

CHAPTER VII:

THE TYRANNY OF DIAGORAS (c.538 - 509).

There is a natural tendency for firmly established régimes to create internal élites over time. While the oligarchic government at Eretria was at first "dynamic" and "progressive" in that it emerged in response to social and economic realities at the time, it seems to have stagnated over time, developing mutually exclusive factions, reminiscent of the last years of Bakkhiad rule at Korinthos.¹ I am not suggesting that the ruling clique at Eretria was a *genos* like the Bakkhiadai; its exact nature is unknown. More than likely it was simply a grouping of very wealthy individuals and their families. But the exclusive nature of the ruling-class at Eretria is implied by Aristoteles, who in discussing oligarchies overthrown as a result of one faction being pushed aside by another, or by exclusive marriage suits negotiated to secure political alliances amongst the ruling group, tells us that this is what happened to the Eretrian régime.² The oligarchy was alienating some of its natural support.

Meanwhile, what about the workers? Trade required ships, and ships required a special class of labourers, rowers. Indeed, Eretria was the 'Rowing-city'.³ They were special because they were not only labourers, but also contributors to the defence of the state as the navy increased in importance. Thus the increasing military importance of the rowing-class had potential for radical political change. Ships also needed constant servicing, and the harbour required men to load and unload the cargoes. Moreover, increasing commercial activity encouraged the further expansion of the artisan class. Eretria had a long-established manufacturing tradition going back to Lefkandí⁴; we have seen that there was metal-working in Eretria as early as the eighth century,⁵ and she produced, in the seventh-sixth centuries, derivative pottery of which some was, if not particularly inspiring and certainly not up to the

¹ Strabon 8, 6, 20 C378: καὶ οἱ Βακκιάδα τυραννήσαντες, πλούσιοι καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ γένος λαμπροῖ, διακόσια ἔτη σχεδὸν τι κατέσχον τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ ἐμπόριον ἀδεῶς ἐκαρπώσαντο. (The Bakkhiadai, a rich, numerous and famous *genos* [who] became rulers [τυραννήσαντες] of Korinthos, and held power for about 200 years and reaped the fruits of commerce without hindrance); Hdt. 5, 92: ἦν ὀλιγαρχίην, καὶ οὔτοι Βακκιάδα καλεόμενοι ἔνεμον τὴν πόλιν, ἐδίδοσαν δὲ καὶ ἤγοντο ἐξ ἀλλήλων. (. . . the *Oligoi* ruled and these, who were called Bakkhiadai, controlled the city, marrying and giving in marriage amongst themselves).

² Ar. *Pol.* 1306 a 32ff.: γίνονται δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιοθεῖσθαι ἑτέρους ἢ ἑτέρον τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γάμους ἢ δίκας, οἷον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημένα πρότερον, καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππέων Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἀδικηθεὶς περὶ γάμον. (Factions arise also as a result of some members of the oligarchy being pushed aside by others, and being provoked to stasis because of marriages or law-suits; examples of this arising from marriage-related causes are the cases already mentioned; also the oligarchy of the Hippeis was destroyed by Diagoras after he was wronged in respect to a marriage).

³ For the early names of Eretria: IV 77f. But it is perhaps not to be entirely dismissed that the name may have been late, reflecting the rise of the rowing class to political prominence in the 6th century.

⁴ III 62ff.; IV 74, n. 19; 98.

⁵ Themelis 1983 (I/63) 157ff. IV 74, n. 19.

best Corinthian ware (to c.550)⁶ or Attic (after this time),⁷ at least of export standard, if only on a local/regional basis.⁸ Most known examples of Eretrian decorated ceramic have been found in local contexts, primarily produced, especially the grave *amphorai*, for the home market. The earlier "orientalising" pottery⁹ was sometimes fabricated in "the careless manner equally characteristic of Eretrian painting in this period."¹⁰ But it has been suggested that artistic influence was not a one-way street, and that motifs used during the "orientalising" period went from Eretria to Athenai:¹¹ Boardman disagrees, although he thinks that Eretria could have developed them independently of outside influences. But the bulk of the output was coarse-ware, designed to convey other Eretrian products abroad¹² and supply domestic utensils for the poorer classes. In the countryside, where agricultural production turned early to olive and fruit growing because of a relative lack of fertile croplands and pastures, there was only a seasonal demand for labour for picking, pressing, and transporting the produce to the city for consumption and export.¹³ Changes in farm production from traditional livestock-rearing or grain-growing were no doubt also accompanied, as in the Attike, by a growth in the landless class, former peasants squeezed off their small plots by the demands of the new tree crops that took years to reach full production. And, also as in the Attike, there was no doubt an increase in rural indebtedness. All these men comprised the *thetes* in Athenai;¹⁴ what they were called in Eretria is not known. We may, however, be quite sure that they existed, and their output in labour was an increasing component of the national wealth. Their rising discontent posed a continuing political threat to the oligarchy. In Athenai they were not **full** citizens; it was probably Peisistratos who gave them that status.¹⁵ In Eretria

⁶ For Corinthian influence on Eretrian Sub-G.: Boardman 1952 (I/41) 17. Boiotian fabric is very similar to Eretrian: *ibid.*, *passim*. Eretrian pottery of 7th/6th centuries: Walker 1996 (III/72) 12, nn. 84ff.; Morris 1987 (III/60); Boardman 13ff.; 18; 24ff.; *ibid.* 1957 (I/65) 28, n. 85.

⁷ For Korinthos and Athenai: Hammond 1959 (II/142) 129. For pottery: Boardman 1952 (I/41): On its quality, 48: "... about 550 B.C. and soon after ... large grave amphorae (plates 9 - 11), painted in a competent black figure style **at first sight quite Athenian**." Also *ibid.* 1957 (I/65). The "acme" of Eretrian pottery was in the 6th century: Andreiomenou 1976/77 (IV/28).

⁸ Boardman 1952 (I/41) 48 (Boiotia; Delos).

⁹ Late-7th/early-6th century: *ibid.*, 26 (the dating is confirmed: *ibid.* 1957 [I/65] 18, n. 111).

¹⁰ 1952 (I/41) 21. 1957 (I/65) 11: "slapdash sixth century Eretrian style."

¹¹ Nilsson cited in Boardman, 1952 (I/41) 21f. (no bibliographical details).

¹² For pottery and trade: VI n. 31.

¹³ The Eretrias still produces olives and fruit, with sheep and (some) cattle on the uplands: I, 16f.; Rodhakis/Triandafillidis II, c.1965 (I/4) 543ff.

¹⁴ I employ the term at Eretria to denote the same group to which it was applied at Athenai where the word properly belongs. The *thetes* were the class under the Solonian reorganisation belonging to the lowest *telos*: having an annual income of up to 200 medimnoi of natural produce; i.e. the minimum at Athenai for hoplite status. However, this was probably a high figure for Greek poleis, since at oligarchic Orkhomenos in Boiotia in the early-4th century, it was only 45 Attic medimnoi according to Pollux *Onom.* 10, 166 - 168 (citing a lost Aristotelian *Orkhomeniōn Politeia*). For Eretria, we know neither the term for this group nor the upper property limit. Attike: Hignett 1952 (IV/251) 100f.; Boiotia: Moore 1983 (IV/240) 129.

¹⁵ Hignett 1952 (IV/251) 118ff; 122 for this argument. While *Ar. Pol.* 1274a generally attributes some role in the state granted by Solon to thetes, 20 - 21 it specifically states that he excluded them from all offices: τὸ δὲ τέτατον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν. For the status of *thetes* before Peisistratos:

they still awaited their champion.¹⁶ The growth of this dispossessed class, combined with the increasing wealth and exclusivity of the Eretrian ruling régime exemplified by the women Koisyra, created a potentially volatile social mix.¹⁷

These economic realities were accompanied by increasing reliance by the state upon its navy as its primary military arm in the international arena into which the oligarchy was more and more drawn by its interventionist foreign policies. As later happened at Athenai, the Eretrian *thetes* would become ever more conscious (because it was pointed out to them by ambitious/disgruntled individuals from higher socio-economic levels) of their worth to the state, and begin to demand political rights, with ultimate results that, in fact, anticipated, by several years developments that occurred at Athenai after 508/7. At Eretria the drift of unemployed (and otherwise unemployable) *thetes* into rowing and shipping-related work occurred earlier, for Eretria, unlike Athenai, already had a significant fleet by the mid-sixth century. Thus discontent was delayed by its absorption of the dispossessed, whereas at Athenai, the absence of a fleet when Solon had to face the problem meant a still increasing pool of unemployed ex-farmworkers. Certainly Eretria also possessed both a hoplite army and a significant cavalry during the sixth century; her 6000 (5000 on Knoepfler's calculations)¹⁸ hoplites makes Eretria numerically the military equal of the major powers of central Greece: her hoplite-class must have been larger than that of Korinthos.¹⁹ However, as the century draws to its close, it is **mostly** the Eretrian navy that we hear of, and not the land forces.²⁰

Despite successes in the arena of inter-*polis* diplomacy, the flirtation of (some members of?) the ruling oligarchy in Eretria in the mid-sixth century with adventurers like Peisistratos and Lygdamis and their political models and allies such as Periandros and Thrasyboulos, soon brought domestic political troubles in its wake. I will not discuss here the arguments concerning the rise of tyrannies in the more commercially developed *poleis* of the isthmus and east Greece; the literature is large and I've already mentioned related aspects such as the emergence of the hoplite *phalanx*.²¹ Ultimately, whatever social and economic forces that ambitious men like Kypselos, and later Peisistratos and Diagoras, were able to exploit had also been working within the political fabric at Eretria, albeit at a slower pace. An immediate

Hignett 84; 100f.; 122f.; J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*, Princeton, 1989, 60ff.; Ostwald 1986 (VI/8) 20ff. Kleisthenes, too, limited their political rights.

¹⁶ M. I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1983, 87 stresses the continuation of debt-bondage outside Attike after Solon's time.

¹⁷ VI 180f.; infra 198f.

¹⁸ These are figures for festival ceremonial troops; they must have been greater in an emergency. Knoepfler 1985A (II/200) 257f. calculates, from inscriptional evidence, that there would have been probably 5000 hoplites and 500 cavalry respectively.

¹⁹ Salmon 1986 (IV/86) 165ff. makes 3000 the likely "full levy" in Korinthos during the 5th century.

²⁰ Since Eretria was involved **at Sardis**, she must have sent hoplites to Ionia.

²¹ V 156ff. Kypselid (and the low) chronology: Appendix 4.

catalyst for change may have been the presence in the city, as guests of the government, of two exponents of revolutionary change, Peisistratos and Lygdamis, both of whom showed by their subsequent career, that they were prepared to actively support the rise to power of each other, and of like-minded men elsewhere in a *philia/xenia* relationship, and they had powerful friends and mentors who had shown the way to do it. Moreover, present with them in Eretria, possibly for up to ten years, was a body of supporters strongly enough committed to their leaders to be prepared to share the risks and pain of exile. It is hard to believe that at least some would not have been ideologically committed to their political aims.²² While the Peisistratidai and their principal lieutenants would no doubt have been restrained and diplomatic within the city of their benefactors, as the mercenaries and adventurers came in towards the end of the exile there must have been a lot of loose talk around the city of overthrowing aristocrats and topics such as land/wealth redistribution. These lower-order followers would probably have been quartered with precisely the class of Eretrieis that we might expect to have shared grievances against the oligarchic régime, and thus be susceptible to influence. This need not have involved direct propagandising; idle conversations, mutual grumbling and gossipy comments would have had their effect after a while. The presence in the midst of the Eretrian thetic class of other men of similar social status who were exercising a role in the rise and fall of governments would have been enough to encourage local dissidents to question the *status quo*.

