

CHAPTER VI:

ERETRIA: EMERGENT "GREAT POWER" OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE SIXTH CENTURY.

The year 556¹ appears to have been a watershed in the history of Eretria particularly, and of archaic Greece in general: at Sparta, Kheilon was eponymous ephor;² at Sikyon, the Orthagorid dynasty of tyrants came to an end;³ the poet Simonides was born on the island of Keos,⁴ and finally, Peisistratos suffered his second exile from the Attike, and retired to Eretria with his sons and followers,⁵ thereby establishing for us the first reasonably "secure" date in Eretrian history.⁶ All four events impinge on the history of Eretria to some degree, so this date is a convenient point to begin the study of "historical" Eretria, and its place within the 'Hellenic oikumene' referred to by Thoukydides in his vague remark about the Lelantine War, and which hints at the great importance of the city, 'some time ago':

and indeed, some time ago, there was a war fought between the Khalkideis and the Eretrieis and the rest of the Hellenic world was split up into the alliances of each of them.⁷

¹ For 556: E. J. Bickermann, *Chronology of the Ancient World*, London, 1980 116; 169 etc. (useful synchronisation tables); J. Cadoux, 'The Athenian Archons from Kreon to Hysichides', *J.H.S.* 68, 1948, 108ff.

² P. Poralla (rev. A. S. Bradford), *Prosographie der Lakedaimonier, bis auf die Zeit Alexanders des Grossen*, Chicago, 1985, s.v. Χείλων (Χείλων) 131f.; Diog. Laert. 1, 68: γέγονε δὲ ἔφορος κατὰ τὴν πεντηροστήν πεμπτην Ὀλυμπιάδα Παμφίλη δὲ φησι κατὰ τὴν ἕκτην καὶ πρῶτον ἔφορον γενέσθαι ἐπὶ Εἰθυδήμιου, ὡς φησι Σωσιζώτης. Pap. Rylands I, 18 (= *F.Gr.H.* 105 F 1). For a select bibliography on Kheilon: Appendix 2.

³ The fall of the Orthagorids is linked to Kheilon's ephorate in Pap. Rylands I, 18 (supra n. 2). For a select bibliography on the Orthagorids: Appendix 2.

⁴ IG XII 9, Test./Not., 147; Bickermann 1980 (VI/1) 169. G. Bernhardt (ed.) *Suidae Lexicon*, II, Halle/Brunswick, 1853, s.v. Σιμωνίδης (α'): "the son of Leoprepes, of Ioulis, a city on the island of Keos . . . he was born in the 56th Olympiad . . .", cf. Eusebios: Ol. 55.3. 56th Olympiad = 556 - 553; Ol. 55.3 = 558. Cf. J. M. Edmonds (ed./tr.), *Lyra Graeca*, II (Loeb) Cambridge Mass./London, 1979, 246ff. for testimonia for Simonides' life. On Simonides and Eretria: Knoepfler 1969 (II/78) 87.

⁵ Regarding the chronology of Peisistratos' exiles and returns, there is considerable controversy (and literature): for a summary of positions held: J. G. F. Hind, 'The "Tyrannis" and Exiles of Pisistratos', *C.Q.* n.s. 24, 1974, 1ff.; he himself opts for 558/7. A select bibliography: Appendix 2. The basic texts are Herodotos 1, 61 and [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 15.

⁶ "Secure" depends of course on the certainty of dating Peisistratos' second exile, which is not secure at all. But 556 is not likely to be far wrong.

⁷ Thouk. 1, 15, 3 (quoted V n. 172). There is some disagreement over the exact meaning of this passage: Walker 1990 (IV/32) 24ff.; Lambert 1982 (V/214) 222ff.; *L.S.J.* s.v. πάλα, (1454); διοστῆμι, (428).

Eretria had been a significant state in the seventh century; during the sixth it would acquire greater, pan-Hellenic importance, and the choice by Peisistratos to retire there was for good and specific historical, political and strategic reasons, rather than simply for its geographic proximity to his homeland at Brauron in the eastern Attike. If the latter were all, why not have chosen Khalkis with its generally assumed "command" of the Euripos and easy access from the mainland? I shall argue in the rest of this thesis, that the role of Eretria in Hellenic affairs down to 490 was far more important than is credited by historians. Indeed, I shall claim for the city hegemonial status, not only over Euboia, but a wider area including the neighbouring coastal areas of Boiotia and the Attike, as well as continued direct rule over her island empire, that she exercised political influence via her colonial foundations in Makedonia and Thrake, and that her power was recognised generally throughout Greece at the time, and was preserved in later memory and, often obscurely, in the writings of later historians. This far-flung influence was established and maintained by means of naval and commercial strength. Only a faint echo of this early glory **has been allowed** to come down to the present and it has been largely unheard or, worse, ignored. Peisistratos himself did not underrate the city's importance, and upon his expulsion from Athenai, he hastened forthwith to Eretria where, he believed, he might expect meaningful support, both from its government and the city's powerful allies and trading network. Eretria in turn willingly received him, his family, and his followers for her own equally good political reasons. This was not her last direct involvement in the internal affairs of Athenai. But it soon proved costly to the régime which welcomed Peisistratos, and relations between the two cities did not remain friendly throughout the period down to 490.

Long before 556, economic and social tensions had been increasing in the Attike. Solon was installed, *de facto* as *aisymnetes*, or at least as *arkhon*, with a mandate to reform the laws;⁸ the traditional date is 594/3, though Miller has advanced arguments bringing the reforms down to 573/2,⁹ but even so "low" a dating is not low enough to accommodate his coinage reforms, which have therefore been attributed by recent numismatists to Peisistratos.¹⁰ Solon's appointment indicates that

⁸ Αἰσιμνήτης: regulator; judge; umpire. His official title was *arkhon*, and he was διαλατῆς καὶ νομοθέτης (**mediator** and *nomothetes*): Plout. *Sol.* 14, 2. The title *aisymnetes* was not apparently given to him, but it is a designation appropriate for his time; it was given to Pittakos of Mitylene (*Ar. Pol.* 1285 a 30ff.). M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law. Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens*, Los Angeles/Berkeley, 1986, 406 says that *nomothetai* are "not [...] attested in Athens before 403/2 B.C." Presumably he takes the reference in Ploutarkhos as an unofficial title (or is talking about *nomothetai* as a board of magistrates). Perhaps Ploutarkhos didn't really know what Solon's real position was; *Ath. pol.* 6, 1 simply says Κύριος δὲ γενόμενος, (having become master of affairs), Solon freed the demos [...]; 2, 2: that he became τοῦ δήμου προστάτης (head of the demos); the same expression is used at 28, 2 where it is qualified as πρῶτον, and compared with the position of Perikles. Both κύριος and προστάτης perhaps suggest he was more than just *arkhon*.

⁹ M. Miller, 'The Accepted Date for Solon: Precise but Wrong', *Arethusa* 2, 1969, 62ff.

¹⁰ C. M. Kraay, 'An Interpretation of "Ath. Pol." ch. 10', in *Essays in Greek Coinage, presented to Stanley Robinson*, Oxford, 1968, 207 is explicit: "the measures concerning the coinage cannot be

the Attike was beginning to face up to her economic and social problems. The choice of Solon is significant, for his interests crossed the divide between those of the old hippobotic/Eupatrid families,¹¹ with their pastoral and agricultural interests, and the new rising class of traders and artisans, for he, though of Eupatrid background, had also engaged in trade, and his reforms (or those subsumed under his name), show that he clearly perceived that the future would in large part be dependent on the development of an expanding artisan/commercial class.¹² Peisistratos' close personal association with Solon in his youth (he must have been born c.605/600, making him about twenty years the younger;¹³ he is said to have been Solon's *eromenos*¹⁴) may have resulted in his adoption of political attitudes which are quite at variance with those of his Eupatrid peers. Though his career exemplified a very different conception of politics from that of Solon, he always showed particular interest in the welfare of the productive classes, and this concern may have been at least partly a legacy from the older man.¹⁵ Peisistratos' family claimed descent from the royal house of Mycenaean Pylos.¹⁶ Thus, although Solon's Eupatrid ancestry might be questioned by some, Peisistratos was a true son of the Attic aristocracy.¹⁷ His rural

Solonian" even on the "low" dating; cf. M. Chambers, 'Aristotle on Solon's Reform of Coinage and Weights', *C.S.C.A.* 6, 1973, esp. 10.

¹¹ I do not wish to become involved in the debate as to whether the Eupatridai were a clan, a group of clans, or some other grouping in Attic society which acquired overtones of noble breeding, as the label itself implies. H. T. Wade-Gery, 'Eupatridai, Archons and Areopagus', *C.Q.* 25, 1931, 1ff.; 77ff. reviews the debate to that time and has a bibliography. I use the term to indicate the nobility of the Attike, which, though probably never so closely identified with horse-rearing as that of Euboiia, and of Khalkis in particular, still had its origins in similar occupations as the social (and later "Solonian" economic) group, the Hippeis, indicates; [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 7, 4 makes it clear that the Solonian pentekosiomedimnoi were horse-owners.

¹² Plout. *Solon* 22.

¹³ Davies 1971 (V/282) 445.

¹⁴ Plout. *Solon* 1, 4 - 5; Ailian. *Hist. Poik.* 8, 16; [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 17, 2.

¹⁵ I originally wrote "must". I have been asked (by Greg Stanton): "why not a reaction against Solon's policies and attitude?" As far as we know Peisistratos remained an admirer of his former *erastes*: though later they "were at variance about matters of state" and Solon disowned him politically, their political differences did not result in personal enmity (Plout. *Sol.* 1, 2). Dr Parker has no difficulty with a rhetorical "must"; I have however left it open.

