was a positive point because ethnic divisions tend to prolong wars and make their peaceful resolution more complex (SLI2). Many scholars agree that ethnicity was not an influential factor of the Sierra Leonean civil conflict (Lacoux, Crombie and Macrae 2002; Collier 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006).

There was a consensus from all the participants interviewed in the course of my field work in Sierra Leone that ethnicity was not a trigger in the conflict that ravaged the country. Some of the respondents even made analogies that Sierra Leone was unlike Nigeria where ethnic identity or consciousness is a defining force within the country's political processes as well as a dividing factor that triggers communal clashes and riots (SLI2). Furthermore, the interviewees explained that the RUF was a mosaic of various ethnic groups (SLI1). For example, they argue that Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader, was a northerner and the RUF top echelon was a composite of ethnic groups. A warlord believed that since the RUF did not spare any areas under its control as regards the destruction of buildings and since their violence was not selective amongst ethnic groups, the war was not ethnically motivated (SLI1). Even when Captain Valentine Strasser (a Krio) came to power the war continued. Mende were found very widely, as a majority of the NPRC military government and holding the top post when Brigadier Julius Maada Bio came to power. According to one person interviewed who is an authority but wants anonymity “I don't think ethnicity played a very big role” (SLI7). Moreover, the majority of the RUF fighters were southerners and the rebellion started in the southern part of Sierra Leone although the proximity of the geographic area to the Liberian borders could have been a strategic factor since Charles Taylor's

Liberia was supportive of the RUF (“the war was not as a result of tribal misunderstanding” SLI1). These positions are corroborated by a Sierra Leonean scholar who contends that:

unlike civil conflicts in Africa, in modern days Africa, ours did not have an ethnic dimension. The leader of the rebels Foday Sankoh was a Temne [a northerner], and his lieutenants came from different ethnic groups within the country: Fulah, Mende, Krio, you name it. The rank and file of the fighting forces were Mende [southerners], and that perhaps led to reduce the ethnic factor in it. It was never ethnicised.

(SLI2)

The participant gave insights into the appalling backlashes from ethnicity in civil wars in Africa and added:

It is good that it did not work because civil wars are very difficult when they take an ethnic dimension, they are difficult to contain. One of the reasons that the Liberian conflict dragged on for such a long time that was because the rebel groups that emerged had that ethnic colour. (SLI2)

Looking into the causes of the Sierra Leonean conflict provides a fertile ground to consider whether scholars are too eager to label conflicts in Africa as being ethno-religious. It is apparent that a straight-jacket approach of giving ethnic or religious colours to all such conflicts is invalid as shown by facts emerging from recent research in the field of peace studies and the economies of war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Abdullah 2004; Van der Veen 2004; Azam and Mesnard 2003; Fearon 2005; Ross 2006). For the respondents ethnicity was not a factor that triggered the civil war. This view is given credence by Coulter (2009:47) of Stockholm University, an anthropologist who has lived in Sierra Leone, as she states that ethnicity and religious factors did not contribute to the war. However, Keen (2003:4-5) who is a former journalist who is now Professor of Complex Emergencies at the London School of Economics argues from his field work that ethnic politics and the ethnicisation of the military were contributing factors.

The respondents' views were different from what is available on ethnicity as a contributing factor to the war in some sections of the scholarly literature. Reading the literature showed the ethnic politics between the Mende (largely supportive of the APC) and Temne (a power base of the SLPP) as well as the ethnicisation of the armed forces with the domination of officers from the North of Sierra Leone who favoured the APC (Bangura 2000; Keen 2003; Giustozzi 2005). For example, in a highly nuanced view Bangura (2000:558-559) states that

[o]ne strand of the discourse that helped to stiffen local resistance in the south and east was an elite-driven view that the RUF was an 'APC/northern' device to exterminate the peoples from the south and east, or more specifically the Mende. The fact the RUF was headed by a northerner, Foday Sankoh, helped to reinforce this view in the minds of those who believe it, even though the majority of RUF fighters came from the south and east. Residents in the north and Western Area on the other hand saw the RUF as a 'Mende movement' formed to wrest power from the APC.

5.4 Backlashes from Colonial Policies and the Causes of Sierra Leone's Civil War

The consequences of colonial policies and their impacts on Sierra Leone are not seen by those interviewed as factors that contributed to the war. Although there were some socio-economic gaps in the access to education and employment at independence, especially between the Creoles and the autochthons these disparities were much reduced in later years (Wyse 1991; Zack-Williams 1999; Hirsch 2001b). However, access to education was limited as the government failed to provide good education facilities and corrupted the educational system, especially at tertiary level (Reno 1995; Hirsch 2001b; Bellows and Miguel 2008). Furthermore, Hirsch (2001b:147) notes that the educational system collapsed under Momoh. The RUF took advantage of the moribund educational system under the APC governments to recruit its young fighters by promising free education if it eventually won the war (Hirsch 2001b:150).

The legacy of indirect rule that favoured the Chiefs could not be totally obliterated as they remain influential on issues of land ownership and its allocation, specifically, in the rural areas (Zack-Williams 1982:79-80). Furthermore,

[t]he colonial administration granted the paramount Chiefs control of settlement and local migration in order to placate the local population (Hirsch 2001a:27).

The influence of the Chiefs was due to the clientelist system of the ruling elite who still rely on the Chiefs for political support, in their turn the Chiefs flirt with the powers that be to avoid being removed (Keen 2005; Bellows and Miguel 2006). Moreover, the consequence of disputes over land and the alienation of the youth by land allocation which largely ignored their needs generated a disposition for revenge against the Chiefs which found ample scope during the war (Keen 2005; Bellows and Miguel 2006). Humphrey and Weinstein (2008:441-443) show how these attacks on the traditional authorities raised a security dilemma as the Chiefs counter-attacked in retaliation by supporting the CDF financially and levying the population in their fight against the RUF. However, the analysis of the perceptions of the participants is that the British had indeed left alongside support for the Chiefs some structures of democracy that the post-colonial governments failed to sustain (SLI2; SLI5, and SLI7). The failure to sustain the institutions of democracy resulted in personal rule classically embodied in Siaka Stevens' long reign.

As noted, the majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that colonial policies and its legacies were not intervening factors and that the British colonialists put in place some structures of democracy. The failure of the post-independence Sierra Leonean government to build on and consolidate on this legacy resulted in the weakening of the institutions of democracy and the rapid deterioration of the political system that degenerated into a prolonged despotic rule under Siaka Stevens. Autocratic rule continued with the regime of President Joseph Saidu Momoh until the break out of the civil war. Some of the participants disagreed with the idea that the colonial policies contributed to the fratricidal

war. A participant is explicit in his opinion that British colonial policies had no consequences that led to the internecine war. He comments thus,

to be fair to the British, by the time they were leaving in 1961, they had put together certain structures through the elections. The Parliament had a function. The arms of government cooperated and mutually supported each other...The basic things for a government to function were there. And unfortunately, we did not develop those. And then, the culture of democracy was beginning to thin. I do not want to blame the British colonialists for what had happened. I would rather blame the Cold War politics. As long as you could see to the interest of either group, one of the two groups, you are okay. That encouraged despotism in Africa in particular... They really started talking about opening up the political space, about good governance, the rule of law after the end of the Cold War. In that line, one could blame England, but England had given us our independence.

(SLI2)

Another respondent is concise in his response to the consequences of British colonial policies in Sierra Leone

No. Not in anyway.

(SL e-interview)

In fact, another participant sums up the mind of the interviewees as he does not subscribe to the “blame” theory:

I think we have to take responsibility for it [civil war]. I am not in that school that will want to go on for a lifetime to blame the British for our predicaments. I don't think we ought.

(SLI6)

And the respondent adds rhetorically before concluding:

How many years now since the British left us? We should have mended whatever lapses or liabilities that might have been left behind. We are an independent country.

(SLI6)

None of the interviewees subscribed to the blame theory of holding the British colonial masters as responsible.

5.5 Governance and Politics as Causal Factors of the Civil War

Governance as displayed in the leadership of Sierra Leone's ruling elite has been a burning issue. Its corrosive effects impacted negatively on all spheres of life. The young independent state had shown signs of a promising future in the economic realm during the short rule of Milton Margai (1961-1964) which was then followed by political instability (Grant 2005:260). The economy relapsed and followed a pattern inconsistent with economic development and then the economy collapsed even further, almost irreversibly, under the protracted rule of Siaka Stevens (1967-1985). Keen (2003:70) notes that

[w]hilst President Stevens built up his personal fortune and power-base through clever use of patronage and intimidation in the 1970s and 80s, his mineral-rich and fertile country remained one of the poorest in the world.

Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton (2000:8) note that the burgeoning democracy at independence was undermined in the 1960s and endemic corruption and dictatorship were institutionalised while the economy continued to decline. Maladministration was a negative characteristic of successive heads of state in Sierra Leone as the respondents observed. The majority of the participants considered that maladministration or bad governance is the root cause of the offshoots of other problems that beleaguered the country (SLI; SLI2; SLI3; SLI7; FGD2; Reno 1995; Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton 2000). The longevity of Siaka Stevens in power despite his dismal economic and social performance impoverishing Sierra Leone was due to the Cold War political blocs that sustained so many African dictators (SLI2; SLI6). Reno (1999b:46) argues that dictators could survive once they were able to satisfy and maintain good relationships with their external Cold War patrons. Furthermore, Dunning (2004:411) explains that in Africa during the Cold War whilst

(...) donors actually prefer to promote democracy among recipient countries, threats to make aid conditional on the fulfilment of democratic reforms may not be credible, because withholding aid from autocratic countries could mean losing clients to the other Cold War power. In other words, the geostrategic cost of losing clients may override any

perceived benefit from successfully promoting democratic reforms among recipient countries.

During the Cold War between the West and the East, each bloc supported its client states in Africa and this was an impediment to the sustenance of democracy and multiparty elections which could have been a foundation for good governance and economic progress (Englebert and Tull 2008:114-116). Economic policies could have benefitted the majority of Sierra Leoneans if the economic pace of the early independence years had been maintained. Cold War politics were later considered by the Bretton Woods Institutions as encouraging bad governance that vitiated the socio-economic progress of autocratic countries. In this connection, Reno (1999b:52) states that

World Bank officials increasingly prescribe direct attacks on the Cold War patronage networks they held responsible for policy failure.

The economic failure and the end of the ideological war, and the demand for democratisation of the autocratic systems affected many African dictators who could no longer rely on their patrons to help maintain their power (Reno 1999b; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Le Billon 2001). Moreover, with the withdrawal of the political and economic support of their external Cold War patrons most African dictators became vulnerable because they could no longer sustain their domestic clientelist systems (Decalo 1985; Chabal and Daloz 1999). The foundations of their personal rule were shaken as non-state actors challenged their power base or supported the strong demand for multiparty elections (Reno 1999b; Le Billon 2001). In the post-Cold war era, the threats of withdrawing aid became more credible and useful (Dunning 2004:410). Sierra Leone falls under the two taxonomies as the demand for multiparty-ism coincided with the RUF attack in 1991. Despite internal and external pressures on President Joseph Saidu Momoh to organise multi-party elections he could not, however, do so because of the RUF invasion (Kandeh 2004:125-126). The implementation of SAPs and the liberalisation of the economy increased inflation and poverty because of the removal of government subsidies. Food insecurity became acute under the Siaka Stevens' successor General Joseph Saidu Momoh and compounded the problem

of poverty that became ever more widespread (Keen 2003:76). The neglect of the development of the rural areas could be attributed to the pattern of party formation in Sierra Leone that was essentially urban based (Hayward 1972:4).

The lack of genuine democracy and executive high-handedness contributed to the frustration of the citizens as a result of one party political system. The one party rule was strengthened by the East-West Cold War. The opposition had no political outlet to express its opinions.

We had this situation where there was a lot of undemocratic behaviour in the institutions of government. The one party system, there was no press freedom, and there was no avenue for people to vent out their anger...We had this situation in which people were really pissed off. It was a classical example of negative peace. People were praying that somebody would come to liberate us from the shackles in which we found ourselves then.
(SLI7)

Well, a lot! Because when we talk of democracy, there are various strands to it: respect of the rule of law, lack of transparency, respect and tolerance of opposing views, accountability and transparency among government functionaries, respect of human rights. All these were largely absent. Democracy involved seeing to the basic needs of the population; socio-economic development. In the end, it produced a population that is anti-system. The youth were anti-government, very radical, and very rebellious. They were just roaming about, no social policy for them. Somebody coming from the bush to pose as a liberator would easily use them. So, by the time the war started in 1991, there was a big gulf between the rulers and the ruled.
(SLI2)

I would say a lot. Governance was bad. There was for a long time a one party state that left out a considerable sector of the country and they went underground. Those political factions that went underground could well have been those who fuelled the underground movement.
(SLI6)

The lack of democracy closed all avenues for political participation of the excluded elite let alone the disadvantaged poor.

5.6 Diamonds and Other Mineral Resources as Contributing Factors to the Civil War

Examining the economic factor as a trigger of the civil war was the copestone of the field work. The guiding theory in my pre-field work analysis of the Sierra Leone conflict hinged upon the economic causes of war as propounded by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) Grossman (1999); Collier (2001); Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Especially, I followed Collier (2001) on his much debated greed and grievance model, as well as the role of mineral resources, particularly diamonds, as a factor of the civil conflicts in Africa (Le Billon 2001; Ross 2000). When I wrote the first draft of the literature review, although I read with keen interest the critique of Collier's (2001) argument on the economic causes of civil war provided by Marchal and Messiant (2002), where they highlighted that the greed and grievance was an invalid theory in its application to the economic causation of civil war, I was still unconvinced by their arguments. I classified their critique as part of the age-long rivalries between the French and the Anglo-Saxons, in as much as it then largely stood alone. As reported by the respondents, conflict diamonds prolonged the civil war and are used to finance war as arms are bartered for diamonds (SLI1; SLI2). Grant (2005:264) states that "diamonds did not cause the war". During the course of my interviews I came to realise the full truth of this assertion.

Lindemann (2006:8-9) concludes that Collier and Hoeffler's (2002 and 2004) theory that there is a correlation between lootable resource and civil war is flawed and that "this is largely not the case". Moreover, some of the theoreticians on the economic causes of civil war have made their *mea culpa* on the controversy the theory engendered, or have revised the economic theory of civil war as triggered by the availability of natural resources (Ross 2004 b; Silberfein 2004; Fearon 2005).

However, the responses of the participants during the field work still came as a shock concerning their views of economic factors in civil war. Overall, the research has demonstrated that the correlation between civil war and the economy as triggers of civil conflict stems from poverty and high rates of unemployment (Sen 1973; Lindemann 2006). Furthermore, Care International (2002, as cited in Keen 2003:69) states that

[c]ontrary to popularly held views that the diamond issue was the root cause of the war, more evidence points toward issue like corruption, poverty and bad governance, and the corresponding need for security, justice, and the creation of democratic mechanisms capable of protecting the rights of ordinary citizens.

The interviewees were mostly concerned by the issues of poverty resulting from bad governance, and a dismal lack of provision of basic needs to the majority of the citizens while a few cabal members that belonged to the ruling elite were the ones who profited, as the secondary source have also revealed (Luke 1988; Reno 1995; Alie 2006). The economic crises are linked to many issues that the participants underlined as the main causes of the Civil War as they affected the youth, the unemployed and rural dwellers who were enlisted either forcefully by the RUF or purposefully joined the rebellion as a result of growing frustration.

Moreover, (Marchal and Messiant 2002; Ross 2006) argue that the economic theory of war regarding the availability of lootable resources as a cause of civil war as propounded by Collier (2001) is inconsistent. According to the participants I have interviewed the availability of diamonds was not a factor that led to the war but prolonged it as the rebels used diamonds to buy arms.

*It was not diamonds.
(SLFGD1)*

*I don't see it that way. Diamonds were not the reason that triggered the war.
I can't identify diamonds as a cause.
(SLI4)*

*I don't think diamonds were really a cause for the civil war as some people would suggest. Don't forget that diamonds have been mined in this country since 1930. And we did not get a civil war until 1991.
(SLI2)*

Diamonds rather prolonged the war and sustained the rebellion because the warring factions had access to diamonds. A warlord says:

diamonds helped us to finance the Revolution, to continue fighting. We used diamonds to have arms and ammunition to prosecute the Revolution.
(SLI1)

In addition,

they used that to sustain the war, to fuel the war. Once the war had started they knew the value of diamonds. If they could sell to various channels to buy arms.
(SLI2)

On the greed and grievance theory, there were mixed reactions. However, the respondents underscore the pre-eminence of grievance.

There was some amount of greed involved, but to say that they [rebels] had no ground for justification would be to downplay the entire conflict because...Sierra Leone was sitting on a timed bomb...There were genuine causes for discontent which I think these people exploited.
(SLI7)

It was because of individuals, people in power...to deprive others, all the citizens to benefit from the wealth of Sierra Leone. If the situation is like that the child will be frustrated. He or she will abuse his parents because they are poor. They cannot feed the children who are hungry. They children will be angry.

(SLFGD2)

A respondent hinged his explanation on the real and mastermind of events that led to the "revolution":

the revolution movement was initiated by students who were kicked out of the University in 1984 and went to Libya to get trained in order to remove the APC from power. Their grievances were legitimate. Most of them were killed by Foday Sankoh.
(SLe-interview)

Others emphasize the fact that rebels used grievance as a cover up and exploit the anger of Sierra Leoneans that was noticeable against the APC's government ineffective rule.

There was anger in the country...particularly among the youth...In 1982; the aftermath of that election produced an armed rebellion, the Ndorgbowusi rebellion which happened in the Pujehun District...There was

already a history of armed conflict....The likes of Foday Sankoh capitalised on the people's anger to pose themselves as liberators; when in actual fact they were not...So, indeed there were grievances...They had grievances against the APC because they have been opposing it since 1971.

(SIL2)

Some people were not happy about the situation in this country. We were suffering in the midst of a lot of wealth.

(SLFGD2)

Greed became a distraction and was not the original element in the causation of the war. This trend figured prominently in the areas under the control of the rebels.

The war started purely on political reasons. Some people wanted the APC out at all cost. Then, when mineral resources were accessed, people became greedy and forgot their initial agenda.

(SL e-interview)

Moreover, some of authors on the economic causes of civil war had already made their *mea culpa* on the controversy the theory engendered. However, the response of the participants during the field work came as a shock concerning the economic factor of civil war. Furthermore, recent research has demonstrated that the correlation between civil war and economic resources as triggers of civil conflicts are unreliable (Fearon 2005; Ross 2006).

5.7 The Economic Crisis and the Sierra Leone War

Some participants identified the economic crisis coupled with poverty, and high rate of unemployment as the major sources of the civil war in the country.

Poverty was the main cause of the war. Poverty was endemic...The majority of Sierra Leoneans is poor despite this wealth. That is what caused the war.

(SLI1)

One could summarise the factors under the broad heading of maladministration or what some people call bad governance which manifested itself in various forms: grand corruption, the politicization and

corruption of the major institutions of state, and bad economic policies. Some of them are internal and other external.
(SLI2)

It was because of corruption, lack of transparency and accountability...It was economic mismanagement.
(SLFGD1)

The majority of the interviewees were of the view that the prolonged economic crisis and its consequences were factors that triggered the Civil War. The endemic poverty together with the crisis in the provision of social amenities, not only in the urban areas, but especially in the rural areas, accelerated the despondency of the vulnerable citizens in a country where social security is nonexistent despite its vast mineral resources (Davies 2000). However, some respondents did not agree with the claims made in the secondary sources (SLI4; SLI5) as they believed that poverty cannot be rationalised as a basis for the extreme violence that was carried out by the belligerents (SLFGD2). The RUF seized on these failures of delivery to recruit its fighters among the mass of frustrated Sierra Leoneans. The implementation of the SAPs by the Momoh's government worsened an already bad situation as the local Compradors who were involved in the clientelist system of the ruling elites connived with the Lebanese businessmen in the shadow state (Reno 1995; Davies 2000). The endemic corruption of the successive inept governments contributed to the causes of the war as it affected the masses that were disillusioned, doubting that the ruling elite that were enmeshed in corruption could provide any meaningful development. Kpundeh (2004:91) asserts that

(t) he deepening systemic corruption since the 1980s, evidenced by the lack of accountability and transparency, produced the proximate causes of the rebel war.

There was no consensus on the poverty argument as a trigger of the Sierra Leone civil conflict. It is noteworthy to stress that some respondents disagreed with the "poverty" explanation as a cause of the civil war.

The reason was not poverty. Is it because I am suffering that I will harm other people? It was their wish. Rebellion is not something that you do spontaneously. The leaders of the rebellion were urban dwellers. They had

not lived in the bush. They had planned something that put us one hundred years backward.
(SLI4)

A major challenge that the youth have to contend with is the unemployment that has proved to be a daunting task for government for years. Successive governments in Sierra Leone have invariably used the youth; especially those marginalised youth who cannot be gainfully employed to achieve parochial and selfish interests in the political game. The youth have acted as instrument of political intimidation, through thuggery, political vendetta, and urban violence (Kandeh 1999; Zack-Williams 1999; Abdullah 2004; Alie 2006).

5.8 The Military Involvement in Government in Sierra Leone

The armed forces have been a powerful institution to be reckoned in the political calculus right from the nascent post-colonial Sierra Leone as well as in most African states (Gutteridge 1970, 1985; Fukuyama 2006). The armed forces put aside their constitutional role to play an active but negative function in the political instability that plagued Sierra Leone. The political history of Sierra Leone is interspersed with chronicles of faked or real coups and counter-coups and palace revolutions (Keen 2005; Alie 2006). When this happens, the ethnicisation of the armed forces is a prominent feature of national politics (Horowitz 1985). A keen observer of the Sierra Leonean political life states

it was really a contributing factor and the involvement of the military in the politics of this country began as far back as the time of independence, in 1961. There were forces that began to politicise the army. We saw that in the coup of March 1967 when Brigadier David Lansana attempted to reinstall Albert Margai. It took a more dangerous turn in 1968 when Siaka Stevens became Prime Minister. We've seen him replacing some senior army officers, particularly of South-Eastern origin with northern officers, principally Limba officers who are his own kith and kin, including catapulting J.S. Momoh to the most senior position... Once they had tasted power, you could no longer remove it from their heads. So there was always plans to disrupt the democratic process.

(SLI2)

I would say the military were also a contributing factor.

(SLI7)

There is a general consensus that the political involvement of the military was one of the causes of Sierra Leone's Civil War (SLI1; SLI2; SLI3; and SLI4). The armed forces became factionalised along party and ethnic lines as their members were involved in coups and counter-coups to promote the interest of the party they were loyal to, to the detriment of the national interest of the country (Alie 2006:53-62). The factionalisation of the armed forces resulted in a deliberate policy of systematically weakening the army in favour of his own ethnic group (the Limba) by Siaka Stevens when he came to power after he had been the victim of the army coup in 1967. Keen (2005:83) notes that Siaka Stevens "tended to leave the army with a ceremonial role", which had negative impacts on the army's professionalism. This policy would have further negative repercussions contributing to the inability of the armed forces to overpower the rebellion. As Bangura (2000:553) puts it:

it was a classic case of elitists being unable to confront popular, albeit brutal, methods of warfare. Indeed, the failure of the government to make national defence a civic duty rendered it dependent on external military forces.

The respondents believed the involvement of the military in the government was a setback that contributed to the ignition of the war due to the undemocratic ways of the military, especially since these tendencies to intervene in the political system had started as long as 1961 (SLI2).

5.9 Spill-over Effects of Regional Instability on Sierra Leone

The domino effects of the first Liberian Civil War reverberated onwards to Sierra Leone. The role played by the former Liberian warlord cum President in the invasion of Sierra Leone by the RUF has been critical in the destabilisation of the country. Davies (2000:351) further assumes that without the Libyan financial

assistance and training the rebels could not have attacked Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Charles Taylor had publicly vowed to undermine Sierra Leone for allowing ECOMOG to use Sierra Leone to attack his forces in Liberia, during a BBC radio programme in 1991 (Ellis 1995 ; Bundu 2001 ; Alie 2006). Further, Charles Taylor had allowed the supply of arms and ammunition to the rebels in exchange for diamonds (SLI1). Moreover, the origins of the sub-regional dynamics may be traced back to the support of the first President of Côte d'Ivoire: Houphouët-Boigny who was an in-law of the Burkinabè President, Blaise Compaoré, and also of the slain Liberian President Williams Tolbert's son, Aldophus, who also was murdered by sergeant-Master Samuel Doe (Reno1999a:81). The thirst for revenge could have motivated Houphouët-Boigny and Blaise Compaoré to support Taylor's ambition to remove Samuel Doe.

This action started the slide towards regional insecurity. The logistics assistance that Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina-Faso gave to Charles Taylor's rebellion has had continuing ripple-effects on the sub-region as the rebellion ignited in December 1989 in the invasion of Liberia through the borders of Côte d'Ivoire continues to burn as it has become a many headed hydra (Reno 1999a ; Richards 2004). Furthermore, Taylor's forces controlled trade along the borders of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Conakry as a prelude to the invasion of Sierra Leone by the RUF (Reno 1999:123). This was part of Taylor's agenda to expand the territory under his control through the "Greater Liberia" agenda. "Greater Liberia" was a plan by Charles Taylor to annex the mineral resources of the East of Sierra Leone to Liberia, land which Liberia had claimed was part of its territory (Richards 1997 :144). West African heads of state were apprehensive that a victory for Charles Taylor could destabilise the sub-region with a domino effect because the NPFL was initially composed of a range of West African adventurers. This resulted in a tendency to weaken the NPFL by creating rival rebel groups such as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) of Alhaji Kromah which was

backed by Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone, or the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) of Prince Yormie Johnson who split from Charles Taylor's forces (Ellis 1995:169-170). Moreover, the insecurity at the Guinea-Liberian borders caused by Charles Taylor was apparently seen as a means to destabilise General Lansana Conté's regime, therefore increasing tension in the Mano River Union (MRU) (Smith 2006:415-416).

The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire led to a change in the pattern of alliances. The Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo accused Charles Taylor and Blaise Compaoré of supporting the Ivorian rebels (International Crisis Group 2003:9). Charles Taylor's support for the Ivorian rebels was also motivated by the Côte d'Ivoire government's assistance to MODEL and support to anti-Taylor rebel movements (International Crisis Group 2003:9-21). The renewed violence in Liberia led to the loss of power by Charles Taylor.

Some participants saw the causes of the Sierra Leone war as including the snowballing effects linked to sub-regional insecurity of the first Liberian Civil War because of the geographic proximity of the two countries. This can be explained by the domino theory and chain reaction (Ninkovich 1994; Gleditsch 1998) or the "contagious effects" of civil war (Gurr: 2001). A much discussed factor was the involvement of the former warlord and Liberian President in the Sierra Leonean conflict.

He [Charles Taylor] supported the RUF technically and financially.

(SL18)

One respondent in the Liberian Capital, Monrovia has this to say:

it is clear that without Taylor's support, by allowing the Sierra Leone rebels to use Liberian territory...It would have been difficult for the insurgents to invade parts of Sierra Leone...There was also the role of Ghaddafi who was Taylor's mentor. Burkina Faso was also a sanctuary, as well as Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny.

(LB15)

These connections were also used as conduit pipes to channel arms to the rebels with negative effects of war prolongation.

When we are talking in terms of the supply of arms, of weapons to fight, many factors, and many nationalities were involved. It is a complex situation.

(LBI5)

Contrary to this widespread belief, a participant suggested that the evidence that led to the indictment of Charles Taylor should be taken with caution. And he commented thus:

this is a personal view not an official one. It is not based on empirical evidence. It is based strictly on my personal thinking. So it is a plus or minus situation. Taylor operated in secrecy. Most of what he did was among few men, well trusted generals and those were things civilians were strictly kept out of. Taylor knew very well that by exposing himself to the international community that he is responsible for wars around the sub-region, he would be indicted. So he did it through third party and not direct involvement of himself. So then, we have a situation where we can only speculate...for us, it is very difficult ...We don't have any empirical evidence that he did it, to be very precise. Some people say Taylor himself did not do some of the things people accused him of; it was third parties that did them. That has to be proven.

(LB11)

The issue of economic crisis and the dynamics of sub-regional insecurity in West Africa were also mentioned as contributing factors. This problem is not unconnected with the multidimensionality of contagion and snowballing effects of transborder instability that are peculiar to many African conflicts. Personal vendettas and interests, post-colonial arch-rivalries between heads of state, which date back to colonial era divisions between states, and factions dividing rebels, are often upgraded in the quest to destabilise the neighbouring country (Verschave 1998; Ellis 1999).

The Liberian civil war just escalated it. It was the one that made it to happen at that particular time, otherwise perhaps, it could have happened a little later.

(SLI6).

A participant gives explicit account of the dynamics of sub-regional insecurity as well as the psychological dimension of the causation of the civil conflict.

The war we had in Sierra Leone was an off-shoot of the Liberian war...The man who brought the war here physically, Foday Sankoh had worked with Charles Taylor in Liberia...The war could not have started until his godfather had started his because he relied initially on a lot of support from Charles Taylor's fighters to be able to fight the war...Charles Taylor played a big role in our country [Sierra Leone]...He also provided the first set of fighters:Burkinabè and Liberians to help Foday Sankoh...He sought assistance from Sierra Leone to overthrow Samuel Doe. That assistance was not quite satisfactory. He was imprisoned here at Pademba Road. When he started his rebellion and ECOWAS put together ECOMOG Sierra Leone was a base from where ECOMOG attacked his positions in Liberia...And he did say Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war...He also provided other forms of logistics support...It was through him that the RUF sold diamonds and got weapons from Eastern Europe through Burkina Faso, and Liberia to Sierra Leone.

(SLI2)

A warlord agrees with the above explanation:

Taylor gave us arms and ammunition and even some men to supports us and fight alongside us. We really benefited from Taylor's help. We worked together...He supplied us weapons, tracers, especially the time when ECOMOG was using Alpha Jets. Taylor gave us a weapon we could use to shoot the Alpha Jets down. There was a time we took a certain amount of money to Charles Taylor, he refused to attend to us and dismissed us. But when we took diamonds to him he happily welcomed us... He gave us arms and ammunition...I was convinced that it is diamonds he wanted not money.

(SLI1)

Charles Taylor's involvement and his subsequent indictment, and trial in The Hague were as a result of his contribution to the Sierra Leonean civil war.

At first, Taylor wanted to use Sierra Leone as a strategic base to launch his war, which was denied to him. Also our [Sierra Leone's] troops involvement in ECOMOG prevented him from winning the war at an early time he swore that Sierra Leoneans would taste war. And he did all in his power to realise it. It is for this and the blood diamonds that he fuelled that he was sentenced at The Hague at the Special Court.

(SLI3)

5.10 The Involvement of the International Community in Restoring Peace to Sierra Leone

There are mixed feelings about the involvement of the international community. The Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS), The Economic Community of West African Countries Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), The African Union (AU), The United Nations (UN), Nigeria, Britain and others. However, it is

instructive to emphasize that there are two dimensions in the discussions involving the international community in Sierra Leone: peace-keeping operations and peace agreements.

A warlord states

I will commend the effort of ECOWAS. Today, I still acknowledge their effort...Today, and we are living together. As far as Pa Kabbah was concerned, he wanted us to be killed. He was vindictive. ECOMOG officers met with us to avoid further bloodshed. They knew we could resist, we were capable. I hold ECOMOG in high esteem for their intervention and effort to restore peace.
(SLI1)

A RUF fighter corroborates the preceding opinion. In her words:

ECOWAS, ECOMOG, UN did a good job. Had it not been for them, we would have been telling a different story now. I am sure they brought peace to Sierra Leone.
(SLI4)

It is a good thing they helped us to end the war.
(SLI5)

A participant who is a member of an NGO believes that the international community should have intervened at the beginning of the conflict:

I think we ought to commend ECOWAS specifically because they came at time the international community was more engaged with conflicts in some other parts of the world. Kosovo, and the likes, and then we saw that it was ECOWAS that took the lead both in Liberia and in Sierra Leone with the formation of ECOMOG and before that the formation of the Standing Mediation Committee.
(SLI7)

Some respondents in focus group discussion view the effort to restore peace from the broader international community perspectives:

The British were the people that really ended the war. However, ECOMOG tried also its best to end the war. They played their role they united in defeating the rebels.
(SLFGD2)

ECOWAS did well. Especially, the English speaking countries with the only exception of Guinea [Conakry]. AU was just a toothless bulldog that was good at publishing press releases.
(SL e-interview)

It was a mixed success. ECOWAS took the lead and others came later. However on a whole they did a good job.
(SLI3)

A participant puts the involvement of the international community in sub-regional context of the Anglophone versus Francophone rivalries before extending the scope of his discussion to the global arena. According to him:

there were a lot of problems because of individual members within ECOWAS had their own interest. Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Gambia, and others. And so there were this old colonial divide of Francophone versus Anglophone which played itself out in ECOMOG. Even with the difficult role they had played, I would say they largely succeeded in Sierra Leone because despite several handicaps which are understandable they were able to at least contain the rebellion to the extent that a peace agreement was signed in July 7 1999. And the UN, when they came in, it was after ECOMOG had done the dirty job. It was really ECOMOG that was involved in this enforcement because there was no peacekeeping. I think to be fair to them they did a good job. We have only to contrast their role to that of SADC in Southern Africa or North-east Africa to see that they have been largely successful.
(SLI2)

The view of some participants was diametrically opposed to the above observations.

ECOMOG is also a contributing factor that ruined our country.
(SLFGD1)

ECOMOG did not help this country. Instead they created enmity between Sierra Leoneans.

(SLFGD1)

These responses showed mixed reactions concerning the intervention of ECOMOG depending on the role the respondent played in the war.

5.11 Consolidating Reconciliation: Post-conflict Peacebuilding

The post conflict reconciliation process has been a thorny issue that divides rather than unites Sierra Leoneans. Many respondents see it as an instrument of witch hunting that is selective targets not only of the opponents of the former president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah but also some of his collaborators. Some

participants would have opted for the South African model of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission instead of superimposing penalty (Special Court) on clemency (Reconciliation) while some others are supportive of a traditional approach to reconciliation. However, most of the former combatants believe that the former President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah failed in reconciling the country.

Reconciliation is a good thing, but then, going side by side with the Special Court, one is rather confused. I believe we could have had only the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I don't think it makes sense to have the two at the same time.

(SLI6)

I must confess the reconciliation process was a weak one, poorly done. Since Sierra Leoneans are tired we tried to cope with it.

(SLI3)

I think people have to be made to feel the impact of the whole process. The type of work "TALK" [an NGO] is doing must be given more support because these are traditions and beliefs which the people identify more with.

(SLI7)

It is good but the people are still hungry. We know that we fought and the war has ended now. Everybody suffered. Reconciliation is good.

(SLI5)

Reconciliation takes many forms, and that's the key to peace and stability. Reconciliation is under various things and depends on how it is done and who does it. Reconciliation will also involve addressing the root-causes of the conflict, which in my view are really not been seriously addressed. It calls for determination, for a lot of work, particularly from political leadership.

(SLI2)

According to the respondents reconciliation was a factor that is considered very important.

5.12 Prospect for Peace in Sierra Leone

Opinions vary on the vision for a better Sierra Leone but the crux of the matter is that most respondents hinge their comments on the successful implementation of the reconciliation process and the urgent need for government to attend to the

lingering root-causes of the civil war: poverty, unemployment, the youth problem.

Everybody says we are rich. The government should use that wealth to change things.

(SLI5)

The government must provide the people with what they are yearning for. There is a lot of hardship in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leoneans are still struggling to survive.

(SLI1)

Increase job opportunities and alternative sources of livelihoods for the people, combat poverty and restore normalcy in the people's lives, improve education, health and other services in the country.

(SLe-interview)

According to some respondents, there is the urgent need to reinforce democracy, the rule of law, and get the military out of politics and politics out of the armed forces.

Strengthening of the pillars of democracy. Get the military to understand their constitutional roles and limitations. Decentralise government.

(SLe-interview)

I would apply the Nelson Mandela approach to non-retributive punishment.

(SLI3)

Other participants believe that accountability is the road to nation building and zero tolerance for corruption in the country, and social justice. And the prospect for another war is not totally ruled out if the above-mentioned parameters are not well taken care of by government. A participant hinges durable stability in Sierra Leone on keeping the peace by addressing the myriad of problems militating against social cohesion, and the president must understand the people:

the root-causes [of the civil war] are there! Especially, the youth and the spate of armed robbery. We need peace. If the boys are not making noise all around does not necessarily mean that we have peace. There are a lot of things we need to do to sustain this peace, and reconciliation is one such thing. The government needs to put together pro-poor policies, address inequalities in the system, ensuring that there is civility in the country.

(SLI2)

Otherwise, he warns that the prospects of social unrest and political instability are not foreclosed because

a group of army officers gave an ultimatum to government saying that if the government does not come out with a comprehensive policy "things will not be good".⁴⁶

(SLI2)

A former warlord warns thus:

If they push us to the wall, we will react. We will wreck things.

(SLI1)

However, a respondent sums up the feasibility of cooperation as a means to resolve the present predicament and future peace coexistence of Sierra Leoneans. She states that:

I am very unhappy when people say there could be another war. We advised them not to think of it or even try it. Those who say it don't know the bitterness of war. Some of us have tasted it. I know the bitterness of war. The best thing for us is to cooperate. We need the cooperation of all ethnic groups.

(SLI4)

5.13 Conclusion

Flowing from the foregoing, some clear-cut and identifiable factors have emerged from the analysis of the root-causes of the Sierra Leonean civil war. The prominent elements that can be pinpointed as triggers of the Sierra Leone Civil War are the perversion of the political system that resulted in the corruption and the weakness of the institutions of government.

Another contributing factor is that the greater part of the Sierra Leonean population did not benefit from the huge natural resources that the country is endowed with. Moreover, the maladministration of the country coincided steadily but negatively with economic decline that had inexorably led to the disenchantment of the majority of the citizens. Eventually, the rebels would use this "psychological loophole" to identify with the frustration of the marginalised,

and poor, as well as entice, and then recruit fighters among the youth and from some sections of the vulnerable population in the rural areas to freely or by force join the rebellion as well as those infamous two-faced '*sobel*s'. Especially, this was the trend while the rebels had launched their attacks on the Sierra Leonean state. The youth participated in civil conflict mainly as a result of growing economic hardship, especially unemployment, and the promise of a better tomorrow by the rebels' high command.

Ethnicity as a factor is the involvement of the Kamajoor Mende ethnic militia group that played an important role in the war. The Kamajoor not only supported the government of President Ahmed Tejan kabbah but also fought alongside government soldiers (Riley 1997; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2003). The involvement of the Kamajoor represents the ethnic dimension of the civil war although there were signs that the army was ethnicised by Siaka Stevens who favoured northern Mende officers in the army to the detriment of other ethnic groups (Keen 2003:4-5). In addition, the Mende–Temne ethnic and political rivalries contributed to ethnic violence (Keen 2003:3). However, Coulter (2009:47) argues that ethnicity and religious factors did not play prominent roles in the Sierra Leone. Coulter (2009:47) states that

unlike so many wars in Africa, ethnicity and religion were not major issues of contest in Sierra Leone conflict.

However, cultural features played a dual role by unifying the rebels and by cementing national unity above sectarian affiliations and parochial interest. Cultural affinities were used as instruments of social cohesion in the path to the peace agreements and the charting of the course of action towards reconciliation that contributed to bring the war to an end. Moreover, Richards, Bah, and Vincent (2004:23) argue that religion was a positive factor in community life in the post-conflict Sierra Leone. However, some respondents concur that the factors that led to the war are even now not properly addressed by the government. Especially, the issue of poverty alleviation, decent housing, unemployment and adequate health care facilities all need considerable attention owing to the decay of social

infrastructure. The external support the RUF enjoyed was a relative factor that contributed to the war.

Sierra Leone's war was a result of the contagious effects of the Liberian Civil War that created insecurity in neighbouring countries. The RUF benefitted from the support of Charles Taylor in their insurgency. Moreover, the crisis of governance (lack of democracy, political intolerance, and corrupt leadership) coupled with unemployment, and inflation in Sierra Leone were contributing factors that triggered the war. The lack of socio-economic development, especially the abject poverty, which frustrated and affected many Sierra Leoneans, were factors the rebels exploited in recruiting their fighters, especially among the youth, who were largely unemployed. The sum-total of these crises has contributed to increase violence and insecurity in the Mano River Union. The analysis strongly suggests that the main factor that triggered Sierra Leone's war was not the availability of lootable economic resources (diamonds) but other economic factors such as economic crisis, corruption, unemployment, and poverty. This was the view of the majority of respondents and is confirmed by the secondary data (Addison, Le Billon, and Murshed 2001; Reno 2003; Ross 2006).

Chapter Six

The Côte d'Ivoire Case Study

6.1 Introduction

This chapter employs a multidimensional approach to explain the prolonged military and political impasse in Côte d'Ivoire and how the myth of stability was shattered which resulted in widespread instability.

The Ivorian conflict has many dimensions that are connected. The internal factors are linked to the policy of Houphouët-Boigny (the first President of Côte d'Ivoire), who during the economic boom, encouraged migration from neighbouring countries and the north to the forest of the south of Côte d'Ivoire without appropriate regulations as regard land policies (Chauveau 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Subsequently, the scarcity of arable land and the economic crisis that forced many youths to return to the rural areas created much frustration and communal violence against the migrants (Colin, Kouamé and Soro 2004:37). The death of Houphouët-Boigny resulted in a crisis of succession and fight for political power by his political heirs, in addition to the economic crisis that exacerbated xenophobia with the introduction of the concept of *L'ivoirité*⁴⁷, (Akindès 2004; Marshall-Fratani 2006) which led to ethnic and religious violence (Dozon 2000a; Colin, Kouamé, and Soro 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). This ethnic and religious violence increased with the coming to power of Laurent Gbagbo and the intensification of violence in the west (Bassett 2003; Vüllers 2011). The cumulative effects of these crises led to the civil war.

The chapter contends that the ideology of *L'ivoirité* or Ivorianess (Ivorian ethno-nationalism) was used to soothe economic deprivation, social strains and stresses

as well as political frustration (Bayart, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2009:181-183). It is asserted that socio-economic handicaps are encrusted in the ethno-regional cleavages that spread through the Ivorian society (Ogunmola 2005:153-155). The political class that has stamped its authority on Côte d'Ivoire exploits these fissures. The backbone of the argument is that the economic crisis, in conjunction with political setbacks amidst socio-cultural strains, propelled ethnicity to the pinnacle of Ivorian public life. It is argued further that the rolling back of the economic red carpet Côte d'Ivoire had enjoyed at the domestic level and in the international system coincided with the development of a form of ethnicity that culminated into ultra-nationalism (Dozon 2000a:46-50).

This study builds on the theories of ethnic conflicts by contributing the opposing concepts of benevolent ethnic clientelism and exploitative ethnic clientelism to the discourse on the causation of conflict in Africa. These twin theories can be extrapolated to explain some of the underlying factors that trigger conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

6.2 Historical Context and the Dynamics of Migration in Côte d'Ivoire

The territory of Côte d'Ivoire became a protectorate in 1842 and was effectively annexed as a French colony in 1893. The seeds of the Ivorian conflict were partly planted during the French colonial administration in West Africa (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:83). During the colonial period, the French amalgamated and divided territories according to their economic and political interests, for economic expediency and agro-climatic conditions, and thus segments of colonial entities were transferred from one territory to the other (Crowder 1968: 338). These arbitrary amalgamations and the groupings of people from diverse ethno-linguistic backgrounds are real handicaps for social cohesion, societal harmony and national integration for the post-colonial African state as ethno-linguistic supports became the factors that influenced state formation and political

struggle (Sall 2005: 597-598). Whenever these factors are at play, obviously, the task of national building becomes very difficult because they lead to the division of the country, personal rule, and ethnicised politics, which result in weakening the state (McGowan 2006; Englebert 2009). The fluidity of the ebb and flow of the migratory waves across the colonial territories means that in post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire there are ethnic groups which still have strong kinships across international frontiers. In fact, many studies have shown the linkages of the colonial creation and artificiality of the African borders and the problematique of cultural identities (Crowder 1968 and 1977; Young 1979; Bâ 1996; Azam 2001).

When the colony of Côte d'Ivoire was established in 1893, France had no coherent colonial policies as regards the new territory (Dozon 1989:140). For example, the French colonial masters fashioned and unfashioned the identity of the colonised people of Upper-Volta according to the economic and administrative interests of the Métropole by amalgamating the south-west of Upper-Volta (which was then known as Upper Côte d'Ivoire) with the colony of Côte d'Ivoire on the 5th of September 1932 (Bâ 1996; Crowder 1977). However, the French colonial administration decided fifteen years later to detach Upper-Volta from Côte d'Ivoire on the 4th of September 1947. The colony of Upper Volta was then established but the south-west of Upper Volta was dismembered and divided into three and shared out among the colonies of Côte d'Ivoire, French Sudan (present Mali), and Niger (Bâ 1996; Crowder 1977; Akindès 2004). The concomitant effect of this transfer of territory was the movement of indigenous populations as well as the intermixing of ethnic groups. Moreover, during the colonial yoke on Francophone Africa, the issue of border demarcations that were not clearly defined (and prone to confusing interpretations) had been a cause of disagreement even between the French colonial governors of these territories (Crowder 1977:146).

The result of this policy of population transfers and artificial colonial boundaries bequeathed to Africans in the post-colonial African states was that some ethnic

groups still straddle the borders of the post-colonial African state, thus leading to the fluidity of ethnic and or national identification (Ogunmola and Badmus 2004a; 2004b). A case in point is

the kingdom of Kong established by the forefathers of Alassane Ouatarra [precisely Sékou Ouatarra], covered a territory that straddled some parts of today's Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso from the seventeenth century to the colonial conquest (Bathily 2003:97)⁴⁸ (Personal translation).