The combination of deteriorating conditions for the thetic classes, and the presence of outside role-models, resulted in growing destabilisation following the departure of the foreigners in 546. Questioning of the established régime, the *patrios politeia*,²³ thus gained momentum as a result of its foreign policy gamble; and this now failed to pay off. The expansion of Phaleron made possible by the capture of Salamis, and which gained momentum under Peisistratos, led to the downgrading of Prasiai as the major trading gateway to the Attike, and the effects would have been felt in Eretria by the merchants, the natural supporters of the oligarchic government, causing rifts to develop within the ranks of the "Hippeis" themselves as trade and profits dipped. The dependent *thetes* too would suffer. No doubt there had been from the beginning those within the ruling class who thought that dalliance with men like Peisistratos spelt long-term trouble, and when he acted against Eretrian political and economic interests, these internal critics would now say, "I told you so." However, there were also those who were too compromised by policy as well as through the

²² That men did consider future political outcomes is demonstrated by the pleas of those wanting Solon to become tyrant in Athenai in 594 (or 570) and his response: Plout. *Solon* 13, 2; 14, 3f. *Ath. pol.* 6, 3; 9, 2 implies that there was pressure on him to take the tyranny, as indeed does his own poetry: fr. 32; 33; 34; 36.

²³ The concept of *patrios politeia* was later adopted by democratic politicians, but it is essentially aristocratic-oligarchic in nature: Hignett 1952 (IV/251) 2; 93; M. Ostwald 1986 (VI/8) index. *P. politeia* and *p. nomos*; *ibid.* *Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy*, Oxford, 1969, ch. 2.

marriage alliance via Koisyra, and other social, familial and economic ties with the tyrants, to easily withdraw their support. Our sources say nothing about the fate of Koisyra, other than that Peisistratos remarried. But perhaps her family in Eretria had a later change of heart, for two²⁴ Koisyras married into the Alkmaionidai, the political enemies of the Peisistratidai. If Peisistratos rejected his Eretrian wife not long after his return to Athenai, it symbolised to the world his refusal to accept a subordinate role for himself and his city. By the 530's, Peisistratos' strong Athenian nationalism was being expressed in the revitalisation of the purely Athenian spectacle of the Panathenaia,²⁵ the beginning of the grandiose building of the Olympeion²⁶ and a range of other construction and beautification projects.²⁷ The development of an unrestricted trade outlet at Phaleron, made possible by the subjection of Salamis, in direct competition with the Euboian Gulf port of Prasiai, would be natural for a nationalist ruler with an interest in trading.²⁸

Increasing destabilisation of the internal political situation seems to have given the disgruntled oligarch Diagoras his chance to seize power.²⁹ The ostensible cause was his "wronging" by another faction within the ruling oligarchy in connection with a marriage proposal. Oligarchies often contain sub-groups, reflecting distinctions between those that actually wield power and those that are, in fact, only on the fringes of the ruling élite.³⁰ Most tyrants indeed emerged from the fringe groups.³¹ The circumstances of Diagoras' rise remind one of those surrounding that of Kypselos, where marriage and family marginalisation were also factors.³² Is it possible that Diagoras believed that his prototype was Kypselos? He had enduring links with Korinthos, and is said to have died there in exile.³³ But his inspiration was probably the immediate and present example of Peisistratos, and possibly even more so that of Lygdamis³⁴. But like all other aspirants to unconstitutional political power,

²⁴ VI 181; VIII 244ff. (246: stemma).

²⁵ Schol. (Sopater?) Ail. Arist. *Panath.* 189, 4. Parke 1977 (VI/111) 34; McGregor 1941 (VI/3) 267. Schachermeyr: *R.E.* s.v. Peisistratos (3): foundation of the Panathenaia originally by Peisistratos: "Die Anregung der Stiftung stammt möglicherweise bereits von Peisistratos selbst."

²⁶ *Ar. Pol.* 1313 b 24f.

²⁷ For his building and cultural programme: J. A. Smith, *Athens under the Tyrants*, Bristol, 1989, 53ff.

²⁸ French 1964 (VI/21) 25f.

²⁹ Quoted supra n. 2.

³⁰ Walker 1996 (III/72); Morris 1989 (III/60) 94ff.

³¹ Social (Kypselos), geographical (Peisistratos) or racial (Kleisthenes of Sikyon), or a combination of more than one.

³² *Ar. Pol.* 1306 a 35ff. (quoted supra n. 2).

³³ Herakl. Lemb., *Politeiai* 40: Διαγόρα εἰς Σπάρτην πορευομένῳ καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ τελευτήσαντι Ἐρετριεὺς εἰκόνα ἔστησαν. (Diagoras having died at Korinthos on the way to Sparta, the Eretrians erected a statue to him). (=12 in C./T. Müller, *F.G.H.* II, 217: their comment: "distinguendus procul dubio est a Diagora Melio atheo quem item Corinthi obisse dicunt Hesychius Milesius et Suidas."). Cf. Suidas, *Lexikon* s.v., 1271ff., where several Diagorases are conflated, but one died at Korinthos: s.v.: Διαγόρας κατοικήσας Κορίνθον αὐτόθι τὸν βίον κατέστρεψεν. A 5th century funerary inscription for a Διαγόρη exists: IG XII 9, 299.

³⁴ Lygdamis was yet another disgruntled aristocrat: *Ar. Pol.* 1305 a 37ff. W. G. Forrest, *C.A.H.*³, ch. 39d: 'Euboea and the Islands', 258f.: Lygdamis a member of the oligarchy who championed the cause of an oppressed people. In another story in Athenaios (quoting the lost *Naxiōn politeia* of Aristoteles)

he needed more than just a sense of outrage at his own personal wrongs; he needed supporters, and plenty of them, men who also felt a sense of grievance and who could be led/manipulated by a dynamic personality.³⁵ Diagoras must have been such a man, and most likely his support came not only from the unrepresented but increasingly significant thetic class, but also from those members of the oligarchy who were disappointed by the policy of support for the new tyrant of Athenai. Rejection of Koisyra, symbol of Peisistratos' alliance with the "Hippeis", was a clear sign to any opposition in Eretria that the ruling élite could expect no help from Athenai. Alternatively, Peisistratos may have divorced his wife **after** Diagoras' coup, for it would then be plain enough that his former personal allies in Eretria would henceforth be of little political value to him.

Obviously the coup occurred after 546, for the Hippeis were still in power when Peisistratos left Eretria, and they were involved, along with their Athenian and Naxian allies, in overseas actions from 546 to c.540, providing a *terminus post quem*. We should allow time for the conspiracy to develop, especially if we believe (as we should) that there was more involved than just the marriage problem. But Diagoras, I suggest, also will have dealings with Periandros of Korinthos, and the very latest dating for the latter's death is c.533.³⁶ It is not impossible that Periandros had a hand in Diagoras' coup, which may have been part of a broader intervention by him in Euboia.³⁷ By 530, the Kypselid tyranny had collapsed, Periandros' ephemeral successor Kypselos II (a.k.a. Psammetikhos) was deposed after a strife-troubled reign of fewer than three years.³⁸ This makes c.538 the most probable date for Diagoras' accession,³⁹ after which relations between Eretria and Athenai appear to have become cooler.⁴⁰ Having come to power with the support of merchants as well as the thetic class, both of which were suffering the consequences of Peisistratos' trade policies,⁴¹ Diagoras could ill-afford to maintain any sort of close relationship with the Athenian tyrant. Moreover, Diagoras probably regarded him as the political (and personal) friend of his own enemies of the exclusivist old régime.⁴²

8, 348 B: he was a friend of another very rich Naxian aristocrat. Also on Lygdamis: Hdt. 1, 61; 64; Polyain. *Strategem.* 1, 23, 2; [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 15. He must have been **very** rich, as he was able to contribute both money and followers to the Peisistratid cause.

³⁵ Salmon 1986 (IV/86) 97ff for this notion in relation to the rise of Kypselos.

³⁶ Kypselid (and the low) chronology: Appendix 4. Wallace 1936A (Intro./1) 65, n. 1 has Periandros' reign entirely within the 6th century.

³⁷ Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 80; H.-J. Gehrke, *Stasis*, Munich, 1985, 63: between 539 and 510; cf. Knoepfler 1985A (II/200) 256, n. 50: "il semble plus probable de le (Diagoras) placer quelques années après la réforme de Clisthène."

³⁸ It is generally assumed that the two names are applied to the one man: cf. *F.Gr.H.* II a. 358 note/supplement to 90 F 60: Κύπελον <τὸν καὶ Ψαμμήτιχον>.

³⁹ Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 80 dates end of the régime of the Hippeis c.539.

⁴⁰ *Infra* 209ff.

⁴¹ French 1974 (VI/21) 25f.

⁴² *Supra* 193f. and n. 2.

Diagoras pursued his own 'nationalist' policy abroad during the **early** period of his rule, and he fostered the interests of those that had helped him to power. He must have been popular with somebody for, sometime after he died (or was killed or suicided?) at Korinthos, following the establishment of the Eretrian democracy, a statue was raised in his honour.⁴³ But there is evidence that he harassed the old ruling-class, for during the sixth century, the ancient aristocratic cult at the West Gate *Heroön* ceases,⁴⁴ something Bérard⁴⁵ links to the rise of democratic sentiment at Eretria. The wealthy were no longer either able or willing to display the traditional status-symbols at this time: ostentatious grave-stelai are absent at Eretria (but not at Athenai),⁴⁶ but the ladies Koisyra had been proverbial at Eretria for extravagant personal display; indeed they managed to transfer this image onto their city in Athenian minds.⁴⁷ However, Eretrian commercial activity continued strongly through the rest of the century, and new building works, comparable to those of Peisistratos, commenced around the agora and the harbour,⁴⁸ signs also that the new régime was not hostile to business. Probably only the pseudo-aristocrats and their offensive display were attacked.

Meanwhile Eretria was moving closer to Korinthos, perhaps involving military co-operation.⁴⁹ Periandros was adept in the art of wooing like-minded rulers; he developed friendship with Thrasyboulos of Miletos, changing the whole balance of power in the Aegean,⁵⁰ and maintained an alliance with Peisistratos, mediating peace between him and Mytilene following a war for control of Sigeion, and he awarded the town to Athenai.⁵¹ The Egyptian pharaoh Psamtek was also his ally. Clearly foreign policy interested Periandros greatly. Now that Eretria, ally of his friend Thrasyboulos, was also a *tyrannis*, the old Korinthios, always an indefatigable

⁴³ Quoted supra, n. 33.

⁴⁴ Ph. Bruneau, 'Une nouvelle publication de fouilles; Eretria III', *R.E.G.* 83, 1970, 129f., reviewing Bérard 1970 (IV/151): "la continuité culturelle (of the Hero-cult) est assurée pendant le VII^e siècle, et c'est au cours du VI^e siècle que disparaît toute trace de culte, rupture qu'il (C. Bérard) explique avec vraisemblance par la poussée démocratique." On the political uses of hero-cult: Snodgrass 1980 (II/184) 38ff.; R. Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual. Homer and Tragedy in the Developing City-State*, Oxford, 1994/5, 110 - 114; 180f.; 184; 194; Ridgeway 1992 (IV/57) 20 asserts that the hero-shrine was used for cult until the early-fifth century, citing Bérard, but cf. Bérard himself!