¹⁶ Hdt. 5, 65, 3. *R.E.* s.v. Peisistratiden. Davies 1971 (V/282) 445 believes that the status of the Peisistratidai is "demonstrably Eupatrid". Their claimed descent from the Neleids of Pylos is evidenced in the names of a sub-branch of the family from Khios (whither they probably went after the fall of the tyranny): W. G. Forrest, 'A Lost Peisistratid Name', *J.H.S.* 102, 1982, 134. A tradition also links Nestor with near-by Keos, and perhaps with Naxos. There are, as we have already noted, interesting congruencies between toponyms and mythical personal names in the Eretrias and in Messenia, (we may also add Strabon 8, 4, 4 C360: Methone and Kharadra [also Eretrian colonies in the north], Nedon and Pherai [Eretrian demes: my deme notes, s.v. ἐγ Νε. and ἐκ Φηρα.]); I have also already noted close links of Keos and Eretria: II 23 and n. 14; 34; IV 81, n. 65; 119; Psyllas 1920/1992 (II/36) 30. Perhaps the Philaidai are also to be related to them. Brauron seems to have been their deme centre: Platon, *Hipp.* 228 B (ἐκ Φιλαιδῶν); Diog. Laert. 1, 53 for the Alkmaionidai: Pero, daughter of Neleus, was grandmother of Adrastos and Mekisteus (eponym of the Eretrian phyle Mekkistis), and Amphiaraios, possibly to be identified with the ancestral Alkmaion, may be the mythological ancestor of the Alkmaionidai: Wallace 1936A (Intro./1) 93; infra 180f. and n. 56; VII 209f.; VIII 243ff. G. Huxley, 'Studies in Early Greek Poets 1: Neleids in Naxos and Archilochus', *G.R.B.S.* 5, 1964, 21ff.

¹⁷ Solon's mother was cousin of Peisistratos' mother. The recurring element ἵππ- in Peisistratid names suggests a hippobotic tradition in the family. "Hippus-names" were also frequent at Eretria even as late

and aristocratic background would have made it clear to him that Solon's hope for an Attic *concordia ordinum* was in reality futile, and that change, in the last resort, would have to come through the use of force, as had happened at Eretria between c.825 and c.700 as a result of military disasters and the loss of the Lelantine Plain. Whether or not he had family connections with Eretria, as did several Attic noble families, including the Gephyraioi¹⁸ and the Alkmaionidai,¹⁹ he would certainly have been aware of Euboian affairs; an astute politician, he would not have retired there in ignorance of the political state of play between the island's *poleis*. Indeed, the progress (if that is the right word!) of events in Khalkis during the last half of the sixth century²⁰ suggests the political backgrounds in the Attike and Khalkis were similar. Perhaps Peisistratos adopted the model of tyranny because, thanks to his background and connections and, as events in Khalkis showed, he could see, unlike Solon, that the landholders would never give up control of the *polis* except under duress. Thus his background and political interests would have predisposed him towards the commercial oligarchs at Eretria rather than the outdated reactionaries of Khalkis who had more in common with his political enemies. Brauron,²¹ his home, was near Prasiai which, before the capture of Salamis made development of Phaleron and the Peiraieus possible, was the safest port of entry and export for the whole Attike;²² a glance at a physical map of the Attike shows that Brauron was the natural port for the produce of the Mesogeia, the grain-bowl of the Attike. It lies parallel with the Petalai islands. Their strategic and economic importance, defining the boundary established by the Eretrieis themselves of the area of the Straits of Euboea over which they claimed direct control, will be discussed later.²³ Peisistratos

as the fourth century, and the government there was still styled τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρῶν δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἰσπεύων, both facts witness the enduring prestige of the hippobotic class in Euboea.

¹⁸ II 54f.

¹⁹ Supra n. 16.

²⁰ Walker 1993 (IV/227).

²¹ Brauron was the site of a very ancient cult of Artemis-Iphigeneia. For the close relationship of this cult with that of Artemis Amarysia in Eretrian territory: cf. Walker 1995 (II/15). Cult centres of Artemis existed right along the eastern and northern coasts of Attike and Boiotia; this and the survival of the characteristically Eretrian dialect feature of rhotacism - absent from the dialect of neighbouring Khalkis but present at Oropos suggests ancient ties between the Eretrians and the mainland coast opposite: II 38 n. 112; VII 212, n. 114; Appendix 11. For Peisistratos and the cult of Artemis Brauronia: Davies 1971 (V/282) 454. On the region in general: A. French, *The Growth of the Athenian Economy*, London, 1964 chs 1 - 3; with more emphasis on eastern Attike: cf. idem 1959 (I/25) 46ff.

²² French, 1959 (I/25) 49f.: "Before the capture of Salamis, some grain was no doubt brought to the Attic plain around Athens by ships willing to run the gauntlet of Megarian patrols. A much safer port of entry than Phaleron was the excellent harbour of Prasiai in east Attica. It may be conjectured that **the most important of the trade routes of Attica before the capture of Salamis was that which ran from Thessaly and Macedonia south to Euboea and thence along the friendly Euboean coast to Marathon and the harbours of east Attica.**"

²³ 167ff. IG XII 9, 1273/1274 dated c.550 - 525; cf. Jeffery 1961/90 (II/211) 84. However, F. Cairns, 'The "Laws of Eretria" (IG XII, 9 1273 and 1274): Epigraphic, Legal and Political Aspects', *Phoenix* 45 1991, 298, says that in a private communication, Jeffery indicated that she was prepared to see them down-dated to c.525. The Petalai islands are adjacent to the border between the Eretrians and Karystia: Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 117 wrongly thought they were part of Karystian territory, although later (118) he contradicts this somewhat. Similarly 91, n. 1. For the Petalai Islands, the classical references are:

thus came from an area which was both one of the most important commercially at the time, but also directly subject to Eretrian economic control. It also had age-old religious/racial/linguistic links with Euboia, especially Eretria.²⁴

Peisistratos was supported by the thetic class²⁵ who had not really benefited from Solon's reforms.²⁶ No doubt similar conditions were being experienced in other *poleis* as the experience of Khalkis (and Eretria somewhat later) indicate. The delay at Khalkis is perhaps explained by the relatively greater fertility of the land there; at Eretria by a more pragmatic ruling class, and wider prosperity. But support came also from the "new-rich", the commercial classes.²⁷ Forrest argues that the Athenian economy between 594 and 560 had undergone "thirty years of boom", that this prosperity was the work of a substantial commercial class, but that they were rewarded politically only once Peisistratos was firmly in power.²⁸ "Commonsense would suggest some form of link" between the rise of Peisistratos and this economic expansion. Holliday²⁹ thinks not. He assembles evidence for the economic weakness of Athenai at this time, and notes particularly (as I have already done), that **she was not a sea-power**: "it seems pretty certain that **Athenian goods were carried to a large extent in foreign bottoms.**"³⁰ (And from Prasiai on the South Euboian Gulf,

Strabon 10, 1, 1 C444; Plin. *H.N.* 4, 71; Athen. *Deipn.* 9, 376 a - b (quoting Akhaios of Eretria: the name means "pig island"). Wallace 1947 (I/53) 131 (map) locates the deme Aiglephe(i)ra (ἔξ Αἰγλεφεῖρας) on these islands. The northern boundary of the area of their control was set by the Eretrieis at Cape Kenaion.

²⁴ Cult: supra n. 21.

²⁵ Plout. *Solon* 29, 1: Πεισίστρατος δὲ τῶν Διατριβῶν, ἐνοῖξ ἦν ὁ θηριζὸς ὄγκος. [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 14, 1: δημοσιζώτατος, variously translated as "most democratic"; "an extreme advocate of the people" (Rackham [Loeb] 43). I prefer "very much a populist".

²⁶ A. French, 'The Economic Background to Solon's Reforms', *C.Q.* n.s. 6, 1956, 25: "(But) to suppose that he (Solon) gave to the helpless serfs everything they asked for and made no concessions whatever to the all-powerful nobles passes all belief. A compromise that would fit the situation and square with probability was the cancellation of the arrears of debt and the freeing of the serf in return for the recognition by the latter that he had no further claim on his master's estate. (i.e. the land lost by the indebted peasant remained within the landowners' estates KW). This compromise would meet the worst grievances of the masses - their slavery - without robbing the nobles of anything valuable. A policy of pleasing the poor without robbing the rich usually succeeds in annoying both parties, and so it was with Solon."

²⁷ Bengtson 1988 (IV/243) 81; Ure 1922/62 (V/142) 37ff.; W. G. Forrest *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*, London, 1966, 176ff.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ 1974 (VI/5) 43; 48ff.

