PART I - THE PNG CONTEXT

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 The nature and extent of violence

The extent of violence in Papua New Guinea (PNG) has become an issue of national concern. 'Gutpela sindaun bilong nipela i bagarap pinis,' meaning 'our peaceful living has gone bad', is expressed by many concerned people. Violence in PNG is an epidemic and affects almost all citizens.

In the last decade, the country has been confronted with rapid social, political and economic changes as it has increasingly adopted aspects of Western model. Unfortunately, this modernisation has brought with it many undesirable side effects. One of the more obvious is direct violence, involving serious criminal behaviour such as vicious murders, often associated with robbery, savage rapes, armed robberies, motor vehicle theft and breaking and entering (The Independent, 1996 November 15, 1996:3).

In the last couple of years, the use of guns has become widespread. Even allowing for the unreliability of crime statistics, the increase in crime in the capital, Port Moresby, is alarming. According to Bob Nenta, the Commissioner for Police, 'the capital city accounted for 29% of all crime in 1994, 35% of all crime in 1995, and 39% of all crime in 1996' (The National July 29, 1996:4). Indeed, 1996 was particularly violent given the intensifying of the Bougainville conflict, high inflation as a result of the kina devaluation and rapidly widening socio-economic inequalities.

When PNG citizens speak of violence, it is in reference primarily to visible street crime, known in the vernacular as 'ra-calism' or 'criminal activity'. This terminology encompasses a range of behaviour which are adverse to the security and well being of society, including criminal activity such as breaking and entering homes, assault and rape (Harris, 1988). The perpetrators are often young males between the ages of 12 and 30.
who have not been successful in completing their formal education and who are characteristically known as 'pupils' and 'dropouts' (Ahai & Faraclas, 1991:84; AIDAB, 1994: xiv; Ahai, 1996:23). They think of themselves as having 'failed', as do many parents and villagers. This process alienates students from their traditional cultures. They have become the victims of the rush to adapt to the economic, technological and ideological frontiers of the West. Lacking appropriate skills and with limited formal sector job prospects, they become attracted to the urban centres where criminal activities are an attractive source of income.

A more recent form of crime to emerge in PNG is corruption amongst the elite, against which the judicial system has been ponderous and ineffective (Standish, 1993:106). The Barnett Inquiry of 1989 into the forest industries exposed the massive extent of corruption in the Ministry of Forests. Similarly, in 1996 the Ombudsman Commission exposed the extent of corruption in a number of government activities, including the National Capital District (NCD) Water Project and the Malaysian consortium JC-KRTA Consortium (The National, October 10, 1996:6; Post Courier October 10, 1996:2). Many ordinary citizens feel impotent and frustrated in the face of such high level corruption. They feel a pervading sense of injustice as they see crimes such as robbery, rape and murder dealt with severely while those guilty of white collar crimes of national significance are treated leniently or escape prosecution entirely (Cox, 1992: 9; The Independent, November 16, 1996: ).

According to Simon Pentanu, the Ombudsman Commissioner, 'it is no wonder that we are faced with an intolerable amount of lawlessness in PNG today. ...If the Government of the day ignores our country's laws, then it can hardly expect the ordinary citizens to obey them' (Post Courier, November 7, 1996: 2). Similar sentiments have been expressed by other concerned politicians and citizens who have made impressive statements alerting the nation to the extent of political corruption and mismanagement. e.g (Pokawin, 1996: 11-12; Gawi, 1996:11).

The fact that the law and order situation is worsening indicates that it needs urgent and effective attention (Clifford Report, 1984; Morauta, 1986; Harris, 1988; Dinnen, 1992; Reid, 1993). Table 1.1 points to an apparent increase in serious crimes between the years 1980 and 1990. Despite the unreliable nature of crime statistics in PNG, the great
increase from 1980 to 1990 is confirmed by the researcher’s observation and overwhelming anecdotal reports.

**Table 1.1** Reported number of serious crimes in Papua New Guinea, 1980 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>2622</td>
<td>3149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Robbery</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaking and Entry</td>
<td>2438</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>2137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Figures refer to 1980 and 1990 estimates respectively. Informed sources suggest that only 30-40 per cent of all sexual assaults are reported. Of those reported a portion are classified as aggravated assault. 

1.2 Causes of violence in PNG

Two important causes of conflict and violence in PNG are the decline in traditional village-based authority and mores and structural violence involving growing economic inequality and conflict over natural resources between foreign and domestic elites on the one hand, and village people on the other. Colonialism has come and gone in PNG, causing massive disruption to traditional societies. In terms of modernisation, the values imposed through the social, political and economic structures are alien to traditional practices. Gerry Semos (1991:1C), a PNG academic, argues that modernisation and urbanisation are forms of ‘structural violence’ which lead to physical violence and the real ‘law and order’ problem.

Colonialism also created the ‘cargo cult’ or ‘hand out’ mentality and this has been an additional destabilising factor in the peaceful coexistence of people throughout PNG (Faraclas, 1993). Citizens who fail to gain such access tend to become disillusioned and frustrated and may turn to violence. Cox (1992:8) observes that:
The real problem is in the very unbalanced and grossly unequal economic development which is going on within the nation, a trend which has been occurring for quite some time and which has been catalysed in recent years. The increasing brutality and militarisation of the internal security forces is the new officially sanctioned 'solution' to handle the symptoms of these growing inequalities within PNG society, particularly discontentment amongst traditional land owners who are locked out of receiving a fair share of mining profit, plus the young people who feel increasingly alienated by political, social and economic trends which catalyse inequality.

Finally, it is important to note that Papua New Guineans view themselves as a violent people and seem to regard violence as an acceptable way to settle conflicts and a part of their normal way of life (Strathern, 1993:43). In Chapter 4, we examine traditional methods of trying to resolve such conflicts.

1.3 The costs of violence

Highlighting the seriousness of the crime problem in PNG, former Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu stated at the 1991 National Crime Summit that 'crime has the potential to do lasting and severe damage to the country's future'... (Post Courier, February 12, 1991:2). Ordinary citizens perceive crime as a 'cancerous growth eating into and destroying the very fabric of society'. More specifically, urban crime and other forms of violence are considered a major disincentive to domestic and foreign investment with serious consequences for the economy (A.DAB, 1993a:15; AIDAB, 1994a:51). AusAID lists law and order as one of the seven major constraints on economic growth:

Papua New Guinea's transition from a traditional to a modern society has not been a smooth one. In recent years, growing social tensions resulting from lack of access to education, employment opportunities and government services have been reflected in the emergence of a serious law and order problem. The problem not only affects the quality of life, but imposes major costs on business, discourages investment and retards economic growth.

AusAID 1996a:6

The immediate costs of crime control are immense. Over a decade ago, the Clifford Report (1984) estimated these to be K76 million for the private sector and K85 million for the government, equivalent to more than half of the aid received annually from Australia. The costs involve a range of security measures, including guards, barbed-wire
fencing and other security facilities to ensure the safety of foreigners and national elites (Cox, 1992).

There is also the opportunity cost of resources allocated to control violence. Table 1.2 presents data on national expenditure allocations to five main expenditure categories - education, health, agriculture, police and defence.

Table 1.2  Government expenditure on selected categories, 1989-1996 (current prices, thousands of kina)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>44878</td>
<td>45055</td>
<td>78303</td>
<td>88998</td>
<td>52807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20.5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(20.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td>44475</td>
<td>40887</td>
<td>51498</td>
<td>53486</td>
<td>45106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(17.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
<td>41688</td>
<td>26212</td>
<td>11185</td>
<td>11499</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
<td>47156</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>67857</td>
<td>69850</td>
<td>86235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(32.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defence</strong></td>
<td>40820</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>83342</td>
<td>57043</td>
<td>68000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(25.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>291017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>262148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNG Budget Estimates, various years.
Note: Figures are actual expenditure except when marked with an asterisk when they refer to appropriations. Bracketed figures refer to the proportion of the total expenditure on these five categories.

NA: Not Available

Table 1.2 does not purport to be a reliable summary of government finances in these five categories over this period because the figures are in current prices and do not allow for inflation. However, the figures show some major changes in budgetary allocations. Allocations to each of the five categories were of very similar magnitude in 1989. By 1996, however, there had been a massive reallocation away from agriculture and smaller reductions in the proportion spent on health and education, and large increases in
allocations to police and defence. Expenditure on police and defence rose from 40% to 60% of the total expenditure between 1989 and 1996.

From an economic perspective, such a reallocation would have a severe detrimental effect. For example, reduced allocations to education, health and agriculture represents a failure to provide investment in human and resource development. On the other hand, police and defence expenditure yields little identifiable return in terms of national development, although it may ensure a more orderly and secure society and may act as a stimulus to economic activity in some areas. Overall, it is likely that the government's response to law and order problems by increasing defence and police allocations at the expense of other categories has had an adverse net economic and social impact.

1.4 State responses

The former Wingti government introduced three major bills in 1993, including reversing the onus of proof in certain types of criminal cases, allowing the courts to deny bail to accused persons and creating a system of national identity cards which would force the repatriation of unemployed people and 'trouble makers' to their home villages (Standish, 1993: 66-67). In addition, it was proposed to introduce capital punishment for murder, rape and drug abuse; tattoo committed offenders; increase maximum security prison facilities; use unemployed youth as vigilantes to monitor crime; and build boomgates on the two main highways entering the National Capital District (Cox, 1992).

To further maintain 'stability', the Wingti government considered martial law measures under the Internal Security Act 1993 aimed at preventing terrorism and sabotage. The Act also banned individuals and political groups from participating in protests and marches (Dinnen, 1992; Cox, 1992; Standish, 1993). The Internal Security Act was closely modelled on the Singaporean, Malaysian and Sri Lankan models, despite the distinct cultural difference of PNG to these countries. Wingti was perceived as an authoritarian ruler who was seeking to expand the power of the state. There was widespread condemnation of the proposed Act, including that of the Shadow Attorney-General, Bernard Narakobi:

The Wingti Government is morally bankrupt, manipulative, contemptuous of the rule of law. The present government is
one of violence, of confrontation, of force and of rule by fear. It specifically rejects dialogue and negotiation. It is condemned to hand on power.

(Quoted by Standish, 1993: 67)

The Chan Government in 1996 wanted to impose a nationwide two month curfew even though some of the more brutal crimes were committed in daylight hours. At the same time, it approved K1.7 million (in late 1996 1 Kina = approx $1.20 Australian) to re-arm the police (The National November 6, 1996: 2). This is of particular concern when, at the same time, sufficient funds were not available to equip the main hospitals with basic drugs. The violence epidemic throws up the critical question of the best ways of curbing violence given that the implementation of curfews and the strengthening of law enforcement have up to date been largely unsuccessful.

While criminals are blamed and punished, the root causes of their violent actions are not debated or well understood. One PNG commentator has remarked that ‘It is typical of our way of thinking that we spend so much money on law and order enforcement agencies and security services in dealing with the symptoms of the problem rather than dealing with root causes of the “law and order” problem which is a political one’... (Natin, 1996:9). Indeed, all Governments in PNG have placed great emphasis on ‘negative peace’ measures i.e. the suppression and punishment of crime and the imposition of ‘peace’ by bestowing greater powers on the army and police. Consistent with this is equipping the army and police with sophisticated weapons to act as a deterrent against violence. For example, it was reported in late 1996 that the PNG Defence Force was to get high-tech weaponry and equipment at a cost of more than K100 million (The National, September 27-29, 1996: 1). In 1997, the Chan Government negotiated to deploy foreign mercenaries on Bougainville at the cost of K36 million (The Sydney Morning Herald March 8, 1996: 35; Post Courier February 28 - March, 28., 1997:1,12). The resulting turmoil saw the withdrawal of mercenaries through the defiance of the then Defence Force Commander, Jerry Singirok. His actions attracted widespread national support, being seen as a morally courageous move to save the nation from further violence and corruption.
It seems that the underlying motive of increased state control over the years was not aimed at peace *per se*, but to rid the country of its 'negative image', protect foreign investment and safeguard the political interests of internal elites (Fallon, 1992; Standish, 1993:66). In its quest to sustain natural resource exploitation, the PNG Government have sometimes bypassed normal legal processes in favour of a more direct exercise of state control and power. A recent case is the handling of Ok Tedi mining venture where the Chan Government ignored the environmental destruction caused by the mine. The absence of a tailings dam in the Fly River caused massive environmental problems, yet the Government altered the mining laws to suit foreign interests and internal elites whilst denying the rights of local landowners. This is a classic example of how the Government has opted to suit interests of foreign companies. Only lip-service has been paid since 1975 to the Government's Eight Point Development Plan that emphasises human development.

Broadly speaking, government policies have not been effective. Sinclair Dinnen (1992:1), who has written extensively on law and order in PNG, states:

> the voluminous documentation, media coverage and pronouncements touching on issues of crime and crime control over the last two decades attest to the tone and endurance of official and popular concerns in this respect. The impression is one of escalating lawlessness, on the one hand, and a progressively ineffectual crime control system, on the other.

The Clifford Report (1984), Harris (1988), Dorney (1991: 286-318) and Dinnen (1992) all comment that the method of crime control employed by the PNG Governments has proven both ineffective and costly. If the root cause of violence in PNG is the result of unjust structures, the present policies of attempting to control violence through the use of force and rule of law will not lead to peace. The nature of peace needs to be understood and addressed more broadly and holistically so that more effective policies can be adopted.