Côte d'Ivoire was considered for a long period as the icing on the cake of the French colonial conquest in Francophone West Africa owing to its great economic potential. There is a fundamental difference between Côte d'Ivoire and its landlocked Northern neighbours. Côte d'Ivoire, a coastal state that benefits from favourable agro-climatic conditions, is also endowed with agricultural resources but lacked the prerequisite labour to work on its farms and vast plantations. In fact, Delavignette (quoted in Crowder 1968:338) notes that under the colonial agro-economic policy:

[b]etween 1921 and 1930 nearly 43,000 [inhabitants] of Upper-Volta [Burkina-Faso] were taken to Ivory Coast for timber cutting and worked on European plantations.

Furthermore, French farmers were partially instrumental in the annexation of the colony of Upper Volta (as Burkina Faso was known then) to Côte d'Ivoire in 1932 because the former was considered as a pool of labour (Wallerstein quoted in Crowder 1968; Losch 2000). This policy shaped the national demographic configuration and had economic undertones for post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire.

6.3 Post-independence Côte d'Ivoire: The Interface between Ethnic Heterogeneity and the Ivorian Economy: 1960-1980

The continuity of the colonial agricultural policy was the apex of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's policy during 1960-1980. As during the colonial era, the perennial structural problem of labour deficit inherent to Côte d'Ivoire was the stumbling block to the agricultural development and economic emancipation of

the country⁴⁹ (Losch 2000:10-11). Thus the policy of using labour from the riparian northern colonies during the colonial era was carried-over to post-independence Côte d'Ivoire. Côte d'Ivoire's economic potential was harnessed most fruitfully by Houphouët-Boigny, the Father of Ivorian independence. Moreover, the French colonial policy in the agricultural sector was carried over to the post-colonial Côte d'Ivoire in the framework of *L'Union Française*⁵⁰, with its "immense advantages", and this rationale explains the policy of collaboration with France that Félix Houphouët-Boigny embraced wholeheartedly (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:84). This policy was firmly grounded on a twin alliance "between the state and foreign companies on one hand, and between the state and the farmers on the other" (Losch 2000:8-9). However, Banégas and Marshall-Fratani (2007:84) argue that the "alliance" had three facets "with the former colonial power, the planters, and immigrant workers" which were rooted in clientelism.

This economic factor that worked in harness with difficult climatic conditions in the Sahel underlines the importance of the presence of immigrant labourers, workers and traders in Côte d'Ivoire (Akindès 2004:10). The migration of foreigners to and within Côte d'Ivoire was two-fold. On the one hand, there were those foreigners that migrated from the northern riparian states of Côte d'Ivoire (Burkina Faso and Mali) to the rural areas as temporary farm labourers to work in the forest zone. On the other hand, there were those migrants who settled down, having obtained a plot of land-specifically between 1950 and 1960 (Chauveau 2000; Akindès 2004). In addition there were the Ivorian citizens who migrated across the country to the forest zone (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:85). Migration was facilitated by the liberal agricultural and land policies of the Houphouët-Boigny government which were encapsulated in the principle of "the land belongs to [s/he] who cultivates it" (Banégas and Ruth-Marshall 2007:86). The presence of this multitude of up to two million foreigners in the context of the deep-seated economic downturn that began in the close of the 1980s also explains also the crucial role of ethnicity where social cohesion was hampered by economic miscarriage.

Houphouët-Boigny's government vigorously pursued its liberal economic policies with openness to the external world, and to all intents and purposes foreigners were in control of the Ivorian economy (Losch 2000:8-9). Cornevin (1972:363) argues that a decade after independence, a high concentration of foreign nationals was already noticeable in the demographic configuration of Côte d'Ivoire. Cornevin (1972:363) emphasizes that:

in 1970, Côte d'Ivoire has 4.5 million inhabitants, with about 20% non-Ivoriens...40,000 Europeans out of which 35,000 were French nationals and 10,000 Syrian-Lebanese. Abidjan had 500,000 inhabitants with an urbanisation rate of 25%. Pagans were 60%, Muslims 23% and Christians 17%. (Personal Translation).

The reliance on foreign expertise, capital, and labour later had dire backlashes not only for the Ivorian economy but also for its political future that left deep social scars on Ivorian society. Cornevin (1972:363) expands upon the economic liberalisation *à l'ivoirienne* and gives an insight into the weight of economic migration,

to the African inconveniences of a code of investments extremely favourable to non-African interests (duties and fiscal advantages, guaranty of transfer, etc.) is added in the case of Côte d'Ivoire the extreme scarcity of national labour force; 84% of farm labourers are non-Ivoriens (mainly Voltaics [Burkinabès] and Malians); 40% of skilled labour and 75% of employees in the commercial sector are equally foreigners. (Personal Translation).

There was an uneasy calm between the Voltaic immigrants and Ivorians over employment before this policy became the source of ethnic frictions. Horowitz (1985:125-126) gives graphic details about this "working-class economic competition".

The conflict between Ivorian and Mossi [a Burkinabè ethnic group] immigrants in the Ivory Coast is a legacy of colonial labor policy. Imported from the Upper Volta by the French, the Mossi are employed in a wide range of low-level occupations, as agricultural workers and urban menials and domestics.

Apparently, this presence of foreigners was looming large to the discomfort of Ivorians, and Horowitz (1985:126) continues thus

[s]o numerous are they and so prevalent throughout the lowest rungs of urban wage [labour] that the laborers of other ethnic groups could scarcely avoid meeting competition from the Mossi, who are regarded as especially hardworking and reliable. In 1969, the Mossi were attacked in Abidjan.

The unrestrained unidirectional movement of economic immigrants has also the opposite traffic of the labour highway, the expatriation of savings to the countries of origin of those immigrants. This phenomenon equally fuelled labour movement across the borders of Côte d'Ivoire. The ever increasing economic and agricultural expansion in Côte d'Ivoire encouraged migratory waves not only from the neighbouring countries of Côte d'Ivoire but also across the West African sub-region as a whole where living conditions were gradually becoming precarious due to protracted drought and worsening economic conditions, as well as political instability (Akindès 2004: 9-11).

It cannot be denied that this cultural and ethnic interpenetration worked out in favour of Côte d'Ivoire and boosted the charisma and the paternalistic posture of Houphouët-Boigny's personal rule. By and large, Houphouët-Boigny exemplified the traits of the rare exceptions of African personal ruler that Mkandawire (1991:84) states, "is inclined towards some national developmental objective". And even under these circumstances, "any benefits from this type of regime are dependent upon the ruler's continued goodwill and sound mind" because "[t]he personal ruler's main interests are personal aggrandizement and the maintenance of power" (Mkandawire 1991:84). The economic windfalls oiled clientelism and neo-patrimonialism through some parastatals and mainly via the *Caisse de stabilisation* (Caistab) that served as government outlets in the commercialisation of the cash crops and timber-pillars of the Ivorian economy- and the instrumentisation of government patronage and rewards (Contamin and Losch 2000; Conte 2005; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Houphouët-Boigny, through his "developmental dictatorship" (Sandbrook 1991:111), embarked on ambitious socio-economic projects that developed Côte d'Ivoire's social infrastructure such as low-cost housing schemes, road construction, the provision of pipe-borne water; and Azam (2001:431) comments that

former President Houphouët-Boigny followed a strategy of high visible public investments in the regions peopled by the other ethnic groups. These included the San Pedro port [in the South-west], and the less successful sugar complexes in the Sénoufo country in the north, which probably has a major impact in peacekeeping.

These projects were carried out during the economic boom. Consequently, the economic boom of the 1970s translated into social well-being that was used to contain social unrests and prophylaxis that masked the thin veil cast over ethnic divisions in Ivorian society. Clientelism under Houphouët-Boigny was generally benevolent, after consolidating his political power in the early post-independence era. Houphouët-Boigny skilfully maintained a peaceful ethnic coexistence that gave a semblance of 'national unity' and political stability to Côte d'Ivoire and the illusion of forging an Ivorian nation' (Azam 2001; Akindès 2004).

Furthermore, the Ivorian political leader combined the twin strategies of punishing recalcitrants, buying support through the affiliation, coalescence and cooptation of the most articulate members of ethnic groups in government and spreading high public investments across ethno-regional lines (Crook 1990; Azam 2001). He managed ethnic diversity and sustained the 'social contract' as pillars of his ethno-economic policy, which this study defines as benevolent ethnic clientelism specifically after the era of political repressions in the early years of the Houphouëtist reign.

This study calls it benevolent ethnic clientelism because the redistribution pattern of the spoils or the fallouts from the agrarian economy was mainly done horizontally among and within the ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire during the protracted reign of Houphouët-Boigny by co-opting their representatives. Moreover, the application of benevolent ethnic clientelism was aimed at the systemic integration by absorbing a new work force from West Africa that shared in the destiny of Côte d'Ivoire by giving foreigners (Africans) a quasi status of

Ivorian citizenship which is some of the basic principles of functionalism (Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). This gave the ethnic groups a sense of sharing in the destiny of Côte d'Ivoire as well as keeping the peace mainly by a system of clientelism (Azam 2001; Akindès 2004). French companies and some expatriates benefited to a large extent from the Ivorian patrimonial and clientelism system (Samir 1967; Conte 2005).

The Houphouëtist ethno-political methodology of patronage and rewards was justified by the leitmotiv of the parable of the peanut roaster by Houphouët-Boigny himself: “[d]on’t look too closely at the mouth of the peanut roaster” (Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Akindès (2004:11) gives an explicit account of the Houphouëtist parable of benevolent ethnic clientelism:

[t]his African parable is only meaningful in the context of specific attributes of political power in Africa, in particular Côte d'Ivoire. Roasting peanuts presumes that, at some point in the process, the cook tastes them for salt. Symbolically, the relationship between the act of roasting and tasting relates to the privilege of the roaster in belonging to a select circle of political clientele who benefit from an equal but socially recognized distribution by the mere fact of belonging to this group.

Akindès (2004:11) notes further that essentially,

The mouth refers to the logic of mastication that is present in the social representation of the exercise of political power in Africa. In other words, it is a legitimation of the prevarication and the primitive accumulation specific to Côte d'Ivoire.

However, this social contract waned and things began to fall apart with the economic crisis of the 1980s that exposed the structural weaknesses of the Ivorian economy.

The monetary shock at the close of the 1970s engendered the problems that were linked to external debt, which was in a large proportion used to feed clientelism which was then in a full swing while rent from cash crops was dwindling (Conte 2005:221)⁵¹(Personal translation).

The backlashes from this financial crisis showed that Côte d'Ivoire was seemingly heading towards a financial and economic cul de sac. Moreover, the “economic

miracle” became an “economic mirage” which exposed the limits of the Ivorian economic paradigm (Akindès 2001; Conte 2005). This financial predicament resulted in the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that marked the end of an economic era in Côte d’Ivoire.

6.4 The Management of Cultural Pluralism: Houphouët-Boigny’s Chemistry in the Complex Socio-ethnic Laboratory of Côte d’Ivoire

In the domestic political arena, President Houphouët-Boigny was able to suppress all forms of political dissensions under the firm grip of the one-party state of the ruling *Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire* (PDCI), that was only democratic in name. On the one hand, it was on the altar of one party dictatorship that the political ambition of Jean-Christophe Kragbé Gnagbé (a Bété and founder of the *Parti Nationaliste*-PN) was accused and sacrificed. On the other, the Agni or Anyi of Sanwi (an Akan group in the south-east of Côte d’Ivoire that has extended kingship in neighbouring Ghana) found their self-determination was silenced in violent repressions by government forces. In addition, there were the phantom coups of 1963 during which some barons of the political establishment were jailed in order to consolidate Houphouët-Boigny’s political power (Azam 2001; Akindès 2004). However, there was no real challenge against the one party system or any effective contest for Houphouët-Boigny’s personalised rule for two decades (1960-1980), and he stamped his authority on the gambit of political, military, socio-economic life of Côte d’Ivoire. In short, Houphouët-Boigny was larger than life (Bakary 1991:68-71).

More importantly, the management of ethnic diversity by Houphouët-Boigny was significant in giving a sense of belonging to virtually all geo-political ethnic blocs. Apparently there was a ‘political alliance’ between the Baoulé and the Dioula (broadly defined as northerners), or particularly between Houphouët-Boigny and some prominent members of the political class in the north of Côte d’Ivoire (Dozon 2000a;Akindès 2004). Such ethnic leaders include Mamadou

Coulibaly (the number three in the political hierarchy) who was, until his demise, *the Chairman of the Conseil Économique et Social* (a leading organ in the shaping of Côte d'Ivoire's economic direction). Likewise, Lanciné Gbon Coulibaly (a scion of Korhogo Côte d'Ivoire traditional chieftaincy) was an influential member of the PDCI (Dozon 2000a:58).

This political alliance was strategic to Houphouët-Boigny's political longevity as he consummated the art of regional representation, or ethnic balancing, in the allocation of government appointments (1960-1993) (Nnoli 1989; Le Vine 2004). The PDCI served as a basis for ethnic mobilisations in favour of the ruling party. The then Speaker of the Ivorian National Assembly, Mr Philippe Grégoire Yacé from the minority Alladian ethnic group-was the Secretary General of the ruling PDCI (1965-1980) and had been for a long time the heir apparent to President Houphouët-Boigny and the number two citizen before the Ivorian constitution was amended in favour of a vice-president that was never appointed. The former president also created outlets by using ethnic arithmetic as way to give a fair representation to other ethnic groups and he was a socio-political balancer (Le Vine 2004:307), the guarantor as well as the moral force of the 'Ivorian order'. Nnoli (1989:6) points out that

President Houphouët-Boigny has employed ethnic balancing within his cabinet and elsewhere in public life to allay the fears of Baoulé [Houphouët-Boigny's ethnic group] domination by other ethnic groups.

Azam and Mesnard (2003:456) give a fillip to the above argument when they highlight that

(...) the late president of Côte d'Ivoire [Houphouët-Boigny]...tried explicitly to build national unity by taxing his own ethnic group, the Akan cocoa and coffee growers, in order to fund visible public investment in infrastructure in the other regions of this ethnically divided country, and some other redistributive public expenditure, with evident success until his death.

To return to the Northern question: when we speak of ethnic balancing, and 'Political Alliance' we must carefully distinguish between central and northern

Côte d'Ivoire. The fact is that there was no 'Alliance' between the north and the south, and precisely, Central Côte d'Ivoire. But rather there was a pact between Houphouët-Boigny and some northern leaders (Dozon 2000a:58). Therefore, there was during the tail end of the Houphouëtist long reign⁵² a clear impulse to a northern agenda regarding the desire of its ruling elite to govern at the centre and also to be more politically assertive.

It was apparent that, henceforth, the zone would no longer play second fiddle in the Ivorian political arena. The declaration of the "Charte du Grand Nord" in 1992 was unambiguously asking for a transfer of political power to the north (Crook 1999; Akindès 2004). In a nutshell, the "Charte" was a programmed ethnic agenda of separatism, especially when Alassane Dramane Ouattara (a northerner whose ethnic identity and nationality are subjects of controversy as to whether he is an Ivorian from the north or a Burkinabè citizen) became the Prime Minister of Houphouët-Boigny's Presidency during the implementation of the SAPs. This brings to the fore the complexity of the fluidity of ethnic/national identity owing to the artificial ethno-linguistic separation of Africans. It is essential to note that the mutability of identity is not confined to Côte d'Ivoire⁵³.

6.5 The Decay of the Clientelist System

As demonstrated the 1980s marked the beginning of a gradual sunset on the "Ivorian economic miracle" as well as the erosion of the system of political regulation and the corrosion of the cladding of socio-political structure. The Ivorian government procrastinated in accepting the terms of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) owing to the French financial support in bailing out some of its former colonies (Duruflé 1989:137), especially those that belong to the *pré-carré* or "the square meadow"⁵⁴.

The structural deficiencies of the Ivorian economy have both internal and external causes and are highlighted thus:

[t]he erosion of incentives to farmers through adverse domestic terms of trade, caused by an appreciating CFA currency relative to the dollar, a weakening world market, high local industrial prices and, effectively, high rates of taxation through the state marketing board system (La Caisse) led to export stagnation. The second oil shock combined with this to create huge current balance of payments deficits which in turn discouraged private capital inflows (Loxley 1987:57)

Durouflé (1989:159) provides a complementary explanation on Côte d'Ivoire's economic slump. According to him,

(...) the analysis of disequilibrium over a long period is that of the limits of the model of growth which was instituted before independence and over the following two decades. The macroeconomic signs of its exhaustion can be enumerated as follows: the slowing down of growth in agriculture; blockages in industry; the growing costs of maintaining growth through public expenditures; and finally and consequently, growing extraversion and indebtedness. At a deeper level, hidden behind the rise of structural disequilibrium, are the limits of the mode of political and economic regulation which had been the basis of the Ivorian experience during the 1960s and 1970s.

The heavy debt overload, and servicing it, plummeted Côte d'Ivoire's economy (Devarajan and de Melo 1987:447-448), on top of the growing transfers of savings (expatriate and Ivorian) (Durouflé 1989:132). However, the implementation of the "Balladur doctrine"⁵⁵ in former French dominions had back-breaking effects on the Ivorian political economy (Hibou 1995; Conte 2004). The multiple deteriorations of the terms of trade in the international market arena, with Côte d'Ivoire's main agricultural products prices continually plummeting, "delivered Côte d'Ivoire into the hands of the international bailiffs, or...the "donor community" (Crook 1990:649). This crisis led to a severe reduction in 1989 in the revenue accruing to the farmers who have always been at the receiving end of the patrimonial system (the real engine of the Ivorian economy and its economic success), as well as salary cuts in the public sector (Crook1990; Bourguignon 1991). The stringent economic austerity measures with concomitant socio-economic upheavals resulted in the falling standard of living which led to strikes and economic riots that dealt further damaging blows to a prostrate economy (Crook1990; Bourguignon1991). This conforms to the axiomatic assertion that civil disturbance usually occurs in the neo-patrimonial state when the "patronage

flows [are] severely reduced” (Sandbrook 1991:108). The Houphouët-Boigny government fought desperately, and as expected, lost the struggle to maintain favourable prices for its main agricultural exports. Losch (2000:12) gives a more detailed account of the cause and effects of the politico-economic crisis as he avers that:

having played the game of stubbornness, the regime was constrained to sever the historic compromise with farmers, which was a main component of the Ivorian social structure. Having resigned himself to halve the farm gate price as a result of the disaster of the cocoa war, Houphouët-Boigny opened the Pandora's box of widespread protest (labour, political, military) that forced the regime to take the course of liberalization, to go back to multiparty elections of the pre-independence years and to implement significantly the disinvestment of the State under pressure from the donor community.

The country then underwent a deep recession characterised by a political tension which is not unconnected to a forceful implementation of a programme of austerity imposed from abroad by the new Prime Minister Ouatarra (Personal translation)⁵⁶.

These structural adjustments were conducted under the auspices of the two Bretton Woods sisters (International Monetary Fund, and The World Bank), with substantial debt owed to the London and Paris Clubs (Campbell 1995; Conte 2005). The implementation of the structural measures which were consistent with unbridled liberalisation or the Washington post-consensus had some perverse economic impacts on the social cohesion of Côte d'Ivoire as well as led to changes to the political structures of the Ivorian politics.

These structural economic deficiencies resulted in micro factors that later assumed alarming and disturbing proportions in the realm of the social fabric (steady rise in unemployment, urban pauperisation, violence) that bred gradually and put to the fore a culture of denouncing “others” as scapegoats partly for the hard time the country was facing. This is in addition to the crisis of unemployment in spite of the policy of *Ivoirisation des cadres*⁵⁷. The economic malaise had many aspects. The prolonged economic stagnation at the close of the 1980s and the subsequent economic decline (due to the deterioration of the terms of trade, the debt over-hang, the ever increasing import bills that became difficult to meet, a high rate of the dollar), while in contradistinction export earnings were nose-diving at the expense of other vital sectors such as health and education.

These sectors took a heavy financial bashing from successive Ivorian governments.

The result of these negative elements coupled with massive corruption and economic mismanagement were salient factors that militated against economic development and social progress in Côte d'Ivoire. The logical but bitter corollaries of these factors were human, political, military and socio-economic dislocations. Suffice it to say here that this morbid socio-economic diagnosis is not the sorry privilege of Côte d'Ivoire alone but this state of things is rather legion in sub-Saharan Africa (Bourguignon, de Melo, and Morrisson 1991; Azam and Morrisson 1994; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). In fact, the economies of SSA were riddled with crises that became enigmas to be solved.

The general consensus is that the application of the structural adjustment measures bred political instability not only not in Côte d'Ivoire but also across Sub-Saharan Africa (Loxley 1987; Azam, Berthélemy and Calipel 1996; Crook 1999; Contamin and Losch 2000; Conte 2005). Worse still for the economies, the IMF lending processes are "highly politicized even in Africa" (Stone 2004:578), and this is coupled with the fact that the interference of the major powers in the implementation of the Fund's programmes in Africa (Loxley 1987; Stone 2004).

Azam (1993, cited in Oussou, Pégatiéan, and Ngaladjo 2004:327) observes that SAPs were used by Houphouët-Boigny as a double-edged sword to deal decisive blows to his traditional opponents (teachers and intellectuals) and ambitious politicians as well as a pretext to circumvent some aspects of the programmes. First, at the macro-level there is the dynamic of the unipolar system, which is yet to be effectively counter-balanced. It is no coincidence that the overwhelming triumph of liberal ideology over state-driven economy and the freefall of communism incarnated by the Soviet Union had domino effects and immediate implications for authoritarian regimes across the global arena. It was in this

atmosphere of economic uncertainties that these political conditionalities as integral parts of loan disbursements were introduced by the creditor nations to developing nations where there was a dearth of democracy.

African dictators were compelled to espouse liberal values, even if the changes were only cosmetic, in order to be relevant in the domestic arena as well as credible at the international level. Of particular importance was the issue of democracy which was in short supply in Africa. The unipolar system also had a compelling impact on dictators as they were forced to shift to political pluralism which Mkandawire (1998) tagged as a sort of “choiceless democracies”. Adherence to democracy for even those half-hearted Presidents has become the order of the day. Côte d’Ivoire was no exception in the opening of the political arena to accommodate participatory democracy. This meant the narrowing of political patronage. As indicated, there were the concomitant negative effects of prolonged economic recession on the Ivorian economy with a steady decline of the terms of trade. Worse still, the debt over-hang and its servicing drastically curtailed the room for manoeuvre of the ruling party (PDCI) in particular and government in general (Campbell 2003:34).

What is more, the debt servicing exacerbated the socio-economic problems for Côte d’Ivoire (Akindès 2004; Chirot 2006). These problems were further compounded by ineffective and inauspicious but well trumpeted SAPs that critically deepened the socio-economic crisis (Crook 1990; Bourguignon 1991). The application of some facets of these economic austerity measures led to widespread protests that challenged the authority of Houphouët-Boigny and the stability of the government (Morrison 1996:11). These conditions

included putting the former IMF and BCEAO technocrat, Alassane Ouattara, into the position of Prime Minister in effective charge of the economic programme (Crook 1997:219-220).

It is apparent that democratisation and the economic slump coincided with the end of Houphouët-Boigny's long rule. This unequivocally led to the deterioration that inexorably laid bare the structural deficiencies of the politics and policy of integration, which Akindès (2004:17) defines as the "Houphouëtist compromise", namely integration through economic factors. Losch (2000:11) puts it succinctly,

The chosen mode of regulation, based on the organisation of levies from the interface with international markets and on the redistribution fashioned on a clientelist type, was able to function taken as a whole until the 1980s.(Personal translation).⁵⁸

Losch (2000:11-12) argues further that those other participating factors that drove the Houphouëtist economic and socio-political system to its knees are multifaceted:

Its [the Houphouëtist system] fast disintegration was a challenge to the overall plan...the deep changes that took place in world economy that resulted in liberalisation, the recomposition of markets and that forced the state to be helpless-the Ivorian state included...the ever-growing needs of political regulation in the clientelist regime. The wearing effect of being in power that is linked to an ageing regime, the arrival of young graduates that could no longer be absorbed into the civil and semi-public services system coupled with demands of young managers led to an increase in the costs driven by the support for internal protest whereas the level of and access to resources of the political establishment was fast reducing (Personal translation)⁵⁹.

It was in that atmosphere of economic crisis that multiparty elections were organised in 1990 in Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, ending three decades of the political supremacy of Houphouët-Boigny as the only point of reference in the Ivorian presidential system.

6.6 Multiparty Elections in Côte d'Ivoire: The Challenge to Houphouët-Boigny's Autocratic Rule

The major political challenger of Houphouët-Boigny in the presidential election was Laurent Gbagbo of the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI). The FPI's favourite theme was the revival of Ivorian nationalism whose major catchment area was the central-west home to the Gbagbo's Bété ethnic group, traditional opponents to

Houphouët-Boigny's rule. The FPI's nationalistic agenda mainly targeted foreigners and questioned the continued domination of the Baoulé [Houphouët-Boigny's ethnic group] in strategic areas of the Ivorian political and administrative spheres (Crook 1997:220). Although Laurent Gbagbo lost, the FPI had some representatives in the National Assembly.

A crack emerged in the PDCI camp as a high profile cacique member of the northern bloc of the PDCI, Lanciné Gbon Coulibaly, a former PDCI mayor of the northern town of Korhogo, decamped to the FPI in the prelude to the 1990 presidential elections (Crook 1997:226). Moreover, there was a palpable tension in government circles in the post electoral period owing to the deteriorating health of Houphouët-Boigny. The Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, who had executive power, became the second in command to the aging Ivorian leader in the absence of a vice-president that had been provided for in the Constitution but who had never been appointed. Indeed, Houphouët-Boigny never had a running mate.

Article 10 of the Ivorian constitution was amended yet again, in favour of the Speaker of the National Assembly to succeed the President in case of his death in the course of his mandate (Akindès 2004:18). The Speaker was, incidentally, Henri Konan Bédié⁶⁰ (a Baoulé). The attending result of this double political act was that it exacerbated wrangling within the PDCI between Bédié's faction and those that were unequivocally in support of the Prime Minister. Alassane Ouattara did not foreclose any prospect to run for the presidential election and this power struggle is encapsulated by Crook (1997:224)

Bédié, the constitutional heir apparent, was clearly the leader of the old guard and the champion of the new generations recruited in 1990 who did not want to see their career prospects ruined prematurely by any manoeuvre to deny Bédié the presidency. Ouattara's support at this time came from the technocracy-those who had benefited or hoped to benefit from the creation of a leaner and fitter public service, a 'reformist' group within the PDCI led by Djenny Kobena, a former top civil servant at cabinet level and PDCI National Secretary for External Relations.

This feud did not spare the government and Houphouët-Boigny had to intervene in favour of the Prime Minister who embarked upon belt-tightening economic policies (which were unpopular) to sanitise the Ivorian economy and rehabilitate the financial sector⁶¹, as well as repressive measures to contain opposition to the implementation of the IMF driven austerity conditions to put Côte d'Ivoire once again on the path of economic recovery and growth (Crook 1997:224-225). It was in this deleterious atmosphere of mutual suspicion and political uncertainty within the political class that Houphouët-Boigny passed away on December 7, 1993.

6.7 The 'War' of the Political Heirs for Political Succession

The passing away of the Ivorian president in 1993 revealed an institutional void that was difficult to fill. All the more so because there was a glaring lack of a strong legal disposition and the mechanism of succession was weak. The (mis)interpretation of the Constitution led to a 'war' of the heirs between the then Prime Minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, and the then Speaker of the Ivorian Parliament, Henri Koran Bédié. While the former insisted on continuity in government by virtue of the executive power and the management of the economy that was showing timid signs of improvement, the latter instrumentalised the interpretation of Article 10 that vested the power of the President on the Speaker of the National Assembly and was supported and sworn in by the Supreme Court (Hugon 2003; Ogunmola and Badmus 2005).

It is worth noting that the said Article 10 had been tampered with many times by Houphouët-Boigny. The cacophony of the political legacy was, on the one hand, traceable to the fact that the spirit of the Constitution was unclear in the mind of the political actors. On the other, Houphouët-Boigny, who had not missed any opportunity of drawing from the fountain of African tradition as expediency required, relied on the Akan myth of succession, which of course was anachronistic in a modern state. In Akan mythology, no successor is appointed

until the demise of the ruling king. For Houphouët-Boigny, having a successor while still alive was anathema. The 'war' of the political heirs bred the ferments of institutional instability. On the one hand, the FPI and the *Parti Ivoirien du Travail* (PIT) of Francis Wodié were supportive of the idea of a transitional government rather than allowing Bédié to run the affairs of the state until the expiration of the mandate of Houphouët-Boigny. And on the other, Alassane Ouatarra was obstinate, wishing to continue as the head of government to fill the vacuum (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005:220). In the end Henri Konan Bédié emerged as President to complete the mandate of Houphouët-Boigny, thus putting an end to the fight over the succession.

The PDCI imploded as a breakaway faction, The *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) left the then ruling party (PDCI) because of what the first Secretary General of the RDR termed the "Baoulisation" of the PDCI, to create a centrist party that accommodated some of those that felt disenchanting with the leadership style of the ruling PDCI. Alassane Ouatarra became the presidential flag bearer of the RDR in the countdown to the 1995 presidential elections, thus crystallising an already frosty relationship between Bédié and Ouatarra. The Henri Konan Bédié government undertook an effective witch-hunting and blacklisting campaign in virtually all the spheres of government of Ouatarra loyalists, hence worsening the political tension (Crook 1997:226).

In order to safeguard and consolidate his new position and in preparation for the 1995 presidential elections, Henri Konan Bédié used some constitutional clauses that quickly took on an ethnic tone. The policy puts a question mark on the origin of autochthony as well as the criteria for the Ivorian citizenship whose hallmark was the concept and doctrine of *L'ivorité* that redefines the Ivorian Code of nationality and citizenship (Losch 2000; Dozon 2000; Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007), as well as the promulgation of a new Electoral Code that was apparently tailor-made to put Ouatarra out of the political contest.

Already, in 1994 the FPI had speculated on Alassane Dramane Ouattara's nationality and Henri Konan Bédié recycled the question of the nationality (through the ideology of *L'ivoirité*) of the RDR presidential candidate in the countdown to the 1995 election, because the former had held leadership positions in the IMF and the Banque Centrale des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) as a national of Burkina Faso (Akindès 2004:20). For that reason, the Bédié government considered Alassane Dramane Ouattara as a usurper who seized the opportunity of

uncontrolled immigration, particularly along the northern frontiers, the possession of false identity papers by nationals of Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, who were culturally close to the populations of northern Côte d'Ivoire, and the allegedly illegal claim by an immigrant to govern a host country (Akindès 2004:20).

The issue of Ivorian citizenship developed into a source of discord after the introduction of the Residence Permit with its excesses against foreign nationals when security forces harassed foreigners during Alassane Ouattara's Premiership that had made the Prime Minister very unpopular among the teeming population of foreigners owing to the economic crisis (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005:219). In order to thwart Bédié's political manoeuvres, an umbrella body of opposition to his rule emerged, and accordingly

In March 1995, the FPI, the RDR and the Union des forces démocratiques (UDF) of Bamba Moriféré announced a formal alliance under the banner of the Front Républicain (Crook 1997: 229).

On the economic front, Bédié's six-year rule was characterised by accumulated executive kleptomania and squandermania⁶² that resulted in the misapplication of the meagre gains from the economic recovery occasioned by the devaluation of the CFA in 1994 as well as the slightly favourable terms of international trade for its main agricultural exports (Contamin and Losch 2000:124). Furthermore,

the lasting financial turnaround of the country was mortgaged by the persistence of predatory behaviour and by the implementation of a policy of white elephant projects (Contamin and Losch 2000:125). (Personal translation)⁶³

6.8 Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics as Vehicles for Social Dislocations in Côte d'Ivoire's Babel Tower

Why did ethnicity and citizenship become a subject of paramount importance in Côte d'Ivoire? The intensity that ethnicity and citizenship assume in Côte d'Ivoire is ascribable to macro and micro political and socio-economic factors. Ethnicity, with its reckless application and backlashes, shattered the social cohesion of Côte d'Ivoire. Ethno-politics was also the springboard that propelled Côte d'Ivoire into an unpromising future with dark prospects that coincided with the economic decline of the country.

Furthermore, the communities and farmers of the fertile agricultural areas of Côte d'Ivoire suffered from the bitter realities of the international trade as the prices of the main export crops fell dramatically on the international markets. To all intents and purposes, and benefiting from hindsight, it is pertinent to note that given the high percentage of expatriates in a socially tense country that was in economic crisis that affected negatively the masses, the virtue of African brotherhood that was so dear to the first President of Côte d'Ivoire, was drastically eroding if not corroding. In arguments foreigners were derogatorily called "bôyôrôdjan"⁶³. Hence, Houphouëtism, or benevolent ethnic clientelism, was seen the other way round as one of the sources of the socio-economic crises by marginalised Ivorians. This belief ignited a retroactive hatred that culminated intermittently in xenophobia as shown in Table 1. Ethnic intolerance of foreigners is not a new phenomenon in Côte d'Ivoire.⁶⁵

Table 1: Waves of Xenophobia in Côte d'Ivoire

Year	Ivorian Groups	Target groups
1930	ADIACI	Senegalese and Dahomeans
1958	Ivorians in the colonial civil service	Dahomeans (Beninese)
1966	National Assembly and PDCI	Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger, and Dahomey nationals

Source: Ogunmola: 2010

The heterogeneous layers of a multi-ethnic nation-state in Africa, if persistently attacked in the scheme of things of national politics, can endanger the very corporate existence of the state. The plural character of the Ivorian state that is made-up of over 80 ethnic groups is a ready ferment of ethnic conflicts that are exploited by ethnic political leaders amid enormous socio-economic disparities especially between the south (that is well endowed in economic terms) and the north (that suffers from very adverse climatic and ecological conditions).

The introduction of the *L'ivoirité* concept became the open sore of Côte d'Ivoire. The ideology has disastrous effects on the Ivorian unity as the modus vivendi and modus operandi of the Ivorian political class is "divided we stand, united we fall" (Ogunmola 2007:119). Benefiting from hindsight, it is argued that the windfall from the economic boom era left some segments of the Ivorian population on the fringes of progress and that there was an air of resentment in the poorest strata of the Côte d'Ivoire, especially those that were attracted to the urban areas in the quest to have their share of the dividends (that became so elusive) of the economic miracle (Dumont and Paquet 1991:187-188).

Ultimately, this would explain why the fervor, the doctrine and concept of ivoirité finds its flavour and favour with the urban poor, who are a ready pool of recruitment. The concept also gets its ferment from the political discourse in the presidential elections. *L'ivoirité* is a social hydra and vote-getter that fosters ethnic conflicts and social disharmony rather than peaceful coexistence and integration (Ogunmola 2007:118).

6.9 *L'ivoirité*: Ethnicity and Its (mis)Representation

The perennial abysmal failure of the governing elite in Côte d'Ivoire, especially after the death of Houphouët-Boigny, as regards sustained development metamorphosed into the birth of *L'ivoirité*.

The combination of these factors put to the fore the acute issues of ethnic identity and citizenship crises. The intricate connection between the redistribution pattern of rents and solidarity between and among ethnic groups and the collapse of the same is a source for instability owing to these intrinsic interrelationships. The ethnic group is a backbone of mobilisation and a conduit pipe of rebellion when the state fails to maintain peaceful coexistence (Azam 2001:430-434).

In Côte d'Ivoire's context, *L'ivoirité*, the Ivorian version of ethnic nationalism, is intrinsically linked to the problem of political leadership and to developmental or related issues. *L'ivoirité* owes its origin as an instrument of political exclusion to the creativity of Bédié's government and is used to disenfranchise political opponents by casting doubt on the genuineness of the Ivorian citizenship of perceived opponents to prevent them from participating in the political processes of Côte d'Ivoire (Akindès 2004; Ogunmola 2007; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). *L'ivoirité* was used to revisit the origin, birth and nationality of some citizens. The doctrine was used to reassess on its own criteria the above triad, and give approval to those who vied for political offices. It is generally believed that the ideology of *L'ivoirité* was targeted at the northerners while another facet of the doctrine is selective in the sense that it even makes a distinction between southerners. Consequently, *L'ivoirité* creates categories of Ivorians (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005: 220-222).

In the post-Houphouëtist era, these crises are deeply embedded in the mindset of the new ruling elite as well as among the masses. These twin problems are not only factors of disenfranchisement but they are also instruments of political exclusion and/or marginalisation. Ultimately, the root of this ethno-political behaviour can be traced in part to colonial factors owing to the erroneous demarcations of the borders of the African states by the colonial powers without taking cognizance of historical and ethno-linguistic factors between and among the colonised peoples as well as the geo-political and power configurations of pre-colonial Africa.

The introduction and the subsequent application of *L'ivorité* by the Bédié government has done far-reaching damage to Côte d'Ivoire. *L'ivorité* was conceived in 1995 by a group of Ivorian intellectuals who were close to the corridors of power of the Bédié government. These proponents of *L'ivorité* define the concept as follows:

Ivorité is according to us a requirement for sovereignty, identity and creativity with regard to dispossession and subjection: be it immigration or economic and political power. The person that claims his/her *ivorité* is supposed to have Côte d'Ivoire as his/her country, be born of Ivorian parents who must belong to one of the autochthon ethnic groups of Côte d'Ivoire (Ethics 1996:66)[Personal translation]⁶⁶.

In the process, the ideology engenders political animosity not only within the political class but the doctrine also stimulates hatred and social frustration as well as a feeling of powerlessness felt by the marginalised in the larger society. *L'ivoirité* is an ethnic weapon that contributed to the civil war and has been wreaking havoc on the social cohesion of Côte d'Ivoire (Ogunmola 2007:118).

It cannot be gainsaid that *L'ivorité* is a concept that contravenes some fundamental human rights. Indeed, it favours a flagrant violation of some basic rights as they are unequivocally enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The concept created a string of recriminatory remarks mainly from northerners, who incidentally have nominal affinities with Burkinabè,

Maliens and Guineans who are found in the northern riparian countries of Côte d'Ivoire. The irony being, of course, that there was no Ivorian entity before the coming of the Europeans.

This state of things is more complex when we critically examine the concept of the nation-state in Africa. A close read of the concept of the nation-state in Africa reveals that when part of the nation-state is close to the borders of a neighbouring country, a micro nation-state can exist based on ethno-linguistic ties to the contiguous country. And, of course, the two entities have ethno-cultural affinities (Querol-Reynal 2002). Ethnic solidarity is strong and transcends the porous frontiers of the post-colonial state in Africa. By and large, it is not impossible that the larger ethnic group considers its kinsman in the contiguous state as "brothers" in the Diaspora. *L'ivorité* on the one hand differentiates between Ivorians and, on the other, redefines Ivorian citizenship and makes a sharp distinction between those Ivorians who have naturalised and those Ivorians who are described as "Ivorians of circumstance rather than genuine Ivorians" (Ogunmola 2005:155).

Hence the xenophobic character of *L'ivorité*, which was also appropriated by some Ivorians to decry the perceived influence of foreigners in the economic sphere.

The general population and housing census in 1998 revealed that the foreign community, with a labour participation rate of 57.9%, had a higher participation rate in the national economy than the Ivorian population, whose participation rate was 47.7%. This meant there was a high and increasing rate of unemployment in the local Ivorian population and an economic ranking that was relatively favourable for immigrants in rural agricultural work and especially in the informal sector in urban areas...The image of the foreigner as "invader" (Conseil Economique et Social:1998) emerged...The dominant presence of foreigner communities and "Dioula" traders in certain sectors was highlighted and, as a result, became a source of social tension. The dominance was referred to by a good number of actors on the political scene, who overemphasize national preference as a basis for "Ivoirité" (Akindès 2004:24-25).

Political and socio-economic issues are viewed through the prism of a zero-sum ethnic game. *L'ivorité* promotes the competition for state resources. This is equally a major catalyst for north-south dichotomy. It is worth stating that the application of *L'ivorité* is tantamount to the de-Houphouëtisation of the Ivorian social contract (Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). *L'ivorité* and ethnicity promote the Akan ethnic hegemony and ethnocentrism in Côte d'Ivoire (Memel-Foté, cited in Akindès 2004:24). After falling unceremoniously from power, the deposed President rationalised the application of *L'ivorité* in a post-mortem of his tenure as a unifying, integrative and cultural concept in contraindication of the obvious fact that *L'ivorité* created a propitious mood for civil war before the coup d'état of 24th December, 1999 (Dozon 2000a:55).

Flowing from the above, it can be stated that the doctrine shattered the Houphouëtist philosophy of peace and dialogue and replaced it with the twin bellicose concepts of insecurity and intolerance that had fatal consequences for the spirit of common purpose and social cohesion. The coming of power to Henri Konan Bédié opened the door to what this study describes as exploitative ethnic clientelism. Henri Konan Bédié used ethnicity for the promotion of his ethnic group (the Baoulé) in the socio-political and economic spheres as regards the distribution of the spoils (Langer 2005:33).

6.10 Deconstructing the Ethnic Myth: The Dynamics of Migration and Ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire is a multi-cultural society that has four major ethno-linguistic groups with "two being close to one another in the north, all of them strongly related to groups living across the borders" (Azam 2001:431). They are the Akan that consists of the Baoulé, Agni, Abron, and the lagoon ethnic groups, Akye, Abbèy, Ebrié, Abidji, Adjoukrou, Alladjan, Abouré, Avikam or Brignan, Ega, Ehoulé, Essouma, M'batto, Krobou and N'zima (Ministère de l'Education Nationale 1998;Akindès 2004).

The Akan migrated to Côte d'Ivoire from Ghana in the second half of the 18th century.. In fact this assertion is corroborated by Davidson (1965:251):

The Baulé and Anyi of southern Ivory Coast [Côte d'Ivoire] also belong to the history of the Akan. After the death of Opoku Ware in about 1750 [in Ghana], there arose a dispute as to who should have the power. Sections of the Asante decided to leave home and seek fresh lands to the west.

Thus began the process of the settling of this Akan faction in the territory of modern Côte d'Ivoire. It is believed that the Baoulé, in spite of their demographic superiority, settled down in Côte d'Ivoire after the Lagoon ethnic groups (Ministère de l'Education Nationale 1998:49). It is pertinent to note that the Akan have an overbearing cultural influence on the Lagoon ethnic groups (Roussel 1973:384). Similarly, there were migration waves from Liberia: the Krou ethnic group is composed mainly of the Bété, Dida, Bake, Neyo, Wobè, Guéré, and Wè that migrated from Liberia. The Mandé ethnic group is sub-divided into two groups in the north-east of Côte d'Ivoire: the Mandé of the south and those of the north. The Mandé of the north or the Gur comprise what is also known as the Voltaic group that came from Mali and those who migrated from Burkina Faso (Yacouba, Gouro, Toura, Gagou, Kweni, Dan). The Voltaic group that migrated mainly from Burkina Faso are the Malinké, Dioula, Bambara, Sénoufo, Koulango, and Lobi (David 1986; Akindès 2004; Ogunmola and Badmus 2004 a and b).

For reasons best known to France, the French undertook an ethnic ranking whose source is nebulous and scientifically erroneous, by a “pseudo-scientific colonial legacy ranking the races on the basis of the existence of the state, and the development of writing of books” (Akindès 2004:12). The colonialists ranked the Mandé as the superior ethnic group. The Akan occupied the middle position while the Krou were found at the bottom of the ethnic pyramid designed by the colonialists (Akindès 2004:12). However, in the post-colonial state, a new ethnic ranking was carried out by a group of Akan politicians through ethnic manipulation. The Akan now found themselves at the top of the ethnic ladder

“with the explicit predominance of the Baoulés and Anyi over the ethnic groups from the Lagoons” followed by the Mandé and of course the Krou within the state apparatus (Memel-Foté1999 b, cited in Akindès 2004:13). The failed presidential elections of 1995, which were boycotted by the Front⁶⁷, resulted in the election of Henri Konan Bédié and marked the beginning of a crisis of political legitimacy in the post-houphouëtist era. This was a watershed in the descent into deeper decay that culminated in a near civil war situation (Contamin and Losch 2000:117).

The political crisis continued unabated with the clampdown on the opposition until the armed forces overreached its constitutional prerogatives and sacked the Bédié government on 24th December, 1999, when some young officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who had returned from a United Nations peacekeeping operation mutinied over the non-disbursement of their stipends which were in the keeping of the Ivorian authorities. This resulted in a coup d'état and General Robert Guéi was appointed as the head of state⁶⁸.

In addition, President Henri Konan Bédié had a sour rapport with the armed forces, especially those military officers sidelined in the administration of the country, and he had drastically and continually cut the budget of the military, in addition to undertaking a systematic promotion of Baoulé officers to the detriment of seniority and ethnic balance in the army as well as the dismissal of the army Chief of Staff (General Robert Guéi) in 1995 (Contamin and Losch 2000; Kieffer 2000). Ironically, the overthrow of Henri Konan Bédié, instead of serving as a cure for the ills that were plaguing Côte d'Ivoire, signalled the start of a spiral of political anomies and violence that typifies military regimes in Africa.

6.11 Praetorianism and the Rise of Anarchy in Côte d'Ivoire: A Post-mortem⁶⁹

From then on, the *Comité National de Salut Public* (CNSP) became the supreme body of Côte d'Ivoire. The reasons for keeping the military at bay in Côte d'Ivoire were many. The social engineering of President Houphouët-Boigny incorporated military officers in the administration of the country but this was also due to his good rapport with the erstwhile colonial French masters and the establishment of a French military base in Abidjan, the 43^{ème} *Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine* (43^{ème} BIMA) as well as defence pacts that serve as a protective umbrella for the Côte d'Ivoire government (Turkson 2000b; Kieffer 2000). This held until the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the "Balladur doctrine" which led to the selective withdrawal of the French umbrella, in spite of the string of defence agreements that France had signed with some of its former dominions (Ogunmola 2009:240). The salient factors that motivate the armed forces to intervene in governance in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are to a great extent related to political and societal issues because

[i]n underdeveloped societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Their goals are general and diffuse as well as limited and concrete (Huntington 1969:194).