³⁰ Ibid. 48. On the lack of a significant Athenian navy: Kondoleon 1963/65 (I/28) 24: "Ὁ ἀγὼν Ἀθηναίων - Χαλκιδέων ἐγένετο κατὰ ξηρῶν, τὴν ἐποχὴν δ' ἐκείνην οὐδ' οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον ναυτικόν." (The Athenian - Khalkidian struggle [of 506] took place on land, and at that period neither did the Athenai have a fleet.) (My translation). It is crucial for an understanding of the roles of Athenai and Eretria in the 6th century to remember this fact. But on the southern coasts of Attike and in the Saronic Gulf, Korinthos was better placed to provide the "foreign bottoms" of which Holliday 1974 (VI/5) 48 speaks. Later Korinthos supplied Athenai with 20 hulls (at the purely nominal price of 5 drakhmai each) to build up a naval force against their joint enemy, Aigina, in the so-called ἀζηριζτος πόλεμος, **some time after 506**: Hdt. 6, 87 - 96; L. H. Jeffery, 'The Campaign between Athens and Aigina in the years before Salamis (Hdt VI, 87 - 93)', *A.J.P.* 83, 1962, 44 - 54. On the survival of knowledge of earlier events in historians such as Herodotos and Thoukydides: Walker 1990 (IV/32) esp. 26ff., including what they probably took for granted in their audience, what concepts of time lay behind such expressions as πάλαι ποτε γινόμενον, and the suppression of unwelcome data. Jeffery believes c.70

whose bottoms would these be?) He notes, rightly, that it was not until the early-fifth century that Themistokles turned the Athenaiοi decisively towards the sea, by developing the Peiraieus harbour and building a navy. He however notes an increase in output from Attic pottery kilns after c.600,³¹ but pottery output alone does not, I think, provide conclusive evidence of increased interest in matters commercial or naval, despite even the increasing use of the ship motif in vase decoration. Kirk³² observes that the superiority of Attic vase-painters in representing ships does not "necessarily entail . . . the surprising consequence of a greater Athenian interest in naval affairs than Corinthian, for example, or Euboean, for artistic fashion need not march in step with progress in other fields." Forrest and Holliday agree that Peisistratos had the support of the merchant-class, despite their opposing views as to why that support was forthcoming. Resolution of these differences of opinion are important for Attic history, but less so for us. Both Peisistratos, and Solon before him, involved as they were with the merchant-class, must have had links with the ruling merchant-oligarchy at Eretria. The long-established involvement of Eretria in Aegean and western trade and in the commerce of central Greece, makes it certain many Attic merchants would have had commercial ties with the Eretrieis who controlled the government there. Eretria's long-established involvement in shipping, and her control over the trade-route via the Euboian straits to the north, make the reply to the question "in whose bottoms Attic exports were carried": Eretrian ships. Thus when Peisistratos fled to Eretria in 556, he went with more than good hopes and good looks.³³ Holliday is partly right to say that Peisistratos' support base was fundamentally weak, as is evidenced by his failure for so long to securely hold his

years to have been beyond general memory. The Korinthioi would have had a record of these matters in their archives but would they have been remembered (even had they been a welcome memory) at Athenai in 433 when, Thoukydides tells us (1, 41, 1), the Korinthioi thought their Athenian audience needed reminding of their past favour to them?

³¹ For pottery and trade: V 167, n. 264; VII 193f. For recent debate concerning trade in decorated pottery: J. Boardman, 'Trade in Greek Decorated Pottery', *O.J.A.* 7, 1988, 27ff. (it had a decided intrinsic trading value); reply by D. W. J. Gill, 'Trade in Greek Decorated Pottery: some Corrections', *O.J.A.* 8, 1989, 369f. suggests that they were largely ballast; Boardman, 'The Trade Figures', *O.J.A.* 8, 1989, 371ff. deals with disputed value-figures raised by Gill. Gill is preparing a further reply (non vidi): 'Pots and Trade: Spacefillers or *objets d'art*?' If Boardman is correct, then Eretrian ceramic was probably not good enough to justify the effort to transport it, and its scarcity outside Eubοia is probably thereby explained.

³² Albeit of an earlier period: 'Ships on Geometric Vases', *B.S.A.* 44, 1949, 152f.

³³ Bengtson 1988 (IV/243) 82: "By **connections** (my emphasis) with the Eretrian nobility, the tyrant returned to Athens for a second time." He doesn't say what these "connections" were. *Infra* n. 55. Plout. *Solon*, 1: καὶ φίλια τὸ πρῶτον ἦν αὐτοῖς πολλὴ μὲν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν, πολλὴ δὲ διὰ τὴν εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἄρα, ὡς ἐνοιῶ φασιν, ἐρωτικῶς τὸν Πεισίστρατον ἀπαζομένον τοῦ Σόλωνος. (Their friendship was great, partly because they were related, and partly because of [Peisistratos'] youthful good-looks; some say Solon passionately loved Peisistratos). Cf. Polybios' observation (31, 16, 3): παντὸς ἐπιστολίου τὸ κάλλος ἐστὶ συνστατικώτερον. (also found in Diog. Laert. 5, 1, 18). Solon must have been one merchant-aristocrat whose aesthetic went beyond perfectly balanced ledger-books. The old aristocratic paiderastic ethos is interesting also in view of the meaning of χαλιζιδίειν (Suidas s.v.). Perhaps the predilection extended to Eretria. Generally cf. W. A. Percy, *Pederasty and Pedagogy in Archaic Greece*, Urbana and Chicago, 1996 (though in passing note that his assertion [p. 67], that youths at Eretria were grouped strictly in age classes, is totally without foundation in evidence).

position.³⁴ But permanent success followed his stay in Eretria where he was able to observe the strengths and weaknesses of the merchant-class who wielded power in government.³⁵

According to Forrest,³⁶ the capture of Salamis by Peisistratos, and the subsequent expansion of Phaleron as the main commercial port of the Attike, led later to a great expansion of Athenian trade because it freed Athenai itself from the threat of blockade by Megara. But Holliday rightly stresses that for a small state like Megara, even if it had a strong navy, the enforcement of any lengthy blockade in the sixth century would have been nigh-on impossible. Thus, this may have been less of a factor in the changed pattern of Athenian trade routes than a deliberate policy choice by Peisistratos, who seems to have developed into a ruler who saw clearly the "national interest" and placed it above his own local background and ties and any "obligations" to foreign supporters like the Eretrian oligarchs. Any shift of trade from Prasiai to Phaleron is sufficient in itself to explain the cooling in the attitude of the Eretrieis towards Athenai that we perceive soon after the return of Peisistratos from exile there in 546, from one of extreme cordiality to one that may at best be described as frosty, a hostility that endured until about 508/7 when a radical shift in the political balance brought the two *poleis* together again. For the movement of the bulk of Athenian trade from the east-coast ports must have had an adverse effect on Eretrian commerce and shipping.³⁷

Be that as it may, in 556 Peisistratos expected, and received, a warm reception in Eretria, something that scholars apparently find surprising³⁸ although it is now clear there that were good reasons why Peisistratos would have believed that he would be welcome there. For their part, the Eretrieis must have thought that a client-ruler at Athenai from "their" east coast would favour their commercial aims and be a useful ally against Khalkis. This scholarly surprise, no doubt, springs from the supposed differences in aims and outlook between the populist tyrant and a traditionalist Eretrian "*Politeia of the Hippeis*", but as I have already argued at length,³⁹ this description masks a very different government from that of Khalkis, and rather illustrates the desire of Greek régimes of all sorts that their constitution reflect the (usually, but not perhaps in the case of Eretria), imaginary *πάτριος πολιτεία*. In fact it represented the same merchant-class still struggling at Athenai for political and social recognition. They would no doubt have informed their Eretrian counterparts that Peisistratos was "their man", and thus he got encouragement and active backing from the régime of the Hippeis. He made good use of it.

³⁴ From 561/60 (his first coup) to 546 (his final return from Eretria). 1974 (VI/5) 48ff.

³⁵ A later example of a ruler learning, while in exile, the strengths and weaknesses of his "hosts", and who later turned the knowledge to his and his state's advantage, was Philippos II of Makedonia

³⁶ 1966 (VI/27) 176f.

³⁷ Not that it led to a significant growth of the Athenian navy.

³⁸ Hopper 1961 (VI/5) 198. n. 99.

³⁹ Supra II; IV passim.

Herodotos says that when he heard the Alkmaionidai were plotting against him:

(Peisistratos) went by himself right away from the country and came to Eretria, and there he took counsel with his sons.⁴⁰

Whether Peisistratos remained in Eretria itself for the whole decade of his second exile, or even that he went straight there upon fleeing from the Attike, are debated questions; I see no reason to disagree with Herodotos.⁴¹ *Ath. pol.* omits any reference to him going first to Eretria, and takes him straight to the northern Aegean, but Eretria had long-established connections in the region, as did her ally Miletos, and there were several Eretrian colonies/*emporía* in the precise area to which he eventually went. I believe Peisistratos would have first visited his contacts within the governing-class at Eretria, as a matter of diplomatic courtesy, and to have his way in the north smoothed in advance. To have arrived suddenly in "Eretrian places"⁴² with his (presumably armed) retinue, within Eretria's patch, would surely have unnecessarily alarmed his Eretrian friends as to his real intentions. It has been recently suggested that when he went north, it was a joint Peisistratid-Eretrian colony that he led to Rhaikelos.⁴³

Whilst there, Peisistratos used his Eretrian connections to exploit the mineral wealth of the Pangaion region. But this, however, is not particularly close to Rhaikelos/Aineia; the wealth of the Pangaion mines, if it had to be taken first to Rhaikelos, would have to make a potentially dangerous journey by sea of at least 300 km.⁴⁴ around the Khalkidike peninsulas, some with - presumably hostile - Khalkidian colonies, not to mention frequent storms, or else a cumbersome and no less dangerous journey inland, if indeed such a journey were possible at that early period in a roadless region inhabited by barbarian tribes and Khalkidian settlers. Peisistratos' activities in the north are usually treated rather loosely; it is implied (a) that he went to Rhaikelos and, (b) that he exploited the Pangaion mines, but there is

⁴⁰ The basic and somewhat contradictory texts are Hdt. 1, 61: μαθὼν δὲ ὁ Πεισίστρατος τὰ ποιούμενα ἐπ' εὐνοίῳ ἀπαλάσσετο ἐκ τῆς χώρας τὸ παράπαν, ἀπιζόμενος δὲ ἐς Ἐρέτριαν ἐβουλεύετο ἅμα τοῖσι παῖσι. (presumably his sons fled separately, having previously agreed to meet again at Eretria) and [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 15, 2 (quoted IV n. 230). For the exiles of Peisistratos, there is a brief bibliography in Appendix 2.

