

CHAPTER IX:

ERETRIA IN THE 490's.

Following the victory of 506 Eretria entered fifteen years of *hegemonia* in central Greece, the achievements of which prompted the eulogistic sentiments expressed in the *Menexenos*¹ which show that the memory of Eretria's years of power and fame was not yet dead in the time of Platon in the fourth century.

Eretria now began pursuing imperialist/interventionist political aims. Persia was a political force that Eretria was increasingly obliged to take into account, for it posed a threat to Euboia and Naxos even before 500 as Herodotos makes clear,² and one can hardly forget that Miletos was under increasing pressure from Persian expansion into Ionia which resulted in the intervention of the Eretrians in the military events of the Ionian Revolt. In Naxos, the oligarchy of the *Pakheis* installed in 514 by the Lakedaimonioi (with the active support of Diagoras) fell, and was replaced by a democracy, c.505.³ Myres believes that thanks to her navy, Eretria was able and willing to assist the Naxioi in installing a like-minded government in her sphere of interest in the middle Aegean, and that Naxos now became a dependency of Eretria. It was itself the centre of a small "empire" which included Paros, Eretria's old ally, and her former dependency Andros.⁴ Eretrian intervention in favour of the *Demos* at Naxos may have had a price: the return of Andros, and possibly Paros also, to the Eretrian empire. The importance of Andros to any Eretrian bloc is obvious, and in hostile hands, the equivalent for Eretria of "the eye-sore of the Peiraeus". Myres points to "the significance of Miltiades' attempt to annex Paros, as soon as Athens is beginning to see her way through her entanglements in Aegina. **She is picking up the pieces, as elsewhere, of the Eretrian ἀρχή.**"⁵ But the fall of the Naxian oligarchy had momentous consequences, for when the exiles went to Miletos and appealed to Aristagoras to reinstall them with a Persian fleet, that ambitious and unscrupulous ruler took their request to Sardis **along with proposals to attack Euboia as well**, which, in practice, meant Eretria. Miletos had had a chequered political history during the sixth century. Throughout she had been phil-Eretrian, but

¹ Platon, *Menex.* 10, (240 A - C); quoted VIII n. 131.

² Hdt. 5, 31 and Platon, *Menex.* 10 (240 A - C)

³ Hdt. 5, 30. Myres 1906 (IV/277) 98: "And in 505, or soon after, one of the first results of the fall of Chalcis was to set Eretria free to support its ancient protégés, the Naxian δῆμος, in a second expulsion of their oligarchy." Myres gives an interesting and plausible resume of 6th century Naxian history in terms of pro- or anti-Eretrian régimes.

⁴ Hdt. 5, 31: Νάξου καὶ τὰς ἐκ ταύτης ἠγερμένας (νήσους), Πάρον καὶ Ἄνδρον. . . (Naxos and those islands dependent on her, Paros and Andros. . .). In his list of ship contingents at the Battle of Salamis, the Naxian seems to be part of that of the Euboian bloc: Hdt. 8, 46, X n. 8. But Naxos may already have been part of the Eretrian empire. Burn 1929 (V/173) 20 points out the vulnerability of Paros and Naxos to any powerful maritime state.

⁵ Myres 1906 (IV/277) 98, n. 40.

had also since the days of Kyros been consistently loyal to Persia.⁶ However Histiaios its tyrant, and Aristagoras his kinsman-deputy who succeeded him and then later handed over power to a 'democracy',⁷ may earlier have regarded the democracies in Eretria, and Naxos also, as a threat. Perhaps Diagoras had been their ally. The nature of *tyrannis* under Persian control was quite different to that in autonomous Greek poleis, being essentially anti-democratic, a *de facto* oligarchy-of-one.⁸ The apprehension of the Milesian tyrants proved well-founded, for when the Ionian Revolt broke out in 500 there was a general overthrow of these Persian puppets in the subject states and the establishment of democracies.⁹ This would explain the initially favourable reception of the Naxian *pakhais* exiles at Miletos and Aristagoras' suggestion for an attack on Euboia. After his 'conversion' to democracy (making a virtue of necessity) and his revolt from Persia, Aristagoras would plead successfully for help from the three democratic states of Eretria, Naxos and Athenai.

The need for a Persian fleet to restore the exiles can only be explained by another large fleet standing in the way. Aristagoras' appeal was successful, and Artaphernes obtained Dareios' approval for an expedition with a **fleet of no less than 200 triremes and a very great number of Persian and allied troops** under the command of Megabates, a cousin of Dareios himself.¹⁰ Since the original plan outlined at Sardis by Aristagoras included an attack on Euboia (and not, be it noted, on the Attike) we may be confident that had the siege of Naxos succeeded, Eretria would have been the next target. Indeed Naxos merely stood in the way and was an excuse for the Persians to attempt to destroy the most powerful fleet in the Greek world in 499. The size of the Persian fleet, and its large complement of Persian and allied troops is excessive if the sole purpose was the restoration of a few "fat" Naxioi, but such a force would have been thought needed for the conquest of Eretria, its empire and Euboia. But the expedition failed at Naxos: Aristagoras and Megabates fell out and so Megabates, piqued, fore-warned the Naxian democrats and their allies of the impending attack, giving them time to prepare a defence. Though Naxos-polis was besieged for four months, the city held out provisioned no doubt by the Eretrian navy. The leadership in disarray, the Persian fleet sailed home. Later, Naxos was the only other independent state in the western Aegean to send troops in conjunction with Eretria and her dependencies and Athenai to aid the Ionian cause, so perhaps they thought that they had good reason to be grateful to Eretria. In these events, we hear of no Athenian involvement, and for a state with a minimal navy we

⁶ Hdt. 1, 141; 143. Miletos in the 6th century: Appendix 2.

⁷ *Isonomie*. Hdt. 5, 37: ὁ Ἀρισταγόρης ... πρῶτα μὲν λόγῳ μετὰ τὴν τυραννίδα *ἰσονομίην* ἔποιε τῆ Μιλήτῳ and μετὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ Ἴωνίῃ τοῦτο τοῦτο ἔποιε, τοῖς μὲν ἐξελάνθον τῶν τυράννων, τοῖς δ' ἔλαβε τυράννους ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν τῶν συμπελαρασάων ἐπὶ Νάξῳ, τοῖσι δὲ φίλα βούλοισιν ποιεῖσθαι τῆσι πόλεσι ἐξεδίδου, ἄλλον ἔς ἄλλην πόλιν παραδίδους, ὅθεν εἴη ἕστατος.

⁸ Myres 1906 (IV/277) 98, n. 38.

⁹ Hdt. 5, 38: τυράννων μὲν γὰρ ... καταπαύσις ἐγένετο ἀνά τὰς πόλεις.

¹⁰ Hdt. 5, 31f.

should not have expected it. There is a curious story in Athenaios (quoting Herakleides Pontikos¹¹) concerning one Diomnestos of Eretria and a "first Persian invasion into Euboia" which refers to (if anything) this expedition.¹² The details of the story do not concern us. What is interesting though is its inference that Dareios sent **two** expeditions to Eretria, the first of which failed to take the city; Athenaios' story implies that it did, in fact, reach Eretrian territory because the buried gold was on the land owned by Diomnestos and was then obliged to withdraw.

The Naxian episode alerted Eretria (and Athenai) to the Persian threat. When the unsuccessful expedition returned, Aristagoras, furious with Megabates' treachery and fearful that the latter's influence at the Persian court would be fatal to his power in Miletos, began the intrigues and policy shifts that led to the outbreak of the Ionian Revolt. Thus was Miletos, by another of those ironies of Greek history, established as the agent of the destruction of its ancient kindred city and ally. Because of their long-standing friendly relationship, it is not surprising that when her "kinsmen"¹³ of Ionia appealed for help in their crisis, the Eretrieis should go to their aid with their allies and naval power. Perhaps the Karystioi joined the expedition to Asia Minor. Karystos' later attitude towards Persian demands suggest that she had obligations (treaty? dependency? friendship?) to Eretria. The other islanders offered no resistance. If Cary¹⁴ is correct that "Carystus was apparently under Eretrian rule as late as 490 B.C.", she proved loyal when the Persians came to attack Eretria itself and had to be subjected to considerable pressure to co-operate with them.¹⁵ Sparta was solicited for aid by Aristagoras who personally appealed to Kleomenes! Without success, needless to say. It wouldn't have required his daughter's admonition to dissuade him.¹⁶ How was it likely that he would join a relief effort led by precisely those powers which had frustrated his plans and policies in central Greece? When Aristagoras toured Greece seeking support for the Ionians in their rebellion, it was in the guise of a democratic leader of a generally democratic coalition, for his 'selfless' abdication of his autocracy had indeed inspired the majority of the Ionian cities to drive out their pro-Persian tyrants.¹⁷ In his account, however, Herodotos fails to

¹¹ Herak. Pont. *peri Hedonēs*.

