
Roman Defences Against the *Germani*: Initial Contact to the Emergence of the ‘*Limes*’, 58 BC – AD 96



Otto Albert Koch: ‘*Varusschlacht*’, 1 January 1909 (Lippisches Landesmuseum Detmold)

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the circumstances and causes that led to the various stages of development in Rome's defence against the *Germani* from the initial interaction with Julius Caesar to the emergence of the permanent patrolled and defended defences, the '*Limes*', under the Flavians. This dissertation has three principle aims. Firstly, it identifies and defines what constituted the Germanic tribes and the various stages of Roman defensive development (border, 'buffer zone', frontier, '*Limes*'). Secondly, it identifies and explains the potential and the perceived threat posed by the *Germani* to Rome and Roman interests. Thirdly, it explains the development of defences against the *Germani*, its origins as two separate buffer zones, along the rivers Rhine and Danube, and its subsequent transition from a military frontier into a permanent, patrolled and defended defensive line (the '*Limes*').

This dissertation observes that the evolution of the Rome's defences directly corresponds to the development of their relationship and depth of understanding of the *Germani*. The later emergence of the '*Limes*' signalled Rome's final abandonment of their efforts to conquer and incorporate the *Germani* and their territory into the empire. This abandonment is connected with their realisation that the *Germani* were not capable of being a unified people. Rome came to understand that the *Germani*'s potential threat could be limited and their impact to Rome could be minimalised by following their established defensive policies. The establishment of the '*Limes*' secured Roman interests using minimal military resources whilst at the same time establishing necessary links with Rome and the Danube, and ultimately freeing up military strength needed against a more immanent and apparent threat posed by other peoples along the Danube.

CANDIDATE'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the substance of this dissertation has not already been submitted for any degree and is not being currently submitted for any other degree or qualification.

I certify that any help received in preparing this dissertation and all sources used have been acknowledged in this thesis.

SIGNED:

DATE: 11 DECEMBER 2015

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The *clades Variana* (Varian Disaster, AD 9) and the *Bellum Batonianum* (War of the Batons¹, AD 6-9), and the immediate events that followed, had a devastating and enduring effect on the Roman Empire. Although the significance of the events in Germania and Illyricum are still a contentious subject amongst many scholars,² there is little doubt that these rebellions had a profound and lasting impact not just on the empire, but also imperial policy, and on the Romans themselves.³ Furthermore, although Varus' defeat, the loss of the province of Germania, and the losses inflicted during the *Bellum Batonianum* were significant in themselves, these disasters were more importantly the catalyst for a larger and more significant period of Roman activity centred on the *Germani* and the perceived threat that they posed to Roman interests.

Similarly, the *clades Lolliana* (the Lollian disaster, c. 17 BC) can be identified as the initial catalyst for the shift in the Augustan policy towards the *Germani* during the late first century BC. A Roman defensive response to the Germanic threat, however, can be dated back to the campaigns of Julius Caesar; it is from his initial campaigns that the first Roman defensive policy against the *Germani* can be identified. This entire period of interaction and conflict from Caesar until the end of Domitian's reign would witness

¹ The war is named after the two tribal leaders that were both named Bato/Baton; Bato (Breucian [of the *Breuci*]) and Bato (Daesitiate [of the *Daesitiates*]).

² For examples of the various arguments, see R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 376, 381; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians 100 BC– AD 300*, p. 31; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 BC to AD 69*, pp. 258-259; W. A. Oldfather, 'The Varus Episode', *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 226-236; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. X, pp. 526-528. See also, R. Wiegels & W. Woesler, *Arminius und die Varusschlacht: Geschichte, Mythos, und Literatur*, Germany, 2003; D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, 1970. This debate is examined in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