It is also argued that in the new states, the end result of the inherent lack of credible political institutions that can regulate the polity, and modulate conflictual political interests is that various groups become politicised and compete in the political arena (Huntington 1969; Otayek 1997).

The young officers that threw the state stewardship into the lap of General Robert Guéi did not wish to turn out to be outsiders in the political game. These kingmakers tried to be assertive and project an aura of untouchability. They even had had the temerity to set surveillance structures to monitor the military ruling hierarchy (Keiffer 2000:28). The factionalisation and fractionalisation of the

Ivorian army turned out to be a real scourge that undermined discipline and eroded the esprit de corps of the armed forces as loyalty to the leaders of the groups superseded national patriotism⁷⁰ (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:89). The introduction of the concept of *L'ivoirité* and its selective use recklessly promoted the north-south regional schism as well as accentuated the division within the *Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire* (FANCI). Officers of northern extraction were sidelined within the upper hierarchy of the armed forces, especially in the post-Houphouëtist era (Ogunmola and Badmus 2004 a and b), whereas the first Ivorian President gave a sense of belonging to Northern ethnic groups in the army (Azam 2001:431).

Ethnicity has pervaded virtually all the facets of the Ivorian society. The military are no exception to this. The military coup d'état had fatal consequences for the cohesion of the FANCI. The Guéi military junta was unable to avoid the plague of ethnicity. General Robert Guéi relied on the ideology of *L'ivoirité* to persecute and prosecute real or imagined opponents to his regime and to promote his personal ambition (Le Pape 2002; Ouatarra 2008). This harassment weakened the cohesion of the triumvirate of Generals: Robert Guéi, Lassana Palenfo and Abdoulaye Coulibali (a personal pilot to the late Félix Houphouët-Boigny), and became enmeshed in the ethnicisation of the Armed Forces. The two generals served in the Guéi's junta from December 1999 to January 2000, and as a sign of things to come the junta had "two governments in five months" (Losch 2000:6). The two officers were later accused of coup plotting in September 2000 (Banégas and Losch 2002; Ouatarra 2008). While General Coulibali was acquitted, General Palenfo was sentenced to one year imprisonment by a military tribunal. The incursion of the military into Côte d'Ivoire's political arena resulted in what Mazrui (1975:448) referred to as "militarised ethnicity". This exacerbated social tension and prolonged division in Côte d'Ivoire.

General Robert Guéi seemingly manipulated the state machinery to persecute the other generals who incidentally are northerners. It is not impossible that the

north-south dichotomy coupled with the personal ambition of General Robert Guéi led eventually to the eviction of his colleagues from the military government. The consequences of the application of *L'ivoirité* have two dimensions. *L'ivoirité* exacerbates ethnic dichotomy between the south and the north. *L'ivoirité* strengthens northern solidarity, which is predominantly Muslim, vis-à-vis the south that is largely home to Christians.

6.12 The Failure of General Robert Guéi's Political Transmutation and Laurent Gbagbo's Presidency

The military political leadership, which was enmeshed in the power struggle, had strikingly demonstrated that it had no well defined blueprint to bail Côte d'Ivoire out of the economic crisis. Likewise, its inability to successfully manage cultural diversities successfully featured patently on its adverse score sheet.

From the outset, the disqualification of Alassane Ouattara on the basis of his alleged foreign nationality and the code of citizenship as well as the exclusion of Henri Konan Bédié from the 2000 presidential race showed that General Robert Guéi was re-enacting the script of *L'ivoirité* or his own version of exploitative ethnic clientelism (Akindès 2004; Langer 2004). Bédié had used the same strategy of political exclusion in the 1995 Presidential election by using a metamorphosis of *L'ivoirité* through an amendment of the constitution by explicitly preventing the candidate of the RDR, Alassane Ouattara, to take part in the elections (Langer 2005:28). The concomitant effect of this policy was that major socio-linguistic segments of the Ivorian society were marginalised from exercising their political rights, thus feeding the ferment of social disintegration. General Robert Guéi compounded the political situation by participating in the presidential election as a candidate of his political party, *l'Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'Ivoire* (UPDCI), with his main rival the FPI candidate Laurent Gbagbo.

The political ambition of General Robert Guéi who wanted to stay in power through the ballot box proved fatal for him and ignited a whirlwind of political and ethnic violence. General Robert Guéi was manipulated by Laurent Gbagbo who, with the help of military officers mostly with northern backgrounds, who had put General Robert Guéi into power in 2000, used the spontaneous reaction against him to attack the fortress of his power (the Presidential Guard) while the FPI 'foot soldiers' rushed out to the street, all in a mob atmosphere (Le Pape 2003; Ouatarra 2008). It was in this shaky circumstance for the future of Côte d'Ivoire that Laurent Gbagbo emerged as President, thereby deepening the ramifications of the crisis of legitimacy and legality (Langer 2004; Ogunmola 2005) as the opposition, especially the RDR, insisted new elections be held owing to the manner in which Laurent Gbagbo came to power.

6.13 The Expansion of the Epicentre of the Vortex of Ethnic Violence

These demands by the opposition were violently quelled in the streets of Abidjan as the FPI with the support of government forces clashed with the RDR adherents. The aftermath of this violence was the discovery of "a mass grave of fifty-seven bodies - all whom were northerners and many of whom had been close to the RDR" (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:90). The discovery of the mass grave aggravated ethnic tension and deepened further the north/south schism (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:90) which was already noticeable since Henri Konan Bédié's presidency.

Laurent Gbagbo came to power creating a new scheme of identification based on his own version of *L'ivoirité* so that the onus still fell on northerners to prove the genuineness of their Ivorian citizenship (Tadjo 2004; Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007). Revisiting the contentious matter of identity cards opened both old and fresh wounds, upgraded the policy of exploitative ethnic clientelism, and increased acrimony because

[t]here has been a long-standing polemic in the country over the naturalization of immigrants and their “purported usurpation of identity”, exacerbated by the introduction of national identity cards and resident’s cards for immigrants under the Ouatarra government. The question of national identification grew increasingly contentious during the Bédié and Gueï regimes; through the promulgation of exclusive texts concerning electoral eligibility of and the exclusion of former Prime Minister Ouatarra on the grounds that he was a Burkinabè, and alarmist press reports concerning the level of immigration and falsification of documents, these regimes attempted to resolve the question of “real-fake” identity cards (and by extension, “real” and “fake” Ivorians) (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007).

President Laurent Gbagbo increased the ethnic tensions by fanning the embers of ethnicity instead of promoting appeasement and national unity (Tadjo 2004:3-5). And also by making the issuance of new identity cards attached to the ‘village or ancestral roots’ and a link to the ‘genealogy’ of the applicants by creating the Office National d’Identification (ONI) (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87). The introduction of the new method of identification was inconsistent with “a highly urbanised population, where the relations with “a village of origin” are weak...and where individuals and groups have proved highly mobile, both socially and geographically” (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87). The end result of this policy was the marginalisation of those Ivorians all of whom could not provide evidence “of the local origins of their national belonging”, and particularly “those whose northern surname does not rhyme with southern villages” (Banégas and Marshal-Fratani 2007:87). A Forum for National Reconciliation (FNC), which was presided over by Seydou Elimane Diarra, took place in 2001 to conciliate aggrieved parties. In spite of this, the outcome of the Forum was an anti-climax. Peace was still in short supply in Côte d’Ivoire. Tables 2 and 3 show a brief summary of Ivorian leaders and their policies which explain how they contributed positively or negatively to the unity or disharmony of Côte d’Ivoire.

Table 2: Ivorian Leaders and a Synopsis of their Policy

Year	Leaders	Position	Policy
1945-1993	Félix Houphouët-Boigny	Legislator representing the territory of Côte d'Ivoire and later president from 1960-1993	Liberal economic policy, management of cultural diversity, and all inclusive immigration policy.
1990-1993	Alassane Dramane Ouattara	Prime minister	Economic reforms and introduction of the residence permit that increased the importance of Ivorian identity and fake/genuine Ivorians.
1993-1999	Henri Konan Bédié	President	Economic, constitutional, electoral, land reforms and ethnonationalism (<i>L'ivoirité</i>, Ivorianness).
1999-2000	General Robert Guéi	Leader of military junta	Constitutional and electoral, citizenship code reforms. Failed attempt to civilianise and ethnonationalism.
2000-2011	Laurent Gbagbo	President	Land reform and ethnonationalism
2011-	Alassane Dramane Ouattara	President	National Reconciliation and Reconstruction

Source: Ogunmola 2008

Table 3: Prime Ministers since 2002 in Côte d'Ivoire

Prime Ministers	President	Year
Seydou Diarra	Laurent Gbagbo	2004-2005
Charles Konan Banny	Laurent Gbagbo	2005-2007
Guillaume Soro	Laurent Gbagbo	2007-2010
Guillaume Soro	Alassane Ouattara	2011-

6.14 Agrarian Policy

The land policy issue was one of the corner stones of the Houphouëtist method of developing the agricultural base of Côte d'Ivoire by encouraging farm settlers and/or resettlers in the tropical forest of the south and south-west of Côte d'Ivoire (Akindès 2004:23). This was trumpeted in 1963 through his catchy phrase “the land belongs to those who cultivate it”, which was held as the Gospel truth although it was not enshrined in the Constitution. Moreover, it ran contrary to law inherited from the French colonial master, but it was used to rally farmers to his political cum economic clarion call (Chauveau 2000; Dozon 2000b; Losch 2000; Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Côte d'Ivoire, in spite of arboricultural potential, was lacking the demographic strengths to expand exports (Roussel 1973; Horowitz 1985).

As a continuation of the movement that was already promoted in the colonial era, the Syndicat Interprofessionnel d'Acheminement de la Main d'Œuvre (SIAMO) led by Houphouët-Boigny accelerated the process of transfer of labour from Burkina Faso and Mali by giving those immigrants an outlet of integration (Losch 2000:11). This was despite the fact that the autochthons of the forest zone were dissatisfied as early as the 1950s with the massive presence of non-natives. That has led to recurrent conflicts since the 1960s (Chauveau 2000:98-99). However, for the immigrants, this was a golden opportunity owing to the unfavourable climate in the Sahel zone as well as providing a *cordon sanitaire* for sub-regional socio-economic problems and political instability (Akindès 2004:23).

Apart from its external dimension, Houphouët-Boigny's agricultural policy and watchwords also encouraged internal population flux from the north (Malinké and Sénoufo peoples, who have cultural links with Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea) and central zone (Baoulé, Houphouët-Boigny's ethnic group) to the west and south-

west of Côte d'Ivoire to establish cocoa and coffee plantations (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:86). This ethno-cultural interpenetration through the agrarian economy upset the ethnic balance in west and south-west of Côte d'Ivoire "to the extent that in many villages and towns in the far and central southwest, autochthons make up less than half of the population, and in some places less than 30 percent" (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:86). Another effect of these migratory waves was to "dramatically reduce remaining arable land, giving rise to disputes among newcomers and autochthonous" (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:86). Although the focal point of land issues is the Cocoa and Coffee Belt, the savannah zone was not immune from the same conflicts over grazing and farm land, here involving immigrant and migrant cattle rearers and autochthonous farmers (Chauveau 2000:100-105).


The manipulation of the presence of foreigners and the land issue, ever sensitive issues in Côte d'Ivoire, became the main themes of political campaigns in the 1990s by Henri Konan Bédié. Laurent Gbagbo queried the right of foreigners, especially Burkinabè planters, to own farm land when there was a lack of arable land for Ivorians (Dozon 2000a:48-49). This revisionist policy led to many complaints by some Ivorians when the land crisis became more acute in the 1990s.

Notably as many youth returned to the rural areas to find that their fathers had sold or ceded remaining land to migrants, numerous conflicts broke out, initially between autochthonous and Baoulé, then from 1998 on between autochthonous and northern immigrants and migrants (notably Burkinabè, of whom there are some 2.5 million in Côte d'Ivoire). In the western regions, the multiplication of militia groups imbued with the political ideology of autochthony has gravely exacerbated these conflicts, and tens of thousands of strangers had been chased out off their land since 2003 (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:86).

The dispute over land was given greater force by the Bédié and Gbagbo governments' land reforms that revised the procedures of land acquisition by promoting customary law further increasing tension over the land issue. The consequences are not only re-inforcing ethnic tensions but also the economic

situation has seriously degenerated (Dozon 2000b:597). The media fuels the numerous crises by using its social influence to whip up ethnic sentiments and assertively promote customary law and traditional values over the written law concerning disputed land matters. The connection between mineral resources and civil war is correlated in the case of Côte d'Ivoire by the occupation and ongoing mining of the diamond rich areas occupied by the insurgents (Global Witness 2006; IRIN 2007). The conflicts over land issues have vertical and horizontal dimensions as shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2: Vertical and Horizontal Conflicts over Land Issues in Côte d'Ivoire



Source: Ogunmola 2008.

6.15 The Changing Face of Ethnicity

By extension, land issues and the three brands of Ivorian nationalism took a cultural undertone when ethnicity was, by its association with a north-south divide, projected as a Muslim claim (northern expression symbolised by Alassane Ouatarra) and as Christian identity (embodied by Henri Konan Bédié, Robert Guéi and Laurent Gbagbo).

The “other” was no longer identified as an Ivorian but as a Muslim, or a northerner; and as a Christian or southerner. The Muslim northerners were suspected to be abusing the open door policy on immigration of Côte d’Ivoire by stretching too far the Ivorian or southern hospitality (Akindès 2004:39). As regards the impact of ethnicity on religion, a closer look at the various scenarios suggests that religion is not really an underlying issue in the Ivorian intra-state war. Religious violence in November 2010 between the supporters of the former President Laurent Gbagbo and the current President Allasane Ouatarra was not clearly apparent (Vüllers 2011:6). Allasane Ouatarra was identified with his religion (Islam) and region (the north) both by the FPI government and his supporters (Akindès 2004:35). Prior to the internal conflict, Côte d’Ivoire was known for its religious peace compared to Nigeria where outbreaks of religious violence are intermittent (Basedau, Strüver, and Vüllers 2011:2). Religious turbulence is quite minimal in Côte d’Ivoire and confined to a great extent to Abidjan (with some isolated cases) in spite of ethnic tensions. It appears, then, that religious violence is exceptional rather than normative. However religious violence is a factor that is linked to other factors such as ethnicity and economy.

The sum-total of the consequence of political instability, mutual suspicion between some heads of state in West Africa, ethnic fundamentalism, economic downturn, (for example, Côte d’Ivoire experienced negative economic growth

before the war (Bassett 2003a; Crook 2003), and the redefinition of exclusive codes of citizenship culminated in civil war subsequent upon a failed coup d'état on 22 September 2002 that plunged Côte d'Ivoire in a long period of uncertainty. In the process, the vast majority of Ivorians are compelled to eke out a precarious existence. Ethnicity becomes a potent instrument to achieve the parochial goals of leaders. Ethnic militias appeal to the unemployed youth, especially since the stalemated Ivorian civil war.

Ethnic movements, ostensibly an extension of ethnic politics, supersede (by their violent nature) traditional ethnic politics, which remain so far the private domain of the Elders who have consummated the art of ethnic manipulation for political goals (Turton 1997:1). Therefore, ethno-regional cohesion can cave in. This is true when the hegemonic group can no longer lubricate the machinery of clientelism. When this applies, realignment or new alliances across the ethnic divides cannot be ruled out. Minority ethnic groups or those that are dissatisfied will eventually form new alliances still based on ethnic affiliation. Often, the hegemonic group considers the new alliances as a pact with the devil. Ethnic strife did not spare the north. There have been bitter rivalries and intermittent violent clashes within the rank and file of the rebellion, the *Mouvement Populaire de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI)-that are mainly northerners-that later became *les Forces Nouvelles* (FN)[New Forces] with other rebel groups that operated from the south-west (FN). Paradoxically, ethnicity, which was a unifying factor among northerners, has gradually and steadily become the source of division within the FAFN, *Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles*, as the ex-rebels' army is known. The FAFN and its political wing, the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN), are yet to purge the 'carnivorous demons' of ethnicity among its own members. It shows that ethnicity can also be a source of the collective promotion and the defence of a particular ethnic group in righting perceived, actual, and discernible wrongs. Ethnic politics remain central in Ivorian politics. Ethnic politics simply mean the instrumentalisation of ethnicity in the pursuit and the actualisation of economic and political goals.

Another factor in our analysis is the emergence of ethnic militia movements led by the youth during the current impasse in Côte d'Ivoire. These groups are a radical accretion in quest of socio-economic security and identity preservation as well as the manipulation of non-elite elements to protect class interests, which are promoted as ethnic or regional interests in a zero sum game (Horowitz 1985:101-105).

In this connection, this study makes a careful distinction between the ethno-regional division between the North and the South (loosely defined), and ethnic differences within the FN, the ex-rebellion. This angle of the study is a novel dimension and adds to the literature of ethnic conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.

At this juncture, the limpid analysis of Memel-Foté on ethnic manipulation in Côte d'Ivoire is worth mentioning. Memel-Foté (1999, as cited in Akindès 2004:13) debunks the Akan's claim to ethnic supremacy in the following terms:

The state-centred focus of the Akan militants does not appear to be well founded. In the first instance, the Akan state experience comes relatively late in the history of the West African region in general and in the pre-colonial history of Côte d'Ivoire in particular...Secondly, the state in West Africa has no universality either in the Mandé world or in the Akan world...Thirdly, from the normative point of view, the Akan states, both in their expansionism and their domination of their subjects, have demonstrated the same type of violence and succeeded in the same types of endeavour as the Mandé or Gur models: they do not appear to present a model more humane in any way than the Mandé or Gur models.

The Mandé and the Gur were not different in their oppression of the people they conquered (Memel-Foté 1999, as cited in Akindès 2004:13). Memel-Foté (1999, as cited in Akindès 2004:13) concludes the Akan groups were polytheists that practised some rites that were stopped by colonisation that were also abolished in the Muslim Mandé societies. The Baoulé/Anyi like other ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire are products of migration whose settlement was based on the claims of supernatural mythical ancestors (Davidson 1965; Azam 2001). The fallacious myth

of the Akan supremacy has wrecked havoc on the collective psychology of the average Ivorian who came to accept it as a genuine explanation. The impacts of ethnicity on Côte d'Ivoire can be viewed from two perspectives which, though distinct, are not mutually exclusive and form the sum-total of the weight and roles of ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire. The impact can be divided into two periods: 1960-1980, that is the early independence period to the end of the 1970s: the golden era of Côte d'Ivoire economic prowess. The other is from the 1980s to date; the period of ethnic consciousness and differentiation that highlights the social fracture of the Ivorian society.

The post-management of the insurrection in the FAFN-held zone shows that the ex-rebellion group is apparently incapable of digesting ethnic dichotomy. The former insurgents are also enmeshed in the traps of ethnicity that are further tinged with clanism. This ethnic tension is reminiscent of the *Armée Populaire de Libération* (APL) led by Gaston Soumialot in DRC, former Zaïre (Mazrui and Tidy 1984:216-217).

The power struggle between Sergeant-Master Ibrahim Coulibaly (a Malinké) and the political leader of the FN and Guillaume Soro, a Sénoufo, resulted in fanning the embers of ethnicity. In fact, the ethnic struggles took on the dimension of an ethnic purge within the FAFN. There have been sporadic armed confrontations such as the Malinké and the Sénoufo taking sides against the Koyaka axis of the rebellion. Infighting led to the death of corporals Kassoum Bamba and Adama Coulibaly. The circumstances of these killings are yet to be elucidated (L'Inter 2003; Jeune Afrique: 2004).

6.16 The post-elections crisis and the emergence of Alassane Ouattara as president

Many agreements such as the Marcoussis, the Accra Accords, the Pretoria Agreement, and the *Accord Politique de Ouagadougou* (APO) Ouagadougou Political Agreement failed to bring peace to Côte d'Ivoire. However, President Laurent Gbagbo accepted the organisation of the Presidential elections in 2010. Three major candidates who represented the main parties took part in the election: Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI, Henri Konan Bédié of the PDCI, and Alassane Ouattara of the RDR. This led to a run-off election between the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. Alassane Ouattara won the runoff election when Bédié supported him by asking his supporters to vote in favour of the RDR candidate and the results have been certified by the UN (Cook 2011:1). However, Gbagbo refused to accept the victory of Alassane Ouattara and instead declared himself winner and refused to step down in spite of mediation, and persuasion by the international community (Cook 2011:1). The impasse led to the post-election violence that resulted in the war between the pro-Gbagbo forces and the *Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire* (FRCI), the former rebellion that supported Alassane Ouattara (Banégas 2011; Cook 2011). The UN and France supported the FRCI in removing Gbagbo from power and facilitated Alassane Ouattara's ascension to the Presidency (Martins 2011:79). As discussed in chapter Six France is now involved in security matters in multilateral cooperation. The feud between Ibrahim Coulibali and Guillaume Soro resulted in the death of the former by the FRCI in unclear circumstances.

6.17 Conclusion

L'ivoirité stimulates hatred and disunity. So far it has been argued that in Côte d'Ivoire, if properly harnessed, ethnicity can be a catalyst for economic and social development for the over-all benefit of the populace, and that there is strength in ethnic diversity. The positive aspect of ethnicity was noticeable during

the period of Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Vüllers 2011:11). However, if exploited negatively, national cohesion is threatened, for differences are highlighted in order to point at the 'others' as the source of economic deprivation and social woes.

Moreover, *L'ivoirité* has shown that it could even consume its political proponents. *L'ivoirité* has also demonstrated its ability to promote mutual distrust instead of confidence and peaceful coexistence in virtually all the spheres of life in Côte d'Ivoire. *L'ivoirité* has exacerbated the north-south division on the issue of the new national identity card that Ivoirians were asked to produce under new conditions such as going back to their village of origin and tracing the ancestral roots (Bassett 2004:34-35). Moreover, Ivorian Muslims and northerners were identified with foreigners and the issuance of new identity cards was politicised (Akindès 2004:29). The issue of the national identity card was narrowly linked to the new status of residency, land ownership by foreigners or Northern migrants to the southwest (Akindès 2004; Marshall-Fratani 2006). In sum, the politicisation of the new identity cards created ethnoterritories, internal boundaries, and the redefinition of Ivorian citizenship and a new identity which are the consequences of *L'ivoirité* (Bassett 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Therefore, *L'ivoirité* should be rejected by well-meaning Ivoirians in order to rebuild trust and confidence in the polity. There is also the need to have good rapport with the international community so that it not so reluctant in its efforts to help Côte d'Ivoire find a good politician who can carry along the people and redefine national priorities.

It is vital for the Ivorian political actors to engage in trust building. The promotion of ethnic pluralism as a basis for positively exploiting the strength in ethnic diversity is also necessary to avoid and eliminate the apparent programmed disenfranchisement of a section of the population. Above all the economy needs to be revamped in order to allow investment in social development. The crises have shown that ethnic fundamentalism can only lead to chaos. Therefore, public

life should be de-ethnicised so that the climate of security, which Côte d'Ivoire once enjoyed, may return. Social justice will surely lead to social progress. The presence of impartial forces should be used to implement sanctions that will, of course, serve as a deterrent to all the parties to the conflict.

L'ivorité has only succeeded in promoting misunderstandings that widen political and socio-economic gullies that accelerate political and institutional instabilities. Consequently, the urban-poor become a tool that is constantly manipulated to achieve parochial ethnic goals used to fuel ethno-religious crises. The leaders of Côte d'Ivoire need to work together to promote unity through economic projects which require various groups to collaborate with each other.

Chapter Seven

Analysis of Côte d'Ivoire Findings

7.1 Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the previous chapter which aims at giving “voices” to the respondents by analysing their perspectives and insights on the factors that led to the war. The chapter follows the thematic approach and the central themes selected for the analysis of the factors of the Ivorian civil war in both the literature review and the case study. Violence motivated by xenophobia and ethnic discrimination had been a major part of the Ivorian civil war which started on 22 September, 2002 (Vidal 2003; Le Pape 2003; Ogunmola 2009). Since this date, ethnic violence had been featuring regularly on the Ivorian political scene with measureless human suffering for Ivorian society. This violence is symptomatic of the pervasive climate of deep insecurity that has engulfed the country since the demise of the first President: Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

The focus of this chapter is to discuss respondents' views on the causes of war in Côte d'Ivoire. According to them the main factors that triggered the Ivorian conflicts are multifaceted. They are rooted in political rivalries and politics of succession of the post-Houphouëtist regime, economic decline, and prolonged crisis that culminated in deep social malaise that took ethnic and xenophobic dimensions. Although united in common socio-political ideologies, political differences emerged between the former opposition groups led by Laurent Gbagbo of the FPI and Alassane Dramane Ouattara of the RDR when they came to power at different times of their political career. These disagreements were also contributing factors that had divided the opposition before the war. The students Union: *La Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI)* had two factions that had been involved in the infamous “*war of machetes*”⁷¹, that brought to the fore a culture of violence and impunity among the youth. The two groups that were immersed in partisan politics were led by Gillaume Soro and Charles

Blé Goudé respectively. These sectional leaders played prominent roles in the Ivorian conflict.

The field work also shows that there is an external connection that accelerated the descent into the Ivorian quagmire (CII3; CII6; CII7; CIFGD1). This section of the discussion is based on a thematic interpretation of the field work data on the etiology of the Ivorian civil war. Some of the interviews were conducted in French, mainly with the Ivorian respondents while others were carried out in English, which was used when interviewing expatriates, diplomats, and senior UN officials of the United Nations Operations in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI).

The primary causes of Côte d'Ivoire's protracted crisis have been widely discussed in the literature on civil conflicts in Africa (Losch 2000; Daddieh 2001; Ero and Marshall 2003; Akindès 2004; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007; Tchero 2007; Vüllers 2011) . As the literature review shows, the themes which arise are relevant to our understanding of the new developments and the turns of events in Côte d'Ivoire in the pre-civil war period, during the war, and the "no war, no peace" situation that resulted in new hostilities in which the former rebels supported Alassane Ouatarra with the defeat of Laurent Gbagbo's forces. As events unfolded, in the twilight of the long Houphouëtist reign and immediately after the demise of the first Ivorian President, analysts came to the view that the count down to a conflict ridden era in Côte d'Ivoire was in the making (Crook 1997; Daddieh 2001; Akindès 2004; Banégas 2006).

The post-Houphouëtist period was characterised by the 'war' of succession among the political heirs of Houphouët-Boigny and political intolerance that followed the crisis of succession (Banégas and Losch, 2002; Le Pape 2003; Ngoupandé 2003). The promotion of divisive policies highlighted ethno-nationalism and ethnicity (Dozon 2000a, Dozon 2000b; Loch 2000; Contamin and

Losch 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Furthermore, the bickering in the ruling party- the PDCI (Crook 1997; Le Pape 2002), and the social unrest accompanying the economic crisis revealed the weak nature of Côte d'Ivoire's government due to the policies of squandermania and corruption of government (Azam 1993; Campbell 2003; Langer 2004; Ogunmola 2007). In addition, the armed forces were also influenced by ethnic politics (Kieffer 2000; Turkson 2000b). These factors increased the divisions among Ivorians.

The discussion with respondents centred on the main undercurrent of events that triggered the civil war. Some were shown to be insignificant factors, although a number of politicians tried to use them. The secularity of the state was still preserved, in spite of many attempts by the political actors to confuse ethnic identity with religion. The emphasis was on the north being predominantly Muslim, and controlled by the rebels with the south, predominantly Christian under the government (Bassett 2003b; Vüllers 2011). This illusion of an ethno-religious bond was given credence by the fact that the post-Houphouëtist governments discontinued the policy of peaceful coexistence bridging the north-south geographic zones of the country (Le Pape 2002; Ngoupandé 2003). Houphouët-Boigny balanced the existing social infrastructure and appointments to government positions between the regions and this policy had been one of the hallmarks in keeping the peace (Azam 1993; Le Pape 2002; Ngoupandé 2003).

7.2 Religion: A Controversial Factor in Côte d'Ivoire Conflict

The secularity of the Ivorian state has been difficult to uphold (Nordås 2008:20). Although the respondents did not raise religion as a contributing factor, it has certainly been mentioned as one of the factors that plunged Côte d'Ivoire into the present war in some studies (Akindès 2004; Miran 2006; Vüllers 2011; Basedau, Strüver, and Vüllers 2011). This belief stems from the fact that the north of Côte d'Ivoire is predominantly Muslim while the majority of Christians are found in the

south. This belief was given credence by analyses of events during the Ivorian internal conflict. Muslims were harassed by the police in some mosques in Abidjan, which is the economic capital and most developed city of the country as well as in some other cities such as Grand-Bassam and Daloa and Christians were also harassed and churches burnt in the north (Akindès 2004; Miran 2006: 24; Vüllers 2011; Basedau, Strüver, and Vüllers 2011). According to a respondent a total of nine mosques were burnt (CII12).

The perceived religious divide coincides with ethnic cleavages between the two zones. Any group intent on attacking northerners is likely to look out for Muslims. Yet studies have shown that there are actually more Muslims (Ivorians and foreigners inclusive) in the south than in the north (Bassett 2003b:18). Animism is also practiced by a minority of Ivorians, some of whom combine animist beliefs and practices with Christianity or Islam. Religion became a factor of the policy of autochthony, discrimination, and xenophobia used to identify or stigmatise Muslim northerners (Daddieh 2001:17-18). In addition, the generic pejorative word *Dioula* has become elastic in its meaning as it encompasses immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea (Banégas 2006:542). Moreover,

Islam has been presented as a religion of foreigners and the Dioula and other groups originating from the North ...The protestanization of power following the election of Laurent Gbagbo in 2000, [was] celebrated by Evangelicals as the first "Christian" president of the country (Miran 2006:1).

The truth is that Gbagbo's predecessors were Catholics not Muslims. Another element that gives the conflict its religious dimension, is the fact that President Laurent Gbagbo and his wife Simone, as well as some of the close associates of the regime are adherents of the Gospel of the Pentecostal Churches (Banégas 2006:548). Gbagbo was "[c]onverted by his wife to a militant form of evangelical Protestantism" (Chirot 2006:71). It is interesting to note that although the relationships between Gbagbo's government and the northerners have not been smooth, and despite the clampdown of his regime on the "Dioula", Gbagbo still has good relationships with some Muslim associations such as the *Front de la oulama Islamique* (FOI) and the *Al Coran* that are close to the FPI government

(Miran 2007:7). Historically, episodes of religious violence became more pronounced between 1999 and 2002, while there were minor acts of violence connected to religion between 1993 and 1999, and Côte d'Ivoire did not experience any act of religious violence between 1990-1993 (Vüllers 2011:20). Vüllers (2011:20) notes that religious violence coincided with the politicisation of religion and ethnicity. Remarkably, President Gbagbo approved Côte d'Ivoire's membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conferences (OIC) which was denied during the time of Houphouët-Boigny who was most circumspect in relationships with the Arab world (Miran 2007:13-14). Houphouët-Boigny built churches including the Saint Paul Cathedral in Abidjan and the imposing Basilica of Our Lady of Peace (*Basilique Notre-Dame de la Paix*) in Yamoussoukro as well as many mosques in Côte d'Ivoire (Miran 2006:6). In addition, Houphouët-Boigny, by financially supporting religious organisations both Christian and Muslim and co-opting influential ethnic leaders in the one party system, made his ethno-religious policy a stabilising factor (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007; Vüllers 2011). Moreover, it can be stated that the religious tolerance was noticeable during the Houphouëtist period (Nordås 2008; Vüllers 2011). The ecumenical demography of the political parties shows that the majority of RDR members are Muslims while the FPI adherents are Christians, the PDCI accommodated Christians and Muslims especially before the creation of the RDR (Bassett 2003b; Vüllers 2011). The majority of the respondents relied on the fact that the political leader of the rebels (Guillaume Soro) is a Christian from the north of the country whereas the majority of the rebels are Muslims to say that religion was not a contributing factor to the civil war (CII4;CII7;CII9;CIFGD1).

Miran (2006:24) notes that

[i]n many ways, the Ivorian "civil" war is only a conflict of political chiefs fought primarily in Abidjan (since January 2003, the New Forces leaders-many of whom are not Muslims-have spent more time in Abidjan than in Bouaké [The Capital of the FN]) mostly for political reasons and, given the patrimonialist nature of the State, for economic ones as well. It is no way a religious war.

This belief that the war involves fighting over the spoils by political chiefs was what respondents mentioned to refute the idea that Côte d'Ivoire's war had a

religious character that pitched Muslims against Christians. It is important to note that religion has been mentioned as a factor by some respondents while others rejected any suggestion that it was a contributing factor in Côte d'Ivoire's civil conflict. Since the war is undeniably associated with ethnic cleavages, and since ethnicity and religion are often closely correlated, it can be difficult to distinguish between overlapping ethnic and religious factors as contributing issues to civil war (Basedau et al 2011:19). Others argue that religion cannot be dissociated from the contributing factors that led to the Ivorian war (Akindès 2004; Vüllers 2011).

Religion is certainly a factor that was given a range of interpretations by the respondents. Some of these interpretations of the religious factor differ from those authors who argue that religious violence contributed to the division of Ivorians (Bassett 2003b; Vüllers 2011; Basedau, Strüver, and Vüllers 2011). Most of the respondents believed that religion was not an important factor that contributed to the civil war. In some cases a misunderstanding stemmed from the fact that particular respondents (and academics) have confused religious war with religious violence. Moreover, the media's accounts of the war were often based on an over simplified view of a "religious conflict" between a Muslim-north versus a Christian-south which was a false representation of the religious divisions (Bassett 2003b:13). Furthermore, the 1998 National Census revealed that 77% of Muslims lived in the south while only 23% of Muslims live in the north (Bassett 2003b:18). According to Bassett (2003:18) these figures show that the number of Muslims living in the south was three times higher than the number of Muslims in the north. The 1998 Census also showed that Muslims are predominant in the small total population of the north (56%) compared to the proportion of Christians who were only 14% while animists represent 14% (Bassett 2003b:19). Another factor that might have led to a different interpretation of the religious factor in the civil war was that there were both co-operation and inter-religious dialogue between the religious elites through the Interreligious Forum networks (Vüllers 2011:16-22). Although there have been religious tensions (Muslims versus Christians), and attacks on religious buildings and groups, religious

violence was not a decisive factor in the Ivorian civil strife. For example, Guillaume Soro (a northern Christian is the political leader of the rebels who are mainly Muslims). A northern Christian retorted impatiently to the issue of religion as a factor that I raised and pointed to the fact that the north is not a monolithic Muslim bloc:

No, but some politicians had wanted to use it. When people talk about the north, they refer to it as a homogeneous Muslim bloc. Northerners are not all Muslims. Being a northerner does not necessarily mean that you are a Muslim. I am a northerner but I am a Christian.
(CII6)

However, there were attempts by some prominent politicians to manipulate and monopolise religious sentiment as part of their propaganda campaign; especially the main political parties that used a religion as a divide and rule strategy (Bassett 2003:14). This attempt did not work out as the secularity of state and neutrality on religious matters have long been entrenched in the psyche of Ivorians. Rather, a sense of patriotism, which was a backlash of colonial policies, was promoted in the civic sphere of Côte d'Ivoire. For example, prayers are not said during school assemblies and only the national anthem is sung (personal observation).

Some politicians have tried to use and score political points with religion. Even, some charismatic political leaders attempted to use religion and appropriate religion for their propaganda.
(CII6)

The respondents consistently mentioned an outstanding leader of the opposition (Alassane Ouattara) who wanted to whip religious feelings as a rallying call for Northerners. The respondents stated that when he was opposition leader Alassane Ouattara gave his opinion of these religious and ethnic issues. A respondent observes that:

He relied on the North, in his region and raised the issue of religion. He later interpreted it as the opposition of southerners to the emergence of a northerner, of a Muslim to become President in Côte d'Ivoire.
(CII3)

I do not believe religion was a real factor, but there was religious tension as a result of the action of the police that harassed incessantly some Imams in

Abidjan. Especially, the issue of the arrest of some people in a Mosque in Adjamé or Treichville [suburbs of Abidjan]. These are isolated cases. (CII9)

According to a diplomat, religion was not a contributing factor to the civil war but it was instrumentalised in the media:

*I don't think this is a Muslim/Christian issue. But I have seen people using it as a tool. For instance, when you watch Television, you see the Ministers calling the French Devil.
(CII2)*

Some participants in a focus group discussion concurred with the above opinion on religious issues as not even remotely involved in the fundamental factors of the intra-state war in Côte d'Ivoire.

*We had lived in peace before the crisis had started. There was no problem between Muslims and Christians. We used to celebrate all festivals together whether they are Christian or Muslim festivals.
(CIFGD1).*

*Religion is not really the problem. But some politicians are using it for their personal ambition. Most of the rebels are Muslims but their leader is a Christian. Guillaume Soro is a northern Christian.
(CIFGD1).*

A participant who believes in the unity of the message of different religions blames religious discord on ignorance.

*Although we have different values systems, we are still one. People don't know the history of their religion. People have lived with mistrust and lies.
(CII7)*

As demonstrated by the fact that a Catholic was able to become effective leader of the FN.

(C1e-interview2)

Nevertheless, according to the opinion of most respondents there is a linkage between religion and ethnicity. Often, the lines of demarcation are blurred between the two factors.

Although the respondents did not see any linkages between religion and the war, studies have suggested that religion has been one of the factors that exacerbated ethnic tension (Akindès 2004; Vüllers 2011). Religious tension has been noticeable in Côte d'Ivoire; even during the time of Houphouët-Boigny when he built the Catholic Basilica in his village, Yamoussoukro, which was considered to be a sign of the domination of the Christian religion in the country (Langer, Mustapha and Stewart 2007:25). Religious violence characterised the post-Houphouëtist period as the 'war' among the political heirs took ethnic and religious undertones with religion being politicised (Vüllers 2011:20).

Two periods have been identified in the history of religious violence of Côte d'Ivoire: 1993-1999 that coincided with the competition between the political heirs, mainly between Henri Konan Bédié of the PDCI and Alassane Ouattara of the RDR (Akindès 2004; Vüllers 2011). The 1999-2002 period was characterised by religious violence which increased in its intensity, especially as a result of the crisis that marred the 2000 Presidential elections and brought Laurent Gbagbo to power. Then churches and mosques were burnt, and a mass grave containing mainly RDR supporters and northerners was found in the suburbs of Abidjan (Bassett 2003:24).

7.3 Economic Melt-down and the Politics and Policies of the “Otherness”

There is a general consensus that ethnic dissensions are one of the major factors that triggered Côte d'Ivoire's Civil War (Chauveau 2000; Daddieh 2001). Furthermore, a UN official states that:

Ethnicity played a huge part. Unfortunately, there is one group which is less represented in government. The Dioula are marginalised (CII2).

Another argument is that it is the politicisation of ethnicity by politicians rather than ethnicity itself that served as a catalyst of the civil war. In the long term,

ethnic politics in Côte d'Ivoire resulted only gradually in violence. Ethnic politics has been, more or less, a hallmark of Ivorian political life since the twilight of French colonialism in the country (Dozon 2000b; Losch 2000).

It is essential to realise that the economic decline and the rise of poverty intensified ethnic tensions and cleavages (CII2 and CII7, 2009; CII12). This was a result of the continued deterioration of the terms of international trade for Côte d'Ivoire's main exports (cocoa and coffee) because of market glut and the challenges that other exporters posed to Côte d'Ivoire's exports (Crook 1990; Campbell 2000). A further complication was the mismanagement of the economy that led to the introduction and (mis)application of the controversial conditionalities of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that led to the scrapping of some government parastatals with negative social consequences (Chauveau and Dozon 1985; Decalo 1992; Campbell 1995, 2000; Conte 2005).

The withdrawal of government subsidies and social safety nets affected the broader population in a country where the government is the major provider of employment. The result of that policy was a massive retrenchment in the public services and the subsequent downsizing of the number of civil servants (Bratton and de Walle 1992:422). The policy led unavoidably to a high rate of unemployment, social unrest, and the spread of poverty (Bratton and de Walle 1992: 424). Since economy and politics go hand in hand in policy formulation and decision making in government, the economic difficulties the country was going through had great impacts on the political life of Côte d'Ivoire (Oussou, Pegatienan, and Ngadjalo 2004: 321). As a consequence, once decay began, the social fabric started to degenerate remarkably quickly.

Xenophobia and discrimination based on ethnicity became prominent and found a place in the lexicon of some of the political actors along side the economic deterioration. The "other" became the scapegoat for the economic woes of the

country (Ogunmola and Badmus 2009:107-110). Houphouët-Boigny was generally seen among Ivorians as a symbol of unity, and a bridge-builder. Ethnic politics reached its climax with his death: the demise of the first Ivorian president, in 1993. Ethnic politics became a potent political weapon at the call of Ivorian politicians (Dozon 2000a:45-55).

Côte d'Ivoire is not alone in such xenophobia. The governments of Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria had also had recourse to the politics of blaming foreigners for some of their country's problems (Adepoju 1984; Aluko 1977; Hatton and Williamson 2001). They did this by resorting to nationalism and blaming foreigners for the economic downturn to gain favour in the face of waning government popularity (Adepoju 1984; Aluko 1977; Hatton and Williamson 2001). This is despite the much trumpeted policy of Regional Integration that is one of the objectives of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) (Robert 2005:15).

A step back in the history of Côte d'Ivoire is useful to understand why ethnicity and xenophobia became so important. This was true, especially, with the thorny and controversial issue of Alassane Dramane Ouattara's candidature for the presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 in the 'war' among the political heirs of Félix Houphouët-Boigny which heated the polity and brought forth the issue of Ivorian citizenship (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005:199-220). Generally, the issue of citizenship raised the problem of the integration of the second and third generations of foreigners who were born in Côte d'Ivoire after independence (Ware and Ogunmola 2010 81-82). As a background to this crisis, the issue of 'genuine' and 'fake' Ivorians sharpened the dissensions and bitterness among the Ivorian population.

Reverting to the main argument of this discourse, it should be stressed that there are firstly those who had migrated during the colonial period because of the 'soft'

French policy on immigration that saw labour flock to Côte d'Ivoire colony to work on the cocoa and coffee farms or attracted by the plantation economy (Akindès 2004; Banégas 2006). Then there was another wave of immigrants that came during the first decade of independence. This latter wave of immigrants from riparian countries was attracted by the liberal migration and land policies of the Houphouëtist government as well as Côte d'Ivoire's economic boom (Banégas 2006: 535). There was also the burning issue of the large number of northerners in the Ivorian civil service which the Gbagbo government raised at the beginning of his government (2000) as some of them were not considered to be *bona fide* Ivorians. The manipulation of the judiciary and the electoral law by the executive arm of government and the exclusion of Alassane Dramane Ouattara from the presidential race by Henri Konan Bédié in 1995, and by the General Robert Guéi junta in 2000 fanned the fires of hatred among northerners and the RDR supporters (who are in the majority Northerners). In addition, the incessant harassment of northerners by the security agents also contributed to the sentiment of deep frustrations among Northerners (Crook 2003; Grace and Mooney 2009). It is in this connection that Northerners asked stridently for a power shift in favour of the north and more participation of northerners in the political life of the country with *la Charte du grand Nord* in 1992 and the calls for the development of the north (Akindès 2004:18).

However, some northerners believe that they themselves should be blamed for the backwardness of their region, because they do not invest in their region of origin for its emancipation (CII7; CII9). Often, northerners are the ones who are found at the helm of trade, transport, and general merchandise among Ivorians but, their investments are concentrated in the south. Moreover, most respondents argue that some of the northerner elite were used by southerners to assert their political power and that it was essential for northerners to assert themselves not only politically but also economically (CII9). However, the fact still remains that businessmen do invest in areas which they are convinced will be more profitable because business is not a philanthropic venture.

Identity politics did wreck havoc in the west of the country between the Yacouba and the Guéré ethnic groups ever since the emergence of General Robert Guéi (a Yacouba) as the head of the junta that overthrew Henri Konan Bédié's government in December 1999. This was seen as an extension of the Liberian ethnic war that opposed the Khran against the Gio in Liberia because of the transnational ethnic affiliations and solidarities among these ethnic groups that are found saddling the borders of the two countries. On the one hand, the Gio in Liberia who are Charles Taylor's supporters are sympathetic with the Yacouba that they consider as their cousins; on the other hand the Khran, (the late Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe's ethnic group) are supportive of the Guéré who are their cousins from Côte d'Ivoire (Ero and Marshall 2003:97). Moreover, there was also an alliance between Charles Taylor and General Guéi that predated the ascension of Guéi to power. General Guéi had played a vital role as a bridge between the Ivorian government of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Charles Taylor's rebellion against Samuel Doe's personal rule in Liberia (Ero and Marshall 2003:90). The Guéré and the Bété (Laurent Gbagbo's ethnic group) are Khran and mutually loyal to one another and united against the Yacouba and Gio and Charles Taylor's group (International Crisis Group 2003). This inter-ethnic conflict partially explains the spate of extreme violence and other atrocities perpetrated by the rebels on innocent civilians in the West of Côte d'Ivoire. The brutalities are clearly reminiscent of the Mano River Union⁷² (MRU) conflict vortex that was characterised by orgies of rape and mutilations as well as summary executions of innocent civilians. Furthermore, the West of Côte d'Ivoire has become a beehive of mercenaries where impunities thrive (International Crisis Group 2003:1), resulting in the loss of life and destruction of property, and gross violations of human rights.

Although most of the respondents agreed that ethnicity was a significant catalyst in igniting the civil war, some see this from the civil service perspectives relating to imbalances, others see the politicisation of ethnicity as a consequence of regional cleavages between the north and the south.