¹² Athen. *Deipn.* 12, 536f - 537a.: "It was **at the time when the Persians made their first expedition to Euboia**, they say, when a man from Eretria, Diomnestos, became master of the commanding officer's money . . . When however the Persian king **again** sent his army to Eretria, with orders to totally destroy the city, etc."

¹³ V 166ff.

¹⁴ Cary 1929/65 (V/271) ch 24, 621.

¹⁵ Hdt. 6, 99: ὡς δὲ περιπλέοντες τὰς νήσους προσέσχον καὶ ἐξ Κάρυστον, οὐ γὰρ δὴ σφι οἱ Κερύστιοι οἶτε ἄλλοις ἐδίδοσαν οἶτε ἔμασαν ἐπὶ πόλιος ἀστυγέτονας στρατεύεσθαι, λέγοντας Ἐρέτριαν τε καὶ Ἀθῆνας ἐνθάδε τοῦτους ἐπολιόρθεόν τε καὶ τὴν γῆν σφειν ἔζευρον . . . (When [the Persians] came also to Karystos while sailing round the islands, the Karystioi gave no hostages nor would they agree to campaign against neighbour cities, specifying Eretria and Athenai, so they laid siege to them and devastated their land).

¹⁶ Hdt. 5, 49ff.

¹⁷ Hdt. 5, 37.

indicate clearly (and we should not overlook it) that, whatever the motives of Aristagoras may have been, the Íones were generally very ready to revolt.¹⁸ Though successful in Eretria and Athenai, the "democratic guise" contributed to his general failure to win support in Greece: Kleomenes had spent much effort to suppress democracies and tyrannies.¹⁹ Korinthos, apart from the westerly direction of her interests, was a steadfastly oligarchic state, and averse to any activity that might disrupt her *status quo*. Aigina and Thebai were Spartan allies, and would in any case have nothing to do with anything supported by Eretria and Athenai. The change in the internal politics of Miletos may not have been a decisive factor, but it undoubtedly made it easier for democratic Eretria, Naxos and Athenai to justify the risks in going to the aid of the beleaguered Íones in 499.

Sealey²⁰ wonders why Eretria became involved: "the immediate motives of the Eretrians are not known." I believe that we can now understand these very clearly. He himself refers to the centuries-old alliance between Eretria and Miletos, which ought to suggest at least one motive. This alliance had been effectively in abeyance during the last half of the sixth century as a result of the decline of Miletos following the death of Thrasyboulos, and the resultant political chaos²¹ while the oligarchy at Eretria had fallen, to be replaced by the tyranny of Diagoras, which in turn was succeeded by the democracy. These political permutations never quite matched until in 500 Aristagoras handed over his power to a "democracy", by which time crisis was upon the Íones. The decline of Miletos is reversed by the rise of Eretria. During her evolution from oligarchy via tyranny to democracy, she avoided the political/social excesses of Miletos. Meanwhile, Eretria's main commercial and political interests moved to the western Aegean and central Greece and the northern coastlands of Makedon and Thrake, especially in the mineral and timber rich region around Pangaion. These shifts in emphasis had made the Milesian alliance less important to the Eretrieis. But though less pivotal, the friendship persisted, and obligations were remembered. When revolution and war came to Ionia, Miletos appealed to the old relationship with her now great ally, and Eretria did not fail her:

"when the Athenaioi came with twenty ships, they were accompanied²² by five triremes of the Eretrieis, **who came not as a favour to the Athenaioi but to the Milesioi themselves, thereby repaying their debt**; for earlier, the Milesioi had been allies of the Eretrieis in the war against the Khalkideis when the Samioi came to the aid of the Khalkideis."²³

¹⁸ For a succinct survey of the motivation and individual responsibility for the Ionian Revolt of Histaios and Aristagoras: Emlyn-Jones 1980 (II 99) 186, n. 132 (with bibliography).

¹⁹ VII 210ff.; VIII 224ff.; 247.

²⁰ Sealey 1976 (V.5) 176.

²¹ Appendix 2.

²² I discuss the verb ἀπόμεινοι (ἀπό) infra 259.

Herodotos omits all reference to the role of Naxos in the Ionian War,²⁴ and minimises that of Eretria, as he normally does with anything that might diminish the "glorious role" played by Athenai. Was Herodotos' suppression of Eretrian (and Euboian) affairs the result of his awareness of Eretria's pivotal role before 490 and a deliberate falsification for his Athenian patrons? After all, there were few Eretrieis left to object after 490! And indeed he had much to hush-up with respect to the part played by Athenai over the course of the whole Ionian, and later, the Persian Wars. Her ambiguous role begins as far back as 506 when the Kleisthenic/Alkmaionid-led democracy had in fact offered earth and water when their embassy went to Persia to get support against the threat from Kleomenes' great coalition.²⁵ There was, subsequently, general censure of the envoys (so Herodotos says) when they returned, blame following easily, no doubt, upon failure to secure the help for which they had asked. It long remained a sensitive point at Athenai. But Herodotos never suggests there was ever any public repudiation of the ambassadors' actions, and it is hard to imagine that they had not been led to believe they should offer this gesture in exchange for the desperately needed aid. Eretria never at any stage offered earth and water or we would certainly have heard of it from Herodotos. Also reflecting no glory on Athenai is the fact that when the going got tough, the Athenaiοi were the first of the western allies to quit Ionia, leaving the Eretrieis (and, we may presume, the Naxioi) to carry on without them. The incredible scenes following the production of Phrynikhos' play *The Fall of Miletos*²⁶ clearly suggest problems of collective conscience on the part of the *Demos* over its poor response to that particular crisis.²⁷ Their extraordinary reaction shows that the Athenaiοi were well aware of the propagandist power of literature. Guilt seems also to inspire Themistokles' tasteless jibe at the Eretrieis in 480 about being like cuttle-fish (no backbone).²⁸ Eretria moreover had by this time fallen to the Persian attack of 490, and the Athenaiοi had made no attempt to help the besieged city. Herodotos succeeds in pushing these

²³ Hdt. 5, 99: οἱ τε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέζοντο εἰκοσὶ νηυσὶ, ἅια ἀγόμενοι Ἐρετριέων πέντε τριήρας, οἰοῦ τὴν Ἀθηναίων χάριν ἐστρατεύοντο ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτῶν Μηλῶν, ὀφειλόμενά σφι ἀποδίδοντες οἱ γὰρ δὴ Μιλήσιοι πρότερον τοῖσι Ἐρετριέσι τὸν πρὸς Χαλκιδᾶς πόλεμον συνδύνησαν, ὅτε πρὸ καὶ Χαλκιδᾶσιν ἀντὶ Ἐρετριέων καὶ Μηλῶν Σάμοι εἰβήθηον.

²⁴ Plout. *peri Hdt. kakoeth.* (Mor. 896 B - C). Ephoros (*E.Gr.H.* 70 F 187) says that they sent five; Hellanikos (4 F 183) six, ships.

²⁵ Hdt. 5, 73. G. H. R. Horsley, 'Kleisthenes and the abortive Athenian embassy to Sardis', *Museum Philologicum Londoniense* 7, 1986, 99 - 105 argues that Kleisthenes himself was probably not only a member of the embassy, but was responsible for urging the delegation to accept the terms, thus explaining his enigmatic disappearance from the political scene and the historical record.

²⁶ Μιλήτων ἄλωσις.