⁴¹ Cole 1975 (V/128) 42f. The *Ath. pol.* figures are not reconcilable with Hdt. 1, 61 and Aristoteles, if he wrote the *Ath. pol.*, contradicts his own statements in *Pol.* 1315 b 31ff. Also cf. A. French, *Sixth Century Athens: the Sources*, Sydney, 1987, 46, n. 1.

⁴² The phrase is used to describe Eretrian establishments in the north by Steph. Byz.: supra V nn. 129; 141. On classification terms used by him, cf. D. Whitehead, 'Site-Classification and Reliability in Stephanus of Byzantium' in D. Whitehead (ed.), *From Political Architecture to Stephanus of Byzantium. Sources for the Ancient Greek Polis*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 87, Stuttgart, 1994, 106; 117ff.

⁴³ Cole 1975 (V/128) 42f.; Viviers 1987 (V/128) 193ff.; Figueira 1990 (V/128) 134, n. 8: says that the Eretrians "co-settled" (συνῆζασε *Ath. pol.*) it with Peisistratos. V 149, n. 128, VII 221.

⁴⁴ The land journey is about a third of this distance.

no attempt to show that the two places are, in fact, not close together, and one is left with the impression that the mines were somehow within a *sogenanntes* northern fiefdom of Peisistratos. This is not so, and it is never mentioned that Rhaikelos is not at all suitably located for exploitation of the resources of Pangaion. The *Ath. pol.*, however, states that Peisistratos settled first at Rhaikelos and that subsequently he proceeded to the Pangaion area where he enriched himself and hired soldiers; he then went (back?) to Eretria; Herodotos alludes to revenues from Peisistratos' properties on the Strymon, but makes no mention at all of Rhaikelos, which is not by any means to be located near that river. But Eretria had a commercial station at Skábala⁴⁵ (I have argued above for its identification with modern Kavala, and I proceed on this assumption.⁴⁶), which is not so far from the Strymon. Whatever the truth concerning Peisistratos' movements and residence while in the north, logistical problems were involved in his exploitation of the natural wealth of the region. Eretrian participation in and approval of his activities would solve these problems.⁴⁷ Why would Peisistratos, if he were in the north for much of his ten-year exile, have risked his precious bullion cargoes on a dangerous route to an intermediate location at Rhaikelos/Aineia, only to have then to organise the onward shipment of an accumulated mass of material (and his mercenary recruits) to Eretria, his final base from which, all our authorities agree, the final descent on the Attike was made? It is extremely unlikely that he, an exile (and an Athenaios), had any ships of his own, so we must assume that he relied on foreign vessels: the obvious choice, and it is unlikely he would have had a choice, was Eretrian ships. And, if this were so, why not have shipped his gains directly to Eretria from the near-by Skábala? From Rhaikelos, if he indeed settled there, would have come timber from the near-by forests.⁴⁸ It is inconceivable that he didn't have agents at Eretria organising his affairs. In fact it is probable that at least one of his sons (Hippias?) remained there acting as marshal of his followers and resources. And the argument might be made that he himself remained in Eretria for the whole or most of his ten years exile.⁴⁹

Amongst Eretria's allies there were were significant land powers whose acquiescence, if not their direct assistance, would be important for Peisistratos' long-

⁴⁵ Steph. Byz. s.v. Σκάβαλα· χώρα Ἐρετριέων; *C.A.H.* III, ch. 25, 650ff. Cf. Bradeen 1952 (V/136) 374, who thinks it was Khalkidian(!), not Eretrian.

⁴⁶ V 150f.

⁴⁷ Cf. however Sandys 1893 (V/5) 58f., n. 2: Ῥαίκελος and τοῖς περὶ Πάγγαιον τόποις.

⁴⁸ From inland via the River Axios or near-by Mt Khortiatis, even today thickly timbered, for ship building purposes. However there is no evidence that Peisistratos built ships to create a fleet at this time. But as I have pointed out (I, 11) Euboia itself is deficient in ship-building timbers; the Eretrians thus may well have been interested. The Pangaion is a potential source of timber also.

⁴⁹ How are we to interpret πάλιν in *Ath. pol.* 15, 2? It could mean that he returned "again" or "afterwards" to Eretria from the north: **such is my opinion** and of e.g. Cole and Sandys; the latter is a linguist and textual critic. But it may simply "mark this period as the latest in the *A.p.*'s series of intervals of time": Rhodes 1981 (V/5) 208, and thus it would be only "after" ten years that Peisistratos made his next attempt. Rhodes, too, is a textual critic.

term success: Thebai, building up her federal structure in Boiotia,⁵⁰ whose territory lay along the northern border of the Attike, Argos, not yet utterly paralysed as she would be after Sepeia (495), and by no means least, Thessalia, whose horsemen remained faithful allies of the Peisistratidai right to the very end of their rule. Also Korinthos, whose friendship was significant though at this stage she remained largely passive.⁵¹ Alliance with Argos (and, indirectly perhaps, Korinthos) was confirmed by Peisistratos' marriage to the Argolis, Timonassa, daughter of Gorgilos, and former wife of Arkhinos of Ambrakia,⁵² Kypselid heir and grandson of Periandros c.599.⁵³ As far as I am aware, no one has considered that this political marriage to Timonassa might have brought with it Kypselid socio-political ideas.⁵⁴ It was celebrated before Peisistratos' exile in Eretria; it may not have lasted very long. The vital Eretrian alliance was likewise sealed with a marriage to an Eretris called Koisyra, whom he probably married while in Eretria. She was undoubtedly from one of the innermost ruling families of the Eretrian oligarchy;⁵⁵ two other Koisyras, of the same family, later married Alkmaionids: Alkmaion, grandfather of the reformer, Kleisthenes, and

⁵⁰ *C.A.H.*³ III, ch. 41, 288ff.; J. Ducat, 'La Confédération béotienne et l'expansion thébaine à l'époque archaïque', *B.C.H.* 97, 1973, 72 dates the beginning of this process at c.525; R. J. Buck, 'The Formation of the Boeotian League', *C.P.* 68, 1972, 94ff. between 525 and 520.

⁵¹ Along with Khalkis and Eretria, Korinthos had colonial and trading links with the Khalkidike: under Periandros, she founded Potidaia between 625 - 585, a site so important that later, Athenai would sacrifice other crucial interests in her struggle to assert control over it. It straddles the isthmus of Pallene, separating "Peisistratos'" foundation from the Eretrian colonies on Pallene. Therefore the agreement of the Korinthioi (or, at least, absence of hostility) was important for the success of the venture, especially if he were to reap any substantial material gain from the establishment of the town. Cole 1975 (V/128) 42.

⁵² On this marriage: Davies 1971 (V/282) 449f.; he dates it c.560.

⁵³ Hind 1974 (VI/5) 11; Forrest 1971 (VI/2) 81. For the relationships of the Ambrakiot Kypselidai, beginning with Gorgos, son of Periandros: Newman 1902 (IV/242) 329f.

⁵⁴ If it be doubted that a woman might significantly influence her husband's socio-economic thinking in an ancient Greek context, one may consider Kleomenes III of Sparta (king 235 - 222) who came under the influence of his wife Agiatis, who imbued him with the political ideas of Agis IV, her previous husband: Plout. *Kleom.* 1, 1f. On politically meddling wives, cf. also Plout. *Agis* 7, 3.

⁵⁵ Aristoph. *Neph.* 47: ἔπειτ' ἔγημα Μεγακλέους τοῦ Μεγακλέους | ἀδελφιδὴν ἄγροικος ὦν ἐξ ἄστεως | σεμίνην, τριψῶσαν, ἐκεκοισυρωμένην. (Then I married the niece of Megakles, son of Megakles, and me a rustic, she a city girl, a spoilt, stuck-up snob, **totally koisyrated**). Schol. Aristoph. *Neph.* 47: ἐγκεκοισυρωμένην: περισσῶς ἐκεκοισυρωμένην (ἢ ἔθνος ἢ Κοισυρόπολις ὀνομάζεται, πάντι ἀσχηρὸν καὶ μισαφόν· ἢ τὰ τῆς Κοισύρας φρονοῦσαν). ἔστι δὲ Ἐρετριακὸν τὸ ὄνομα. οὗτοι δὲ εἰς τριψὴν διαβάλλονται. αὕτη δὲ ἐγαμήθη Πεισιστράτῳ ἐπιχειροῦσαντι τυραννεῖν - περισσῶς κεκοισυρωμένην, κεκαλλωπισμένην, ὁμοίως τῇ Κοισύρα, αὕτη δὲ ἦν γυνὴ τις πάντι ἐαυτὴν κοισιοῦσα ἡματιοῖς καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ διαίτῃ, ὡς τοῖς ὀρθῶντας ἐκπλήττεσθαι. ("Totally koisyrated": Excessively bedecked with jewellery [or, that her native town was called Koisyropolis, a really awful and foul place; or that the lifestyle of Koisyra was over the top]. **The name is Eretrian**. They (the Eretrieis) are slandered as living in luxury. **She married Peisistratos while he was aiming at the tyranny**. - excessively bejewelled, made up like Koisyra. For she was a woman who used to adorn herself very much both in her dress and in the general manner of her living, so those who saw her were amazed); Schol. Aristoph. *Neph.* 46: ἦτις ἦν ὑπερβαίνουσα γένει καὶ πλούτῳ· ἦν δὲ ἐξ Ἐρετρίας, διὸ καὶ κοισυρεῖσθαι τὸ μέγα φρονεῖν, παρ' Ἐρετριεῦσιν. (She was surpassingly exalted both in her family and her wealth. She was from Eretria. Thus, "to play the Koisyra" was to be excessively proud, according to the Eretrieis).. Quoted from the ed. of Dübner: cf. the bibliography in Appendix 1; also that of Rutherford, and Koster's ed. of Tzetzes' scholia there listed. Note underlined phrases.

