

Philippika (Book 24). There is a further argument: Thoukydides¹⁴⁶ records that the forebears of the Makedonian Temenid king, Alexandros I (c.498 - 454),¹⁴⁷ incorporated coastal Pieria into Makedonia and expelled the "Pieries", who afterwards took up their abode in areas at the foot of Mt Pangaion.¹⁴⁸ When did this expulsion occur? Hammond writes: "A *terminus post quem* for this event was c.730, for at that time the coast of Pieria was described as 'Thrace' and not 'Macedonia', presumably because there were Thracians there. This description occurs in the foundation story of a Greek colony [Methone]. For some colonists from Eretria . . . c.730 sailed 'for Thrace' (*epi Thrâkês*)."¹⁴⁹ He suggests c.650 or shortly after, in the reign of Perdikkas I the first Temenid king, for the expulsion. Now, if colonists originally from Eretria had been driven to emigrate from Pierian Methone to the foot-hills of Pangaion about the mid-seventh century and settled at Skábala, this would explain both Theopompos' description of the place as 'Eretrian' in his Makedonian history, and the apparent ease with which Peisistratos, with his close Eretrian connections, was able to exploit the mines of the Pangaion. Moreover, the early coinage of Neapolis corresponds exactly with the earliest types of Eretria itself¹⁵⁰ so it is not at all impossible that Peisistratos copied its "gorgoneion-type" for some of his Athenian issues following his return from exile in Eretria and its northern colonies.

Before we leave Eretrian colonisation in the north, we may consider the possibility that Eretrieis settled, or perhaps had small service stations, on several islands between Eretria and Pallene. Skiathos is said to have been Euboian,¹⁵¹ Eretria itself is linked to Skyros.¹⁵² However, Khalkis is also said to have colonised some of these islands after they had declined in importance from the days when they were occupied by Minoans from Krete.¹⁵³ To have done so would be very sensible given the difficulties of long distance sailing in the Geometric and early Archaic periods.

Oropos.

It is perhaps appropriate here to at least revisit the relationship of Eretria and Oropos. I have already discussed this place¹⁵⁴ in the context of possible

¹⁴⁶ Thouk. 2, 99, 2ff.

¹⁴⁷ E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus. The Emergence of Macedon*, Princeton, 1992, 2: stemma of the Argead dynasty.

¹⁴⁸ Thouk. 2, 99: οἱ ὑστερον ὑπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέριον Στριμόνος ῥῆσαν Φάργητα καὶ ἄλλα χωρία.

¹⁴⁹ N. G. L. Hammond, *The Macedonian State. Origins, Institutions and History*, Oxford, 1992, 8.

¹⁵⁰ For an illustration of a coin of Neapolis: Smith 1856 II (I/1) 411; cf. an Eretrian issue: Head 1963 (V/19), 360, fig. 203, description: 361 (his dates are c.600 - 511). It is not unlikely that Eretrian Artemid religious symbolism (Walker 1995 [II/15]) was taken by Eretrian colonists to the north: Head, 361. Idem 1884 (V/90) introd. I.

¹⁵¹ Steph. Byz. s.v.

¹⁵² Skyl. 58 (quoted supra n. 18). Skyros lies off the northern coast of the Eretriás, and is most easily reached from Euboian Kyme. For Elephenor and Skyros: II 37, n. 106; 108.

¹⁵³ Skymn. 579ff. A. Sampson, *H νῆσος Σκόπελος*, Athenai, 1978.

¹⁵⁴ II 51ff., nn. 207 - 210.

immigrations from Elis to the Eretriás via eastern Boiotia. But we have a text that actually states that "Oropos is a foundation of the Eretrieis."¹⁵⁵ Knoepfler accepts this;¹⁵⁶ Wilamowitz thought so even before the text was discovered. But if so, when was it established? Knoepfler places its foundation, the purpose of which he believes was to control the commerce of the Asopos valley,¹⁵⁷ after the establishment of the Lefkandiots at Eretria. He argues that the very "off-centre" location of Eretria within its territory may be explained by the need to have a short crossing to the mainland at a point where there was a sheltered harbour on both sides of the gulf, and so it was there that the Eretrieis established a "comptoir".¹⁵⁸ But there were also strategic considerations and Thoukydides was well aware of them:¹⁵⁹ It is no accident that when the Eretrieis began actively intriguing against Athenai in 411, they quickly betrayed Oropos to the Boiotians, and immediately went to Rhodos and invited the Peloponnesioi to invade Euboia.¹⁶⁰

I think however it is more likely that there was a settlement at Oropos since very early times: the name has West Greek connotations. I have already noted that toponyms with the element -οπ- are very early.¹⁶¹ Oropos is a rhotacised form of the name of the local river, the Asopos and is also the name of a river in Epeiros. It may be that the site of Eretria was itself chosen by the retreating Lefkandiots for its position *vis-à-vis* an already existing mainland town, rather than vice versa (as Knoepfler wants). Later, Eretria had a *deme* Ὠρωπόθεν or Ὠρώπια.¹⁶² Wallace¹⁶³ placed it in his district IV, east of the city, but gives no reason in his brief commentary on the *deme*. But in a footnote¹⁶⁴ he suggests it may have been west of the city, from the discovery of a grave stele of a demesman near modern

¹⁵⁵ Nikokrates, PMich. Inv. 4913. Papyrus fr. now in the University of Michigan. On the text: C. Bonner 'A New Historical Fragment', *T.A.P.A.* 72, 1941, 26 - 35; M. Gigante 'Frammenti di un'opera periegetica', *Aegyptus* 28, 1948, 3 - 16. Bonner, 33 (citing Steph Byz. s.v. Βοιωτία) suggests that the Nikokrates, mentioned col. II, ll. 7ff., as the author of *Peri Boiottias*, is the same man mentioned by Steph. Byz. Nikokrates: col. III, ll. 4 - 6: [.....Ἐρε | τρέων κτίσ[μα εἶναι τὸν Ὠ] | ρωπὸν ἄμφισβη[ήσιμος] | γὰρ ἐστὶν Βοιωτοῖς [Ἐρετρι] | εἶσιν Ἀθηναίους [. (Oropos is a colony of the Eretrians; for it is disputed by the Boiotoi, the Eretrieis, and the Athenaioi).

¹⁵⁶ Knoepfler 1985B (II/207) 50; Wilamowitz 1971 (II/207) 9ff. Wallace 1947 (I/53) denies that Oropos was an Eretrian colony on the grounds that Eretrian rhotacism was not earlier than the 5th century (which is not true). Idem 1936A (Intro./1) 36ff. On rhotacism: II 51f., nn. 202ff., and its introduction: 53f., nn. 219ff.

¹⁵⁷ 1985B (II/207) 50.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 50: "For since the place is opposite Eretria, it was impossible that if the Athenaioi held it, that it would not pose a great threat to both Eretria itself and to Euboia in general." (My translation).

¹⁵⁹ Thouk. 8, 60, 1

¹⁶⁰ Thouk. 8, 60, 2f.; This anti-Athenian activity culminated, later the same year, in the treachery in the harbour of Eretria against the defeated Athenian ships and their sailors: 8, 95.

¹⁶¹ Supra II 33ff.; Evangelides 1962 (II/26) 12: Epeirotoponyms with the element -οπ- (Ellopia, Dryopes, Dolopes and [in Epeiros] a river **Oropos**) pre-Hellenic.

¹⁶² Steph. Byz. Ὠρωπότις, ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλη Εἰρήβοίας; this is presumably the deme. But note his comment s.v. Κορόπη (quoted supra IV n. 130) which suggests that Eretrian Oropos might be Lefkandi.

¹⁶³ 1947 (I/53) 144 on readings (two **very** doubtful, one "certain") in IG XII 9, 241_{84; 89; 90} (infra VIII 229 and 230: photos figs 71 and 72).

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. 144, n. 91.

Vasilikon,¹⁶⁵ just inland from Lefkandí and opposite mainland Oropos. Thoukydides calls Oropos γῆν παραίτιζήν καλουμένην and πέραν γῆς;¹⁶⁶ this suggests an Eretrian perspective, and that the area was for Eretria the παραία γῆ.¹⁶⁷ It is probable that the inhabitants of one of the Oropoi settled the other: I think settlement and name went from the mainland to the island, and so we can't talk of Oropos as an Eretrian colony. Clearly, however, the two places were closely associated at all periods of their history, and the Eretrieis, growing more powerful during the eighth/seventh centuries, took control of its mainland satellite. This could have been quite amicable, for Eretria seems at all times to have enjoyed good-will at Oropos, and certainly never relinquished hopes of repossessing the town when it was under either Boiotian or Athenian control.¹⁶⁸ It was not until after the destruction of Eretria in 490 that Athenai gained control of it.¹⁶⁹ Thenceforth Oropos was a bone of contention between Eretria, Athenai and Thebai; Eretria was always hostile towards the foreign occupying power.¹⁷⁰

(b) Eretria's relations with other independent poleis.