An important consideration in the pursuit of peace is the notion that peace cannot exist without development. National development needs to include all aspects of social and economic progress in the context of justice and equity. If the majority of the people are marginalised, oppressed, segregated and left on the periphery of development, attempts
to secure peace by force will only lead to more violence and higher social and economic costs. For the advanced industrialised countries, peace can be more readily understood as the absence of war and violence. In many Third World countries, it is evident that peace will be a reality only when people's basic needs for food, shelter, clothing, security and human rights are realised. Change for peace and authentic development will not be secured through violence, but through nonviolent means which result in justice. One of the ways to a more peaceful and just society is to educate people to understand the nature and the causes of violence and to train them in the practice of nonviolence.

1.5 Can Peace Studies Make a Difference?

One of the underlying assumptions of this thesis is that a significant and effective contribution to a peaceful society can be made by studying peace. This is because attitudes towards violence in PNG - whether traditional or 'modern' - need to be reconsidered. Universities have a vital role in this reconsideration. We identify four ways in which the study of peace can affect individuals. The first step in the process is the holistic approach to learning whereby issues are broadly studied through linking parts to a whole. This is a deliberate move away from the traditional approach to learning where issues are studied partially within separate disciplinary entities. The second step involves the conscientization of students as they are stirred in their consciences by their new understanding of injustice. In the third, such learning is likely to develop into critical thinking; students become much less inclined to accept conventional explanations concerning the way the world is. The fourth effect is when students are moved to action for peace in the wider society.

The few previous studies of the impact of studying peace (see Chapter 8) report only modest effects. At least part of this, however, is due to the research methods adopted and the limited time over which the impact was studied.
1.6 Thesis Aims and Outline

The research is based on the assumptions that:

1. Peace studies can help students to develop a better awareness of the root causes of conflict and violence at the global, national, regional, community, family, interpersonal and personal levels.

2. The study of peace encourages personal change in terms of commitment to nonviolence and peace.

3. Peace studies can cultivate, in its students, skills which will enhance individual and social action resulting in more peaceful individuals and communities.

An overall purpose of this research is to encourage government, broadly defined, to accept that the issue of violence in PNG is complex and needs to be understood in a broad context. It posits an alternative to the popular 'quick fix' measures which are based on increasing the powers of law enforcement bodies. This thesis proposes a nonviolent and less costly option. In the writer's view, it is likely to be much more effective in promoting peace than the use of violence against violence. An indication of the potential of this approach will be seen through the kinds of impact that the study of peace has on students at the University of Papua New Guinea.

The study will involve an exploration of the causes of violence in PNG and a search for more effective and nonviolent ways of resolving conflict. The development, teaching and evaluation of a peace education curriculum is an integral part and a main analytical focus of this research.

The research has the following specific objectives:

1. To demonstrate the need for alternative means of dealing with violence in Papua New Guinea.

2. To present the theoretical and practical cases for peace studies; this will include an evaluation of impact in general and specifically in one Australian university.
3. To design a one semester peace studies course for teaching at the University of Papua New Guinea. The design will take account, among other things, of contemporary curriculum design, peace studies in developed countries and, Papua New Guinea cultural practice in the resolution of conflicts.

4. To teach this course in an environment where learning is enhanced by a range of co-operative learning practices.

5. To evaluate this peace studies course in terms of its impacts on the learners.

6. To consider the implications of the research findings for the teaching of peace studies at the tertiary level in Papua New Guinea as one means of building a peaceful society.

1.7 Organisation of the Thesis

The thesis consists of fourteen chapters, divided into four parts. Part One provides the social and cultural context of PNG. It introduces the thesis' aims, provides a background to PNG, describes some of the more serious forms of violence and discusses traditional ways of resolving conflict.

*Chapter One* outlines the research problem to be investigated and presents a rationale for the study.

*Chapter Two* provides relevant background to PNG as the setting in which the research is to be conducted.

*Chapter Three* examines serious forms of violence including domestic violence, urban crime, tribal warfare and the Bougainville conflict.

*Chapter Four* presents a series of case studies of traditional conflict resolution and compares these with modern Western conflict resolution methods.

Part Two sets out the nature and scope of peace studies and nonviolence. It provides examples of peace studies in universities and investigates some evaluation studies.

*Chapter Five* compares and contrasts the modernisation and PEACE paradigms.
Chapter Six examines the philosophy and practice of nonviolence.

Chapter Seven paints a broad brush picture of peace studies programs at university level in four countries.

In Part Three, the focus is on the effects of peace studies.

Chapter Eight presents the results of studies evaluating peace studies teaching in some Western universities.

Chapter Nine shares results of research conducted by the writer at the University of New England (UNE) with undergraduate and postgraduate students to evaluate the impact of Peace Studies on them.

Chapter Ten outlines the research methods to be used in the UPNG study.

Chapter Eleven presents the Peace Studies curriculum followed at UPNG.

Chapter Twelve presents the process followed in the Peace Studies course at UPNG.

Chapter Thirteen evaluates the course in terms of its impact on participating students.

Part Four contains one chapter (14) which provides an overview of the thesis and makes recommendations relevant to the teaching of Peace Studies at UPNG.
CHAPTER TWO

The Country Setting

2.1 Introduction

Discussion of peace studies in PNG requires a background to the country. There are always two stories to be told about a nation such as PNG. The first and the more readily available is the official conceptualisation of the nation as one which is flourishing, happy and with bright prospects. The other story depicts the nation as it really stands: a nation vulnerable to subjugation from Western influences and control by minority local and national elites. This chapter therefore attempts to take account of the dichotomy between the real story of PNG and the story that is manufactured and propagated by those who stand to gain most from an alternative story.

2.2 Historical development

In the scramble for the colonies, three colonial powers were involved in PNG - the Germans, British and Australians. The Germans claimed north-eastern New Guinea and Britain claimed south-eastern New Guinea in 1884. The Dutch claimed western half of the main island (now Indonesian province of Irian Jaya). North eastern New Guinea remained a colony of Germany until 1914 when it was taken over by Australia, which had annexed the south eastern part, Papua, in 1884 (see Map 1.1). Germany embarked on the usual policy of economic exploitation, annexing traditional land for copra plantations. On the other hand, the British and Australians were more interested in 'civilising' the indigenous people through missionaries and Government agents known as 'kiaps' or patrol officers, with 'tult ils' and 'uluais' replacing traditional leaders or 'big-men' in many coastal villages (Biskup, et al., 1968:40 & 48; Griffin et al., 1979:59-65; Waiko, 1993:143).

World War II in the Pacific forced Australia to abandon the separate administration of New Guinea and Papua and a single administration was set up to administer the two
territories. Because Australia was slow in preparing PNG towards political independence it came under international pressure in the 1960s to provide better health services, education and more economic and political opportunities. In 1972, the first PNG parliamentary cabinet was formed followed by self government in 1973 and independence in 1975 (Griffin et al., 1979:179-201; Dorney, 1990: 47; Waiko, 1993, 153-234).

2.3 Physical and social geography

PNG is the largest country in the South Pacific region. It is Australia's closest neighbour, situated north of Australia occupying an estimated land area of 463,243 square kilometres. The island is endowed with natural resources and varied fauna and flora. PNG's forest is among the world's most biodiverse forests, containing more than 11,000 species of flora and fauna of which 90% are endemic. Rainforests cover approximately 75% of the land area. There is rich marine life, agricultural potential and significant deposits of oil, gas, gold and copper.

Another attribute of PNG's diversity is the geography which is largely untamed and rugged. Approximately 70% of the land has no development potential owing to rugged terrain, high altitude swamps and poor quality soil. The difficult terrain played a major role in the isolation of tribal groupings, particularly in regard to protection from enemies and fear of the spirits and sorcery (Trompf, 1991).

PNG is characterised by its ethnic diversity, resulting in its over four million people speaking more than 800 different languages and dialects. The language distributions are the most complex in the world. English, Tok Pisin and Motu are the official languages.

This cultural diversity is the key factor which contributes to the fragility and instability of the country. This instability is demonstrated through separatist movements, problems of law and order, tribal fighting and the Bougainville conflict. It is the cultural diversity of this nation that inhibits a sense of PNG as a unified country. Tribal and regional allegiances mitigate against a sense of nationalism and perpetuate violence with the country.
2.4 Sovereignty and political instability

A provincial government system was introduced to give political autonomy to twenty-one provinces to decentralise government and as a strategy to address PNG's diversity (Dorney, 1990: 50-179; Waiko, 1993: 225-232). However, provincial governments have been radically restructured under the Organic Law passed in 1995. Under the restructure, Local Government Councils and appointed Governors, who are the regional members of the National Parliament, comprise the new provincial governing bodies. The stated goal was to further centralise decision making to enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the country's political system and to reduce the growing level of corruption at the provincial government level.

Since independence, the political scene in PNG has been turbulent accompanied by frequent changing of governments. This is due to several causes. First, there is growth of many political parties with no clear policy platform. Clear policies may have no significant role when voters tend to support candidates with whom they have tribal or clan loyalty. Second, being a politician is another means of accumulating wealth and achieving leadership status which many males find alluring. Some of these politicians are not literate, but rely on forceful leadership and the charisma valued within Melanesian culture. A third element is the level of corrupt practices carried out by many politicians at both the national and provincial levels (Narakobi, 1983; Gawi, 1996; Pokawin, 1996).

2.5 Trends in economic development

Since independence, governments have sought rigorous development policies for economic growth. Despite this, the radical Eight Point Plan (Griffin et al., 1979:188-189) was adopted at independence emphasising localisation, equal distribution of incomes and services, decentralisation, small-scale industry, self-reliance in raising revenue and gender equality. Its application has, however, been somewhat ambiguous and governments and foreign interest groups have not strayed far from the traditional growth-first development model (Connell, 1997: 25-41; Henningham et al., 1992).

PNG Exports in the early 1990s were dominated by minerals (70%) and forest products (10%) (AIDAB, 1993:12). Japan is by far PNG's biggest export market, taking 40% by
value in 1989, followed by Germany (27%) and Australia 12%. In terms of imports, Australia and New Zealand dominate PNG's imports providing 44%.

In the March 1995 budget, the Government initiated a number of programmes aimed at creating a favourable environment for sustained economic and social growth (AusAID, 1995). These initiatives included control and restructuring of government expenditure, industry and trade policy reform and reductions in impediments to foreign investment. The strategies were supported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Australian Government.

2.5.1 Foreign investment

Foreign investment in private sector developments are important for economic growth, creating jobs and increasing productivity through improved technologies and skills (Post Courier August 25, 1993:22). The main areas of foreign investment are in mining, forestry and other primary industries. Other investments, though small in comparison, have been manufacturing and tourism.

2.5.2 Mining

Until the early 1980s, major economic activities were agricultural, involving cash crop production such as cocoa, coffee, copra, tea, rubber and oil palm, which accounted for 75% of GNP. The period between 1980-1984 were the years of economic stagnation, but between 1985 to 1988, averaged 3.5% per year (AIDAB, 1993). In 1989 and 1990, PNG faced an economic recession when real GDP declined to 1.4 and 3.0% respectively because of the closure of Bougainville copper mine (see section 3.3) and sharp declines in the prices of major agricultural products.

Economic growth in 1991 and 1992 was dominated by mining and petroleum, the key projects being Kutubu oil and the Pogera, Ok Tedi and Misima gold mines (AIDAB (1993). The Lihir gold mine opened in 1995. Mining is prospering in PNG although some of the underlying issues such as the foreign based mining laws, resource exploitation, profit repatriation, environmental destruction and royalties to land owners contribute to violence in PNG. These are addressed in Chapter 3.
2.5.3 Agriculture

PNG's have for centuries subsisted on their traditional land producing food crops such as sweet potato, cassava, yams, plantains and potatoes, although modernisation meant that an increasing number of traditional rural people have developed tastes for modern imported foodstuff such as rice, tinned fish and meat. There has been a gradual diversion from producing food crops towards cash crop production.

Some of these crops are grown on plantations but much of the crop production is carried out by small growers on their own land. Even though agricultural products continue to perform poorly on the world market and prices for these crops are significantly low, PNG is pressured by the established world market system to grow cash crops in order to earn foreign exchange and at the behest of the World Bank and IMF (AusAID, 1995; Madeley, 1996).

One of the factors identified as constraining economic development is the practice of PNG's land tenure arrangements where 98% of land is customarily owned. It has been argued that this means reduced incentives to improve the productivity of the land and makes it difficult for land owners to borrow for investment purposes (AusAID, 1995:13). Thus far, the government has recognised the likelihood of widening socioeconomic inequalities as an overwhelming argument against 'free trade' in land.

2.5.4 Manufacturing

Manufacturing has not been a high priority in development because the government has been concerned primarily with the promotion of large scale resource-based projects relating to mining, forestry and agriculture. The sector accounts for 9% of GDP and includes the processing of agricultural products, textiles, timber, food and beverages and fabricated metal products. Small scale manufacturing could prove an alternative to relying predominantly on imported manufactures.
2.5.5 Forestry

PNG contains extensive tropical rain forests which are important to the indigenous people and also to maintaining balance in the ecosystem. In the 1980s and 1990s, logging in PNG has intensified because of increased prices on the international market due to log export bans in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Due to the revenue distribution structure of timber contracts and corruption, most of the economic surplus has accrued to the foreign loggers (Deklin, 1992; Post Courier August 25, 1993:22; AIDAB, 1994a: xxii; The Independent November 16, 1996:8).

Under a number of new pieces of legislation since 1990, increased royalties are to be paid to land owners and this would be enforced by the World Bank. The ultimatum given by the World Bank in order for the release of further loan funds was for PNG to adopt World Bank recommendations on logging policies, including the policy of increased royalties to land owners (The Independent October 4, 1996:1-2). The dangers here are that indigenous people may fall into the trap of allowing excessive logging and that forestry companies may not honour their side of the bargain (AusAID, 1996a:90).