⁴⁵ Bérard 1970 (IV/151) 65: "il est possible que les lois somptuaires liées à la montée de classes démocratiques restreignent l'activité des oligarchies traditionnelles." Walker 1996 (III/72): gives some reasons for the funerary sumptuary laws in the 6th century.

⁴⁶ Morris 1987 (III/60); Walker 1996 (III/72).

⁴⁷ Aristoph., *Neph.* 46ff. and scholia: (quoted VI nn. 55; 57). The extravagance displayed abroad was perhaps a reaction against austerity imposed at home: Walker 1996 (III/72). Schol. Aristoph. *Neph.*: διὸ καὶ κοισυρεῖσθαι τὸ μέγα φρονεῖν παρ' Ἐρετριεῦσιν suggests that at Eretria, also, Koisyra was a by-word for extravagant display.

⁴⁸ IV 82f. (harbour); 94 (agora).

⁴⁹ Infra 202ff. (especially 204ff.).

⁵⁰ Bury 1955 (V/17) 151: "The cause of this change (i.e. the shift of Korinthian support from Samos to Miletos) was, at least in great measure, the natural sympathy of tyrannies."

⁵¹ Hdt. 5, 94f.

interventionist,⁵² was given a chance to interfere in Euboia, probably at the request of Diagoras, whether originally to aid his coup or, shortly after, to support his first foreign policy adventure (or both). If so, Diagoras' invitation was to be seconded by other ambitious Euboieis. The collaboration was crowned with signal success, though it was not as permanent as Diagoras and his allies might have hoped.

The evidence for Kypselid involvement in Euboia is to be found in a corpus of poems attributed to Theognis of Megara. His authorship of these particular lines is disputed; I accept Theognis as their author, though for my purposes, it is the period of the poems rather than authorship which is important.⁵³ The writer, whoever he was, is an **eye witness and participant**:

May Peace and Wealth possess the city, so that with other men
I could dance and sing; for I do not love evil War.
And do not listen too eagerly for the far-sounding herald,
for **we are not doing battle for our ancestral land**.
But for me it would be shameful, **being present**, not to mount
the swift-running horses and face woeful War.

Alas for our weakness; Kerinthos is now certain to be destroyed,
and the good vinelands of Lelantos are being laid waste;
the *Agathoi* are fleeing and the *Kakoi* controlling the polis.
Would that Zeus might destroy the Kypselid race! ⁵⁴

⁵² Nik. Damask. in *F.Gr.H.* 90 F 58, 3: ἐστρατεύετο δὲ συνεχῶς καὶ ἦν πολεμικός τριήρεις τε ναπηγησάμενος ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐχρήτο ταῖς θαλάτταις. (He was forever making expeditions and was warlike; he built triremes and used both seas) and Περιάνδρῳ τῷ τυράννῳ Κορινθίων γηραῶ ἤδη ὄντι πάντες οἱ υἱεῖς ἐτελεύτησαν. *Ag. Pol.* 1315 b 29f. confirms this assessment: Περιάνδρος δ' ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικός, ἀλλὰ πολεμικός. (Periandros became both tyrannical and warlike). In alliance with Thrasybulos, he attacks Sikyon: Frontinus 3, 9, 7, *Hdt.* 1, 20. Also supra 195ff.

⁵³ Appendix 4 (Chronological note/bibliography).

⁵⁴ Theognis, ll. 885 - 894 (My translation of the text):

Εἰρήνη καὶ Πλοῦτος ἔχοι πόλιν, ὄφρα μετ' ἄλλων
κοιμάσομε κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔρομαι πολέμιον.
Μηδὲ λίην κήρυκος ἂν οἷς ἔχε μακρὰ βοῶντος
οἷ γὰρ πατρώας γῆς περὶ μαρνάμεθα.
Ἄλλ' αἰσχρὸν παρεόντα καὶ ἀκιντόδων ἐπίβαντα
ἵππων μὴ πόλεμιον δακρυόεντ' ἔσειδεῖν.

Οἱ μοι ἀναλξείης ἀπὸ μὲν Κήρινθος ὄλωλεν
Ληλάντων δ' ἀγαθὸν κείρεται οἰνόπεδον·
οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ φεῖγουσι, πόλιν δὲ κακοὶ διέπουσιν.
ὡς δὴ Κυψελιδέων Ζεὺς ὄλεσε γένος.

I take the perfect ἀπ(ὸ) - ὄλωλεν (891), followed by the presents κείρεται (cf. infra n. 70); φεῖγουσι; and διέπουσιν (892 - 3), to imply that Kerinthos has **just** been destroyed, resulting in the fact that the Lelantine Plain is (now being) destroyed, his friends are now fleeing and his enemies (now) controlling the polis. Cf. W. W. Goodwin, *Greek Grammar*, London, 1879/1977, 1263. On perfects with a strong future meaning (i.e. Kerinthos **certainly** about to be destroyed): Smyth 1920/59 (II/206) 1950. We may note (without agreeing) Burn's (1929 [V/173] 34) interpretation of these lines as "a phil-Eretrian lament for Chalcidian success."(!)



Fig. 65: "Κήρινθον τ' ἔφαλον" (Hom. *Il.* 2, 538). The ancient site was probably the plateau on the left.

The putative author was a disgruntled aristocrat of the deepest dye. On a high dating, he was born about 630, and lived on into the sixth century, during the early part of which his city was governed by an extreme democracy which he hated, but scholars who adopt a lower framework have his lifetime between c.580 and 500.⁵⁵ Exile seems to have been his lot for much of his life, and his wanderings took him as far afield as Sicily, as he himself tells us in his poems.

And in the same lines he also tells us that he was, at some time during his vigorous years in Euboea:

For I myself once went to the land of Sicily
and once to the vine-clad plain of Euboeia.⁵⁶

Everywhere he went in his exile, he was welcome in the houses of like-minded *agathoi*, aristocrats like himself, as *xenos*:

And all men made me very welcome when I came.⁵⁷

At some time in his wanderings he found himself at Kerinthos, a small town in the north-east of Euboea. But when? And why at Kerinthos of all places? Most

⁵⁵ R. P. Legon, *Megara: The Political History of a Greek City State to 336 B.C.*, Ithaca/London, 1981, ch. 6, 136ff. so characterises the democracy, placing it in the 7th century and giving Theognis a birth-year close to 630 (111). Adopting a lower chronological framework, Jeffery 1976 (II/224) 157 places the radical democracy in the 6th century, and its replacement, towards end of the century, by a "moderate" oligarchy, and the life of Theognis c.570 and 490(?). Kerinthos may have fallen c.544 according to Figueira 1985 (VI/123) 299f. (Chronological Table Q). If so, Theognis should have been in Euboea before then; however, Figueira's dates are high. On the other hand, Jacobsen 1964 (Intro./2) 220 n. 32 dates the destruction of Kerinthos to 506!

⁵⁶ Theognis ll. 783f.

⁵⁷ Theognis l. 786.

authorities on Theognis place his *floruit* from 540 to 520,⁵⁸ so we should expect that the incidents described occurred within this period. Authorship by Theognis is not crucial to my argument, although his Megarian origins would explain the venom directed particularly at the Kypselidai, and why he lumped **all** his opponents at Kerinthos together under the contemptuous rubric, "the Kypselid tribe". **None** of the translators available to me actually renders the word *παρόντα* (*L.S.J.* 1333: "be present" and "be [someone's] guest.") in l. 889, nor do any commentators refer to it. Yet historically, this is of the utmost importance, for it surely means that **whoever wrote the lines was an actual observer and participant** in the events that he describes. Nor do they read ll. 885 - 890 with 891 - 894, though they surely demand to be so read, as E. Harrison wisely remarks: "other things being equal, it is desirable that adjacent pieces should be interpreted in the light of one another."⁵⁹ The verses also present a coherent picture that is not at all at variance with what we know about the man and the times that we are dealing with. The poet is an aristocrat welcome amongst Khalkidian aristocratic horse-riders. He is hostile to the *Demos* and hates the Kypselidai. The very environment in which Theognis was likely to have found himself. Not many lines previously, the poet laments the rise of Persian power and the threat it posed for Greece: he appeals to Apollon for protection from the "wanton outrage of the host of the Medes." He "is fearful, seeing the heedlessness and people-destroying discords of the Greeks."⁶⁰ Sardis had fallen in 546, the very year that Peisistratos set out from Eretria. But for whom was Theognis, a foreigner far from his "ancestral land", fighting? He was (of course) helping⁶¹ the "Good Men" who were at the small town of Kerinthos where they made a final and, we must presume, unsuccessful stand since Kerinthos is about to be destroyed, and they are in flight. Their opponents, the "Bad Men",⁶² also have foreign allies, the hated Kypselidai, and, victorious in some battle that has already taken place, it is they who are controlling "the *polis*". We are definitely no longer witnesses in an age in which gentlemen's agonistic contests passed as war, though it may be noted that the

⁵⁸ *Supra* n. 55. Cf. also: Edmonds 1968 (IV/300) intro. 21 (*floruit* 548); D. Wenden, *Hesiod and Theognis*, Harmondsworth, 1979 162 - 163 (*post* 580). J. Carrière, *Theognis de Mégare. Étude sur le recueil élégiaque attribué à ce poète*, Paris(?), before 1948, 10; idem *Theognis. Poèmes élégiaques: texte établi et traduit accompagné d'un commentaire*, Paris, 1962 (Theognis c.50 years old in 544).

⁵⁹ E. Harrison *Studies in Theognis*, Cambridge, 1902, 289.

⁶⁰ Theogn. 757 - 786; 773; 775 - 776; 780 - 781.

⁶¹ Guest-friendship (ξενία) and political ramifications: Herman 1987 (V/175).

⁶² For Theognis' use of 'agathoi' and 'kakoi', (or synonyms: 'esthloi' and 'deiloi'): P. A. L. Greenhalgh, 'Aristocracy and its advocates in archaic Greece', *G. & R.* 19, 1972, 197ff. They may sometimes be social class terms, sometimes moral. Greenhalgh comments on the difficulties in translating them. Cf. also V. Cobb-Stevens, 'Opposites, reversals and ambiguities: the unsettled world of Theognis', in Figueira/Nagy 1985 (VI/122) 159ff.; the introduction to this collection is helpful (especially 7f., paras 18; 21). Some modern historians use the terms in quite specially defined ways, e.g. Morris 1987 (III/60); Starr 1977 (IV/71) 123 - 128.

aristocrats are mounted as befits hippobotic lords,⁶³ but in the midst of social revolution in a *polis*-state, aided and abetted by powerful outside forces.⁶⁴

Kerinthos lay on a small plain south of the Plain of Histiaia, separated by



Fig. 66: View of part of the gorge which was, and is still, the pass for the road between Khalkis and Kerinthos.

the Xirón (Ξηρόν) highlands.