²⁷ Hdt. 6, 21: "Phrynikhos having written a play entitled *The Fall of Miletos* and staged it, the whole theatre burst into tears; and they (the Athenaiοi) fined Phrynikhos 1000 drakhmai **for bringing to mind a disaster that touched them so closely, and forever afterwards, they forbade the performance of that play.**"

²⁸ Plout. *Them.* 27: this reference is probably to the frequently used symbol on some Eretrian coins. Cf. *infra* X, n. 7.

failures well into the background, as the now almost universally held laudatory opinion of the role of Athenai at this time bears witness. His method is to minimise or omit deeds that might overshadow those of his hero-city. This was noted already in antiquity by Ploutarkhos, who fortunately still had access to the necessary corrective texts, particularly (but not only) for our purposes, Lysanias of Mallos' *History of Eretria*:²⁹

"He mentions the Eretrieis quite casually and **passes over their great epic achievement in silence** . . . Various writers have described these events including Lysanias of Mallos in his *History of Eretria*."³⁰

It is worth remembering in this context that Ploutarkhos was born in central Greece at Khaironeia in Boiotia, and that he probably visited Euboia (his comment on the tomb of Kleomakhos in Khalkis³¹ sounds to me like the autopsy report of an interested tourist³²). Cary³³ observes that he "had a specialist's acquaintance with the antiquities of Central Greece" (speaking of Euboia). Nor does he, to our knowledge, have any reason to exaggerate Eretria's role, so it is worth noting his descriptive "great epic achievement";³⁴ he doesn't simply say 'role' or 'exploit' baldly and he specifically charges Herodotos with suppressing the information by "passing over it in silence." But Herodotos also achieves minimisation by the use of misleading or erroneous data. For example (5, 99):

"When the Athenaioi came with their twenty ships, ἀγόμενοι five triremes of the Eretrieis . . . "

The middle participle may mean "accompanied by",³⁵ but it is more often rendered "bringing with [them]". Certainly the verb is **meant to imply** that the Athenaioi were the prime-movers in the naval relief effort. Yet, inconsistently, Herodotos notes that the Eretrieis did not come at the bidding of the Athenaioi, but spontaneously from motives of gratitude and duty towards their old and faithful ally for their past support. We need to consider further the circumstances surrounding the expedition. Let us return to the Athenian desertion. After the (lost) Battle of Ephesos

²⁹ Περὶ Ἐρετρίδας: Jacoby *F.Gr.H.* IIIb (Kommentar/Noten) 165.

³⁰ Plout. *peri Hdt. kakoeth.* (*Mor.* 861 b). The "other writers" included Kharon of Lampsakos: *F.Gr.H.* 262 F 10, and perhaps Dionysios of Miletos and Hellanikos (Jacoby [n. 29] 250)

³¹ Plout. *Erot.* 761A: τάφον δ' αὐτοῦ (i.e. of Kleomakhos) δευζνύουσιν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ Χαλκιδεῖς" (The Khalkideis show his tomb in the agora).

³² He knew that the tomb was surmounted by a column. The inscription (probably in the old Khalkidian epichoric alphabet) may have been difficult to read, resulting in his confusion over the identity of the lover and indeed of the homeland of Kleomakhos himself (Thessalia/Thrace).

³³ Cary 1929/65 (V/271) 618.

³⁴ Plout. *peri Hdt. kakoeth.* 24: παραιοπτήσας μέγα ζατόθλημα καὶ ἰοίδιμον.

³⁵ *Supra* 257; *L.S.J.* s.v. ἄγω I, 2 (17)

which followed the burning of Sardis by the Eretrieis and Athenaioi in 498, and after which the **Eretrian** commander Eualkides was put to the sword by the Persians. the Athenaioi:

"wholly separated themselves from the Ionioi and refused to aid them even though Aristagoras sent urgent pleading messages".

but the Íones (and Eretrieis were Íones and "kinsmen")

"though deprived of Athenian allies nonetheless continued the war against the king."³⁶

But there is no hint of an Eretrian withdrawal, even though their general Eualkides³⁷ had been put to death. This general alone is mentioned by name. Why? Herodotos tells us he was a crowned victor in the games and the recipient of lavish praise in a (lost) poem by Simonides of Keos.³⁸ Fine, but not so rare an achievement and not enough to explain why he, and not an Athenaios, was singled out amongst the notables killed during and after the battle by the Persians.³⁹ The only sensible explanation is that he was in fact commander-in-chief of the allied forces that had attacked and burnt Sardis.⁴⁰ Though the Athenaioi had abandoned their allies, the Íones and Eretrieis fought on, and Jacoby suggests that the alternative tradition represented by the lost writers stated that the Eretrieis did not prematurely abandon their allies along with the Athenaioi.⁴¹ Even at this late stage, the rebels were winning over other allies, so not everyone considered the Ionian cause to be lost. The new allies included most of Karia and all of the cities of Kypros with one exception only.⁴² What had happened to induce Karia and Kypros in the far south to commit themselves at this stage to the revolt?

The "great epic achievement" of the Eretrieis which Herodotos doesn't even mention but which others fortunately did, occurred at this time of crisis **and in that**

³⁶ Hdt. 5, 103.

³⁷ A rare name; it occurs 3 times at Eretria: apart from the commander, once on a Styra tablet and twice in citizen lists of the 3rd century as demesmen of Styra (IG XII 9, 56₈₉; 246B₃₇; 246A₂₆₃).

³⁸ Hdt. 5, 102.

³⁹ Cf. Wallace 1936A (Intro./1) 101. It has been suggested to me that Eualkides may have been the only leader captured. Herodotos says that **he was singled out** amongst the ὄνομαστοίς captured who would still be ὄνομαστοί by Herodotos' day, if not the leaders?

⁴⁰ He may earlier have been Eretrian admira in the Battle of the Pamphylian Sea. Burn 1962/84 (VIII/2) 200 so believes.

⁴¹ Jacoby (supra n. 29) 250: "und es gab schon aus dem 5. Jhdt eine Reihe von Darstellungen des ionischen Aufstandes - Dionysios von Milet. Hellanikos. Charon -, die von den Eretriern mehr erzählt haben können: **wie es scheint, verliessen sie (the Eretrieis) die Sache der Ionier nicht zugleich mit den Athenern.**"

⁴² Hdt. 5, 103f. The exception was Amathous.

very region, so we must credit to it the adhesion of the new allies who replaced the deserting Athenaioi. Ploutarkhos (citing Lysanias) tells us that:

When confusion **had already struck** in Ionia and the King's fleet was on its way⁴³ they (the Eretrians) went out to meet it and won a naval victory over the Kyprioi in the Pamphylian Sea. They then turned back, left their ships at Ephesos, and attacked Sardis and kept up the siege of the acropolis where Artaphernes had taken refuge: the intention was to raise the siege of Miletos: they succeeded in doing this causing the enemy troops to withdraw in a remarkable state of alarm; then, attacked by superior force, they retreated. Various writers described these events including Lysanias of Mallos in his *History of Eretria*. If for no other reason, it would have been a fine epitaph on Miletos, after its capture and destruction, to describe this wonderful exploit. But he says that they were actually defeated by the barbarians and driven back to their ships.⁴⁴

If it is felt that Ploutarkhos is merely nit-picking the text of Herodotos, it should be noted that he is nevertheless using specific authors, whose work he quotes or paraphrases, not making unsourced allegations; his contemporaries could have checked him. There is no conceivable reason to assume these events are fictitious⁴⁵ or the sources untrustworthy. The period was famous in antiquity, scholars would have known them: the events were eminently verifiable. Jacoby notes the existence of an early tradition against Herodotos' account, one he believes would have told the Eretrian story, and that Lysanias was in that tradition.⁴⁶ We don't know the date of Lysanias: he probably wrote in the third second century for, as Jacoby says, this was

⁴³ A reference to the siege of Miletos, that followed the episodes at Sardis and Ephesos. The year of this battle was probably 498 rather than 499. The Persian fleet was coming to the Aegean from bases in Phoenicia. The Phoenicians at this time contributed a great part of the King's fleet.