Forests are rapidly being depleted and a good deal of this is associated with corruption, including transfer pricing practices, misdeclaration of logging species for exports and the underdeclaration of export volumes. There is extensive evidence of bribery by forest products and ineptness and corruption on the part of government and public servants (Barnett, 1992; Deklin, 1992; AusAID, 1996a:88).

2.5.6 Fishing

PNG marine life is rich with considerable potential for both deep-sea and near-shore fishing although is an underdeveloped sector of the economy (Waugh, 1992; Rodwell, 1992). Domestic processing is being constrained by investment funds, inadequate equipment, high costs of transportation, difficulty in storing the product, the fragmented nature of the domestic market and poor distribution system.

The government has provided various incentives to encourage the growth of local fishing industries such as duty-free fuel for fishing vessels and a reduction in tariffs for imported
equipment. In terms of encouraging large scale foreign fishing, the recent agreement between the PNG Government and the Z fishing company of United States was to develop a tuna cannery in Madang (AusAID, 1996a:93). The operation will be operated out of Lae and a 100% tariff will be applied on imported canned mackerel to support it. This will result in a large increase in the domestic price (AusAID, 1995: 38). The Government collects K15 million per annum from the sales of fishing licences to foreign vessels and K1 million from the regional agreement with United States. The country needs to strengthen the management and monitoring capability of the fisheries sector (AusAID, 1996a: 95).

2.5.7 Tourism

Since the 1980s, tourism growth has stagnated in the country. It is estimated that about 10,000 people entered the country in 1988. Tourism development compares poorly with other Pacific nations which have well developed industries which provide foreign exchange, employment and a market for locally made goods. Tourism also has its negative side. It can contribute to the loss of authentic traditions as the indigenous people concentrate on pleasing the tourists.

2.6 Foreign aid

Since independence, PNG has relied heavily on foreign aid to undertake its development plans. Aid to PNG comes in the form of bilateral (government to government) and multilateral (international agencies to governments) agreements.

PNG’s main aid donor is Australia. In 1982, Australian aid accounted for 85% of total aid while in 1991 it represented 66% (AusAID, 1995:28). Australia’s aid is principally in the form of budget support which means Australia has no say on how the aid is to be spent. A new arrangement, under which both governments have agreed to phase out budget support in favour of project aid, is being slowly implemented.

2.7 Human Development

The main indicators used to measure a country’s human development include literacy rates, infant mortality rates and life expectancy. Economists agree that a country with a
balanced distribution of social and economic resources is likely to rate high on its human development indicators and faces less risk of institutional and social breakdown than a society marked by poverty and law and order problems (Development Assistance Committee, 1998:19). In each of these indicators, PNG made considerable improvements for the period 1975-1992. Consequently, PNG's human development index (HDI), which includes GNP per capita as well as the above, went from a ranking of 129 in 1991 within the low human development category to 126 in 1992, which moved it to the medium human development group (UNDP, 1994). However, a comparison of PNG's social indicators with those of other South Pacific countries (Table 2.1) indicates that PNG has plenty of ground to make up.

Table 2.1. PNG's Social Indicators Compared to other South Pacific Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDI Rank</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at Birth (year)</th>
<th>Adult Literacy Rate (%)</th>
<th>Health Services (%)</th>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births)</th>
<th>Safe water % population</th>
<th>Sanitation % population</th>
<th>Real GDP per capita (US$)</th>
<th>GNP per capita (US$)</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59 Fiji</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71/24</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4,858</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>0.787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104 Samoa</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>0.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119 Vanuatu</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,679</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126 Solomon Is</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129 PNG</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>165/54</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2.8 Education

PNG's education indicators are comparatively poor compared to the many South Pacific countries. Literacy rates are low and, in particular, females are substantially worse off than males while school retention rates have declined since 1970. Of those who commenced school in 1986, only 6% reached Grade 6, only 36% of current grade 6 gained places in secondary school and only 10% proceeded to higher education. The net result is that only 1% of age eligible students enter grade 11 (Ahai, 1996:229; AusAID, 1996a:95). The goal of the World Bank proposed education reform program for PNG is to address this problem of high attrition rates (AIDAB, 1994b). However, the most
crucial question is how this reform will be different from the ‘old’ system when there are 
still going to be ‘pushouts’.

In 1993, the Wingti Government introduced universal free education (AusAID, 
1996a:97) in response to the perceived lack of accessibility, equity and relevance in 
education. However, the expansion is facing many problems such as lack of trained 
teachers, poor teacher salaries, inadequate housing, law and order-related problems and, 
perhaps most importantly, the suitability of the curriculum. Free education has turned 
out to be a drain on the nation’s limited resources and many schools are reintroducing 
fees to help provide needed finances.

2.9 Employment

The 1990 census estimated that 49% of the population of 4 million were of working age. 
Of these, an estimated 13-14% (Joint Committee on Foreign affairs, Defence & Trade, 
1991:42) were in the formal wage employment while 36% were employed in the informal 
commercial activities, mainly self-employed small-holders selling part of this output for 
cash. Around 50% are either dependent on the subsistence economy or are unemployed 
(Education Sector Review, 1991:1). The majority of the labour force rely predominantly 
on the rural-based subsistence economy for their livelihood.

The public sector employs about a third of those in the formal wage employment with 
primary industries and commerce employing most of the rest. The unemployment 
situation worsened during the 1980s, reflecting a weak growth in the non-mining sectors. 
Agricultural employment increased by 3.7% per annum between 1980 and 1991 
(AIDAB, 1993:5). The mineral boom during the next decade holds little promise for 
employment because of its high capital intensity (Education Sector Review, 1991:1; 
AIDAB, 1994a:11).

2.10 The World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programme

In 1996, the Chan Government was forced to beg for assistance from the World Bank 
for a substantial loan. The first loan of K254 million was released to help the country 
meet its foreign exchange requirements. The IMF gave K147 million, Australia K67 
million and K40 million came from the Japanese Import-Export Bank. The second batch
of US$25 million (K31 million) was released following the meeting of specific conditions set by IMF (The Independent, July, 22, 1995: 10; The Independent October 4, 1996:1). The IMF's aim was to help the country achieve a sustainable balance of payments position. One of the primary criticisms of the SAP is that it aims to meet foreign exchange requirements, including debt service, by pursuing an 'export-led growth' model (George, 1994 & 1995). The strategy includes the following:

- devaluation of the currency, to discourage imports and encourage exports.
- drastic reduction of government expenditure, particularly on social spending.
- elimination of food and other consumption subsidies.
- privatisation of government enterprises and/or increases in prices charged by them
- the abolition of price control.
- 'demand management' (meaning reduction of consumption) through caps on wages.
- restrictions on credit and higher taxes and interest rates, in an effort to reduce inflation (The Independent, August 23, 1996:13).

The consequences are that incomes have fallen substantially; the long term effects on the country's competitiveness remain to be seen.

2.11 Future development

PNG has a range of development issues and constraints typical of many developing countries. The push for economic growth as a prerequisite for greater prosperity has resulted poorly for PNG with a widening gap between the rich and poor while its natural resources are rapidly being exploited by internal and external elites. The most pertinent issue that needs to be addressed by the citizens is, once the resources are depleted, how will PNG achieve its economic growth, particularly given its poor performance in developing its human capital? PNG needs to critically reassess its development needs and priorities rather than be a puppet to the insatiable demands of Western economies. The struggle for human development in the face of the emphasis on economic growth by the IMF and other powerful players, is a difficult balancing act. PNG governments see that growth may be necessary for development but is not sufficient and they recognise that violence is inimical to both growth and development, as noted earlier in section 1.3.
The next chapter specifically examines the nature, extent, causes and costs of the major types of violence in PNG.
Map 1.1  Papua New Guinea

Map of Papua New Guinea courtesy Current Affairs Bulletin
CHAPTER THREE

Dimensions of Direct Violence

Violence is prevalent throughout PNG. Chapter 3 explores the dimensions of violence under four main themes: violence against women, tribal fighting, Bougainville (a resource based conflict) and urban criminal violence. This discussion will draw attention to the four types of violence perpetuated largely by the unjust political and economic structures.

3.1 Violence against women

3.1.1 Nature

Violence against women refers to direct and indirect violence perpetrated by men whose actions reflect negative attitudes towards ‘their’ womenfolk. This type of violence ranges from negative derogatory comments expressed publicly and privately to rape and even murder of females. The focus of this discussion will be in the area of domestic violence as it is within households that men often exert extreme control and dominance over their wives. The National Council of Women (NCW), a body that attends to improving the status of women commissioned the Law Reform Commission (LRC) to conduct nationwide research into domestic violence in the early 1990s. The LRC defines domestic violence as "physical assault between husbands and wives or those living together as if they were husbands and wives" (Bradley, 1990:19).

Domestic violence is usually a deliberate action by jealous and angry husbands (LRC, 1992:5; Counts, et al., 1992; Post Courier July 24, 1996: 4). Evidence to be considered later suggests that the majority of males believe it is permissible to use physical force on their wives. They may practice adultery and/or use prostitutes, which can be considered as an indirect form of violence whereby a wife suffers from emotional and psychological abuse. Borrey’s (1992) study showed that most women imprisoned for crimes of violence had attacked other women either a second wife or a girlfriend of their husband.
It is important to note that in PNG, the subject of domestic violence is often overlooked as a law and order issue. Many citizens view domestic violence as a private matter in which outsiders should not interfere (Ekeroma, 1986:76; Reid, 1993: 8) and this is one reason why many incidents of domestic violence are not reported. Women may make a choice not to report domestic violence because of the fear of upsetting their husband and causing further violence (LRC 1992:9). Some husbands know that they can be in serious trouble with the law if their violent behaviour is publicly exposed. In some traditional settings, husbands fear that they may be asked to pay compensation for inflicting serious injury on a wife. Indeed, the wife could be retrieved by her family as a protective measure if they become aware of a husband's violence. However, some traditional families opt to remain oblivious to beatings because they feel the husband has paid bride price and therefore has the right to do what he wants with her. If domestic violence is reported to police, their general reaction is often one of feeling that they are 'interfering' in a domestic issue. Therefore, although domestic violence appears to have escalated, it is widely accepted throughout PNG culture (Toft, 1985a).

3.1.2 Costs

Domestic violence is costly. Apart from medical bills, the trauma of persistent domestic abuse can have serious emotional and psychological impacts on the children, as well as on the wife and husband. Wives suffer loss of self pride and dignity, shame, powerlessness and humiliation. Some may have been driven to commit suicide (The Saturday Independent, June 24, 1995: 24). Pregnant women have had miscarriages and other complications affecting them and their unborn child. At an economic level, domestic violence can affect women's personal development and lower their productivity levels (LRC, 1992: 10-15).

3.1.3 Survey results

An LRC rural survey found that 67% of wives interviewed said that their husbands hit them and this was confirmed by 65% of rural husbands (Toft & Bonnell, 1985:55-56). There was considerable variation between different rural areas. For example, in West New Britain and Oro Provinces, 49-53% of women surveyed said they had been assaulted by their husbands compared with 97% and 100% respectively in the Simbu and
Western Highlands provinces (Bradley, 1985; Bradley, 1990:19). One of the contributing factors to male aggression is through their social conditioning. For example, the Bun of East Sepik socialise their boys to be aggressive. On the other hand, societies such as Wape and Nago'isi value reconciliation and self control and socialise their children to solve conflicts peacefully (Counts, 1990: 236-237).

In low income households, 56% of wives said they were physically assaulted and this was confirmed by 55% of the men. Amongst high-income earners, 62.5% of women said they had been hit by their husbands, confirmed by 62.2% of husbands. The higher incidence of wife beating in urban areas may indicate greater female assertiveness; the threat this poses to males may lead them to beat their wives to maintain their dominance (Toft, 1986:22-3).

While far more men hit women, there are women who hit their husbands. The LRC survey found that 30% of rural husbands, 37% of urban low income husbands and 50% of urban elite husbands said they had been hit by their wives. In most instances, women hit in self defence (Josephides, 1985:94; Toft & Bonnell, 1985:86). On the other hand, 73% of women were killed by their husbands between 1979 and 1982 while murders by women of their husbands are frequently in response to long term physical abuse (Reid, 1993:11; LRC, 1987:4) quoted in Counts (1992:64). Finally, a survey conducted over a three month period in three police stations in NCD found that 94% of domestic violence complaints were made by wives and only 6% by husbands (Kaetovhuhu & Tyler, 1987 quoted in LRC, 1992:17-18).

One of the reasons for the persistence of domestic violence is that both sexes have accepted that wife beating is justifiable provided husbands have 'good reasons' (LRC, 1992:9). The LRC survey found that 66.5% of men and 56% of women said it was acceptable under certain circumstances for men to hit their wives. According to the LRC, quoted in Reid (1993: 12), 36% of men said they had hit their wives and 65.4% said it was acceptable, whilst 67% of women said they had been hit by their husbands and 55.1% said it was acceptable (Toft & Bonnell 1986:86). The acceptability of violence reflects the values embedded in PNG culture that reinforce male aggression and dominance over women.
3.1.4 Causes

The factors that lead to domestic violence can be examined in two levels. The first set of factors can trigger domestic violence although they are not necessarily the root causes. Some of these factors include sexual jealousy, alcohol and money problems (LRC, 1992:21). Sexual jealousy covers a range of male expectations, including being efficient in conducting domestic chores and being willing to provide sex when he wants it. Resisting sex is considered as "failing one of her duties" (LRC, 1992:21). Sexual jealousy refers also to adultery, real or suspected. In most cases, it is the husband who is promiscuous but when a wife accuses him of disloyalty, he may react by physically abusing her (Ranck & Toft 1986: 4). In reality, men may react in this manner to cover up their guilt. Polygamy is commonly practiced in the Highlands and women in such marriages make up the biggest group convicted for murder and assault (O'Callaghan, 1996: 23-24). Moreover, a wife who is in paid employment may represent a threat to the husband. The job is seen to increase her freedom of movement and the fear of her being admired by other men presents a challenge to the husband's masculinity to which he may respond violently (Toft & Bonnell, 1985:20-5; LRC, 1992:21). Money is another common problem particularly when the husband spends excessively on alcohol or gambling. Complaints by the wife may result in her being beaten because husbands feel they have right to do as they please.