It was linked, in the mind of Homeros,⁶⁵ to the latter city and to vines. It may still have been a viticultural area in Theognis' day, for he refers to an Εὐβοίης ἀμπελόεν πεδίων.⁶⁶

It is always taken for granted that Theognis is talking of the Lelantine Plain, but it could, but not necessarily, be to the extended Plain of Kerinthos/Histiaia that he is referring. Having visited Kerinthos, I can verify that the soil on the plain around the city⁶⁷ is composed of extremely rich and fertile dark-brown alluvial deposits left by flooding of the Boudoros River. But it is not

extensive, which may be why Kerinthos was never a polis

in its own right.⁶⁸ It is separated by over 40 km. of deep mountainous gorges (passes; supra fig. 65) through the Makistos-Dirphys ranges (1225 and 1743 m. respectively)

⁶³ Theognis (ll. 889f.): "it would be shameful . . . not to mount swift-footed horses . . ." to go to war. It need not have been a cavalry battle; Greenhalgh 1973 (IV/162) 93 suggests that by the 6th century, the soldiers depicted on horseback on vases of the period were mounted hoplites. The Spartan *hippeis* rode to battle but fought in the hoplite ranks as late as Mantinea in 419: Thouk. 5, 72, 23. A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks*, Ithaca/New York, 1967, 85; Gomme (et al.) IV 1956 (V/167) 121. But a cavalry battle cannot be totally ruled out. If it were such, it would be, in fact, the last reference to a cavalry battle by the *hippeis* in Euboeia as a group or class.

⁶⁴ Theognis' poetry was written in an age of 'democratic' turmoil: T. Hudson-Williams, 'Theognis and his Poems', *J.H.S.* 23, 1903, 4f.

⁶⁵ Hom. *Il.* 2, 537f.: πολυστάφυλον θ' Ἰστιαίαν | Κήρινθον τ' ἔφαλον.

⁶⁶ Theogn. ll. 783f. Supra 201. Jacobsen 1964 (Intro./2) 219 thinks that πολυστάφυλον is quite appropriate to the Histiaian plain.

⁶⁷ I 5 (photo fig. 8). In the atlas of Rhodhakis c.1965 (I/4) vol. 1, 528 it is listed as one of the significant plains on the island (today called the Plain of Mandoudhi).

⁶⁸ *R.E.* s.v.; Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 107 - 109; Strabon 10, 1, 5 C446 calls it merely πολειδίον (sic); Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἐλλοπία calls it a χωρίον τῆς Εὐβοίας. Kerinthos does not appear in the Athenian Tribute Lists and so was probably not autonomous even then (or had been destroyed).

from Khalkis and the Lelantine Plain. Eretria is, of course, another 25 km. distant. The two passages of Theognis may thus refer to two separate plains: one (l. 892⁶⁹) is specifically named Lelanton, and described as "rich" and "plain of wine" while the other (l. 784) is merely described as "vine-clad". But were there two? We know for certain that the poet was at Kerinthos, on the southern limits of Homeros' "many-vined" Hestiaian plain, but it may indeed be stretching it to call the flat lands around Kerinthos part of the Hestiaian Plain. So did Theognis also visit the Lelantine Plain? He would certainly have heard much mention of it from his Khalkidian host-friends, and knew it was being (or had been) devastated. But might he have transferred what he would have known of Euboian plains from Homeros to both? He could easily, of course, have resided on a noble estate on the Lelantine Plain **before** he and his friends were forced back onto Kerinthos.⁷⁰ But though there is some viticulture on the Lelantine Plain, it was never, apart from this one instance, described in ancient literature by reference to its vines. Its fame lay rather in its heavy but fertile crop-producing soil, and its water-pastures, on which the Hippobotai grazed their horses and cattle. It was in fact Eretria, rather than Khalkis, which stressed the vine and its product. One of the principal temples in the city was that of Dionysos,⁷¹ and Hiller von Gaertringen observes: "sola Eretria inter urbes Euboeae talia (Oinos-) nomina exhibit, quod qui **vicos atque vineas hodierna ab Eretria urbe usque ad vicum Bathy** (Amarynthos) **peragraverit**"⁷² i.e. the Eretrian vinelands were east of the city, not on the western (Lelantine) side. Notwithstanding that the Lelantine Plain does not have strong ancient associations with vines, and that Theognis might have been 'Homerizing', I am of the opinion that Theognis was in fact thinking of the Lelantine Plain in both passages which mention plains in Euboeia, but that he refers to incidents in two separate (in time and space) theatres of war at which he was present, both, by Euboian standards, quite far apart.

Both theatres of war were geographically, if not always politically, in what was the Khalkidian sphere of influence. Thus if foreigners like Periandros and, as I suggest, the Eretrieis, were involved, we are dealing with an invasion of Khalkidian territory, and the government of the Hippobotai was well and truly on the defensive. Who then were fighting at Kerinthos? It is unlikely that either Eretrieis or Korinthioi

⁶⁹ Line 892 quoted (translated) supra 200; Greek text, n. 54.

⁷⁰ Part of the problem is grammatical (cf. supra n. 54): *ζειρεται* is present middle/passive and may be rendered either as "is now destroyed" (i.e. has been recently destroyed) or "is being destroyed" (i.e. as I speak). The *kakoi* are in fact in control of the polis, so: is this (a) the result of a conflict in which the Lelanton was destroyed, or (b) are the *kakoi* in the process of laying waste the estates of the *agathoi* now? Probably the first, but the latter can't be ruled out.

⁷¹ Auberson 1976 (I/40) 59ff.

⁷² IG XII Suppl., Test./Not. 203, 94ff.: also citing F. Bechtel, *Die historischen Personennamen des Griechischen bis zur Kaiserzeit*, Hildesheim, 1917/1964, 64: "Alia series nominum Eretriensium incipit ab οἶνο-. c.f. Οἶνογάτης, Οἶναργός 'funkelnd wie Wein' aut 'funkelnd von Wein' secundum Bechtel p. 64 Οἶνον, Οἶνόθεος, Οἶνανθισσοζ." (I, 13).

were involved **there** in any numbers, given the isolation of the site by land.⁷³ So we fall back on Khalkideis alone. And that is indicated by Theognis: the Good will face the Bad in "woeful war" (890). *Stasis* in Khalkis is the answer. The Good Men were naturally the Khalkidian Hippobotai, now defeated in a revolution involving outside forces at Khalkis-*polis*, and the *kaloι k'agathoi* have been driven out to this remote town to make a last stand. But Theognis also laments the devastation of the Lelantine Plain. The *kakoi* must thus have won at least one victory for things to have come to this pass. Though neither Eretria nor Khalkis are named in the lines, it is quite inconceivable, given the lurking presence of Kypselid power, that both cities were not involved and that the devastation was **solely** the result of civil war. The *polis*, already captured and now governed by the *kakoi*, and the wasting of the plain, are clearly linked in the poet's mind, both having occurred prior to the situation in which he and his friends now found themselves at Kerinthos. Kerinthos is moreover nowhere called "*polis*".⁷⁴ The "City-state" is Khalkis.

Who/what initiated these events, and when? Eretria, in revenge for earlier losses? Kypselid (i.e. Periandros') ambition and interference? Possibly both, but the answer lies rather in the internal problems of Khalkis itself, which Eretrieis and Kypselids were only too ready to exploit, **especially if invited in by one party in a domestic stasis**.⁷⁵ Given 533 as the probable year of Periandros' death, and the involvement of Eretria in overseas adventures till c.540, followed by Diagoras' coup c. 538, the Kerinthos affair should be dated between c.536/5 and 533 (530 at the very latest if one were to allow for the unlikely possibility that the Kypselid(s) involved was Psammetikhos/Kypselos II.

There is evidence that the Eretrieis were invited to intervene by a faction in Khalkis from Aineias Taktikos. The story is detailed:⁷⁶

⁷³ Supra 202f. It is possible that the attack was sea-borne; **ancient** Kerinthos was on a high promontory at the mouth of the Boudoros River (fig. 66; Homeros calls it "Kerinthos hard-by-sea" (Κήρινθον τ' ἔφαλον). Also I 5f. and figs 3; 8; 9. For recent evidence concerning its location: E. Sapouna-Sakellarakī, 'Mycenaean Kerinthos', in Evely/Lemos/ Sherratt (edd.) 1996 (III/100) 106 - 110. Both Eretria and Korinthos were notable sea-powers. In such a scenario, the Khalkideis would have had to dash to the aid of the town, probably on horseback. But I believe that the Khalkidian aristocrats were already in the town for reasons given below.

⁷⁴ Supra n. 68.

⁷⁵ Cobb-Stevens in Figueira/Nagy: intro. to 1985 (VI/122) 1, para. 2. Forrest 1957 (IV/285) 162: Theognis "appears to be talking of *stasis* (his emphasis) in a Euboean city and without further evidence this cannot be expanded into a full-scale war." and "... whereas verses 891 - 895 (sic. for 894) appear to bear witness to war in Euboea in the second quarter of the sixth century." and the lines "refers merely to some minor interference by Periander in Euboean affairs." I agree that we have here stasis (and war as a result), but Forrest is talking of events he places in the 7th and not, as I do, in the 6th century. Neither does he give much credit to the reference to Kypselidai. This is not acceptable; any interference by Periandros anywhere was important in a 7th/6th century context: how can he say we have here only a "minor interference"? If the Korinthioi came north as far as Euboea at any point of time, it would not have been a minor event and, in any case, in (idem) 1956 (II/74) 51 he himself says that Korinthos was the directing force in the Lelantine War (which he dates to the 8th century); if Korinthos could intervene then, it certainly could in the 6th.

⁷⁶ Ain. Takt. 4, 1: Χαλκίς ἢ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατελήθη ὑπὸ φηγάδος ὀρμημένου ἐξ Ἐρετρίας, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς τεχνασμένου τοιόνδε. κατὰ τὸ ἐρημιότατον τῆς πόλεως καὶ πύλας οὐκ ἀνομιμένας ἔχων

Khalkis on the Euripos was captured by a fugitive operating from Eretria, aided by one of the inhabitants of the town in the following way. To the most deserted part of the city where the gate was kept closed, he used to bring a fire-pot which he kept going both day and night, and so, secretly, one night, he burned through the bar of the gate and admitted soldiers through it. When about 2000 men were gathered in the agora, the emergency war alarm was sounded quickly: many of the Khalkideis were killed because from ignorance they ranged themselves carrying their arms, alongside their enemies, thinking they were friends, each man thinking he was late in arriving. Thus did most of them die in one's and two's, and the city was captured for some time before they realised what had happened."

The Loeb editors⁷⁷ say that "this incident probably took place during the war over the Lelantine Plain in the latter part of the seventh century." The city has obviously acquired a strong and, on the whole, reliable set of walls and gates; Eretria had an enceinte-wall in the seventh century. We know nothing, other than what Aineas reveals, about the early defences of Khalkis, but substantial walls did not become the rule in European Greece until into the sixth. Anything later than the 350's is excluded by Aineas' *floruit* in the first half of the fourth century. Of two possible fourth century scenarios, Knoepfler⁷⁸ discussing the war in which Athenai went to the aid of Ploutarkhos, tyrant of Eretria, has eliminated 349/8, while Tod rules out 357/6.⁷⁹ During the fifth century, all Euboeia was under Athenian domination, and such an event, unrecorded moreover, could hardly have occurred then. We are thus thrust back to the sixth century or earlier.