I think the alignment was more ethnic and geographical, though it is normal that Muslims be thinking of a change under Ouattara. But remember there are more Muslims in Abidjan than in the whole of the north, if a line is drawn through Katiola [a major city in the north].
(C1e-interview2)

The issue of recruitment in the civil service became ethnicised as the Gbagbo government queried the number of northerners in the civil service in the north (Marshall-Fratani 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). On the issue of ethnicity in the civil service a diplomat states that:

For example, in the north, there was the issue of the Dioula in the civil service with the new government [Gbagbo's government]. There was deep-seated feeling of frustration. The northerners believed that it was no longer a personal feud but an ethnic problem. The Dioula, those who were close to Alassane Ouattara, or I will say northerners in general started the clamour for power shift. That one of their sons should be allowed to rule the country; it was their turn to govern the country.
(C1I3)

A participant who is a northerner also believes that the bureaucracy and the security forces were heavily involved in ethnic politics.

The political class tried to use ethnic issues to mobilise their supporters. However, harassment by the police gave apparently an ethnic colouration to the war.
(C1I6)

Nonetheless, the respondent states that northerners should be held responsible for the issue of marginalisation although he acknowledges that there has been injustice against the north.

When people say that the north is marginalised, I believe that northerners must be blamed in the first place before blaming the government. Northerners need to invest in their region. Northern business men and women invest in the south, instead of developing the north. They have to take active part in the development of the north. It is true that northerners have been muzzled.
(C1I6)

On the issue of northerners' investment in the south, Bassett (2003b:20) notes northerners have a near monopoly of trade and transport and these northerners are generally Muslims. Their commercial activities are one of the reasons that explain their high number in the south (Bassett 2003b:20). The issue of marginalisation or social injustice in the scheme of things would later result in mass dissatisfaction among northerners, especially with the accession of Laurent

Gbagbo to the presidency of Côte d'Ivoire (Dozon 2000a; Langer 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007).

Ethnicity became a clear issue in determining who got what in the allocation of political appointments (Losch 2000; Contamin and Losch 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Furthermore, a diplomat explains the importance of the role of ethnicity in the Ivorian civil war.

Ethnicity played a huge part. It is also a kind of frustration that is the poor versus the rich, in part. Unfortunately, there is one group which is less represented in government. Let me use an analogy in Australia. There is one group called the Aborigines. Originally people from that culture are poor than they are rich. The Dioula [northerners] are marginalised.
(CII2)

Other interviewees are of the opinion that religion and ethnicity are not really factors in Côte d'Ivoire's internecine war. These respondents relied on the fact that Guillaume Soro, a Catholic, was the political leader of the rebellion; and that the Speaker of the National Assembly, a FPI member (Mamadou Coulibali), was a northerner and Muslim, to state that ethnicity and religion were not contributing factors that influenced the war. They state:

There were no fundamental differences between the Baoulé and the Bété. Though Gbagbo was an opponent to the Houphouët-Boigny government and personally, I don't think ethnicity played a fundamental role. Not even religion. But we do know that ethnicity was linked to religion. For example, the Prime Minister Guillaume Soro is a Catholic.
(CII1)

The crisis was not an ethnic issue. Ethnicity was not a northern issue until the emergence of Ivoirité that aimed at a certain category of people. Alassane Ouattara was seeing as a victim, particularly when he was excluded from the presidential race because of some ambiguities concerning his Ivorian citizenship.

(CIFGD1)

It is not a matter of discrimination against northerners. Why is the Number Two of the FPI not discriminated against? He is the Speaker of the National Assembly.

(CIFGD2).

A respondent sheds more light on the argument that ethnicity was not one of the triggers of the civil conflict. In his words,

We have more than 64 ethnic groups in Ivory Coast. Ethnicity did not play a larger role. But I will say regionalism did play. During Gbagbo's time, I would say ethnicity played a larger role because the Beté and those allied tribes also wanted to now take advantage, they could find some use of their skills but it didn't play that major role as a bed-rock of Ivorian conflict. I agree that it is a bed-rock of covetousness.

(CII7)

The fieldwork interviews show that political problems relating to the allocation of power and resources constitute the main factors that plunged Côte d'Ivoire into the state of quasi anarchy. However, many factors are intertwined. Therefore they cannot be singled out but rather, it is their combination that led to the civil war. Thus a holistic approach is needed to understand the main factors of the civil conflict.

The factors are for example, the division between the heirs, or the "war of the heirs" of the Houphouëtist regime. Another contributing factor was the harassment of northerners by the police which led to deep feelings of frustration among northerners. One can also say that the faux-pas of Ivoirité. In addition, the involvement of the Armed Forces into governance and their inability to manage its internal feud and the ambitions of the hierarchy of the military were also important elements that cannot be overlooked. The inability of Bédié, Guéi, and Gbagbo to manage well the national economy. I mean their failure to turn around the economy led to deep frustrations among the people. Also, there is the snowballing effects of the 1999 coup d'état that led to the present crisis.

(CII3)

Further evidence is given by pinpointing some of the primary causes of the war.

There are many factors. For example, the issue of the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections where some candidates were barred from taking part. The crisis started within the political class, and then reverberated on the whole Ivorian society. As far as I am concerned, the Ivorian crisis was caused by the political class. Politicians were the starting point of the series of crises that led to the civil war. Houphouët-Boigny had preached and promoted a policy of national unity in Côte d'Ivoire (CII4).

This view focuses on the mismanagement of the Houphouëtist legacy by his political heirs. According to the respondent,

Houphouët-Boigny promoted a policy of national unity; there was no division, no discrimination among Ivorians, there was no separation among the people and everybody was proud to be an Ivorian. There was peace. But when he died, after the death of the great builder, the bridge builder, his country became hardly recognisable. His successors started to preach a fake ideology, to look for what divided Ivorians and not what united

Ivorians, what could forge unity. They excelled in those things that were not genuine, that were fake; that was the opposite of what Côte d'Ivoire stood and was known for. This is what plunged the country into chaos. The root causes of the Ivorian conflict are political. It was those political reasons that led to the consciousness that a particular ethnic group or some people were monopolising the economic sector to the detriment of others.
(CII4)

I do not think the military prior to the war, had much significance. The Guéi era was over.
(CIIe-interview 2)

The views of another participant, an international civil servant, concur with the above.

Guéi's coup that I had mentioned, then Gbagbo came in through the back door. And Gbagbo didn't actually win the presidential election. I know now that the international community is regretting to have said let's "Gbagbo be the President". What led to the civil war was because Gbagbo was going, I believe, was going to try Guéi's military boys. It is a combination of factors. The issue of Ivoirité, the rivalries between the Baoulé and the Bété. You know the tribal differences.
(CIII2)

The above opinion confirmed the thesis that many factors are involved in the conflict of Côte d'Ivoire and that a single factor cannot capture the events that led to the war.

7.4 Economic Resources as Triggers of the Civil War

The economic factor regarding the greed of the rebels in Côte d'Ivoire, with one of the objectives of the rebels being to control the natural resources of the country, was a factor in the preliminary investigation of this study. The assumption was based on the theory of greed and grievance of Collier's (2001) model. The respondents' views vary according to their perception of the causes of the civil conflict. They believe that there was an element of greed behind the grievance factor. However, some of the participants are opposed to the hypothesis of greed as a main motivational factor (CII1; CII6). Some of the respondents believe that the rebels are defending their own interests and the interest of the masses is not a priority for them (CII6). Moreover, the

grievances/frustrations are considered to be significant motivational factors as compared to greed according to the respondents. These findings correlate with those of the Sierra Leone case study where grievances and frustration were some of the motivational factors of the rebels; while the issue of greed was seen to have prolonged the civil war.

I believe the frustration caused by the power struggle is also a major factor. Those who had been occupying high positions could not be removed without causing serious problems for the new comers.

(CII1)

According to the respondents, greed was not an important factor that motivated the rebels from the very beginning of the rebellion. However, the elements of greed were apparent in the pre-civil war period as the military officers that took part in the coup against Bédié became ambitious and harassed the population and were involved in car hijacking, and had lived ostentatious lives in Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:89-93). Moreover, greed was linked to the aftermath of the failed coup of September 2002 and the subsequent occupation of the northern and central parts of the country by the rebels. Thus greed cannot be completely removed as a factor that motivated the rebels.

No, rather it is the outcome of the events that I mentioned at the beginning of this talk. There are also the series of crises within the rebellion itself. When you are eating your appetite is sharpened, appetite comes with eating. The civil war was a revolution within the revolution.

(CII6)

The rebels are using grievances as a smoke-screen to achieve their ambition.

I believe we should stop deceiving ourselves in this country. The rebels are just capitalising on peoples' dissatisfaction to benefit from this situation to help themselves. They are looting whatever is available. People who are close to power whether in government circles or within the rebellion are benefiting from this situation and, of course, the losers are the masses. They are becoming poorer everyday.

(CII9)

Grievance by who and what are the reasons? There were many problems. Many problems that remained unresolved until the civil war broke out. These same problems remain unresolved because they are difficult. The rebels used those grievances but Ivorians are now asking questions. Are

these people really genuine? Not only the rebels but the political class too that cannot resolve the conflict. For most Ivorians, it is high time they got peace.

(CII2)

As of today, the political motives or grievances of the rebellion have been attended to. Their main grievance was that the President should leave. That issue was not negotiable according to the rebels; and it was their main demand. Gbagbo is still in power. They wanted the President to resign but today they are no longer asking him to leave simply because they have tasted the wealth that diamonds, gold or natural resources can bring, the material comfort associated with wealth. The rebels are defending their own interests.

(CII3)

It is a very complex issue but I will say that the rebels said they wanted to correct what they referred to as the lopsided development that did not favour the north; they were fighting the so-called injustice, political marginalisation, etc... But the now the people know them, they know that they were trying to create wealth for themselves. They were trying to put enough financial resources aside for themselves. The rebels are defending their own interest not the interest of anybody. Some of them have wealth they had never dreamt of. But today everybody knows that the masses are suffering, their socio-economic conditions have worsened because the rebels cannot put a plate of rice on the table of the masses.

(CIFGD1)

Although the issue of marginalisation was a main grievance, a participant challenges the northerner elite to develop their region

The rebels are defending, fighting for their own interest. Although a section of the population felt that it was marginalised. Its rights were infringed. I am referring to northerners. I must say that northerners were also partly responsible for this state of things. I mean their refusal to participate actively in the management and in the development of their region.

(CII6)

A respondent believes that marginalisation or the politics of exclusion can be a tool of propaganda and manipulation by the rebels.

They said that it was because they were northerners that they were discriminated against and they have to promote themselves vis-à-vis the state. They made people believe that they were protecting and defending them. They were saying “look how the north is”, “you are not blind, and you can see that the disparities between the south and the north are obvious, the north is not developed”,” the north is lagging behind”. However, northerners have now understood that the development of the north is not the priority of the rebels but their own development, the improvement of “their pocket”! How to amass wealth, how to improve their social and

economic status and not how to improve the life of northerners. The masses have now understood what the objectives of the rebels were really.

(CII3)

On the issue of performance, the respondents generally believe that the balance sheet of the rebels is poor because they failed to provide basic infrastructure in the zones under their control.

They are now controlling half of the country but they have not built a classroom! They have not installed a tap water in any village! Tell me, how the masses can now say they are fighting on their behalf, fighting for their rights.

(CII3)

A respondent described the situation in the rebels controlled zones as depressing and that the government has been unable to provide social amenities, which could be the consequences of the war.

Worse still, they are killing one another because they have factions; because some are saying why don't we honour the Agreements we sign? Our aim was to free the masses from this suffering. What we have here now is the propagation of disease, epidemics, and the proliferation of poverty that are taking root. Hospitals are empty, there are no medications, and basic health care is dishearteningly lacking. It is an eye sore! As for the government, we see daily the same things.

(CII3)

It is a disaster. Kofi Annan was a disaster to Ivory Coast [Côte d'Ivoire]. We don't know whether Ban Ki-Moon will do better. But it was really a disaster; again because of history, The French used the UN. In Sierra Leone, the British played the right role. In Ivory Coast, the French used the conflict to assert their power, influence.

(CII7)

7.5 Sub-regional Conflict Dynamics

The participants are of the view that the involvement of neighbouring countries in the Ivorian Civil War was a channel which the rebels used to destabilise Côte d'Ivoire and help launch their attack. However, some respondents recognised the implication of their own country in fanning discord in Liberia as a repercussion of

instability. The politics of destabilisation was patently noticeable with Houphouët-Boigny's support for Charles Taylor's rebellion against Samuel Doe's junta (Mortimer 1996; Reno 1997). Former President Laurent Gbagbo also supported the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) that launched its attack against Charles Taylor's government (ICG 2003:1-2). Henri Konan Bédié had stopped Côte d'Ivoire assistance to Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) after the demise of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 (Bangura 1997:62). A respondent comments thus on the support some neighbouring countries gave to the rebels:

Some neighbouring countries encouraged and fuelled the war. They were for the civil war because their territory was used as a base by the rebels to attack Côte d'Ivoire. Without their support the rebellion would not have found a sanctuary to launch its attack. They were absolutely for the war. There is no doubt about it. The countries that readily come to mind are Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Mali. The countries were used for the supply of arms and they even gave logistics support to the rebels. In fact, they played a very, very big role in triggering and fuelling the conflict.

(CII3)

The involvement of the neighbouring countries in the Ivorian Civil War is certain for some respondents:

Of course! The majority of the people who took part in the failed coup of September 22nd had found a sanctuary in Blaise Compaoré's Burkina Faso and Charles Taylor's Liberia. It is an open secret that the officers and the soldiers that ran away from Côte d'Ivoire after the attempted and failed coups found a sanctuary in Burkina Faso, and they were behind the failed coup d'état that resulted in the division of the country into two zones.

(CII16)

Yes, the so-called friends of Côte d'Ivoire. We harbour a lot of citizens from other parts of West Africa, and this is how they paid us of back for our hospitality. The rebels came from Burkina Faso, from Liberia, and the mercenaries too.

(CIFGD2)

Some respondents believe that the Civil War is not good for cooperation in the sub-region

It is very unfortunate that these things are happening at the moment when others are planning how to cooperate, how to improve their economy.

(CIFGD1)

I will start from Côte d'Ivoire. We should not forget that Houphouët-Boigny supported Charles Taylor's rebellion against the Doe's military regime in

Liberia due to personal reasons and disagreement between Houphouët-Boigny and Samuel Doe. It is an open secret that Gbagbo was also an ardent supporter of the MODEL that rebelled against Taylor. So we have a situation of the boomerang effect. It is true that neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso and Liberia were actively involved in the Ivorian conflict. The MPIGO and other rebel groups benefited from logistics support from Charles Taylor, while the MPCI had undoubtedly the support of Blaise Compaoré. These two countries, I mean, their governments, were overtly or covertly involved. And Gbagbo has been accusing Taylor and Compaoré from the beginning of the civil war.

(CII9)

A respondent explains that:

Burkina Faso by providing a rear base to the rebels. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ghana by allowing the export and sale of agricultural and other commodities.

(C1e-interview 2)

The respondent explains the involvement of some countries such as Liberia and Angola in the Ivorian conflict:

For Liberia it displaced a problem involving its soldiers, since those people who came to the West of Ivory Coast did not need to be paid, being able to loot. Mali; Burkina and Ghana all had their GNP boosted by the coffee, cotton, etc. passing into their countries. Not to speak of the gold and diamonds. And do not forget the opportunism of Angola, and the mercenaries.

(C1e-interview 2)

Another respondent is even more emphatic as he witnessed some of the actions at Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire's borders and the direct involvement of neighbouring countries in Côte d'Ivoire.

I saw all the arms coming from Burkina Faso through Danané in Côte D'Ivoire. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire were totally behind Taylor until 2001 then 2002 Christmas when Taylor sent all his units and especially his RUF units into western Côte d'Ivoire that all changed. I saw them all crossing over. I was detained at the Loguatou crossing point and saw many units go over on 23 December 2002.

(CI-e interview1)

The eye witness narrates his experience thus:

We heard shots midday, which lasted about 3 hours. I then went about the town to see what we could. Loyalists' troops were celebrating their victory, having repulsed the rebel attack. I talked with them, including five whites that we deduced were mercenaries as they were definitely not French troops. I knew several of the rebels from Grand Gedeh, the county just west and south of Toulépleu. They were not in the first two groups of rebels but by the end of the second week, more Liberians were coming across the

border as rebels. I asked many what their purpose was...most were young, 18-23 years old. Some of the squad leaders were a bit older, but few were over 30. The common response to why was "I had no job in Liberia and was told we would be paid." A second response was from some who had participated in the Liberian Civil War some 5-10 years ago. They simply enjoyed fighting and had another war in which to do it. The Sierra Leoneans, who are entering the fighting on the Liberian rebels' side and have the reputation for mutilation, do not influence the rebels to begin similar activities in Côte d'Ivoire.

(C1e-interview1)

However, a participant believes that there were a lot of mercenaries who could not be controlled owing to the porous nature of African borders. Concerning Taylor's involvement:

No. No, no. Not because I like Taylor. To me Taylor was a nasty, indescribable despot. Perhaps, because the conflict has generated a high number of mercenaries that came across the borders it was believed there was a leader who operated from a neighbouring country and the leader created the militia, you know the mentality associated with an up-rising.
(CII3)

However, the majority of the respondents are of the opinion that Liberia and Burkina Faso were both involved in the war in Côte d'Ivoire (C1e-interview 1, C1e-interview 2; CII9). Moreover, the involvement of Burkina Faso and Liberia and their support for Ivorian rebels are well documented (Ero and Marshall 2003; ICG 2003; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007).

Regional involvement is clearly linked to the issue of ethnic links across the borders of neighbouring countries that have come to the fore with the problems associated with regional insecurity in West Africa (Ero and Marshall 2003; ICG 2003). West African civil wars have resulted in border insecurity in the countries contiguous to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies (CHE). For example, the Liberian and Sierra Leonean Wars have greatly impacted on the national security of Guinea due to the large number of refugees (Sesay 2003:14). A corollary to this is the appearance of mercenaries or recycled warlords in civil wars in West Africa (ICG 2003:19-21). This category of fighters is uncontrolled in the west of Côte d'Ivoire. The supports which rebels enjoy from governments that are sympathetic to their cause increase sub-regional insecurity in West Africa. This is

because external intervention is seen as a guarantee of success in intra-state conflicts (Rocco and Ballo 2008: 348). Moreover, the covert and overt support that some African governments (Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso) gave to Charles Taylor's NPFL rebellion ignited spiral waves of sub-regional instability and violence. In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched its attack against the regime of Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh. The RUF got support from such countries as Libya, Liberia, and Burkina Faso. It is clear that without the logistic support of Burkina Faso and Liberia, the rebels would have experienced extreme difficulty in launching their attacks against the Gbagbo government. It is also important to stress that the Liberian rebels of the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and those of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) not only found sanctuary in Côte d'Ivoire but they also got assistance from the Laurent Gbagbo regime to launch their attacks against Charles Taylor (ICG 2003:22-23). This was seemingly in response to Charles Taylor's support for the two insurgent groups that sprang from the west of Côte d'Ivoire, namely the *Mouvement Populaire du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP) which have been considered to be offshoots and henchmen of the MPCCI. The Gbagbo government tried to thwart the insurgency of the two rebel groups and create a safe haven for its loyalists in the west thus the *Forces pour la liberation du Grand Ouest* (FLGO) was launched (de Koning 2007:45). The LURD also obtained logistics assistance from the Guinean government of the late President Lansana Conté (Clever and Massey 2006:186). In the case of Côte d'Ivoire's Civil War, it is a part of the scenario of the security dilemma that has been unfolding across Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire. Charles Taylor and Lansana Conté were also locked in a battle of destabilisation against each other until rebel groups, which Guinea supported, overran Charles Taylor forces. More specifically, the Gbagbo government has accused Burkina Faso and Charles Taylor's Liberia of being the external backers of the Ivorian rebel movements (ICG 2003:14). Olonisakin (2004:192) notes that Blaise Compaoré's Burkina Faso⁷³ has been accused of supporting the rebels of the *Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCCI) in launching their war against the Ivorian government.

7.6 Franco-Ivorian Relations

Another external factor that Côte d'Ivoire's government has linked to the insurgency is the French factor. The first argument that emerges from Ivorians is against the arbitrary demarcations of borders of the colonial states by the French without taking into account the realities of ethnic affinities of the ethnic groups concerned. This led to the situation whereby the same ethnic groups are found across the borders of the contiguous post-colonial states (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005: 212). Moreover, the FPI government has repeatedly accused France of not intervening on its side, contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1961 Defence Accords between the two countries (Decalo 1992; Bovcon 2009b). The FPI government continued to believe strongly that France's attitude is ambiguous. This is allegedly because the FPI under the leadership of President Gbagbo had sour relations with the conservative French government because Gbagbo had diversified Côte d'Ivoire's economic partners. This was contrary to what had been the rule since Côte d'Ivoire's independence, where France had been the major economic partner of Côte d'Ivoire. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who General Charles de Gaulle once described as a first class politician, unequivocally aligned with the former colonial power, for the survival of his regime, especially during the Cold War (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007; Nordås 2008). The French remained the major economic partners of Côte d'Ivoire throughout the protracted rule of Houphouët-Boigny. He was also able to reach out to other ethnic groups and expatriates in the process of building the national economy. For the new generation of Ivorians, Houphouët-Boigny was seen as having perpetuated French colonial rule through neo-colonialism (Marshall 2005; Chirot 2006). This resulted in a sentiment of helplessness or *le pessimisme ivoirien* in the Ivorian psyche with the internalisation of French influence and power. It is alleged by the FPI supporters that this policy could have spurred France's reaction to destabilise the FPI government, because of the policies of economic restructuring or *la politique de refonte* that aimed to reposition Côte d'Ivoire outside the French political and economic sphere of influence. *La refonte* was supposed to be charting the course of the Ivorian renaissance, or rebirth. There is

also the fact that Côte d'Ivoire is seen as the *chasse gardée* of the French, or its territory to deal with under neo-colonialism, irrespective of the ideological orientations of each French government. The Ivorians see this as the desire of France to indefinitely perpetrate its rule over Côte d'Ivoire (CII5). Banégas (2006:539) argues that

Laurent Gbagbo, president since 2000, has not only been unable to re-establish the post-colonial compromise created by Houphouët-Boigny but has actually aggravated tensions between different communities through his aspiration to refound the nation and modernize the state. He has pursued this programme without creating any viable new sociopolitical alliance to replace the one that has been lost.

It is claimed, however, that the rebels would have taken more cities/areas, and overrun the government forces if the French had not intervened with their *Opération Licorne* as an interposition force between the belligerents in Yamoussoukro-the political capital of Côte d'Ivoire (Bellamy and Williams 2009: 9). In addition, the French put a *cordon sanitaire* to safeguard the port of San Pedro in the west (Rocco and Ballo 2008: 354). Probing further, some authors argue that France's interventionism is considered to be in the interest of peace (Bellamy and Williams 2009; Bovcon 2009b). FPI's supporters are of the opinion that the role of the international community is disrespectful of the sovereignty of the country. For example, a respondent said:

It is a joke! The International Community is playing a double game. We knew the course of action they had taken in Sierra Leone. Why should the case of Côte d'Ivoire be different?
CII6.

They would like the peacekeepers to be peace enforcers as in Sierra Leone or Liberia (CII7). They favoured a peace enforcement action in support of the government (as was the case of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone rather than a peace keeping force).

It [the role of the international community] is a disaster... In Sierra Leone, the British played the right role. In Ivory Coast, the French used the conflict to assert their power, influence.
(CII7)

A more specific point is that the role of the wider international community has been crucial in peacekeeping and drastically reducing the escalation of the civil war during the “no peace, no war” period (Ogunmola 2005:157-163). However, the consequences of the 2010 presidential elections, which Gbagbo lost but then refused to acknowledge the results and vacate power, resulted in the military and political crisis as well as the offensive of the FN that became *Les Forces Républicaines* and supported Alassane Ouattara (Africa Research Bulletin 2011; Banégas 2011; Cook 2011).

The Ivorian respondents blame the French for Côte d’Ivoire’s predicament and believe that France’s policies survive in their country which is still under the yoke of French rule through neo-colonialism. The respondents accused Félix Houphouët-Boigny of being a French stooge. Some expatriates and diplomats extolled the virtue of France’s African foreign policy astuteness. The participants believe firmly that France’s policy in Côte d’Ivoire is mainly driven by the strong desire to protect its economic interests and the former colonial master is not sincere in its approach to the resolution of the Ivorian civil strife.

*Western countries have mutual respect for one another. For example, the US will never violate the rights of France. France will not allow itself to be used as a base for dissident Belgians to attack Belgium. France is playing a dangerous game in Côte d’Ivoire. France is acting with impunity in Côte d’Ivoire. France is an arsonist and at the same time a fire fighter in this country.
(CIII8).*

France was thought to be opposed to the Gbagbo’s government because it was concerned with the issue of neo-colonialism and wanted restructuring of Franco-Ivorian relations (Marshall 2005; Chirot 2006).

There was another regime that wanted a new relationship with France that wanted to break with the past because the new government is socialist and it came to change everything, to make a revolution, to change the old pattern. Houphouët-Boigny collaborated well with the French. They came with a new orientation and they were telling the masses that France was behind their backwardness. France had to protect their interest, their investment. The French would never accept the idea that Côte d’Ivoire should open its door to every investor. That would be disastrous for French investment and interests in Côte d’Ivoire. For a long time, France had had the monopoly of the Ivorian economic activities. Côte d’Ivoire had not opened its domestic market to countries like China, Japan, and other Western countries.

The new government had frowned at the former pattern of Franco-Ivorian relations. They said France was still exploiting Côte d'Ivoire. So, France was more or less involved in triggering the conflict because of its desire to protect its economic interest. France bombed and neutralised the Ivorian Air Force because of the bombing of Bouaké which is under the control of the rebels. France was always out there to support the rebels. The French had never wanted to quell the conflict. They are adding petrol to a house which is burning.
(CII23).

The French used Houphouët to stay in Ivory Coast. The office of the President, the Presidential Palace is a property of the French; the Parliament building was also a property of France. The French own 50 or 49% of Côte d'Ivoire and all this is the fault of Houphouët because he used them to stay in power. Gbagbo was the only opponent to Houphouët's rule. So, Houphouët's people, even the Americans saw Gbagbo as a dangerous person.
(CII7)

Côte d'Ivoire still pays dues as regard the cost of the Presidential Palace and the National Assembly to France.
(CII21)

The French were so successful in colonisation. They continue to maintain an economic and intellectual colonisation. There was nothing to do to use the force of arms to take over Côte d'Ivoire. France depends on Côte d'Ivoire. The French are involved in the decision of the hierarchy. Although in the last five years they lost their grip on Côte d'Ivoire.
(CII1)

The French role is very clear in the Ivorian conflict. France is protecting its interest in this country. If it was not for the intervention of the French, the rebels would have controlled a large part of Côte d'Ivoire and Abidjan would have remained under the control of the government. France will never allow the rebels to take over Abidjan. For the simple fact that Abidjan is where their investments are. They will protect it by all means.
(CII9)

The French had controlled Côte d'Ivoire through the PDCI and Houphouët-Boigny. There was no real independence.
(CII2)

However, one respondent diverged from the view that France's policies contributed to the civil war, as he viewed it from an economic perspective and as propaganda of the Gbagbo regime

They did not cause the conflict, or contribute to its arising. Only in so far as the fact that the rather solid state of the economy and the fact that the utilities infrastructure (phones, mobiles, electricity) enabled the ongoing conflict on both sides. I think the French and "anti-colonialism" became the scapegoats for the Gbagbo regime, aided perhaps by Mbeki as an anti-apartheid figure. The north was no doubt significantly helped by the huge stock of fuel and arms decentralised in Bouaké by Houphouët-apparently to prevent a revolt in Abidjan!
(Cle-interview 2)

It seems that the theory of blame is due to the near monopoly of the Ivorian economy by French companies and the close association Ivorian Presidents had had with France before President Gbagbo.

7.7 The One Party State in Côte d'Ivoire

Many respondents and authors believe that the French contributed to the dictatorship of Félix Houphouët-Boigny by supporting him through his long personal rule (CIII1; CIII7; Bayart 1991; Baulin and Comte 2000; Banégas 2006; Chirot 2006; Dozon 2000b). There has been a lack of a democratic culture in Côte d'Ivoire, beginning from independence. It is hard to overemphasize how far successive Ivorian governments were involved in dictatorship (Ogunmola 2011 forthcoming). Furthermore, even multiparty elections were not the guarantee of the norms of democracy. In fact, the Cold War environment was a decisive factor in support of Félix Houphouët-Boigny's government as he was firmly aligned with the Western capitalist bloc. Cold War international political expediencies were the major determinants that had ignored the fact that Côte d'Ivoire under Félix Houphouët-Boigny was deficient in credible democracy (Decalo 1992:20). The advent of multiparty elections in lieu of one party rule had not really changed the political situation as Houphouët-Boigny's successors did not improve on elections. It was a case of transiting from one era of personal rule to another one. This has contributed to the exacerbation of frustrations that had characterised Ivorian politics before the war. In fact, frustration was also pervasive among those politicians who were politically marginalised as well as their parties and supporters.

A predominant opinion that emerged from the respondents is that the dearth of transparent elections in Côte d'Ivoire was a real impediment to the evolution of democratic norms. Moreover, it is a causal factor because the lack of a forum for the citizens to express their grievances or to make their voice heard, in order for

any contradictions that emerged to be resolved through the institutions of democracy, was a real setback.

When the different ethnic groups of the country are not free to express their opinion or when some ethnic groups believe that their rights are scoffed at, they are rubbished or marginalised; will you blame them if they found other platforms from where they were able to make their voice heard? People could have expressed their grievances if we had had a credible democracy and institutions that were really independent. Checks and balances were aberrations for the powers that were.

(CII6)

I think that it is also an important factor. If the institutions of government were working as they should have been, we will not have the coup d'état of 1999 in the first place. The lack of free and fair election is a problem that contributed to the war.

(CII9)

No doubt and it was partly a consequence of the Guéi coup and his refusal to allow a fair election.

(Cle-interview2)

Other issues associated with the lack of democracy in Côte d'Ivoire, in particular and in Sub-Saharan Africa in general, are freedom and fairness of election results that are challenged by the losing parties. Challenging the results by the losing side might be seen as the "strategy for bad losers" seeking to undermine the political rule of their rivals (Lindberg 2004:69).

It was an important factor. It was the lack of genuine democracy, the violation of human rights, the refusal to uphold the values associated with democracy, the manipulation of electoral laws. All these led to the conflict and the present impasse. I believe that all African countries should emulate Ghana. Ghanaians have proved that democracy can work in Africa and that the loser has to accept defeat gallantly. You cannot always win. I believe that if we are clever we should follow the example of Ghana.

(CII3)

The issue of lack of democracy affects all of us, those who are in power. You may see it as part of ethnic problems because the president is from ethnic X and ethnic Y has not yet produced the president.

(CIFGD1)

It [democracy] takes a long time. Côte d'Ivoire has the worst constitution. There are no checks and balances. It is an executive system where the President can do whatever he likes. In the Parliamentary system, we have those checks and balances. In the Ivorian system, nobody can say no to Gbagbo. For instance, during the time of Houphouët-Boigny, everything revolved around Houphouët.

(CIII)

The lack of democracy is an important factor according to the respondents. The present crisis is also seen through the lenses of the politics of political exclusion based on ethnicity (Akindès 2004; Banégas 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007).

Some people came to power in this country and they excluded others from the political game by manipulating the electoral processes with or without impunity. In a nutshell, they do whatever they want. All this result in frustrations, and we can now see the consequences of the violation of the norms of democracy. I believe that the lack of democracy was also a contributing factor. If we had had a level playing field, if we had let all the candidates go to the polls and let Ivoirians decide we would not have been in this mess today: the bloody conflict and this impasse. It is because those who are in power know that if the elections are free and fair, if the whole electoral process is transparent they can lose, they do everything to remain in power. They want to stay by all means and by excluding others.
(CII19)

That's a peculiar thing to Africans. They were not prepared for democracy. They also went through some forms of political instability, in the form of coup d'états. African leaders don't understand that power has to shift. That you can win or lose any elections; many factors come into play in politics. It is not only through coup d'état you can have a change of leaders. There is still the problem of those who were appointed during Houphouët-Boigny's time, during Bédié's time. My view is that it is a very complex issue. It is the unresolved conflicts of succession that is very significant to understand the civil war, the issue of succession that had not been resolved to satisfaction; we have the case of the mutiny of 1999, the controversial election of 2000. The 2002 thing was a fundamental dissatisfaction primarily within the military. There was dissatisfaction in the north. With the Party in power for over 40 years and the PDCI trying to cling to power by any means until the coup d'état against Bédié.
(CII1)

According to a diplomat, democracy is not even in its embryonic form in Côte d'Ivoire. Therefore, there is no democracy in the country and he raised the issue of legality that has been a thorny issue since the emergence of Laurent Gbagbo as President.

I've seen one election in Côte d'Ivoire in which Guéi took part and I've seen Gbagbo getting in through the back door. He didn't win any election. How can you say the lack of democracy? I haven't seen any. Is that the lack of democracy? I know, the International Community was saying Gbagbo won, and he probably did. And that's democracy. Were all candidates eligible or not? Were they qualified or not? That's a legal question, that's not a question of democracy. People went to vote, probably they voted for Gbagbo or they didn't. Anyway, some people wanted to steal the vote and they managed to steal it.
(CII2)

Consequently, Côte d'Ivoire is yet to experience multiparty and free and fair elections as the respondents have highlighted.

7.8 The Armed Forces in Côte d'Ivoire's Politics

Another contributing factor associated with the lack of credible democracy is the involvement of the military in Ivorian politics. General Robert Guéi's credentials did not portray him as a potential democrat that would lay down a solid foundation for democracy in Côte d'Ivoire. General Guéi as the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces had been implicated in the political repression, during the twilight of Félix Houphouët-Boigny's regime, against students and the FESCI leaders as well as some politicians (including Laurent Gbagbo) (Englebert 2003:329). The armed forces' inroad into politics ruined the modicum of credibility that the military had enjoyed when some young officers sacked Henri Konan Bédié in December 1999.

There is an overwhelming agreement that the involvement of the military in the governance of Côte d'Ivoire was a contributing factor in triggering the civil war.

*I always felt that Guéi was unwilling to rule. He started well. I really liked him until he became a military dictator. He abandoned his uniform and was then appearing in suit. Unfortunately, he changed. I think fundamentally, the military was out of control. Again, I think it was that unresolved conflict between the armed forces: the gendarmes and the military that fuelled the war. For example, in the army, you don't become a general overnight. It takes time. Now what do you do with those people who you still find in some key positions? Do you retire them to create room for your own people? That is an issue you have to consider in your analysis.
(CII).*

Participants thus believe that the involvement of military in governance has many repercussions that contributed to the genesis of the civil war.

The military betrayed the trust the people had in them. Especially, General Guéi who said that he came to clean the stables. He just changed overnight to start promoting the same policies he had condemned. He did not have a sense of history, of legacy. He accelerated the division that was the

hallmark of HKB's government. His attempt to cling to power was his undoing. He could have organised free and fair elections and retired.
(CII9)

Conflicting opinions within the military, the promotion of sectional and parochial interests eroded the cohesion, the unity of the armed forces, especially in the high echelons of the military.

The factionalisation of the army exacerbated ethnicity within the military itself. General Guéi and Laurent Gbagbo did no longer feel secure because of dissident groups within the army. This state of insecurity accentuated regional cleavages within the military. The state of insecurity of the political leaders started when Henri Konan Bédié sacked General Guéi as chief of army staff. The military didn't perform well. The involvement of the Armed Forces into governance and their inability to manage its internal feud and the ambitions of the hierarchy of the military were major causes. General Guéi was a monumental failure for Côte d'Ivoire. His coming to power was a disaster for the country as events that were linked to the Army have shown.
(CII6)

The involvement of the military was part of the problem. Particularly, the disagreement between General Guéi, Palenfo, and Coulibaly. There was also the desire of General Guéi to become a civilian President whereas he had told Ivoirians that he came to clean the stable, to make a clean sweep. He disappointed a lot of people. The coming of the military in the affairs of the state also contributed to the division of country along ethnic lines, the division of the military also because Guéi promoted officers of his region. This also created a lot of frustration within the military.
(CII3)

The weakness of the army was a deliberate policy of Houphouët-Boigny to neutralise ambitious officers who might be tempted to overthrow his government during his protracted rule.

During Houphouët's time our military was non-existent. If our military had not intervened in politics this war would not have come to this far. Houphouët never attempted to develop a powerful military. He took the Swiss model. Our Police and Gendarmerie were more powerful, more armed than the army. When Bédié came to power, unfortunately some of his advisers also played against him by putting pressure on him to sack Robert Guéi. Robert Guéi served diligently. This made him kept grudge so that they were fighting. There was a coup in 1999, hours before Christmas and the whole issue was blown out. Alassane Ouattara came from behind to use Guillaume Soro to destabilise the whole country which resulted into the north and south problem.
(CII7)

The military intervention further compounded a terse situation that was described as a prelude to the civil war before Henri Konan Bédié was overthrown (McGowan 2003; Akindès 2004; Nordås 2008). To be precise, the involvement of the military in the highest levels of politics eroded the *esprit de corps* within the Ivorian armed forces and gave rise to ethnic bias in the promotion of officers that had started during Konan Bédié's regime (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007: 89). Merit and seniority were sacrificed on the altar of regional and ethnic affiliations. General Robert Guéi's personal agenda showed that he was opposed to the democratic clamour of Ivorians as he failed woefully to create a conducive atmosphere that could have paved the way for the political rebirth of the country. Instead, he attempted to cling to power through the fraudulent manipulation of the 2000 presidential elections. This proved to be his undoing. Guéi was removed from power by the FPI supporters of Laurent Gbagbo⁷⁴ through violent street protests. Those officers that were marginalised joined the ranks of dissident officers that participated in the attacks against the Guéi and Gbagbo governments (Kieffer 2000; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). They would subsequently form the elite of the corps of officers that were involved in the abortive coup that resulted in the civil war and consequently led to the division of the country into two zones and the current impasse (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:92).

7.9 The Youth in the Côte d'Ivoire Crisis

The Ivorian war resulted in a general despondency that did not spare the youth. It is well-known that the youth have been catalysts of change in most African countries (Decalo 1992:13). Youth are involved in political changes both directly and indirectly. The involvement of the youth in the Ivorian war is intrinsically linked to economic issues such as the crisis of the high rate of unemployment, deep pauperisation in urban centres escalating poverty coupled with the reduction in purchasing power, and land issues, especially among those who live at the margin of society. A prominent youth group in the Ivorian civil war is *Les*

*Jeunes Patriotes*⁷⁵ that aims at wrestling a second independence from France that will pave the way for the liberation of the country (Banégas 2006: 536).

There are indeed two groups of young patriots: “urban” and “rural” patriots. The “urban patriots” are highly visible and close to government circles. They are the organisers of pro-government rallies while their “lectures” are held in the public auditoriums of the *Sorbonne* in the Plateau area of Abidjan and “Parliaments and agoras” in other cities (Marshall-Fratani 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). The “rural patriots” operate mostly from the hinterland of the country. They are involved in violent actions in the expropriation of land and /or farms from the *allogènes*, foreigners, or the “other” (Marshall-Fratani 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). The land policy of the Houphouëtist regime that had opened the gate to farmland to all-comers became radicalised by his successors (Chauveau 2000; Chauveau and Bobo 2003; Akindès 2004). Land issues are a central force that the indigenes of the cocoa-belt hijacked for personal, economic, and ethnic gains by querying the origins and rights of the “other” to own land. Ostensibly, the youth now ask redress from their elders, who owned the land that had been ceded to the “other” (Chauveau 2000:108). In most cases, verbal approvals were given in lieu of written or legal documents, following the politics and policies of “agricultural openness” and liberal land policy that was backed by customary law (Chauveau 2000:107-109). The rebel groups have also enlisted youth in their quest for military and territorial control, and political power. In addition, there is the ever-increasing hardship in the rural areas as a result of the drop in the purchase price of agricultural products and the crisis engendered by the land issues. Therefore, the youth view the civil war as a way to be engaged in an activity that gives them a semblance of power because they became instantly recruiters of, and recruits in, the government militias and insurgent groups that have mushroomed. The common characteristics of these youth vanguards are that they operate with impunity and spread a reign of terror in the population through the humiliation and sometimes the executions of people suspected to be enemies of the government (Vidal 2007:45).

Poverty is a recurrent and main factor for the involvement of the youth in Côte d'Ivoire's civil war according to the participants. The respondents also believe that unemployment is a catalyst of the involvement of the youth in the civil war. These two factors are followed by the neglect of the countryside and the culture of *loubardisme* or hooliganism, where street urchins, akin to lumpenproletariat perpetrate violence (Galy 2004:135). *Loubardisme* is a culture of urban violence that emerged with the economic crisis, social unrests, uncontrolled population growth, unemployment, and multiparty elections (Fauré 1993; Konaté 2002; Galy 2004). The *Loubards* were used during the Bédié, Guéi governments against students during the protests on campus (Galy 2004:135). The urban violence that was used by the political actors resulted in the political violence of the FESCI (Galy 2004:136). Therefore the instrumentalisation of the youth in political violence did not start with the Gbagbo presidency. However, the participants agree that these factors are intertwined and, consequently they should be considered from a holistic point of view to grasp the reasons for the involvement of the youth in the civil war.

Today, the youth follow those who can solve their problems. Poverty exists, it is real, and it is the main factor. It is the scourge of Africa. But when you have a situation where poverty is merciless it creates and fuels the culture of loubardisme. Loubardisme thrives on unemployment and poverty.
(CII19)

As far as I am concerned, the youth, I mean the innocent youth that were used are the big losers. The politicians used and dumped them once they have achieved their objectives. The youth have become a common denominator to the rebels and the FPI. You see Les Jeunes Patriotes have become a tool in the hands of government and its agents. Likewise, the youth have been identified as members of the rebel groups. All the parties to the conflict have used the youth. And they are willing tools because they are not gainfully employed and they see the rallies or the support for the rebels as ways to have a reprieve from the trap of poverty and unemployment which were exacerbated by the application of SAPs that accelerated unemployment. (CIFGD1)

First of all we have poverty, the high rate of unemployment, economic problems, the yawning gap between the urban and rural areas or what you call the neglect of the country side, I mean the disparity between the two is huge, and the culture of loubardisme that has virtually disappeared.

(CII6)

I believe that poverty was the main cause that the different protagonists used to involve the youth. They also exploited the high rate of

unemployment that was pervasive among the youth to achieve their goals. I would add also that the dividends of the economic boom did not really reach the rural areas. And most of the development was concentrated on Abidjan to the neglect of the countryside, the rural areas that brought prosperity to the country. Only the elite really benefited from the hard work of the farmers. And Houphouët-Boigny knew that farmers were not treated fair enough, that the system was not fair to the farmers. That it is why he refused to sell the cocoa that was stockpiled in what became the “war of cocoa”. One can say that the culture of loubardisme is one of the consequences of what I have mentioned earlier.

(CIFGD1)

However, one of the most important determinants of the participation of youth during the civil war was the splitting up of the hierarchy of the university students' union, the *FESCI* whose leaders became influential politicians. Guillaume Soro, who became the political leader of the rebellion, became Ivory Coast's Prime Minister and Charles Blé Goudé, a pro FPI head of the *FESCI* is now the leader of *les Jeunes Patriotes* (Young Patriots), a coalition of pro government youth militia (Bøas and Dunn 2007; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007).

A point in case is the FESCI, a student union. Instead of promoting and defending the welfare of students, the FESCI leaders are involved in politics; politicking. The politicians are using them in order to assert themselves.

(CII3)

The involvement of the youth in Ivorian politics had taken a dangerous and violent turn even before the war on university campuses during the war of words. This division reached its climax and became a violent conflict between the two groups when rival student groups butchered one another.

There was also, “la guerre des machetes” [the machetes war] between the two factions of the student union, the FESCI (Federation Estudiantine et Scolaire de Cote d’Ivoire). One faction was led by Guillaume Soro and the other by Charles Blé Goudé.

(CII6)

These factors are interrelated with the motives of the youth as well as the economic downturn and its management.

All the factors you mentioned were important. I believe the other factors were as a result of the economic crisis and bad policies, especially after Houphouët. Politicians also used the youth.

(CII1)

Most respondents agree that the involvement of the youth in the Ivorian Civil War was as a result of the economic crisis that engendered endemic poverty that affected the youth.

7.10 Prospects for Sustainable Peace in Côte d'Ivoire

The role of the international community is considered to be that of peace enforcer, rather than conflict resolution force or peace maker, as needed through the barrel of the gun. Ivorian respondents are dismayed by the role and performance of the members of the allegedly impartial forces. The respondents even doubt the neutrality of some members of the international community in the conflict, especially France. They would prefer a robust intervention to flush out the rebels from the zone under their control.

It is a big joke! The international community is playing a double game. There is no seriousness in its approach to resolve the Ivorian conflict. We knew the course of action they had taken in Sierra Leone. Why should the case of Côte d'Ivoire be different? They are not serious.

(CII6)

I believe that the international community played its role. Except, the fact that some members of the international community are taking sides. They are not neutral. France was disillusioned. France felt humiliated. From the first days of the crisis France had started to create handicaps, to block up everything. The most influential members of the International Community such as France, the US had opted for an embargo against Côte d'Ivoire. They wanted to punish everybody. They wanted everybody to suffer. France tried to close all the "taps" [all avenues] they asked the President to resign so that they would be able to go back to old habits.

(CII3)

However, one diplomat is at variance with the above position. He insists on neutrality to keep the peace process going.