Megakles, Kleisthenes' son or nephew.⁵⁶ All three, but especially the latter, are characterised as "surpassingly exalted both in family and wealth."⁵⁷ The marriage was probably a purely political affair, and it was ended (repudiated?) a short time later (when Peisistratos and the Eretrian government quarrelled?⁵⁸), but it seems to have lasted long enough to produce a son, Eretrieus.⁵⁹ It also shows the importance that the Eretrian oligarchy placed on the alliance with the (soon again to be, they no doubt hoped) Athenian tyrant. Certainly if Koisyra were as exalted a figure as our sources suggest, then it was a true marriage and any offspring would not later have been counted amongst Peisistratos' bastards. That her family was later not considered below marriage into the Alkmaionidai is an indication of its status. But if Koisyra were indeed as aristocratically haughty as our sources suggest, hers was not an image that Peisistratos would have wanted to identify himself with for long once back home, and it may have been a factor in his rejection of her.⁶⁰

For Eretria, there were political benefits to be had from the alliance. In the diplomatic arena, the formation of a coalition to restore him would shift the centre of inter-*polis* diplomatic activity to her. Herodotos tells us many *poleis*:

gave great sums, the Thebaioi more than any, and, after some time [. . .] all was ready for their return: Argive mercenaries came from the Peloponnesos, and there also came of his own free will a Naxios called Lygdamis, who was most zealous in their cause and brought them men and money.⁶¹

Such an inflow of money (to be spent), and men (to spend), not to mention diplomatic comings and goings, must have been a windfall for Eretrian businessmen, and made Eretria a major diplomatic focal point. But there were longer-term considerations that could (and should) have been on the minds of the Eretrian leadership: along with men and money for Peisistratos, Lygdamis brought the prospect of enrolling Naxos, an ancient Eretrian enemy, into the Eretrian alliance,

⁵⁶ Davies' Megakles (IV). *Infra* VIII, 244ff. for the various Koisyras and their marriages; L. J. Shear, 'Koisyra: Three Women of Athens', *Phoenix* 17, 1963, 99ff.: provides a stemma (cf. my modifications: VIII, 246). On the Alkmaionidai: Davies 1971 (V/282) 369ff.; the Koisyras (he thinks there are only two): 380 - 381 and nephew: B. M. Lavelle, 'Koisyra and Megakles, son of Hippokrates', *G.R.B.S.* 30, 1989, 503ff.

⁵⁷ Aristoph. *Neph.* 46 (and schol.): *supra* n. 55; VII n. 47.

⁵⁸ On the political ramifications of the end of the marriage: VII 196ff.

⁵⁹ For Eretrieus: cf. the table: Peisistratos' marriages and offspring. (Appendix 2), sub-notes 4; 6. For Koisyra wife of Peisistratos: Shear 1963 (VI/56) 99ff.; VI 164f. Timonassa had either died or been divorced, leaving a son, appropriately named Argeios.

⁶⁰ Assuming that she didn't die or leave him to return home; however, if either had happened, we should probably have some notice of it.

⁶¹ Hdt. 1, 61: πολλῶν δὲ μεγάλα παραισχόντων χορήματα. Θηβαῖοι ὑπερβάλλοντο τῇ δόσει τῶν χορημάτων. μετὰ δὲ . . . χρόνος διέμυ καὶ πάντα σφι ἐξήρτητο ἐς τὴν ἀποδοκὴν καὶ γὰρ Ἄργεῖοι μισθοτοὶ ἀπίζοντο ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, καὶ Νάξιος σφι ἀνὴρ ἀπαιγμένος ἐθελοντὴς, τὸ ὄνομα ἦν Λύγδαμις, προθημίην πλείστην παρείχετο, χορησίας καὶ χορήματα καὶ ἀνδρας. Cf. [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 15. 2.

allowing Eretrian influence to be pushed further into the central Aegean area.⁶² Theban Boiotia, located up against Euboia as well as the Attike, was as important to Eretria as to Athenai.⁶³ Its adhesion to Eretria would isolate Khalkis against any help from the mainland should she ever need it, and the importance of mainland Boiotia to the defence of Khalkis and Euboia generally would be made quite apparent by events in 506. But the greatest hope must have been that a friendly and/or dependent ruler in Athenai would gratefully favour Eretrian political and commercial aims. High amongst these was the maintenance (or restoration) of her control over Oropos and its surrounding territory on the mainland opposite the city, which may have at some stage extended as far north as Tanagra in Boiotia. It has long been assumed that Oropos was under Boiotian control in the sixth century,⁶⁴ based on two notices in Herodotos' concerning an oracular shrine of Amphiaraios, the context of which indicates that it was in Theban hands: it was, naturally enough, identified with the famous shrine of Amphiaraios at Oropos. However Knoepfler has argued persuasively that this was still under Eretrian control at the turn of the century, and was probably not ceded to Athenai until c.470 or later.⁶⁵ He observes that the archaeological evidence from the Oropian Amphiarakon does not antedate c.430 - 410⁶⁷ and so it cannot have been the sanctuary mentioned by Herodotos. There appears to have been a family claiming descent from Amphiaraios at Eretria, or perhaps a *koinon* of worshippers, called Amphiastai.⁶⁸ But during his stay in Eretria, the Thebaioi offered Peisistratos generous financial assistance; he may thus have agreed not to interfere in their designs on Oropos. Some time during the sixth century, Eretria tried to seize the coastal area of Boiotia, and made a descent by sea upon Tanagra,⁶⁹ not far from

⁶² IV 119ff.

⁶³ For Eretria as agent for Miletos in Boiotia in the 6th century: Ure/Burrows 1907/8 (V/261) 236f.: "Milesian goods landed at Aulis in Eretrian bottoms would meet under its (i.e. Boiotian Mykalessos) walls the Samian trade that came from Khalkis over the Euripos." and "In the middle of the sixth century when, so far as our meagre evidence goes, it would appear that Thebes was in closer contact with Eretria than Chalcis." Also Burrows/Ure 1909 (V/261) 333: note that Tanagra is the only other location in this region to which Eretria could more easily have sent her goods. Despite probable ancient connections with Eretria, there is evidence that Tanagra at this time (or perhaps a little later in the century) was not on friendly terms with Eretria, a state of affairs that the latter seems to have attempted, on at least one occasion, to solve by direct military intervention (Paus. 9, 22, 1); this sea-borne attack failed. If it happened about the mid-century, it would explain why Mykalessos was Eretria's choice as entrepôt. But it may have occurred c.506, when both Eretria and Athenai were in conflict with Khalkis and Thebai. Eretria's traditional ambitions in this area may have given the Tanagraioi cause for fear, and Tanagra was probably pro-Theban in 506.

⁶⁴ Following Wilamowitz 1886 (II/207) 91ff.; cf. e.g. Chandler 1926 (II/210) 2f.

⁶⁵ Hdt. 1, 52; 8; 134.

⁶⁶ Knoepfler 1985B (II/207) 50ff.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 50. For the archaeological data: B. Petrakos, 'Ο Ὀροπέδος καὶ τὸ ἱερόν τοῦ Ἀμφιαράου, Athenai, 1984 and reports in *A.D.*

⁶⁸ P. Ducrey, 'Dédicace inédite d'une association à Éréttrie', *Études de lettres (Publ. de la faculté des lettres de l'Université de Lausanne)* 4, 1981, 73 - 78; A. Charbonnet, 'Amphiaraios à Éréttrie', *M.H.* 41, 1984, 49 - 53.

⁶⁹ Paus. 9, 22, 1; Schol. Lykoph. *Alex.* 679; Korinna fr. 5 - 10. Roller 1989 (II/209) Eretria and the coastlands: Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 78 - 79. On whether Eretria still controlled Oropos in the second half of the 6th century: VIII 250.

Oropos, but failed to capture it. This episode belongs, I believe, later in the century: the fact that Korinna, the lyric poetess of Tanagra and (older?) contemporary of Pindaros, wrote about the incident, gives us an approximate *terminus post quem* (i.e. after c.520).⁷⁰ This means that Eretrian control of the area had been lost before this, otherwise the (later?) attack would not be explicable.⁷¹ For the time being (c.546), the Eretrieis probably tried to extract guarantees from their "friends" in both Athenai and Boiotia concerning the status of Oropos as an Eretrian dependency. And at a time when an alliance was being negotiated between Athenai and Thebai, it may have been felt that guaranteeing Eretrian control over the border *polis* might allay fears, on both sides, of annexation by the other party. Lastly, and certainly by no means least in the eyes of the Eretrieis, there must have been an expectation that the man from Brauron near Prasiai would favour continuation of the dominance by his home region's port, of the export of the agricultural produce of the Mesogeia. Despite Peisistratos' earlier involvement under the leadership of Solon in the capture of Salamis,⁷² the Eretrieis must have hoped that Attic regionalist sentiment would prevail over centralism. That these hopes were not fulfilled does not mean they were unreasonable when Peisistratos set off in 546 to regain his tyranny. But once securely re-established following his victory at Pallene, Peisistratos proved to be a truly Athenian leader, refusing to be the slave of local Brauronian or Eretrian commercial interests, which is to say, of the Eretrian oligarchy. However, for the moment, nothing suggested that the role of Prasiai was threatened, or that Attic trade would not continue to move via the Eretrian-controlled South Euboian Gulf, benefiting from the security afforded by Eretrian naval power, and ordered according to the regulations established by the Eretrian government covering navigation in the gulf waters.