³ Cf. C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, Oxford, 1972; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, Baltimore, 1976, p. 8; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome Emperor Augustus, Arminius, and the Slaughter of the Legions in the Teutoburg Forest*, New York, 2004; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, London, 1990; R. Wiegels & W. Woesler, *Arminius und die Varusschlacht: Geschichte, Mythos, und Literatur*, Germany, 2003; D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, 1970. This is examined in greater detail in Chapter 7.

the transformation of Roman defences from their initial forms as ‘buffer zones’, into military frontiers, and later their development into a permanent fortified defensive line, the ‘*Limes*’.⁴

This dissertation aims to examine the circumstances and causes that led to the various stages of development in Rome’s defence and policy against the *Germani*. This examination explores the justification for dense concentration of Roman military resources in this region and specifically the rationalization for the initial implementation of the ‘buffer zones’, the reasons for the emergence of the Rhine and Danube frontiers, their subsequent developments, and later the emergence of the ‘*Limes*’, with the shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube and the threat posed by other peoples. To facilitate this, it will be necessary to explore and examine Rome’s interaction with the Germanic tribes and the extent of Roman military commitment along the Rhine and Danube rivers, and in other relevant sectors of the empire, during the period outlined.

This dissertation is delineated by three specific parameters: chronology, geography, and demography, covering the period between the years 58 BC, corresponding to Rome’s initial contact with Germanic tribes east of the Rhine, and ending in AD 96, with the emergence of the initial ‘*Limes*’ under the Flavians and the death of Domitian. This timeframe encompasses the major changes, and the overall development, of the defences against the *Germani*.

⁴ For the purpose of this dissertation, the terms border, ‘buffer zones’, frontiers, and ‘*Limes*’ are considered to be distinct and separate terms. The use of each term denotes distinct features, functions, and purpose in the context of Roman defence. Their definitions are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

Geographically, this thesis is limited to the development of the Germanic frontier of the Roman Empire. For the purpose of this dissertation the frontier at its greatest extent will be considered as starting at *Lugdunum Batavorum* (modern Katwijk-Brittenburg), continuing south along the Rhine River to Rheinbrohl (south of *Rigomagus*, modern Remagen), where it veers southeast of the Rhine; it is here that the ‘Upper German-Raetian ‘*Limes*’⁵ (Obergermanisch–Raetischer Limes)⁶ began. Continuing south-eastward for some 550 kilometres, the frontier joins up with the River Danube north of *Abusina* (modern Eining), from *Abusina* it travels eastward following the course of the Danube past *castra Regina* (modern Regensburg) and onto *Aquincum* (modern Budapest), situated on the North-Eastern borders of the Pannonia province within the Roman Empire; after this point the Germanic frontier terminates and the eastern frontier begins.⁷ For expediency of examination, the defences on the Rhine and Danube have been divided into two broad sectors. Any division is necessarily arbitrary, since it has no contemporary reality, but a convincing and logical division is made on the borders of Raetia and Noricum; Raetia and the headwaters of the Danube (the Upper Danube) are best connected with defences of the Upper Rhine, and the remaining defences spanning across northern Noricum, Pannonia (the Middle Danube), and the Moesia (the Lower Danube) constitute the defences of the Danube.⁸ [see Map (1)]

⁵ The term *Upper German-Raetian Limes* refers to the system of barriers, watchtowers, and forts that formed a fortified boundary that stretched from Brühl on the Rhine to Eining on the Danube.

⁶ The German scholarship commonly refers to the *Upper German-Raetian Limes* as Obergermanisch–Raetischer Limes, for examples see, D. Baatz, *Der römische Limes: Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau*, Berlin, 2000; B. Rabold, E. Schallmayer & A. Thiel, *Der Limes: Die deutsche Limes-Straße vom Rhein bis zur Donau*, Stuttgart, 2000.

⁷ The view that *Aquincum* was considered the terminus of the northern frontier is based on the argument that it was the last position along the Danube that opposed a Germanic threat, defences eastward of *Aquincum* focused on opposing the Sarmatians and Dacians, see Strabo *Geo.* VII.1; Tac. *Ger.* 41. See also, Z. Visy, *Der pannonische Limes in Ungarn*, pp. 80-85. Map (1) shows the ‘Roman defences against the *Germani* during the period AD 9-18’.