If the French had not been involved, Yamoussoukro would have been in the hands of the rebels. I mean Yamoussoukro would have been controlled by the rebels. This international community does not give the rebels arms. If you look at the conflict in Sierra Leone, in the DRC, the role of the international Community is different. France has a special interest in Côte d'Ivoire, you know they want to make a difference. They don't want to make it worse. You know, they blew up the Ivorian Air Force on the ground without any casualty, you know, to try to protect the peace process. People were saying they're crazy; they want to turn into guerrillas. But the Ivorian government had broken the Peace Agreement. They did that without any loss of life.

(CII3)

On the issue of finding a peaceful settlement to or a way out of Côte d'Ivoire's crisis, the respondents proffer many solutions and much advice. Opinions vary according to their understanding of the factors that led to the civil war. A respondent believes in the spirit of "give and take". He explains thus:

Not only in Côte d'Ivoire, have we needed to bring peace to the world. There is lot of problems in the world now. Afghanistan, Ireland, Iraq, the Philippines, The Congo, Guinea, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Kenya. I think people must know that we need to compromise. My Mom and my Dad lived together for 60 years. They had disagreements, but they still compromised. If you want to live together, you have to compromise. You have to sacrifice something. All the parties to the conflict need to compromise. They need to sacrifice something. You cannot have everything on your own terms.

(CIII)

However, the defeat of the pro-Gbagbo forces made the issue of compromise difficult to implement. Another respondent believes that only true democracy can bring a lasting peace to the beleaguered country and that the international community has a fundamental role to play in ensuring that elections are free and fair. In his opinion:

It is necessary to organise transparent elections to have a lasting peace for the development of the country and the economy in order to have stability. Presently, all the political parties believe that they will win the elections and that it is a matter of life or death. The prospect is scary, the future is uncertain; the future is bleak. So, the first thing is free and fair elections. We need the assistance of international observers to monitor the elections. They need to supervise the forthcoming elections. I think the elections are the solutions because once we have free and fair elections the President

that will emerge will be the President of all Ivoirians. However, if the election of the future President is rigged and the outcome does not reflect the choice of the people there will be no longer peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

(CII5)

Moreover, the Ghanaian experience in multiparty politics and democracy is worthy to be emulated by other African countries.

It is a useful advice if we follow the example of Ghana but I am not very sure if we are going to follow that example in Côte d'Ivoire because I know Ivorian politicians are self-centred. They are warming up, they are galvanising their militants. They have already indoctrinated their militants with the slogan "we win or we win"! They don't believe or even foresee the possibility of losing any election. I believe it should be "we can win or lose". It is a dangerous trend and there is an obsessive fear.

(CII3)

Others believe that the thorny issues should be resolved before Ivoirians go to the polls.

I believe that some fundamental issues that divide Ivoirians should be resolved first. What comes to mind here are the issue of citizenship, the reforms of the electoral code, and the issuance of ID cards, and genuine reconciliation before the elections. However, transparent elections and the promotion of the spirit of sacrifice in the national interest by our politicians are the ways forward.

(CIFGD1)

Frankly, if I were President Gbagbo, I would involve in a true reconciliation process. I will not put cronies but competent people in government. By engaging direct talks with Soro, he did well but, there are gaps. Gbagbo was in haste to sign and get over with the war. He never thought about some of those loopholes. Poverty is too much and people he thinks will not do a revolution will do a revolution. It would be a revolution of the working class.

(CII7)

First of all, there is the Alassane Ouattara factor. There are two extremes: either to exclude him from or to allow him to vie for the highest office of the land. The failure or the success of the solution will have a great influence on other processes.

(CII9)

One participant is of the view that the President should have organised transparent elections and resigned. Furthermore the rule of law should be reinforced and fully supported by the United Nations.

If I were the President of Côte d'Ivoire I would quit! I have done my term. I will organise free and fair elections. Having said that, if I were the President of this country, probably, I would have been Jerry Rawlings. I would create a judiciary that works. The members of the international community should help to establish a judiciary that works. I really believe for the UN to fix all these countries, rather than sending peacekeepers, they should be sending judges. I really believe, honestly, if a country says, for example, if Nigeria says I want to stop corruption. What the UN can say " is fine we're going to interpret the law". Really the start is the judiciary. You just need to get the big guys in court. The little guys can't get away.
(CII2)

For some, looking forwards, an Ivorian solution is the right option with the caveat that the international community should have an input, especially when issues such as human rights and the spread of diseases are involved.

Even, some Ivorians say that it is a crisis between Ivorians and that the solution, the settlement must come from Ivorians themselves and that it is not necessary to look elsewhere for the solution. It must come from within, from Côte d'Ivoire. And it is true that we must find a resolution to the conflict ourselves because we should not wash our dirty linen in public. It is an Ivorian conflict, and Ivorians should look for the solution to end this crisis. They are doing this to exclude the international community. However, due to the hardship the majority of Ivorians are going through and owing to the propagation of diseases, the international community should reject this offer, this request. They need to tell the parties to the conflict that we know it is an Ivorian problem but you people are not making any headway. Human rights are at stake, you have to take responsibility. We have to protect the life of the people, not only the life of Ivorians but the life of expatriates who live in Côte d'Ivoire. Human rights are regularly violated in this country; we have the LIDHO (Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l'homme- Ivorian Human Rights Group) that is complaisant. So far, we have not heard its voice in condemning the violation of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire. In fact, the international community is not taking any action that would enable Côte d'Ivoire to get out of this moving sand.
(CII3)

7.11 Conclusion

The above discussions are derived from the Ivorian fieldwork interviews. The factors that have been identified by the respondents give us some clues to understand the reasons for the civil conflict. The greatest common triggers of Côte d'Ivoire Civil War from the respondents' views are the unresolved issue of the war of succession of the political heirs and power struggle of post-Houphouëtist period coupled with ethnic politics and cleavages. These factors brought about by the introduction of the doctrine and neologism of *L'ivoirité* that

resulted in ultra and ethno-nationalism that exacerbated the binary of “us versus them”. Other remarkable factors are the intervention of the military in the governance of the country and the lack of a credible and functional democracy. There are also the consequences of sub-regional insecurity with the “contagion effect” of civil strife in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The less common triggers are grievances, although, some respondents believe that the rebels rode on the back of frustration to win the people on their side. Other lesser factors are religion, French policies that some respondents see as neo-colonial in nature, the economic crisis that accelerated social disparities, and the involvement of the youth in the conflict. These triggers overlapped and are in consonance with the facts that emerged from the review of the literature on Côte d’Ivoire, and eventually made the civil war possible.

The facts elucidated have shown that Côte d’Ivoire’s abortive coup of 22 September 2002 which led to the rebellion in some parts of the country revealed the latent social malaise that earlier years of economic prosperity had hidden. However, it should also be stressed that the main factor that opened old and unhealed wounds is the protracted economic slump that triggered a chain reaction among the ruling elite as well as within the broader population. The increasing consciousness of vertical ethnic divides between the north and the south and the horizontal ethnic conflict in the south have had disastrous effects on the peace processes. In addition, the externalisation of the ethnic conflicts which give precedence to ethnic fellow citizens has also undermined peaceful cohabitation. Because of the desire for regime survival, neighbouring countries have interfered in internecine wars in the West African sub-region with critical effects. Sponsored rebellions that threaten the territorial integrity of the riparian states of the Mano River Union are becoming a menace to the entire sub-region with the emergence of long-term warlords. Côte d’Ivoire is paying the price (through the destabilisation of “unfriendly” neighbours) for supporting insurgent groups in neighbouring countries. The lesson to be learned here is that sponsoring or causing insecurity in a riparian state can boomerang. The interference of Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours as war-mongers and guarantors of the

rebels have complicated the search for a political solution because those countries are not neutral parties to the conflict due to factors related to the geography and ethnic contours of the country.

The economic advantages derived from the war economy (rebels' extractive capacity in the zones under their control), political influence, and the ability of the government to hold the rest of the country firmly under its control has prolonged the stalemate between the belligerents. The sum-total of the logic of the war economy is that both parties are benefitting from this political and military deadlock. Furthermore, over the years the personalisation of the institutions of the state and a rent-seeking economy woven around key government functionaries and selected cronies have affected the smooth running of government by inhibiting social progress and grounding the economy. The role of government as an agent of development is acutely undermined and many Ivorians are dropping ever further below the poverty line. To all intents and purposes, the governing elite have succeeded in sowing the seeds of division that have grown into ethnic cleavages thus supporting the war machine that makes reconciliation in the foreseeable future an arduous task, if not a mirage.

Chapter Eight

The Roles of Youth in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire's Civil Conflicts Compared

Groups pressing for change-youth...were often more preoccupied with either gaining a greater share of the existing pie, or proselytizing for alternative, more radical developmental roads-entailing similar restrictions on civic freedoms (Decalo 1992:13).

(...) the wayward behaviour of youth and the mayhem they have perpetrated symbolise a breakdown of order, an erosion of values and a definite confounding of collective wisdom (Mkandawire 2002:190).

8.1 Introduction

The above quotations argue that youth are a factor to be reckoned with in the politics and violence of the post-colonial African state. Youths equally take part in peaceful change, solidarity marches or events to support incumbent governments, and violent manifestations against incumbents. Youths have become an asset in contemporary civil wars in Africa. Youth violence has become one of the ugliest traits of African civil wars. In most cases these youths are manipulated to perpetrate extreme violence. In each case, the youth are manipulated by the elite, be they the powers that be or the opposition. The primary objective of this chapter is to provide the analytical and explanatory framework for understanding the roles of the youth in conflict situations, and the reasons for them to take part in the internecine wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, by contrasting and comparing the similarities and differences between these Francophone and Anglophone youths in war situations.

The chapter goes beyond the frustration and aggression theory and the preexisting culture of violence explanation of the involvement of the youths in the two civil wars to analyse other factors that could motivate them. Self-interest and opportunistic exploitation of the intra-state war are factors that have been somewhat overlooked in the literature as the case of Côte d'Ivoire has revealed;

with the leadership of the *Jeunes Patriotes* contrasting with the idealistic, self-denial, and leftist orientation of those Sierra Leonean youth who were the original brains behind the political cells that would lead to the country's "revolution" before being hijacked by the likes of Foday Sankoh.

8.2 The *Problematique* and Taxonomy of Youth Violence

It is well-known that the youth have been catalysts of change in most African countries (Decalo 1992:13). The youth are involved in political changes either directly or indirectly. Since the 1990s, the youths have become a part of civil wars in Africa either as perpetrators of heinous crimes (including the rise of the phenomenon of child soldiers) or as victims of violence, as the youths are also among the vulnerable groups (Peters and Richards 1998; Bøas 2007). Youth violence has two dimensions: both vertical and horizontal. In addition, the Sierra Leonean conflict brought to the fore the issue and involvement of girl soldiers in African conflicts. These young girls were not only victims of atrocities. The "girl rebels" were also able combatants and respected commanders of the RUF (Shelpler 2002:51). Where the youth are not involved in intra-state wars, the youth are found at the periphery of political parties and used as thugs for 'quick fix' raids against critics and perceived or real political opponents. The lumpen youth are also used during political campaigns on *ad hoc* missions to foment troubles. For example, in Sierra Leone the youths were used by the APC to terrorise the opposition to the extent that the SLPP withdrew from elections (Rashid 2004:72). In Côte d'Ivoire, the youth who supported the FPI were used to harass and kill some members of the opposition parties or people suspected to be rebels or "enemies" of the government (Marshall-Fratani 2006:30). One party hegemonic rule was characterised by structural violence to confiscate political and economic power in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire (Ogunmola, 2011a and b forthcoming). Here the instrumentalisation of political violence does not exclude the youth.

The involvement of youth in internecine conflicts is a scourge that has deepened the intensity of violence in African civil wars. Two forms of youth violence can easily be identified. Vertical youth violence occurs when the youth engage government forces in violent confrontations. Or, when child soldiers and youth take part in civil war (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire) and form militia groups.

Horizontal youth violence refers to intra youth violence. As was the case of Students' Union leaders of the FESCI feud which resulted in *la guerre des machètes* or Machetes War between rival factions in which many students were killed. Another illustration of intra-youth violence is the recent clash between the FESCI and the *Union estudiantine de Côte d'Ivoire* (UNESCI) in Dimbokro in the central part of the country which resulted in one death on the side of the UNESCI (*Le Patriote*, 2010). The FESCI is close to the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) and the Gbagbo government. The FESCI was created in 1990 with the initial aim to fight back and resist the oppression of the Houphouët-Boigny government against students during the Structural Adjustment Programme riots and to make demands for democracy and multiparty elections. However, the Students'Union became more radicalised under the post-Houphouëtist government of Henri Konan Bédié and General Robert Guéi's regime. However, a culture of brutality and aggression on university campuses against students by rival factions has taken over the FESCI (Konaté 2003; Lanoue 2006). The active participation of the youth in the Côte d'Ivoire conflict has resulted in the militarisation of the FESCI and militarisation of former FESCI leaders along with extra judicial killings (Konaté 2003; Lanoue 2006).

In African conflicts the roles of the youth are ambivalent. The youth are not only co-opted for inter-ethnic violence, they are also used as willing actors. The youth leaders are interested in the 'rewards' that are attached to 'spoils politics'. The youth can also be unwilling and hapless victims of these intra-state African wars.

Generally, the young illiterates are in this category. Following Gallie (1991) these civil wars have taken their tolls both,

vertically, in intensity and in the scale of its destructiveness. It also expands horizontally, in its influence upon other spheres of human life (Gallie 1991:69).

The destructiveness of war has compounded the deplorable material conditions of the unemployed youth. The existence of a demographic youth bulge has been a facilitating and contributing factor to civil conflicts (Esty et al 1995; Marshall-Fratani 2006); especially for the unemployed and urban poor youth. It is acknowledged that the social dislocations brought about by the implementation of the policies of SAPs accelerated the dejection of the youth who lost faith in governments' capacity to provide the basic needs for the citizenry, which is one of the reasons the youth joined rebel movements (Mkandawire 2002:193).

The SAP policies placed a heavy toll on the less privileged (Leftwich 1993:617). Protracted economic hardships (unemployment and poverty) are one of the reasons why the youth have become part of the violent political history of contemporary Africa. The youth are also rebellious and take part in violent (but less extreme) actions elsewhere in the world. In France, the youth are also involved in urban violence (Osler and Starkey 2005; Loch 2009) as they are in Greece with riots in the streets of Paris and Athens (Kieselbach 2003; Konstandopoulos and Modis 2005). In Africa South of the Sahara, the abdication of government responsibilities and the virtual or complete loss of organised and legitimate force in the case of failing or failed states is also a contributing factor to intra-state conflicts (Leftwich 1993; Allen 1999; Mkandawire 2002). The explanation of Maclure and Denov (2006:121) goes thus

In the contexts of resource disparities and systems of oligarchic governance that dispossess a large swathes of a nation's citizenry, alienated youth are often prone to rebel against political and economic institutions and wrecked revenge on those deemed to have benefitted from support of an exclusionary status quo.

Sierra Leone's civil conflict was replete with stories of youths and children who committed horrendous acts (Maclure and Denov 2006:121). It is also argued that the culture of corruption, neo-patrimonialism, influence peddling, deep pauperisation, and economic crisis are partly the explanations of the involvement of the youth in intra-state conflicts in Africa (Bratton and Van de Valle 1992; Bøas 2007). This tendency has made worse the culture of violence. Especially, urban violence which is linked to the youth. The taxonomy of violence shows that in most cases, it is the marginalised youth, the urban poor youth who are victims of this culture of violence. Students are a distinctive group of youth that have played important roles in the movement for political freedom in their respective countries (Decalo 1992:13). Indeed, students have been playing prominent roles since the struggle for independence and in the post-independence period of Africa against autocratic rule and anti-people economic policies subsequent upon the privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the fading of the social roles of the state.

Where the educated youth are involved in this culture of violence, generally, they are at the vanguard of the youth movements. They play leadership roles. A good example is the roles the former leaders of the student union: the FESCI youth have been playing in the Ivorian crisis as characterised by intra student union violence and killings such as in the war of machetes or recent killing of students on campus (Konaté 2003; Lanoue 2006). In most cases, the victims of youth violence among the youth themselves are the uneducated, poor, and marginalised who before, during, and even after the crisis had been living, will live on the margins of society and therefore will not benefit from the political and economic dividends of the war. In some cases, the uneducated youth can and do benefit from the "spoils of war" by rewarding themselves, as was the case of the RUF or Charles Taylor's fighters when they were involved in the systematic looting of the villages and towns under their control (ICG 2003:1).

In Côte d'Ivoire some of the students that dropped out of school are involved in the expropriation of farm lands that had been sold to the migrants or foreigners (Marshall-Fratani 2006; Banégas 2006; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). The central argument here is that it is the frustration of the opposition which is carried over to the oppressed and vulnerable youth who are manipulated and mobilised in the process of political revenge and armed opposition to capture power by frustrated or marginalised politicians. In Togo, the opposition has marshalled the youth in many anti-government demonstrations against the regime of the Eyademas. As Mkandawire (2002:193) argues

[I]n most cases, the urban poor and 'lumpens' are mobilised by political elites for conflicts that at times turn violent.

This is closely associated with the traditional culture of the ascription of power and decision-making to the elders which requires compliance by the community. In most cases, the border lines between ethnic and political leadership are blurred. The power of coercion and legitimate violence remain the prerogatives of the state, but the incumbent can increase compliance through the traditional mechanisms of influence by using chiefs or traditional rulers for persuasion.

Even when it is the backbone of the armed forces which is segmented by ethnic affiliations and ethnic loyalty to the head of state (as it was the case with Sergeant-Master Samuel Doe's regime in Liberia or the Eyadema dynasty in Togo), power emanates from the core region of the incumbent and his ethnic group who dominate the political landscape and economic arena through their cronies. The youth are the troops these politicians use to achieve their aims. However, in their majority the lumpen youth and radical students, despite their militantism, belong to subaltern categories in the political landscape (Rashid 2004:77).

8.3 The Lumpenisation of Youth and Violence in Sierra Leone

The origin of the involvement of the youth in the Sierra Leone's civil war could be traced to the growing economic crisis and hardships as well as the flagrant and incessant violations of fundamental human rights by the All Peoples' Congress (APC) or the governments of Siaka Stevens and Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh and their collaborators. This rapacious group that Reno (1995) described as the "shadow state" ruined the country despite its huge mineral resources and human potential. Under the decay of the "shadow state" the Congress failed to deliver socio-economic progress, which resulted in a prolonged poverty crisis and general dissatisfaction. The Congress government did not care to initiate poverty alleviation programmes that could have given respite to the vulnerable and considerably reduced the tide of anger and frustrations in the country. A former Chief Security Officer (CSO) to a warlord said:

We mine diamonds, but we do not see the effects on the people. We do not have accountability...The majority of Sierra Leoneans is poor in spite of this wealth. (SLI1).

The lack of opportunities for youth and mediocre educational facilities contributed enormously to the despondency among the youth. At the tertiary level, students became anti-government and took part in demonstrations against the APC or the Congress' government (Alie 2006:85). Linkages between radical students of Fourah Bay College (FBC) and urban lumpen youth had been established in the *pote*⁷⁶ where anti-establishment culture, as a sign of anti-conformism against the APC government misrule, was nursed. The *pote* became a meeting place for iconoclasts, radical students opposed to the oppressive APC rule, social activists, and lumpen youth or uneducated and urban poor (Rashid 2004:71).

Stevens' despotic rule achieved a crescendo when he banned multiparty activities and announced the one party state system and silenced all official and conventional forms of opposition. The Congress became the only recognised

political party in 1978. The economy continued to plummet and inflation skyrocketed hitting hard the vulnerable in the country. It became a bitter fact that the government could no longer absorb the army of young job seekers and unpaid salary arrears contributed to the nightmares of teachers (Reno 1995; Zack-Williams 1999; Kandeh 1999). Corruption characterised the public sector and the boom of the disparaged informal economy under the supervision of a few cronies of the government became the norm (Kandeh 1999:352).

Kandeh (1999:357) notes “[e]lite parasitism and aggrandizement set the tone for expropriating the state and impoverishing society”. Another factor that alienated the government from the youth and increased student militancy in Sierra Leone was the deliberate neglect of the educational sector. Joseph Saidu Momoh made it abundantly clear that education was not his priority while ethnicity and favouritism were significant parameters in the allocation of government scholarships to tertiary institutions (Kandeh 1999; Alie 2006). Moreover, both the quality and quantity of education were neglected in conjunction with poor and unpaid salaries for lecturers who left the country for greener pastures (Kandeh 1999:358). Acquisition of higher education and degrees was beyond the means of youth from a less privileged social class who did not have the ‘right connections’ in government circles. Consequently, Kandeh (1999:358) rightly observes that at the same time

[a]s dropout rates soared, criminal behavior and banditry increasingly came to define youth responses to the collapse of meaning and loss of hope in their lives.

Furthermore, Zack-Williams (1999:147) asserts that

The RUF attracted many of those who were victims of the crisis of the postcolonial mode of accumulation: those who failed to find jobs after their elementary, secondary and even university education. Many others were victims of the crisis of the rural education sector in the country.

Although the idea of a “revolution” was initiated by the majority of the Pan-African Union (PANAFU) student union members, they were reluctant to match theory with action (Abdullah 2004:48). The majority of PANAFU members rejected the ideals of a violent political change. The educated youth who were inspired by the ideals of “revolution” or political change in Sierra Leonean society were some of the dissatisfied students of Fourah Bay College (Abdullah 2004:48-49). This group was later joined by school drop-outs and some social miscreants from East Freetown (Abdullah 2004; Richards 2004). These groups were also later joined by people like Foday Sankoh who then hijacked the movement from the youths (Abdullah 2004:51-52).

The second group consists of poor and unemployed urban youth and the rural boys who are also used as political thugs by the political parties as the opportunity arises. The school drop outs and illiterates distinguished themselves as agents of destruction while some of the “educated youth” were motivated by the ideals of an egalitarian society where justice and fairness, and the wealth of the country will benefit the majority of Sierra Leoneans-not just a tiny ruling clique (Abdullah 2004:53-54). The youth in the RUF consisted of four sub-groups that can still be categorised broadly into two groups. The urban RUF youth comprised those educated youth who were the nucleus and the brains behind the call for the “revolution” and the social miscreants and street urchins of East Freetown (Abdullah 2004:54). The ‘rural RUF youth’ consisted of young rural dwellers and the young diamond labourers and diggers (Peters and Richards 1998:184). Kaldor (2002:95) states that

(...) the Sierra Leonean government recruited large numbers of citizens into its army, including boys some of whom were as young as ten years old.

The Sierra Leonean conflict has been portrayed as the “crisis of the youth” (Shepler 2002:49). The disillusionment of the youth was a motivating factor that sharpened their aggressiveness, which the rebel leaders exploited in their belligerence against the APC government in the civil war (1991-2002).

8.4 Côte d'Ivoire: Youth Violence and Militancy

I've got to the point I don't believe Hitler was, or Milosevic was bad. Because it's the same media networks that presented Hitler and Milosevic as criminals who today present me and the Ivorian patriots who suffer at the hands of the rebellion as the executioners and the rebels as the victims (Charles Blé Goudé, leader of the *Jeunes Patriotes*, quoted in Marshall-Fratani 2006: 36).

Today the youth follow those who can solve their problems. Poverty exists, it is a reality. A point in case is the FESCI, a student union. Instead of promoting and defending the well-being of students, they are involved in politics. The politicians are using them in order to have a base and assert themselves to become relevant in national politics. (B11).

The two quotations cited above illuminate the important roles the youth have been playing in the Ivorian conflict. The post-Houphouëtist political dissensions and the war of succession that followed the death in 1991 of the President, involving the many factions of the then ruling *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), signalled the start of political instability in the country. Ethnic affiliations and affinities were the major determining criteria of youth movements and militias in Côte d'Ivoire. As Azam (2002:132) puts it

(...) ethnicity is a preexisting factor that enhances the ability of the opposing forces to organize themselves in case of war.

The rebels and government alike used and still use the youth to perpetuate their rule over the zones under their control mainly by recruiting them according to their ethnic background.

8.5 Youth and the Implications of 'Patriotism' in Côte d'Ivoire

A frequent theme associated with youth political violence is the appropriation of the real and false meanings of "patriotism" and its ideals in the scourge of episodic violence. Ivorian youth leaders use the voice of ultranationalism to harangue the members of their organisations.

A prominent youth group in the Ivorian Civil War is *Le Congrès Panafricain des Jeunes et des Patriotes (COJEP)* or simply *Les Jeunes Patriotes*. They are Young Patriots that hope to be at the vanguard of wresting a second independence from France that will pave the way for the liberation of the country (Banégas 2006: 536). The Young Patriots are *Ivoiritaires*⁷⁷ who have been feeding on the excesses of *l'ivoirité* and are involved in extra-judicial murders and violent anti-‘foreigner’ actions by broadcasting xenophobic messages to the population using the facilities of government controlled media (Banégas 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006). It was a common sight to see these young patriots armed with cutlasses and other dangerous weapons in the streets of Abidjan, screaming and chanting war songs against the enemies and opponents of the FPI government of President Laurent Gbagbo, who are also automatically considered to be enemies of Côte d’Ivoire (Marshall-Fratani 2006:30). Gbagbo once described the young patriots as innocent youngsters who indulged in jogging to keep fit and who could not hurt a fly (*Le Patriote* May 19, 2003). The activities and objectives of the Young Patriots are encapsulated thus

The "young patriots" are most highly visible in the streets of Abidjan, where, under the direction of extremely popular leaders, veritable stars of the pro-Gbagbo media, these die-hard Gbagbo supporters have taken the streets by storm. This movement, in all its organizational, sociological, and ideological complexity, is doubtless the most emblematic expression of the Gbagbo regime's evolution during the war; with neither a powerful army nor solid international alliances, the regime has used a process of paramilitarization of its youth to impose its political order through terror, and an ultranationalist radicalization in order to legitimate its resistance to any form of external interference (Marshall-Fratani 2006:29).

Moreover, the FPI government provided incentives to mobilise the Young Patriots which led some observers and the opposition to call them derogatorily the “*Jeunes ventriotes*” (Belly Patriots), implying that the leaders of the Young Patriots were preoccupied by monetary inducements and lacked real zeal for their Fatherland (Marshall-Fratani 2006:30). According to Marshall-Fratani (2006:30) the Young Patriots have been benefiting

from extremely generous presidential largesse, this movement managed to mobilize hundreds of thousands at rallies held in Abidjan in the first few months of the conflict (Marshall-Fratani 2006:30).

Furthermore, Florquin and Berman (2005:247) state that the Young Patriots draws its members from the unemployed youths in the south of the country and they are paid between “CFA 1000 to 5 000 (USD 2-10)” to take part in protests. The most prominent leaders of the Young Patriots are Charles Blé Goudé, Serge Kuyo, Richard Dakoury, Eugène Djué, Jean-Yves Dibopieu (FESCI president), Idriss Ouattara, Thierry Legré, Ahoua Stallone, Hilaire Gomé, and Koné Seydou. Charles Blé Goudé campaigned for the candidate of the FPI: Laurent Gbagbo during the 2000 presidential elections (Florquin and Berman 2005; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Gadou 2009). This exposed him as a pro FPI partisan and marred his membership of the FESCI among his peers. The women’s section of Gbagbo’s hawkish supporters included his wife, Simone Ehivé Gbagbo, Geneviève Bro-Grébé (the leader of the women’s wing of the Young Patriots), and Agnès Krady (Marshall-Fratani 2006; Gadou 2009).

This constellation of young patriots that is spread over the southern part of Côte d’Ivoire is also known as the *Galaxie patriote*. They are the organisers of pro-government rallies while their “public lectures” are held in the public auditoriums of the *Sorbonne, Sénat, Parlement, Agoras, Congrès*, where pro-government speeches and analyses of crisis are given in Abidjan and other cities. The leaders of the Young Patriots claim that they defend the constitution, republican values, and fervently support President Gbagbo as well (Gadou 2009:73). It is in this connection that Lanoue (2006:7) sums up the involvement of the youth in militia and politics in Côte d’Ivoire:

[s]tudents became militia men[or boys], degree holders metamorphosed into “generals”-of the social hierarchies, masters holders turned out to be rebel chiefs and ministers in the government of reconciliation...school drop-outs go back to the village to ask for “their land”.

The leaderships of FESCI and the *Forces Nouvelles* (the former armed opposition to the Gbagbo government) are involved in “spoils politics”. The “rural patriots” operate mostly from the hinterland of the country. One of their ‘assignments’ is to make sure that the areas under their control remain a ‘fiefdom’ of the ruling FPI and exclude other political parties.

8.6 Youth, Ultrationalism and Land Issues in Côte d'Ivoire

The rural patriots are involved in violent actions in the expropriation of farmland and farms from foreigners and migrants from the north and central part of the country and they then surrender such property to the influential people in their community (Marshall-Fratani 2006:31). The land policy of the Houphouëtist regime that had opened the gates of farmland to all-comers, became radicalised by his successors. Land issues are a centrifugal force that the indigenes of the Cocoa-Belt hijacked for personal, economic, and ethnic gains by querying the origins and rights of the “other” to own land in the south-west. In most cases, verbal approvals were given in lieu of written or legal documents following the politics and policies of agricultural openness (Chauveau et Dozon 1985; Chauveau 2000b; Marshall-Fratani 2006). The official policy on land ownership during the Houphouët era was that “the land belongs to whomever cultivates it” according to both the 1963 Presidential Decree and the liberal land policy that was backed by customary law (Chauveau 2000b; Marshall-Fratani 2006). This policy gave the opportunity to own land to non-indigenes and foreigners who migrated to the south-west since the early post-independence years. In fact, migrants that had worked as labourers were able to own their own land. A system of *tutorat* or cession of land to the strangers or non-indigenous or migrant Ivorians, mostly Baoulé-Houphouët-Boigny’s ethnic group (an Akan-ethnic subgroup), and northerners and foreign immigrants (mainly Burkinabè, Malians, and Guineans) for a fee was established between the land owners and those acquiring land (Marshall-Fratani 2006:15). Conflicts over land had been the Achilles’ heel of Houphouët-Boigny and the ruling PDCI party. There have been incessant conflicts between the locals of the south-west forest and migrants.

Recurrent land conflicts between Baoulé and autochthons marked the first thirty years of independence in the southwest. Less willing than the northerners to participate in the social and ritual obligations of the *tutorat*, more arrogant in the knowledge that state political power rested on what was essentially a Baoulé monarchy at its heart, the Baoulé and their political party were the principal local producers of autochthonous ethnicity in the postcolonial period (Marshall-Fratani 2006:20-21).

As a consequence, some of these strangers/foreigners (mostly illiterates) became wealthier in their new homes than the locals who with little education went to look for white collar jobs or settled in the city (Bassett 2003a; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). The economic crisis of the 1980s resulted in a mass return to the rural areas by the urban dwellers who were either unable to compete on equal terms with others who were well educated because they were handicapped by their limited education and consequently missed out on the dividends of the economic boom of the 1970s or even lost their jobs (Dumont and Paquet 1991; Ogunmola 2011a forthcoming). This explains the grains of frustration that had been embedded in the psychology of the indigenes, some of whom asked the 'strangers or foreigners' to re-buy the same land or take part in sharing the cost of funerals, and marriage of members of the land owners' families (Chauveau 2000:106).

Furthermore, the socio-economic reverses that have worn away and reversed the model of climbing the social ladder in urban centres reduced the rural exodus to the cities and also led to a movement in the opposite direction. One of the effects of this movement was the land crisis where 'the returnees' have been expropriating lands and farms from migrants who are non-indigenes (*allogènes*) and foreigners (Chauveau 2000; Lanoue 2006). These groups of young school drop-outs, urban poor and social misfits that live at the margin of society (some of whom had already lost touch with the realities of the rural areas) mount roadblocks (*barrages*) on the roads leading to the villages. These '*barragistes*' organise rackets and check the identity and movements of travellers; and extort money from their victims in the name of providing security (Lanoue 2006:7). The politicised and ethnicised 1998 land reform law that nullified the right of land ownership for foreigners sharpened the crisis between indigenes and non-indigenes in the south-west and propped up the impunity of the "*barragistes*" (Chauveau 2007:4). For example, in the towns of Duékoué and Bangolo in the south-west "4 000 Burkinabè have been driven from their home in 2002" (Agence France Presse 2002 as cited in Griffith 2002:3). Similarly, there have been mass movements of the Baoulé from the north to Burkina Faso for fear of reprisal attacks

from northerners (Griffith 2002:3). In sum, these conflicts led to the War of “Who is Who” (Marshall-Fratani 2006).

Table 4: Inter-ethnic Troubles, Youth Violence, Land issues, and Xenophobic Crises in Côte d’Ivoire

Ethnic Groups	Regions	Year
Abouré vs Malians/Burkinabè	South	2001
Bété vs Baoulé	south-west	1985,1990,1995, 1998,1999
Bété vs Malians/Burkinabè	south-west	1999, 2003
Bété vs northerners	south-west	1999, 2003
Guéré vs Malians/Burkinabè	West	2000,2003
Guéré vs northerners	West	2003,2005
Guéré vs Yacouba	West	2002
Krou vs Malians/Burkinabè	south-west	1999

Sources: Chauveau 2000; Griffith 2002; Ero and Marshall 2003; Zongo 2003; Colin, Kouamé, and Soro 2004.

8.7 The Rebels and the Youth

The rebel groups of the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire* (MPCI), the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO), and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MPJ) led respectively by Guillaume Soro, Sergeant N’dri Nguessan alias Félix Doh, and Commandant Gaspard Déli have also enlisted youth in their quest for military and territorial control as well as political power. The three rebel groups are now known as *Forces Nouvelles* or *Forces de Défense des Forces Nouvelles* (FDFN). A common ground of grievance of the youth is the issue of identity and citizenship of the northerners who were excluded and intermittently harassed by security forces over their identity cards which were considered fake (this a very important document without which a passport cannot be issued in Côte d’Ivoire). The rebels have greatly enjoyed the support of the

youth from the north at least at the beginning of the civil conflict, before the disillusionment brought about by the failure to share the spoils. The lack of identity documents not only automatically disqualified them from Ivorian citizenship, but also gave them a kind of blurred, floating, and doubtful identity. The issue of the identity crisis of the northerners has been one of the grievances of the rebels (Gadou 2009:71). A rebel leader, Cherif Ousmane, states that

[a]ll the marginalised Ivorians do not have an identity. Consequently, they do not have the opportunity or the right to say they are Ivorians. Whereas, they are from this country and their grandfathers had fought against slavery. And as a result, they got independence for Côte d'Ivoire in 1960 (cited in Gadou 2009:71).⁷⁸

In essence, northerners had to justify their Ivorian citizenship to avoid being humiliated or harassed by security forces because they were considered to be foreigners since the same ethnic groups straddle the borders of Burkina Faso and Mali (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005:214). For the northerners, the Gbagbo government's policy of identity cards was designed to renegotiate their Ivorian citizenship and was a reflection of the concept of *L'ivoirité* that distinguishes between genuine and fake Ivorians (Akindès 2004; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Gadou 2009). Banégas and Marshall-Fratani (2007:83-85) explain that this is a conflict over rights and identification that has many dimensions such as the economic, the political ambitions of Houphouët-Boigny's heirs together with ethnic, religious, educational, and land issues. These factors were exacerbated by the concept of *L'ivoirité* that was used to marginalise some of Ivorians (mainly northerners and Muslims) and to discriminate against foreigners. Banégas and Marshall-Fratani (2007:85) note that since the beginning of the rebellion in 2002

autochthony has taken a resolute xenophobic and ultranationalistic form, designating "foreigners" and northerners as the "enemies" of Côte d'Ivoire.

In this connection, a northerner expressed the general mood of dissatisfaction of the people from the north as follows

the harassment of northerners by the police led to deep feelings of frustration among northerners. It is true that northerners have been muzzled. The harassments by the police gave an ethnic colouration to the pre-war period.
(BII).

Furthermore, the rebels got the support of the Dozo, the traditional hunters who hail from the north, and the prisoners that had been freed in the cities they conquered in their march (Banégas and Losch 2002; Bassett 2003 a; Gadou 2009). The Dozo are very popular in the regions under the command of the FN (Griffith 2002:4). A Dozo hunter gave his reasons for joining the rebellion because of the issue of identity that affects the northerners (ICG 2003:7). Some other ethnic groups are found straddling the Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia border, and the Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana border but they are not considered to be aliens in Côte d'Ivoire (CII1). This trend sharpened the need to resist further harassments of the northerners by the security forces.

In addition, there is ever-increasing hardship in the rural areas as a result of the drop in the purchase price of agricultural products and the crisis engendered by the land issues. Therefore, the youth view the Civil War as a way to be engaged in an activity that gives them a semblance of power. The youth become instant recruiters of, and recruits in, the government militias and insurgent groups as they mushroomed. Violence became both collective and selective. Marshall-Fratani (2006:21) provides a graphic account of the orgy of violence thus:

Within six months of this war of "who is who," the southern populations had returned from the north. A reign of terror had taken hold of the city [Abidjan], with the infamous "death squads" roaming the streets after curfew, army officials encouraging citizens to report "suspicious activity" to telephone hotlines, and the destruction of poor neighborhoods and slums.

The violence did not spare northerners living in Abidjan especially in areas where RDR supporters are numerous as

northerners in popular neighborhoods were subjected to regular roundups in which they were stripped to the waist, relieved of their documents, and carted off in trucks like cattle. It was not uncommon to drive by a naked corpse on the side of the road in the early morning, hands tied behind the back and a bullet in the back of the head. In what seemed like a form of collective madness, the only voices that made themselves heard were those of the "young patriots" filling the streets and neighborhoods with patriotic rallies, and the nationalist media, all screaming hate-filled insanities daily (Marshall-Fratani 2006:21).

Though the objective of the ex-rebels was not primarily “self-enrichment” as in Chris Allen’s model (1999) of a “spoils politics system”, as the crisis unfolded it became apparent that the youths in the Ivorian conflict combine grievances and greed. The objective of the leaders of FN was originally to fight against discrimination by the post-Houphouëtist governments. However, later as the situation became a stalemate, greed seems to have overtaken this objective. Political appointments and the spoils of office, self-aggrandisement, personal ambitions, and the accumulation of personal wealth have sharpened intra-FN feuds. In the case of the leaders of the “patriots” and FESCI, the first objective was the defence of the fatherland, which has become a controversial point, hence the zeal and texture of patriotism that clothes personal wealth. In the two cases, the strategy of ‘killing two birds with one stone’ was noticeable. The FN leaders have been accused by their followers of “getting rich” at their expense (ICG, 2003:16). It is now known that Guillaume Soro (the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity), Wattao, Chérif Ousmane, and Koné Zakaria and the mainstream of the patriotic leaders such as Blé Charles Goudé, Eugène Djué, Bro-Grébé, Jean-Yves Digbopieu, and Idriss Ouattarra live an opulent life style they could not afford before the rebellion (Gadou 2009:79). The ranks of those who are dissatisfied have been swelling with grumblings and rumblings within the Young Patriots and the FN because the spoils did not trickle down to them (Gadou 2009:80).

In the capital of the rebels, Bouaké in central Côte d’Ivoire, a respondent had this to say:

The rebels are defending their own interests. One of their demands was that (of) the issue of marginalisation. However, northerners have understood that the development of the north is not the priority of the rebels but their own development, the improvement of “their pocket”! How to amass wealth and how to improve their social and economic status. Instead of any improvement in the socio-economic status of the masses they came to “liberate”, the situation is deteriorating! They [rebels] are now controlling half of the country but they have not built a classroom! They have not installed a tap water in any village! Tell me, how the masses can now say they are fighting on their behalf, fighting for their rights. Worse still, they are killing one another. As for the government, we see daily the same things. The present government is not here to promote the case of the masses. It does not have the interest of the masses in its programme.

(BI2).

The common characteristics of these youth vanguards are that they operate with impunity and spread a reign of terror in the population through the humiliation and sometimes summary executions of perceived, real or imagined enemies. There is an implicit understanding between the youth militants of the Young Patriots and the FPI government and President Laurent Gbagbo who has been using them to mobilise public opinion against the opposition of the G7⁷⁹ (Konaté 2005:118). The Young Patriots attacked French citizens and their businesses after the destruction of the Ivorian Air force subsequent upon the government's air attacks against Bouaké in which nine French soldiers of the French Peacekeeping *Opération Licorne* were killed together with an American researcher based in Bouaké during "*Opération dignité*" (Konaté 2005:123). The *Jeunes Patriotes* also attacked, looted, and set ablaze the headquarters of the opposition print media such as *Le Patriote*, *Le Nouveau Réveil* and *24 H* (Konaté 2005:124). A complicating issue in youth militias in Côte d'Ivoire is the participation of the youth in death squads in the cycle of killings and revenge killings (Toungara 2001; Mehler 2008b). Some of these militias, also known as parallel forces, are very active in the west of Côte d'Ivoire where they are involved in inter-ethnic conflicts between the Yacouba and Guéré and inter border ethnic conflicts between the Liberian Gio and the Khran as well; which are the spill over effects of the Liberian civil war. Table 5 shows the mushrooming of militia groups that operated sometimes with impunity in the west Côte d'Ivoire, and between the Ivorian and Liberian borders.

Table 5: Militia Groups in Côte d'Ivoire

Militias	Zone of operations	Activities	Leaders
Alliance Patriotique-Wè	West-Dukoué	Roadblocks, opposed to Baoulé, Malinké, and Burkinabè	Julien Monpého alias "Colombo"
Comités de surveillance	Rural areas	Patrols, self defence	No prominent leader
Femmes Patriotes	Abidjan	Pro-government rallies close to Simone Gbagbo	Mrs Bro-Grébé
FESCI	Abidjan	Pro-government rallies and violent demonstrations	Jean-Yves Dibopieu
Forces de scorpions	Bangolo	Check point, enforcement of curfew, money extortion	No clear leader
Forces de sécurité du centre-ouest (FSCO)	Abidjan	Para-military group closed to government, violent demonstrations	Commandant Marc Bertrand Gnatoa
Front de libération du grand-ouest (FLGO)	Guiglo	Pro-government militia	Denis Maho Gloiféi
Groupe pour la paix (GPP)	Abidjan	Pro-government student group, violent demonstrations	Charles Groguet
Mouvement de libération de l'ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire (MILOCI)	West of Côte d'Ivoire	Pro-government militia	Pasteur Gammi
Hezbollah	Marcory (Abidjan)	Protection of Lebanese	No clear leader
Mouvement j'aime Gbagbo (MJG)	Abidjan	Pro-government militia, violent demonstrations	Touré Moustapha
Jeunes Patriotes (JP)	Abidjan	Pro-government militia, armed, military training	Charles Blé Goudé
Lima-militias	West of Côte d'Ivoire	Mercenaries and bandits from Liberia	No clear leader
Union Patriotique de Résistance du Grand	Guiglo	Pro-government militia	Gabriel Benao

oust			
Union des patriotes pour la libération totale de la Côte d'Ivoire (UPLTCl)	Abidjan and south west cities	Urban tribal militia close to FPI	Eugène Djué
Brigades Rouges	Abidjan	Army militia	Close to MPCl
Cosa Nostra	Abidjan	Army militia	Pro-Alassane Ouattara group led by Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibali (IB) close to Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré
Camorra	Abidjan	Army militia	Close to MPCl
Zinzin	Abidjan	Army militia	Pro-Alassane Ouattara group led by Warrant Officer Tuo Fozié.
Bahéfoué	Abidjan	Army militia	Pro-Alassane Ouattara group close to Tuo Fozié.

Sources: International Crisis Group 2003; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Chauveau 2006; Lanoue, 2006; Saferaccess 2007; Gadou, 2009.

(ICG 2003; Marshall-Fratani 2006). For example, the *Front de Libération du Grand Ouest* (FLGO) recruited some youth who were massacred in the spiral of violence that has enmeshed the western part of the country (International Crisis Group 2003:25).

However, death squadrons or parallel forces' attacks had predated the youth militancy in the war. For example, the attack of the "White Horse" against General Guéi in 2000 and the botched coup of the "Black Mercedes" against President Gbagbo as well as the assassination of former Minister of Education, Bala Keïta, a northerner and supporter of General Guéi in Ouagadougou in 2000

were the handiwork of death squadrons (Mehler 2008b:19-20). According to the ICG (2003:16)

numerous killings and disappearances attributed to death Squads close to the Presidency have targeted opposition members or family of rebel leaders.

Furthermore, the Young Patriots are involved in targeting and drawing up black lists, and they also take part in arrests and shootings of opponents of the government (ICG 2003:17). Prominent victims of summary executions and kidnapping include Benoît Dacoury-Tabley (younger brother of Louis Dacoury-Tabley of the FN), and two foreign journalists: Jean-Marie Hélène, and André Guy-Kieffer (Vidal 2003; Galy 2004; Bouquet 2007). Guillaume Soro, alias the “Che”⁸⁰, the political leader of the FN has been the target of intra-rebel death squads close to the figure head of the rebellion, Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibali alias “IB” and former Commander of the FN, Koné Zakaria who lost out in the power struggle within the rebellion (Mehler 2008b:20). General Guéi was killed in circumstances that remain unclear during the beginning of the rebellion on 22 September 2002.

8.8 Conclusion

One of the consequences of the spiral of violence of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire is the militianisation and militarisation of the youth. Although the educated youth in Sierra Leone were originally motivated by the ideals of promoting a better tomorrow, their Ivorian counterparts, or at least the youth leaders were inspired by ethnonationalism. The Ivorian youth are easily mobilised by the call of patriotism although their leaders have ulterior motives relating to benefitting from the war situation. The lucrative aspects of youth violence have caused a lot of disappointment among the youth militants in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire as well. The politics of university students’ unionism have also led to episodic violence that has not only politicised the students’ union

leaders but also divided them. The losers are, of course, the young innocents who are the victims of this violence. Another concern for post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire will be how to integrate these youth that have taken part in violent actions in the society by giving them the means of livelihood that will be devoid of violence. This is a daunting task for the post-war governments in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The issue of the integration of school drop-outs will also be difficult in a post-conflict Côte d'Ivoire as their means of livelihood is now the dividends of violence through their mobilisation by the youth leaders who are serving and promoting their own interest from the conflict. The presence of Liberian refugees has complicated ethnic violence in the south-west where youths are deeply influenced by ethnicity.