Of these regulations, dated to the third quarter of the sixth century, we are fortunate to possess epigraphic evidence, albeit in a fragmentary condition. These important inscriptions (IG XII 9, 1273/74)⁷³ have generated a modest output of scholarly papers, most having as their central interest the dating of the issue of the earliest coinages.⁷⁴ I too shall be considering this question⁷⁵ but for the moment I am

⁷⁰ *O.C.D.* s.v. Korinna. Pindaros, (b. 518, d. 438).


⁷¹ VIII 250. Eretria was still struggling to control it in the 3rd century: Knoepfler 1985B (I/207) 52ff.; she had recovered it in 411: *Ibid.* 50; Thouk. 7, 28; 8, 60, but by 404, the Thebaioi had seized it: *Diod. Sik.* 14, 17, 3, and later (by 395) had annexed it outright. It had become Athenian by 374. It was subsequently a pawn between Attike and Boiotia, but Eretrian foreign policy was constantly influenced by its current status: V 152f. and nn. 160; 168; 170.

⁷² Plout. *Solon* 8, 4.

⁷³ Cf. the bibliography and notes in Appendix 10. The references to sections are to those of Vanderpool/Wallace 1964 (IV/292).

⁷⁴ Cairns 1984B (VI/73) 144ff. concentrates on the significance of the phrase Δόγμα Χρήματα (he does not believe that χρήματα denotes coinage), and when Eretria began issuing coins; H. Volkmann, 'Δόγμα Χρήματα', *Hermes* 74, 1939, 99ff. thinks that the term means money, and indeed that the first certain use of it was for coinage. W. P. Wallace, 'The Early Coinages of Athens and Eretria', *N.C.*, (7th series), 2, 1962, 37.

FIGS 62, (63 & 64 next page): THE LAWS OF ERETRIA (IG XII 9, 1273/4/5).
 (Eretria Museum). Boustrophedon text beginning at top right-hand corner (*). J. M. Mansfield 1976 (VI/73;
 Append. 13) 102 diag. 14 suggests that another block lay between these two (space currently filled by mortar).



FRONT FACE: (= V./W.: 1273.1274, 1, 2, and 3; Mansfield: a1, a2 and a3).

just interested in them only as evidence for the



Fig. 63: SIDE FACE: (= V./W. 1273, 1274, 4; Mansfield: b1, b2, c1? and c2). The inscription begins in the top left-hand corner (*).




Fig. 64: IG XII 9, 1275 (from Vanderpool/Wallace 1936 [IV/282] pl. 68 b).

hypothesis that Eretria controlled the waters between Cape Kenaion in the north and the Petalai Islands in the south, i.e. the whole of the straits between Euboia and the mainland, which constituted the Attike's "most important" trade route up to the mid-sixth century.⁷⁶ This data occurs in the fourth section of the inscription. Vanderpool/Wallace's brief notice, however, does little other than criticise the supplements of von Gaertringen, but they admit that "it is easier to show that Hiller's ingenious supplements are impossible than to produce any acceptable substitutes."⁷⁷ They remark that "there is no reason to suppose that the inscription deals with 'harbour regulations' at all."⁷⁸ But if they do not refer to some kind of harbour, trade, or navigation-related matters, it is hard to imagine with what in fact they might be concerned.

Jeffery says that:⁷⁹ "The text apparently concerns payments in connexion with shipping and harbourage", and similar views are also expressed by J. and L. Robert,⁸⁰ Wallace⁸¹ and Knoepfler.⁸² In considering the possible nature of these inscriptions,

⁷⁵ *Infra* 185f. and figs 62 - 64.

⁷⁶ French 1959 (VI/21) 49f. (quotation n. 22).

⁷⁷ 1964 (II/292) 386.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* n. 8.

⁷⁹ 1961/90 (II/211) 85.

⁸⁰ 1965 (VI/73) item 322.

⁸¹ 1936A (Intro./1) 76, n. 1.

⁸² 1969 (II/78) 85: he accepts that IG XII 9 1273/1274 does in fact imply Eretrian tariff control over the Euripos during the archaic period and, (86), Eretrian thalassocracy. *Infra* VII 198 and (esp.) 199; VIII 250ff.; IX *passim*.

the location where the blocks were discovered, built into a later wall raised beside the harbour itself, must surely be taken into account. The text is indeed fragmentary, but it seems clear enough that it contained regulations, at least some of which concern traffic in Eretrian ships between the Petalai Islands and Cape Kenaion,⁸³ and involving some fixed (rate of) payments. Vanderpool/Wallace suggest that these were infringement fines, to be paid "to Hera". At Eretria there was a month Heraon and a festival of Hera, but we know of no temple to her into which the fines might be deposited.⁸⁴ The usual Eretrian depositories for state fines were the temples of Artemis Amarysia and of Apollon Daphnephoros; the latter was invoked in matters involving foreigners, so perhaps that is where the money ended up. It was also located *intra muros*, and might therefore have been considered a safer place of deposit than the Amarysion at Amarynthos. There is a strong similarity between our inscription and a later Athenian decree (IG I³ 41_{67ff.}) which, coincidentally, deals with traffic between the Attike and Euboia, in this case between Oropos and Histiaia (beyond Kenaion).⁸⁵ Could the earlier Eretrian decree have provided a model? After all, Oropos is directly opposite Eretria itself. "The traffic between Euboia and the mainland which the Athenians⁸⁶ used to conduct in small boats between Eretria and Oropos has in all ages been as important as the sea road through (the Euripos)."⁸⁷ We may also compare it with a Thasian decree⁸⁸ regulating the wine trade within a fixed set of geographical boundaries. The Eretrian decree is thus not unique, though it may have been a prototype for later laws. It was common enough for Greek *poleis* to proclaim, and (to attempt) to enforce, monopolistic trade-regulating legislation. The Eretrieis adopt the practice early because they were early in a position to enforce their will with some prospect of success, thanks to their naval strength. More important than the fine details of the decree is the fact that they **clearly felt able to impose their conditions and fees on all those sailing in Euboian waters at this time and not just within the harbour of Eretria itself**. Most importantly, given that the Eretrieis exercised control over the straits, the port of Khalkis was thus also, *de facto*, subject to Eretrian interference, if not actual control, for no shipping could approach it from either north or south without entering the zone claimed by Eretria

⁸³ On these places: IV 121ff.; supra n. 23.

⁸⁴ V 144: the cult of Hera at Kerkyra was perhaps brought from Eretria. Cf. supra n. 73 and Appendix 10 for other interpretations of Ἡρα.

⁸⁵ H. von Gaertringen, IG XII 9 Suppl. Test./Not. 204 36ff. Cites IG I¹ 40; there is a revised version in IG I³ 41, 67 - 76, given in Appendix 10 for comparison.

⁸⁶ A typically Athenocentric remark! No doubt traffic "in all ages" was conducted from both sides of the gulf. In the 6th century, it was in fact more likely Eretrieis who regulated the traffic as, in later times, did Athenaioi, as IG I³ 41 shows. The community of worship of Artemis on both sides of the South Euboian Gulf meant that transport of her worshippers was a lucrative source of income, as much as the transport of general traffic and goods.

⁸⁷ Zimmern 1915 (I/23) 30.

⁸⁸ IG XII 8, 347 II 8f. J. Pouilloux, *Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos*, I, Paris, 1954, 128: Appendix 10 (for the Greek text).

as her preserve.⁸⁹ Scholarly opinion has long held that Eretria and Khalkis were **both** strong early naval powers.⁹⁰ But Kondoleon⁹¹ showed there is in fact little evidence that Khalkis possessed a navy of importance, and the evidence he offers for this state of affairs in the sixth and late-fifth centuries is particularly strong.⁹² Lastly: it was very difficult for any archaic Greek state to effectively enforce any kind of naval blockade or trade-sanctions, so the modest limits (within a narrow waterway) set in the regulations reflect a realistic assessment by the Eretrian legislators of the city's naval capabilities, notwithstanding it may have exercised suzerainty over several more remote islands.

IG XII 9, 1273/74 are also important for another very important economic question: when did Eretria begin coining? The answer is one for specialist numismatists. The argument involves the comparative dating of the coinages of Athenai, Korinthos and the Euboian cities.⁹³ Recent opinion favours the mid-sixth century for both Euboia and Athenai,⁹⁴ the dating of Eretria's first issues having been shifted up from c.511. Unless Cairns is right, and the inscriptions refer to a pre-coinage situation with "*statêres*" being a weight (of silver) and the phrase "*khrēmata dókima*" referring to "objects of fixed value such as spits, tripods, and bronze

⁸⁹ Kondoleon 1963/65 (I/28) 9f.