⁴⁴ Plout. *peri Hdt. kakoeth.* (*Mor.* 861 C): ἤδη γὰρ ὡς τὴν περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν συρραχθέντων καὶ στόλου βασιλικοῦ προσπλέοντος, ἀπαντήσαντες ἔξω Κυπρίους ἐν τῷ Παμφυλίῳ πελάγει καταναμάχησαν εἰς ἀναστροφήντας ὀπίσω καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἐν Ἐφέῳ καταλείποντες ἐπέθεντο Σαρδοεῖσι καὶ Ἀρταφέρνην ἐπολιόρουν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καταμάχοντα, βορλομένοι τὴν Μιλήτου ἕρσιν πολιορκίαν καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπράξαν καὶ τοὺς πολέμιους ἀνέστησαν ἐρείθεν, ἐν φόβῳ θαυμαστῷ γενόμενοις πλήθος δ' ἐπιχθέντος αὐτοῖς ἀπεχώρησαν, ταῦτα δ' ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀνσιανίας ὁ Μάλωτης ἐν τοῖς *περὶ Ἐρετρίας* εἶρηκε καὶ καλῶς εἶχεν, εἰ καὶ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τῆ γοῦν ἀλόσει καὶ φθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἐνεπιεῖν τὸ ἀνδραγάθημα τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἀριστίαν, ὃ δὲ καὶ κρατηθέντας αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων φησὶν εἰς τὰς ναῦς καταδιωχθῆναι. . . . (The translation above is by L. Pearson, *Plutarch's 'Moralia'*, XI, Cambridge Mass./Loncon, 1970, 49 - 51 with some changes in the spelling of proper nouns)

⁴⁵ Pearson 1959 (II/221) 261 has doubts.

⁴⁶ Jacoby (n. 29) 250: "Ich sehe keinen Grund zu zweifeln dass das Wirklich ein Buch über Eretria war, das freilich nicht von einem lokalen Autor geschrieben ist. Seine zeit ist nicht zu bestimmen - zu den Lokalhistorikern, die seit ca. 400 gegen Herodot polemisierten, gehört der Verfasser kaum. . . . und es gab schon aus dem 5. Jhd eine Reihe von Darstellungen des ionischen Aufstandes - Dionysios von Milet, Hellanikos, Charon -, die von den Eretriern mehr erzählt haben können: wie es scheint, verliessen sie die Sache der Ionier nicht zugleich mit den Athenern. Auch lokale Überlieferung - Familienerinnerungen, und selbst Weihungen - ist doch nicht ganz ausgeschlossen."

when revisionist writers were active. Mallos was on the coast of southern Asia Minor directly opposite Kypros and not far from Pamphylia. It was here that Eretria's great victory over the royal fleet occurred which brought the cities of the region into the war. We may suppose that Lysanias' city was one. Such an epic part of the story of the Ionian insurrection would have lived long in local tradition, and the reputation of Eretria in the region would have been great. We need not be surprised with Miller⁴⁷ that a citizen of Mallos would be inspired to write a history of Eretria, whose great victory it had been.

Pearson⁴⁸ says that the text "if taken literally . . . is somewhat absurd since, according to Herodotus (V, 99), the Eretrians provided only five ships for the expedition sent out to help the Ionians and Plutarch does not complain of this figure" and since such a small number of ships could not by itself have won such a victory "we must assume that ships from Miletus and other Ionian cities were present. since **not even** Lysanias of Mallus, whom Plutarch cites as his authority, can have maintained that five Eretrian ships routed a Persian fleet." One notes the dismissive tone, though Pearson can have no knowledge of the worth of Lysanias as a historian other than what is revealed in this, his single preserved passage.⁴⁹ At least "not even" he suggested the Athenian fleet was present! Of course no-one would suggest that five ships routed the Persian fleet.

Let us recapitulate what we know about the naval position in the Aegean in the last decade of the sixth century. The *Thalassocracy List*, whenever and for whatever purpose it was compiled, does make Eretria the current thalassocratic power. There is also the very strong likelihood that the city had long ruled over a group of island poleis and been recently active with her navy in political changes such as at Naxos. The Persians thought 200 **triremes** necessary to move against Euboia in 505. The evidence of IG XII 9, 1273/1274 suggests that for some decades she had presumed to control shipping in the Euboian Gulf. We have Lysanias as literary evidence for Eretrian naval strength and Herodotos for the possibility that her general Eualkides was commander-in-chief of operations around Miletos. What, on the other hand, can the tradition offer concerning Athenai as a potential leader in 500 - 498? A state that had to get help from Korinthos in order to challenge her direct enemy Aigina;⁵⁰ which moreover required the persuasion of Themistokles to bring its naval power up to a point that it might hope to defend itself (not act the aggressor) against the Persians **ten years later**. That had no naval tradition before the second decade of the fifth century.

⁴⁷ Miller 1975 (VIII/108) 42: "The date of Lysanias is unknown and so is the reason why a citizen of Mallos in Kilikia should write a book *Περὶ Ἐρετριᾶς*."

⁴⁸ 1959 (II/221) 261.

⁴⁹ Jacoby (n. 29) 250 quoted in n. 41 and G. B. Gray/M. Cary, "The Reign of Darius' in *C.A.H.* IV ch. 7 section 8, 221 - 222: "We must not be deterred by the obscurity of Lysanias and the silence of Herodotus from accepting the former's account."

⁵⁰ Thouk. I, 41, 1. Jeffery 1962 (VI/30) 44f.

So what then are we to make of the statement of Herodotos that Athenai sent twenty "ships" and Eretria five. In fact Herodotos uses different words for "ships" for each city: those from Athenai are simply ναῦς, a general word for any kind of ship, while he specifically uses τριήρεις for the Eretrian five. Triremes are warships used in naval fighting.⁵¹ They are used to convey ambassadors and the like as a safeguard against attack.⁵² They also escort other transport ships.⁵³ I would suggest that in his description of the ship contributions of Eretria and Athenai, the choice of words **does** indicate a difference in the character and role of the vessels. It has been put to me that the use of alternative words is merely a stylistic device to avoid repetition; I would reply that if this were indeed so, since the Athenian contribution is actually given first (how not in Herodotos?), he might have used τριήρεις (to stress the fighting quality of the Athenian contingent) and then ναῦς for the vessels of the "lesser" Eretrian fleet. But he doesn't: he uses ναῦς first and then τριήρεις specifically for the Eretrian ships. I therefore suggest that in fact the twenty Athenian *naus* were troop transports bringing Athenian hoplites that would fight at Sardis, and the Eretrian *triereis* were convoying them while the main Eretrian war fleet was in the south conducting naval operations designed to prevent the movement of the King's ships northward bringing reinforcements to his land troops. These activities culminated in the great battle Lysanias has preserved from Herodotean oblivion. This reconstruction certainly gives the Athenaioi a subordinate role to that of the Eretrieis both on land and sea and so we should remember Platon's encomium of the Eretrieis at this stage of their history lest it be felt that I exaggerate too much their status in the Hellenic *oikoumene*.⁵⁴ Both Myres⁵⁵ and How/Wells⁵⁶ believe that even in Herodotos, one can perceive, running through the narrative of the history of this period, evidence of the political and military primacy of Eretria.

Eretria must have withdrawn when Miletos finally fell in 494. The siege began in 499, but had been raised thanks to the Eretrian efforts on sea and land.⁵⁷ But eventually the weight of Persian resources was bound to tell. After its defeat in 498, the royal fleet was re-equipped and came again to Miletos, and the city was re-invested. This time the Eretrieis could not raise the siege. Miletos fell. No wonder

⁵¹ A search in *T.L.G.* (TLG0016 Herodotus Hist.) produced 37 occasions when Herodotos uses "trireme" or "trierarkhos". In 20 cases, the context makes it quite clear that the vessel was a fighting warship; 4 probably a fighting warship; 1 escorting a treasure ship (infra n. 53); 2 conveying embassies (infra n. 52). In 4 others, it is impossible from the context to say what kind of vessel. In only 5 cases do triremes and *naus* seem to be treated as synonyms. Thus I believe that in Herodotos, it is permissible to assume that when he uses "trireme" he means fighting ship, while a "naus" may mean any ship in general.

⁵² Hdt. 5, 38, 8: the embassy of Aristagoras to Sparta; 8, 83, 10: a trireme brings Aiakidai from Aigina.