1. The Lelantine War.

The central factor governing Eretria's relations with states in Euboia itself, from the ninth to the mid-sixth centuries, was the "Lelantine War". Interwoven with this were Eretrian involvements overseas, the result of its control over islands in the Aegean, and its wide colonial/trading interests. The very settlement of Eretria itself seems to have been the outcome of warfare between the Khalkideis and Lefkandiots, and there is evidence that fighting erupted periodically over centuries between the two *poleis*. The reason scholars give such differing dates for this war is undoubtedly due to the chronic nature of the fighting over a long period of time.¹⁷¹

Because Eretria had overseas interests, fighting on the island inevitably involved other *poleis* outside Euboia. Thoukydides, in his brief comment on "the" Lelantine War, says that this was the first occasion when many Greek states became embroiled in a single conflict.¹⁷² We need not think a majority of the *poleis* were

¹⁶⁵ IG XII 9, 744. I presume Wallace means Vasilikó(n) when he writes Vasilike. There is also a stele for Oropokles (a very rare name) from Magoula (in District III): IG XII 9, 772.

¹⁶⁶ Thouk. 2, 23, 3; 3, 91, 3.

¹⁶⁷ Fossey 1970 (II/210) 11; cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (II), Oxford, 1957, 81: suggests that παραίτιζήν is a corruption of Γραίτιζήν. Cf. Eretrian deme παραίτιζήν = Παραίτις?

¹⁶⁸ Nikokrates, quoted n. 155. Knoepfler 1985B (II/207) esp. 50; 52ff. for its vicissitudes during historical times. Infra VI 182f. for another theory as to when Eretria lost Oropos.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. 50, 51.

¹⁷⁰ Menedemos was obviously intriguing over it and wrote to Antigonos Gonatas defending himself on the matter: Diog. Laert. 2, 141 (= Euphantos *F.G.H.* III, 19 f 1).

¹⁷¹ Walker 1990 (IV/32) for ancient sources for the war.

¹⁷² Thouk. 1, 15, 3: μάλιστα δὲ ἐς τὸν πάλαι ποτὲ γινόμενον πόλεμον Χαλκιδέων καὶ Ἐρετριέων καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἐξ ἑπιμαχίαν ἐξατέρων διέστη.

involved, actively or passively, in great battles. Periodically there did occur 'decisive' events, such as the destruction of Lefkandí, and whichever phase of the war attracted his attention, it must have been one of these. But we should not be seduced by Thoukydides' note into believing that it usually involved much more than the picture of cross-border cattle raiding in the marches of the Eretriás and the Karystia that emerges from the fragmentary epic referred to above.¹⁷³ Hippeis and Hippobotai justified their control of the state by virtue of their martial prowess, and episodes such as this indicate that they had plenty of opportunities to keep in training.¹⁷⁴

In whose interest were these local wars? Certainly not the non-hippobotic classes. The early rural gentry could perhaps carry on their age-old duel with their neighbours in the *eskhatia*, the remote border countryside, where the writ of the *polis* was weak, in the manner some scholars describe as "agonistic". The notion of "chivalric" *agones* has, in fact, as one of its principal foundations, Strabon's comments on the conduct of warfare between the two rival Euboian *poleis*.¹⁷⁵ It is an extension of Herman's scenario of elaborate friendship links between aristocratic families and individuals from different *poleis*.¹⁷⁶ But c.825, on the Lelantine Plain,

¹⁷³ Supra IV 122ff. Such raids were always a feature of Greek life, even under Roman rule: Paus. 7, 14, 7: ἐαλόζισσαν δὲ οἱ Θηβαῖοι πρώτην διζην Μετέλλου διζάζοντος Φοκαεῖσιν ἐκτίσαι ζημίαν, ὅτι ἐσέβαλον σὺν ὄπλοις ἐς τὴν τὴν Φοκίδα, δευτέρην Εὐβοεῖσιν, ἐδήρυσαν γὰρ καὶ Εὐβοέων τὴν χώραν, τρίτην δὲ Ἀιγιοσσιῶν, ταπεινὰς καὶ τὴν Ἀιγιοσσιέων περὶ ἀγρὴν σιτοῦ. Earlier, the governors of Dareios had to impose order on the Ionian cities after the conquest, because of cross-border raiding: A. R. Burn, 'The So-called "Trade Leagues" in Early Greek History and the Lelantine War', *J.H.S.* 49, 1929, 23.

¹⁷⁴ *Ar. Pol.* 1289 b 36ff.: διότι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσας πόλεις ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἢ δύναις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχία παρὰ τοῖς ἦσαν ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοῖς πολέμοις ἵπποις πρὸς τοῖς ἀστυγείτονας, οἷον Ἐρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ Μαϊάνδρῳ... (And this is why in ancient times those states whose strength lay in their cavalry and which used horses in their wars against their neighbours, e.g. the Eretrians, the Khalkideis and the citizens of Magnesia-on-the-Maiandros [were governed by] oligarchies...)

¹⁷⁵ P. Gardner, 'A Numismatic Note on the Lelantine War', *C.R.* 34, 1920, 91; Brelich 1961 (II/18); Mastrocinque 1980 (II/18) 460ff.: warfare in the 9th/8th centuries like a chivalric *agon*, (contest) in which battles fought according to well-defined courtly rules. Killing was minimised and hostages ransomed rapidly after being well-treated. Gardner 91: "It was a kind of fighting match or ordeal by combat; and did not permanently embitter relations between the two cities (i.e. Eretria and Khalkis)." Strabon 10, 1, 12 C448: Τὸ μὲν οὖν πλέον ὀμιολόγοιν ἀλλήλαις αἱ πόλεις αὐταί, περὶ δὲ Ἀηλάντων διενεχθεῖσα οἷδ' οὕτω τελέως ἐπαύσαντο, ὥστε τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ αἰθέρασαν δρᾶν ἕκαστα, ἀλλὰ συνέθεντο, ἐφ' οἷς σιστήσονται τὸν ἀγῶνα, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ Ἀμαρινθίῳ στήλῃ τις, φράζουσα μὴ γῆροθα τηλεβόλοις. (For the most part these *poleis* agreed with one another, and when differences arose concerning the Lelantine [Plain], they didn't so completely cease in this as to each wage war with stubborn remorselessness, but developed a convention according to which they would conduct the fighting. This is revealed by a stele in the Amarnythion, which expresses a prohibition against thrown weapons). Often aristocratic hostages became the 'guest-friends' (*xenoi*) of their captors; networks of relationships between noble houses were built up, lasting well into the classical period; on 'guest-friendship': G. Herman, *Ritualized Friendship in the Greek City*, Cambridge, 1987. Burn 1929 (V/173) 23: "The old aristocratic republic had been liable to be swayed by sentimental considerations - old guest-friendships with the nobles of other states and the curious and widespread feeling that the national honour demands the vigorous prosecution of ancestral border-feuds - the tyrant cared for none of these things..." "He was an opportunist." etc.

¹⁷⁶ Herman, 1987 (V/175) *passim*. The most famous example is that between Perikles the Alkmaionid and Arkhidamos II, the Eurypontid king of Sparta: Thouk. 2, 13, 1: Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, στρατηγός, ὢν Ἀθηναῖον δέκατος αὐτός, ὡς ἔγνω τὴν ἐσβολὴν ἐσομένην, ὑποτοπήσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὢν ἐτίμηχανε, μὴ πολλὰς ἢ αὐτός ἰδίᾳ βουλόμενος χωρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἀγροῖς αὐτοῦ παραλίην

this cosy pattern of war-games amongst aristocratic *oikoi*¹⁷⁷ appears to have ended in a real war, involving annexation by Khalkis of the defeated nobles' territory. Why did Khalkis break the convention?

Drought¹⁷⁸ and its economic strains would have put paid to the mitigating effects of ancient class-friendship links with neighbouring landowners, and have increased pressure to reform the military efficiency of the state for both attack and defence. But the emergence of the *polis*, associated both with the phenomenon of colonisation and changes in the methods and conventions of warfare, may have played a role. The phase of the Lelantine War leading to the settlement at Eretria was a "manifestation of the struggle between the old order of the *ethnos*-states and the new world of the *polis*-states".¹⁷⁹ For Kondoleon (and myself), Eretria represents the "*neos kosmos*", Khalkis the "*palaios*". Arkhilokhos¹⁸⁰ "spear-famed lords of Euboia" were the heirs of the Ábantes,¹⁸¹ already known in Homeros as ῥηξιθόρακες,¹⁸² since their method of using the spear was to stand firm and thrust for the chest. The description of the method of fighting by the Abantic contingent in the *Iliad*, quite compatible with that of the hoplite phalanx, has thus been regarded as a later interpolation.¹⁸³ But were the "spear-famed lords" still from the old hippobotic class? And were they the sole custodians of Euboian military ethics anyway? Perhaps the convention (Strabon writes "συνέθεντο", suggesting a "συνθήκη") preserved in the temple at Amarynthos¹⁸⁴ is a survival from these early times, the prohibition against missiles (τηλέβολοι) being an attempt by the victorious Khalkideis to forestall any Eretrian counter-offensive. Missiles were a feature of Eretrian warfare at this time: we see them used against the colonists returning from Kerkyra (734/3). The clause favoured users of traditional methods such as duelling with swords and, especially, those using horses.¹⁸⁵ Valuable and hard to replace, these were vulnerable to missiles

καὶ μὴ δῆρῳσῃ ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελεισάντων ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γέννηται τοῦτο. . . . Ἄρχιδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένος εἶη οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῶ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο. . . . But it is misleading to believe that warfare and associated diplomacy in the sixth and later centuries was at all "chivalric" in any but a few cases such as (perhaps!) the war for the Thyreatis (Hdt. I, 82): was this anything more than a romanticised version of a preliminary skirmish followed by a "real" battle? I think not. In any case, the result was decided by a formal hoplite engagement.