The Eretrieis, according to this evidence, actually take the city, and **by treachery from within**. The ruse employed may appear overly elaborate, but there are parallels from Thoukydides in the mid-fifth century.⁸⁰ On the other hand, this

ἔφερον πυργίστην*, ἣν κηλάσασον τὰς ἡμέρας καὶ τὰς νύκτας ἔλαθεν νικτὸς τὸν μόχλον διαπρήσας** καὶ δεξιόμενος ταύτῃ στρατιώτας ἀθροισθέντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ ὡς διαχιλίων ἀνδρῶν ἐσημιάθη τὸ πολεμικὸν σποικιδῆ πολλοὶ δὲ τῶν Χαλκιδέων δι' ἀγνοίαν ἀπόλλινται· οἱ γὰρ ἐζυοβηθέντες ἐτίθεντο κέροντες τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ὡς πρὸς φίλους, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος δοκῶν ἕστερος παραγίνεσθαι. οὕτως οὖν καθ' ἓνα καὶ δύο οἱ πλείστοι ἀπόλλιντο, μέχρι χρόνου ἕστερον ἐγνώσαν τὸ συμβαῖνον, τῆς πόλεως ἤδη καταχομένης. I use the Loeb text. However, D. Whitehead, *Aineias the Tactician. 'How to Survive under Siege'*, Oxford, 1990, 106 suggests ῥινῆν (file) instead of πυργίστην (brazier, fire-pot) and διαπρήσας (sawing) instead of διαπρήσας (burning). I keep the MS reading, because the bar could have been sawn through with less need for the elaborate ruse which attracted Aineas' interest, and would consequently seem to require also the deletion of the consequently superfluous bringing of the fire-pot, kept going day and night.

⁷⁷ Notes: W. A. Oldfather: *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander*, Cambridge Mass./London, 1928/1986, 38, n. 1. Whitehead 1990 (VII/75) 31, n. 6 misquotes them (8th for 7th century).

⁷⁸ Knoepfler 1981 (I/20) 289ff.

⁷⁹ Tod 1968 (IV/264) 160. Whitehead mentions events in this year (Diod. Sik. 16, 7, 2) but no capture of Khalkis.

⁸⁰ For bar-cutting (if not bar-burning): Thouk. 2, 4, 4 (Plataia, in 431); 4, 111, 2 (Torone, in 424/3).

action would fit perfectly into the scenario described above. When, other than at a time of severe internal *stasis*, might we have expected Khalkis to be betrayed to the old enemy? Aineias also says that casualties arose from the fact that there was confusion as to who were friends and who enemies, which suggests that many locals were part of the revolutionary group, so the city was lost before the loyalists realised what was happening. Two thousand is too many outsiders to have entered *secretly*! Such a number entering via a single gate would have been so obvious that the alarm would have been raised by some loyalist and not, as is apparent, by the rebels themselves to get their enemies out into the streets.

The sequence of events was probably as follows: the Eretrian and Korinthian tyrants combined to invade and devastate the Lelantine Plain, causing suffering for the Hippobotai. In Khalkis-town meanwhile, and in concert with the invasion, there was a revolution, raising an obscure populist tyrant, Antileon,⁸¹ to power, obliging the hard core of the old régime to flee to Kerinthos where they re-grouped to attempt a comeback. They were followed (perhaps by sea), attacked and (probably) defeated. Thus the fighting at Kerinthos follows the coup of Antileon at Khalkis. It is entirely possible, and indeed likely, that Antileon and his supporters had been in contact with Periandros and Diagoras; perhaps Antileon himself or one of his key supporters had been the fugitive resident in Eretria and negotiating with the new tyrant there. Soon after the death of his chief patron, Periandros (for he could hardly have continued to rely only on Eretrian support and still maintain popularity in Khalkis, and the prime importance of Periandros is stressed by Theognis' use of "Kypselidai" for **all** his and his Khalkidian friends' enemies), Antileon was overthrown, and flayed alive if the indications are correct.⁸² The returning aristocrats who had suffered from the devastations of their estates on the plain, and political and military humiliation, would no doubt have been vengeful enough to make an example of Antileon. He may have been called "Phoxos"⁸³ in

⁸¹ References for Antileon: Ar. *Pol.* 1316 a 29f: βάλλει καὶ . . . τυραννίς . . . καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. ὥσπερ ἢ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἢ Ἀντιλέοντος. (Tyranny . . . can degenerate . . . also into oligarchy, as did that of Antileon at Khalkis); Solon (!?) fr. 33 (ap. Plout. *Solon* 14): μᾶλλον γ' ἄξιός Ἀντιλέοντιος ὄδ' ἢς ἀπυθέσθην. Also cf. Alkaios LP 296 P2; Aristoph. *Hipp.* 1036ff. Solon however (if they are indeed his lines) does not mention any tyrant or city by name. Flagellation may have been a standard manner of conceiving the punishment of defeated tyrants. There was a 4th century politician Antileon from Khalkis-on-the-Euripos (a descendant?) mentioned in a decree from Samos (the ancient ally of Khalkis): C. Habicht, 'Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit', *M.D.A.I. (A)* 72, 1957, 157ff.

⁸² For Alkaios: E. Lobel/D. Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*, Oxford, 1955 231 (fr. 296 P2) emended by P. Maas, 'How Antileon's Tyranny ended', *C.R.* 70 (n.s. 6) 1956, 200, and accepted by H. Lloyd-Jones, 'More about Antileon, Tyrant of Chalcis (Solon, fr. 33 and Aristophanes, *Eq.* 1042 - 44)', *C.P.* 70, 1975, 197. Alkaios was born shortly before 600 and died old (he refers to his "grey breast"); it is therefore not beyond reason he lived on into the 530's. Aristophanes is clearly referring to a paradigmatic **populist** tyrant called Antileon in *Hipp.* 1036ff. (and schol.), for he wishes us to compare Kleon with him.

⁸³ For Phoxos: *Il.* 2, 218 - 219. The accent alters if used as a proper noun (Φόξος). φοξός = "peaked in the head", indication of impudence: [Ar.] *Physiogn.* 812 a 8: οἱ τὰς κεφαλὰς φοξοὶ ἀναδειξ. Thersites was φοξός. But φοξοὶ were thought to possess great physical strength (a working-class quality?): Hippokr. *Epidem.* 6, 1, 2: . . . αὐτὰρ ἔπειθε φοξός ἔην κεφαλὴν . . . φοξός. As a name it

derision by the Homerically "literate" aristocrats, an allusion to the impudent Thersites who challenges his betters in the *Iliad* and is slapped down for his trouble by the noble Odysseus. However, this name more likely belongs to a later tyrant of Khalkis for he was apparently followed by a democracy; if so, it is a sign that the collective "Thersites" of Khalkis were not so easily to be squashed as was the Homeric buffoon, since he must have followed Antileon (and lost power) some time before 506, for by then, the estates of the Lelantine Plain were back in the hands of the Hippobotai.⁸⁴ Thus the history of Khalkis for the rest of the century is one of upheavals (we hear of yet another tyrant, Tynondas⁸⁵), culminating in a catastrophic military defeat in 506. This picture is reinforced by the archaeological evidence, sparse though it is.⁸⁶ After that Khalkis was under Athenian control with *kleroukhai* established on the Lelantine Plain. We hear of no more Khalkidian tyrants until the fourth century.

According to this reconstruction, Eretria had intervened decisively in the affairs of her neighbour, and her hegemony within Euboaia at this time is clear. Doubtless it was after this that Diagoras and the Eretrieis were able to play an aggressive and controlling role in the trade of the region, and they presumed, c.525, to lay down the regulations covering navigation and taxes for the whole of the Euboian Straits from Kenaion to the Petalai Islands, including Khalkidian home waters. Khalkis was henceforth unable to do much about such Eretrian activities. Though the rule of their dependent, Antileon, was short-lived, the local impact must have been considerable. Not only was Khalkis defeated, but the city had fallen into Eretrian hands. The new régime had asserted itself decisively in interstate affairs. Diagoras now settled down to what proved a long period of rule and the city, to a period of steady growth and generally peaceful foreign relations, based on a continuation of her ancient friendship with Miletos in the east, and Korinthos and Thebai (down to 519) in central Greece. It is likely that Eretria maintained her island

occurs at Phokaia. Polyain. *Strategem.* 8, 37). *Ar. Pol.* 1304 a 29ff.: ... καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δῆμος ἀνελὼν εἶχετο τῆς πολιτείας. (...) and at Khalkis, the demos, along with the better class, overthrew the tyrant Phoxos and immediately seized control of the government).

⁸⁴ Ailian. *Hist. poikil.* 6, 1: Ἀθηναῖοι κρατήσαντες Χαλκιδέων κατεκληρούχισαν αὐτῶν τὴν γῆν εἰς διαχιλίους, τὴν Ἰπποβότων καλουμένην χώραν, τεμένη δὲ ἀνήκαν τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ ἐν τῷ Ἀηλάντῳ ὀνομαζομένῳ τόπῳ. (The Athenaioi, having defeated the Khalkideis [in 506] divided up the land into 2000 lots for kleroukhai, that is, the so-called land of the Hippobotai in the area called Lelanton, and offered a portion to Athena). Plout. *Perikl.* 23, 2 uses a similar phrase: Χαλκιδέων μὲν τοὺς ἰπποβότας λεγομένους referring to the Hippobotai as the ruling group when Perikles suppressed the Euboian revolt in 447/6. Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 63 believes the passage from Ailianos belongs to this time, and not 506, but he regards the outcome of the Lelantine War (which he dates earlier) as consolidating the power of the Hippobotai at Khalkis (58).

⁸⁵ Plout. *Solon* 14: his name suggests a Boiotian origin. Perhaps it was he who took Khalkis into the alliance with Thebai in the later 6th century, though Ploutarkhos links him with Pittakos (and Sigeion), as an example of a "good" tyrant.

⁸⁶ Boardman 1957 (I/65) 27ff., n. 163.

power, moreover with its character and policies unchanged. But by 525 Diagoras had been in power for a decade. We should certainly regard Khairion as a political exile from Peisistratid Athenai, welcome in hostile Eretria. He was a *pentekosiomedimnos* since he is identified as *tamias* of Athene c.550.⁹³ The flaunting of the epithet "Εὐπατριδῶν", as Davies observes, "must be the political manifesto of an *ancien régime* family."⁹⁴ His son, Alkimakhos, who was perhaps recalled by Hippias (cf. Kimon and Kleisthenes), erected a statue to him on the Akropolis c.520;⁹⁵ the wording of its inscription, ἐσθλὸ πατρὸς ἡῦς, makes his own political attitudes as perfectly clear as did the term "of the *Eupatridai*" on the tomb-stone at Eretria.⁹⁶ Khairion's family has been linked to that of Alkibiades, the Eupatrid Salaminioi.⁹⁷ But the presence in Eretria of Alkmaionidai, with whom Alkibiades is also said by Isokrates to have been related, strengthens the possibility that Khairion was related somehow to the Alkmaionidai and was part of the conspiracy leading to the death of Hipparkhos.⁹⁸ By 514 "*Eupatrides*" was being used as a term of praise for opponents of the Peisistratid government.⁹⁹ Khairion was probably not the only noble Athenian political exile in Eretria; we shall see that Alkmaionidai (including Megakles and his son Kleisthenes), may have been there. However Kleisthenes at least had been recalled (by Hippias as a goodwill gesture?) by 525 and held the arkhonship in that year though by 511 the Alkmaionidai were out again.¹⁰⁰

Peisistratos was succeeded by his sons Hippias and Hipparkhos in 527.¹⁰¹ Periandros, the lynch-pin of the diplomatic order from c.570 to c.530 was recently dead.¹⁰² Lygdamis of Naxos survives until 515/4. As the last quarter of the sixth century dawns, Diagoras seems firmly in power at Eretria, but both his ally Miletos and his enemy Khalkis were reduced to impotence by more or less chronic social revolution, which produced short-lived tyrannies interspersed with ephemeral régimes, both oligarchic and democratic. Other figures now intrude upon the history of Eretria. By far the most important and interesting will be Kleomenes I of Sparta (c.520 - 487), a relation of Kheilon, with whose ephorate (556) we began the previous chapter. Sparta had been making headway in the Peloponnesos and had

⁹³ Davies 1971 (V/282) 13.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 11. Raubitschek 1949 (VII/91) 364, no. 330.