Chapter Nine

Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire's Civil Wars in Comparative Perspective

9.1 Introduction

The two previous chapters discussed my analysis of the variables involved in the Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire civil wars. This chapter is the heart of the thesis. It provides an in-depth analysis and account of the main causes of Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire's civil wars. It focuses on a comparative analysis of the main variables in the two civil conflicts. Here, the study takes into consideration the fundamentals of the information and opinions provided by the respondents and the assertions made in the literature review of the causes of the two intra-state wars.

Table 6: An overview of the Causal Factors of Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire Civil Wars

Factors	Sierra Leone	Côte d'Ivoire
Religion	No	To a limited extent
Ethnic cleavages	To some extent	Yes
Youth	Yes	Yes
Land issues	Yes	Yes
Economic crises	Yes	Yes
Corruption	Yes	Yes
Unemployment	Yes	Yes
Poverty	Yes	Yes
Neglect of the countryside	Yes	Yes
Dictatorship	Yes	Yes
Lack of democracy	Yes	Yes
Socio-economic inequalities	Yes	Yes
Consequences of Colonial policies	No	Yes
Availability of natural resources	No	No
Frustrations	Yes	Yes
Military role in governance	Yes	Yes
Sub-regional conflict dynamics	Yes	Yes

Source: Ogunmola 2010

9.2 Religion as a Potential Trigger of the Civil Wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire

Sierra Leone's case study is a negation of religion as a cause of the civil war. Both the literature review and the respondents' testimonies point to the fact that religion was not one of the root causes of the conflict. The belligerents did not rely on religious affinities to recruit participants in the war, nor in choosing whom to maim among their victims who were in the majority innocent and hapless civilians. All the opinions gathered in Sierra Leone during my fieldwork converged to confirm that religion was not a causal factor that triggered the war. A respondent summarises this opinion thus:

As far as religion is concerned, we have no problem in this country. Sierra Leoneans are religious people and the two religions [Christianity and Islam] cohabite together (FGD1).

Religion did not have any impact on the outset nor the outcome of the Sierra Leone's civil war. The membership of the belligerent groups cut across Islam and Christianity, as well as traditional religion.

Likewise, in the Ivorian internecine war, although there were tensions between Muslims and Christians, the undercurrents of the religious aspects of the war were misleading, leading some to assertively claim that religion was a factor. Religion was not a factor across the country but limited to a pocket of strained relations between security operatives and Muslims in Abidjan-the economic capital of Côte d'Ivoire. In most cases, in the harassments that occurred, religious divisions coincided with ethnic divisions and the stigmatisation of "the other", or the "Dioula Tchê"⁸¹ phenomenon, which is the generic reference to the northerners. It is incidentally that religion coincides with the identification of people from the northern riparian states of Côte d'Ivoire. It is argued that

(...) being a northerner does not necessarily mean to be Muslim, similarly, being a southerner does not automatically denote that the citizen is a Christian. Magnifying the religious dimension of the conflict is tantamount to a superficial interpretation of the identity crisis....Thus; it appears that ethnicity submerges religion (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005:222).

However, some studies point to the fact religion was a factor in the Ivorian civil war although we do not have a cause and effect reaction on a large scale. The key lies in the politicisation of ethnicity as a major determinant of who gets what, and how in the Ivorian political system before, during, and after the civil conflict. Here the ethnicists included those who were recruited and benefitted from the long reign of the PDCI and the short-lived military regime of General Robert Guéi. The two case studies reveal that it was not a religious war. In Côte d'Ivoire religion was attached to ethnicity and sometimes confused with regional cleavages especially by outside commentators (Bassett 2003a:13-15).

9.3 The Politicisation of Ethnicity as a Determinant of Civil War in West Africa

The politicisation of ethnicity cannot simply be dismissed as a causal factor in the Sierra Leonean and Ivorian conflicts. Ethnic divisions were focal in some areas during the Sierra Leonean Civil War and they are important among factors of the Ivorian conflict (Bangura 2000; Keen 2003; Akindès 2004; Colin, Kouamé, and Soro 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Ethnic competition is a recurring variable as a trigger of Côte d'Ivoire's civil strife. For some of the Ivorian respondents, ethnicity is even a major factor with the introduction of the doctrine of *L'ivoirité* that divided the country along ethnic lines. Northerners were discriminated against and harsh rules introduced when Bédié and the leaders who followed him denied many their Ivorian citizenship (Bassett 2001; Daddieh 2001; Akindès 2004). This discrimination resulted in identity crises and deep frustrations against the government. The issue of denial of citizenship is one of the main grievances of the rebels.

9.4 Sierra Leone: The Combatants and Ethnic Divides

According to the outcomes of the interviews and analysis the Sierra Leonean fighters were not concerned with ethnicity in the internecine war. Recruitment in the rebellion was carried out across ethnic lines and depended on the geographic zones which the rebels were able to reach and conquer in their offensive against government troops and the pro-government Kamajoor ethnic militia. A Sierra Leonean scholar corroborated this view. According to him

the leader of the rebels Foday Sankoh was a Temne [northerner], and his lieutenants came from different ethnic groups within the country: Fulah, Mende, Krio, you name it. The rank and file of the fighting forces were Mende [South]. It was never ethnicised.
(SIL2)

The same view is expressed by another respondent, a warlord, who played an active role in the rebellion.

The war was not as a result of tribal [ethnic] misunderstanding.
(SL11)

The respondents' views that the issues of identity are not motivational factors are also found elsewhere (Kandeh 1999:362) (Kaldor and Luckman 2001:56), and (Coulter 2009:47). However, Bangura (2000: 558-559) and (Keen 2003:3-5) believe that ethnicity was a contributing factor to Sierra Leone's civil war. This shows that there are two strands of opinions concerning the issues of ethnicity as a contributing factor. The attacks on the victims by the rebels were not selectively or systematically carried out according to the ethnic groups of the victims. The victims of the rebels included children from a range of ethnic groups: boys and young girls who were used by the rebels in their war against the government and the main victims were the poor who were unable to escape.

9.5 Côte d'Ivoire: Ethnic Politics and Its Consequences

A number of factors can explain why ethnicity became politicised in Côte d'Ivoire. The power shift after the then ruling PDCI, led by Henri Konan Bédié lost political power in December 1999 resulted in a deep restructuring along ethnic lines and political party affiliations in the civil service and security forces (Crook 2003; Akindès 2004). Bakary (1991:76) notes that even during the Houphouëtist era ethnicity was a factor that mattered in the political equilibrium of the country, with the distribution of political power among the ruling elite along ethnic lines. Secondly, there are the problems associated with land issues in the rural areas. The ownership and the mode of acquisition of land by migrants and immigrants in the south of the country were reviewed by the Bédié government and the National Assembly voted a new land law on December 18, 1998 (Chauveau 2000; Boone 2007). Also, the high rate of unemployment among urban Ivorians led to discrimination in the labour market against immigrants in the urban zones. The land issues and the problems associated with unemployment and poverty led to the belief that the high percentage of foreigners in the country denied Ivorians opportunities to be gainfully employed (Adepoju 2003:40). This view was popularly believed to be supported by the 1998 census. Akindès (2004:24) remarks that the 1998 census

(...)revealed that the foreign community, with a labour participation rate of 57.9%, had a higher participation in the national economy than the Ivorian population, whose participation rate was 47.7 %. This meant that there was a high and increasing rate of unemployment in the local Ivorian population and an economic ranking that was relatively favourable for immigrants in rural agricultural work and especially in the informal sector in urban areas.

This fuelled further xenophobia because immigrants were considered as enemies who came to take what belonged naturally to Ivorians. In reality, this situation resulted from Houphouët-Boigny's open policy on immigration and access to land (because of the perennial shortage of labour in the country) which imposed policies independently of the aspirations of the autochthons (Akindès 2004:24). Thus the government's policy of accommodating migrants was forced

on the autochthons of the south west and the north as part of the grand strategy of open economic access for the development of the country (Chauveau 2000:105).

The post-mortem on the pattern of recruitments of the belligerents showed without any ambiguity that it was an ethnic war, as the parties to the conflict were divided by ethnicity. All the belligerents, the rebels, the government troops, and pro-government militia or "*les loyalistes*" were ruthless towards their victims because they belonged to different ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic conflicts took place in the south-west between the Bété and the Baoulé, and between the Guéré and the Baoulé as well as the Guéré and Yacouba, and between the northerners and some autochthons in the region (Ero and Marshall 2003:91-98). The ethnic conflicts between the Guéré and Yacouba were widespread and more brutal because they mirrored the international and transborder feuds between the Khran and the Gio in Liberia who are respectively the cousins of the Guéré and the Yacouba of Côte d'Ivoire. The General Guéi factor was also an important motive because of the pre-eminence the military ruler gave to his own ethnic group (Yacouba) over the Guéré in the armed forces and civil service during his rule and his period of cooperation with Charles Taylor. Sawyer (2004:446) states that after the demise of General Robert Guéi at the beginning of the Ivorian war, Taylor still supported some of General Guéi's loyalists in the military. This could explain the intensity of intra-ethnic war in the south-west of Côte d'Ivoire which is close to the Liberian border.

9.6 Land Issues: Sources of Conflict in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire in the Rural Areas

Land is still critical as a mode of production and economic survival in Africa. The ruling elite also have stakes in land issues as they are arm-chair farmers who employ people in the rural areas to work on their behalf.

9.6.1 Sierra Leone: Struggles between Farmers and Diamond Diggers

The discovery of diamonds in the country changed the pattern of the mode of production in some parts of Sierra Leone. Hirsch (2001a:27) notes that agriculture was no longer a priority for everyone as the diamond fields attracted a lot of people who diverted from farming to diamond digging.

The scarcity of arable land in some communities was made worse by the discovery of diamonds. The digging of diamonds worsened food production because diamond digging required a lot of labourers that were diverted from farming (Keen 2005:24). Those who were unable to get land for farming also joined the rebels in order to seize the opportunity to take possession of land that they had been unable to take prior to the war (Keen 2005:52). The rebels also benefitted from the support of some chiefly families who had been excluded from land distribution and the privileges that diamond licences bring (Keen 2005:69). Members of chiefly families are involved in competition and disputes because access to land and its use are still under their prerogatives (Peters 2004: 274). The chiefs also benefit from the informal trade in diamonds. Reno (2003: 49-50) states that

[e]nterprising chiefs and headmen found that they could extract informal “license fees” and “fines” from young men in return for protection for their IDM [Illicit Diamonds Mining] activities. Willing chiefs also manipulated widespread local sentiments that diamonds really belonged to local people.

Nevertheless, the control and exploitation of land resources still falls under the rule of a government that is unable to effectively control illicit mining of gem stones. Furthermore, Keen (2005:24) observes that the competition for land between diamond diggers and farmers have led to serious conflicts between the two groups as they have different perceptions of land use. Thus diamond mining has forced farmers to leave to find more arable land in the forested hills of Kono, a major alluvial diamond town in the Eastern part of the country. In contrast with Côte d’Ivoire, land issues have not resulted in ethnic conflict and xenophobia, but

were used as a tool of propaganda by the rebels as bait for recruitment, especially for the youth.

9.6.2 The Post-Houphouëtist Government and Land Policy Revisionism

The benefits that the governing elite can derive from land and its resources are still very important, as the case of the elite in Côte d'Ivoire shows. Houphouët-Boigny was categorically clear on the involvement of government in land related matters (Brou and Charbit 1994; Chauveau and Bobo 2003). The governing elite and some wealthy urban dwellers are major landholders who are influential in the local politics of their regions.

After becoming President in a very tense situation in 1993, Henri Konan Bédié tried to consolidate his power by introducing populist policies and thus revising some of the taken-for-granted policies that had made Côte d'Ivoire a melting-pot. Henri Konan Bédié and the then opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo, repeatedly said that due to the prolonged economic recession which had commenced in the 1980s, and the prevailing unemployment in the country, there was the urgent need to review immigration, employment, and land policies, as well as the voting rights given to foreigners by Houphouët-Boigny (Dozon 2000a:48). Ironically, West African immigrants had consistently voted for the PDCI (Bédié's party) to the dismay of Laurent Gbagbo who saw this policy like a 'thank you vote' to PDCI and Houphouët-Boigny for welcoming and giving foreigners freedom in Côte d'Ivoire. Laurent Gbagbo described immigrants as "electoral cattle" that cast their votes for the then ruling PDCI government (Marshall-Fratani 2006:22). The National Assembly voted the new Rural Land Law of 1998 which emphasized the rights of the autochthonous people over land. The new policy emphasized customary law and excluded foreigners from the rights of land ownership (Koné and Chauveau 1998: 12-16). The new law has not yet been implemented due to the present crisis and political and military impasse and could have resulted in compounding the issues surrounding land ownership because the new Land Law

denies the right of land ownership to foreigners (Colin and Ayouz 2006:407). However, the new Land Law had the peculiarity of being interpreted differently by the various host communities where Ivorian migrants and foreigners had become land owners. Customary law varies from place to place; and the law on land acquisition is open to different interpretations according to the meaning the locals gave to transactions with migrants and immigrant farmers. It is interpreted in the logic of autochthony that creates '*frontières internes*' or internal boundaries, a variant of the ideology of *L'ivoirité* that discriminated and created categories of non-Ivorians (Chauveau 2000:96-98). This means that only the autochthonous have the rights to own land within their local geographic or internal borders to the detriment of migrants or immigrants. The ethnic nomenclature of *L'ivoirité* targeted non-Ivorians as well as their right to economic prosperity and was discriminatorily used to disenfranchise northerners (Ogunmola 2009: 562-575). Land is central to Côte d'Ivoire's economic development and wealth and the subsistence of the peasantry. Influential and wealthy politicians in the cities invested in the plantation economy of coffee and cocoa by using immigrant labourers and proxy farmers who were in charge of their farms. Crook (1995:36) argues that

[d]ifferences in the degree of legalisation and the uncertainty of land relations are likely to affect both economic and political outcomes.

Furthermore, Chauveau and Bobo (2008:108) argue that in Côte d'Ivoire law and regulations were flexible because there were no real and effective national law that regulated transactions on access to and ownership of land. Colin and Ayouz (2006:405) show that the purchase of land by a migrant or a foreigner is not a definitive or 'outright sale' that frees the buyer in legal terms from the land owner as the buyer still has some obligations towards the seller or the community. Misinterpretations of such gentlemen's agreements explain the controversies surrounding land issues in southern Côte d'Ivoire. From this lack of security with no legal backing, divergences emerged. According to Colin and Ayouz (2006:405)

[p]ast transactions, which had been considered socially secure, might be questioned after a generation or when there is a broader change in the balance of power in society. The commoditization of ownership rights is thus not the final stage in a linear process.

Instead, each community has a mode of regulation of land based on its customs. As a result, Crook (1995:37) argued that

[t]he state manipulated-or-ignored-whatever regulatory orders were in operation, using its power as both supreme patron and ultimate enforcer.

The politicisation of land policy accelerated the breakdown of social relations in the rural areas of the country. The outcome of the drastic depreciation in the prices of cocoa, coffee, and cotton affected the farmers' incomes and reduced their purchasing power and resulted in them openly challenging the authority of government in arbitrarily fixing the prices of these raw materials (Chauveau 2000:95). The politicisation of land policy has many negative consequences for foreigners in south-west regions of Côte d'Ivoire. In the north, incessant conflicts between the autochthonous and Burkinabè and Malians resulted in many deaths among the foreigners. In the south there were also skirmishes between migrants and locals over farm land in the south-west and west, and conflicts involving pastoralists and farmers over grazing land in the north as well as clashes between autochthons and the Krou fishermen from Liberia (Chauveau 2000:95).

In addition, ethnicity played an important role in the conflicts between Baoulé and autochthons while xenophobia was a major factor that ignited the spiral of violence between the autochthonous and immigrants in the forest zone. The Baoulé (the most powerful ethnic group during the time of the PDCI) made themselves a distinct group that did not integrate into the forest communities where they settled as farmers, whereas northerners were deliberately integrating themselves into these communities (Marshall-Fratani 2006:20).

Ethnic conflicts between the Baoulé and autochthons of the south-west were already rampant during the Bédié era. However, instead of quelling the ethnic

conflicts, Bédié made an inflammatory pronouncement in his popular *'Fengolo call'* in 1997 after a bloody clash between the Baoulé and the autochthonous Wè (Chauveau 2000:96). Worse still, the new land policy of the Bédié government accelerated the decay of communal relations where ethnic tensions were already overt. The President reiterated the necessity to review land ownership by giving more power to the local community. Many saw this as a political campaign strategy to win votes from the rural areas as well as other politicians who went to the rural areas. The former President's speech was interpreted differently according to the understanding of the autochthons (Chauveau 2000:96). He was criticised by a section of the media who said that whenever communal conflicts involved the Baoulé, the government was quick to nip them in the bud but it was very slow or even ignored conflicts involving immigrants and other non-Baoulé autochthonous groups (Chauveau 2000:96). Land related conflicts became acute and frequent and took on ethnic characteristics and xenophobic dimensions in the late 1990s. Janin (2000:800) notes that social relations between the migrants and the autochthons became bitter with a

rapid deterioration of relationships between farmers and autochthonous (30%), Baoulé farmers (37%) and foreigners (33%) in many villages; around Gagnoa between Bété and Baoulé in the region of Tabou between Baoulé and the Burkinabè, in November 1999, around 20 000 Burkinabè labourers and their families were chased out.

Houphouët-Boigny had used the wealth of the industrious Baoulé (his own ethnic group) and Anyi [an Akan group], or the Akan farmers in general, to develop the country by taxing his own group, to keep alive the peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic groups (Azam 2001:431). The military putsch that removed Henri Konan Bédié from power in December 1999 and brought General Guéi (a Yacouba) to power marked the end of the effective domination of the Akan. The other ethnic groups have criticised what they referred to the "Akanisation of political power" (Arnault 2008:3). When Bédié, another Baoulé, succeeded Houphouët-Boigny, he made ethnic relations worse by implementing a selective policy of putting the Baoulé in the most important positions of power. For example, the armed forces became divided along ethnic lines with the promotion of Baoulé officers to sensitive security positions in a sector that had been traditionally dominated by northerners during the Houphouëtist era (Kieffer 2000; Dozon 2000a).

Ethnicity continued to be a major factor in promotion in the civil service when Laurent Gbagbo became President in the controversial election of 2000 by outmanipulating General Guéi. Houphouët-Boigny's successors promoted ethnic partiality and violence by purging the civil service on the basis of ethnicity and putting people from their own ethnic groups in key positions in government instead of sharing jobs between the various geopolitical zones as during the time of Houphouët-Boigny (Langer 2004:33). The coming to power of former General Robert Guéi and Laurent Gbagbo increased ethnic tensions in the west and south-west of the country, especially in the agricultural sector as their ethnic groups the Wè (Yacouba, Guéré and Ouèbè) and the Krou (Bété and Tabou) saw this as an opportunity to claim lands and assert themselves politically and socially by seizing farms from migrants and foreigners. The crisis in the rural areas can be explained by intolerance and the ethnicisation of politics associated with the scarcity of land and the political domination of an ethnic group as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Akindès (2004:17) states that

(...) the Bété origins of...Laurent Gbagbo made him the main focus for rallying the Bété, who were unhappy with the political exclusion that flowed from the myth of Baoulé aristocracy

The ethnic character of the Ivorian war spilled over to neighbouring Liberia during the Second Liberian Civil War. Ethnicity was most manifest in the West of Côte d'Ivoire as the Guéré and Yacouba, assisted by the Khran and Gio respectively, engaged in wanton and indiscriminate killings motivated by ethnic hatred (ICG 2003; Ero and Marshall 2003). Also, on the domestic scene, there were violent fights between the Bété and the Guéré (ICG 2003:26). Furthermore, ethnicity was a robust factor that was manipulated by politicians right from the outset of the protracted Ivorian crisis starting with the Bédié government's introduction and selective application of the ideology of *L'ivoirité* that created deep cleavages (Akindès 2004:28-33).

L'ivoirité created deep schisms by promoting north-south divisions that initially triggered mutual hatred between southerners and northerners within the population and the military (Dozon 2000b; Banégas and Losch 2000; Akindès

2003). This also led to the issue of the identity crisis and emphasis on autochthony as well as a policy that revisited the rights to Ivorian citizenship, especially, since 2000 under the Gbagbo presidency (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:85-87). The combination of the politics of ethnicity, and discrimination on the basis of autochthony and the paranoia of xenophobia were underlying factors sharpened by the economic crisis. The economic difficulties that affected the blossoming bureaucrats in Côte d'Ivoire and the urban population more broadly had similar negative social and political impacts on Sierra Leone society. In both countries, the economic crisis also resulted in pessimism and frustration in the rural areas.

Unlike Côte d'Ivoire, where land issues led to bloody conflicts, ethnic discrimination and xenophobia, Sierra Leone's case showed the competitions were between two rival groups that competed over land use as means of livelihood. The significance of disputes over land stems from the fact that as the land issue in Côte d'Ivoire shows "[l]and, which is not a lootable resource, is a much more important source of contention than diamonds" because it is the foundation of agriculture, the cornerstone of Côte d'Ivoire's economy (Ware and Ogunmola 2010:82). Although there was a high presence of foreigners in the mining of diamonds in Sierra Leone, their presence did not result in conflict with the land owners who benefited from the illicit diamond mining. Instead competitions were between the chiefly families over the right to control the allocation of land.

This could reflect the fact that whilst diamond mining activities bring rewards on a continuous basis, farming (especially of coffee and cocoa) is a long process and benefit from it takes a long time. The autochthons do not derive any direct benefit from farming once the land has been sold. Farming on the same land can last many generations which is unlikely in the case of mining because the alluvial diamonds of Sierra Leone are easy for predation and illicit mining. Multiple sales of the mining sites by the chiefly families cannot be ruled out, resulting in conflicts between the ruling traditional families. Another difference is that while

mining in Sierra Leone is about resources that are beneath the ground and legally belong to government, farming is about what can be planted into the ground.

9.7 Protracted Economic Downturn: A Ticking Time Bomb for Conflicts in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire

The 1980s were a watershed in the economic life of both Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The decade marked the weaknesses of wrong policies that degenerated into structural setbacks for the economy. This situation had deep economic and socio-political impacts for most Sub-Saharan African economies because of the deterioration of the terms of international trade that continuously affected the monocultural economies of these countries. Another factor that cripples the economy of many oil importers is the high price of oil that indirectly depletes the national treasury. This ugly trend is worsened by the mismanagement of the national economy by most leaders.

9.8 Sierra Leone: A Tale of Economic Woes

Although naturally blessed with economic and human resources to serve as engines of socio-economic development, Sierra Leone's leaders woefully failed to uplift the majority of the people due to economic mismanagement and corruption. Sierra Leone's economy has been in a depressed state for decades and even was unable to satisfy domestic food demand, resulting in poverty and its social consequences (Luke 1988; Reno 1995). Compared to Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire had had a good start in the economic sphere. The country was among the best performing economies of Africa for two decades after independence, resulting in meaningful social and economic development (Azam 2001:431).

However, after nearly two decades of progress Côte d'Ivoire was unable to sustain this pace and global trends seriously affected its exports. The mismanagement of the economy in the two countries coupled with inimical terms

of international trade and devastating debt and debt servicing, as in most African countries, resulted in the introduction of Structural Adjustments Programmes (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods Institutions in support of economic bail outs. The application of the SAPs accelerated the worsening socio-economic situation with the removal of subsidies, the devaluation of the national currency, retrenchment in the public sector, and growing urban poverty (Geo-Jaja and Mangunm 2001; Konings 2003).

The youth became one of the direct casualties of the adjustment measures. For example, Ware and Ogunmola (2010:77) state that a culture of youth violence was embryonic in Sierra Leone before the civil war as the youth were used to achieve specific objectives:

[c]onditions were exacerbated over Siaka Stevens' 17 years of despotic rule during which he co-opted ghetto youths, fed with drugs and false promises of employment, to brutalise opponents.

This situation and the manipulation of elections fostered a culture of urban violence and rebellion that the leaders of the opposition exploited by using the frustrations among the youth to pursue their own political agenda that led to insurgencies (Reno 1995; Ellis 1999; Mkandawire 2002; Abdullah 2004; Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007). Unemployment and pervasive poverty among the vulnerable populations in general, and the youth in particular, have caused a lot of frustration favouring conditions that the rebels used to gain the sympathy of the populations in the two countries.

Another factor associated with the economic crisis and abject poverty among the majority of the citizens in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire is the lack of democracy and thus of checks and balances upon corruption. The opening of the political space, that had been under the control of the one party system of government or military rule, to accommodate the opposition and organisation of multiparty elections were among the political conditionalities the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the creditor nations put upon providing further financial and economic assistance (Reno 1995; Akindès 2004). Therefore, political

liberalisation was engineered externally, not *ab initio* from within. It was certainly not a movement for change that started from the grassroots. The opposition incited and led the masses' calls for political change in reaction to these unpopular economic policies. Elections were organised in Côte d'Ivoire at a time when the government had already been weakened and was most unpopular because of the implementation of SAPs, while the RUF rebels started their rebellion from the Liberian border at the time when Joseph Saidu Momoh was reluctantly trying to return the country to multipartyism in Sierra Leone.

9.9 One Party versus Multiparty Elections in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire

The lack of democracy has been one of the banes of the post-colonial African state. Although multiparty elections were organised at independence, the leaders of the post-independence states in Africa abysmally failed to consolidate on this democratic start. Swiftly, dictatorship and ethnicity took the place of the overarching interests of the country as a whole as the head of state imposed their policies in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. The incumbent Presidents were reluctant or refused to proceed with multiparty elections. Hirsch (2001a:28) states that Sierra Leone is the archetype of the troubled post-colonial African country that witnessed "a brief experiment in the early 1960's quickly replaced by thirty years of one-party civilian government or military rule".

Attacking the evils of ethnic conflicts, the first post-independence African leaders emphasised that multiparty elections were weapons and instruments of division that were unsuited to their fellow countrymen and women. The former President of Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens referred to multiparty government as a

[s]ystem of...institutionalized tribal and ethnic quinquennial warfare euphemistically known as elections [which] contributes an open invitation to anarchy and disunity West Africa (1982, as cited in Decalo 1992:10).

These leaders built their political power from their ethnic and/or regional bases. Often, these leaders enlisted the support of a strongly ethnicised army in their confiscation of political power, such as in the cases of the Eyadema dynasty in Togo, Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone, and Samuel Doe in Liberia. For those leaders multipartyism was synonymous with chaos. This stems from the fallacious belief that democracy was incompatible with “African realities”⁸².

This resulted in the imposition of the one party state oligarchy system. Whether the government was communist, socialist, or capitalist oriented during the Cold War, these African leaders secured and strengthened their grip on power. Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was the first to voluntarily leave power in 1980 but the ruling party, *Parti Socialiste Sénégalais* (PSS) still dominated the political life of the country until his successor Abdoulaye Diouf was defeated by the candidate of the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) Abdoulaye Wade in the presidential elections of April 2000 (Ottaway 2003:158-159). The resignation of the Senegalese leader, which Houphouët-Boigny considered as an abdication of power, envenomed the protracted rivalries between Houphouët-Boigny and Léopold Sédar Senghor in the Francophone bloc (Gaulme 2002: 16). Houphouët-Boigny considered his Francophone rival as a French idealist who was far from African traditional realities that stipulate that a leader must die in office (Gaulme 2002:17-18). Frequently, military coups were the only option left to unseat incumbents. This happened in Côte d’Ivoire in 1999 with the overthrow of Henri Konan Bédié by the military. However, the end of the Cold War politics made the one party system generally irrelevant and ideological client-states were thus abandoned by the Western Cold War pro-democracy bloc who then forced their former allies to join the bandwagon of multiparty-ism (Chabaz and Daloz 1999:116-119). Consequently, in the 1990s,

single-party rule, once hailed as Africa's contribution to political philosophy, has been rolled back across much of the continent, giving way to competitive elections and multipartyism (Decalo 1992:8).

Thus, African rulers half-heartedly accepted the forceful introduction of multiparty elections as a condition for economic survival (Chabaz and Daloz 1999:119). In most cases, in Francophone Africa the incumbent presidents who

were “friendly” to the French government “scaled through and regained their seat” in Francophone Africa while the Marxist-Leninist regimes ‘lost’ out because communism was moribund (Ogunmola 2009:238).

As mentioned, multiparty elections had been short-lived in Africa after the euphoric period of independence. In Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens agitated for multiparty election before independence; he changed his mind later when he became the head of state (Alie 2006:22-23). The constitutional crisis that ensued after the demise of Sir Milton Margai is a clear indication that the mechanisms for succession were non-existent or ill-prepared. The emergence of Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister and later as President put multiparty elections on hold for a long time. Furthermore, the pattern of voting showed that ethnicity remained a major factor in elections under the APC’s rule (Alie 2006:34). The closure of the political space created a lot of frustrations for the opposition. Members of civil society were intermittently harassed and students’ unions were proscribed. Siaka Stevens’ rule is summarised as follows by Hirsch (2001a:29)

Stevens’s (sic) rule was called the “seventeen years of plague locusts”. He destroyed and corrupted every institution of the state. Parliament was gutted of significance; judges were intimidated or bribed; the university was starved of funds, many professors compromised their integrity by joining the cabinet; the value of education was deprecated in favor of quick acquisition of wealth; and professionalism of the army was undermined. Those who opposed the one-party state in 1977 were executed, forced into exile, or reduced to a condition of penury.

Contrary to Houphouët-Boigny, Siaka Stevens retired and chose a Dauphin whom he imposed on Sierra Leoneans; for his part the Ivorian president abhorred the idea of having a successor. While Siaka Stevens chose his Chief of Army Staff, Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh, Houphouët-Boigny opted for the manipulation of the Constitution and the PDCI to avoid the process of change. The political legacies of the two leaders did not endure because they bequeathed weak institutions to their countries and their successors did not have the strong authority required to dominate the political landscape due to the end of Cold War international support and the economic crisis that drastically affected the neopatrimonial system.

In a reputedly modern state, Houphouët-Boigny dug into Akan tradition to refuse to nominate a successor. He became famous with his 'theory' "there cannot be two male crocodiles in the same pond", which meant he would not share political power, and this resulted in the "*nananisation* of power" or personal rule, as Houphouët was fondly called "*Nana, Papa, the Father of the nation*" by his followers (Ogunmola and Badmus 2005:218). Côte d'Ivoire experienced a long lasting dictatorship (Tchero 2007:85).

In Côte d'Ivoire, the economic crisis and poverty were elements that contributed to the demand for multiparty elections. For example, Morrisson (1996:56) observes that the Ivorian government did not take into consideration the social consequences of the application of SAPs and this affected the public, private, and the informal sectors as well as immigrant workers. These factors were the real drivers of the demand for multiparty elections not only in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, but also for a number of African countries. Huband (1998:95) argues that

[t]he new expression of grievances, repressed for so long, amid the all-embracing pursuit of the myth of the common good, a goal now thrown to the wind, the reality of poverty having become too obvious beside the enormous wealth of the élite.

The same parameters apply to Sierra Leone. Apart from the elite, the clamour for multiparty elections was supported by the masses for economic reasons. Bakary (1991:68) argues that in Côte d'Ivoire, radical political opponents and the elite were only concerned with the capitalist orientation of the government and they had not challenged the one party system of the PDCI which was de facto accepted with "implicit consensus" as a political "*modus vivendi*" from 1960-1980. Ghana and Senegal are the exceptional cases in West Africa owing to the open leadership style adopted by the ruling elite and their willingness to embrace genuine democracy. This political dynamic and evolution has brought the opposition to power through multiparty elections in both Senegal and Ghana.

9.10 Colonial Policies and Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire Civil Wars

Colonial patterns of administration were different in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. Although the powers of the traditional rulers were curtailed, the British system of indirect rule relied on the traditional African rulers to provide local control. The French operated the direct system that gave little power to the traditional African institutions, as the roles of the traditional rulers in French colonies were reduced to symbolic gestures as one of the indirect consequences of the French Revolution of 1789 (Bett 2005; Wilder 2005).

In Sierra Leone the British disengaged from local political affairs with independence in 1961. However, the British maintained their economic ties with the post-colonial government. This was especially true for the mining economy, which is responsible for main export-earnings of the country since the colonial era. Unlike the French in Côte d'Ivoire, the British did not maintain overt political tutelage in the domestic affairs of the post-independent state. Furthermore, the socialist inclination (which was highly questionable because of the failure of Siaka Stevens to match his rhetoric with concrete actions) of the Stevens government and his close association with the regime of Sékou Touré did not appeal to the British government. Moreover, since Sierra Leone's civil conflict was a post-modern war that took place when Africa was no longer as relevant to the geopolitical calculations of the Great Powers as the continent used to be during the Cold War, the British diplomatic role was initially performed through a range of multilateral organisations. However, the British eventually played an important role in ending Sierra Leone's war through their direct military intervention.

9.11 Côte d'Ivoire: Independence Means Continuity

For Félix Houphouët-Boigny, political independence did not mean severing cooperation with France, unlike Sékou Touré, who declared the independence of Guinea-Conakry in 1958 contrary to French wishes. Thus, the Ivorian leader was among the Francophone Presidents who had wanted continuity and cooperation with France rather than independence. The Houphouëtist political and economic ties with France strengthened the regime in virtually all the domains of Ivorian national policies. These ties were harnessed by Houphouët-Boigny to develop the Ivorian economy by continuing the French agricultural policy; especially regarding migration of Burkinabè workers that eased the lack of labourers on the Ivorian cocoa, coffee, and rubber farms (Cornwell 2000; Daddieh 2001; Akindès 2004). It was the typical case of the old wine in a new bottle as Houphouët-Boigny did not try to undo the privileges the French had enjoyed since the colonial period.

Furthermore, as President, Houphouët-Boigny signed defence agreements that allowed the French to establish a military base in Abidjan, the 43^{ème} BIMA. However, the defence pacts also allowed the Ivorian President to stabilise his government and his long rule was supported by using the French security umbrella to protect his personal rule. The Houphouëtist option was to embrace economic liberalism instead of the socialist model some radical African leaders had chosen. Daddieh (2001:13) notes that

[w]hen Houphouët-Boigny reluctantly demanded independence from France in 1960; he wagered that dependent capitalist development would be a viable option for Africa. He categorically rejected the Nkrumaist option of seeking the political kingdom in the framework of a Pan-African union. Instead, he committed himself to strengthening the vertical ties between France and Côte d'Ivoire. This renewed relationship was buttressed by the signing of economic cooperation and defense agreements between the two countries.

These ties with France were important for the regime stability of the Francophone African countries. During the Cold War, France assured easy access to European markets and financial assistance in personalised and well-established

relationships between some African rulers and a number of important French decision makers (Bovcon 2009a:284). Félix Houphouët-Boigny coined the term *Françafrique* to describe these special ties that gave highly preferred access to the Francophone African countries' economies to French companies (Bovcon 2009a:284).

The *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) opposition party of Laurent Gbagbo criticised these special Franco-Ivorian relationships, which the *Frontistes* described as neo-colonialism and dependency, because they were perceived to be largely to the detriment of Côte d'Ivoire. The FPI blamed the poverty that spread through the social strata on the economic crisis stemming from the colonial umbilical cord with France that Houphouët-Boigny and the Barons of the PDCI government were unwilling to sever. The FPI, an opposition party, advocated for a *refondation* or restructuring of the national economy dominated by France and by the same token for a diversification of the country's economic partners instead of the French near monopoly.

France's relations with Côte d'Ivoire under the Gbagbo government became frosty since the French President Jacques Chirac called for the cancellation of the sham 2000 presidential elections organised by General Robert Guéi that had seen the emergence of Gbagbo (Lamin 2005:22). Furthermore President Gbagbo challenged the strong hold over the country's economy maintained by French companies and assured Ivorians that he would implement his policy of restructuring (Lamin 2005:19). The result of my field-work survey shows that the majority of respondents in Côte d'Ivoire believe that France has been implementing neo-colonialist policies. This belief is related to the dynamism of the recent nationalistic agitations. It is noticeably linked to their view of the past under Houphouët-Boigny and the belief the claim for true or second independence is authentic (Banégas 2006:4). Critics of the Ivorian government claim that the capital of the country is in Paris, since major decisions had the input of France and the majority of Ivorian leaders have made France a second home

(Kamara 2000:3). Charbonneau (2008:149-150) echoes the same view of neo-colonialism as he asserts that

the case of Côte d'Ivoire reveals the extent to which French policy is about the same issues of influence, subordination, and domination while France might disguise its intervention with the language and politics of multilateralism, its recent involvement in Côte d'Ivoire suggests fundamental continuities between the logics of (neo)colonialism and global governance.

The policy of restructuring by the Gbagbo government affected the control of the Ivorian economy by the French as President Gbagbo diversified the country's economic partners by allowing investments from China, Libya, and the Asian Tigers. The socialist inclination of the FPI government further damaged the relations between the two countries when France was under the conservative governments of President Jacques Chirac and later Nicolas Sarkozy (Konaté 2005: 119). President Nicolas Sarkozy has continuously criticised the special ties of *Françafrique* as the new generation of French leaders are influenced by the "Doctrine Balladur" (Thiam 2008:873-876). Another facet of the FPI restructuring was the issue of land ownership and distribution in the rural areas with the no longer acceptable domination of the plantation economy by migrants in the south-west, which is Gbagbo's home region. The high rate of unemployment in the country, especially in urban areas, brought to the front-burner the burning issue of fake and genuine Ivorians in the civil service. The FPI became the megaphone arguing for giving priority to Ivorians in all spheres of national life. Most Ivorians blame the high numbers of migrants on French colonial policies and Houphouët-Boigny's open policy on migration.

France's African foreign policy has changed since the end of the Cold War. France's policy is now viewed mainly through the economic prism; also it is diluted within the foreign policy of the European Union. Francophone Africa is now lagging behind other economic partners of France (Ogunmola 2009: 237-238) such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola. One of the features of this change is that France is no longer applying the Defence Agreements to intervene in favour of friendly African governments. An example of the abdication of French

interventionism in Africa was when the military threw out the government of Henri Konan Bédié in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999 and France did not intervene to restore the civilian government in spite of the call by Bédié for France to apply the modalities of the mutual Defence Agreements and intervene in his favour.

Again, when the war broke out in Côte d'Ivoire, President Gbagbo also called on France to apply the terms of the Defence Agreement it had signed with Côte d'Ivoire to defend the territorial integrity of the country. This attitude shows that the politics of the Gbagbo government could be softened in time of adversity and threat to regime survival, despite his original radical position. However, France preferred a political solution to the conflict. France said that the conflict was an internal affair, although some neighbouring countries (Burkina Faso and Liberia) were involved in giving support to the rebellion. Moreover, the FPI government accused France of supporting the rebels especially after the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement of 24 January 2003 with the *Jeunes Patriotes* then leading anti-French demonstrations and shouting anti-French slogans and attacking French businesses (Banégas 2006:13). It is worth noting that the rebel groups have also accused France of partisanship in favour of President Laurent Gbagbo by interposing its peacekeeping force *La Licorne* in Yamoussoukro (Lamin 2005:19). Moreover, Charbonneau (2008:149) argues that the intervention of France by looking for a political solution

led to the legitimization of an armed rebellion, and thus it contradicted the objective of "deterring" the use of force in African politics. Furthermore, France's action prolonged the conflict by artificially dividing the country in two[a] along North-South line.

In addition, the youth supporting the FPI believed the conflict was a liberation war that the country needed to free itself from France by winning a second and genuine independence (Lamin 2005:27). The Gbagbo government renewed its hostile policy against the French because France neutralised the Ivorian Air Force jet fighters in Bouaké (Mehler 2008a:29). This led to violent reprisals against French expatriates and their businesses by the *Jeunes Patriotes*. The vandalism of French businesses led to the repatriation of 8,332 French citizens

(Bovcon 2009a:286). This repatriation had ripple-effects on the French polity as the repatriated demanded compensation and assistance from the government through the *Association des Rapatriés de Côte d'Ivoire* (ARCI) and the *Association de Défense des Entreprises Sinistrées de Côte d'Ivoire* (ADESCI), but these forums did not achieve many tangible results (Bovcon 2009a:286-287). The anti-French protests were some of the consequences of the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accord that the FPI government and its supporters considered very disadvantageous to them as the agreement was seen as providing too many concessions to the rebels (Bovcon 2009b; Marshall-Fratani 2006).

The victims asked the French government to apply the Law of 1961 for their indemnification but the government refused and argued that they were not colonial settlers. However, the members of the ADESCI were paid six million Euros as compensation by the Ivorian government (Bovcon 2009a:293). This did not result in thawing of Franco-Ivorian relations as the climate of suspicion has not yet dissipated.

9.12 The Military in Governance in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire

Compared to Côte d'Ivoire, that had enjoyed political stability for 39 years (Kieffer 2000; MCGowan 2003); Sierra Leone had had a long history of political instability from its early years of independence (Hanlon 2005:459). The phenomenon of the military in politics in Sierra Leone dates back to the 1967 elections when the armed forces intervened three times in coups and counter-coups opposing one faction of the army against another (Hanlon 2005; Alie 2006). Some officers, among whom was Colonel John Bangura, were arrested in 1964 by Sir Milton Margai's government for planning to topple the government (Alie 2006:60). Côte d'Ivoire had remained politically stable for almost four decades (1960-1999) in an unstable sub-region where coups-d'état were rampant and a

preferred mode of changing the political leadership in many countries. The appearance of the military on the political scene in both countries created many problems that the army could not solve (Kieffer 2000; Hanlon 2005; Alie 2006; Ouatarra 2008).

9.13 The Inability of the Armed Forces to Sever its Umbilical Cord from Politics in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the intervention of the military in politics was clearly linked to the turbulent period after the demise in 1964 of the first President Sir Milton Magai of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) when his younger brother, Sir Albert Margai succeeded him in controversial circumstances because no provision was made for replacement of the President in case of his/her demise (Alie 2006:59-60). Although Sir Milton Margai had already influenced the politicisation of the armed forces through ethnically motivated recruitments and promotions as a part of his effort to force the one party state system on Sierra Leoneans, Siaka Stevens accelerated the process (Kondeh 2008:283).

The armed forces were divided between the supporters of the SLPP and those of the All People's Congress (APC) and this resulted in the coup and counter-coups of 1967 (Bundu 2001:19). Brigadier David Lansana interfered with the 1967 general elections by disallowing the APC's candidate: Siaka Stevens who won government while a faction of the armed forces led by Andrew Juxon-Smith (who later became colonel) overturned his action by arresting Brigadier David Lansana and Sir Margai (Zack-Williams 1999; Bangura 2000). Juxon-Smith led the National Reformation Council (NRC) that suspended the institutions of the Republic. Furthermore, John Bangura, who had been released by the counter-coup officers aligned with the APC, was planning to invade the country with some of his supporters from neighbouring Guinea-Conakry in order to claim Siaka Stevens' mandate and reinstate him (Abdullah 1998:216). However, the NRC junta was unpopular and short-lived as

[t]he attempt by the members of NRC to legitimise their rule in Sierra Leone achieved little success, and the exertion of Colonel Juxon-Smith to portray himself and the armed forces in heroic, saintly terms were a disaster (Hayward and Dumbuya 1983:670).

The election of the APC candidate Siaka Stevens against a sitting President (Albert Margai) in the general elections was by and large considered as a ray of hope and a sign for the post-independent African countries that democracy was feasible (Bundu 2001:19). Siaka Stevens took over power with the help of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who toppled Juxon-Smith (Basedau and Mehler 2005:260). However, once he climbed the Presidential pedestal, Siaka Stevens institutionalised a long period of personal rule through the one party state and subjugated the armed forces by creating a powerful parallel force: the dreaded Internal Security Unit (ISU). With the support of this unit he survived many coup attempts until he vacated power in 1984 (Zack-William 1999:373). In addition, the ISU were used by Siaka Stevens as agents of intimidation and repression, and he purged the armed forces by protecting the officers loyal to his regime and frustrating those opposed to him (Kposowa 2006:40). Furthermore, Siaka Stevens' proscription of multiparty elections shows that he was inconsistent or ambivalent because as an opposition leader responding to Sir Milton Margai's plan to create a one party state, Siaka Stevens had said that

[n]ot only as leader of APC but as an individual, I abhor and detest the One Party System of Government, *We Yone* (1965, as cited in Reno, 1995:79).

Siaka Stevens ethnicised the armed forces by enlisting APC supporters in the armed forces and in 1974 the heads of the police and the army were nominated in the Parliament (Gbla 2006:79). This policy was a grand strategy to keep the armed forces loyal to the president. Siaka "Pa" Stevens retired in 1985 due to ill health and handpicked Army Commander Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh as his successor (Penfold 2005:550). Chege (2002:151) concludes that

Sierra Leone's misfortune was Stevens's (sic) misunderstanding of the essential factors underlying the economic and governance structures he had inherited and yet his insistence on continuing in power for 17 years. Consumed with ambition and the desire to create a one-party state under his personal control, he gradually emasculated the once-vigorous parliament, finally banning opposition parties and dealing harshly with bona fide political opponents.

Momoh's attempt to sideline some powerful members of the ruling elite by withdrawing the dividends of spoils politics resulted in a failed coup as those that were affected tried to overthrow him (Reno 1995:160). Although the economy was already failing under Siaka Stevens, it further degenerated and social inequalities and tensions marred the socio-economic fabric of the country under Brigadier-General Joseph Saidu Momoh's rule with his inability to discontinue the corrupt system that Reno (1995:112-120) appropriately described as the "Shadow state". Although reluctant, Momoh tried to restore multiparty elections in 1991 while the RUF launched its rebellion from the Kalaihun District near the Liberian border, which ignited a reign of terror on the victims that were unlucky enough to be in the areas the rebels controlled (Jackson 2005:51).