¹⁷⁷ Supra IV n. 299, for "house" in the sense of an aristocratic household, specifically in an Eretrian/Karystian conflict scenario.

¹⁷⁸ Evidence for Eretria: IV 76ff., and neighbouring areas: Attike: 76, n. 38; Andros: 71, n. 40; in relation to attacks on Lefkandi and Eretria in LPG: supra III 64f.; and for colonisation: supra 135f.

¹⁷⁹ Kondoleon 1963/65 (I/28) 16: "ἐκδήλωσιν τοῦ ἀγῶνος μεταξὺ τοῦ παλαιοῦ κόσμου τῶν ἐθνῶν καὶ τοῦ νέου κόσμου τῆς πόλεως."

¹⁸⁰ Arkhilokhos fr. 3 (infra n. 196): is not incompatible with a small body of aristocratic warriors riding to battle then fighting more or less as hoplites with thrusting spears. Given the likelihood of very small numbers on both sides, the battle would have been rather removed from the typical hoplite battle of the late-6th century onwards.

¹⁸¹ II 24ff.: 37ff. for the Kouretes/Ábantes and their fighting customs.

¹⁸² Hom. II, 2, 543f.

¹⁸³ Lorimer 1974 (II/105) 114; (and especially) 121.

¹⁸⁴ Strabon 10, 1, 12 C448: (quoted supra n. 175). Early Eretrian writing: supra 139f., nn. 61 - 65.

¹⁸⁵ Greenhalgh 1973 (IV/162) 91f.

shot from a distance.¹⁸⁶ As in any period of social tension, attitudes clash and become blurred; the Amarynthos convention appears an attempt to re-enforce *mores*¹⁸⁷ of constraint that were breaking down, while the new, all-out approach to winning in war, in particular betrays a more opportunistic, hard-headed philosophy. This appears to contrast superficially with the spirit of the *polis*, with its collective rather than individual responsibility in such matters as the defence of the state, and reflected militarily in the hoplite *phalanx*, requiring subordination of individual self-pride in personal glory to the more mundane collective interest of the state and its protection. Still, Arkhilokhos didn't hesitate to jettison his hoplite *porpax* shield, and economic opportunism, at Eretria and elsewhere, is also manifested by the new dominant class, with its more "selfish" commercial interests, whose rise to power exhibits features of later class struggles.¹⁸⁸ The hoplite army was its means of countering the old aristocratic military dominance. Elsewhere too we see the emergence of mercenaries¹⁸⁹ and tyranny, whose appearance at Eretria came later.¹⁹⁰

The debate concerning the emergence of the hoplite/*polis* system is not new. Recent scholarship¹⁹¹ sees the military reforms **preceding** social change.¹⁹² But there must have been **some** prior socio-economic changes that had already created potential "revolutionaries", a class of farmers of sufficient substance, or men who had obtained wealth from an expansion of trade opportunities, able to afford a hoplite panoply, or part of it. Farmers with such resources were likely to have been growing exportable commodities, such as olives. We need not imagine a rush to arms by the rising classes; Cartledge thinks they would have been reluctant soldiers.¹⁹³ I believe that as men became more affluent, they were able to acquire, perhaps piecemeal, the equipment of what would later become the fully-fledged hoplite, and that pressure to do so may have been applied by the *polis*-government in order to strengthen its military capabilities; often that government will, of course, still have been in the hands of the old aristocratic class. Following defeats by Khalkis in the

¹⁸⁶ Thouk. 6, 22 represents Nikias in 415 as saying that Athenai would have to send many archers and slingers to counter the Syrakoussan cavalry superiority.

¹⁸⁷ Strabon 10, 1, 13 C448 - 449 dilates upon this aspect of Abantic warfare; Eustath. *ad Hom. 'Il. pertin.*, 282, 15ff.: "Ἀβαντες αἰχμηταὶ οἱ μὴ ἀφιέντες τὰς αἰχμὰς, ὀρέγοντες δὲ ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ οἴτω πλήσσοντες . . ." (the Abantes were spearmen who did not discharge their spears, but by bringing them forwards in their hands they inflicted wounds . . .).

¹⁸⁸ Kondoleon 1963/65 (I/28) 16; M. Watson, *Class Struggles in Ancient Greece*, London, 1947, 52f.

¹⁸⁹ E.g. Arkhilokhos and Hybrias (mid-6th century): D. L. Page, 'The Song of Hybrias the Cretan', *Proc. Camb. Philolog. Soc.* 191 (n.s. 11) 1965, 62 - 65. Lorimer 1947 (II/105) 118, speculates that τηλεβόλους perhaps refers to mercenary slingers and archers.

¹⁹⁰ For the tyranny at Eretria in the 6th century: *infra* VII 197ff. Cf. Burn 1929 (V/173) 23.

¹⁹¹ For a select bibliography on the rise of hoplite warfare: Appendix 2.

¹⁹² Cartledge 1977 (V/191) 20; 21: "The adoption of phalanx tactics did not create a revolutionary situation . . . rather it turned potential revolutionaries . . . into actual revolutionaries."; Salmon 1977 (V/191) 95: "According to some 'piecemeal' theorists (not including Salmon himself), it was the tyrants who produced the phalanx, according to the 'sudden change' hypothesis, ('the alternative hypothesis to which I subscribe. . . ." [p. 20]) the phalanx that produced the tyrants."

¹⁹³ Cartledge 1977 (V/191) 20; Morris 1987 (III/60): stresses the existence of revolutionary discontent in the classes below that of the actual rulers; Walker 1996 (III/72).

late-seventh/early-sixth centuries, and having already undergone the economic revolution, Eretria may have been especially willing to adopt the new methods and equipment. No-one yet seems to have considered that Euboia, with its martial traditions, from the mythical Kouretai and historical Ábantes to the lords who fought with/against Arkhilokhos, might have been the original home of the hoplite.¹⁹⁴ The extent to which Euboian interest in Al Mina and the metal-working cultures of the Middle East may have encouraged the adoption of new armour and tactics is hard to assess. Did Euboia get its reputation as the inventor of bronze weaponry from this contact? Arkhilokhos' jettisoned shield was certainly a hoplite *porrax*-shield.¹⁹⁵ Two texts¹⁹⁶ link both Euboia and (part of) the hoplite panoply (though of course the *rhipsaspia* did not occur there, since a Thrax was beneficiary of Arkhilokhos' prudence). Both Eretrians and Khalkideis had hoplites early on; while discussing the Thessalian hero Kleomakhos of Pharsalos, Ploutarkhos shows Eretrian hoplites defeating those of the Khalkideis, but subsequently fleeing the battlefield following his cavalry charge.¹⁹⁷ Of great importance is a LG *amphora* found at Eretria itself¹⁹⁸ depicting a file of warriors, each with two spears (throwing, probably not hoplite) and blazoned shields (most probably hoplite). Boardman thinks "transitional" comes most readily to mind when considering this evidence.¹⁹⁹ The weapons unearthed in the excavation of the West Gate *Heroön* (c.680) are swords and spears, which **might** be hoplite equipment, but there are no distinguishing items such as shields or helmets which would settle the matter; the excavators however note Homeric rituals pointing to earlier usage,²⁰⁰ though there is no necessary correlation between funerary and military practices. Still, there was a long-standing contempt for "non-hoplite" methods in Euboia.²⁰¹ Euripides in *Herakles* starkly expresses the feelings of (class) antagonism between old and new worlds. Lykos (Euripides wrongly calls him

¹⁹⁴ W. Helbig (cited by Kondoleon 1963/65 [I/28] 1, n. 2) attributes to Khalkis the development of the phalanx in order to control the numerically superior natives in her areas of colonisation.

¹⁹⁵ On Arkhilokhos' *rhipsaspia*: Lorimer 1974 (II/105) 111.

¹⁹⁶ Fr. 3: οἷ τοι πολλὰ ἐπὶ τόξα τανύσσετα οἷδὲ θαμναῖ
σφενδόνα, εὖτ' ἂν δὴ μῶλον Ἄρης σινάγη
ἐν πεδίῳ ξίφεων δὲ πολύστονον ἔσσετα ἔργον
ταύτης γὰρ ζεῖνοι δαίμονές εἰσι μάχης
δραπέτα Εὐβοίης δουριζλιτοί.

(**Not so many bows shall be stretched, | nor so many slings discharged**, when Ares goes forth | to war on the Plain, but then there will be | the awful work of the sword, **for this | is the sort of battle in which are masters | the spear-famed lords of Euboia**), and fr 6, for the shield. If we place his floruit in the last quarter of the 7th century, we would not be far wrong. The date of Arkhilokhos is still a topic of dispute: F. Jacoby, 'The Date of Archilochus', *C.Q.* 35, 1941, 107: c.625 (low chronology): the poet as a young man; A. Blakeway, 'The Date of Archilochus', *Greek Poetry and Life: Essays presented to Gilbert Murray on his 70th Birthday*, 2 January, 1936, Oxford 1936, 53: 740/30: his birth. The dating is important (despite the fact that precision is not to be had) because it reveals fighting in Euboia during his active lifetime and for dating the introduction there of hoplite armour.

¹⁹⁷ Plout. *Erot.* (*Mor.* 760F - 761A).

¹⁹⁸ Boardman, 1957 (I/65) 29.

¹⁹⁹ Greenhalgh 1973 (IV/162) 91.

²⁰⁰ Bérard 1970 (IV/151) 28f., 32, 50. Homeric echoes: 29.