⁹⁵ Khairion himself had raised an altar on the Akropolis at Athenai before his exile: idem.

⁹⁶ On the term "esthlos": supra n. 62 for references: Davies 1971 (V/282) 13.

⁹⁷ Raubitschek 1949 (VII/91) 364f. For Alkibiades and the Salaminioi, Davies 1971 (V/282) 10ff. For Alkibiades' family and as Eupatrid, Isokr. 16, 25; Plato, *Alk.* I, 121 a; Plout. *Alk.* 1, 1; Didymos (Schol. Pind. *Nem.* 2, 19). But Davies, 10ff. doubts any connection of Khairion's family with that of Alkibiades ("not required by the evidence").

⁹⁸ *Infra* 212ff.

⁹⁹ [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 19, 3 (the 'Leipsydriion skolion'). Davies 1971 (V/282) 12.

¹⁰⁰ [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 19, 3; Hdt. 5, 62.

¹⁰¹ I accept that Hippias was the elder(-est) son and that he succeeded to his father's position. In 526/5 he held the arkhonship, perhaps a formality to stress the continuity of the dynasty's rule. 526/5 is generally accepted as the date of Polykrates' death, but cf. G. Dickins, 'The Growth of Spartan Policy', *J.H.S.* 32, 1912, 28 for Polykrates' death in 517 (with which I agree): *infra* 215.

¹⁰² Sealey 1976 (V/5) 53ff.; 60, n. 5 (Kypselid chronology again!); Walker 1990 (IV/32) 56ff.

supplanted Argos as the natural hegemon of southern Greece. After the fall of the Kypselidai, even powerful Korinthos became a member of the Peloponnesian league, though as later events show, a very independently-minded one. Sparta had a reputation for suppressing tyrants going back to Khilon's days, not entirely deserved: when it served their interests, the Lakedaimonioi were quite ready to accommodate tyrants.¹⁰³ The arrival of Spartan troops in central Greece led by Kleomenes, changed the political balance in the region considerably.

Kleomenes played a sophisticated diplomatic game there.¹⁰⁴ His first move, probably within a year of his accession, came in 519.¹⁰⁵ It was a brilliantly mischievous ploy, and impacted very much on Diagoras and the Eretrieis. When the Plataieis in Boiotia, threatened by the expansionist activities of Thebai, the ally of Eretria and Athenai since at least 546, sought alliance with him, Kleomenes advised them to apply to Hippias.¹⁰⁶ Hippias accepted the challenge/bait. Naturally Thebai was enraged, and consequently threw over the Athenian alliance, and with it, the Eretrieis, and allied with Khalkis; any alliance with Khalkis was, of course, incompatible with friendship with Eretria.¹⁰⁷ At the time of this affair, Kleomenes was in Megara; by the late-sixth century there was an oligarchy in power there which had a bilateral *symmakhia* with Sparta. It had been fighting Korinthos (also oligarchic after the fall of the Kypselidai) and had achieved some success up to this point in time, but Korinthos must, ultimately, have prevailed had Kleomenes not intervened in this dispute between two allied states. Korinthos, angered by the interference, was to long remain deeply suspicious of Spartan intentions, and her later reactions to Kleomenes' attempts to interfere both in and north of the isthmus must be seen in this context. Korinthian independence of action from Sparta continued to be demonstrated for decades, and with Megara in the pro-Khalkidian/Theban camp, she continued to favour the Eretrian/Athenian side with momentous consequences as we shall soon see.¹⁰⁸

The new Spartan interest north of the isthmus posed a threat to the tyrants of Eretria and Athenai, and it appears that the danger was at first not fully appreciated in either city. An even more obvious danger was the now hostile Thebai. Yet it seems that neither tyrant made any effort towards rapprochement, in fact, attempts

¹⁰³ Hdt. 5, 91.

¹⁰⁴ K. Walker, *The Policy of Kleomenes I of Sparta down to 506 B.C. and the Establishment of the Athenian Democracy. A Study of Spartan Foreign Policy in the Last Quarter of the Sixth Century*, June 1962.

¹⁰⁵ Thouk. 3, 68, 5: Plataiai fell to the Lakedaimonioi in 427, 93 years after the beginning of its alliance with the Athenai.

¹⁰⁶ Hdt. 6, 108.

¹⁰⁷ For the sequence of events: M. Miller, *The Thalassocracies - Studies in Chronography II*, Albany, 1975, 53.

¹⁰⁸ For these events, with emphasis on Spartan motives: Dickins 1912 (VII/101); for a critique of this paper: G. B. Grundy, 'The Policy of Sparta', *J.H.S.* 32, 1912, 261ff. and Dickens' reply, 'The Growth of Spartan Policy - a Reply', *J.H.S.* 33, 1913, 111f. Megara: Legon 1981 (VII/55) 136ff. For summaries: Figueira/Nagy, 1985 (VI/122). For Korinthos, Will 1955 (IV/252) 634ff.; Salmon 1986 (IV/85) 240ff.

were made from the Eretrian side to undermine the Peisistratidai, ultimately with success, and there is evidence that Diagoras actually collaborated with Kleomenes in his intrigues against Hippias; by 525 he was giving asylum to Peisistratid political opponents as we have seen. Sparta (in foreign policy in 519, this meant in practice Kleomenes) though technically an ally of Hippias, wanted a less independently-minded government to deal with, and when the need was present, the old anti-tyrant policies could always be dusted off. The political situation for Hippias was worsened because Argos, which had aided Peisistratos in 546 was, after her defeat in the Battle of the Champions, more and more obsessed with her own weakened position within the Peloponnesos, so in the event of trouble, no help could be expected from that quarter. Thus for Athenai, there remained as allies only Naxos, Thessalia and Korinthos, though the continued friendship of the latter, a member of the Spartan alliance, could not be assumed with confidence. The Thessaloi were loyal to Hippias to the end,¹⁰⁹ but in 514 Lygdamis, installed by Peisistratos with the support of the then Eretrian government of the Hippeis, would be removed by the Lakedaimonioi¹¹⁰ with Eretrian support.¹¹¹ His replacement by an oligarchy of the Παχεῖς (lit. the Fat-Ones, i.e. the Very Rich) proved instrumental to the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt, and the involvement of Eretria in it.¹¹² For a democratic Eretria was partly responsible for the overthrow of this régime, probably c.505, and this, along with her leadership in the attack on Sardis, made her the principal object of the Persian attack in mainland Greece.¹¹³ Hippias' friends were becoming fewer, so it appears strange indeed that he made no attempt to patch up friendship with his father's old ally. That he couldn't must be due to Eretrian indifference or rather, hostility.

In 514/3, the year after the fall of Lygdamis, a conspiracy was set afoot in Athenai, which sheds some light on the attitude of Eretria towards the government there, and reveals the real weakness of the Peisistratidai at home and abroad. Hippias' younger brother, Hipparkhos, was slain during the opening ceremony of the Panathenaia by two members of the *genos* of the Gephyraioi,¹¹⁴ Harmodios and

¹⁰⁹ For Thessalia and Thebai: V, 167ff.; Forrest 1956 (II/74) 42.

¹¹⁰ Hdt. 5, 30. Myres 1906 (IV/277) 97f.: a very interesting reconstruction of events c.515 - 505.

¹¹¹ IX 254f.

¹¹² Trying to interest the Persians in an attack on Naxos, Aristagoras points out to Artaphrenes, satrap at Sardis, that: ἐντεῦτεν δὲ ὁμοίωμενος εὐπετέως ἐπιθήσει Εὐβοίῃ νήσῳ (Hdt. 5, 31).

¹¹³ Myres 1906 (IV/277) 98.

¹¹⁴ For the Gephyraioi: II 53ff. The basic text: Hdt. 5, 55 - 58: Οἱ δὲ Γεφυραῖοι, τῶν ἦσαν οἱ φονεῖς οἱ Ἰππάρχου, ὡς μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἐγεγόνεσαν ἐξ Ἐρετρίας τὴν ἀρχήν, ὡς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀνατυνθανόμενος εὐρίσχω, ἦσαν Φοίνιζες τῶν σὺν Κάδιμῳ ἀπιζομένων Φοινίκων ἐς γῆν τὴν νῦν Βοιωτὴν καλεομένην, οἴζιον δὲ τῆς χώρας ταύτης ἀπολαχόντες τὴν Ταναγραζικὴν μοῖραν. (The Gephyraioi, to whom were related the killers of Hipparkhos, themselves say that they came originally from Eretria; but being unconvinced, I made my own enquiries [and found that] they were Phoenicians who came with Kadmos to the area now called Boiotia, and of that country the region around Tanagra was allotted to them and they settled there.). Gephyraioi as a *genos*: B. D. Meritt, 'Greek Inscriptions' (26: Stele of the Gephyraioi) *Hesperia* 8, 1939, 80f.; idem, 'Greek Inscriptions (17: The Genos of the Gephyraioi) *Hesperia* 9, 1940, 86ff. In the 1st century, the clan was still associated with the north coast of the Attike as these inscriptions show. Thomson 1965 (II/210) 123: "This clan was another off-shoot from

Aristogeiton, two dyed-in-the-wool aristocrats, and Thoukydides rightly debunks the idea of them, assiduously spread around by Eupatrid propaganda, and widely accepted in his day, as idealistic tyrant-slayers who gave democracy to their city. The result of their bungled attempt to overthrow the Peisistratid government was, in fact, harsher oppression by the surviving Hippias, though this just increased (aristocratic) unrest still further; the Athenaiοi did not rise up against their 'oppressors'. Harmodios was killed on the spot, and Aristogeiton arrested and tortured before being executed. Investigations led Hippias to believe the conspiracy went further than the anger of the two men over a homosexual affair between Hipparkhos and Harmodios.¹¹⁵ The origins of the two 'tyrannicides' are, however, of great interest to us. Their family, the Gephyraioi **claimed Eretria as their ancestral homeland**, and about their origins we need not doubt that they knew better than Herodotos and many later historians.¹¹⁶ At some remote time, members of the *genos* had left Eretria and gone, probably first to Tanagra,¹¹⁷ and thence to the Attic deme Aphidna not far from what may still have been Eretrian Oropos.¹¹⁸ Perhaps they were constantly driven forth by Eretrian pressure; perhaps they were just inveterate intriguers, making themselves unwelcome wherever they tried to settle: if the latter, their sixth and fourth century descendants had not lost the knack. Nor had the latter forgotten their Eretrian origins; the father of the politician Aristogeiton, condemned to death in 338, fled . . . to Eretria!¹¹⁹

The semi-abortive coup and the interrogations that followed it may have revealed Eretrian involvement to Hippias.¹²⁰ Some of the likely conspirators certainly had Eretrian connections, probably 'family) back 'home'. Such, definitely, were the Gephyraioi, and also as we shall see, **very probably** the Alkmaionidai. Others will have had connections through the institution of *xenia*; such perhaps was Khairion. These links were within the old Eretrian oligarchic families who may have been looking for a way to achieve in Eretria what their Athenian allies and kinsmen were trying to do in Athenai. But why would Diagoras have operated against his neighbour-tyrant using men like these? These aristocratic 'front-men' in Athenai (for that is all they really were) were a group of reactionaries with nothing in common with either ruler. However all the parties appear to have been willing to exploit each other. Diagoras, may well have used such a group of die-hard dissidents for his own

the stock of Kadmos. Its first home on Greek soil had been Eretria (Euboia). From there it migrated across the straits to Tanagra (Boiotia). Expelled from Tanagra after the Trojan War, it then settled in Athens where it maintained a secret hereditary cult of Demeter Achaia. This we learn from Herodotus (V 57; 61)." Cf. Appendix 11.