The military interfered again in 1992 and sacked President Joseph Saidu Momoh's APC government during the civil war. The coup was carried out by a group of young officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser (Kandeh 1996; Bangura 2000). The findings of a probe of the Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh's government by the NPRC confirmed allegations of corruption and mismanagement of the national economy which had already been in shambles during Siaka Stevens' era. The outcome of the probe showed that Brigadier-General Momoh

was in control of pecuniary resources disproportionate to his past official emoluments; that evidence of corruption, dishonesty, and abuse of his office for private benefit had been established; and that he had acted wilfully and corruptly in a manner which resulted in loss and damage to the Government (Kpundeh 1994:144).

Although he survived a coup attempt in 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser was later toppled in a palace coup on January 16 1996 and replaced by Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio who organised multiparty elections in 1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP won the Presidential elections but the civil war continued (Richards 2004:9). Grant (2005:255) underlines the fact that the Strasser junta proved to be no different from its predecessors as the members of the NRC plundered the mine economy.

The final intervention of the military in Sierra Leone was during the civil war and civil rule of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah when a faction of the army led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the civilian government on May 25 1997 (Davies 2000; Penfold 2005). Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) allied with the RUF leadership to rule the country until 1998 when ECOMOG troops dislodged them from Freetown (Peters and Richards 1998:186). Basedau and Mehler (2005:265) note that

Siaka Stevens, Joseph Momoh, and Valentine Strasser used their position for personal gain, as diamond revenues were either directly or indirectly siphoned off into personal bank accounts.

Sadly, the interplay between the civilian and the military in the country showed that bad governance characterised the administration of Sierra Leone's rulers both civilian and military because neither performed satisfactorily as they mismanaged the economy to the detriment of a population continually subjected to economic and social hardships.

9.14 Côte d'Ivoire: Dictatorship, Ethnicity, and the Involvement of the Army in Politics

The contagious effect of the armed forces' intervention in the political affairs of the state did not spare Côte d'Ivoire which had been long considered as an island of political stability and peace in West Africa. Houphouët-Boigny subjugated and used the army to stabilise his government just as Siaka Stevens did in Sierra Leone. The Ivorian president did not hide the fact that he did not want a strong army as he said "[a] Franc devoted to armaments is money stolen from the development of the country" (Afrique Contemporaine 2000:9).

The role of the army in Côte d'Ivoire has generally been limited to that of a militia that supports the policies of the president and his party (Tchero 2007:88). Although they had no intention to overthrow the government, in the 1970's some senior military officers expressed their dissatisfaction over their non-inclusion in

the administration of the country (Kieffer 2000:30). Houphouët-Boigny then co-opted some senior officers by involving them in his government (Ogunmola and Badmus 2004:226). Houphouët-Boigny saw the Ivorian army (the *Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire-FANCI*) as a “reflection of his policy of peace” and dialogue. He described the FANCI as “an instrument of development not war” whose objective was peace. FANCI was described as “The Swiss Army of Africa” due to its peaceful orientation⁸³ (Ouattara 2008:150). The application of SAPs resulted in the exclusion of army officers from the administration of the country when Alassane Ouattara became Prime Minister as military officers were replaced with civilians (Kieffer 2000:31-34). The budget allocated to the army was drastically reduced during the government of Bédié (Kieffer 2000:34). Despite being described as an “army of peace” by Houphouët-Boigny (Ouattara 2008:150), the Ivorian army did not always act peacefully, when the need arose the Ivorian president did not fail to use the armed forces to nip in the bud or repress violent protests, and against some ethnic groups that wanted to secede or have autonomy, as well as to suppress student unrest (Daddieh 2001:16) as shown in Table 7. Houphouët-Boigny used the army to repress the Sanwi (Agni) and Guébié (Bété) revolts in 1969 and 1970 (Akindès 2004; Ouattara 2008). Alassane Ouattara, as the Prime Minister under Houphouët-Boigny also used the army to quell political protests led by the FPI and some FESCI members (Galy 2004:134)⁸⁴. Moreover, the Guébié revolt was led by Kragbé Gnagbé and the Bété consider Laurent Gbagbo to be his spiritual son (Marshall-Fratani 2006:24).

Table 7: Army Involvement in Repressions under Houphouët-Boigny

Year	Army intervention
1969	Repression against the Sanwi
1970	Repression against the Guébié revolt led by Kragbé Gnagbé
1991	Repression against students in Abidjan
1992	Repression against the FPI and Laurent Gbagbé under Alassane Ouatarra Premiership

Sources: Kieffer 2000; Akindès 2004; Ouatarra 2008; Gadou 2009.

However, during the Houphouëtist regime, some senior military officers planned a coup d'état as soldiers mutinied and closed Abidjan airport demanding pay rises during the SAP riots that coincided with demands for multipartyism. François Mitterrand, the French Socialist President, reassured Houphouët-Boigny of France's concern about his regime's stability (Huband 1998:103). The mismanagement of his political heritage by his heirs led to the manipulation of ethnic sentiments that resulted in dividing the ruling party, the PDCI, which imploded, as Alassane Ouatarra the former Prime Minister, created his own party the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) (Crook 1997; ICG 2003).

Ivory Coast, under the leadership of President Houphouët-Boigny, has an independent policy, providing it with stability and credit abroad. But after he is gone, will young people follow this policy...? Will they feel the need to change for the simple pleasure of change? Will it be worth it to change a policy, which has provided the population of this country with a standard of living, which many African nations envy? A standard of living which gave Ivory Coast great respect and great prestige abroad? No, no, the young people in the PDCI who in turn will be the elders will not feel the need to change our practice of stability and continuity, Zartman and Delgado (cited in Kamara 2000:4).

During the rule of Houphouët-Boigny, Henri Konan Bédié, who considered himself as the Dauphin of the President, reassured the Ivorian population that the post-Houphouëtist regime would mean continuity. Why did he change this formula? This change affected politicians and divided the army. After the death of

Houphouët-Boigny, the army did not really have a leader who could control it (Tchero 2007:88). The armed forces were divided into ethnic and political factions with the political parties having their loyalists who were ready to intervene in their favour (Ouattara 2008:163). As Houphouët-Boigny's successor Bédié initiated and manipulated the ominous doctrine of *L'ivoirité* that broke up the sense of unity in order to sideline his rivals (Bassett 2003:14-16). Furthermore, it seems that Bédié was overwhelmed by the multitude of problems the country was facing and resorted to ethnic politics as a saving grace. Ethnicity became the norm in promotions, not only in the civil service but also in the armed forces, and ethnic tension was real, especially when the country experienced serious economic problems (Chirot 2006:64-67). Furthermore, Langer (2005:43) observes that

[b]y stopping Houphouët-Boigny's ethnic balancing system and conversely starting a process of monopolization of political power within his own ethnic group, the Baoulé, President Bédié was also a major culprit for the breakdown of the inter-ethnic élite cooperation and alliances. The ensuing Baoulization of the military forces would eventually result in the military coup d'état in December 1999.

As one of the consequences of the ethnic policy of Bédié, many Muslims from the north were forced out of the civil service and this deepened ethnic apprehension between the south and the north (ICG 2003:6). This climate of witch-hunting exacerbated ethnic rivalries and suspicion as any policy was regarded as a tool of ethnic domination and deprivation used by Bédié's government to the detriment of other ethnic groups, especially northerners. Bédié had a sour relationship with the military that refused to be dragged into quelling civil unrests and this led to the removal of the army Chief of Defence Staff, General Robert Guéi who was replaced by General Palenfo before the 1995 Presidential elections which were effectively boycotted by the opposition (Crook 1997:235). General Guéi (cited in Kieffer 2000: 33) reminded politicians of the statutory duty of the army as follows:

[t]he army can only intervene if the country is in danger. Otherwise, I do not see any reason why the army should be dragged to the street. This should be understood by the government and the opposition⁸⁵. (Personal translation).

At that moment, there were rumours of a coup d'état to remove Bédié from power, but later, Guéi was co-opted in the Bédié government as the cabinet Minister for the Civil Service but lost his position in 1996 in a cabinet reshuffle (Cornwell 2000:87). Contamin and Losch (2000:118) note that Konan Bédié broke the ethnic balance and composition of the armed forces that his predecessor had maintained for peaceful coexistence and the stability of the country. The President embarked upon his policy of promoting officers from his ethnic group (Baoulé) following the dismissal of Robert Guéi. In his analysis of the consequences of this selective policy, Kieffer (2000:33) observes that the marginalisation of officers from other ethnic groups and the promotion of Baoulé frustrated officers from the west and north of the country who are largely the dominant groups in the army. The cankerworm introduced by Konan Bédié ruined the cohesion of the army as his successors further fractured the army along ethnic lines favouring their own peoples.

Bédié was overthrown on Christmas Eve 1999 by a group of young Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who were angry at his procrastination in paying the allowances for their participation in peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (ICG 2003:6). The change of government was well accepted and jubilant Ivorians believed that the coup was a Christmas gift and saving them from the precipice Konan Bédié was leading the country to. The young officers chose the retired General Robert Guéi as their leader. General Guéi promised to provide a level playing ground for the emergence of true democracy in the country. He declared that

[w]hatever the duration of our mission, we will do our best to ensure that Ivorians who want to engage in politics in the interest of the country can do so. Agence France Presse (1999, as cited in Kamara 2000:1).

Although General Guéi promised to create an enabling environment for democracy to thrive, his policy increased the fissures of ethnicity in the armed forces by promoting officers from his own ethnic group (Cornwell 2000:83). Consequently, the rule of Robert Guéi did not bring succour for the country. Rather, it was characterised by political instability with coup attempts that

resulted in more repression from the regime. Cherif Soulemane, a rebel leader, commented on the ethnic cleavages that were rife in the army thus

in the armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire, people were categorised according to their ethnic group or religious affiliations. Any socio-political troubles in which young Dioula [the generic name for northerners] were involved, resulted in accusing northerners. We were no longer free in our country. First of all, this unhealthy situation resulted in the coup d'état of December 24, 1999 that brought General Robert Guéi (rtd) to power. Things did not improve (cited in Gadou 2009:70)⁸⁶ (Personal translation).

Guéi exhibited dictatorial tendencies including attempts at self-succession as a civilian president. However, he failed to manipulate the 2000 presidential elections in his favour. This was due to popular uprisings in support of the FPI candidate: Laurent Gbagbo (Akindès 2004:5). By the time General Robert Guéi unceremoniously left power, the country's economy had further worsened from the bad situation under Bédié (Campbell 2001:163). The junta infringed upon the human rights of many Ivorians and the military became further divided as Guéi purged the armed forces (Ouattara 2008:149). The controversial and unresolved outcomes of the 2000 elections, which brought Gbagbo to power, generated further crises for the country, which then led the country to civil war with Robert Guéi and his family and the internal Minister Emile Boga Doudou as the first casualties. These politics of extreme ethnic discrimination that started with Konan Bédié became exacerbated as commitment to one's ethnic group not to the country became the paramount factor in determining key policies under the successive regimes after Houphouët-Boigny.

When President Robert Gueï and after him President Laurent Gbagbo subsequently copied Bédié's strategy and policies of political monopolization and ethnic favouritism, they too were confronted with widespread civil opposition and eventually military revolt (Langer 2005:43).

The FPI government persecuted, sacked, or jailed most of the NCOs that staged the 1999 coup that brought General Guéi to power for wrongdoings allegedly committed under the Guéi junta (ICG 2003: 9). A rebel leader, Issiaka Ouatarra, alias Wattao, opines that

[t]he rebellion in Côte d'Ivoire did not come as a surprise. For over a decade, everyone witnessed how the army and the population were divided. Everyone saw how some people were arrested, tortured, and

killed other Ivorians because of trumped up charges or simply because they belonged to the opposition, or because they were northerners. We staged a coup in 1999 to put an end to this situation. Unfortunately, the general [Guéi] did not seize the opportunity of his coming to power to put the country on the right track. The same injustice, exclusion, harassment, and killing continued (as cited in Gadou 2009: 70-71)⁸⁷. (Personal translation).

The military revolt, triggered by the consequences of the ethnic policy of these regimes, led to the breakdown of social order resulting in the civil war which was linked to the involvement of neighbouring countries. This further aggravated the mutual suspicions between the Presidents of the countries involved and has continuing implications for alliance formation in the sub-region.

9.15 The Dynamics and Boomerang Effects of the Civil Wars in West Africa

The political instability that started in Liberia with the killing of President William Tolbert Jr (1971-1980), during the bloody coup d'état that brought Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe to power in 1980, was followed by a civil war when Charles Taylor attacked Liberia in 1989. The 1980 coup d'état ended 133 years of Americo-Liberians' (freed slaves) domination of the political life of the country (Volman 1993:1). Tolbert's government had become unpopular as reflected in the SAP riots following a 50 per cent rise in the price of rice in 1979 and the government had to call in Guinean troops to restore order when the army refused to be involved in the repression (Kandeh 1996:389). This showed that the army was no longer dominated by Tolbert's True Whig Party (TWP) and that SAPs were factors of destabilisation. Master-Sergeant Doe used almost the same rhetoric of saving the country from disintegration that Robert Guei would use nineteen years after in Côte d'Ivoire after the military overthrow of Konan Bédié. Doe stated that:

The PRC government came to power not to continue the suppression of our people but to release them from the chains of oppression and provide them with a full and meaningful life (West Africa as cited in Kandeh 1996:392).

Doe promoted members of his ethnic group, the Khran, who represent less than 4 per cent of the Liberian population (Reno 1999:81) to the detriment of other ethnic groups, which showed that his policy was not so very different from that of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy. The new regime betrayed the hope of Liberians as increasing human rights violations and violence characterised Doe's despotic rule (Kandeh 1996; Reno 1999).

As a result of mass executions and arrests of Tolbert loyalists, Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe offended many dignitaries of the former regime and some Presidents in the sub-region such as Houphouët-Boigny (Huband 1998; Ali 2007). His alignment with the US against Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya and his enmities with President Houphouët-Boigny were overwhelmingly to his disadvantage (Reno 1999:87). Houphouët-Boigny, whose foster daughter Desirée Delafosse was married to Tolbert's son: Honourable Aldophus Benedict Tolbert was executed by Samuel Doe despite entreaties by the Ivorian President, and he never forgave Doe for this action (Ali 2007:229). The execution of A.B. Tolbert deepened the animosity of Houphouët-Boigny's regime towards Samuel Doe's junta, with Côte d'Ivoire welcoming dissidents from the Liberian military government that Doe considered as a ploy to destabilise his regime. Consequently,

[m]embers of Doe's Khran tribe with contacts across the border in the Ivory Coast, and Guéré within the Ivorian government, warned the Ivory Coast (sic) Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the danger of harbouring dissident from a country with which the Ivory Coast shared a long border (Huband 1998:51).

Moreover, Samuel Doe was envious of Houphouët-Boigny's wealth and wanted to be rich like him (Huband 1998: 42). Charles Taylor, a former ally of Samuel Doe, got logistical support from Blaise Compaoré, who accommodated a lot of opponents of Samuel Doe, especially after the repressions that followed the failed coup of Brigadier-General Thomas Quiwonpka whose faction of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) later joined Charles Taylor's rebellion (Kandeh 1996:396). Charles Taylor's access to Blaise Compaoré was also easy because the Burkinabè

President, who married a foster daughter of the Ivorian President, Chantale Terrasson, is thus also a son in-law of Houphouët-Boigny-both these Francophone Presidents wanted to avenge the killing of Tolbert's son for which Samuel Doe was responsible (Huband 1998:105). Meanwhile Samuel Doe's relations with the US deteriorated due to widespread corruption and his failure to return the country to multiparty elections (Reno 1999:87).

Another factor that led to Samuel Doe's downfall was his collaboration with the USA at the peak of Colonel Gaddafi's long face-off with America. The Libyan leader's support of Charles Taylor is deeply rooted in the geo-politics of the sub-region with Libya's rivalries with Nigeria and Gaddafi's anti-Americanism (Xavier-Verschave 1999:219). Thus Libya assisted Charles Taylor in his rebellion. Richards (2005:119) asserts that

[a] core group of fighters was trained in Benghazi, and received Libyan financial support for its military campaign. Lybia first backed the insurgency of Charles Taylor in Liberia, but Taylor proved an unreliable revolutionary, more interested in business than ideology.

Johnston (2004:446) notes that France and China were not supportive of the UN Security Council's sanctions on Liberian timber up to 2003, because they relied on the Liberian timber for their domestic use after the depletion of timber in the other countries of West Africa. Thus, subjective factors and irreconcilable differences between some personalities and the promotion of "self-interest" are arguably all parts of the causes that precipitated some ECOWAS countries into anarchy and even threatened the stability of the whole region of West Africa.

Thus, on Christmas Eve 1989 Charles Taylor, supported by external allies, crossed the Liberian border from his Côte d'Ivoire sanctuary and attacked Liberia to remove Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe from power. The Liberian civil conflict opened another era of civil strife and insecurity in West Africa with worsening economic and social conditions, and the toll of human insecurity resulting in the displacement of many people. The old rivalries between Francophone and Anglophone appeared in the politics of peacekeeping in

Liberia. The intervention of the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was largely considered by the Francophone West African states as a strategy to protect Samuel Doe whereas the Francophone bloc supported Charles Taylor (Davies 2010:70).

Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso opposed the intervention of ECOWAS in the Liberian conflict and Senegal complained of the lack of appropriate discussions among ECOWAS members before the deployment of ECOMOG (Mortimer 1996: 294). The Anglophone composition of ECOMOG members gave credence to this Anglophone domination view as the initial countries that took part in ECOMOG were dominated by Anglophone countries (Mortimer 1996:293). However, Guinea under General Lansana Conté supported ECOMOG and the cooptation of Senegal into ECOMOG was also to correct this view (Mortimer 1996:293). President Lansana Conté had reasons to oppose Charles Taylor: first, for the security of his regime and also the suspicion that Côte d'Ivoire was playing a hegemonic role with France and Burkina Faso to destabilise his government (Smith 2006:422). Second, General Lansana Conté's opposition to Charles Taylor had economic undertones, which are fundamentally rooted in the exploitation of Guinean iron ore of the Mt. Nimba region, in a joint-venture with Samuel Doe's government known as the MIFERGUI-Project. Liberia had to re-strategise because of the depletion of its own Yekepa iron ore deposit (Prkic 2005: 117). The MIFERGUI-Project was seen as an excellent alternative when the Liberian-Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO) closed its iron mining activities in Yekepa in 1989 (Xavier-Verschave 1999; Prkic 2005). Prkic's (2005:118) explanation is useful to understand the bitterness between General Lansana and Charles Taylor

(...) there were more than 500 million tons of high grade iron ore which had never been exploited by the Guineans since it would have required the laying of 350 km of railway linking Kankan to Conakry [Guinea capital] and the building of relevant facilities in the port of Conakry. The idea beneath MIFERGUI Project was then to build a 17 km railway line between the Guinean side of the mountain and Yekepa in Liberia in order to use the railway laid out by LAMCO between their mines and the deep water mineral port of Buchanan.

However, the whole plan was thwarted in December 1989 when Charles Taylor's forces launched their rebellion from the Ivorian side of Mount Nimba and the international investors negotiated with Charles Taylor over the iron ore (Xavier-Verschave 1999; Prkic 2005). The relationship between the US and Guinea resulting in economic assistance to Guinea led the US to explore with General Lansana Conté the possibility of finding a peaceful and negotiated resolution to the Liberian conflict as the Guinean President was supporting anti-Taylor groups (Smith 2006:415).

Smith (2006:421) states that Lansana Conté's

operating assumption during the 1990–2003 period was that Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Liberia's Charles Taylor, with French encouragement, were engaged in a conspiracy to install governments beholden to them in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and throughout West Africa.

This would prompt Guinea to join ECOMOG (Smith 2006:422). The other Francophone country that was involved in ECOMOG, although its participation was short-lived, was Senegal. France objected to Senegal's participation in ECOMOG while the US encouraged President Abdou Diouf to send Senegalese troops to Liberia and assisted Senegal financially in that mission (Mortimer 1996:297). However, Senegal withdrew its troops following the killing of some of its soldiers in Lofa County in 1992 by the NPFL (Mortimer 1996:301-302). The warring factions signed the Abuja Peace Accord II temporarily putting an end to the Liberian fratricidal war. Charles Taylor's NPLF metamorphosed into the National Patriotic Party (NPP). Ware and Ogunmola (2010:76) note that Charles Taylor genuinely won the presidential elections of 1997 when Liberians decided to cast their vote for peace because Taylor the warlord threatened that he would start the war anew if he should lose the presidential elections.

Moreover, Taylor's rivals did not provide any viable option. Xavier-Verschave (1999:210) states that Charles Taylor was the only Presidential candidate of 1997 who really had the financial resources to campaign as a result of his predatory activities in plundering Liberia. In the post-election years, insecurity still loomed

because Charles Taylor could not control the whole country as there remained some pockets of resistance to the NPFL (Nilsson and Kovacs 2005:399). Charles Taylor's opponents would later regroup and chase him out of power in the Second Liberian Civil War with the support of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, who saw the Liberian president as a real danger to stability in their own countries (ICG 2003:1). Taylor's support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and his fighters' attack on the Guinean border towns in 1999 made General Lansana Conté consider Taylor to be an enemy of his regime (Smith 2006:415-416). Chege (2002:149) states that Taylor criticised the Sierra Leonean President General Saidu Momoh for allowing ECOMOG to use Sierra Leone as a base against his position and vowed revenge.

The participation of Sierra Leonean fighters alongside the NPFL in the Liberian Civil War facilitated the invasion of Sierra Leone by RUF rebels (Ellis 1995:167). It was not only Liberians who suffered under the dictatorships of Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor, but their neighbours also paid dearly for supporting or antagonising them (ICG 2003; Sawyer 2008). Thus, Charles Taylor was largely seen by ECOWAS leaders as a destabilising factor in West African politics, with his idea of forming Greater Liberia and supporting rebels and imposing weak puppet regimes in neighbouring countries. This view is supported by Charles Taylor's involvement in the civil strife of Sierra Leone; a neighbouring country which had been badly governed. He thus helped the rebels to create another dysfunctional state in the Mano River Union.

There was no doubt when the RUF crossed the Liberian border to launch its attack against Sierra Leone in 1991 that the rebellion had an input from Charles Taylor. The RUF had the support of Charles Taylor's forces, Libya's backing and some Burkinabè fighters in the initial stage of the conflict, which shows the dynamics of insecurity in the sub-region (Riley and Sesay 1995; Davies 2000). Davies (2000:351-352) argues that Libya's financial and military assistance to the rebels was a critical factor that spurred the rebellion. A former warlord I interviewed confirmed the assistance of Charles Taylor in giving the RUF logistics support,

supply and the exchange of arms for blood diamonds instead of money (SLII). Davies (2000:350) states that the outcomes of the war were devastating for the population as the

[r]ebel war claimed thousands of lives-estimates range from 20 000 to 75 000 and internally or externally displaced about 2.1 million people, nearly half the country's population.

Post Cold War Sierra Leone's civil strife ranks among the most brutal internecine wars in its targeting of civilians. Charles Taylor and Captain Blaise Compaoré also exported their politics of destabilisation to Côte d'Ivoire by supporting the Ivorian rebels who launched the civil war after an abortive coup in 2002 against Laurent Gbagbo.

Laurent Gbagbo was quick in accusing Burkina Faso and Liberia of being the external masterminds of the Ivorian rebellions. The warning Samuel Doe gave to Houphouët-Boigny of the danger of giving safe haven to dissidents of a neighbouring country had finally materialised. Côte d'Ivoire's former ally, Captain Blaise Compaoré had sour relations with Côte d'Ivoire's rulers after the demise of Houphouët-Boigny. The issues were the victimisation of Burkinabè by the police, and repeated attacks on Burkinabè living in the south-west of Côte d'Ivoire by the autochthonous people. Moreover, the expropriation of the lands and farms owned by foreigners, (mainly Burkinabè, Malians, and Guineans in the south-west of Côte d'Ivoire) affected the former warm relations which the Burkinabè President had had with his Ivorian counterparts, given that Laurent Gbagbo was a former protégé of captain Compaoré (ICG 2003:13).

At the beginning of hostilities the international community believed that the conflict was an Ivorian internal affair until evidence emerged that there were external forces involved with Liberia and Burkina Faso giving logistical support to the rebels (ICG 2003:1). Côte d'Ivoire's support for the Liberian rebels in 1989 and Taylor's assistance to the Sierra Leone's RUF had boomeranged. The Ivorian

President Gbagbo had also assisted Liberian fighters of the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) while Guinea supported the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) during the Second Civil War that consumed Charles Taylor's regime in 2003 (ICG 2003:19). Taylor was forced into exile in Nigeria before he was extradited to face criminal charges for his role in the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991-2002) before an international tribunal at The Hague. On the consequences of the two Liberian Civil Wars for human security Blaney, Klein, and Mcfate (2010:2) note that

It is difficult to convey the extent of damage inflicted on Liberia and the suffering endured by its people under the 14-year civil war. By 2003, the country was post-apocalyptic.

The war that Côte d'Ivoire helped to start in 1989 returned in 2002 to destabilise the country which is now divided into two with the rebels occupying the north while the government still controls the economic capital and the south. Transborder ethnic affinities in the north and south-west have played a large role in recruiting support for both the rebels and the government.

9.16 Conclusion

West Africa was once known for its stability compared to other sub-regions of the continent. Cold War politics were a factor of stability. Sadly; the sub-region has now joined the unenviable list of human calamities due to fratricidal wars. Four countries which are regularly mentioned in the politics of the destabilisation of West Africa through external funding and assistance to warlords are Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Liberia. Although many factors that result in conflicts were latent, it can be argued that without Libya's support to the warlords the First Liberian War and the Sierra Leone conflict would not have been possible (Davies 2000; Abdullah 2004). The warlords that had fought in the First Liberian Civil War reappeared in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire's Civil Wars. Burkina Faso has escaped so far because its borders with Côte d'Ivoire are under the control of

warlords that have been benefiting from Captain Blaise Compaoré's logistical support. Otherwise, Gbagbo could have supported anti-Compaoré dissidents from Côte d'Ivoire as he worked to undermine Charles Taylor by supporting his opponents. Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny was believed to be insulated from insurgency because the regime supported Charles Taylor's rebellion. However, alliance formation patterns changed when other leaders emerged in the post-Houphouëtist period. The Ivorian internecine war can also be seen as a war by proxies involving neighbouring countries that are at loggerheads and this has a lot of implications for the stability of ECOWAS states. Charles Taylor's Liberia supported armed opposition to President Laurent Gbagbo, while the latter supported the main group of MODEL and also LURD that eventually defeated Charles Taylor's forces. Blaise Compaoré's involvement in supporting the Ivorian rebels might have resulted from the deterioration of the policy of good neighbourliness between the two countries that had survived since the colonial era with the Burkinabè labour market providing a reservoir for Côte d'Ivoire's plantations. The presence of foreigners, especially people from countries to the north of Côte d'Ivoire, that was once a beneficial factor, turned with economic recession to be a source of disharmony that resulted in aggression and discrimination. The issue of identity is one of the main factors that led to frustrations, hatred, and harassment, and subsequently to the Côte d'Ivoire war. On the other hand, the Sierra Leone case study is evidence that not all African wars are about ethnicity. The main issue is that bad economic policies resulted in poverty and frustrations which, in addition to the politics of political exclusion, created conditions favourable for political instability and aggression.

These West African wars are not about ideologies such as featured in inter-state conflicts during the Cold War. Antagonism based on different self-interests among the elites led them to the of support the respective leaders in each country. This study shows that, primarily, the conflicts are about political differences between the leaders, which I refer to as the 'special factor' for the wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. These political conflicts were exacerbated by economic crises, poverty, unemployment, ethnic tensions,

conflict over mining rights, and disenfranchisement that affect the youth in the Ivorian and Sierra Leone conflicts alike. These findings show that economic crisis triggers many other factors that lead to civil war in West Africa, or in Africa in general. The youths who are affected by the crisis of unemployment are filling the gap of poverty, that wrong policies have left wide open, by taking to the rewards of violence. Moreover, this study has shown that it is the combination of factors that result in civil war.

Apart from the state of lawlessness that was latent for many years before the conflicts, uncertainty about the future, insecurity of jobs, the lack of development programmes equally in urban and rural areas, the failure to promote education, good health and well-being all led to hopelessness. Moreover, the provision of multiparty, free and fair elections is a paramount condition for peace. The processes must be transparent and must guarantee the freedom of every bona fide citizen to take part in elections. This freedom has to be harmonised with sound economic programmes that will free the masses from the shackles of poverty. Corruption has to be reduced and then eradicated, which is an extraordinary task. Economic development is linked to the success of democracy. The example of Côte d'Ivoire, although the system was neopatrimonial during the economic boom, shows that developmental projects and gainful employment can stem the ugly effects of ethnic divisions if leaders are able to spread the dividends of economic prosperity across ethnic and regional bases. If well implemented, these policies can have multiplier effects in creating a secure environment for the peaceful and sustainable coexistence of the nation-states that constitute Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire and also for the West African states in general.

Chapter Ten

Conclusion

10.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesises the findings of the present study. The conclusions stem from the examination of the various issues that emerged from the theoretical framework, concepts and secondary data, and the empirical evidence collected from the field. The implications of this study are sketched out and recommendations for further research are made.

10.2 Focal Points and Purpose of the Study

The main focus of the study was to examine the causation of the civil wars in two West African countries (Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire). In particular, two theories of conflict were tested: on the one hand frustration and aggression and on the other hand the economic theories of civil war. The study also examined other potential contributing factors that may have triggered these civil conflicts. The data collected from the literature review were compared with the field research information provided by the interviewees and the mass of general data collected by the author in the field.

The results demonstrate that accumulated frustration was a result of the widening socio-economic gaps (associated with economic crisis, poverty, and unemployment affecting the youths); the politics of exclusion from elite power that favours ethnic cronies of the President and the rusty mechanisms of political succession. Conflicts developed between the social strata of the Sierra Leonean

and Ivorian societies as a consequence of failed policies that crippled development and the emancipation of the population. Africanists and other scholars have reached the same conclusions that these pathologies sooner or later breed civil war (Banégas and Losch 2000; Davies 2000; Daddieh 2001; Zack-Williams 2001; Mkandawire 2002; Akindès 2004; Langer 2004; Hanlon 2005; Banégas 2006; Hugon 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Lindemann 2008). These negative trends and factors have influenced the psychology of the fighters, as the elite members excluded from the political game have successfully enrolled the marginalised in their quest for power. However, the economic prosperity of the post-independent years of Côte d'Ivoire served as an instrument of political and social peacekeeping as the government of Houphouët-Boigny was able to distribute rewards and patronage to influential cronies under his clientelist one party system. In contrast, the Sierra Leonean economy has been plagued by significant problems since independence. Corruption pathologies were noticeable from independence in Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone and the one party system imposed on Ivorians and Sierra Leoneans by Houphouët-Boigny and Siaka Stevens respectively compounded the problem. Presidents Siaka Stevens and Houphouët-Boigny erected political barriers such that their long stay in power did not allow any significant opposition to their rule to develop. They succeeded in check-mating the army as a measure to stabilise their respective governments. Their political legacy was weak. As examples have shown elsewhere in Africa (Sékou Touré, General Lansana Conté in Guinea-Conakry, and General Gnassingbé Eyadema in Togo, Marshall Mobutu Sésé Séko) despots fail to bequeath a stable polity. It is therefore no coincidence that the armed forces have appeared to be a biased element in the political conflagration after the despots' exit from power as was the case of Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Guinea-Conakry (Azam 2001; Goldsmith 2001; Akindès 2004; Hogan and Kaiser 2005).

The youths and rural dwellers been marginalised for a long period. Finding a sustainable solution for the problems of the youths is imperative because their marginalisation does not work in the interest of peace especially as the rural areas are no longer the food basket of urban dwellers. The urban poor and the

unemployed youth are increasingly desperate and there is even a tendency to return to the rural areas. Moreover, the lack of amenities such as motorable roads, hospitals, schools, and potable water make life difficult. Although there is a trend to go back to the rural areas among some Ivorian youth as a result of the crisis in employment, this movement has in turn compounded the issues surrounding the mode of distribution and acquisition of land, especially in the south-west of Côte d'Ivoire, highlighting the strains resulting from disputes over migration and citizenship, and the informal internal boundaries that have exacerbated cleavages between the ethnic groups (Chauveau 2000; Janin 2000; Crook 2001; Bouquet 2003; ICG 2003; Koné and Chauveau 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Boone 2007; Chauveau and Bobo 2008). Many scholars point to the fact that in Sierra Leone land issues and the marginalisation of the youth in access to land have influenced some of the youth who joined the RUF due to their alienation from the paramount chiefs (Zack-Williams 1995; Peters and Richards 1998; Richards 2005).

In Sierra Leone the roles of the paramount chiefs in the allocation of land are crucial in the rural areas. This could be adduced as the main reason that land issues have not degenerated into bloody conflicts between migrants/farmers and autochthonous in Sierra Leone as compared to Côte d'Ivoire where land was sold to migrants and later subject to dispute (Koné and Chauveau 2006; Marshall-Fratani 2006; Unruh and Turray 2006; Chauveau and Bobo 2008).

The negative roles of the governing elites in excluding their opponents from political power and their failure to promote and achieve sustained development in the overall interest of the country have been critical factors that led to the frustration of those left on the fringe of the distribution of rewards. In the long run, these problems created frustration that led to grievances against the selfish ruling elites.

10.3 Suggestions for Further Research

Many issues have been identified for future research because of the implications of the present study for the future stability not only of Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire in particular, but also for most of the West African countries in general. These countries have exhibited the same pathologies over a long period of time. The enigma as to why they have not experienced civil war but only social unrest and coups d'état may be explained by the presence of strong despots supported by ethnicised, clientelist armies, and loyal armed forces whose support they enjoyed. These authoritarian leaders have used multiparty elections as a smokescreen to stay in power, by putting their self-interest before that of the country (for example Togo, Burkina Faso, General Moussa Traoré's Mali, and the Gambia). A palace revolution or death has been the main cause of the tyrants' exit from power (Niger, Togo, Guinea-Conakry, and Guinea-Bissau). Multiparty elections have successfully been held in Senegal and Ghana, where the ruling party accepted defeat by the opposition, while Nigeria has been struggling with organising credible multiparty elections.

First of all, it is important to examine why democracy works in some West African countries and why it fails in others.

Secondly, further study is needed to examine the stabilising factors that attract the confidence of local and foreign investors in the national economy through the evolution of a culture of democracy that transcends periodic multiparty elections through the enthronement of good governance.

Thirdly, considering the fact that the economic predicaments of Côte d'Ivoire have been politicised and ethnicised, it will be good to look in-depth at the reasons why ethnic politics took precedence over national unity and peaceful co-existence which had been the hallmarks of Côte d'Ivoire compared to some countries in West Africa.

Fourthly, it is important to study economic development as an engine of political stability in West Africa. This is significant because during the economic prosperity of Côte d'Ivoire, the country was politically stable because of/despite the autocratic rule of Houphouët-Boigny.

Fifthly, a mixed method study using qualitative and quantitative approaches in comparing and contrasting the causalities of civil conflicts in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire and their impacts on transborder ethnic conflicts and the influence of migration may provide clues for early warning signals in preventing the occurrence of civil conflict in neighbouring countries. A further dimension could be to extrapolate these factors and compare them at regional levels, for example, comparing the causalities of these West African civil wars with those of the Great Lakes Regions of Africa.

Finally, since theories are not constructed in a void and are derived from facts (Arango 2000:287), considering Collier's (2001) model of the economic theory of war, it would be appropriate to investigate all possibilities for examining the roles mineral resources played in these two wars. Certainly the respondents were convinced that diamonds prolonged but did not cause the Sierra Leone war. Whilst much emphasis has been placed on the role of diamonds in motivating rebels, more research is needed on the relationship between lootable resources and the failure of governments to prevent rebellion. Is it simply that corrupt governments in Africa have an exceptionally narrow focus on personal wealth and survival? Although Houphouët-Boigny was not free of corrupt practice, he had at least, promoted the interests of the country as a whole as his goal.

10.4 Conclusion

The promotion of good governance and the rule of law, in conjunction with sound economic and pro-poor policies reflected in actual performance are strong predictors and guarantors for the peaceful coexistence of the different ethnic groups. The economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s were the major factors that triggered these conflicts. There were combined with the end of the Cold War that accelerated the vulnerability of the Sierra Leonean (chapter 4) and Ivorian governments (chapter 5) as their heads of state could no longer rely on their Cold War patrons.

Pro-poor policies should be implemented from the grass-roots up because these wars, as a respondent in Sierra Leone (SLI3) said, were launched from the rural areas by the elite and urban dwellers because they targeted the rural poor in their recruitment drives. Some of the fighters and victims did not even believe that they knew the causes of the cataclysmic war (SLI3; SLFGI1). Moreover, the distribution of poverty is very lopsided to the disadvantage of the vulnerable. The interviewees considered that the elites were fighting for their own selfish interests, not for the masses as they claimed, nor for the overall interest of the country. The rule of law and transparency in the management of issues related to land are needed to de-ethnicise and de-politicise land issues. This could create a conducive atmosphere that will bring peace to the various communities by gainfully employing the youth through ambitious programmes of job creation. To forestall future occurrences, it is imperative that governments invest in social amenities to make life easier for the citizenry by also implementing a policy of decentralisation.

West Africa has two major problems to solve. One is how to promote harmonious interethnic relationships. The other is how to achieve economic growth and reduce economic disparities between groups and regions. It may, indeed, be the

case that if the second problem of how to create pro-poor economic growth is actually solved, then, the first problem relating to ethnic harmony may well solve itself. When the economy is buoyant or when people are busy with the prospect of improving their standard of living the incentives for conflict are minimised. The issue of the marginalised elite can be resolved through a consociational form of democracy but it will not be meaningful unless the yawning poverty gap between the social strata is considerably reduced through economic growth. Moreover, credible democracy will give a sense of belonging to all the citizens irrespective of their ethnic groups. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the adoption of true federalism may solve the problem of marginalisation and exclusion in political representation. A strong and independent judicial system is also important in the respect of the rule of law. However, there is no point in distilling the lessons from past experience, unless a way can be found to secure leaders who are willing to learn.

Notes

1. The Sudanese conflict has been intermittent and the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) has witnessed many insurgencies before the civil war that swept away the regime of Mobutu Sésé Séko, and later left the DRC in the jaws of its neighbours. Some parts of the DRC became places where the Hutu rebels have been launching their attacks against Rwanda. The Rwandan and Burundi inter-ethnic violence is also a case in point (Mazrui and Tidy 1984; Huntington 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bøas and Dunn 2007).
2. Civil war, internal conflict, internal war, intra-state war, intra-state conflict, civil strife, and insurgency are used interchangeably in this study.
3. Elle s'accompagne, avec la constitution d'un capitalisme financier mondial, d'une libération explosive des intérêts matériels et d'une spéculation financière débridée qui ne semblent pas empreintes de la plus haute spiritualité.
4. The authors refer to the 2000 version of the same article published by the Development Research Group of the World Bank in which Collier gives data on 73 civil wars and uses 47 intra-state conflicts. Whereas in the 2001 edition, Collier reports 74 civil wars and analyses 44 intra-state wars. He explains that "in practice some civil wars occur in countries for which there are virtually no other data. We know that the country had a war, but we do not know enough of its other characteristics to include it in our analysis...however, this number is still sufficient to find strong patterns" (p 147).
5. Si ces résultats restent pertinents après une amputation de près de trente pour cent.
6. Qu'un conflit armé commence n'implique pas qu'il puisse se perpétuer et se structurer en rébellion.
7. Sa thèse centrale-celle de la rébellion comme prédation-ne l'amène pas au moins à prendre *analytiquement* en compte les acteurs extérieurs qui achètent le produit de ces pillages en échange (par exemple) d'armes.
8. Sous-développement...exclusion et ...pauvreté.
9. On peut ainsi différencier en Afrique les guerres liées aux rentes pétrolières (Angola, Congo, RCA, Soudan, Tchad), au diamant (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, RDC), aux métaux précieux (or, coltan à Bunia en RDC), aux narco-dollar, aux enjeux fonciers (Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfour, Rwanda) au contrôle de l'eau (riverain du Nil) ou des ressources forestières.
10. My explanation is extrapolated from Lemke's argument, which is originally taken from Christopher Clapham (ed) 2000 African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey ltd.

¹¹. Clapham (1998:4), Michailof, Kostner, and Devictor (2002:1), Buhaug (2006:693), have expatiated on the sub-regional dynamics of civil war in Africa. Hugon is more explicit (2006:256) “Les conflits armés africains internes aux pays s’articulent avec des réseaux régionaux et internationaux. Ils ne peuvent être traités, comme le supposent les théories réalistes, en termes d’États-nations poursuivant des buts de puissance. Dans le cas africain, on observe une réactualisation des tensions séculaires non résolues et qui sont instrumentalisées par les pouvoirs.

Translation: “Armed conflicts in Africa have their international dimensions and as such are intertwined in regional and international networks and contrary to realist theories it will be erroneous to see those conflicts in the light of a power game in which states pursue their objectives. In the African context, some conflicts are the revival and enactment of unresolved age long conflicts that were instrumentalised by governments” (Personal translation).

¹². According to Lemke (2003:133), “In a very real sense, the existence of a de facto state is evidence that the official state is not fully operational, is not in control of its territory and people”.

¹³. For examples, Ross (2004:351) states that some research on the influence of mineral resources in triggering civil wars “have ambiguous or contradictory arguments about the mechanisms that link resources to conflict, which can lead to conflicting recommendations”. Moreover, Ross (2004:352) argues that:

Gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis do not seem to be linked to the initiation of conflict, but they do lengthen pre-existing wars...The claim that primary commodities are associated with the onset of civil war does not appear to be robust”. In addition, Fearon and Laitin (2005:504) shows that “there is no clear evidence that high levels of primary commodity exports cause higher risk of civil war onset by making for easier rebel start-up finance”

¹⁴. Davies draws attentions to some Nazi concentration camps as exceptions to this assumption.

¹⁵. However when Professor Helene Ware asked why they had not revolted during Idi Amin’s rule, some Ugandans were of the opinion that civil war would have been a worst alternative than having to put up with Amin. Information hindsight provided through discussion with Professor Helen Ware (May 12, 2008).

¹⁶. This sub-title is borrowed from Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) “Riots, Coups and Civil War: Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Debate”, World Bank Development Research.

¹⁷. Spoils systems.

¹⁸. En Côte d’Ivoire, l’Église synchrétique indépendante avait fait de la célébration de la nation ivoirienne et de son chef, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, “prophète envoyé par Dieu” selon sa prophétesse, Marie Lalou, l’un de ces (*sic*) thèmes centraux.

¹⁹. Frank Van Acker's (2004 336-345) account of the causal factors of the Ugandan civil war is as follows. "At the core of the conflict lies the failure of consecutive Ugandan leaders to construct and consolidate a modern state that legitimises and promotes collective aspirations, and to wield the magnitudes and levels of power a modern state conveys, other than divide-and-rule tactics. Many Acholi claim that they have been singled out and treated by current dispensation as a negative force, because of their numerical majority in the army of former President Milton Obote...Out of accounts of betrayal of the Acholi by various Ugandan governments, three episodes stand out: Amin's order in 1972 for all troops to report to barracks, and the subsequent ethnic purges; the flouting by the National Resistance Movement of the Nairobi Peace Accord of 1985, and the 1988 peace treaty between the NRM/A and the UPDA, which was followed by major military operations aimed at annihilating the remaining rebels...the combination of other elements directly supported the operational capacity of insurgents in the north, such as the proximity of Sudan, a huge country with its own share of rebellion and tenuous or non-existent government control of the southern area bordering on Uganda, and easy access to arms even before the advent of direct support to the LRA by the Sudanese government. The issue of arms proliferation is obviously closely related to the quick succession of wars in Uganda and neighbouring countries, especially Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

²⁰ NB: A new Peace Agreement has been signed by the Ugandan government and the LRA early 2008 to end the 20-year-old conflict (BBC NEWShttp://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-2/hi/Africa/7272369.stm Published: 2008/03/01.

²¹. Pseudo démocraties.

²². Démocratie de marché.

²³. La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure.

²⁴. C'est qu'en réalité, l'armée post-coloniale n'avait nulle vocation à la cohésion, pour la défense des intérêts du peuple, dans l'effort d'édification nationale et de développement; elle fut au contraire, le lieu de contradictions multiples.

²⁵. Turkson (1999:5) notes that during the General Sanni Abacha's military junta "Western interests have often stood in the way of depoliticisation of the military. Nigeria is a case in point. In spite of declared American opposition to continued military rule in Nigeria, business and brisk business in fact, still goes as usual between Nigeria and the United States which has huge stakes in the Nigerian oil business. Clinton caused a stir when he declared in South Africa that he had no objection to the [then] incumbent military ruler of Nigeria, General Abacha competing in free and fair elections for the presidency of his country. Indeed Western interests in military ruled undemocratic states may not be conducive to discouraging army rule. Economic and other interests may make the West reluctant to encourage depoliticisation."

²⁶. The new terms that are ascribable to the Civil War in Sierra Leone are (1) Short sleeves, Long Sleeves. The former is used when the RUF rebels amputated their victims at the wrist and they employed the latter when they cut off their victims' limb at the elbows. This cruelty has led to a colony of amputees in the country which shows the dimension of sheer brutality of the war, (3) *Sobelers* refers to those members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL) who are soldiers by day and rebels by night to fight government troops.