⁹⁰ Quoted by Ure 1922/66 (V/142) 330 from Mitchell/Caspari (edd.), G. Grote's *History of Greece*, intro. 8 (publishing details unknown): "In later times (i.e. after the eighth century) . . . when the navies of Aegina, Chalcis and Eretria cleared the Aegean of corsairs." Cf. scholars in Kondoleon's n. 1.

⁹¹ 1963/65 (I/28) *passim*.

⁹² *Ibid.* 6; 23ff.: "Θετιζὰς μαρτυρίας ὅτι οἱ Χαλκιδαεῖς εἶχον ναυτιζὸν δὲν ἔχομεν. ἀντιθέτως πρὸς τὰς βεβαιώσεις τῶν σημερινῶν ἐρεινητῶν." Hdt. 8, 1: [The Khalkideis] ἐπλήρουν εἴκοσι Ἀθηναίων σφι παρεχόντων τὰς νέας. Ἐρετριεῖς δ' ἑπτὰ. ([The Khalkideis] manned twenty ships, **the Athenaiοι providing them**, on the other hand, the Eretrieis [furnished] seven). [23 - 24]). (My translation). Amongst the combatants at Artemision, the Khalkideis **alone** are singled out as not supplying their own ships; even Styra (later a deme of Eretria) provided two of her own. In fact, Athenai had to supply the 20 ships for Khalkis to man, and this in a battle of crucial importance for all Greece fought off Euboia itself.

⁹³ Wallace 1936A (Intro./1) 70 - 74; *idem* 1962 (VI/74) 23: "It is, however, clear that the early coinages of Euboia should be considered in connection with those of Athens."

⁹⁴ Cairns 1984B (VI/73): bibliography; contains (146) a useful tabulation of the opinions of four groups of scholars on the dating of the two earliest issues of Eretria. Cf. *idem* 1991 (VI/23) 298, n. 7: "The former scholarly view that the first Greek silver was early sixth century B.C. had been overtaken by a downdating more or less radical." Note the quotation of a modified opinion of Jeffery (298); Kraay 1976 (V/19); *idem*, 'Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Coinage', *J.H.S.* 84, 1964, 89f.: it is not clear whether he regards the inscription as referring to harbour regulations: "Among receipts may be mentioned harbour dues which are said to have formed the main revenue of the Bacchiads and Cypselids at Corinth, the fines and penalties which are commonly threatened in laws⁷⁶ and other taxes." (His note 76: "The so-called Constitution of Chios [cf. *B.S.A.* li {1956} 157] and the Eretrian Laws [IG XII 9, 1273 - 1274] are sixth century examples."). Starr 1977 (IV/71) 113: believes that the fines at Khios were probably set in terms of bullion which was "certified" (χορηγία δόκιμα ?KW). L. H. Jeffery, 'The Courts of Justice in Archaic Chios', *B.S.A.* 51, 1956, 157ff. on the Khiot inscription, dated c.575 - 550, making it more probable that we are here dealing with a pre-coinage situation (unless Lydian coins were involved, KW). D. Kagan, 'The Dates of the Earliest Coins', *A.J.A.* 86, 1982, 361ff. sets a very early date for introduction of coinage but does not mention Eretria. Cf. J. H. Kroll/N. Waggoner, 'Dating the Earliest Coins of Athens, Corinth and Aegina', *A.J.A.* 88, 1984, 328ff.

bowls",⁹⁵ the dating of the inscriptions confirms the third quarter of the sixth century as a *terminus ante quem* for the introduction of coinage at Eretria. If Eretria did not issue coinage before c.511, we would be forced back to Cairns' hypothesis as to the meaning of *khremata dokima*, but the up-dating of the earliest **Eretrian** issues combined with the down-dating of Greek coinage generally is fortunate for my reconstruction of Eretrian history in the mid/late sixth century, and meshes well with the generally accepted dating of the inscription. Jeffery, who earlier posed the problem of the non-congruence of the inscriptions and the earliest Eretrian issues,⁹⁶ suggested that the "approved coinage" must have been Attic. But the earlier dating for the introduction of coinage at Eretria makes it probable that payments (of the fines) would have been mostly (entirely?) in coins of the "Euboian standard", specifically, **Eretrian "statêres"**.⁹⁷ Unless current views concerning chronology are overturned, we may be reasonably sure that both Athenai and Eretria were issuing coins shortly after 550, following Aigina, in the late-seventh/early-sixth century, and Korinthos, c.575.⁹⁸

It is thus likely that the bullion Peisistratos collected in the north came down to his Eretrian base in the form of δόκιμα χρήματα. At least one Eretrian colony in the north was coining at an early period: Dikaia Eretrieon⁹⁹ and at least one Khalkidian colony in the area, Torone, used **Eretrian silver stateres** to make its coins by over-stamping them.¹⁰⁰ W. Wallace, specialist in the study of the archaic coinages of Athenai and Euboia, believes that the Athenian coinage is to be dated after Peisistratos' return from Eretria; however, he thinks they should be "at least as early, one would think" (why?), as the first issues of Eretria.¹⁰¹ I would not necessarily agree. We may just as well (and better) suppose that if the earliest

⁹⁵ Cairns 1991 (VI/23) 298f. States his arguments clearly in 1984B (VI/73); I remain convinced by the general opinion (Vanderpool/Wallace; Jeffery; Volkmann; Wallace; Kraay etc.) that χρήματα δόκιμα is 'acceptable' **money**. We may compare use of δόκιμα to describe money in these inscriptions with its use (in its negative form, ἀδόκιμον) in Ar. *Oik.* 1347 a 8, describing Hippias' so-called "reform" of the currency: "He declared the existing coinage to be unacceptable (ἀδόκιμον), he fixed a price for it and ordered it to be brought to him." Cairns does cite this passage, but I don't believe that he gives it enough weight, especially as it refers to a 6th century situation. Current opinion holds that the principal reason for the early issue of coined bullion was precisely for this kind of purpose, i.e. payment of state taxes, dues and fines: Kraay 1964 (VI/94) 89f.: "δόκιμασία' of money was meant to guarantee, rather than to establish its authenticity"; idem, 1976 (V/19) 231f.; his review of P. Radice Colace/M. Caccamo Caltabiano, "Αργυρον δόκιμον... τὸ δ' ἐναντίον παρώσηιον. (Pollux III, 86)", *A.S.N.P.* 13, 1983, 421ff. in *S.E.G.* 23, 1983, 1621. Cairns (1991) explicitly allows that, possibly, the text refers "to the abundant Eretrian coinage of the last decade of the 6th century." (299, n. 9).

⁹⁶ 1961/90 (II/211) 84.

⁹⁷ Kraay, 1976 (V/19) 91: "These are presumably the staters in which the fines for offenders were reckoned in a set of Eretrian inscriptions dated to the third quarter of the century; the same documents refer to δόκιμα χρήματα - 'acceptable money.'"

⁹⁸ Kroll/Waggoner 1984 (VI/94) 339f.

⁹⁹ It seems to have minted as early as c.525: Kraay 1976 (V/19) 91; 134. For the coins: C. Seltman, *Greek Coins. A History of Metallic Coins and Currency down to the Fall of the Hellenistic Kingdoms*, London, 1933, pl. xi, 3 with comparable Eretrian devices, pl. xi, 1; 2.

¹⁰⁰ Kraay 1976 (V/19) 134.

¹⁰¹ Wallace 1962 (VI/74) 36

Athenian coinage ("*Wappenmünzen*") was issued after Peisistratos' return in 546, he got the idea from his experiences in bullion-amassing in the north, transporting it and distributing it in Eretria. Indeed, his earliest coins were probably struck in Eretria, judging from their metallic composition.¹⁰² There is, in fact, no evidence at all (other than the tendency to automatically give primacy to Athenai), to compel us to accept that Eretria was not already coining when Peisistratos arrived, or at least that she was doing so before he left to return home. It should not be forgotten that the earliest coins of Eretria were for long attributed to Dikaia Eretrieon.¹⁰³ Most of these are now attributed to the mother-city itself. Both Strabon¹⁰⁴ and Herodotos¹⁰⁵ locate Dikaia Eretrieon in Thrake, on the shores of Lake Bitsonis¹⁰⁶ not far east of modern Skábala/Kavala and the Pangaion mines, so it is not at all beyond possibility that Peisistratos got the idea of using stamped bullion as coinage from the Eretrian dependencies in the north. We need to remember too, that the coinages of Athenai (and Korinthos) were **based on the Euboic standard**.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, Kraay observes: "At the beginning of the sixth century, compared with some of her neighbours in Central Greece, such as Corinth and Sicyon, Athens was still a relatively backward state, dominated by an archaic aristocracy which monopolized political office."¹⁰⁸ It is unlikely such a regime would have been very interested in, or capable of, implementing a major economic innovation like the adoption of coinage. That Athenai was issuing coins **before** Solon, who, according to the *Ath. pol.* **reformed** the coinage as well as weights and measures, is untenable.¹⁰⁹ However, the probable relationship between reasons recently adduced for the introduction of coinage,¹¹⁰ and the publication of the Eretrian regulations, should induce caution before denying legislators and their constituency in **all** archaic Greek *poleis* at least some ability to perceive and formulate economic policy - even if only of a rudimentary kind - in the interests of the state, i.e. their own interests.

In 546 Peisistratos was back in Eretria ready for his final return to the Attike, his allies and resources mobilised. The exiles and their allies/mercenaries landed on the Plain of Marathon, a place suitable for a small-scale cavalry engagement, for Peisistratos had with him his Thessalian allies and it is not impossible that there were some Eretrian cavalymen too; Eretria in the sixth century

¹⁰² Ibid. 29: "The Eretrian coins show a great similarity in composition to the *Wappenmünzen*. Perhaps Eretria, through her colonies, was able to get northern silver . . . our readings (of metallic compositions) do little more than establish a sharp difference between the *Wappenmünzen* and Eretrian coins on one hand, and the (Attic) owls on the other."