²⁰¹ Mele 1975 (II/20) 21f.

"king of Thebai",²⁰² for he is a Euboieus, as he himself later makes clear. Abantic Dirphys, his homeland, is mostly in Khalkidic territory²⁰³). Appropriately for a Khalkideus, he espouses the conservative view, echoing the sense of shame and contempt felt by Euboian aristocrats for men who used missile weapons such as bows-and-arrows, arguing against Amphitryon, Herakles' "father", who speaks for the new.²⁰⁴ Herakles is the aggressive outsider/innovator, exploiting the missile arrow. The convention-stele thus expresses only the Euboian noble attitudes of the "spear-famed lords".²⁰⁵ Lykos' contempt, together with the angry frustration of the verses of the aristocratic Theognis dealing with his experiences in Euboia²⁰⁶ during civil strife there in the mid-sixth century, reveal what must have been a widely felt anger amongst this class at the total breakdown of the ancient interstate and interfamilial relationships. On behalf of the new way, we have only Amphitryon's diatribe.

Despite military and political changes, the old notion persisted that whoever fights in defence of the community should have a say in the direction of state policy (especially of war and peace). The revolutionary potential of this idea in the new climate is obvious, and it had a great impact on Eretrian military and civilian life when the "fighting-class" extended downwards into the artisans and labouring sections of the population: the increasing importance of naval warfare²⁰⁷ would

²⁰² A throwback to Theban/Abantic rule at Lefkandi in Mycenaean times?

²⁰³ Though Vellacott's translation does not since he doesn't render Δίφρην ... Ἀβαντίδα (so I give my own: Eur. *Her.* ll. 195ff.:

What would Abantic Dirphys, your homeland
have to say about you, if we were to ask?
It would not praise you, for there is no place
in your fatherland which could witness
any noble deed of yours.

Cf. P. Vellacott (tr.) *Euripides: Medea, Hecabe, Electra, Heracles*, Harmondsworth, 1963, 159.

²⁰⁴ Ll. 195ff.: Eur. *Her.* 156ff. (Vellacott's trans.):

Herakles won his fame fighting animals;
in other matters, he was no hero - he was nothing!
His left arm never held a shield, he never faced
an enemy's spear. **He used the bow, the coward's weapon,**
handy for running away. The test of courage is not
skill with a bow, but in the firm foot, the unflinching eye,
when the spear drives its hurtling furrow through the ranks.

Cf. Pandaros and Paris, examples of other contemptible or untrustworthy men who were archers.

²⁰⁵ Euripides *Her.* 156ff. (supra nn. 203f.). The conflicting combination of Euboia, Herakles and archery is also present in Sophokles' *Trakh.* 265ff. resulting in the sack of (Eretrian) Oikhalia. Schol. Hom. *Il.* 543: ἦν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς αἰσχρὸν τὸ τόξεύειν.: Erbse 1969 (II/18) 302 and Eustath.: δηλοῖ μὲν ἡ ἱστορία εἰποῦσα αἰσχρὸν εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ τόξεύειν continue this theme, though nowhere does **Homeros** specifically say that it was disgraceful for Euboieis to use bows-and-arrows. Both commentaries come from the same unknown source (influenced by Euripides whose play would have been well known?) In any case, the aristocracy early on regarded Homeros' epics as their own, and their class-interpretation will have impressed itself on the public perception of them. However there were Herakleia agones in both Eretria: IG XII 9, 234, 17 - 18; 257, 272 (5th century) and Khalkis: 952 (late-2nd).

²⁰⁶ Theogn. 783f.; 885ff.

²⁰⁷ Thouk. 1, 13, 4 records "the earliest naval battle"; there is, however, evidence of earlier (late-eighth century) naval battles involving Euboieis: e.g. Amphidamas of Khalkis who died in a naval engagement against the Eretrieis: infra 163f.; Arkhilokhos' poems suggest that battles that he took part in were fought using at least the hoplite panoply.

further change, even more radically, the socio-economic composition of the military. "Thus, when the hoplite element in Chalkis and Eretria realized its potential power, government by the Hippobotai became less settled."²⁰⁸ By the mid-sixth century, Thersites was no longer to be silenced by a slap from his noble betters, and his fellows were no longer simply at the scene of battle merely to provide applause at the exploits of heroes.²⁰⁹ While the sanction of the stele perhaps represents an early setback for the new world in Euboia, change could not be indefinitely postponed, for Euboia was not isolated from the rest of the Greek world. Military defeat had resulted in the break-up of the Lefkandiot community and the relocation of the classes representing the new social forces to Eretria, where they could express the new ideology in the new *polis* through its economic dynamism. The hard-headed driving away of the colonists "with slings and shots" not long after its "foundation" displays the new spirit in action at Eretria.

2. The "Lelantine War" and Extra-Euboian Alliances.

The early war involving Karystos and Miletos probably involved an alliance between the latter and Eretria.²¹⁰ Kondoleon has pushed back the concept of two major groupings of a "politico-military nature" to the "end of the Geometric period", and argued that these reflected the characteristics of the component *poleis* so profoundly that they lasted for centuries.²¹¹ His is the most detailed examination of evidence for the early period, but even he fails to cover all the available data: there is no discussion of the climatic factor and, naturally, the results of the Swiss excavations were not available in 1963. Also, he is too strongly seduced by his desire to prove his theory that Eretria provided the convoys for **all** the Chalkidian colonial ventures that he ignores the political implications of non-maritime factors (such as the Lelantine land war). His account, though interesting and valuable, is thus unbalanced and incomplete.²¹² His belief in unchanging alliance groups cannot finally be sustained, witness the alacrity with which Periandros abandoned the long-

²⁰⁸ Jeffery 1976 (II/224) 68.

²⁰⁹ Hom. *Il.* 2, 212ff.; 243ff.

²¹⁰ IV 110ff. N. Kondoleon, 'Νέα Ἐπιγραφαὶ περὶ Ἀρχιλόχου ἐκ Πάρου', *A.E.* 1952/54, 83f. "Κατὰ τὴν περὶ τοῦ Ἀηλιάντου πεδίου πόλεμον μετὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων τῶν Χαλκιδῶν εἶναι οἱ Μιλήσιοι τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον, ὅπως καὶ τὸν Ναξιακόν, μνημονεῖται καὶ ὁ Ἀρχιλόχος. Οὕτω ἀμφοτέρωι οἱ πόλεμοι πίπτουσιν εἰς τοὺς χρόνους τοῦ Ἀρχιλόχου. Ἡ στενὴ σχέσηις Παρίων καὶ Μιλησίων καθιστᾷ πιθανωτάτην τὴν συμμετοχὴν καὶ τῶν Παρίων εἰς τὸν Εἰβοϊκόν τοῦτον πόλεμον παρὰ τὸ πλεονόν τῶν Ἐρετριέων." and "ὁ Ναξιακός καὶ ὁ Εἰβοϊκός πόλεμος δὲν εἶναι ἀσχετοὶ μετὰ τῶν." P. Oliva, *The Birth of Greek Civilization*, London, 1981, 114: "Some scholars have even gone so far as to put forward a theory of two 'mercantile alliances', mutually hostile, in archaic Greece."

²¹¹ Kondoleon, 1963/65 (I/28) 2: "Εἰς τὴν διάκρισιν ταύτην τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πόλεων κατὰ τὸ τέλος τῆς γεωμετρικῆς ἐποχῆς εἶχον τὴν εἰσαίριαν νὰ αναφερθῶ εἰς πλείονας μελετάς μοι* νὰ θεωρήσῃ δὲ ταύτην (alliance) οὐχὶ ὡς μίαν πρόσκαιρον, καθαρῶς πολιτικοῦ-στρατιωτικοῦ χαρακτήρου «διάστασιν» τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ κόσμου εἰς δύο συνασπισμοὺς ἀντιμαχομένους ἕνεκα προσωρινῶς ὑπαρξάντων συμφερόντων, ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν ἐξαρσιν βαθιτέρας διαφορῶν μετὰ τῶν δύο παρατάξεων ἐκατέρωι τῶν ὁποίων τὰ μέλη ἠρόνοντο διὰ μακροχρονίων δεσμιῶν οὕτινες δὲν μᾶς εἶναι πάντοτε ἀμέσως φανερά."* e.g. supra n. 202; Kondoleon 1952/54.; idem 'Archilochos und Paros', *Entretiens Hardt X: 'Archiloque'*, 1963, Genève, 1963.

²¹² Supra nn. 210; 211.

standing Korinthos/Samos alliance for friendship with Thrasyboulos of Miletos, and thereby upsetting the balance of power in the Aegean region, a change that had momentous consequences for both Eretria (long-standing ally of Miletos) and Khalkis (of Samos) and, indeed, for all Greece.²¹³

However, I disagree with those who argue that trade considerations can **never** be used to explain the actions of archaic Greek *poleis* in general, or the Lelantine War in particular.²¹⁴ Thus while concurring with Hasebroek that the idea of predictive commercial planning by archaic *poleis* is unthinkable, I disagree with his assertion that there were no "foreign and sea trade and regular trade alliances (resting on a basis of naval strength) with commercial aristocrats"; the examples of the Bakkhiadai²¹⁵ and of both Solon and Peisistratos, not to mention the Eretrian oligarchy, should give one pause before asserting this. Similarly, we should reject the idea that rulers (and even the people) of archaic *poleis* did not perceive mutual non-competing interests: commercial, political and other (e.g. racial: it is unrealistic to believe that Iones were oblivious to their distinctiveness from, say, Dorieis and vice versa) and form alliances. The variety of colonies established by various states indicates that the *metropoleis* had certain political or economic objectives in mind when sending out colonists. We have already noted that Eretria itself may well have dictated to its Pithekoussan *emporion* over gold trans-shipments. The tyrants Periandros and Thrasyboulos undoubtedly shared similar interests and political goals which were probably, in the last analysis, more important than their personal friendship. Before c.550, ties linking city-states must have been fairly unstructured and "personal", not unlike the intra-*poleis* alliance networks amongst aristocratic families and individuals which existed from the Heroic Age right down to, and beyond, the classical period, described by Herman.