²⁷. South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana are exceptions to the perverse effects of conflict engendered by mineral resources. Ross (2004:350) states that

States that depend heavily on the export of oil, gemstones, and minerals tend to suffer from a variety of problems, including:

- slow economic growth (Sachs & Warner, 1995;1999;2001; Gylfason, 2001; Leite & Weidmann,1999; Doppelhofer, Miller & Sala-i-Martin, 2000);
- high poverty rates (Ross, 2003c);
- high corruption levels (Sachs & Warner,1999; Collier and Gunning, 1999; Marshall, 2001; Schloss, 2002);and
- authoritarian governance (Ross, 2001a; Wantchekon & Lam, 1999 and de Soysa, 2002a).

²⁸. A variant of this tale is given by Pemagbi (2006: xviii): "When God Created Sierra Leone, He endowed the country with such wealth of natural resources that the angels protested at the unfairness of His distribution. 'Oh! That's nothing,' God replied. 'Just wait till you see the people I put there.'"

²⁹. Elitism is used pejoratively in this study and in this context it refers to the ruling elite who are out of touch with the common people. It denotes a group of self-centred people who benefit from the spoils of office of the governing elite who "grant themselves extra-privileges at the expense of others". Moreover "consensus about major political issues that directly affect the distribution of valued things is never deep nor widespread among non-elites. Once such issues rise to public consciousness, the tendency of non elites is toward civil strife" (Field and Higley 1980: 117).

³⁰. The first Liberian civil war (1991-1996) started a whirlwind of sub-regional insecurity with its legion of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and contagious effects that triggered the Sierra Leonean civil war (1989-2002); boomeranged to Liberia (1999-2003) and some of the actors of these wars were also involved in Côte d'Ivoire civil strife (2002-2011) as well as acts of destabilisation of the moribund and inept of Lanssana Conté's government in Guinea. The thousands of refugees threaten the fragile economy and the delicate ethno-social structures of the neighbouring countries.

³¹. The researcher noticed surprisingly that during an *Egungun* (masquerade) festival, the participants sang traditional Yoruba songs associated with the Yoruba hunter's mythology and beliefs whereas this tends to disappear in some Yoruba

societies due to the influence of monotheism or Abrahamic religion of Christianity and Islam.

³². Smillie, Gberie, and Hazleton (2000:43) note that” [a]s a Minister of Mines with oversight of the diamond industry during much the turbulent 1950’s; Stevens had been on the side of corporate control of the important diamond resources. But now in opposition, he campaigned on a populist platform calling for a greater share of SLST’s holding for the ‘common people’. His new party claimed to stand for a welfare state based on a socialist model in which all citizens, regardless of class, colour or creed, shall have equal opportunity and where there shall be no exploitation of man by man, tribe by tribe, or class by class”.

³³. Luke (1988:71) notes that President Stevens “not only incorporated leading SLPP politicians into the All People’s Congress (APC) after assuming power in 1968 but cultivated clientelist relations with the leadership and other well-placed individuals of potential opposition groups: the army, labour unions, the intelligentsia (notably, faculty members of the country’s institutions of higher education) but with less success, the students”.

³⁴. The ambivalence of Siaka Stevens is highlighted in that as an opposition leader he was quoted as saying: “[n]ot only as leader of APC but as an individual, I abhor and detest One Party System of Government” (We Yone 1965, cited in Reno 1995:79). In addition, when he became President he said “The widespread belief that political parties are indispensable for the existence and maintenance of good and effective government is certainly erroneous” (President Stevens Speaks, Ministry of Information and Broadcast, Freetown Publications Division, cited in Reno 1995:79).

³⁵. Luke and Riley (1989:135) note that Sierra Leone is a particular case in experiencing such a setback “[a] number of African states combine neo-patrimonial politics and progress in economic development, including Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, and Morocco...In the case of Sierra Leone, however,...development management has not been insulated from a political culture which encourages or tolerates maladministration, bureaucratic incompetence, and corruption”.

³⁶. A vivid example of President Momoh’s weakness is provided in (Koroma cited in Alie 2006:131)as follows: The Inspector-General of Police Bambay Kamara...whose office had unofficially doubled as the APC headquarters, took it upon himself to harass opposition members without reference to President Momoh...When the Minister of Labour complained to the President that the Inspector-General was interfering in his constituency, the President lamented that the Inspector General often ignored his directives.

³⁷. “A parasitic cabal known as the Binkolo Mafia (most of its members hailed from Binkolo, Momoh’s hometown) replaced the personal rule of Stevens. The members of this inner circle belonged to Ekutay, an organization of Limba politicians, cultural entrepreneurs and influence peddlers. Membership in Ekutay

became such a prized social currency under Momoh that even opportunistic non-Limba elites sought to join” (Kandeh 1999:352).

³⁸. Charles Taylor was a protégé of General Thomas Quiwonpka. The original NPFL was founded by the former Commanding General of the Armed Forces of Liberia, General Thomas Quiwonpka who died while attempting to overthrow Master Sergeant Samuel Doe in 1985 (Ellis 1999; Verschave 1999).

³⁹. Ellis (1999:69) states further that “Compaoré was beholden to the Liberian expatriates who had helped him to take power and helped them with ...introductions”.

⁴⁰. A detailed account of Samuel Doe’s involvement in the American Intelligence plan is provided by Bram Posthumus, 2000, *Liberia: Seven Years of Devastation and an Uncertain Future, Searching for Peace in Africa*, The Hague.

⁴¹. According to Verschave (1999:206), Charles Taylor was a former Director of the General Services Agency. An adept of self-service, he was nicknamed “Superglue” because anything that he handles stick to his hand. He was accused in 1983 for corruption and the embezzlement of \$ 900 000. He went into self-exile. (Personal translation).

Original version: Il [Charles Taylor] fut directeur général des services généraux. Adepte du self service, on l’avait surnommé « Superglue »: tout ce qui passait entre ses mains y restait. En 1983, accusé d’avoir détourné 900 000 dollars, il fut contraint à l’exil.

⁴². Bockarie was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) on seventeen charges of war crimes, including acts of terrorism, collective punishment, unlawful killings, sexual violence, crimes against humanity, use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labor, looting and burning, and attacks on United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) personnel. The indictment was withdrawn after his death was confirmed on June 2 2003 (Bøas 2007:53).

⁴³. Sierra Leoneans were so desperate that this belief became popular “It is only through war could Sierra Leone prosper but when we witnessed the atrocities of the war we were exhausted”.

⁴⁴. A RUF warlord says “Some of my boys were young. I had to tie AK47 to the waist with a rope so that they could pull it” (SLI1).

⁴⁵. Si des jeunes urbains ont pris part au conflit sierra léonais, c’est essentiellement du côté du gouvernement, pas avec le RUF. Les données post-conflit sur le passé des ex-combattants ne confirment donc pas la pertinence du modèle de guerre de bande urbaine.

⁴⁶. A group of army officers named the Dream Team (Detective Reconnaissance Emergency Action Mission Team) wrote an open letter to President Koroma, “ I request that members of your government, members of the International Community, and the Fourth Estate investigate the under mentioned grievance

and take urgent remedial actions on them”; the Dream Team is a network of 850 officers and men in all bases of Sierra Leone Armed Forces cutting across tribal and political lines and stands for justice and peace all over Sierra Leone] “Grievances in the Sierra Leone Army : another war is possible” Standard Times, February 3 , 2009.

⁴⁷. The ideology of *L’ivoirité* was first mentioned in 1995 by President Henri Konan Bédié during the National Convention of the PDCI in Yamoussoukro. Its selective application resulted in a socio-political crisis of identity in Côte d’Ivoire. This study takes a retrospective look at the Ivorian conflict and backdates the beginning of the prolonged conflict to the introduction of the ideology of *L’ivoirité* that coincided with the steady decline of Côte d’Ivoire’s economy. This argument is based on the empirical and theoretical work of James Fearon (2004) on the duration of civil war and the relationship between the causal factors of ethnicity, population homogeneity, peripheral insurgencies, and income.

⁴⁸. Le royaume de Kong, fondé par les ancêtres de M. Alassane Ouattara [précisément Sékou Ouattara] s’étendait du XVII^{ème} siècle à la conquête coloniale sur un territoire que se partagent la Côte d’Ivoire, le Mali et le Burkina Faso.

⁴⁹. Losch (2000:11) states that “as early as 1951, the Syndicat agricole africain of Houphouët-Boigny joined the colonists to establish the Syndicat interprofessionnel d’acheminement de la main-d’œuvre (SIAMO) that facilitated the draining off of labourers from neighboring countries. After independence, Houphouët did all his possible best to safeguard that influx by signing a specific treaty with Upper-Volta [Burkina Faso] and he also “pacified” his relations with Mali [that was under a Socialist government]; he consolidated that policy by giving a status of integration to foreign workers”.

⁵⁰. Under the French Union, the Ivorian farmers had enjoyed the protection of their market output (through a system of non-fixed and fixed prices) as well as incentives to produce more, and this policy was adhered to until the 1980s (Losch 2000:8).

⁵¹. “Le choc monétariste engendre des problèmes liés à l’endettement externe, largement utilisé pour satisfaire la demande clientéliste en pleine expansion, face à une offre de rente agricole réduite”.

⁵². Contrary to the widespread belief that Félix Houphouët-Boigny ruled Côte d’Ivoire from 1960-1993, Losch (2000:7) demonstrates that actually the long Houphouëtist reign spanned almost five decades (from 1945-1993). He was elected in 1945 to represent the territory of Côte d’Ivoire in the French National Assembly, became Prime Minister in 1959, and remained President from 1960 until his demise in 1993.

⁵³. One of the corollaries of the politicisation of ethnicity in Africa is for political opponents to cast doubt over the claims to citizenship of some prominent citizens notably former presidents Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and Mobutu Sésé Séko in the Congo (former Zaïre).

⁵⁴. Le pré-carré, the square meadow, or the backyard in the Gaullist tradition, refers to an exclusive circle of friendly francophone African governments (mainly Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroun, Gabon, and Senegal) that are unconditionally supportive of France. The pré-carré was under the unofficial supervision of Jacques Foccart who had vast networks and connections in Africa. Le Vine (2004:246) avers that "the connection was, in sum, a dense network of personal, private, public, official, formal, and informal relationships, all devoted to keeping the multiple Franco-African linkages and to minimizing the presence of outsiders and potential interlopers (notably, American and other Europeans) on the pré-carré". This policy worked out smoothly until the end of the Cold War. However, the members of the pré-carré have continued to enjoy more or less special relations and preferential treatment with France.

⁵⁵. The aim of the "Doctrine Ballardur" (*la doctrine Ballardur*) was the systematic disengagement or reduction of France's assistance to Francophone Africa states. The "Doctrine Ballardur" means that major financial decisions concerning France's former colonies are taken by the Bretton Woods Institutions and this resulted in the devaluation of Francs CFA although the traditional French networks have been active meaning a selective application of the doctrine (Hibou 1995:37). Moreover, the "Balladur doctrine" implies that France's African foreign policy, is encapsulated in the guarantee of the provision of France's bilateral and financial assistance to former French dominions only if they had signed economic reform programmes with the Bretton Woods Institutions; the devaluation of the Franc CFA (the common currency of the francophone states which has a fixed exchange parity with the French Franc, and this equivalence was later maintained with the Euro). The extensions of French economy, the defence pacts with the Francophone African countries, were drastically reviewed. Consequently, military assistance became selective, and a hold was put on military interventionism to rescue friendly governments, thus making the defence agreements obsolete. However, this does not mean France's complete disengagement from francophone Africa owing to its huge investment in this international market outlet.

⁵⁶. Après avoir joué l'entêtement, le régime a été contraint d'opérer une rupture du compromis historique avec les planteurs, qui fondait une composante essentielle de l'édifice ivoirien. En se résignant à diviser par deux le prix payé aux producteurs, après la déroute de la guerre du cacao, Houphouët-Boigny a ouvert la boîte de Pandore d'une contestation généralisée (syndicale, politique, militaire) qui allait conduire à la libéralisation forcée du régime, au retour au multipartisme d'avant l'indépendance et à la mise en œuvre du désengagement réel de l'État sous la pression des bailleurs de fonds. Le pays s'est alors enfoncé dans une récession rapide, caractérisée par une crispation politique liée à la mise en œuvre musclée, par le nouveau Premier ministre Ouattara, d'un programme de rigueur imposé de l'extérieur.

⁵⁷. Under the long reign of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, [the children of] non natives could obtain Ivorian citizenship under the 1961 code of nationality. However, in the early 1980s a new policy of "*Ivoirisation des cadres*" whose aim was the filling

out of sensitive positions held by foreigners (Africans) with native Ivorians was adopted by the Ivorian government (Ogunmola 2005:154). Subsequently, priority was given in general to Ivorians in the job market.

⁵⁸. “Le mode régulation choisi, basé sur l’organisation de prélèvements à l’interface avec les marchés internationaux et sur une redistribution de type clientéliste a globalement pu fonctionner jusqu’aux années 80”.

⁵⁹. “Son délitement rapide, qui remettait en cause le projet global ... les profonds changements survenus dans l’économie mondiale, qui allaient conduire à la libéralisation, à la recomposition des marchés... les besoins croissants de la régulation politique en régime clientéliste. L’usure du pouvoir liée à la longévité d’un régime vieillissant, l’arrivée de jeunes diplômés qui ne pouvaient plus être accueillis dans le dispositif public et parapublic et les revendications des jeunes cadres ont conduit par la contention de la contestation intérieure, alors que le pouvoir politique voyait le niveau et l’accès à ses ressources se réduire rapidement”.

⁶⁰. Aimé Henri Konan Bédié was a former Minister of Economy and Finance (1966-1977). He was the first ambassador of Côte d’Ivoire to the United States and Canada. He was sacked over the scandal of the failed sugar factories that were to launch the north into the industrial sector.

⁶¹. Alassane Dramane Ouattara was a former chairman of the *Banque centrale des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest* (BCEAO), the Central Bank of West African Countries (1988-1990).

⁶². The Bédié government was marred by corruption and characterised by neo patrimonialism as well as prebendalism, and it squandered the gains of the devaluation of the Franc CFA (Sinzingre 2000:29-32).

⁶³. “Le redressement durable de la situation financière du pays était donc hypothéqué par la persistance de comportements prédateurs et par une politique de grands projets aux retombées très incertaines pour l’économie nationale”.

⁶⁴. Bôyôrôdjan means literally, in the Dioula language, those who came from very far places (or other lands), and it refers by extrapolation to migrants and, foreigners. The term was discriminatory used later to refer to those Ivorians that the doctrine of *L’ivoirité* considers as foreigners according to its selective use.

⁶⁵. “On en trouve d’abord la trace dès les années 30, durant un épisode crucial de l’histoire coloniale. Un certain monde indigène, qui s’était « modernisé » avec l’exploitation cacaoyère, la scolarisation et l’urbanisation, s’associa dans le cadre de ce qui fut appelé l’ADIACI (Association de défense des intérêts des autochtones de Côte d’Ivoire) pour protester auprès des autorités contre le fait que les Sénégalais et les Dahoméens occupaient une trop grande place dans les emplois publics. Puis sur un mode franchement xénophobe, elle s’exprima de manière violente en 1958 à l’encontre des Dahoméens [Béninois], à un moment où la Côte d’Ivoire était devenue juridiquement autonome avec l’application de la

loi-cadre de 1956, et où d'aucuns jugèrent sans doute que ce tournant vers l'indépendance devait impliquer le départ des étrangers travaillant dans l'administration coloniale. Enfin, elle se manifesta à nouveau en 1966, mais d'une manière plus paisible, lorsque Houphouët-Boigny proposa à l'Assemblée nationale que les ressortissants du Conseil de l'Entente puissent bénéficier légalement de la double nationalité, ce qu'elle lui refusa, à l'instar du PDCI'' (Dozon 2000a:50).

Translation: The signs of xenophobia could be found as early as 1930, during a crucial episode of the colonial history. A certain group of indigenous people that were "modernised", owing to cocoa farming, education, and urbanization, joined forces together under the framework of what was called the ADIACI (Association for the defence of the interest of the autochthonous of Côte d'Ivoire) complained to those in authorities about the high number of Senegalese and Dahomeans in the civil service. Then, in a downright xenophobic mode, the protest took on a violent dimension in 1958 against the Dahomeans at a time when Côte d'Ivoire was legally autonomous under the Framework law of 1956, because some people believed that foreigners working in the colonial civil service should vacate their positions. Finally, it emerged anew in a peaceful form in 1966, when the National Assembly and the PDCI rejected a bill by Houphouët-Boigny that proposed dual citizenship for the nationals of the Conseil de l'Entente [Council of Understanding or Accord] (Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (Bénin), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo).

^{66.} "L'ivoirité est selon nous une exigence de souveraineté, d'identité, de créativité. Le peuple ivoirien doit affirmer sa souveraineté, son autorité face aux menaces de dépossession et d'assujettissement, qu'il s'agisse de l'immigration ou du pouvoir économique et politique" (Ethics 1996:66).

^{67.} Crook (1997:229) discusses this alliance and its *raison d'être* and asks:

How had the RDR and the FPI, parties which initially had had very different agendas and rival leaderships, come to take such a position? In the first place, the FPI had been further weakened in the late 1994 by the defection of two Deputies, leading to the loss of its position as the official parliamentary grouping. The new RDR, with its 9 Deputies, then became the official opposition. Gbagbo must have calculated that the only way forward was for the opposition to unite. An alliance between the FPI and a party with the potential to sweep the north might stand a chance of preventing a Bédié victory in the first round of the Presidential elections. The price of the alliance for Gbagbo, acknowledged as leader of the new Front, was that he had to throw himself fully behind the campaign against the Electoral Code, which he attacked as 'anti-liberty, racist, xenophobic and dangerous'. The RDR's line was that unless the Code was withdrawn or amended there could be no Ouatarra candidacy; and without a Ouatarra candidacy, there could be no credible opposition challenge. The price for the RDR was that it was drawn into the politics of ethno-regional coalition building... The RDR leadership therefore dedicated itself to portraying Bédié's purge of Ouatarra supporters as systematic discrimination against the north; it decried the Electoral Code as designed not just to exclude Ouatarra but hundreds of thousands of northern

voters and Muslim migrants who might have voted for him. It began to use inflammatory language of the Charter of the North, talking of Baoulé domination, tribalism and the possibility of 'civil war'.

⁶⁸. Contamin and Losch (2000:118) aver that the military take over was triggered by many factors:

La dégradation des conditions matérielles de la troupe, l'éveil de la conscience politique des jeunes officiers et des hommes du rang envoyés en mission à l'extérieur, l'incapacité du président Bédié à gérer les revendications et, surtout, sa morgue ont été à l'origine d'une crise dont le détonateur aura été le non versement des indemnités réglées par les Nations Unies...Les équilibres internes de l'armée avaient été progressivement rompus par Konan Bédié qui avait engagé une <<baoulisation >> de l'état-major et des postes de commandement depuis le limogeage du général Robert Gueï pour «indiscipline politique» en 1995.

Translation: The debasement of the material status of the rank and file, the political awareness of young officers and the rank and file who took part in peace keeping operation, the inability of President Bédié to manage the protests and demands, and above all, his haughtiness were at the root of a crisis whose trigger was the non payment of the allowances that the United Nations had paid...the upset [ethnic] balance and the Baoulisation of the army high command by Konan Bédié since the dismissal of General Robert Guéi for "political indiscipline" in 1995.

⁶⁹. Keiffer (2000:30) notes that, contrary to the common wisdom, the FANCI had demonstrated signs of rebellion that were contained by Félix Houphouët-Boigny. This wind of protest was led in 1973 by General Bony; in 1975 by Colonels Sio and Kouamé, Martin Yaenlin in 1977 as well as the protest of 1980 due to the application of austerity measures at the command of the international institutions.

⁷⁰. Divided and increasingly undisciplined, the regular soldiers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers] obeyed their hierarchy less and less and considered them fundamentally corrupt. Following the coup of 1999 carried out by these *jeunes gens*, they constituted informal and more or less autonomous military factions (such as the PC-Crise) and parallel forces, which rapidly turned into urban militias, more or less affiliated with a political leader but in reality obeying their own minor military chiefs. The two most infamous were Lieutenant Boka Yapi and Staff Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly (the famous IB who was to head the rebellion of 2002). These groups' exotic names-the Camorra, Cosa Nostra, and Red Brigades-indicate the criminal turn taken by the military regime... Guéi attempted to rein in the excesses of these groups, disbanding the PC-Crise in the summer 2000 and operating brutal purges among those young leaders whose loyalty he doubted. Nevertheless, he was incapable of controlling them and was in fact hostage to these young soldiers who had handed him the presidency and considered themselves to be above the law (Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007:89).

^{71.} The “war of machetes” between the two factions of the student union, the FESCI (Federation Estudiantine de Côte d’Ivoire). One faction was led by Guillaume Soro and the other by Charles Blé Goudé.

^{72.} The Mano River Union (MRU) comprises Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

^{73.} The irony of Côte d’Ivoire’s predicament is that Blaise Compaoré is a mediator in the Ivorian Civil war and political crisis. He was instrumental in the Peace Accord of Ouagadougou.

^{74.} Laurent Gbagbo was the only opponent at the poll against General Robert Guéi who had banned Henri Konan Bédié and Alassane Ouattara from taking part in the presidential elections.

^{75.} The leadership of Les jeunes patriotes or Young patriots is composed of former leaders of University students’ Union, La Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de la Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). The patriots have strong links with the Ivorian presidency, especially, Simone Gbagbo, wife of the incumbent President. The Young Patriots are derogatorily called “les ventriotes” allegedly because they derived financial rewards from the FPI government for their ‘patriotism’.

^{76.} A local pub where alcohol and drugs, especially, marijuana are freely consumed.

^{77.} *Ivoiritaires* are those Ivorians that are feeding on the doctrine of exclusion of l’ivoirité and molest their victims.

^{78.} Tous ces Ivoiriens marginalisés, qui n’ont pas d’identité, et de ce fait n’ont ni la chance, ni le droit de dire je suis ivoirien, alors qu’ils sont natifs du pays et que leurs grand-parents ont lutté contre l’esclavage et ont fini par obtenir l’indépendance du pays en 1960.

^{79.} The Group of 7 includes the PDCI (Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire, Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), Union Populaire pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UPDCI), Mouvement des Forces de l’Avenir (MFA), Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP), and Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO).

^{80.} Guillaume Soro was the target of Young Patriots in June 2003 in the premises of the National Radio and Television networks. He escaped death from the death squads of IB in June 2004. His plane was shot at in June 2007.

^{81.} *Dioula Tchè* is the generic name for male Northerners while *Dioula Moussou* refers to the female. It also encompasses people from the northern countries neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire (Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali).

^{82.} The former French President Jacques Chirac claimed that it was ill-timed for Africa to organise multiparty elections because of the ethnic character and

composition of the continent (Daddieh 2006:14). This account is more detailed in Bayart (1995).

⁸³. “L’armée ivoirienne est une armée de development et non de guerre. L’armée ivoirienne est une armée de paix”.

⁸⁴ Galy (2004:134) notes that the incarceration of some members of the FPI including, Gbagbo, and his son for three months while his wife Simone was hospitalised because she had been beaten by the army would partly explain the hardline position of the couple against Alassane Ouatarra.

⁸⁵. “L’armée n’intervient que lorsque la République est en danger...Dès l’instant où la comprehension guide les pas de chacun, qu’il soit du parti au pouvoir ou de l’opposition, je ne vois pas pour l’armée des raisons de s’exciter dans la rue”.

⁸⁶. “Dans l’armée de Côte d’Ivoire, les gens étaient jugés par rapport à leur appartenance ethnique ou religieuse...Dès qu’il y avait des troubles socio-politiques impliquant des jeunes dioula, tous ceux du nord étaient mis dans la même assiette par le pouvoir. Nous n’étions plus libres dans notre propre pays. Cela nous a d’abord amené au coup d’Etat du 24 décembre 1999, qui a porté le Général Guéi au pouvoir. Les choses n’ont pas changé”.

⁸⁷. La rébellion en Côte d’Ivoire ne doit pas surprendre quelqu’un (sic). Depuis dix ans, chacun a vu venir la déchirure dans ce pays; chacun a vu comment on a divisé l’armée et la population, chacun a vu comment on arrêtait, torturait et tuait d’autres Ivoiriens sur des fausses bases et tout simplement parce qu’ils sont opposants ou parce qu’ils viennent du Nord. Les armes ont déjà parlé en 99 dans ce pays pour arrêter tout ça. Malheureusement, le général n’a pas profité de cette situation pour remettre le pays sur les rails. Et puis les mêmes injustices, exclusions, tracasseries et tueries ont continué.

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Appendix 1: Intra-state Wars in Africa.

Cou Ntries	Year of independenc e	Civil war	MILEX	Date of informatio n (projected est.)
Algeria	1962	1962,1992 -2002	2,994,000,00 0	2005
Angola	1975	1975-2002	2,000,000,00 0	2005
Benin	1960		100,900,000	2005
Botswana	1966		325,500,000	2005
Burkina Faso	1960		74,830,000	2005
Burundi	1962	1970- 1971,1993 -2006	43,900,000	2005
Cameroun	1960	-1971	230,000,000	2005
Cape Verde	1975		7,178,000	2005
CAR	1960		16,300,000	2005
Chad	1960	1965-1990	68,950,000	2005
Congo	1960	1997-1999	85,220,000	2005
DRC	1960	1960,1996 - 1997,1998 -2003	103,700,000	2005
Côte d'Ivoire	1960	2002	246,600,000	2005
Djibouti	1977		29,050,000	2005

Egypt	1952		2,440,000,000	2003
Equatorial Guinea	1968		152,200,000	2005
Eritrea	1993		220,100,000	2005
Ethiopia	-	1991-1993	295,900,000	2005
Gabon	1960			
Gambia	1965			
Ghana	1957		83,650,000	2005
Guinea	1958		119,700,000	2005
Guinea-Bissau	1974	1998-2000	9,455,000	2005
Kenya	1963		280,500,000	2005
Lesotho	1966		41,100,000	2005
Liberia	-		67,400,000	2005
Libya	1951		1,300,000,000	2007
Madagascar	1960		329,000,000	
Malawi	1964		15,810,000	2005
Mali	1960	1990-1995,2006	106,300,000	2005
Mauritania	1960		19,320,000	
Morocco	1956		2,306,000,000	2005
Mozambique	1975	1975-1992	78,030,000	2005
Namibia	1990		149,500	2005
Niger	1960	1990-1995;	44,780,000	2005

		2007.		
Nigeria	1960	1967-1970	737,600,000	2005
Rwanda	1962	1990-1994	53,660,000	2005
Senegal	1960	1980-	117,300,000	2005
Seychelles	1976		14,850,000	2005
Sierra Leone	1961	1991-2002	14,250,000	2005
Somalia	1960	1991-2004	22,340,000	2005
South Africa	1910		3,700,000	2007
Sudan	1956	1955- 1972,1983 -2005, 2003*	587,000,000	2004
Swaziland	1968		41,600,000	2005
Tanzania	1961/1964*		21,200,000	2005
Togo	1960		29,980,000	2005
Tunisia	1956		356,000,0000	-
Uganda	1962	1980-1986	192,800	2005
Zambia	1964		121,700,000	2005
Zimbabwe	1980		124,700,000	2005

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Figures; CIA World Fact Book.

Appendix 2: Some Hypotheses on the Causations of Ethnic Conflicts

Year	Authors	Hypotheses
1994	Gurr & Harff	The causations of ethnic conflicts are many and not mutually exclusive
1999 2003	Vanhanen Fenton	Ethnic nepotism engenders ethnic alignment and exacerbates inclination for conflict interest along same.
2000 2003	Otite Jinadu	Ethnic manipulation is a major cause of violence in divided societies.
2000 2002 2003	Ellingsen Renal-Querol Osaghae	Transborder ethnic affinities exist; the West is also prone to ethnic conflict; Ethnic cleavages do not always result in civil war; ethnicity is not a paradigm of the art of governance in divided societies.
1989,1996 1993 2000	Nnoli Eriksen Easterly	Ethnicity is both inclusive and exclusive. It gives confidence and mutual security.
2000 2003	Ellingsen Fearon & Laitin	There is a possibility of civil war in societies where is a dominant

2003	Fearon & Laitin	ethnic group.
2004	Collier & Hoeffler	
1985	Horowitz	Grievances within an ethnic group can be latent and lead to collective mobilisation action. The intensity ethnicity assumes is partially promoted by the elite and it is widespread in militant form in political parties. Ethnicity is a major cause for the collapse of democratisation.
1995	Wallensteen & Sollenberg	
1998	Christie	
2000	Gurr	
2000	Jeon	
1989	Nodia	Ethnicity shapes nationalism
1994	Koitari	
2000	Gurr	Ethnic warfare is declining
2003	Fearon & Laitin	When there is a minority that is at least 5% of the population, ethnic diversity is associated with a higher risk of ethnic civil war.
1999	Chabal & Daloz	The politicisation of ethnicity and ethno-political exclusion leads to conflict.
2002	Michailof, Kostner & Devictor	

Appendix 3: Interview Scheduled for Sierra Leone and Liberia

1. Which of the following factors do you believe triggered the Sierra Leonean civil war? (Kindly tick one factor only).
 - (a) Economic crisis
 - (b) The availability of gem stones, precisely diamonds
 - (c) The spill over effects of the first Liberian civil war (1989-1996)
2. Did ethnicity play a major role in the civil war?
3. Do you think that the involvement of the military in the governance of Sierra Leone was a contributing factor to the civil war?
4. Do you think that religion is another factor that plunged Sierra-Leone into civil war?
5. Do you believe the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor contributed in triggering the conflict in Sierra Leone?
6. If your answer to Question 5 is yes, what is/are the reason(s)?
 - (a) To control the Diamond mines in Sierra Leone
 - (b) To destabilise Sierra-Leone because the government was allowing the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to use the territory of Sierra Leone to attack Charles Taylor's base in Liberia during the Civil War.
 - (c) To install a puppet government in Sierra Leone through the RUF.
7. Do you think that the lack of a credible and functional democracy is one of the factors that resulted in the civil war?
8. Do you think that colonial policies have contributed to the Sierra Leone conflict?
9. Please rank the following causes in order in which you believe contributed to the involvement of the youth in the Sierra Leonean civil war. The highest rank of 5 should be given to the most important cause:
 - (a) Poverty
 - (b) Economic oppression
 - (c) High rate of unemployment
 - (d) The neglect of the countryside
 - (e) The culture of *Lupem Youth*
10. In your opinion, do you think the cause of the civil war can be traced to the Greed of the rebels and the leaders (the desire to exploit the economic resources of the country)?

11. Do you believe that Grievances (frustrations and the desire to defend the interests of the people) is a possible reason for the conflict?
12. How do you assess the performance of the International Community such as ECOWAS, AU, in finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict?
13. What do you think will bring peace to the country and a sense of belonging to the citizens?

Appendix 4a: Interview Scheduled for Côte d'Ivoire.

1. Which of the following factors do you believe triggered the Côte d'Ivoire civil war? (Kindly tick one factor only).
 - (a) Economic crisis
 - (b) The availability of gem stones, precisely diamonds
 - (c) The spill over effects of the first Liberian civil war (1989-1996)
2. Did ethnicity play a major role in the civil war?
3. Do you think that the involvement of the military in the governance was a contributing factor to the civil war?
4. Do you think that religion is another factor that plunged Côte d'Ivoire into civil war?
5. Do you believe neighbouring countries contributed in triggering the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire?
6. If your answer to Question 5 is yes, can you mention those countries that were involved and the reasons for their actions?
7. Do you think that the lack of a credible and functional democracy is one of the factors that resulted in the civil war?
8. Do you think that colonial policies have contributed to the Ivorian conflict?
9. Please rank the following causes in order in which you believe contributed to the involvement of the youth in the Ivorian civil war. The highest rank of 5 should be given to the most important cause:
 - (a) Poverty
 - (b) Economic oppression
 - (c) High rate of unemployment
 - (d) The neglect of the countryside
9. In your opinion, do you think the cause of the civil war can be traced to the Greed of the rebels and the leaders (the desire to exploit the economic resources of the country)?
10. Do you believe that Grievances (frustrations and the desire to defend the interests of the people) is a possible reason for the conflict?
12. How do you assess the performance of the International Community such as ECOWAS, AU, in finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict?

13. What do you think will bring peace to the country and a sense of belonging to the citizens?

Appendix 4b: Entretien prévu pour la Côte d'Ivoire

1. Lequel des facteurs suivants selon vous a déclenché la guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire? (S'il vous plaît cochez seulement un facteur).
 - (a) La crise économique
 - (b) La disponibilité des pierres précieuses, plus précisément les diamants
 - (c) Les effets boule de neige de la première guerre civile libérienne (1989-1996)

2. Les problèmes ethniques ont-ils joué un rôle de premier plan dans le déclenchement de la guerre civile?

3. Pensez-vous que la participation des forces armées dans la gestion des affaires de l'Etat a-t-il été un facteur qui a contribué à la guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire?

4. Pensez-vous que la religion est aussi un facteur qui a plongé la Côte d'Ivoire dans la guerre civile?

5. Croyez-vous que les pays frontaliers ont contribué au déclenchement de la guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire?

6. Si votre réponse à la question 5 est dans l'affirmative, pouvez-vous mentionner ces pays qui sont impliqués et les motifs de leurs actions?

7. Pensez-vous que le manqué d'une démocratie crédible et fonctionnelle est l'un des facteurs qui ont résulté à la guerre civile?

8. Pensez-vous que la politique coloniale française a contribué au conflit ivoirien?

9. S'il vous plaît classez les causes suivantes dans l'ordre dans lequel vous croyez qu'elles ont contribué à l'action des jeunes dans la guerre civile ivoirienne. Donnez au maximum de 5 points à la cause que vous jugez la plus importante.
 - (a) la pauvreté
 - (b) Les problèmes économiques
 - (c) Le taux élevé de chômage
 - (d) L'écart entre le milieu urbain et le milieu rural

10. Selon vous pensez-vous que la cause de la guerre civile est imputable à l'avidité des rebelles et des leaders politiques (le désir d'exploiter les ressources naturelles du pays)?
11. Croyez-vous que les doléances (frustrations et le désir de défendre les intérêts du peuples) est une raison du conflit ivoirien?
12. Comment évaluez-vous la performance la communauté internationale (CEDEAO, UA, ONU, la France, etc...) dans la résolution du conflit ivoirien?
13. Quels sont selon vous les éléments qui pourront apporter une paix durable en Côte d'Ivoire et donner un sens du destin commun aux citoyens ivoiriens?

Appendix 5: Consent Form



School of Humanities

UNE, Armidale, NSW 2351 Australia

Phone (02) 6773 2439, fax (02) 6773 3520

Consent Form for Participants

I, have read the information contained in the information sheet for Participants and any questions I have been asked have been answered to my satisfaction. Yes/No

I agree to participate in this activity, realizing that I may withdraw at any time.

Yes/No

I agree that the research data gathered for the study may be published using a pseudonym

Yes/No

I agree to the interview being Audiotape recorded and transcribed.

Yes/No

.....
Participant Date

.....
Chercheur Date

Appendix 6: Formulaire de Consentement

Je, soussigné _____ que j'ai lu les informations de la lettre d'information pour les participants et je suis satisfait (e) des réponses aux questions que j'ai posées. Je suis satisfait (e) de participer à cette activité tout en sachant que je peux cesser de continuer l'entretien. J'accepte que les données obtenues de cette recherche peuvent être publiées pourvu que mon nom ne soit pas mentionné.

Signature _____ Date _____

J'accepte/Je n'accepte pas que mon entretien soit enregistré au magnétophone.

Signature _____ Date _____

Ce projet a été approuvé par Le Comité d'Éthique de la Recherche de l'University of New England (Approbation No..... valable jusqu'au.....)

En cas de plainte concernant la manière dont cette recherche est entreprise, veuillez prendre contact avec the Research Officer à l'adresse ci-dessous:

Research Services
University of New England
Armidale NSW 2351
Telephone: (02) 6773 3449

Appendix 7: Letter of Information

Dear Participant,

This research entitled **The Slippery Slopes into Civil War: Comparing Expalnsations for the Intra-state Wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire**. The main objective of this study is to know the root- causes of the two civil wars in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire on the one hand. On the other, I am also considering how the factors have contributed in triggering these wars. The end-result is to develop conflict resolution mechanisms on how to proffer lasting solutions to the civil wars through negotiations instead of having to resort to arms.

Should you agree to take part in this research, we will meet for approximately twenty minutes. You may participate in-group discussions, however if you feel uncomfortable to discuss in-group, we will consider the option of one-on one interview at a place and time of your choosing. During the meeting, I will provide you with a copy of the transcribed version and you are welcome to make changes as you deem fit. If you are uncomfortable with being audiotape recorded. I will make notes on a notepad, which will be transcribed and will give you a copy. The interview will be semi-structured, with several prepared questions, and several which may come up in course of the interview. If any time during the interview, you do not wish to respond to any question, I will understand. You are also free to stop the interview at any time. My primary aim is to ensure your comfort. If you are concern that raising the issues surrounding the civil war will be of emotional concern to you, I will encourage you not to take part in this project. At any time, if you want further clarification of this exercise, please feel free to ask. You can contact me by e-mail at aogunmol@une.edu.au

Please keep a copy of this information for your record and accept my sincere appreciation for your participation, insights and valuable knowledge, which would be of great importance to this project.

Sincerely,

Dele Ogunmola
Centre for Peace Studies,
School of Humanities
University of New England
Armidale NSW 2351, Australia.

Appendix 8: Lettre d'Information à L'attention des Participants

Cette recherche est intitulée “**La descente des pentes glissantes de la guerre civile: une comparaison des explications des guerres intra-étatiques en Sierra Leone et en Côte d'Ivoire**”. D'une part le but principal de cette étude est de savoir les causes premières qui ont déclenché ces deux guerres. Et de l'autre, mon objectif est de savoir comment ces facteurs ont contribué au déclenchement des guerres en question. Le résultat définitive est d'élaborer des mécanismes en ce qui concerne la pérennisation des solutions par le truchement de negotiations au lieu de faire recours aux armes.

Si vous acceptez de participer à cette recherche, nous passerons ensemble à peu près vingt minutes pour cet entretien. Il peut s'agir de discussions en groupe. Néanmoins, si vous vous sentez mal à l'aise au cours de la discussion en groupe, nous pourrons l'option de faire l'entretien face à face et vous pouvez choisir le lieu et le temps de notre rencontre. Pendant notre rencontre, je vous fournirai une copie transcrite de la version de notre entretien et vous pourrez effectuer des changements que vous jugerez utiles. Si vous ne vous sentez pas à l'aise d'être interviewé (e), je prendrai des notes qui seront transcrites et je vous donnerai une copie. L'entretien sera semi structuré, avec des questions préparées, et d'autres qui pourront être posées au cours de l'entretien. Si vous souhaitez ne pas répondre à certaines questions, je vous comprendrai. Vous êtes libre d'arrêter l'entretien à n'importe quel moment. Mon objectif majeur est de garantir votre confort. Si vous pensez qu'aborder des questions qui concerne la guerre civile vous donnera des troubles émotionnels, je vous encourage à ne pas participer à cet entretien. Toutes fois que vous aurez plus de clarifications en ce qui concerne cette étude , veuillez me poser des questions. Vous pourrez commuiquer avec moi par mél à l'adresse suivante: aogunmol@une.edu.au

Gardez, s'il vous plaît une copie de cette lettre d'information pour votre archive et veuillez accepter mes sincères remerciements pour votre participation, votre perspicacité et vos connaissances qui ont sûrement beaucoup de valeur et qui auront une grande importance pour cette étude.

Je vous prie d'accepter mes sincères remerciements.

Dele Ogunmola
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University of New England
Armidale NSW 2351
Australia.

Appendix 9: List of participants

Appendix 9a: List of respondents in the Côte d'Ivoire interviews

CII1: a retired Colonel of the British Royal Forces

CII2: a Chief Security Officer of the UNOCI

CII3: a leader of the Students' Union

CII4: a Lecturer in the University of Abidjan Cocody

CII5: a trade Unionist

CII6: a retired Catholic Priest

CII7: an activist for Human Rights

CII8: a journalist and member of a Human Rights Organisation

CII9: a retired Inspector of Police

CII10: a youth leader and member of a Pentecostal Church

CII11: an Ivorian international civil servant based in Freetown

CII12: a University teacher in the University of Bouaké

CII 13: an unemployed graduate who holds a Masters degree in English

CII14: a youth leader

CII15: a militia leader

CII16: a chairman of an inter-state transport services

CII17: a member of civil society

CII18: a security operative

CII19: a leader of a vigilante group

CII20: a chairman of an association of foreigners

CII21: a FPI member

CIE interview1: an expatriate and member of a Christian NGO

CIE interview 2: a member of a Christian NGO

CIFGD1: interview with members of civil society

CIFGD2: interview with some students and locals

APPENDIX 9b: List of respondents in Sierra Leone Interviews

SLI1: a warlord veteran of the RUF fights

SLI2: a university lecturer

SLI3: a student union leader

SLI4: a RUF fighter

SLI5: a RUF combatant

SLI6: a junior research fellow

SLI7: a woman combatant, wife of a warlord

SLI8: a Christian leader and member of a NGO

SLI9: a lecturer in Fourah Bay (founded 1827).

SLI10: a victim of the civil war

SLI11: a member of civil society

SLI12: a retired civil servant

SLI13: a secondary school teacher

SLI14: a diamond digger

SLI15: a diamond digger

SLI16: a student of Peace and Conflict at the University of Fourah Bay

SLI17: a market woman

SLI18: a village chief

SLI19: a rural dweller who suffered atrocities from the war

SLI20: an administrative officer in the University of Fourah Bay

SLI21: a staff member of an international NGO

SLI22: a student of the Department of Peace and Conflict studies at the University of Fourah Bay

SLI23: a security operative

SLI24: a member of the Civil Defence Force

SLI25: a member of an NGO

SLe-interview: a researcher and member of civil society

SLFGD1: interview with some RUF veterans

SLFGD2: interview with a group of rural dwellers

APPENDIX 9c: List of respondents in the Liberia Interviews

LII1: a senior lecturer in the University of Liberia, Monrovia

LII2: a diplomat in the United Nations Mission in Monrovia

LII3: a member of an INGO

LII4: a diplomat in the United Nations Missions in Liberia

LII5: A senior military officer in Liberia

APPENDIX 10: DATELINE FOR THE SIERRA LEONE WAR

Year	Major events
1991	RUF attacked Sierra Leone from Liberia with the assistance of NPLF and Burknabè soldiers.
1992	President Joseph Saidu Momoh overthrown by Captain Valentine Strasser.
1996	Captain Valentine Strasser removed in a palace coup by Brigadier Julius Maada Bio who organised Presidential elections.
1996	Ahmad Tejan Kabbah becomes civilian president.
1996	Abidjan Peace Accord
1997	Major Johnny Paul Koroma removed President Kabbah from office.
1998	ECOMOG ousted Major Johnny Paul Koroma. President Kabbah returned to power.
1999	RUF entered Freetown. Fierce battles between ECOMOG and RUF rebels. ECOMOG repelled RUF from Freetown.
1999	Lomé Peace Accord. Foday sankoh became vice-President
1999	Establishment of UNAMSIL.
2000	Some UNAMSIL peacekeepers abducted by RUF rebels.
2000	Corporal Foday Sankoh arrested.
2000	The West Side Boys captured 11 British soldiers. British forces freed them.

2001	Disarmament of rebels.
2002	War ended.
2002	President Kabbah won presidential elections.
2002	Corporal Foday Sankoh died in prison.
2003	Truth and Reconciliation Commission established.

Sources: Bangura 2000; Abraham 2004; BBC News-Sierra Leone profile.

APPENDIX 11: DATELINE FOR THE CÔTE D'IVOIRE WAR

Year	Major events
1993	Death of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and crisis of succession.
1993	Henri Konan Bédié became President
1995	Ideology of <i>L'ivoirité</i> .
1995	Election of Henri Konan Bédié.
1999	Coup d'état of General Robert Guéi.
2000	Election organised by General Guéi. Emergence of Laurent Gbagbo as President in a chaotic manner.
2000	Post-electoral violence between FPI and RDR supporters as RDR called for new election.
2001	Failed coup against Laurent Gbagbo
2001	Forum for National Reconciliation
2002	Failed military coup and rebellion
2002	Assassination of General Robert Guéi.
2002	Partition of Côte d'Ivoire between the rebels' zone (north) and government zone (south).
2002	Ceasefire with intermittent fights between government forces and the rebels.
2003	Establishment of ECOMICI
2003	Kléber Linas-Marcoussis Peace agreement
2003	Elimane Seydou Diarra became Prime Minister.

2004	Establishment of UNOCI
2004	Ivorian Air Force bombed a French military base in Bouaké. French forces destroyed Ivorian planes. Anti-French protests.
2005	Expiration of Gbagbo presidential mandate.
2005	Pretoria Agreement. Charles Konan Banny became Prime Minister.
2007	Ouagadougou Peace Accord. Guillaume Soro became Prime Minister.
2007	Disarmament of militia and rebels
2010	Presidential elections. Alassane Ouatarra declared winner by the Electoral Commission.
2010	Laurent Gbagbo declared winner by the Constitutional Council.
2010	Post-election violence and crisis. War between the pro-Gbagbo and Alassane forces.
2011	Gbagbo arrested by the FRCI with the assistance of UN and French forces.
2011	Alassane Ouatarra became president
2011	Establishment of Truth, Reconciliation and Dialogue Commission.
2011	Laurent Gbagbo transferred to The Hague and to be tried for alleged crime against humanity by the International Criminal Court.

Sources: Abidjan.net; Akindès 2004; Banégas and Marshall-Fratani 2007.

Appendix 12: Map of Africa



Source: <http://www.leemelee.wordpress.com/2007/12/> (Date accessed 25 May 2009)