The second level of analysis examines the underlying reasons for domestic violence. First, male dominance is deeply rooted in Melanesian culture. According to the LRC (1992:15), 'wife-beating ... encourages other forms of violence against females in general, because it reinforces an attitude of male superiority and disrespect for women'. PNG is predominantly a patrilineal society with males dominant in the social and political arena. Women are expected to accept their inferior status and to submit to men, including husbands, brothers and other male members of the society. By tradition, the husband owns the wife for whom he has paid through the bride price system. A wife becomes part of his possessions and gives him total rights and dominance over her and, to a lesser extent, the children (Counts, 1990:237). Wives work to please their husbands and his family, often suffering in silence under the many demanding roles she is expected to perform. Bride price can force a wife to stay in a violent relationship, particularly if
her family is not in a position to pay back the bride price. If the wife leaves the husband without returning the bride price payment, she can be imprisoned.

It is not traditional practice for women to make domestic violence a public issue. Typically, complaints are considered trivial and not worth public hearing (Strathern, 1985:12-13). Indeed, husbands may publicise their domestic problems as means of demonstrating their dominant role (Reid, 1993:14). Symbolic violence legitimises the gender inequality within marriages in PNG. Girls may be told stories early in life how to be good wives and to carry out their roles proficiently; they are warned of what happens to wives when they fail to fulfil their expected duties. For example, in the Western Highlands from which the researcher originates, girls are told that if they perform poorly in cooking that their husbands will burn their hands. Sexual relations with women are considered harmful to a male’s well being, particularly when women are menstruating, pregnant, after birth and while breast feeding (Counts, 1990:239; Counts, 1992). Such beliefs reinforce the subordinate role of women. Furthermore, traditional marriage was based more on work and sex than love. Work and sex were conducted under strict rules and guidelines and, in such a marriage environment, communication between sexes was often poor and conflict levels high.

In rural areas, the introduction of cash crops has led to further tension between males and females. Cash crops take up most of the best land once cultivated for food crops. The returns to cash crop production often goes to the men who spend it on whatever they please. Reduced land under food crops may mean that some of this money is needed to buy food and this can be a source of conflict (Counts, 1990: 243).

In urban areas, women without income earning opportunities may find themselves entirely dependent on men. Some women, particularly the educated, have achieved a measure of independence, but this sometimes itself leads to conflict. Men may feel threatened in a relationship with an educated women and may try to restrict her from furthering her career. Philip’s (1993) study of women in distance education at UPNG reported that men often made it very difficult for their wives to study. Most PNG men have yet to unlearn what tradition has taught them about women so that both sexes can enjoy the married relationship. Educated women are becoming more assertive; they wish
to make decisions and take control of their lives, but this needs the support of the men. As Stephen Pokawin (1996:12) has argued: “Our women do not need us to replace them. All they want is our genuine support and recognition of their full value as equal partners in the development of our country”. The 1975 Constitution of PNG enshrines this equality, stating that: “all citizens have the same rights, privileges, obligation and duties irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex”.

3.2 Tribal warfare

3.2.1 Traditional tribal warfare

While tribal warfare is quite unusual in coastal areas, it is sporadic in the Southern and Eastern Highlands, and common in Simbu, Enga and the Western Highlands (Strathern, 1977:135). Tribal warfare is a suitable description because the groups involved represent mini-states. Although tribes had their own form of legal and moral order, colonisers believed that these tribes lived in a state of anarchy (Narakobi, 1977; Reay, 1982:630; Gordon & Meggitt, 1985:192). Early colonial administrators imposed laws to enforce ‘peace’ and stability. Under patrol officers, people respected the law more so than in contemporary PNG, due to the fact that kiaps maintained a neutral role, imposed few cumbersome bureaucratic rules and had close contact with the villagers (Standish, 1973; Gordon & Meggitt, 1985:159; Tefft, 1988:156). It is interesting to note that although tribal warfare in coastal areas has been subjugated due to early pacification, people still resort to indirect forms of violence such as sorcery and black magic to harm or kill an enemy. In the Highlands tribal warfare is accepted as an important social and cultural phenomenon to enhance clan solidarity and to defend the territory vital for clan survival (Meggitt, 1977; Gordon 1943:150).

3.2.2 The causes of tribal warfare

In the pre-colonial era, tribal warfare occurred over issues involving marriage, pigs, land, revenge and prestige. Dorney (1991: 309) notes that late contact with European colonisers is a contributing factor to the continuation of tribal fighting. Highlands men
were raised to be warriors and to protect their clan and tribal interests. They regard violence as being ‘in their blood’, a view inherited from the past generations.

The increase in tensions due to population pressure is often thought to be the major cause of the apparent increase in tribal fighting which has occurred since colonisation. It is also likely that warfare was not as common in pre-colonial times because there were traditional alternatives (see also section 4.2) such as mediation and negotiation which people tended to use. This allowed the possibility of a mutually satisfactory outcome, compared with the imposition of an egal decision which typically results in a winner and a loser, and a good chance of recurring conflict. Tribal fighting remained as the last resort if the conflicting parties could not reach an agreement by “talking the conflict through”, the common traditional way of dealing with disputes. “Western law was held to be retributive, to address the individual and to emphasise the past; Melanesian law is compensatory, group oriented and concerned with the future” (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985:212). Further, the Reference on Customary Law lists the essential features of dispute resolution as follows:

“(1) the maintenance of social harmony through the dispute settlement process
(2) the importance of reaching a decision which is acceptable by the parties and the community
(3) varying degrees of popular participation in dispute settling
(4) the admission of a wide variety of evidence
(5) the opening of issues going back several years
(6) taking into account relationship between the parties” (Gordon & Meggitt, 1985:196).

The contrast between customary and legal approaches has left many people confused and frustrated. For instance, village courts seem informal and flexible, but the system is trapped in the formal procedure of formal court rooms and exploiting ‘village court magistrates’ as poorly paid agents of the legal system (Goddard, 1996). In the end, according to Strathern (1977:139) “the notions of individual punishment and jail were substituted for ideas of collective responsibility, vengeance, and compensation ...the people never regarded this as a valid substitution”. 
3.2.3 Contemporary tribal warfare

It is difficult to measure the extent of tribal warfare because of unreliable statistics. The figures may be manipulated and even exaggerated in some instances because of the desire to demand greater compensation. However, official records do point out that the numbers killed in tribal fights have increased. For example, Clifford et al. (1984: 96) quoted in Reid, 1993: 26) estimated an average of 20 deaths per year in the 1970s, 55 deaths in 1981 and 99 in 1982; this compares with Young's (1997:42) figure of 200 per year in the 1990s. Standish (1979: 28) documented tribal fighting in the Simbu Province in the 1970s which accounted for fifty lives per annum. In addition, people are injured, communities displaced and property destroyed and damaged.

Traditional tribal fighting was a ritual typically involving long and careful preparation, and was organised following strict tribal sanctions which helped to keep fighting under control. The weapons used were traditional and this kept the death toll low (Meggitt, 1977:58 & 257). Some variation existed between the different Highlands Provinces. While Simbu, Western Highlands and Enga restricted their killing to opposing warriors, Southern Highlands warriors would also kill 'civilians', including children and women (see section 4.2.1). Since the early 1980s, while certain aspects of tribal warfare have remained unaltered, Dorney (1990:311) and Strathern (1993:47) have observed that fighting rituals were broken with the increasing use of firearms. These have been obtained through a number of sources: robbery, borrowing a legally-held weapon from friends and a black market in guns smuggled from overseas. Also, military weapons have been supplied to clansmen from wantoks in the Police and the PNGDF or taken from the police armouries because of lack of security and accountability (Reid, 1993:27-28). Giddings (1991) reported that guns are highly priced on the black market, costing between K1000 and K3000 and that some members of the police are lured into selling guns. The warriors are supported by wantoks in official positions whose support is part of their efforts to maintain their network of obligations (Standish, 1979: 128-129; Gordon & Meggitt, 1985:156). Their involvement can either be through direct participation in tribal fighting or indirectly by supplying the tribe with modern weapons and giving their moral support. As Reid (1993: 28) states, "Tribal warfare is profoundly..."
embedded in the Highlands social system and it is difficult for any clan to avoid involvement”.

The effects of tribal warfare have added new dimensions to the contemporary social problems (Clifford et al, 1984:92). The traditional reasons for tribal warfare have been supplemented by alcohol, robbery, political opportunism, election and motor vehicle accidents (Ketan & Wari, 1992). Youths constitute the main perpetrators of major tribal warfare traditionally which once was strictly confined to village leaders and older men of high standing order in society (big men). Youths use tribal fighting to express their frustration and boredom, often forcing the involvement of older men (Strathern, 1977; Standish, 1981:7). In fact, the latter are likely to try to settle disputes peacefully (see section 4.2). Jealousy of a tribe which is doing well in business or whose young are succeeding well in education can trigger a tribal fight, sometimes with the aim of claiming compensation as a quick and easy means of accumulating wealth. Status is accorded to perpetrators of violence (Kerpei, 1976 quoted in Strathern, 1977:142). Finally, the choice of resorting to tribal fights may reflect the lack of faith and trust people have in the state and its mechanisms such as the courts, for resolving conflicts (Standish, 1979:128-129). According to Narakobi, quoted in Gordon and Meggitt (1985: 193), ‘many law and order problems are caused by the fact that the existing legal system does not provide appropriate answers’.

3.2.4 Costs of tribal warfare

The costs of tribal fighting is worsening with the frequency and the seriousness of fighting. Government costs include: the use of mobile police squads to control fighting; the destruction of Government property including schools, aid posts, and bridges; closure of government facilities, such as schools; and absenteeism amongst public servants (because of involvement in the fighting, or fear). Private losses occur to small business activities such as trade stores, piggeries and coffee trees (Clifford Report, 1984). The fight between the Kukika and Gneneka Tribes in the Mid Whagi in 1982 and 1983 led to the destruction of the water piping system installed by the Kukika. Tribal fighting can reduce the ability and willingness of individuals and the group’s ability to be
active participants in development programs. There are costs in terms of forgone or postponed production during fighting.

Further, physical violence is frequently used by the police deployed to stop tribal fighting and restore law and order. As Reid (1993: 27) observes, their inability to control the fighting has on occasions led police to act as an attacking force, whose members have raped women, burnt houses, and stolen food crops and other goods. A whole culture of violence is thus created.

3.2.5 Responses to tribal warfare

The State response to tribal warfare has been to treat the symptoms rather than the causes. The application of the legal system and the use of police force have not been effective in controlling wars (Reid, 1993:62). It draws attention to the need for more effective and alternative means of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, such as training the police be more disciplined to perceive their role differently.

Fr. Doug Young, who initiated the Gutpela Sindaun ("Peace") as an alternative nonviolent means of dealing with violence in the Enga Province, believes that this approach can also be adopted in other highlands regions. He proposes the Gutpela Sindaun Committee whose role would be to foster harmonious intergroup relations between tribal groups. The Committee would have undergone training in alternative conflict resolution methods rooted in traditional cultures. Examples of traditional means of building peace include: avoiding of rumour-mongering and story telling designed to foment conflict; the encouragement of intermarriage; and fostering the traditional exchange system (Young, 1997:43).

Traditional cultures have unique features which need to be protected. However, there are some aspects of culture that should be challenged because they are destructive. Tribal fighting is one of these. The beginning of this change should be in the minds of Highlands men, who need to revive the status of peacemaking and use Melanesian methods of mediation as a producti ve and positive alternative to fighting.
3.3 Bougainville - a resource based conflict

3.3.1 Introduction

The Panguna copper mine in Bougainville commenced operations in 1972 and provided 40 percent of the country’s export earnings and 17 to 20 percent of Government revenue by the late 1980’s (Standish, 1989:3; Callick, 1990:12). While accepting that the exploitation of natural resources is necessary, the Bougainville conflict sheds light on some of the serious underlying issues involved in such projects. The deep feelings of resentment by landowners over the company’s operation, supported by internal elites, represents a classic example of conflict over resource ownership and its exploitation (May & Spriggs, 1990; Spriggs & Deroon, 1992).

3.3.2 Issues of conflict

Five particular areas of conflict can be identified. First, there was the clash of traditional beliefs and attitudes with a modern sector, capital intensive profit-oriented business. The Melanesian concept of land ownership was vastly different from that of Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia (CRA) and the PNG Government. As early as 1969, CRA was warned that:

...there will inevitably be trouble in Bougainville if the people are forcefully asked to accept a legal system of land tenure for which they have no cultural preparation...Economic pragmatism might be a valid political argument, but it is no solution of itself to the problem of people who have been pushed to the edge of some social abyss and are being asked to leap into the twenty first century.