⁵³ Hdt. 3, 136, 2: here used to escort treasure ships.

⁵⁴ VIII n. 131.

⁵⁵ 1953 (II/221) 200ff.

⁵⁶ 1912/75 (V/282) II, 58.

⁵⁷ Plout. *peri Hdt. kakoeth.* (*Mor.* 861 b - c).

the Athenaioi wept at the performance of Phrynikhos' play! Their over-prompt desertion may merely have hastened what must have been inevitable, but which was disgraceful none-the-less. But Athenai's self-serving desertion would be repeated only four years later.⁵⁸ We are apt to condemn the Lakedaimonioi for not coming to the aid of Athenai in 490, and the Peloponnesioi generally for their "Peloponnesos-first" policies as self-serving. Athenai was no better when she and her *kleroukhai* abandoned Eretria without a fight in 490. No wonder that Eretria was frequently in the forefront of attempts to stir up rebellion in Euboia⁵⁹ and the Aegean during the fifth century and that an Eretrian admiral was at Aigospotamoi to help Athenai's enemies in the final conflict of the Peloponnesian War. No wonder the Lakedaimonioi didn't hurry to the aid of Athenai at Marathon: after the fall of Eretria, Athenai must have been viewed widely as the *Albion perfide* of the age. Had the Athenaioi not then covered themselves with glory, I do not doubt that later ages would have told a very different tale of Athenian participation in the Ionian and Persian Wars. Not that Sparta could boast: she sent no aid to Ionia. Sparta was too concerned about Peloponnesian affairs: her leadership of the region was challenged again in 495 by Argos in the Battle of Sepeia. That year saw the destruction of the Ionian fleet by the Persians in the Battle of Lade. We do not hear whether Eretria was involved. Neither Athenai nor Korinthos sent help.

Having castigated Athenai for her actions in the period of the Ionian Revolt, we must now point out that her weak responses hint at political divisions in the city. The Athenaioi later used the excuse of internal dissension at Eretria as their excuse for not helping the city in its dire need in 490.⁶⁰ But in 496/5 we have the spectacle of the Peisistratid, Hipparkhos son of Kharmos,⁶¹ elected eponymous arkhon: the family, with its Persian connections, has been seen as the core of the 'peace party'⁶² during the Ionian and Persian Wars. This was the man for whom Kleisthenes is said to have invented ostracism (and who was indeed ostracised in the spring of 487, when appeasement was safely disreputable in Athenai).⁶³ His election represented the victory of the party supporting the withdrawal. The Peisistratidai had no reasons at all to help Eretria. Also, an ostrakon naming "Eretrios" would chronologically tie in with a purge of Peisistratids early in the fifth century following the fall of Miletos,

⁵⁸ Hdt. 6. 100.

⁵⁹ Evidence (in brief) for troubles: a possible *kleroukhia* at Eretria: IG I² 396, Ἐρετριάζων καταλόγος: Hesych.; Photios; Paroem. gr. II. 168; the tribute was lifted in 425 from 3 to 15 talents; Schol. Ar. *Sph.* 715.

⁶⁰ Hdt. 6. 100.

⁶¹ Cadoux 1948 (VI/1) 116 cites Dionysios in *Ol.* 71.1; Davies 1971 (V/282) 451ff.

⁶² Hurwit 1985 (V/216) 322; J. Fine, *The Ancient Greeks. A Critical History*, Harvard, 1983, 279.

⁶³ So [Ar.] *Ath. pol.* 22. 4, Cadoux 1948 (IV/1) 116 and D. Kagan, 'The Origin and Purposes of Ostracism', *Hesperia* 30, 1961, 393ff.; G. R. Stanton, 'The Introduction of Ostracism and Alkmeonid Propaganda', *J.H.S.* 90, 1970, 180ff. rejects this (182), arguing that it was aimed at Isagoras (who negated its purpose by retiring from Attike 181], hence the delay before it was finally invoked). Cadoux 1948 (VI/1) 116.

and which included Hipparkhos, son of Kharmos. Since "Eretrius" would not have been born before c.546, his age in 494 would have been about 52 and could easily still have been alive. The fact that only one ostrakon has been found probably means that he was not a significant figure.⁶⁴ Another, later Eretrius (a grandson ?) occurs in IG I² 950₁₄ (a list of soldiers who fell in a naval engagement in 412/11). Could it be that the battle was associated with the revolt of Euboia, of which Eretria was a prime mover? He may have been there by reason of his descent and some perceived use for his family connections in Eretria. Thukydidēs describes this battle, fought in the harbour of Eretria in 411 (8, 95, 3 - 7). The name might belong to an Eretrian deserter fighting alongside the Athenaiōi, for it appears to be a personal and not an ethnic one. There may also have been a 'peace party' at Eretria at this time. We will shortly meet with three of its number (all members of the oligarchic faction) who in 490 betrayed their city and stirred up the "divided counsels" that provided the Athenaiōi with their excuse to betray the city.⁶⁵ If such did exist, the democracy held them in check. If there had been significant opposition to the war at Eretria, it is most unlikely Herodotos would have failed to inform us of the fact. It is likely that this faction only achieved significance after the city itself was in peril of invasion, and even then it did not command numbers that made it able to influence decisions without resort to treachery.

Despite the final result in Ionia, Eretria was still seen as "strong" and "numerous"⁶⁶ even though the city must have suffered considerable losses of men and material in the late war, for Platon's description refers to the eve of Dareios' invasion of 490. Eretria's prominent (if not primary) record in the Ionian struggle was recognised by the non-Herodotean tradition even though he minimises it:⁶⁷

"Now I shall let it pass that he (Herodotos) calls the Eretrieis slaves though they had shown as much courage and patriotism as any of the Hellenes and suffered a worse fate than their bravery deserved.

This reputation was gained during the wars, and the fact that Platon knew of it is significant, for it shows that the pro-Eretrian tradition was not confined purely to non-Athenian local historians, and that the memory of Eretrian patriotism remained alive through the fifth century, the great age of Athenian glory at home and abroad. But then Platon did not have a great love for the fifth century Athenian democracy.

⁶⁴ E. Vanderpool in: H. A. Thompson, 'Excavation of the Athenian Agora, Twelfth Season, 1947', *Hesperia* 17, 1948, 193 - 195; R. Thomsen, *The Origin of Ostracism - A Synthesis*, Copenhagen, 1972, 73. On this supra VI n. 59, sub-note 7 (Appendix 2).

⁶⁵ Hdt. 6, 100.

⁶⁶ Platon *Menex.* 10 (240 C).

⁶⁷ Plout. *peri Hdt. kakoeth.* (Mor. 862 d): ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν τοῖς Ἐρετριεῖς ἀνδράποδα προσεπιεῖν, οὔτε τόλμην Ἑλλήνων οἰδεύος οὔτε φιλοτιμίαν ἐνδεικτέραν παρὰ σοχομένους καὶ πάθοντας ἀνάξια τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀφισθῆναι ...

In 490 when the invasion was imminent we find evidence of dissension in Eretria, not so much over whether to resist or submit (as, it should be emphasised, there was in all the Greek poleis) but how resistance was to be mounted. The assembly was divided: some were for defending the walls, while others favoured a guerrilla-type resistance from the mountains (but not surrender), while a **few** others:

"were plotting treason hoping for gains for themselves from the Persians."⁶⁸

The pro-resistance faction wishing to defend the walls won out in the debates in the assembly: their arguments no doubt bolstered by knowledge that their primary involvement of Eretria in the Ionian insurrection made all hope of lenient treatment by Persia out of the question should it be victorious in Greece. But the party of submission was to have the final word. It included in its ranks, according to Herodotos, Aiskhines Nothonos, Euphorbos Alkimakhou and Philagros Kuneou, who were "leading men" in Eretria. They were almost certainly members of an oligarchic clique.⁶⁹ The last two named actually opened the gates to the Persians. The first, Aiskhines, revealed the "divisions" in the assembly to the Athenian *kleroukhoi* from the "lands of the Khalkidian Hippobotai"⁷⁰ who had been told to assist the Eretrians. Herodotos makes him appear a compassionate and generous man rather than the traitor to his polis that he in fact was:

Aiskhines, son of Nothôn, who was one of the foremost men in Eretria, out of his knowledge of both intentions (of the patriots and of the traitors) told those Athenaioi (from the *kleroukha*) who had come how things were and pleaded with them to depart to their own country lest they also be slain with the rest: the Athenaioi were convinced by the advice given by Aiskhines and followed it. So they saved themselves by crossing over to Oropos."⁷¹

But had they not fled and remained to help the defence, their presence would have been significant, for they numbered 4000. Aiskhines no doubt embroidered his story of the dissensions in the town; the Khalkideis too would not have encouraged the Athenaioi to remain: defeat for Eretria and Athenai would have meant the return of the occupied Lelantine Plain. The Athenaioi jumped at the

⁶⁸ Hdt. 6, 100: ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεζόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσῃ οἴεσθαι προδοσίην ἐσπεύοντο. Here translated "gains" [*L.S.J.* s.v. κέρδος p. 942]; 'kerde' can mean (political) "advantages". An almost identical phrase is used of treasonous rewards in Hdt. 3, 71.