¹¹⁵ For a select bibliography: Appendix 2.

¹¹⁶ Appendix 11.

¹¹⁷ Hdt 5, 57; Strabon 9, 2, 10 C404 calls Tanagraioi γεφυραῖοι. For Gephyra as a name for Tanagra, Steph. Byz.; *Etym. Magn.* s.v. Γέφυρα.

¹¹⁸ Aristoteles identified Tanagra with Oropos: Steph. Byz. s.v. Τάναγρα. Sealey 1960A (VII/21) 36; 38, nn. 62f.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 39; idem, 'Who was Aristogeiton?', *B.I.C.S.* 7, 1960B, 33ff.; Kirchner 1902 (VII/91): 1775; 1777; 2232; 8930.

¹²⁰ Sealey 1976 (V/5) 145f.

purposes, believing that he could control them and limit their meddling to the Attike. His objectives, as we shall soon see, appear to have been much more Machiavellian than hitherto recognised. Indeed, Hippias' reaction was sufficiently sharp and widespread to indicate that he was aware that the intrigue extended beyond two jealous lovers and their 'impulsive' act of revenge against his brother. But more importantly, Kleomenes I was using them and he was by now Diagoras' ally.

Kleomenes was the prime-mover behind the push to get rid of the Peisistratid government. To use such discontented Eupatrids as his instruments against Hippias inside Athenai is an obvious ploy. While Diagoras died at Korinthos, he was in fact *en route* to Sparta.¹²¹ No one has ever, it seems, wondered why the tyrant of Eretria was on his way to Sparta. Kleomenes may have been using Diagoras and the Eretrian families as go-betweens to provide himself with access to the conspirators in Athenai. That Diagoras had his own agents within the old oligarchic families of Eretria is quite likely; after all, he was himself originally one of them, even if not of the innermost ruling clique. He would thus have been able to infiltrate the conspiratorial groups and exploit them for his own ends, and those of anyone else that he might wish to assist. That he lasted so long indicates that he was very much aware of what was going on in his own city. Kleomenes too was a subtle operator and he would have been well aware of Diagoras' enmity to the Peisistratidai, the presence at Eretria of the exiles and the Eretrian connections of families of the leading plotters, and, noble as the Gephyraioi were, there were others still more noble than they, whose current interests converged with those of Kleomenes. There was an Athenian story¹²² that the influence at Delphoi of the Alkmaionidai, where they had financed the re-building of the temple, was responsible for the repeated message to Sparta to 'liberate' Athenai. I suspect that it was more the result of a convenient coincidence of interests; the idea that an Athenian family, no matter how wealthy and benevolent to the temple, and once more in exile, would have had more influence than the ambitious and interventionist King of Sparta with an army at the isthmus, is not to be countenanced. Kleomenes was undoubtedly getting responses that he wanted in order to neutralise the strong non-interventionist party at home, but which would soon act decisively against him.¹²³ As Aristoteles (and we) have noted perceptively, Greek oligarchic groups were invariably factionalised; the conspirators, whose actual performance was hardly super-efficient (on the day of the murder they believed they had been betrayed, and so panicked, and bungled the attempt), were no exception, making them easy targets for intelligent and powerful men like Diagoras and Kleomenes. After 515, Sparta is openly supporting anti-Peisistratid forces in the

¹²¹ Herakl. Lemb. *Politeiai* 40 (=12 in *F.G.H.*). For the Greek text and translation, supra n. 33.

¹²² Hdt. 5, 63, 1.

¹²³ Walker 1993 (IV/227) 9.

Attike itself as well as their kinsmen in residence or exile in various friendly neighbouring states like Eretria.

Secondly, other events occurred after 515 which need to be kept well in mind. In 514,¹²⁴ Lygdamis was removed by an oligarchic coup, aided and abetted by Sparta, following her attack on Polykrates of Samos.¹²⁵ The fall of the island tyrants should have been a warning sign to their Athenian and Eretrian 'colleagues'. But to have carried out these operations Sparta needed ships. Myres¹²⁶ postulates a Spartan *thalassokratia* between those of Samos (534 - 517) and Naxos (515 - 505) Eretria's follows that of Naxos in 505) of only two (convenient!) years, noting also Dorieus' expedition to Kyrene in 514.¹²⁷ But can we really believe that Sparta suddenly rose to thassalocrat status, overthrew two very powerful island tyrants with significant ("thalassocratic") navies in two years, and then fell like a meteor to surrender her status to Naxos which she had just defeated, and on which she imposed a new government? In fact Sparta's is the shortest period assigned to any city in the *List*.¹²⁸ If Myres is correct and the *Thalassocracy List* is a fifth century compilation, memory of the separate Spartan initiated naval interventions (Polykrates, Lygdamis, Dorieus' voyage, Ankhimolios) would account for the brief inclusion; it is quite probable that the political and military initiatives of Kleomenes would be remembered, rather than the identity of the agent supplying the ships. I doubt whether the Spartan "thalassocracy" was based on her own fleet, for Sparta has no other known naval tradition earlier than the last years of the fifth century. There is another indication that Sparta needed outside help for mounting naval operations: the attack on Polykrates, whenever it took place, was "zealously assisted by the Korinthioi",¹²⁹ i.e. Sparta (Kleomenes) was unable to undertake such a naval enterprise alone. Of course, the Korinthioi had to have reasons to be willing to attack Samos and they were certainly not likely to have been those adduced by Herodotos (the Kypselidai were long gone, and a pragmatic, commercially-oriented oligarchy now ruled at Korinthos), but rather trade related. Korinthos would also willingly neutralise Aigina

¹²⁴ An alternative hypothesis dates his fall to 527/6, as a prelude to that of Polykrates in that year: cf. D. M. Leahy, 'The Spartan Embassy to Lygdamis', *J.H.S.* 77, 1957, 272 - 275.

¹²⁵ The attack on Lygdamis is generally so seen: Myres 1906 (IV/277) 98; *R.E.* s.v. Lygdamis 2 (Kahrstedt); *ibid.* s.v. Tyrannis, 1831; H. W. Parke, 'Polycrates and Delos', *C.Q.* 40, 1946, 106ff.; Sealey 1976 (V/5) 143 Parke and Sealey prefer 525/4. This is perhaps suggested in Plout. *Apophtheg. lak.* 67 (*Mor.* 236 C). Cf. Leahy 1957 (VII/124). Dickens 1912 (VII/101) 29: "Sparta supports the Athenian malcontents against the tyrants as she had done already in the cases of Samos and Naxos" and "a weak oligarchy in dread of a restoration of tyranny had already proved Sparta's best ally in the Greek towns and we have no reason to believe that Sparta's action in Athens was any exception to her ordinary policy."

¹²⁶ 1906 (IV/277) 98ff.

¹²⁷ Hdt. 5, 42. His attribution of motives is unsatisfactory. The expedition is better seen as an example of Spartan expansionism at this time: Walker 1962 (VII/104) in which I try to show that the king, far from being mad, was an astute politician with a more global view of affairs than most of his contemporaries. His ultimate failure does not change this assessment.

¹²⁸ Myres 1906 (IV/277) 88; Miller 1975 (VII/108) 6ff.

¹²⁹ Hdt. 3, 44ff., esp. 48.

(as she would in 506). But she was a friend of Athenai (and Eretria), and Athenai (but not Eretria) was probably still friendly with Lygdamis. Korinthos, though a member of the Peloponnesian League, shortly demonstrates that she will not obey Spartan orders to attack old friends if it is not in her interests to do so,¹³⁰ and she has no motive apparent now. Thus if I am correct, Kleomenes was in a position rather akin to that of Peisistratos some three decades earlier, and we must therefore ask from where else Kleomenes might have obtained the naval support necessary to act against Lygdamis and Phaleron by sea? I suggest that the ships were Eretrian: Lygdamis was perhaps seen by both Kleomenes and Diagoras as too closely attached to the sons of his old benefactor and ally, and to the Eretrian oligarchs, Diagoras' political enemies. Evidence for Eretrian naval power, unlike that of Sparta, relies on more than the *List*. And Eretria had in the past been willing to assist others in overseas adventures with ships and money, and will do so in the Ionian Revolt and the events leading up to it. Such then was the diplomatic background in central Greece when, in 514, Hipparkhos was murdered by conspirators with strong Eretrian genealogical connections. The actual degree to which the plot was developed in or aided from Eretria cannot now be determined with accuracy. But there was some, probably considerable, involvement and Diagoras could not have been unaware of all this activity. I believe he had seen that Sparta was the rising power, and that in central Greece for the moment, Kleomenes was Sparta, and so around about 519, he had taken positive steps to assure himself of the good-will of the King. The aggressive intent of Kleomenes was shortly brought home very directly indeed to Hippias, and to any other Greek state whose leadership was astute enough to read the signs, when c.511 he sent an expedition **by sea, and sanctioned by Delphoi** (as Herodotos makes clear) against Phaleron, under the command of Ankhimolios.¹³¹ The attack was foiled, thanks to the Thessalian cavalry and Ankhimolios killed.

Meanwhile, having apparently at last seen the drift of things, if such is the right phrase to use when we are discussing matters that are being manipulated by men like Kleomenes and states like Korinthos and Eretria, Hippias took steps to counter the Spartan threat: the Thessalian alliance was maintained, and Thessalian cavalry were on hand to meet the crises of 514 (the murder of Hipparkhos) and 511 (Ankhimolios' incursion). He still cultivated impotent Argos, but this may in fact have been counter-productive, since it would have created the impression at Sparta of Hippias as a dangerous meddler in the affairs of the Peloponnesos and so strengthened Kleomenes' hand at home against the anti-interventionists. Overtures were made to Persia, and to other foreign tyrants such as Hippoklos of Lampsakos, a client of Persia.¹³² But the fact that there was apparently no approach to Eretria to

¹³⁰ For the attitudes of Korinthos: Appendix 12; Hdt. 6, 108: Cf. Appendix 12 for the Greek text.

¹³¹ Hdt. 5, 63.

¹³² Hdt. 5, 138; Sealey 1976 (V/5) 145f.




Fig. 68: IG XII 9, 286 ΠΛΕΙΣΤΙΑΣ || ΣΠΑΡΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΠΑΤΡΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΝ ΕΥΡΥΧΩ ΟΡΟΙΣΙ ΑΘΑΝΑΙΣ ΕΘΡΑΦΘΕ ΘΑΝΑΤΟ ΔΕ ΕΝΘΑΔΕ ΜΟΙΡ ΕΧΙ[Χ]Ε (photo over fig. 70)

reactivate the old alliance is indicative of strained relations between the two *poleis*. Hippias must have known that Diagoras would not respond favourably (or having made an approach, had been rebuffed).

Is there any non-literary evidence for a relationship between Sparta and Eretria at this time? Let us consider a grave-inscription for a Spartan who died at Eretria:

Pleistias.