Second, there was the issue of compensation for damage resulting from the mining. Bougainville Copper Limited (BC) paid compensation for the loss of bush land, damage to crops, fences and the costs of relocation. The compensation process caused conflicts within village communities, especially between those who were compensated and those who were judged to be less directly affected and who were not compensated. There were also issues of monies shared within clans and how the interests of future generations were to be taken into account (Filer, 1990; Connell, 1991).
Third, Bougainvilleans were promised that the mine would be beneficial to them by way of employment opportunities and would encourage local participation in economic activities, as well as a share of the benefits as the country's GNP increased (Oliver, 1973:159; Quodling, 1991:37-42). In fact, the employees just prior to the mine's closure comprised 610 expatriates in highly skilled and well paid jobs, 2000 non-Bougainvilleans and 1000 Bougainvilleans. Of the last two groups, the majority were employed in semi skilled jobs at low salaries. Bougainvilleans benefited little from the anticipated linkage effects since most foodstuffs and other supplies were imported. They also resented the distribution of profits of which, in 1990, 58% went to the PNG Government, 35.6% to CRA, 5% to the Provincial Government and a mere 1% in royalties and compensation for the landowners. Before the mine closed, it was pumping a million kina a day into the national government's coffers and profits of K1.5 million a week to BCL (Dinnen, 1989; Rooie, 1989:12; Standish, 1989:3). In the first half of 1988, BCL's profit rose from K17.4 million [A$26.8 million] to K51.8 million [A$75.2 million] (Maclellan, 1989:40).

Fourth, there was the negative impact on the environment. BCL rejected the construction of a tailings dam because it believed the area was too unstable due to seismic activity. The tailings from the mine were dumped into Jaba River, enormously affecting the surrounding riverine ecosystem. The mine disposed of 12,000 tones of mine waste in the form of slurry each day contributing to 90% land loss in the immediate surroundings of the Jaba River (Gynberg, 1989:21; Robie, 1989:16). The methods of disposal affected surrounding agricultural lands and marine resources and poisoned community drinking water (Oliver, 1991). The communities closest to the mine along the Jaba river reported health problems attributed to the increased amount of dust and chemicals from the mine. Respiratory disease and diarrhoea and malaria increased because of river banks made swampy by the tailings' disposal (Quodling, 1991:29-36; Jenkins & Spence, 1996). It was reported in 1991 that 3000 people were estimated to have died on the island from preventable diseases such as malaria, gastro infections and tuberculosis.

Finally, Bougainvilleans resented the large number of expatriates and immigrants from the other areas of PNG. The Panguna minesite and the residential area of Arawa were
enclaves in which expatriates lived a segregated life, congregating in ‘white’ clubs and mixing little with the locals (Dorney, 1991:127-128).

3.3.3 The Bougainvillean response

Attempts to raise and resolve the conflicts listed in the previous section were met with little interest by CRA and the PNG Government. The buildup of frustration and anger over 30 years finally led to attacks on the mine by young radicals who formed the Bougainville Republican Army (BRA). This was led by Francis Ona, a former employee of BCL who believed that the older men were uninformed and not forceful enough in fighting for better deal (Connell, 1989:19; Dorney, 1991:123; Oliver, 1991:147). With him in leadership was Sam Kaouna, a former soldier in the PNG Defence Force and a trained explosives expert. Francis Ona demanded a K10 billion compensation payment for the use of land and environmental devastation, closure of the mine and political secession from PNG. The last of these has been pushed by at least some Bougainvilleans since the 1970s. The movement enjoyed popular support among many Bougainvilleans (Robie, 1989:15; Standish, 1985:4; Callick, 1990:18). Coupled with this is the perception of many Bougainvilleans that they are ethnically different to other Papua New Guineans and geographically and culturally part of the Solomon Islands.

When an independent study by a New Zealand company produced an environmental impact study in 1989 claiming that it could not be proven scientifically that fish were dying from the pollution of Jaba River, landowners described it a whitewash. Ona declared that “the only way is to shut the mine” (Robie, 1989:15; Standish, 1989: 4). Ona and his supporters took to the jungle to wage a war of attrition and sabotage against the mine.

3.3.4 A military solution

The BRA carried out a series of attacks on the mine beginning November, 1988. The mine shut down in December 1989 following further attacks on company workers (Post Courier October 7, 1989:3). The PNG Government attempted a military solution to defeat the BRA and get the mine back into operation (Pacific News Bulletin, 1992: 4-5,
November). Former Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu describes the stance which has been maintained by successive Governments:

> The priorities of the Government are clear. First, we will rid Bougainville of this terrorist scourge. Second, we will restore peace to the island. Third and final for the nation, we will re-open the Bougainville Copper mine. I want to assure the innocent people of Bougainville that the security forces will be controlled effectively and will pose no threat to those who remain within the law. They are there to help the people of the province regain a way of life which has been stolen from them by a group of ruthless and fanatical terrorists.

(Quoted in Albon, 1990:16)

Ona responded by warning Namaliu that “the measures you are taking to solve the crisis are only counter-productive” (Cullick, 1990:18). Ona was labelled by the PNG Government as a criminal, rascal and terrorist while the Australian media at times portrayed him as a Robin Hood figure who was only interested in claiming land back for his people (Robie, 1989:10; Seneque, 1990:11). The Commissioner for Police issued “shoot to kill” orders against the saboteurs. The PNGDF commander Colonel Lima Dotaona was ordered to adopt tough military measures including the electrification of pylons, booby traps, and landmines (Robie, 1989:17). Police and PNGDF declared “all-out war on militants” under the operation code-named Tapara (Post Courier January 12, 1990:1; Amnesty International, 1993).

While a military solution was sought by the Government, prominent Bougainvillean leaders such as John Momis, Joe Kabui, Bishop Gregory Singkai and Theodore Miriung pleaded for the use of a more peaceful solutions based on mediation, negotiation and dialogue between the parties (Maclellan, 1989:41; Dorney, 1991:123; The National, 1996:17). Several attempts were made to bring BRA leaders and the Government to dialogue. These efforts led to the formation of two political groups, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) and the Bougainvillea Transitional Government (BTG). BIG aims at achieving complete independence from PNG by any means and as soon as possible whereas the BTG believes independence can be achieved in three stages (i) continue as part of PNG, but have equal power with the PNG Government over Bougainville affairs (ii) be independent apart from foreign affairs and defence and eventually (iii) become completely independent. BTG emphasises the importance of
allowing time for dialogue between various parts of the Bougainvillean population as well as for building a self-reliant economy. Both groups want independence either on their own or in association with the Solomon Islands (O'Callaghan, 1991). Ona appointed himself the president of BIG, declaring that Bougainville was an independent country and renaming it the Republic of Mekamui.

A second PNGDF mission in January 1990 called 'Operation Footloose' failed to defeat the BRA after some intense fighting (Albon, 1990:16). The Government used other methods to try to force the surrender of BRA, including stopping shipping and air services to Bougainville, followed by a complete economic and communications blockade on the island. The civil war resulted in about 44,000 people being placed in the PNG government 'care centres' as internal refugees. The blockade restricted the import of medicines, food, clothing, and petrol. The consequent deterioration of health care has resulted in the death of as many as 15,000 Bougainvilleans (Blair, 1997:42).

According to an Amnesty International report released in 1997, "The people of Bougainville have been subjected to extra-judicial executions, 'disappearances', torture, including rape, ill-treatment, arbitrary detention and surveillance' at the hands of PNGDF (quoted in Blair, 1997:41). Former PNG Judge Tos Barnett and Australian-based activist Moses Havini have argued that police and PNGDF members should be charged for violation against human rights abuses (Callick, 1990:20; Havini, 1992:163). Documentary evidence is difficult to obtain from war zones, but anecdotal evidence and verbal testimony by church leaders and the like provide an overwhelming evidence of PNGDF personnel at times being out of control in respect of their treatment of the civilian population.

The BRA and elements associated with it have also committed atrocities. They have threatened, assaulted, killed, and looted the properties of people whom they suspected of supporting the Government (Briggs, 1990:25-30). Joseph Kabui, former premier of North Solomons Province, claimed that his life was threatened by BRA when he talked against secession. Provincial Miniser John Bika was assassinated. Although sympathetic to the BRA cause, Theodore Miring believed only nonviolent means could restore

In 1997, the Government attempted to hire mercenaries from the British-based Sandline International at the cost of K36 Trillion to 'put an end' to the conflict and get the mine back in operation (Blair, 1997: 40-43). The use of mercenaries was thwarted through the defiance of then PNGDF commander, General Jerry Singirok, (The Sydney Morning Herald March 24, 1997:1) a move supported widely by the common citizens.

3.3.5 Attempts to obtain peace

Efforts to obtain ceasefires and peace agreements efforts by the PNG Government have thus far been violated by the PNGDF and the BRA. The two major peace agreements to date are the Endeavour Agreement and the Honiara Accord and Agreement (Havini, 1992:162). The former was signed by the PNG Government and BIG on 5 August, 1990, and included lifting the blockade to allow shipment of relief supplies to Buka island although the BRA alleged that the presence of PNGDF troops on the relief ship was a breach of the agreement. Under the second agreement, signed on 23 January, 1991, the PNGDF could not re-enter Bougainville after their withdrawal in May, 1990; BRA rebels would be granted amnesty and immunity from prosecution; all services would be restored; prisoners of war were to be released; and a multinational supervisory team would monitor progress (Callick, 1991:15). Under the agreement, the PNG Government lifted the blockade and basic services such as health and education were gradually restored. However, the BRA were not willing to give up their arms after witnessing the breaking of previous ceasefire agreements by the PNGDF (O'Callaghan, 1991). Despite the signing of the agreement, deeply embedded distrust remained.

Following the Honiara Accord, the then Deputy Prime Minister of PNG, Ted Diro remarked that the solution to end the war was to assassinate the rebel leaders and begin an all out civil war to take back the island (O'Callaghan, 1991). Another Honiara Accord was signed in 1992 by the Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan and BRA commander Sam Kauona. Whilst there are grounds for optimism in 1998, Francis Ona recently remarked that:
The fight is connected on both sides, with independence and mining. It is to protect the land, environment and social system on Bougainville...We believe that people's lives, social life, political or whatever, and the environment, will be disturbed by all these mines. This one thing that most people don't understand. We are standing for independence because only through independence all these mines will be under control.

(Blair, 1997:42)

Attempts at nonviolent resolution have included numerous meetings, conferences and workshops, such as the Bougainville Leaders' Forum in April, 1993; the Resolution of the Bougainville Peace Conference held in Arawa, 10-14 October; 1994; The Bougainville Crisis: the search for Peace and Rehabilitation Conference, 22-24 June, 1995 at ANU; the Bougainville Women's Conference in May, 1993; the Bougainville Businessmen's Association Conference in June 1993; and the Education and Reconstruction Seminar in September, 1991 (Ahai, 1996:17). The PNG NGO the Foundation For Law and Order has conducted conflict resolution courses. The North Solomons Provincial Government has produced Bougainville: From Talk To Action-1994-1997: A Needs Analysis and Three Year Provincial Action Plan for the Rehabilitation and Social Development for the North Solomons Province (Bopp & Ahai, 1994) and meetings between PNG Government representatives and the Bougainville leaders resulted in 'The Charter of Mirigini for a New Bougainville' (Pacific Research, 1994). Most recently, a United Nations Inter-Agency Mission (1997) produced a two volume report on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Bougainville.

These are examples of efforts to help end the conflict and to develop mechanisms of peacebuilding. They commence by helping individuals overcome the physical, psychological and social wounds of war. The next step would be to initiate development using a bottom up approach, with the local people actively involved in its formation, as opposed to the top down model offered by CRA (Peniai, 1995; Ahai, 1996). The contrast between the two is made clearly by John Momis in a 'letter to CRA' (Quodling 1991:91):

You are not ruthless exploiters. You are the modern faceless corporation which take no care to observe local laws and incorporates local people, locking them into minority shareholding in trading operations you so generously call a
foundation...You may not be legally responsible for the Bougainville Development Corporation, but morally it is your shame as much as ours. The problem is that your way and our Melanesian way are different. Our people want to improve their lives, to improve their skills and abilities. They want to learn skills appropriate to village development. Not only has BCL nothing to offer that is relevant to assisting the self-reliance and dignity of our people, it actually saps their confidence, reducing our people to development wage slaves and cogs in a wheel.

3.4 Urban criminal violence

3.4.1 Introduction

The increase in urban criminal violence (see Tables 1.1 and 3.1) lies behind the perception that law and order has broken down (Reid, 1993:17; Clausen, 1997:39). Much of this urban crime is carried out by unemployed youths known as 'rascals' who engage in breaking and entering homes, car theft, robberies, murder and rape (Harris, 1988). They are also moving into the drug trade (The Independent November 8, 1996:1) and their activities are having a trickle down effect in many rural areas. Goddard (1992; 1995) and Dinnen (1995) argue that the relationship between unemployment and rascalism is not straight-forward. Firstly, rascalism seems to be an avenue where ordinary Papua New Guineans have resorted to as a direct and indirect means of expressing their anger at an unjust structure. Secondly, it is the only choice people feel they have of obtaining wealth and personal power which they are denied under the present system that favours the domestic elites and their foreign counterparts.

Another type of urban crime is 'white collar' crime, when the politically and economically privileged sectors of society engage in various types of misappropriation and corruption (Dinnen, 1991a; McGeough, 1995). Typically, however, crime is thought to be confined to the lower socio-economic order groups whose actions impinge on those in higher socio-economic groups.