By the eighth century (or earlier if we believe Kondoleon),²¹⁶ the middle Aegean and central Greek *poleis* had established alliances based upon perceived

²¹³ Bury/Meiggs 1981 (IV/213) 107: notes the reversal of the Bakkhiad alliance with the Samian Geomoroï (land-sharers), whose natural sympathies lay with the Khalkidian Hippobotai; Periandros had more in common with the commercially oriented Eretrieis and Milesioi under a fellow-tyrant.

²¹⁴ Starr 1962 (IV/263) 347: "Modern hypotheses (about the Lelantine War) fit far too much into terms of trade wars."; J. Hasebroek, *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Eng. trans.: *Staat und Handel im alten Griechenland*) Tübingen, 1928, 70f.: "We must altogether reject the picture of seventh century Greece as a country with elaborate inter-city division of labour and specialization of production, with an extensive foreign and sea trade and regular trade connections (resting on a basis of naval strength) with commercial aristocrats and merchant princes."

²¹⁵ Strabon 8, 6, 20 C378. Trade was important at Korinthos even before the 9th century, and trade considerations seem always more important there than political ideology in determining policies: Siegel 1978 (I/46).

²¹⁶ Supra n. 211. For the stability of these groupings: J. Hurwit, *The Art and Culture of Early Greece, 1100 - 480 B.C.*, Ithaca/London, 1985, 81f.: "Such as they were, these 'leagues' did exist and the wars of the Greek maritime states in the seventh century **do seem to be connected in every case, directly or indirectly, with the rivalries of Chalcis and Eretria, Samos and Miletos . . .**" (My emphasis).

common interests, political and commercial, called "trade leagues"²¹⁷ though the term is much questioned, which impinge on the series of battles which I call the "Lelantine War". Eretria developed its friendships amongst the outward-looking commercial states, and may have been first to acquire overseas friends, a natural consequence of her trading interests, while Khalkis found allies amongst conservative states such as Samos, with her landowning aristocratic government, the Geomoroi. However such natural alliances were often thwarted by anti-neighbourly and selfish considerations: originally, commercial Korinthos was an ally of Khalkis while Korinthos' neighbour, conservative Megara, was probably therefore a friend of Eretria;²¹⁸ a general principle operating from very early in the history of the Greek *poleis* right up to the last phase of their autonomous existence, may be expressed as follows: "my neighbour is my enemy; my neighbour's neighbour will thus be his enemy, therefore my neighbour's neighbour can be my friend."²¹⁹ The effect of these alignments on internal politics is hard to estimate. A powerful partner might reinforce an allied régime or even subvert it. The effects of Peisistratos' stay in Eretria during the 540's on the stability of the oligarchy are examined in my next chapter. Later tradition preserved the memory of old alliances, opposing groupings of naturally (and predictably) hostile pairs. Thessalia with governments in the hands of horse-rearing aristocracies²²⁰ also belongs within the Khalkidian grouping at this time;²²¹ the following is the likely basic arrangement:²²²

ERETRIA	Miletos	Paros	Khios	Megara
KHALKIS	Samos	Naxos	Erythrai	Korinthos

A series of wars between Eretria and Khalkis and their allies began about the middle of the eighth century. We don't know which side began the war, possibly

²¹⁷ Burn 1929 (V/173) 14ff. "... the history of the period (i.e. between 720 and 660) in which may be discerned two groups of Greek states which always appear hostile to one another."

²¹⁸ Thouk. 6, 4: Khalkidian hostility to Megara was, perhaps, a legacy of ancient antagonisms. But Thoukydides makes no connection with his earlier (I, 15, 3) note concerning the *πάλαι ποτὲ γεινόμενον πόλεμον* (i.e. the Lelantine War).

²¹⁹ This was generally true of Euboia.

²²⁰ Bradeen 1947B (IV/32) 223; Bengtson 1988 (IV/243) 30: "It is therefore no wonder that the nobility, supported by their land, and by a following of a great many small-holders and serfs (as for instance, Thessaly), gradually seized complete control of power and within a short time completely controlled the whole of public life ... before the ... middle of the eighth century" We could also perhaps be talking of Khalkis here.

²²¹ Forrest 1957 (IV/285) 161.

²²² My emphasis is on Eretria (and Khalkis); however, the dominant polis in each group was not necessarily either of these; but Eretria at times certainly could claim hegemonial status in the central Greek/Aegean area. In discussing alliances in the Lelantine War and Thoukydides I, 15, 3, we must note (without agreeing) that schol. thinks there were in fact no alliances: S. D. Lambert, 'A Thucydidean Scholion on the Lelantine War', *J.H.S.*, 102, 1982, 216ff. For the alliances associated with Eretria and Khalkis: Burn 1929 (V/173) 4: "The great maritime states of Euboia enlisted their trading partners as allies." and "But it appears that the political landscape of Greece (and some enduring alliances between poleis) had taken shape ..." (speaking of the seventh century).

Khalkis. The rupture between Eretrieis and Khalkideis on Pithekoussai c.750, and the loss in 734 of Kerkyra, and perhaps Syrakoussai, by Eretria to Korinthos (as an ally of Khalkis) are probably related. Is the Miletos/Eretria vs Karystos fight also part of this fighting? Quite likely. At about this time, the people of Khios help the Milesioi in return for previous help against Erythrai.²²³ The fact that at Khalkis, the Hippobotai maintain their control until the troubles there in the second half of the sixth century,²²⁴ suggests that the Eretrieis lost the mid-eighth century phase of the "Lelantine War" in Euboia.

This episode in the "War" may be linked with other fighting in the Aegean. Kondoleon has written several papers on Arkhilokhos and Paros, discussing the poet's involvement in a series of wars - Arkhilokhos was a mercenary²²⁵ - which he dates to the seventh century,²²⁶ between Paros and Naxos in which Miletos, Eretria's friend, was allied to Paros; Miletos was still hostile towards Naxos on the eve of the Ionian Revolt and the expedition against it of Aristagoras with the Persians.²²⁷ The Polykrite incident²²⁸ shows that Milesioi and Erythraioi jointly attacked Naxos while Paros was fighting her. Earlier, Miletos and Erythrai joined Paros to found Parion on the Propontis (709).²²⁹ Conversely, the ancient friendship of Khalkis and Naxos is demonstrated by their joint foundation of Naxos in Sicily in 734.²³⁰ Paros and Miletos remained friends of Eretria for centuries.²³¹ Thus Paros may have sent troops to Euboia with, or perhaps even under the command of, its prominent soldier-poet, maybe in repayment for some Eretrian help in the Naxos war for which we have no record. The military action in Euboia involving Arkhilokhos seems to have been fought under the terms of the convention imposing a ban on missile-weapons.²³² The similarity between the wording of the stele and his poem is so striking that I am surprised that (military) historians have not commented on it more.²³³ If Arkhilokhos

²²³ Hdt. 1, 18.

²²⁴ Walker 1993 (IV/227) for the rise of the tyrant Antileon in Khalkis and the aftermath.

²²⁵ A description of himself emerges from frs 1, 2, 6, 14 etc.; cf. Hybrias, the Kretan mercenary of the 6th (?) century.

²²⁶ Supra nn. 189; 195 - 200.

²²⁷ Hdt. 5, 28ff. doesn't recognise the ancient enmity between the two. Friendly relations between Paros and Miletos c.525 are clear from the request by the embattled Milesioi for a fleet from Paros (Hdt. idem).

²²⁸ Polyain. 8, 36; Plout. *Gyn. aret. (Mor. 254 F)*; Parthenios *Myth.* 9.

²²⁹ *C.A.H.* III³, 162 (Table).

²³⁰ Idem. Dunbabin 1948 (V/7) 8.

²³¹ Hdt. 5, 28ff. Decree of Paros, IG XI 4, 1065 + IG XII 5, i, 128 (ed. pr. E. L. Hicks, 'The Collection of Ancient Marbles at Leeds', *J.H.S.* 11, 1890, 260ff) honouring Eretrian arbitrators who find in favour of Paros against Naxos (post 194); for later Eretrian/Milesian friendship: IG XII 9, Test./Not. 162f.; supra 105. n. 181. There was a hiccup in this happy arrangement between 540 - 530 when Paros was, briefly, hostile to Miletos. Kondoleon 1952/54 (V/210) 59 for 7th century trade ties between Paros and Eretria.

²³² Greek text, supra n. 175. Arkhilokhos and Euboia: Greenhalgh 1973 (II/162) 90 ff.; supra 155f.