⁶⁹ Hdt. 6, 100f.; Plout. *peri adoleskhiás* (*Mor.* 510 b). For the names: Appendix 2 (Note).

⁷⁰ Hdt. loc. cit.; Ail. *Hist. poik.* 6, 1. On Ailianos: Geyer 1903 (Intro./3) 63.

⁷¹ Hdt. loc. cit.: μάθον δὲ τούτων ἐξάερα ὡς εἶχε Αἰσχίνης ὁ Νόθωνος, ἔόν τῶν Ἐρετριέων τὰ πρῶτα, φράζει τοῖσι ἥζοισι Ἀθηναίων πάντα τὰ παρόντα σφί περὶ ἄλλα, προσεδίτο τι ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι σφέας ἐς τὴν σφί τεύχην, ἵνα μὴ προσάπολλονται, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τούτῃ Αἰσχίνῃ σφί φρονέουσιν πείθονται. 100. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν διαβάντες ἐς Ὀροπέον ἐσώζον σφέας αὐτοῖς.

chance to escape: "Clearly H (sic) is anxious to justify the Athenian people for not sending succour from Attica and the Athenian clerouchs for leaving E to its fate by emphasizing the divided counsels and positive treachery of the Eretrians. After Marathon it may well have been thought that a bold stand might have been made at Eretria."⁷² "Herodotos' whole elaborate and controversial exculpation conveys the impression of after-thought. The calumniators of Athens in later generations can hardly have missed the point that she did eventually profit from the destruction of Eretria and Miletus."⁷³

There is altogether too much emphasis placed on the "treachery" inside Eretria at this time by Herodotos and those modern historians who follow him. Clearly the great majority were for holding out, otherwise it would not have rested with but three conspirators to betray the gates to the enemy. No one would deny that there was a medising group in the city - there certainly was in Athenai and in other cities too. The Athenaios, Xenophon, goes as far as to say that there was only **one** (!) Eretrian mediser, Gongylos, and he belongs to the next round of the Persian Wars (close friend of Pausanias, the Agid king of Sparta, he acted as go-between in his treasonous relations with Xerxes).⁷⁴ This need not be taken as literally true - it clearly wasn't - but it shows that later Athenian opinion felt that medism was not particularly strong at Eretria. Xenophon (like Platon and Lysanias) was probably following the "alternative" tradition. Gongylos was rewarded with vast estates around Pergamon in Asia Minor that his descendents were still ruling in the fourth century. We are again reminded of the close relations between the Agid Kleomenes and Eretria in the last part of the sixth century. Gongylos was probably an aristocrat of the same faction as the other medising traitors who betrayed the city in 490; his name suggests associations with the moon cult at Amarynthos, a festival that had strong aristocratic associations.⁷⁵

In 491/0, the Persians, led by Datis, launched their expected attack on Greece, heading to Eretria **as their main objective**. How/Wells: "The raid on Sardis justified reprisals against **Eretria and its accomplice**, Athens. H (sic) lets us see the importance of the contingent from Eretria and of the tie between Eretria and Miletus. **He constantly affirms that the expedition of Darius was directed against Eretria** as well as against Athens" (6, 43; 94; 98ff. My emphasis).⁷⁶ Aristeides, in his *Panathenaios*⁷⁷ also makes this clear: "But Dareios with this excuse (the burning of Sardis) [. . .] marshalled his forces, his pretext that he was defending himself against

⁷² How/Wells 1928 (V/282) vol. II, 105.

⁷³ J. A. Munro/E. M. Walker, 'Marathon', *C.A.H.* IV, ch. 8 sect. 3: Eretria and Miltiades' Decree, 237.

⁷⁴ Gongylos and family: Xen. *Hell.* 3, 1, 6; Xen. *Anab.* 7, 8, 8; Thouk. 1, 128, 6; Diod. Sik. 9, 44, 3.

⁷⁵ Heinze 1869 (IV/47) 17 cited in Head 1884 (V/89) p. 1.

⁷⁶ How/Wells 1928 (V/282) vol. II, 105. Also Myres 1955 (II/221) 201.

⁷⁷ Arist. *Panath.* 95. I have been exhorted to note the freedom with which Aristeides takes history. But why would he have said that the Eretrians were included for plausibility, in an oration extolling the Athenaios, if there were no basis for the observation? It detracts from the position of Athenai.

the Athenaioi and the Eretrieis. **For he added the Eretrieis to make the excuse plausible.**" Aristides thinks no-one would have believed that an attack on Greece could have been plausibly justified if Athenai alone were the pretext. Eretria was another matter. She had led the invaders. The Eretrieis and their navy were the real and present threat to the Persian hold on the coastal cities of Asia Minor, and the later success of Athenai and its new navy in detaching these poleis from the Persian empire shows that the assessment by Dareios' strategists was perfectly reasonable. The tradition I have been calling "alternative" was strong enough to persist until the period of Aelius Aristides (c.117 - 189 A.D.), and so Ploutarkhos (c.46 - 120 A.D.) was **not** alone in later antiquity to see the primacy of Eretria in the events of 500 - 494.

The fact that there were horse transports in the Persian armament also points to Eretria as the likely first objective: no-one expected it to fall easily, least of all the Persians who had experienced at first hand the power of the city and the daring of its citizens at Sardis on land and in the Pamphylian Sea. Later tradition attributed a powerful cavalry to Eretria. Perhaps the Persians obtained their intelligence from the aged Hippias who, it will be remembered, had spent time in Eretria during his father's exile from 556 to 546 (if so then they may have relied on the defective memories of an old and embittered man) and prepared accordingly. A battle on the plain seemed very likely to them. So:

"the Persians in sailing held a course for Temenos, Khoireai and Aigilea, all places in the Eretriás, and when they had occupied these places, **they disembarked their horses immediately** and prepared to attack their enemies. But the Eretrieis had no intention of coming out and fighting: they put all their effort into guarding the walls if they could."⁷⁸

These places are attested epigraphically as *demes* of Eretria.⁷⁹ Wallace⁸⁰ comments on this passage locating all three on the coast. He keeps Temenos though only one demesman from a deme Tra is known; there is perhaps a second.⁸¹ **The Persians sailed right past Marathon** to the Bay of Aliveri.⁸² This strategy strengthens the view that Eretria was indeed the primary target. Wallace thinks Aigilea, about 15 km east of Eretria, is where the Persians would have landed their

⁷⁸ Hdt. 6, 101: οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι πλέοντες κατέσπον τὰς νῆας τῆς Ἐρετριῆς χώρας κατὰ Τημενος καὶ Χοιρέας καὶ Αἰγίλεια, κατασχόντες δὲ τὰ ταῦτα τὰ χωρία αὐτίκα ἵππους τε ἐξέβαλλοντο καὶ παρορμηθέντες ὡς προσοισόμενοι τοῖσι ἐχθροῖσι, οἱ δὲ Ἐρετριεῖς ἐπεξελθεῖν μὲν καὶ μαχέσασθαι οὐκ ἐποιεῖντο βουλῆν, εἰ ζωὴ δὲ διαφυλάττειν τὰ τείχεα τοῦτου σφι πέρι ἔμελλε...

⁷⁹ II 44ff.