Sparta is his fatherland: in wide-landed Athenai did he earn a living,¹³³ and he met Death, his fate, here.

The grave stele belongs to the last quarter of the sixth century (photo, fig. 69, next page¹³⁴) It may appear, at first sight, that Pleistias was an Athenian *metoikos* of Lakedaimonian origin. But why was he in Eretria? If a metic, he may, of course, have been there for business reasons. But in 511 Ankhimolios launched his attack on the trading centre/port of Phaleron. Was then Pleistias a traitor to his adopted city? On the other hand, to betray one's *patris* was the greater crime.¹³⁵ Was he perhaps a victim, following the murder of


¹³³ τρέφο = "I nourish". Could ἐθράφθη be a variant from θράφα: the equivalent form is ἐθράφθη? *L.S.J.* gives θράπτο as a synonym for θράφα. Friedländer notes ἐθράφθη a "vulgarism". Was there a form θράπτο/θράπτο? and confusion with passives ἐθράφθη/ἐθράφθη? Probably not, given examples of use in other inscriptions of τρέφο-forms. However, **if it were so**, Pleistias would even more likely have been a Spartan soldier who lost his life in Ankhimolios' expedition. Other uses of τρέφο in grave-markers: H. Volkmann 'Ein Spartanergrab in Eretria (zu IG XII 9, 286)', *Klio* 31, 1938, 244 - 249.

¹³⁴ IG XII 9, 286 Πλειστίας.

Σπάρτα μὲν πατρίς ἐστίν· ἐν εὐρυχῶ ὄροισι Ἀθάναις (IG has ὀ for ὀ).
ἐθράφθη θάνατον δὲ ἐνθάδε μοῖρ ἔχιχε.

For a description of stele in the general formulaic context of archaic Greek grave markers: C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Reading' *Greek Death, to the End of the Classical Period*, Oxford, 1995, 168f.: c.500 - 475; Jeffery 1961/90 (II/211) 86: "first quarter of the fifth century." Ziebarth in IG XII 9: "saec. VI a. Chr." Volkmann 1938 (VII/133) 248: 6th century.

¹³⁵ Volkmann 1938 (VII/133) 247 discusses a number of similar expressions of patriotism in inscriptional sources: "Im Regelfalle wuchs der Bürger in der Stadt auf, in der er geboren war, die gleiche πόλις war ihm πατρίς und θεέπτειρα, an der er in treuer Liebe hing. Verrat an ihr galt immer für das abscheulichste Verbrechen." (Normally, the citizen grew up in the city in which he was born, the same πόλις was for such a one both πατρίς and θεέπτειρα to which he remained bound in faithful love. Betrayal of it was always regarded as amongst the most repulsive of crimes). Greek attitude to the *patris*: Platon, *Kriton* 51 C and *Menex.* 237 B - 238 B.



Hipparkhos in 514, and the subsequent Spartan raid, of anti-Spartan/anti-Eretrian hysteria, perhaps making the Attike an unsafe place for Lakedaimonioi, who fled to pro-Spartan Eretria? The epitaph preserves his native Lakonian Doric dialect; if it reflects his speech-type, it would have been audibly obvious to any Athenaios. It also would mean that Pleistias came to Athenai reasonably late in life, after his speech patterns had formed, and his primary loyalty was probably still to Lakedaimon. Indeed, the adjective used to describe Athenai is one more commonly applied to Sparta.¹³⁶ Perhaps he actually joined the invaders, was wounded and taken to Eretria. Friedländer¹³⁷ observes that the phrase Σπάρτα μὲν πατρίς ἐστίν is stronger than simply saying that he was born in Sparta, and I would point out that **in this phrase alone is the present tense used**. Pleistias clearly set his Spartan origin above that of his metic residence in Athenai. Whatever the immediate reason for him being at Eretria when "Death, his Fate" caught up with him, it was certainly also because he expected and got a welcome there.

But was he perhaps a Spartiate? Volkmann believes so.¹³⁸ At Sparta, only those who fell in battle received a tombstone inscribed with their name:¹³⁹ one thinks of the tombs in which, in 403, the Spartiates who fell in the cause of the Athenian oligarchs were interred at Athenai, which mentioned, in the archaic Lakedaimonian script, simply the names and place of death of the deceased.¹⁴⁰ The Doric element of our inscription suggests that it was Lakedaimonioi who held Pleistias in such esteem that they had his memory preserved in this distant resting-place; it is unlikely that his family would have come all the way to Eretria to commission the stone, but rather a Spartan on the spot. Thus I believe that Pleistias was a Lakedaimonios (whether Spartiate - possibly, - or *perioikos*) who took part, possibly as an inside agent, in Ankhimolios' ill-fated attack on Phaleron, and received wounds in battle, hence his right to a tombstone, and was removed to Eretria where he later died. If Sparta were sending her war casualties to Eretria, she must have had a prior understanding with

¹³⁶ Hom. *Od.* 3, 414; 15, 1; Pind. *Nem.* 10, 52.

¹³⁷ P. Friedländer, *Epigrammata. Greek Inscriptions in Verse, from the Beginnings to the Persian Wars*, Chicago, 1987, 82.

¹³⁸ Volkmann 1938 (VII/133) 249: "So wie hier kann nur ein Spartiate sprechen, kein Periöke." Cf. Friedländer 1987 (VII/137) 82: "... the Doric vocalization of Σπάρτα and Ἀθήνας in Ionic Euboea is meant to reveal the unalterable Doricism of the man whose 'country Sparta is'. Abroad he was a Spartan; whether he had been born as a Spartiate or a perioecus we cannot tell."

¹³⁹ Plout. *Lykourg.* 27, 2. Tyrtaios fr. 12 (Loeb 76f.) 7th century, expresses similar sentiments and implies only a limited group of the dead would have an ἀρίσμιος tomb, i.e. a fallen soldier and his descendants: ἐπιγράψα δὲ τοῖνομα θάψαντας οὐκ ἔξῃν τοῦ νεκροῦ, πλὴν ἀνδρὸς ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ γυναικὸς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀποθανόντων.

Tyrtaios fr. 12, 23f., 29f.:
 ὅς δ' αὖτ' ἐν προμάχοισι πεσὼν φίλον ὄλεσε θυμὸν
 ἄστν τε καὶ λαοὺς καὶ πατέρ' εὐκλείσας.

 καὶ τίμβος καὶ παῖδες ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρίσμιοι
 καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἔξοπίσω·

¹⁴⁰ *Arch. Anzeiger* 45, 1930, 90ff.

the Eretrian tyrant. So, did Ankhimolios set out from a friendly Eretria to launch his attack on Phaleron, which was perhaps for the Eretrians, given the circumstances of




Fig. 70: The tomb-stone and epitaph for Mnesitheos of Aigina (IG XII 9, 285). Eretria Museum.

Diagoras' rise, a symbol of the Peisistratid trading policies that had diverted Attic commerce from the Euboian Gulf?

There are also two epitaphs from Eretria for Aigineis, the first is for Mnesitheos, dating from this very time, which may suggest that citizens of this rabidly pro-Spartan and anti-Athenian *polis* were also welcome at Eretria.¹⁴¹ He was probably a man of some consequence, for his mother was able to dedicate a grave-stele to him bearing a metrical epitaph,¹⁴² with clearly heroic / literary allusions. Perhaps he was involved in these obscure political machinations also. And perhaps he too was a battle casualty. It would

certainly have been well in character for Aiginetan volunteers to have been involved in an attack on the great enemy, Athenai.¹⁴³

The Eretrian ruler must have reached the conclusion, based on an appraisal of recent events in central Greece, that friendship with Kleomenes was his best

¹⁴¹ IG XII 9, 285. Another early epitaph for an Aigineus and his wife: IG XII 9, 300. Sourvinou-Inwood 1995 (VII/134) 211f.

¹⁴² Friedländer 1987 (VII/137) 130f. notes incongruities between provincialisms of style and spelling and the generally elevated tone.

¹⁴³ Hdt. 5, 82: Ἡ δὲ ἔχθη προοφειλομένη ἐς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ τῶν Αἰγινήτων ἐγένετο ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιῆσδε. An exception was that the kings were buried with named markers following elaborate funerals: Hdt. 6, 58; Xen. *Hell.* 3, 3, 3; [Xen.] *Lak. pol.* 15, 9. Morris 1987 (III/60) 44ff.; esp. 50.

guarantee of future security¹⁴⁴ for despite the failure of the expedition of Ankhimolios, Kleomenes, it was already quite clear, was determined to achieve his objectives, and later events show only too well how stubborn he could be in pursuing his aims, and a prime aim now was the overthrow of the tyranny at Athenai and the installation of a pliant oligarchy there. So Diagoras not only permitted some political enemies of the Peisistratid government to base themselves at Eretria, but also encouraged them and their Eretrian friends to stir up trouble in the Attike. Thus proving his good-will he became the ally (tool?) of the Spartan king. And Kleomenes would not forget his Eretrian ally later when circumstances for both men had changed for the worse. The grand plot, conceived by Kleomenes in conjunction with the exiled Athenian dissidents, and the willing collaboration of Diagoras, failed in its objective in the immediate term because the agents, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, bungled the attempt to assassinate both the brother-tyrants. But indirectly success was achieved, because the resulting purge and increasing repression seriously undermined the popularity of the government, so that in 511/10 Kleomenes was able to directly intervene and expel Hippias from Athenai. In Kleomenes' train returned the old oligarchs - the Alkmaionidai et al. - from their various places of exile, Eretria a major one amongst them. With them came, too, all the ancient factional feuds and jealousies, to which could now be added the split between those who had endured the pains of exile to a greater or lesser extent, and those who had temporised and remained at home, some even accepting office and honours from the tyrants. A volatile situation indeed. Making matters worse, Kleomenes took sides. Perhaps believing that the Alkmaionidai might follow an independent foreign policy, or even emulate the Peisistratidai (they were rich, and had family connections with Eretria, a powerful backer if able to be subverted), he by-passed their leader, Kleisthenes son of Megakles, and set up the Philaid(?) Isagoras¹⁴⁵ as the leader of the narrow oligarchic régime that he now imposed on Athenai. Meanwhile Hippias, not unsurprisingly if our restoration of events has been broadly correct (but surprisingly if it has not), did not follow his father's example and flee into exile to Eretria, where he himself had spent some ten years, nor to "Peisistratid" Rhaikelos,¹⁴⁶ but retired to Sigeion, and from there finally into Persian controlled lands.¹⁴⁷ At Athenai, the oligarchy maintained its position for a short time until Kleisthenes brought in the *Demos* as a political factor and took power. Kleisthenes the Alkmaionid, with his Eretrian family connections! But at Eretria itself, politics had taken another turn.

¹⁴⁴ This did not remain true later. But we may remember the Lakedaimonioi had a relationship of *xenia* with the Peisistratidai: Hdt. 5, 90f. Kleomenes for political reasons entirely ignored this. His failures led to the resurgence of the peace party at Sparta and the breach of *xenia* was adduced by them as a reason for Spartan policy failures under Kleomenes' direction: VIII 224ff.

¹⁴⁵ D. J. McCargar. 'Isagoras, son of Teisandros and Isagoras. Eponymous Archon, 508/7 B.C.' *Phoenix*, 28, 1974, 275ff.; Davies 1971 (V/282) 295f. Doubts re. Philaid relationship. Davies 296.

¹⁴⁶ V 148f.; VI 178f.

¹⁴⁷ Some members of the family may have gone to Khios. Forrest 1982 (VI/16) 134.