²³³ Lorimer 1974 (II/105) 118 has only an implicit reference (despite title of her paper); W. Donlan, 'Archilochus, Strabo and the Lelantine War', *T.A.P.A.* 101, 1970, 132ff; A. J. Podlecki, 'Three Greek Soldier-Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Solon', *C.W.* 63/64, 1969, 73 - 81.

is fighting on the Eretrian side, then Eretria at least was moving towards hoplite methods of fighting by then, and so its level of prosperity must have allowed enough of its citizens to acquire the means to equip themselves with the hoplite panoply such as it was at that period. But Eretria still possessed a powerful cavalry which could successfully challenge that of hippobotic Khalkis for supremacy as we shall see.

A story perhaps belonging to an episode of the Lelantine War, that general opinion dates to c.705, concerns the Khalkidian hero Amphidamas who died fighting Eretria. Hesiodos, who competed in the recitation contest which was part of the "funeral" games celebrating "the" fallen hero,²³⁴ does not call Amphidamas '*basileus*'; he applied this term with derogatory connotations to his own local "gift-devouring lords".²³⁵ But were the games associated with the interment of a contemporary Amphidamas, or part of a funeral cult for another Amphidamas, long dead? If the latter, was he involved in an earlier outbreak of the war (in the late-ninth century? for Lefkandí?²³⁶). The problem with 705 is that many scholars have put Hesiodos' *floruit* in the eighth century at the latest.²³⁷ Evelyn-White summarises: "Critics from Plutarch²³⁸ downwards have almost unanimously rejected the lines 654 - 662 on the ground that Amphidamas is the hero of the Lelantine War between Chalkis and Eretria whose death may be placed c.705 B.C. - a date which is obviously too low for the genuine Hesiod.²³⁹ Nevertheless there is much to be said in defence of the passage . . . And there is nothing in the context to show that Hesiod's Amphidamas is to be identified with that Amphidamas whom Plutarch alone connects to the Lelantine War: the name may have been borne by an earlier Chalkidian, an ancestor perhaps of the person to whom Plutarch refers."²⁴⁰ But Ploutarkhos ought not be dismissed too lightly, for he shows a considerable interest in, and detailed knowledge of, Euboian (particularly Khalkidian) history: he apparently saw the monument to the later war-hero Kleomakhos in the agora of Khalkis²⁴¹ and, by researching carefully his sources for Eretrian involvement in the Ionian War, was able to correct Herodotos' account, and provide a vital clue nowhere else reported in the surviving literature.²⁴² Thus his observation that there was a tradition that Amphidamas died

²³⁴ On the Eretrian heroön: supra 101f. Texts bearing on this event: Hes. *Erg.hem.* 650 - 662; Plout. *Hepta Soph. Symp.(Mor.* 153F - 154A); idem *Eis Hesiod. Erg. (Mor.* fr. 84) on ll. 651 - 662 *Erg.hem.*; idem *Symp. Probl. Biblia VI (Mor.* 674F - 675A); and the anon. (Hadrianic period) *Peri Hom. kai Hes. agon.* On the nature of the early *agones*: Bérard 1970 (IV/151) 149.

²³⁵ Hes. *Erg.hem.* 38 - 39: βασιλῆας δοροφάγους.

²³⁶ IV 74f.

²³⁷ Supra n. 34.

²³⁸ Evelyn-White 1926 (II/106) xvi is referring to fr. 84, and *Mor.* 674F - 675A.

²³⁹ Note the assumptions that: (a) Khalkis won the war; (b) the war was early.

²⁴⁰ Loeb, 1926, intro. xvi; S. Benton, 'The Evolution of the Tripod-Lebes', *B.S.A.* 35, 1934/35, 114, n. 1: Amphidamas was a local hero whose son was killed at Opous (*Il.* 23, 87): "the ἄθλα then are a local festival (**not** connected with the Lelantine War)." Cf. Burn 1929 (V/167) 33.

²⁴¹ *Erot. (Mor.* 761A): τάγον δ' αἰτοῦ δεικνύουσιν ἐν ἀγορῇ Χαλκιδεῖς, ἐφ' οἷ μὲχρι νῦν ὁ μέγας ἐφέστηκε ζῶν. (And the Khalkideis point out his tomb on which stands even today a great column).

²⁴² Plout. *peri Herod. kakoeth. (Mor.* 861B) 24

"in a **naval** engagement against Eretria over the Lelantine Plain" is particularly interesting even though apparently he himself dismissed it.²⁴³ For there are reasons encouraging us not only to accept, but to prefer a date c.700 for it. Such a kind of battle seems implied on a LG vase showing "Dipylon" warriors fighting to the left of a ship.²⁴⁴ The reader is reminded of early literary traditions of ναυοικλείτης Euboia, the representations of Euboian ships on vases,²⁴⁵ including battle scenes, Euboian trade in the east, and the early colonial ventures in the west in the eighth century. That a sea-battle occurred so early is not at all impossible, in spite of Thoukydides' belief that the "earliest" did not occur until 644, between Korinthos and Kerkyra.

There is a convergence of other military data around 705 that also calls for examination. First, Thoukydides reports²⁴⁶ that a Korinthian shipwright built four triremes for Samos 300 years before the end of the Peloponnesian War, i.e. c.704; both Korinthos and Samos were then, of course, friends of Khalkis. Then archaeological data from Zagora point to c.700 for its abandonment,²⁴⁷ while Andros colonises in co-operation with Khalkis at Akanthos c.655,²⁴⁸ suggesting perhaps that it had already slipped (temporarily?) from Eretrian control. Could these events be associated with anti-Eretrian naval activities by Korinthos and/or Samos on behalf of Khalkis? "We do not possess positive evidence that Khalkis **ever** had a fleet, contrary to the certainties of contemporary researchers."²⁴⁹ (I have already expressed my doubts). But Khalkis may well have had help from allies. It **may** have been the first, but it was certainly not the last time Khalkis triumphed over Eretria thanks to decisive intervention by foreign powers, and indeed the frequency with which Khalkis would henceforth rely on others for her successes casts doubts about her ability to match Eretria unaided in war, either on land or at sea. Already, formal ally of Khalkis or not, Korinthos had some thirty years earlier stripped Kerkyra from Eretria. The battle in which Amphidamas died thus appears to be just one in a series involving Khalkis and other states. He was perhaps victorious, since he received heroic honours. Also around 700 Euboian material ceases at Al Mina, while there is a corresponding increase from other sources,²⁵⁰ indicating that Eretria now had difficulty getting her products overseas; a naval loss and the supremacy of the

²⁴³ *Mor.* fr. 84 (on Hesiodos' *Erg. hem.* 651ff.): τὸν μὲν οἶν Ἀμφιδάμαντα ναυμαχοῦντα πρὸς Ἐρετριέας ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἀηλιάντων ἀποθανεῖν commenting on an earlier work in turn quoted by Proklos, *Khrestomatheia*, then later preserved in Photios, *Bibliotheke*. The tradition thus comes to us second or third or fourth hand, and in a negative comment.

²⁴⁴ Greenhalgh 1973 (IV/162) 67 (fig. 4).

²⁴⁵ III nn. 43 - 47 and figs 33; 34.

²⁴⁶ Thouk. 1, 13. 3.

²⁴⁷ IV 77 for details.

²⁴⁸ Plout. *Ait. hell.* 30.

²⁴⁹ Kondoleon 1963/65 (I/28) 23f., nn. 4 (23) and 1 (24): "Θετικὰς μαρτυρίας ὅτι οἱ Χαλκιδεῖς εἶχον ναυτικὸν δὲν ἔχομεν, ἀντιθέτως πρὸς τὰς βεβαίωσεις τῶν σημερινῶν ἐρευνητῶν."

²⁵⁰ Boardman 1980 (II/224) 38f.; Popham et al. 1980 (Intro./4) 151ff.; Popham/Hatcher/Pollard 1980 (III/48) 151ff., for Rhodos, A. Johnston, 'Rhodian Readings', *B.S.A.* 70, 1975, 167.

Korinthian fleet at this time would explain this fact. Khalkis does not fill the gap;²⁵¹ it is Korinthos that does that.

Evidence (discussed above²⁵²) for warfare between the two Euboian cities at this time also comes from the excavators of the Eretrian *heroön* at the West Gate, who date the monument to c.680.²⁵³ Archaeological dates cannot be pressed to precision. Suffice it to say that about the beginning of the seventh century, the Eretrians also honoured a hero, and chose as the site of his memorial rites the Khalkis Gate of the city.²⁵⁴ The two hero-cults complement each other; the anonymous Eretrians provides us with material evidence of heroic burial and rites, while Hesiodos' poem tells us about the games. It is thus tempting to see both as victims of the same hostilities. I have related the Eretrian hero-cult to the final abandonment of Lefkandí and the destruction of houses and the building c.710/690 of walls at Eretria (on the western side facing Khalkis, if not surrounding the entire city) in my archaeological survey of the city.²⁵⁵ Thus there is enough evidence of a major eruption of the "Lelantine War" about the turn of the century to dissuade us from trying to force the literary references back to the mid-eighth century, and I prefer to adopt Evelyn-White's suggestion that there were perhaps two Amphidamantes, and that the hero of the c.705 conflict was a descendent (grandson?) of him at whose games Hesiodos competed. Most of this evidence also suggests that Eretria was defeated, though the hero-cult perhaps indicates at least one victory for Eretria. For Boardman observes that, judging by the ceramic record, Eretria suffered no discernable decline in this century, and although comparable evidence for Khalkis is much more limited, he thought the period was one of decline for her.²⁵⁶ So little effect indeed, that he regarded Eretria as the "ultimate victor" in the "Lelantine War"²⁵⁷ while later in his paper, he notes that Eretria was still one of the foremost Greek states during the period from the eighth to the sixth century.²⁵⁸

²⁵¹ Boardman 1980 (II/224) 46ff. (esp.) 48: "It is clear . . . that most of the Greek pottery arriving at Al Mina in the seventh century is coming from parts of Greece other than those which served the Greeks living there in the eighth century. **The Euboean influence has virtually disappeared.** The years around 700 may have seen the last or most decisive of the struggles between the two main Euboean cities, Eretria and Chalcis (the so-called Lelantine War [B's phrase]). The balance of trade and colonization interest in the two cities probably changed, **and it is at Eretria, not (so far) Chalcis, that we find the type of vase still carried to Al Mina,** but this may mean nothing. Both cities retire from the arena for many years." By "still" one presumes he means "up to 700"?