⁸⁰ 1947 (I/53) 130ff.; map, fig. 1.

⁸¹ IG XII 9 191C 44; 191B 10. Wallace 1947 (I/53) 143 has a question mark against Temenos - Aigilia is perhaps, however, to be equated with Aigalēthen: *ibid.* 133.

⁸² Maps pp. xi and xii.

cavalry, far enough from the city for them to have disembarked without too much harassment, but near enough to attack it without a long and tiring preliminary march. He notes that this location was "eminently suitable for their (cavalry) employment"⁸³ and stresses the Eretrian reputation for cavalry power. He rightly attacks Maurice,⁸⁴ who thinks Euboea is totally unsuitable for the deployment of mounted troops; in fact the intervening area between Aigilea and Eretria is flat coastal plain.⁸⁵ The immediate disembarkation of the horses is also significant, for it shows the Persians believed they would have to deal quickly with the Eretrian cavalry. Whether it was still as powerful as in the days when the Eretrieis helped Peisistratos back to power may be doubted, and this is perhaps why they were so reluctant to confront the Persians immediately. Democratic Eretria relied on other forms of military power though this does not mean that she had no cavalry at all. Perhaps there had been an increase in the relative importance of the "aristocratic" arm following the Ionian War since losses in hoplites and sailors during those years may have been considerable.

Eretria was alone in 490. *En route* to Euboea, the Persians again attacked Naxos,⁸⁶ securing it and other islands; Delos was "propitiated",⁸⁷ Karystos was assaulted and forced to submit after resisting,⁸⁸ Aigina medised. Korinthos was looking to her own defence and the fortress-Peloponnesos strategy; Athenai **still** could not challenge the Persian fleet. Amongst the islands "secured" by the Persians were probably the Eretrian dependencies and Paros. Sparta was not going to help. Eretria had been weakened by the exertions of the Ionian War; hoplites had been lost at Sardis and Ephesos. If she had been present at Lade, the losses of ships would have been greater. Once the Persians had disembarked their troops and horses, they:

"strongly attacked the walls and for six days many fell on both sides, but on the seventh, **two Eretrieis of repute**, Euphorbos, son of Alkimakhos and Philagros, son of Kuneas, betrayed the city to the Persians. They entered and plundered and burnt the temples in revenge for those that were burnt at Sardis; also, they enslaved the people according to Dareios' command."⁸⁹

⁸³ Wallace 1947 (I/53) 132 and n. 42.

⁸⁴ F. Maurice, 'The Campaign of Marathon', *J.H.S.* 52, 1932, 17.

⁸⁵ Maps pp. xi and xii.

⁸⁶ Hdt. 6, 96.

⁸⁷ Hdt. 6, 97, 118.

⁸⁸ Hdt. 6, 99, quoted and translated *supra* 256, n. 15.

⁸⁹ Hdt. 6, 101: προσβολῆς δὲ γινομένης κατοικῆς πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος ἔπιπτον ἐπι ἡμέρας πολλοὶ μὲν ἀμφοτέρων τῆ δὲ ἐβδόμῃ Εὐφωρβὸς τε ὁ Ἀλκιμάχου καὶ Φίλαγρος ὁ Κυνέου ἄνδρες τῶν ἀσπίων δόξαί τε προδιδόναι τοῖσι Πέρσησι, οἱ δὲ ἐσελθόντες ἐς τὴν πόλιν τοῖτο μὲν τὰ ἱεῖα σπλήσαντες ἐπέπησαν, ἀποτινίμενοι τῶν ἐν Σάρδιαι κατοικαθέντων ἰσθῶν, σπλήσαντες ἐπέπησαν. . . . τοῖτο δὲ τοῖς ἀσπίεσσι ἠνδραποδίσαντο κατὰ τὰς Δαρείου ἐντολάς.

After the fall of the city, some escaped to the mountains.⁹⁰ The Persians are said to have fanned out and scoured the countryside "netting" the fugitives. Such an operation would have required the help of traitors (one recalls the emergence of anti-democratic forces at Athenai after the defeat in 404), for the Eretriás is a large and rugged territory. Platon says:

"Datis . . . sent an alarming account to our city (Athenai) of how not a single Eretrieus had escaped: the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and swept the whole of the Eretriké (sic) clean as with a drawnet."⁹¹

A memory of the captured Eretrieis exiled to a location near Babylon called Kissia⁹² is recorded in the late writer, Philostratos.⁹³ He describes their grave markers, significantly for such a remote inland place, decorated with reliefs of ships commemorating their naval traditions. Platon's epitaphs⁹⁴ also emphasise the seafaring origins of these lonely exiles, far from the "deep-sounding" Aegean. Descendants of the exiles were later involved (on the Persian side) in the Battle of Gaugamela: "After these marched the Gortuae, really an Euboian race who formerly followed the Medes but were now degenerate and ignorant of their native customs."⁹⁵ Strabon too notes the presence of Eretrieis in Gordyene, the province of Mesopotamia.⁹⁶ There can be no doubt that they were descendants of Eretrieis exiled by Dareios after the fall of the city.

The destruction of Eretria, so quickly achieved, was both an embarrassment and a blow for Athenai, and indeed it sent shock waves through the rest of Greece.

⁹⁰ A. J. Graham, 'Abdera and Teos', *J.H.S.* 122, 1992, 72 defends Herodotos against Philostratos: (a) the majority were enslaved; (b) there were insufficient citizens to refound the polis; (c) possibly (probably) Eretria's relations with her colonies remained good and these were not far distant, so that the city was possibly refounded by an influx of new citizens from these cf. Teos from Abdera or Miletos from her colonies.

⁹¹ Platon, *Nomoi* III, 698 D: Δάτις . . . καὶ πῶς λόγον εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἀγῆζε φέρον, ὡς οἰδοῖς Ἐρετριέων αὐτὸν ἀποπειραγὸς εἶη συνάροντες γὰρ ἅρα τὰς χεῖρας ἀσπληνίσαντες πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετριάζην οἱ στρατιῶται τοῦ Δάτιδος. Platon, shortly before this passage, says that the Persians at Eretria were present μυριάσι σιχναῖς (in many thousands). Even so, guides would have been necessary, as well as direct help, in the work of rounding up and removing the captives.

⁹² Penella 1975 (VIII/9) 295ff.

⁹³ Philost. *es ton Tyanea Apollonion*, 1, 23f.

⁹⁴ *Infra* 271 and n. 99.

⁹⁵ Q. Curtius, 6, 11. The name Gorduae may, I suggest, be explained by means of the ancient connection of Eretrian and Elean toponyms: there was a town called Gortys/Gortyna (Paus. 5, 7, 1; 8, 27, 4; Polyb. 4, 60, 3; Plin. 4, 6, 10) in Arkadia, but in the upper Alpheios valley, captured by Elis in the Social War of 219. We know at least one Eretrian tribe was named from an Eleian toponym (Mekisstis, from Mt Makistos in Triphyllia), so it is not impossible that another (or some civic division), may have taken its name from this place and had a name like "Gortuai" or "Gortuis".

⁹⁶ Strabon 16, 1, 25 C747 derives the name from Gordys, son of Triptolemos, who came to live here. At 16, 2, 5 C750, Triptolemos is sent by the Argeioi in search of Io, Gordys accompanied him to Asia. Io said in one tradition to have been transformed into a cow in Euboaia (whence "Eu-boia") after giving birth to Epaphos at a place on the coast of the island known as "the Cow-Yard" (Βοὸς Αὐλή). Strabon 10, 1, 3 C445; Eustath. *ad Hom. 'Il.' pert.* 278, 39ff. Smith 1889 (I/1) s.v. 'Gordyaei Montes' and 'Gordyene or Cordyene'.