¹⁰³ G. K. Jenkins, 'Greek coins recently acquired by the British Museum', *N.C.* 1955, 136, no. 7.

¹⁰⁴ Strabon 7, frs 43 (44); 46 (47).

¹⁰⁵ Hdt. 7, 109.

¹⁰⁶ Talbert 1985 (V/118) 60 (C1).

¹⁰⁷ The "*Wappenmünzen*" didrachme was of 8.6 gr., exactly half the Euboic stater of 17.2 gr.

¹⁰⁸ Kraay 1976 (V/19) 56.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. One consequence has been the attempt to drastically downgrade Solon: Miller 1969 (VI/9) 62ff. for a "low" date.

¹¹⁰ *Supra* nn. 94; 95; payment of state imposts.

still had a considerable cavalry force at her disposal. The expected battle did not eventuate, and it was not until the invaders had reached Pallene that there was a battle, which demonstrated the superiority of the foreign horsemen. The allies also included Lygdamis and his followers (Naxioi were not likely to have been Hippeis) and Argive mercenaries (hoplites certainly). Were there any Thebaioi? We don't hear. Perhaps they only supplied money. But were they in fact having a bet each way? It would not be atypical of that devious city. For while Herodotos says that "above all others" they contributed to Peisistratos' war chest, an Alkmeonides (significant name) of Athenai, who won a victory at the Panathenaia that year, was apparently obliged to flee before he could formally dedicate his prize on the Akropolis: he dedicated it instead at the Ptoön in Boiotia, a Theban dependency.¹¹¹ The athletic victory dates the battle (late-Aug./early-Sept.), for the Panathenaia traditionally began on 28 Hekatombaion.¹¹² Perhaps Peisistratos specifically chose the beginning of the festival, because he knew his *kaloi k'agathoi* enemies would be taking part, as indeed was Alkmeonides. This too might explain why the invaders reached Pallene before meeting their opponents. But if the Thebaioi were 100% behind Peisistratos, they surely shouldn't have been harbouring (secretly?) a member of a family that at precisely this time, and at **most** other times, were his and his sons' most inveterate enemies.¹¹³

Once back in power, Peisistratos began to repay some (but not all) his political debts. In the following year, he is credited with installing Lygdamis as tyrant in Naxos as a kind of vassal,¹¹⁴ though a story in Athenaios implies that Peisistratos merely helped Lygdamis **back** into power.¹¹⁵ Aristoteles¹¹⁶ tells us that Lygdamis was himself a member of the Naxian oligarchy. If so, his rise will be paralleled by that of Diagoras at Eretria shortly after.¹¹⁷ But in 545 Athenai without a credible navy was not in any position to install Lygdamis on Naxos without help. Peisistratos had been dependent on Eretrian ships during his exile, and it is likely that he turned again to his ally for ships to invade Naxos. Eretria would not have minded: Naxos had been traditionally a friend of her rival Khalkis.¹¹⁸ At this stage Korinthos was not involved although Korinthian good-will was almost certainly given to the man credited with reducing her ancient enemy, Megara, to impotence.

¹¹¹ Hdt. 8, 135: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἴσον καλέεται μὲν Πτωῶν, ἔστι δὲ Θηβαίων. Paus. 4, 32, 5. Davies 1971 (V/282) 372f.

¹¹² H. W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians*, London, 1977, 33.

¹¹³ Of course it should be noted that later family members (including the "democrat" Kleisthenes) collaborated with the tyrants: cf. Meiggs/Lewis 1989 (IV/317) 6c.

¹¹⁴ Peisistratos used Lygdamis to guard sons of exiled opponents who (unlike Alkmeonides) failed to escape by the time he arrived: Hdt. 1, 64. Perhaps the relationship was of *xenia* or *philia*. The latter term, Greg Stanton has pointed out to me, may indicate unequal status (cf. Roman *amicitia*).

¹¹⁵ Athen. *Deipn.* 348 C. Newman 1902 (IV/235) 346: alternative reconstruction of events giving more emphasis to the story in Athenaios.

¹¹⁶ Ar. *Pol.* 1305 a 40.

¹¹⁷ VII 198.

¹¹⁸ *Infra* 191 and nn. 120 - 121.

Possibly Korinthos' role had been to check Megara or, more importantly Aigina, in the Saronic Gulf, thus preventing any interference from that quarter in 546/5. We are thus left with Eretria as the only other possible source of ships to transport the allies to Naxos. The successful installation of Lygdamis, the candidate of Eretria and Athenai (and Korinthos?) on Naxos, altered the balance of power in the Aegean still further. From 545 until his fall c.517, Lygdamis kept Naxos within the pro-Eretrian orbit, and his adhesion began a 'domino-effect' situation: Lygdamis later assisted Polykrates to the *tyrannis* of Samos, Khalkis' ancient ally.¹¹⁹ No record of Eretrian involvement survives, though again her ships may have provided transportation. Samos henceforth could no longer be relied on by the Hippobotai of Khalkis.¹²⁰ The latter would certainly have been horrified to see their old allies, the Geomoroi¹²¹, dispossessed and exiled by an upstart mercantile tyrant who was, moreover, indebted to the friend of their most implacable foes. Some time during the sixth century, there was warfare between Eretria's oldest ally, Miletos, and her (probable?) former friend, Megara. An epigram¹²² records the Milesian dead in a war that Figueira¹²³ rightly believes could hardly have occurred before the alliance between Miletos and Korinthos.¹²⁴ Since both Miletos and Korinthos were in the "pro-Eretrian" group after c.550, Megara must now be "pro-Khalkidian"; we shall shortly find the Megarian poet Theognis at Khalkis.¹²⁵ All this military and diplomatic activity thus gave Eretria a central and influential position with respect to the whole western Aegean area. Only Korinthos or Aigina could challenge her at sea, and since the Korinthioi and Eretrieis had achieved amicable relations, Aigina, thus isolated, posed no real threat to either. Most of Korinthos' energies were directed towards her western interests, and to containing Aigina in the Saronic Gulf and Argos on land. About 544, Korinthos, and indeed her old enemy Megara, were brought into an alliance with Sparta, the rising power in the Peloponnesos following her defeat of Argos in the Battle of the Champions in 546. The more-or-less simultaneous adhesion of **both** Korinthos and Megara to the Spartan alliance would have significant political repercussions for the whole of central Greece, not least for Eretria and Athenai. In the north Aegean, Korinthos planted her only colony in the region, Potidaia, between 625 and 585, athwart the isthmus of Pallene; the foundation would have been viewed favourably by the Eretrieis, for it stands

¹¹⁹ Polyain. *Strategem.* 1, 23.

¹²⁰ For Lygdamis and Samos: Burn, 1960 (VI/3) 313; 318ff.; Bengtson 1988 (IV/243) 82; 427f., n. 35. For a less significant role for Lygdamis: G. Shipley, *A History of Samos*, Oxford, 1987, 90f.

¹²¹ V 159f.; 170, n. 285.

¹²² L./J. Robert, 'Bulletin épigraphique', *R.E.G.* 80, 1967, 536ff. (item no. 528).

¹²³ 'Chronological Table: Archaic Megara 800 - 500 B.C.', T. J. Figueira/G. Nagy (edd.) *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*, Baltimore, 1985, 261ff.

¹²⁴ I also would find it unlikely, indeed inconceivable, that a war between these two significant states, after 500, left no trace at all in the literature. Relations between Megara and Miletos in the 7th/6th centuries. Burn 1929 (V/173) 22ff.

¹²⁵ VII 200ff.

between and separates the numerically fewer (and generally weaker) Eretrian colonies on the peninsula of Pallene from their more numerous and stronger Khalkidian neighbours.¹²⁶ Later Eretria assisted, in the same area and doubtless partly for like reasons, the establishment of Peisistratos' settlement at Rhaikelos. Later still, Eretria would encourage Athenai to perform the same buffer-role in Euboia itself, by settling *kleroukhoi* on the Lelantine Plain between her and Khalkis, following the latter's decisive defeat in 506.

"The decline of Chalcis was followed by a radical change in the foreign policy of Corinth. This city had formerly cultivated the alliance of Samos. She now deserted this alliance and formed a friendship with her old foe, Miletus."¹²⁷ Bury thus emphasises the crucial role that the perception at Korinthos of Khalkidian impotence had had in prompting the change that altered the mid-century balance of power in the Aegean. Periandros' shift of Korinthos from the old Samos/Khalkis axis was without doubt, in my opinion, the single most important development in Greek interstate affairs to affect the remainder of the sixth century, and though conceived primarily with a view towards his relations with Thrasyboulos' Miletos,¹²⁸ the political effects on Eretria were enormous. It soon found practical expression in Euboia with intervention by Periandros, perhaps even with troops, on the side of Eretria against Khalkis. However, all this activity was not without its effects on Eretrian internal affairs, and it is to these that we shall now turn.

¹²⁶ *Supra* n. 51.

¹²⁷ Bury 1955 (V/17) 151. On the decline of Khalkis: Auberson 1968 (I/40) 15; Bérard 1970 (IV/151) 68, n. 31.

¹²⁸ Burn 1929 (V/173) 24: "It seems rather to be true to say that both our two despots (i.e. Thrasyboulos and Periandros) abandoned their cities' old alliances."