²⁵² For the war: III 70ff. (especially 71f.); IV 74, 78ff.; for the heroön: 101f.

²⁵³ Bérard 1970 (IV/151) 65.

²⁵⁴ Ibid. 62; 65

²⁵⁵ IV 74, n. 18, for the synchronism with the destruction of Lefkandí; III 71f; IV 74f. Bibliography for the end of the "Lelantine War": n. 32; for destruction at Eretria c.690: IV 74, nn. 19ff. Cf. especially Themelis' reports: supra IV, n. 20. Coldstream 1977 (III/33) 196; 330 and Popham et al. 1980 (Intro./4) 369: "Then, around 700 B.C., Xeropolis was sacked and virtually abandoned thereafter."

²⁵⁶ Boardman 1957 (I/65) 28.

²⁵⁷ Ibid. 1.

²⁵⁸ Ibid. 28: "If we are forced to assess the historical value of this evidence, (i.e. ceramic) admittedly barely adequate as far as Chalcis is concerned, the most satisfactory explanation would be that Eretria enjoyed continuous prosperity from the eighth to the sixth century with no alarming disasters or change

At the beginning of the seventh century, "The War" may have **seemed** over. Certainly most scholars who treat the "Lelantine War" as a single episode are convinced that it ended now, and that Khalkis was victorious. Success once more reinforced the position of the Hippobotai and the economic *status quo*. But Khalkis was, at very least, a declining power at sea and her eclipse culminates in the debacle of not being able to supply her own ships at Salamis. Moreover, the long drought probably did not end until well into the seventh century, and this would have held prosperity in check in a *polis* with apparently little non-rural industry and commerce, despite its later reputation as a producer of swords.

But hostilities were not over, and the Eretrieis were shortly able to make yet another challenge for their lost part of the disputed plain. In the meantime, they had to regroup and rebuild their resources and their city which, as we have seen above, was (partially?) destroyed c.690. Eretria apparently still had her bases in Epeiros and Pithekoussai, and despite the probable loss of Andros, she may have retained some (most) of the island "empire". But the seventh century was necessarily a period of reconstruction and reconsolidation; despite Boardman's assessment, she **must** have suffered from her defeat, especially from the loss of markets in the east. There were however some hopeful signs. She retained friendship and alliance with Miletos, still in the seventh century the greatest commercial, colonising and cultural *polis* in the east. Herodotos²⁵⁹ has the cities still allies in the mid-sixth century, and the relationship endured into the second/first centuries.²⁶⁰ In the sixth, Eretria seems to have been Miletos' agent on the Greek mainland assisting her trade with inland Boiotia via Mykalessos (Rhítsóna),²⁶¹ and possibly Miletos reciprocated for Eretria through her influence at *emporía*, like Naukratis.²⁶² Eretria's "colonies" in Makedonia and Thrake were still intact in the mid-sixth century when Peisistratos left Eretria for the north. These allowed her to exploit abundant mineral and other natural resources, such as timber, furs, and fish. Her ceramic output, as Boardman

in population; that Chalcis early in the seventh century fell from prosperity, and was perhaps in part abandoned - at any rate suffered some loss of status in comparison with Eretria. One might deduce that Eretria, her close and powerful neighbour, was the cause of this eclipse." and "Partial abandonment of the site is possible. This might explain the apparent absence of seventh century pottery and the presence of what might be plausibly called Chalcidian in Etruria."

²⁵⁹ Hdt. 5, 99.

²⁶⁰ IG XII 9, Test./Not. 162f. For a summary of the history of Miletos in the 6th century: Appendix 2 (Note); IX 254ff.

²⁶¹ R. M. Burrows/P. N. Ure, 'Excavations at Rhitsóna in Boeotia', *J.H.S.* 29, 1909, 332ff.; P. N. Ure/R. M. Burrows, 'Excavations at Rhitsóna', *B.S.A.* 14, 1907/08, 232ff. *Infra* VI n. 63 (detailed).

²⁶² H. Prinz, 'Funde aus Naukratis', *Klio Bieheft* 7, 1908, 121: "Das auf diese Weise gewonnene Bild entspricht einigermaßen dem, das wir auch sonst, aus dem literarischen Quellen, kennen lernen. In dem Kampf um die Ielantische Ebene zwischen Chalkis und Eretria (Thuk. 1, 15) treten die Handelsinteressen der griechischen Welt zutage: Korinthe und Samos unterstützen Chalkis; Milet, Megara und Aigina die Eretrier. Die Funde bestätigen einigermaßen diese Rivalität; milesische bemalte Ware hat im Mutterland und im Westen, wie wir sahen, so gut wie gar keinen Eingang gefunden, während andererseits Korinthisches nicht in Milet vorkommt.", speaking of the 7th/early-6th centuries.

indicates, was maintained and even increased.²⁶³ This fact may indicate increased production of olive oil, since, though sometimes of competent quality, Eretrian pottery was never likely to have been sought after for itself.²⁶⁴ I have already commented above on the expansion of the port and agora.²⁶⁵ The erection of strong walls, especially on the west, testify that danger from that quarter was not underestimated.²⁶⁶ The conditions for continued warfare had, in any case, been laid down long ago in the cycle of attack and counter-attack for possession of the plain.²⁶⁷ And by the early sixth century, the changes in Greek warfare discussed above were being implemented.²⁶⁸

In the early sixth century Thessalia, a new and powerful player, entered the Lelantine contest. Ploutarkhos in a passage of his *Erotikos* that is one of the very few actually to mention the "Lelantine War" by name, relates a story about Kleomakhos of Pharsalos.²⁶⁹ It is not really a description of an episode in the war, but rather a paradigm of the ennobling qualities of pederastic love: Kleomakhos, ally of the Khalkideis, sees them getting the worst of an engagement, thanks to Eretria's superiority in cavalry (though apparently the Khalkidian *hoplites* hold their own) and to set an example to his *eromenos*,²⁷⁰ he leads the Thessaloi into what may be the last true cavalry charge in archaic Greek warfare. In doing so he lost his life, but routed the Eretrieis. Thus the war, going badly for Khalkis - they had to depend on their allies for cavalry - was won by the intervention of Kleomakhos. Once more, thanks to foreign aid, the *status quo ante* was restored.²⁷¹ It was however Khalkis' last victory. Kleomakhos' involvement dates it to the early-sixth century, for it was

²⁶³ Boardman, 1957 (I/65) 28.

²⁶⁴ Wine was rarely transported in pottery but rather in skins (which allows for the squeezing out of air before sealing). The use of pottery generally for transport is very speculative; e.g. oil flasks can be, and often were, used for other purposes. Thus, if Khalkis were producing wine from "vine-rich Lelanton", pottery would not necessarily reveal this. But Eretria with a much greater area of marginal land would have tended to produce oil, which was transported in pots, and this might explain her greater ceramic output. For assessing the evidence for pottery and trade, cf. references in VI, n. 31.

²⁶⁵ Port: IV 82ff.; agora: IV 94.

²⁶⁶ For references, supra n. 255.

²⁶⁷ Arkhemakhos ap. Strabon, 10, 3, 6 C465 (quoted II n. 8).

²⁶⁸ Supra 153ff. Just where this process began is a matter of debate, cf. R. Drews, 'The First Tyrants in Greece', *Historia* 21, 1972, 140: "We know very little about the introduction of hoplite warfare."

²⁶⁹ *Mor.* 760E - 761B. Supra nn. 197; 241 (quote); infra 279 (quote). Kleomakhos and for Thessalian cavalry intervention: Greenhalgh 1973 (II/162) 92.

²⁷⁰ Aristoteles(?) ap. Plout.: he was a youth from the Thracian Khalkidike. Cf. F. Buffière, *L'Éros adolescente: la pédérastie dans la Grèce antique*, Paris, 1980, 103ff.; it is chronologically just possible that Khalkis got aid from its colonies in that area.

²⁷¹ Some believe that it was now that Eretria lost her possessions on the Boiotian coast: M. Cary, 'Northern and Central Greece', *C.A.H.* III, Cambridge 1929/65, ch. 24, 623 probably confusing an earlier phase of the war; (with Knoepfler, I think rather that Oropos was lost in 490). Cf. Buck 1928/65 (II/117) 195: "As a result of their defeat, the Eretrians lost their Boeotian possessions and part of the Lelantine Plain." and "Oropos seems to have been an Eretrian possession before it passed into the hands of the Thebans in the Sixth Century and preserved the Eretrian dialect throughout the Boeotian and subsequent Athenian domination." Lorimer 1947 (II/105) 118: her interpretation might suggest that Khalkis, having won the infantry battle dictated the stele from a need to protect its inexperienced phalanx from Eretrian missiles.

just then that the Thessalian League was active in central Greece.²⁷² The Thessaloi were horse-rearers (Hippotrophoi) like their Khalkidian allies.²⁷³ As late as 511, they came with cavalry to help Hippias of Athenai, though by then they were largely a spent force outside Thessalia.