In PNG, the law and order problem appears particularly alarming because the media portrays the country as the most dangerous and violent in the Asia/Pacific region (Turner, 1990:163, quoted in Reid, 1993:16). Although there is little reliable information on the actual incidence and pattern of crime in PNG (see section 3.4.2),
lawlessness is unquestionably causing a great deal of damage and suffering (AIDAB, 1994a: 36; Post Courier November 1, 1996:3). Law and order is one of the major constraints on growth identified by AusAID (1996:6). Whilst recognising the exaggerations of media reporting, there is mounting evidence that PNG has a problem of lawlessness and that more effort is needed to address the root causes rather than merely attending to the symptoms (Cox, 1992; Dinnen, 1992a; Nibbrig, 1992; Vulum, 1996; Natin; 1996:9). The Morgan Report (1983), commissioned by the Department of Provincial Affairs, and the Clifford Report (1984) by the INA and IASER are two comprehensive but somewhat dated reports on the nature and extent of crime in PNG.

3.4.2 The extent of crime

Despite the fact that crime is portrayed as a serious national problem, it is difficult to accurately assess the actual extent and trends of violence in PNG due to inadequate and unreliable official statistics (Clifford Report, 1984:28; Morauta, 1986:6; Dinnen, 1992a:7; Post Courier October 30, 1996:3). Statistics on the extent of crime compiled by the police suggest a decline in criminal activity which is not consistent with the general perception and experiences of the community (Morauta, 1986:28-44; Nibbrig, 1992:116). For instance, there is a general belief that 1996 - the 'Year of Law Enforcement' - saw an upsurge in crime, particularly in Port Moresby. Table 3.1 suggests a decline in crime in that year, even allowing for the fact that the 1996 data exclude the last two months of the year.

Table 3.1 - Reported crime by type, 1994-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Murder</th>
<th>Sexual offences</th>
<th>Drug offences</th>
<th>Fire arms offences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1246</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 (1)</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (The Independent November, 15, 1996:5), based on data from the Police crime data base.
Note: 1 up to October 31st only.

Some of the more notorious crimes in 1996 included the following:
• the murder of four high school students by members of a security firm in Port Moresby in retaliation for the death of the son of the owner of the security firm (Post Courier October 28, 1996:1).

• four consecutive bank holdups and attempted robberies in Port Moresby, one involving a PNGDF soldier (Post Courier August 9, 1996: 4).

• the slaying of Premier Miriung (Post Courier, October 14, 1996:1).

• a dramatic increase in breaking and entering of homes and crimes against people, which resulted in a three month curfew (The Independent November 15, 1996:3).

3.4.3 Rascal gangs

Rascal gangs emerged in the late 1950s (Dorney, 1991:301) but began to generate serious public concern in the 1980s. Rascals tend to be unafraid of the police and the legal system which they view as weak and ineffective. They are one of the few inter-ethnic organisations in a country where people tend to keep to their own ethnic groups (Nibbrig, 1992:117; Goddard, 1992:21). A gang leader is like a traditional 'big-man'; he is powerful but, at the same time, is expected to share his resources in order to maintain his power (Dinnen, 1986; Dinnen, 1989; Goddard, 1992).

The Clifford Report (1984:28-29) estimated that gangs typically consist of a core group of 20-30, with a total of about 70 full gang members. Individuals who commit petty crimes may be unrelated to the gangs, although they are associated with gangs in the public perception. Some gangs have set up their own retail outlets to sell their stolen goods. The growth of gangs has instilled something of a siege mentality in residents of urban areas and led to the rapid growth of private security firms and intensified security in homes and buildings.

A phenomenon dating from the 1980s and used by some criminal groups has been to surrender, a strategy used to secure prestige and financial payments from the Government. A commitment to surrender is rarely unconditional and should financial payments not materialise, the implicit threat is to return to crime. Churches have played a major role by administering the rituals of forgiveness and reconciliation integral to most surrenders. Dinnen (1995:116) observes that surrenders are an innovative way in which marginalised social groups can find a negotiating space with Government to obtain financial support and recognition.
3.4.4 White collar crime

The extent of this type of urban crime is difficult to measure because there are no obvious victims and it usually does not involve direct violence (Reid, 1993:20; McGeough, 1995). Hence, it does not attract as much fear as the direct street violence associated with rascals. White collar crime nonetheless has a negative impact on the performance of commercial and private enterprises thereby on the economy on the whole. Clausen (1997:35) shares the views of Meg Taylor, a board member of the corruption watchdog Transparency International (Post Courier October 24, 1996:5), and Governor General Sir Wiwa Korowi, that corruption, manipulation, favours, deals, nepotism, and abuse of public power are highly corrosive and damaging to society and economy. Clausen (1997:35) asserts that 'graft creates and compounds other problems: inefficiency in a public service starved of funds and trained staff, a failure to deliver badly needed services like education and health'.

Since independence, white collar crime among politicians and bureaucrats has grown into a major problem. Wari Iamo of the PNG Research Institute asserts that 'politics has become a lucrative and dirty game [where] politicians freely change allegiances and line their pockets with contemptuous disregard for principle and those they allegedly represent' (quoted in McGeough, 1995). The extent of white collar crime can be seen by the Ombudsman Commission's submission to the National Crime Summit in Port Moresby in February 1991, which revealed that 90 of the 109 members of the National Parliament were being investigated for corruption (Dinnen 1991a:11). However, many Commission investigations and recommendations have not been acted upon and left to die a natural death (The Independent November 8, 1996:5). Politicians and senior public servants have been dismissed, suspended or reprimanded because of misappropriation of public funds (Maino, 1985: 57).

Some white collar crime can inflict personal injury and death. Politicians and businessmen may use rascal gangs to carry out paybacks or use scare tactics against opponents, especially during elections (Dinnen, 1992:1). In August 1991, the Ombudsman Commission's offices were broken into and important documents stolen. Some days later, the National Fraud Squad offices were destroyed by fire, around the
time that the Minister for Police alleged criminals were working with politicians (Harris, 1988: v-vi).

The statutory body established to monitor the Government's Leadership Code of Ethics is the Ombudsman Commission. The code states that "a leader shall not gain or enter into any transaction or engage in a use of his office for personal gain or enter into any transaction of engage in any enterprise or activity that might be expected to give rise to doubt in the public mind as to whether he is carrying out or has carried out the duty imposed by the above" (Dorney, 1991:216). However, the establishment of the Commission has so far not deterred leaders from their continued corrupt practices (Post Courier July 31, 1996:3). If anything, it seems to be worsening as foreign companies queue to exploit the country's natural resources. Indeed, corruption is assumed to be part of the ordinary operation of TNCs, politicians and bureaucrats. An unusually clear study of corruption in the PNG log export industry has been made by Grynberg et al (1988), and the Barnett Report of Inquiry into the Forest Industry (1990) details many examples of corruption involving TNCs and local politicians.

3.4.5 The costs of crime

Crime prevention takes a large slice of the national budget. The allocation to police has risen from 21.5 percent of the national budget in 1989 to 32.9 percent in 1996 (see Table 1.2). Allocations to the judiciary and the Ombudsman Commission have remained reasonably constant (Vulum, 1996). Considerable amounts of Australian foreign aid is allocated to police rather than to directly productive activities (Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1991:72).

Less obvious are the costs in terms of individual freedom. Curfews are applied with increasing frequency, particularly in Port Moresby (The Independent November 8, 1996:2). Under the Curfew Act of 1987, police have much increased powers to search areas where criminal activity is suspected. The Wingti government's Internal Security Act forbids nonviolent demonstrations and protests. Police action in dealing with tribal fights (see section 3.2.5), demonstrations and suspected criminals increasingly involve 'militaristic solutions' and excessive force (Cox, 1992; Dorney, 1991:290-300; Dinnen,

The costs of crime faced by other sectors of society includes private companies' spending on the security of their offices and factories and the homes of their employees (see section 1.3) which results in higher costs of production. For individuals, there are the monetary costs of security measures, the costs of replacing stolen goods and the feelings of fear and insecurity which reduce well-being and lowers productivity.

A major reason for government concern, however, is the belief that the law and order problem is threatening capitalist development (AIDAB, 1994b: 100) by making both domestic and foreign investment unattractive.

3.4.6 Causes

Dinnen (1993a:140) divides the causes of crime into two categories - structural and institutional. Structural factors include the social, economic and political issues that encourage certain individuals and groups to become involved in crime. Institutional explanations emphasise the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system. Clearly, the modernisation of society and economy results in a rapid enhancement of the standard of life of a few and little change, or even an absolute deterioration for the majority. Western-style development means a widening gap between the majority and the new elite. This disparity encourages unemployed young men to join gangs to steal as way of building their own material wealth (Dinnen, 1992). Apart from the opportunity of earning income, other contributing factors to crime include alcohol and drug abuse, and the male-driven youth culture where boys put their courage to the test; this is one reason why the children of upper and middle classes join gangs (Nibbrig, 1992:123-124).

We have mentioned that indignation directed against the beneficiaries of a system that denies benefits to the majority may be an important motive (Nibbrig, 1992:122-127; Vulum, 1996). Nibbrig (1992:127) reiterates Harris' (1988a) suggestion 'that to fail to examine the sources of indignation among rascals is to fail to understand what continues to fuel their activities'. For instance, in an interview with Sam Vulum (1996), gang members said that the widening gap between the rich and poor, coupled with difficulties
they face daily to simply survive, had forced them to turn to crime. They saw rebellion against a system which has failed to provide them with opportunities for meaningful participation in their communities to be a central part of their survival mechanism.

Institutional explanations explore the inadequacies of the formal criminal justice system. The revisionist explanation, which focuses on problems within the system, whereas the fundamentalist explanation questions the principles on which the current system is modelled (Dinnen, 1993a:21-22). Revisionists are critical of the performance of the criminal justice system including such matters as poor police investigation procedures, limited statistical data on crime, low conviction rates, long delays in the processing of cases, lack of coordination between the police, the courts and correctional institutions, inexperienced lawyers, inadequate resources, bail absconding and a high level of prison escapes (Dinnen, 1992; Dinnen, 1993a:22; Clifford Report, iii-iv). For example, only 34% to 60% of all crimes (depending on type) handled by the police entered their official crime statistics (Clifford et al., 1984: Vol 1: 15); in the 1980s, less than 3% of break and enters led to an arrest, and only 5% of stolen property and 7% of stolen vehicles were recovered (Clifford Report, 1984: 10-28; Reid, 1993:20).

3.4.7 Alternative solutions

Over the years, successive governments have responded to escalating crime levels by reactive short term measures. When there is a public outcry and investor concerns over crime, Government has responded with a number of repressive measures aimed at bringing the conflict under control very quickly. Root causes are not addressed.

There are alternative measures which, although long term, are potentially more effective. These are beyond the scope of this thesis, but wholly consistent with its emphasis on nonviolence and justice as necessary prerequisites for peace.

In summary, this chapter aimed to put into perspective the predominant types of violence in PNG and how these affect citizens at the local and national levels. This violence is a symptom of a deeper cause, embedded in the structure of society which gives rise to the direct and indirect forms of violence. Being conscientized concerning these issues is a necessary and important step in order to reflect on causes and to initiate changes which
will build peace and justice. The next chapter is based on the premise that resolution of
the underlying conflict is necessary in order to avoid violence. It discusses both
traditional conflict resolution practices and representative examples of Western conflict
resolution approaches.
CHAPTER FOUR

Traditional Ways of Resolving Conflict

4.1 Introduction

We saw in Chapter Three that violence is widespread in PNG. However, peace is far more common and there are well-developed traditional procedures for handling disputes. In this chapter, we examine some of these procedures and compare and contrast them with Western conflict resolution procedures. We commence with a discussion of the types of conflict likely to occur in village society.

It should be noted that PNG society is based on communal and cooperative behaviour. The obligations of sharing, supporting and reciprocity all work to enhance group cohesiveness (Reay, 1981; Narakobi, 1983:30; Goddard, 1995). Nonetheless, conflicts occur within and between groups, which can be categorised into four types:

- conflicts between individuals (e.g. in marriages, in households)
- conflicts between an individual and a group
- conflicts between two or more groups
- conflicts between households

In the Melanesian cultural context all conflicts are a public matter, given the generally high degree of group cohesion (Gewertz, 1984: 619; Greenhouse, 1987:39). Communal conflicts surface in a number of ways. These include everyday disputes which manifest themselves as arguments and verbal abuse. Some cultures may not consider these to be serious although sometimes such conflicts have the potential to trigger more serious problem. When faced with a conflict, some individuals become emotional and at times irrational and a disagreement may become violent. On the other hand, conflicts can create an opportunity for strengthened relationships (Tillet, 1991; Waal, 1989:236). In
the following table are summarised a number of typical traditional conflicts and the ways in which they are commonly resolved.