The sequel of Marathon is not really a part of Eretrian history. But we may note with some sadness (and irony) that amongst ceramic remains uncovered during excavations of the tumulus at Marathon raised over the glorious dead, there was found a cinerary urn "with its row of hooks in the handle zone" which "may well be from Eretria",⁹⁷ perhaps indicating that an Eretrian who escaped the sack of the city and the round-up of fugitives fought in the ranks of the betrayers of his city. I quote Boardman: "If it is indeed to be associated with the great burial, one might read into it a tribute to the tragic fate of Eretria immediately before the battle." A bitter tribute indeed. Athenai, having deserted Ionia and betrayed Eretria, her historians henceforth distorted the memory of the achievements of the only state in Hellas proper which fought against the Persians from the beginning of the war until her own elimination as a polis for the "freedom of the Greeks". not offering earth and water as had Athenai and Thebai, nor sheltering behind religious forms as had Sparta, but going out to help her old friend and kinsmen from a sense of common heritage and of gratitude for past benefits received. Myres alone of modern historians recognises the *pietas* of Eretria as the real motive force of the expedition to Ionia.

Perhaps the final word should be left to an Athenaios. Platon the Eupatrid, descendant of Solon, whose lover Peisistratos played such an important role in what is left to us of early Eretrian history, seems to have had some special interest in Eretrian affairs. I have already cited his tribute in the *Menexenos*. In the *Laws*⁹⁸ he notes "not a single Eretrian escaped" when describing the "combing" of the island by the Persians after the sack. Just Persian propaganda? Certainly however not all were killed or captured. Some were taken and sent into slavery in Asia. Their fate moved Platon deeply, for he wrote not one, but two epitaphs for the city and its people. I can do no better than to quote one of them in conclusion of this study, a fitting tribute to a famous polis and its enterprising people, its maritime glory and its bitter fate:

WE WHO LIE HERE AMIDST THE PLAINS OF EKBATANA
ONCE LEFT THE DEEP-SOUNDING WAVES OF THE AEGEAN.
FAREWELL, FAMOUS ERETRIA, OUR FORMER HOME:
FAREWELL, ATHENAI, NEIGHBOUR OF EUBOIA.
FAREWELL DEAR SEA.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Boardman 1957 (I/65) 2; E. Vanderpool, 'Some Black Figured Pottery from the Athenian Agora', *Hesperia* 15, 1946, 130.

⁹⁸ Platon, *Nomoi* III (698 D). Supra n. 91.

⁹⁹ My translation (with minor modifications) from Edmonds (ed./tr.) 1970 (IV/300) II, 8f. (no. 13):

Οἶδε ποτ' Αἰγαίοιο βαρβάρου οἶδμα λιπόντες
Ἐρβατάνων πεδίω γαίης ἵνα μεσάτω
γαίης, γλυτή ποτε πατρίς Ἐρέτρια γαίης. Ἀθῆναι
γαίονες Εὐβοίης γαίης θάλασσα φίλη.

CHAPTER X:

EPILOGUE

In 487, the leader of the "peace" faction in Athenai, Hipparkhos Kharmou, the pro-Persian *arkhon* of 496, was ostracised.¹

By 487, a few Athenaioi, and perhaps the remnants of the population that had escaped the "combing" of the Eretriás by the Persians, had come to settle on the site of the ruined city. Were they the medisers and their supporters? "After the Persian invaders withdrew into Asia Minor, therefore, there were probably enough Eretrian refugees to reconstitute the polis." There is some evidence for an Athenian *kleroukhia* at Eretria in the mid-fifth century.² The finds of Attic pottery from the period hardly suggest that the majority of the inhabitants came from the Attike³ though it is likely that "a few Athenians migrated and settled in Eretria."⁴ The characteristic rhotacising dialect slowly dies out during the fifth and fourth centuries, to be replaced with the Attic.

By 485, Eretria was being rebuilt. P. Gardner⁵ and B. V. Head⁶ suggest that this is signalled by the issuing of a new coinage, bearing the traditional cow on one side and the cuttlefish on the other. This emblem of the city became the subject of an Athenian joke in excruciatingly bad taste (given the record of Eretria in the Ionian and Persian Wars, especially if compared to that of Athenai), which was uttered by Themistokles during the war conference prior to the Battle of Artemision, to the effect that the animal and the city on whose coins it appeared shared one thing in common, no backbone.⁷ Eretria had recovered to be able to send seven ships (and there were also two from Styra, and two plus two pentekonters from Keos⁸) to take part in this campaign, compared with Khalkis, which sent none (the Athenaioi supplied twenty which the Khalkideis manned⁹); if the Eretrieis were less than enthusiastic about Athenian leadership in the new war, one can understand their

¹ IX 264f., nn. 60 - 62.

² Richardson 1891 (I/1) 59 - 69; Farnell 1906 (II/112) 27 - 31. IG I, 339: τῆς ἀπο[ρίτης] τῆς ἐς Ἐρ[ετρίαν?]; dated 445 (Ol. 83, 4).

³ Boardman 1952 (I/41) n. 316.

⁴ Green/Sinclair 1970 (VIII/10) 518.

⁵ P. Gardner, *A History of Greek Coinage*, Oxford, 1918, 127, n. 2.

⁶ Head 1884 (V/90) introduction lviii.

⁷ Plout. *Them.* 11; repeated in *Apoph. basil. kai strat.* 14 (*Mor.* 185 e). A small irony, given Themistokles' remarks: it was through the Eretrian wife of Artabanes, the Persian *chiliarch* that Themistokles got his audience with the King when he fled to Persia an exile (Plout. *Them.* 27) Supra IX 258.

⁸ Herodotos (8, 46) listing the ship contributions for the Battle of Salamis gives these two places and also Naxos, apparently as part of the bloc of Ionian Euboia; Myres, 1953 (II/221) 262.

⁹ Hdt. 8, 1. We may also note that Eretria was a ship contributor to the fleet of the Delian League before c.450 B.C.; *A.T.L.* III (1950) 197.

attitude very well in the light of recent events. The Eretrieis were to prove to be active participants in the Revolt of Euboia (446), suppressed by Perikles.¹⁰

In 479 Eretrieis had fought at Plataia: the name of the city appears on the Serpent Column set up at Delphoi to commemorate the victory. Eretria sent 600 men to the common Hellenic army compared to 400 from unscathed Khalkis.¹¹

After Plataia, probably about 478, we have seen that an Eretrian named Gongylos, said by Xenophon to have been the only Eretrian to medise,¹² was involved in the treachery of Pausanias, and he was ultimately rewarded by Xerxes with extensive lands, and that his descendants still ruled these domains around Pergamon in Asia Minor as late as the fourth century.¹³

From the end of the Persian Wars until 411, the history of Eretria is part of that of the Athenian empire. In 411, she led the Euboians in revolt from Athenai.¹⁴ Thoukydides tells us that not even the Sicilian disaster so distressed the Athenaioi as what had happened in the harbour of Eretria. The statue of the Eretrian admiral, Autonomos, was on the Spartan dedication at Delphoi for the victory at Aigospotamoi¹⁵ which finally ended the Peloponnesian War with a humiliating naval defeat for Athenai.

¹⁰ Hesykh. and Photios s.v. Ἐρετριῶτες κατόλογοι mention that in the arkhonship of Diphilos at Athenai (442/1), a decree was passed requiring the sons of the richest Eretrieis to be transported to Athenai as hostages, evidence, as Wilamowitz long ago noted (*Hermes* 20, 1885, 481, n. 1), that Eretria continued to be disaffected for some years after the revolt was suppressed. For the revolt from a Euboian perspective: cf. Vranopoulos 1987 (IV/34) 100 - 103. The kleroukhia may belong to this period (supra n. 2).

¹¹ Myres 1953 (II/221) 287.

¹² IX 267, n. 74.

¹³ J. A. S. Evans, 'The Medism of Pausanias, two Versions', *Antichthon* 22, 1988, 1 - 11.

¹⁴ Thouk. 8, 95, 2 - 7.

¹⁵ Meiggs/Lewis 1989 (V/317) no. 95 (287 - 290). Along with an Eretrian, we find a Milesian, an Ephesian and a Mal(i)ot admiral (for the ethnics of Mallos and Malis: Smith 1856 (I/1) s.v. "Mallos" and "Malis"), together with the rather more expected Megarian, Korinthian, Boiotian, Troizenian and Khalkidian leaders. For the notion that Eretria remained loyal to Athenai: Knoepfler 1969 (II/76) 86. There was, however, **never** a time when Eretria had any reason to be "grateful" to Athenai: prior to 490 Eretria dealt with Athenai as an equal (or rather, as an inferior); after that, as a betrayer and mistress.