In the context of this episode, we may also consider a Delphic "oracle" concerning the status of the Thessaloi and Khalkideis.²⁷⁴ Though not regarded as a genuine response by Fontenrose,²⁷⁵ it does perhaps outline the political status map of the period. Salmon²⁷⁶ points out that it represents two separate chronological periods: he argues that the original "oracle" (ll. 1 - 3) reflects the position of Khalkis "in the age of cavalry warfare", and that the first addition (4 - 6) became necessary when Argos developed the *phalanx* in the reign of Pheidon.²⁷⁷ I doubt this interpretation. Firstly, the chronology of Pheidon is very vague: the problems are summarised by Tomlinson.²⁷⁸ Using Pheidon as a chronological reference point does not tell us certainly when or why the second part was added. Then, though in fact Khalkis is not directly named, its "appearance" is **not** for primacy in cavalry fighting; that is (rightly) assigned to Thessalia. The text thus reflects accurately the strategic situation in Euboia c.600: the Khalkidians were **not** then excellent in cavalry fighting as the Kleomakhos episode makes clear: **it was not her cavalry that did best in the battle but her infantry**²⁷⁹ and it was the intervention of the superior Thessalian cavalry that won a tightly balanced struggle. The hippobotic rulers of Khalkis were certainly in no doubt about the crucial role of Kleomakhos and his men; they raised a

²⁷² A. Jarde, *The Formation of the Greek People*, London, 1926, 86: "In the Sixth century, the Thessalian League was powerful in Northern Greece. It extended its sway over the hill-men of (its) neighbourhood . . . The small subject people paid tribute and furnished troops. With the vote of these people at her disposal, Thessaly held the majority on the Amphictyony of Thermopylae; she availed herself of it to extend her influence in Central Greece. She took part in the Sacred War to deliver Delphi from the tyranny of Crissa, she intervened in the war between Chalcis and Eretria; she imposed her supremacy on Phocis and even sought to subdue Boeotia. But the power of the Thessalians was short-lived. Defeated by the Boeotians, . . . they were back in their own country by the Fifth Century."

²⁷³ Herakl. Pont. ap. Athen. *Deipn.* 624 c - e.

²⁷⁴ Of all the ploughland, that of Pelasgic Argos is better,
Thessalian cavalry, and Lakedaimonian women,
and the men who drink the water of lovely Arethousa too; (end 1)
but even better than these latter are the men who live
in the land between Tiryns and Arkadia, the land of many sheep,
the linen-corsleted Argives, the spurs of war. (end 2)
But you, men of (Aigion; Megara; whoever) are neither third
nor fourth nor twelfth, nor in the reckoning or listing.

(My translation; it is seldom [never?] rendered accurately), e.g., J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle: its Responses and Operations, with a Catalogue of Responses*, Berkeley, 1981, 277 translates: ἄνδρες δὲ οἱ πίνουσι νεῦρον καλῆς Ἀρεθούσης: "the Chalcidians".

²⁷⁵ Ibid. 276ff. dates it c.700.

²⁷⁶ Salmon 1977 (V/191) 93.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ R. A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid. From the End of the Bronze Age to the Roman Occupation*, London, 1972, 79ff.: dates it to the 7th century.

²⁷⁹ Plout. *Erot.* 760F: καὶ τὸ μὲν πεζὸν ἐδόξει τοῖς Χαλκιδαῖσιν ἐρρωσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἰππέας μέγ' ἔργον ἦν ὀκισθαι τῶν πολεμίων. . . . (And the infantry of the Khalkideis seemed to be strong, but the cavalry was finding it a big task to stand up to the enemy's [i.e the Eretrieis] . . .). Cf. supra n. 269.

monument in the agora itself that was still impressive in Ploutarkhos' day, thereby conferring on the Thessalian commander the status of (second) city founder,²⁸⁰ so great was their gratitude.

Over the next decades new methods of warfare, the hoplite *phalanx* on land and the trireme at sea, everywhere replaced the old. The ruling régimes in several important states fell in the first half of the century. Old alignments were modified and powers such as Korinthos, Sparta (consolidating and expanding her influence in the Peloponnesos, and whose League embraced the Isthmus states shortly after the middle of the century), and Thebai (which had halted the southward thrust of Thessalian aggression), began to play a more active role in central Greece.²⁸¹ Their heavy defeat may have had something to do with the abandonment of the Khalkidian alliance by the Thessaloi; perhaps the Khalkideis were unable or unwilling to come over to the mainland (not for the last time) to assist their Thessalian allies. The Thessaloi had changed sides by the time of Peisistratos, a friend of Eretria in 556, who named one of his sons Thessalos in honour of his alliance with them.²⁸² Miletos, for the last three quarters of the sixth century debilitated by on-going internal *stasis*, though still a friend of Eretria, was not of much account internationally. Eretria needed other allies. The Korinthioi had long been allies of Khalkis despite ideological differences after the accession of Kypselos. Now his opportunist son, Periandros, having established Korinthian interests in the west at the expense of both Eretria and his ally Khalkis, seeing no future in maintaining the old Korinthos /Samos/Khalkis axis, took his city into the grouping which included Eretria; the tyrant of Miletos became his personal friend. The change in the position of Korinthos altered the whole alliance-system, and encouraged the emergence of new tyrant-régimes: at Eretria, Athenai and Naxos. At Khalkis, the old order did not go unchallenged; there was a series of coups by aspiring tyrants followed by reaction.²⁸³ By 506 the *ancien régime* had again regained power to preside over the final humiliation of military defeat and the establishment of an Athenian *kleroukhia* on the Lelantine Plain.

Thus down to c.570, alliance patterns remained fairly constant, but in the second quarter of the sixth century, the old stability began to collapse. The main

²⁸⁰ *Oikistes*; for eponymous hero cults: L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults*, Oxford, 1921 413ff. (he doesn't mention Kleomakhos); Berard 1970 (IV/151) passim; O. Broneer, 'Hero Cults in the Corinthian Agora', *Hesperia* 11, 1942, 128ff.; Bérard 1972 (IV/96) 219ff.

²⁸¹ The victory of Kerissos: before 571: Plout. *Cam.* 19: the battle "more than 200 years before Leuktra." (371) Ploutarkhos calls the place "Geraistos" which is, of course, in Euboia; he is a Boiotian with Euboian interests, so the error is probably scribal. Cf. Paus. 9, 14, 3f.

²⁸² Birth-dates for Peisistratos' sons are controversial: J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* Oxford, 1971, 446ff. Thessalos was the youngest legitimate (γνήσιος ἀδελφός) brother of Hippias and Hipparkhos. Of the later tyrants: Davies gives 570 as birth-year of Hippias, so Thessalos' must have been later (νεώτερος πολὺ: [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 18, 2). On the Peisistratid alliance with Thessalia: Hdt. 5, 63; W. How/J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, Oxford, 1928, vol. II, 30, 55ff.

²⁸³ On the decline of Khalkis, Bérard 1970 (IV/151) 68, n. 31; Auberson 1974 (IV/131) 15; Boardman, 1957 (I/65) 28. Walker 1993 (IV/227)

changes were, naturally, not simultaneous. Like the interfamilial relationships that Herman²⁸⁴ describes, the links between early *poleis* were personal or class-based.²⁸⁵ The very stability of the earliest alliance groups may be the result of precisely this personal and 'class' factor; the rulers often had more in common with similar groups in other *poleis* than with other classes in their own, and the landowners held power for a long time in most *poleis*. Instability thus emerged when the old-established ruling groups²⁸⁶ lost power. The fact of the short-term power of tyrants also caused rapid changes of outlook. However, traditional loyalties sometimes remained very strong and over-rode pure self-interest and Eretria itself provides the example when, in 499,

"the Eretrians, . . . came to the (Ionian) war to please not the Athenai, but the Milesioi themselves, thus repaying their debt, because earlier they had been allies of the Eretrians in their war against Khalkis, when the Samioi came to help the Khalkideis against the Eretrians and Milesioi."²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ 1987 (V/175).

²⁸⁵ E.g. Samian geomoroi, hippobotai of Khalkis; tyrants of Athenai, Naxos, Korinthos, Miletos and Eretria, or commercial oligarchies of Eretria; Miletos.

²⁸⁶ Land-owners in Khalkis; commercial oligarchy in Eretria.

²⁸⁷ Hdt. 5, 99: οἱ οὖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων χάριν ἐστρατεύοντο ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτῶν Μιλησίων, ὀφειλόμενά σφι ἀποδιδόντες· οἱ γὰρ δὴ Μιλήσιοι πρότερον τοῖσι Ἐρετριεῦσι τὸν πρὸς Χαλκιδέας πόλεμον συνδιήνευαν, ὅτε περὶ καὶ Χαλκιδεῦσι ἀντία Ἐρετριέων καὶ Μιλησίων Σάμιοι ἐβοήθηον . . . The comment also says something about Eretrian attitudes towards Athenai at the time: IX 257 (for translation); 259 (for discussion of ἀγόμενοι).