Table 4.1 Common conflicts and traditional responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A married woman of one clan runs away with a man from another clan.</td>
<td>Due to the bride price system, women are often forced to return to the husband. If she elopes again, the two clans try to solve the dispute by talking through the conflict to reach a consensus decision. If they do not reach a consensus, tribal fighting would most likely occur. Normally, compensation is paid to her clan, and the clan of the 'new' man, to the husband's clan. She could return to her former husband or, if she decides to marry the man she eloped with, further resolutions are made. If children are involved (in patrilineal societies), they are expected to remain with the father and the woman's family are expected to pay back the bride price payment. She is often banned from visiting her children and the children from visiting her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Arguments between two families or clans because of stealing, or damage to the gardens by pigs.</td>
<td>Family or clan members would discuss the incident in an open forum aided by a mediator or an elder. Compensation is the normal practice helping to settle the dispute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Conflict within the family.</td>
<td>The family could attempt to resolve the conflict on their own or invite a third party to intervene to help mediate the conflict. Peacemaking includes compensation followed by family feasting as a mark of the end of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conflict between two or more clans over land.</td>
<td>The 'big men' of the village discuss and plan strategies of how best to deal with the conflict. Negotiation and mediation often leads to finding a solution but at other times it may end up in tribal fighting. This may happen when people are dissatisfied with the compensation demand or the compensation demands have not been adequately fulfilled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Conflict between two individuals or an individual and a group from another clan</td>
<td>A solution is reached through mediation and negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rape of a woman by a man of another clan.</td>
<td>If the rape is reported, the leaders of the two clans resolve the conflict by deciding on compensation. This is paid by the man's clan to the wife, the husband, and his clan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Chagnon (1967: 13) 'cultural systems define and regulate the circumstances under which expressions of aggression are permitted, what form they take, against what and whom they are directed and the legitimate means of such expressions'.
The extreme form of unresolved conflict, tribal warfare has culturally been accepted as a necessary means to assert a clan's name, identity, dominance, strength and power over another. As regards conflict between groups, the decision to enter into warfare is typically a last resort when nonviolent actions and constrained violence fail to result in a resolution. However, dispute resolution in Melanesian culture is founded on the ritual of consensus decision-making, which allows parties to talk the conflict through. A decision reached in the end is usually satisfactory to all parties. There are no mechanical applications of predetermined rules. Talking the conflict through is the dominant method and involves lengthy periods of discussion and negotiation. The art of peacemaking is an important function of elders and the 'big men' of the society. The qualities involved in peacemaking include the ability to communicate skillfully, a sensitivity towards the participants in the conflict and a sense of tolerance and respect for all parties. At the same time the peacemaker must be neutral and apply his knowledge of traditional values to negotiate a peaceful solution. The Melanesian consensus approach is a time consuming method but frequently avoids the human and economic costs of warfare.

Young (1997:42) sums up the range of traditional nonviolent methods of dealing with conflict so as to avoid warfare as follows:

- avoidance of enemies and enemy territory
- flexibility and genealogies (thereby providing face-saving solutions)
- social shaming of potential trouble makers
- migration to other areas
- encouraging traditional religious values
- fostering effective leadership
- instigating informal dispute settlement procedures
- development of valued relations, ties and cross-cutting ties such as participation in an exchange system and intermarriages between enemies.

In the next section, we expand our knowledge of traditional conflict resolution by examining four case studies reported in the anthropological literature.
4.2 Case studies of traditional conflict resolution

In this section, a number of case studies are presented which illustrate the types of nonviolent means used by traditional cultures to deal with conflict and to bring violence to an end. These are based on anthropological studies with various emphases which means that they are not necessarily ideal for our purposes.

4.2.1 Revenge and redress among the Huli

Glasse (1959) examines revenge and redress among the Huli of the Southern Highlands. Breaches of norms within local descent groups (typically comprising less than 100 people) are usually settled by the intervention of other group members whose influence includes threat of expulsion or withdrawal of group support. Such intervention, may mean that the conflict is dealt with by hand to hand fighting or with sticks, followed by compensation payments to mend any remaining feelings of hurt.

Typical breaches between descent groups include insults, adultery, seduction of young girls, theft, damage to gardens or other property, failure to meet obligations (e.g. payment of compensation) and attempted or actual homicide. The methods of revenge - the obligatory response to such breaches - are poisoning, sorcery and warfare. Glasse distinguishes between feuds (which involve two local descent groups and limited destruction for a specific injury) and warfare, involving many groups and general destruction over several weeks or months. Warfare ends with formal negotiated settlements when human losses amount (and are in rough balance) and/or when food shortages intervene. Negotiations are carried out by neutrals or by men with relatives on both sides of the war. Discussion are then held to determine damages to be paid to enemies and allies. The individuals involved in the initial conflict, and their descent groups, are responsible to provide compensation to any allied group which suffered a death, at a rate of perhaps 30 pigs per death in a widespread war.

4.2.2 Contrasting styles of conflict resolution in New Ireland

Billing's study (1991) of Tikana and Lavongai, neighbouring areas in New Ireland, provides a comparative example of how two cultures deal quite differently with their
conflicts. Tikanas were concerned more with drawing people together peacefully as a group. They make every effort to prevent any escalation of violence with the aim of ending the conflict. Men and women are treated as equals since Tikana is a matrilineal society. Cultural institutions in Tikana promote unity through giving, helping and doing things together. Ceremonial exchanges provide ongoing channels through which constructive and peaceful relations are initiated over wide areas and nurtured over long periods of time. The peacemaking processes involve reconciliation, mediation and compromise with the goal of promoting a win-win situation.

Lavongai, on the other hand, is a patrilineal society, with no rules or leadership roles to help resolve conflict and justice is sought irrespective of the impact it may have on peace. Lavongais have never been willing to follow a leader, or accept an idea because some 'authority' suggested it. They live as individuals and strive hard to get what they can get at the expense of others. The weak are more likely to be exploited. Disputes are viewed as private matters between individuals and unrelated to the public interest. Quarrels are often considered entertaining while marital disputes are frequent and violent; usually no one intervenes. These contrasting styles can be illustrated by the following case studies.

**Tikana**

When resolving conflicts, Tikanas give priority to peace over justice, as the following examples illustrate.

(a) **Property**

A dispute between two old ladies over a pig occurred, each claiming that the pig belonged to her. The dispute started when the pig was fed by one old lady to which the other reacted arguing that the act was an attempt to steal her pig. The son of the old lady who fed the pig reacted by hitting the old lady who complained. The Local Government Councillor from another village intervened to hear the both sides of the story to resolve the conflict. A big man from another village, however, added that it was important to get all the bad talk out so to avoid any further conflict. The Councillor decided that it was important to address the primary problem and suggested that he would kill the pig. One of the disputants suggested that the pig be allowed to go to the
bush where it would be 'everyone's pig' and this was the resolution - that the public got the pig. To end the dispute, an exchange was carried out where those who became part of the problem gave each other five shillings as they shook their hands. This brought an end to the quarrel and involved a win-win situation for all parties.

(b) Marriage

In marital conflicts, the extended families of each spouse are called to settle them. The goal is to reach a reconciliation of all parties, although there was one recent divorce where an abandoned husband went to live next door to his former wife and her new husband so that he could still have access to his children. In another incident, a couple resumed their marriage after some months of separation when he was found to be having an affair with his half sister. The fault was dealt when the husband returned home.

(c) Leadership

The memai in malangan ceremonies has the major role of preventing disputes from arising either because of competition in exchanges or jealousy over who will pass on memaihood to another young man or over who did not bring a pig. The memai have an institutionalised way of ending disputes if they do occur. Billings (1983) describes one example of such disputes:

'When a shouting match followed dissension over who should bring a carving to a particular malangan ceremony, the memai strode into the centre of the gathering waving a particular kind of leaf and calling out their names. In this case, people immediately quieted shouting and sat down, waiting for the memai to lead the way to compromise. Toward the end of this malangan, the memai was asked to 'step down' from his task of passing on memaihood to a young man, so that another memai, of the young man's clan, could make the installation. The ousted memai was given one string of shell currency, to 'buy his shame', and, thereafter, he stayed home: no power struggle disturbed the unity of the group'.

Lavongai

Lavongais are more interested in seeking justice than reconciliation. Disputes are considered as private matters between individuals and have no community significance.
Lavongais entertain violence rather than seeing it as any threat to the community. Loss of control is accepted as a ‘peak experience’, a sign of dedication and commitment. The young boys of Lavongai are trained to be aggressive and violent.

(a) Property and labour

The United Farmers Association (TIA) representative called a meeting, at which he criticised the people for not turning up to work on the TIA coconut plantation. Some people agreed with his reaction while others complained about the TIA party held in the previous week where no food had been provided. Those who turned up ate the food they brought themselves and then went home. Furthermore, a number of people expressed the view that co-ops were a failure because people in fact failed to cooperate and also clerks were accused of stealing money.

Talking moved onto stealing in general where the theft of betel nuts was brought into the discussion. The man whose betel nut was stolen began running around in circles, shouting, ‘You like to steal’? You like to steal?’. He even threatened to shoot the thief himself. General fist fights broke out and accusations were made concerning theft of food crops.

Eventually, the man who stole the betel nuts walked through the crowd and called out that everyone should dance in the ‘bright moon’. The person whose betel nut was stolen walked over and shook his hands which ended the quarrel (‘bright moonlight’). People drifted away, telling stories about their past failures to settle disputes.

(b) Marriage

Disputes in marriage are frequent and violent and usually no one intervenes. One incident involved a wife who saw her husband laughing and singing with his friends which she interpreted as talking about his affairs with other women; she hit him on the head with a rock rendering him unconscious. The husband of one of his girlfriends later came to beat him up. The story was told dramatically with much laughter, although privately those involved suffered emotional pain.
(c) Leadership

In Lavongai, there are no traditional big men. The colonial administrators created positions of leadership but the appointed men abused their positions by exploiting their people and threatening to put them in jail if they failed to comply. No traditional leader tried to help resolve disputes or to create peace in the village. When people engage in public exchanges of accusations, amused crowds would gather to watch.

4.2.3 Settlement of disputes in Tabar - New Ireland

Disputes amongst the Tabar, as reported by Groves (1936-37), occur between individuals, large groups, whole families, clans and subclans. The primary goal of dispute settlement is to safeguard the interest of the community, restore harmony and secure reciprocal co-operation between groups. The frequent personal squabbles are usually settled between individuals rather than being brought to the attention of the whole group. Any conflicts seen to be outside the scope of the traditional “court” were dealt with by the local luluais and tultuls appointed by the colonial administrators.

The Tabar dispute settlement followed a primitive legal code which involved a formula of recognised precedent which served as guides. Older people made reference to past disputes and how these were settled; thus a body of precedents made a positive contribution to considerations of what should be done in the present. The procedure of these courts is as follows:

The nig-vakuit-kokok (we all-talk-together - type of “court”).

1. The courts are usually held in the evening when everyone has returned from work, and are signalled by blowing the conch shell.

2. Participants squat in groups. The senior men open the proceedings by stating the reason for the assembly, naming the individuals involved in the dispute and expressing the concern that the dispute may cause disharmony within the group. During the proceedings, the statements and expressions of the older men are always listened to with respect.
3. The court allows no rigid form of procedure with no recognised judge and jury. Contributions by way of testimony or advice are made even though some contributions may be irrelevant to the issue.

4. In brief, the matter is brought to the public notice. Any defiance by an individual or group of anti-social nature is subjected to public examination and criticism to safeguard the welfare of the group as a whole and so that its institutions are respected and preserved.

A case study (Groves 1936-37:509-510) illustrates this procedure:

An old woman from the Keis tribe, whose ti-i-ti (subdivision of one of the local clans) had almost disappeared, had given permission to a man, Guru, to use for gardening purposes a patch of ground belonging to members of her ti-i-ti. The area was a long distance from the hamlet, and the old woman was too feeble to make further use of it. So Guru, having secured her permission through his own wife, fenced and cleared the patch, and his womenfolk planted it with taro.

Title to land goes with the use, unless definite arrangements for “loan” are made. In this case, no such arrangements were made, it being assumed that Guru would provide the woman with food from the crops grown on the patch. As they flourished it became customary for passers-by to refer to Guru’s garden. One day the old woman wandered from the village and visited the place. She saw Guru’s womenfolk working inside, and her thoughts turned to the days of her youth when her ti-i-ti, now all dead, worked together just as the young woman were now doing. This upset her, and she tied some nornor reeds round the trunks of the trees that marked the boundary. This had the effect of putting a taboo upon the patch and meant that Guru would have to abandon the garden.

Personal appeals having failed to move the woman, Guru brought the matter to the notice of court. Guru said that he did not for a moment dispute the old woman’s title to the land and her right to exclude him from it, notwithstanding the arrangement which she had made. But what about his sweat, his hunger? Had the old women the means of paying compensating him for those? If so, he would be ready to accept a satisfactory
offer. "The land belongs to her people, certainly, but the garden belongs to me. And her action has taken the use of land from me - and with it my crops."

Speakers pointed out that she was an old woman, that in her declining years she experienced periods of great sorrow at the passing away of her kinsfolk. "And who of us is not proud of his ti-i-ti and who would not be sad to see it disappear?" With all these Guru agreed. He knew the old woman's sorrow was understandable and natural. But that fact would not provide his people with food while they made another garden.

No one appeared ready to offer him compensation on the old woman's behalf, and finally a luluai went across to where the old woman sat and spoke very quietly with her. She commenced to cry. "Oh, I am only a foolish old woman", she said. "It was a wrong thing that I did. But I was upset when I thought of all the big men and women of my ti-i-ti who had worked in that patch in the past, and I was sad to think that soon no one of my ti-i-ti would be left. I will remove the taboo and accept food from the Guru's women." So Guru continued to use the patch. End of narrative.

Groves (1936-37:509) summarises the significant principles in Tabar dispute settlement as follows:

1. Anything done by the individuals or small group which appears to interfere with the smooth working of the society along traditional lines is the concern of the society as a whole, and so must be thrashed out in public.
2. To maintain the harmonious working and the stability of the wider community, such matters must be settled immediately to involve inter-related social group.
3. Inter-group co-operation is a basic principle of the society and groups prestige is a strong motivating force.
4. The principle of reciprocity applies universally, even with regard to reprisals for wrongs
5. Magical rites (malagan) are important in dispute settlement.
6. The effectiveness of settling disputes by open public discussion.

4.2.4 Samukundi Abelam conflict management

The Abelam in the East Sepik Province use three methods of conflict management:

(a) moots, talk (kundi); (b) yam exchanges, and (c) fighting (Scaglion, 1981).
(a) **Moots (kundi)**

When ‘trouble’ (*paaw*) occurs in the village, the big men react by calling together an informal meeting with concerned parties for ‘talk’; alternatively, they may show up at the scene of the dispute. When trouble breaks out between members of the same ceremonial group, the big man of that group attempts mediation by stressing the importance of their group solidarity with the aim of convincing one or both parties of their fault. Frequently, conflicts involve members of the same lineage or the same clan or have the same clan totem. Here also, the big man would stress the importance of group solidarity. Intra-ceremonial group disputes are often resolved by this type of mediation. Compensation payments are sometimes negotiated in which shell rings (*yuwa*) are used for payment.

When the parties have reached an agreement, the big man who has acted as the main mediator performs a therapeutic ceremony. He first receives a shell ring from each disputant. Holding these rings, he chants a special conciliatory song known as *ngwye kundi*, followed after by giving each disputant the other’s shell ring. Each disputant holds a small quantity of lime on the leaves of the *narandu* plant, a symbol of peace. Holding the other’s shell ring, each disputant then smears the lime on their counterpart’s chest, after which the disputants clasp hands. This ring exchange is said to kill the trouble.

The *ngwye kundi* song is frequently used in conciliatory technique and variations are used at all levels of conflict resolution. It may be used to effectively stop fighting, or signal the end of a conflict situation. Disputes within the ceremonial group rarely involve violence and, even when they do, other members of ceremonial group rarely become involved because of conflicting loyalties arising from their closeness to the disputants. Consequently the *ngwye kundi* technique is often used in conjunction with a ring exchange to formalise the end of in ra-ceremonial group conflict.

(b) **Yam Exchanges**

In the Abelam conflict management, yam exchanges have a dual function - to terminate conflicts and to prolong them non-violently. Disputes between members of different ceremonial groups which are not settled through mediation often result in yam
exchanges. The dispute termination function of the yam exchange involves an equal and simultaneous exchange of ceremonial yams, pigs and shell rings. The function of the exchange is that it again validates the settlement and 'kills' the trouble. The same sort of an exchange, undertaken in a different spirit, actually continues the dispute but channels aggression into a patterned, socially acceptable and non-violent form. One disputant gives a number of large yams, together with a pig, to his adversary, and challenges him to match them. These exchanges may take place repeatedly, and over a period of several years, with the man who cannot match the other, losing prestige. A challenge to a yam exchange may prevent a fight. For example, in a potentially explosive situation where a man was threatening to spear the other, the threatened man prevented the fight by the challenge: `You talk about fighting; but your yams are inferior'. The statement shamed his opponent into an exchange.

(c) Fighting

Traditionally, disputes between members of different villages often resulted in spear fights, with large pitched battles occasionally occurring. Raiding between enemy villages was frequent and casualties were not uncommon. Disputes within the village but involving members of different ceremonial groups sometimes also resulted in spear fights. However, since the hostile groups ultimately had to unite against enemy villages for purposes of defence, casualties were few and mechanisms were available to stop the fighting. The leave of narandu plant, tied together with yellow flowers (again symbolising peace) could be hoisted on a pole during a fight. This constituted a powerful taboo against further fighting, and anyone who broke it would be killed by sorcery or be speared.

The ngwaye kundi was often used in conjunction with the narandu to stop fights. In such cases, the ngwaye kundi was used as a ritualised style of argument and verbal conciliation. Unlike ordinary verbal statements, the ngwaye kundi could not be interrupted for any reason, and tempers usually cool during its delivery. The ngwaye kundi which was sung as an interruption during a fight, was repeated later at the ritual exchange of rings, where other ngwaye kundi songs could be sung as in the intra-ceremonial group disputes. Overall, ngwaye kundi is used in disputants in the same
ceremonial group. The yam exchange is applied among disputants in different ceremonial groups in the same village and fighting involves disputants in different villages.

In summary, in traditional conflict resolution, decisions are generally reached on a case-by-case basis through consensus, with an emphasis on dispute settlement and the maintenance of group cohesion rather than achieving 'justice'. Though there may be cases similar to Western jurisprudence, they may be handled quite differently depending upon such factors as relationships amongst parties to the dispute, the relative status of participants and the history of conflict. Customary solutions are less dependent on formal rules and more interested in ensuring a just solution through compromise. Customary solutions are flexible and responsive to changing social institutions.

4.3 Contrasting traditional and Western conflict resolution methods

In order to compare Western and traditional conflict resolution approaches, we briefly outline three well known Western models.

4.3.1 The Conflict Resolution Network's 12 steps

In the CRN model (Cornelius & Fire, 1989), twelve steps are identified as the basis of effective conflict resolution:

- empathy
- appropriateness
- assertiveness
- co-operative power
- managing emotions
- willingness to resolve
- mapping the conflict
- development of options
- negotiation
- mediation
- broadening perspective

Participants are encouraged to be assertive rather than aggressive. The method is firmly based within the win-win approach and emphasises the importance of logic and rationality, rather than emotion, in leading to the resolution of conflicts.
4.3.2 The Egan Model

The basis of Egan’s (1982) approach is self awareness. If individuals know themselves, they are more able to help themselves and other people to solve their problems. There are three stages and nine steps in the Egan model.

**Table 4.2 The Egan Approach to Problem Solving**

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4.3.3 Ury and Fisher

Ury and Fisher (1991) and (Ury et al, 1991) categorise dispute resolution procedures according to whether they:

1) determine who is right
2) determine who is the most powerful (physically or economically)
3) reconcile interests

They propose that the interest-based methods are likely to be both least costly and most effective of the three in actually resolving the conflict in that a win-win solution is much more likely to be achieved. Rights based procedures (e.g. via courts) involve higher
costs and there are winners and losers. Power based procedures are even more costly and also result in winners and losers so that any 'peace' which is achieved is prone to instability.

Given that reconciliation of the interests of underlying needs of the parties is central to each of these models, we now investigate some typical traditional conflict resolution procedures to see how much they involve an attempt to reconcile interests, as opposed to reliance on rights or power.

(a) The common traditional methods of discussion and negotiation (see section 4.2) to reach a consensus is clearly interest-based. Such methods attempt to address and meet the parties' underlying interests, to satisfy all parties and minimise damage to the relationships.

(b) Not all cultures practice peaceful conflict resolution. For instance, Billings' study of New Ireland villages (section 4.2.2) demonstrates that neighbouring societies can pursue quite different approaches, one interest-based while and one power-based. This goes to prove that it is difficult to generalise about PNG societies.

(c) Typically warfare is ritualistic, with well understood rules of engagement and procedures by which it can be halted (e.g. warriors fire off arrows, wait until someone is hit, then negotiate), although full scale warfare, as amongst the Huli (section 4.2.1) may involve the killing of non-combatants as well as warriors and a 'scorched earth' policy as regards enemy gardens and property. Feuds, on the other hand, are much more restrained. Both are eventually settled by discussion, negotiation and compensation.

In brief, there seems to be a strong degree of reconciliation of interests in traditional dispute resolution.

4.4 Contemporary conflict

As PNG has moved towards modernisation, some traditional conflicts have declined in importance while others have intensified. New conflicts have emerged and new procedures of settling disputes have been introduced. The changes have made traditional conflict resolution procedures more difficult to operate. The new forms of conflict are exacerbated by alcohol (Iamo & Ketan, 1992). Critical observers argue that contemporary tribal warfare maybe a response to boredom and frustration on the part of young men over the loss of traditions and having been left on the periphery of

Traditionally, leaders have been able to restrain any acts of revenge because clan solidarity was strong enough to prevent it. However, the presence of alcohol and the less controllable behaviour of young men has increased the chances of an individual acting without the permission of leaders and embroiling the whole clan in unwanted conflict.

Similarly, law and order problems may be generated by modern values of individualism, greed and power. The hedonism generated by such modern values is at odds with the objectives of traditional society where, to a large extent, individual economic and political power was restrained by the need to meet group obligations. This conflict of values is aptly illustrated by the study of 'rascals' by Michael Goddard (1995), who concludes that rascalism involves the pursuit of prestige or, in other words, a way of becoming a 'big-man'. This would enable them to appropriate commodities into a gift economy along the lines of that practiced in the Melanesian culture. Goddard sees this as a dynamic and creative response to capitalism, with strong cultural underpinnings, rather than a direct consequence of unemployment and underdevelopment.

The Western court system, introduced to administer colonial justice, has tended to weaken the Melanesian procedure of dispute resolution. Its adversarial, power-based, win-lose approach is at odds with the Melanesian emphasis on negotiating a mutually acceptable decision (Standish, 1973; Strathern, 1993:44). It is also focussed on individuals, compared to the group focus of Melanesian society. This is not to say that courts do not have important functions, particularly in dealing with disputes beyond the scope of locally-based traditional conflict resolution.

A major new area of conflict concerns traditionally-held land and transnational resource extraction operations. These companies view land as a commodity like any other, and owned by individuals. In Melanesian cultures, however, land has enormous spiritual significance and individual and group identity is inseparable from their land. This is a classic example of what Nicole Graham (1993) terms 'value conflict' which she regards as particularly intractable:
... value conflict is problemat.c in that not only is there a difficulty with compromise, mediation or negotiation between opposing parties, but also that any compromise or negotiation undermines and invalidates the values in conflict. There are no halfway positions in value conflict.

(Graham 1993:8)

There seems to be an important role for mediated settlements between, for example, mining companies and traditional landowners. In terms of costs, effectiveness and durability, this option is preferable to relying on legal judgements.

4.5 Blending traditional conflict resolution with modern conflict resolution

The presence of well established and effective traditional conflict resolution procedures suggests the need to give the Melanesian consensus approach a greater role in conflict resolution. However, considering the impact of modernisation, to what extent can Western and traditional methods of conflict resolution be blended? This question calls to mind Strathern's (1977:145) concern that the solution to contemporary problems in PNG must involve a creative readjustment between 'law' and 'custom'.

Western conflict resolution methods focus, as we have seen, on the individual and the importance of equipping them with the necessary conflict resolution skills to deal with conflicts. The Western definition of conflict resolution has certain characteristics, usefully elaborated by Ury & Fisher (1991). First, it emphasises assertiveness and rationality over aggression and emotion, as essential factors leading to a solution that is acceptable to all parties with the aim of doing away with a "win-lose" approach. Second, conflict resolution is an on-going activity which involves learning to adopt humane values in order to be able to deal with conflicts creatively. There is no guarantee that it will work, but nor does the use of violence necessarily guarantee a peaceful resolution. Third, by implication, violence is not an acceptable way of dealing with conflict. This may be argued from a philosophical or spiritual position (violence is not 'right') or a pragmatic one (violence is not effective in resolving conflict).

Traditional PNG society conceptualises peacemaking and violence in a particular way and these would need to be reconstructed to accommodate new values of conflict.
resolution. The change would mean a paradigm shift from seeing violence as an acceptable alternative when other efforts fail to nonviolence as a more powerful alternative. To change such an integral part of the cultural matrix would not be easy, but it is essential if the complexities of traditional and modern conflicts are ever to be resolved effectively. Some other considerations in blending traditional and Western conflict resolution based on Young (1997) are as follows:

- Dialogue with traditional leader: is a fruitful approach with negotiating skill.
- The victim and/or immediate family should decide on the type of response. When more people become involved it becomes more difficult to find a solution.
- If a significant relative, insists that there should be no form of violent revenge, it is more difficult for the distant relatives to justify the pursuit of violent revenge.
- The holding of retreats, where former enemies or parties to the conflict eat together and share accommodation are also effective ways to prompt harmony. In this, sufficient time should be allowed so as not to rush the process of healing.

4.6 Conclusion

There are strong elements of nonviolent and interest-based approaches in traditional conflict resolution. There is considerable scope for strengthening traditional conflict resolution by the imaginative and sensitive application of some Western conflict resolution principles to traditional conflict resolution. The Hawaiian ho-oponopono problem solving (Shook, 1985) illustrates how such a blend of traditional and introduced (in this case Christian) concepts can result in a powerful conflict resolution method.

Ho’opononpono means “setting things right” i.e. restoring harmonious relationships and resolve conflicts within the extended family. The method is highly structured with four distinct phases; a discussion phase in which those involved share their thoughts and feelings in a calm manner and listen to others as they speak; a resolution phase that enables the exchange of confession and forgiveness; release; and a closing phase to summarise what transpired and give spiritual and individual thanks for sincere participation. The model is the modern romanticised version of conflict resolution using prayer as the main impetus to find a peaceful solution to the conflict at hand. Given the almost total adoption of Christianity in PNG, this could be a useful model. Figure 4.1 shows the simplified structure of Ho’oponopono.
FIGURE 4.1 Hawaiian Approach to Problem Solving

Ho'oponopono

START

PULE

(opening prayer)

KUKULU KUMUHANA

(problem identification)

MAHIKI

(discussion)

READY FOR MIHI, KALA, AND OKI?

Y

IS THERE TIME AND DESIRE TO PROCEED?

Y

IS "COOLING OFF" NEEDED?

Y

HO'OMALU

(Cooling-off time)

N

MIHI, KALA AND OKI

(mutual confession, forgiveness and release)

Y

ARE ALL PROBLEMS RESOLVED?

Y

PULE HO'OPAU

(closing prayer)

(includes ho'omalu)

PANI

(closing snack or meal)

FINISH

(family resumes normal activities)

N

FIGURE 1. Simplified Flow Chart of Ho'oponopono Session