⁸ V. A. Maxfield, ‘Frontiers: Mainland Europe’, in J. Wachter (ed.), *The Roman World*, p. 140.

Demography as the final parameter comprises the ‘Germanic’ tribes that dwelt beyond, and in the surrounding area of, the empire’s ‘Germanic frontier’ according to the Roman tradition [see Map (2)].⁹ It is essential to point out that it is impossible to write a ‘Germanic’ history, first and foremost because the concept of ‘*Germani*’ is a Roman construct.¹⁰ An ancient, independent, and self-aware Germanic ‘nation’ or people, opposed to the Roman Empire, never existed: only various northern European tribes that shared some degree of common ancestry.¹¹ Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, the terms ‘Germanic’ and ‘*Germani*’ will refer to the northern European tribes that dwelt near the periphery of Rome’s north-western frontier and in the lands east of the Rhine and north of the Danube that correspond with being considered *Germani* according to contemporary Romans.¹² Moreover, in order to present a more accurate argument, specific ‘Germanic’ tribes will at times be examined by reference to a particular regional group, such as the *Suebi*, *Batavi*, and the *Cherusci*, rather than using the generic terms ‘*Germani*’ and ‘Germanic’ in order to identify specific threats.¹³

The lack of existing research that covers the entirety of Rome’s interaction with the *Germani* from its initial contact under Caesar up to the emergence of the ‘*Limes*’ under the Flavians justifies the examination being undertaken here. There is also a tendency in some of the modern scholarship to assess the significance, or otherwise, of the *Germani*, and the Roman defences against them, without adequately testing

⁹ [Map (2)] shows the known Germanic tribes that existed opposite the Rhine, the Danube, and the region they made up the ‘Germanic frontier’ (also included are the latest estimates on the various tribal territories). An in-depth definition for the problematic definition for ‘Germanic’ will be addressed in Chapters 1 and 2. The term ‘Germanic frontier’ is discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

¹⁰ D. Timpe, *Römisch-germanische Begegnung in der späten Republik und frühen Kaiserzeit. Voraussetzungen-Konfrontationen-Wirkungen. Gesammelte Studien*, München/Leipzig, 2006, pp. 3-18; Pohl, W., *Die Germanen*, München, 2000, pp. 50-1.

¹¹ D. Timpe, *Römisch-germanische Begegnung in der späten Republik und frühen Kaiserzeit*, pp. 4-5.

¹² This concept, and the argumentation behind it, will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 1 and 2.

¹³ W. Pohl, *Die Germanen*, München, 2000, pp. 101-7.

analysing, and incorporating all existing evidence. Additionally, prevalent in the scholarship is a polarisation between English and German scholars. The former tend to marginalise the role of Germanic tribes and the significance of the Germanic frontier in Roman history, whilst the latter tend to attribute excessive significance and uniformity to the Germanic tribes without adequately justifying or supporting their claims.¹⁴

A substantial amount of scholarship exists on the Germanic tribes and Rome's north-western frontier, the majority of which has been undertaken by two main groups, the English and German based scholars. Many English historians fail to recognise the specific significance of the Germanic frontier or the Germanic tribes; they are of the opinion that the empire's frontiers and the 'barbarian' tribes in general played a role in imperial history but many fail to measure or elaborate on this view,¹⁵ while others have tended to marginalise the importance of the Germanic tribes and the Germanic frontier altogether.¹⁶

¹⁴ For a detailed discussion on this phenomenon, see the works of R. Wiegels & W. Woesler, *Arminius und die Varusschlacht: Geschichte, Mythos, und Literatur*, Germany, 2003; D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, 1970.

¹⁵ For examples of this, see P. Southern, *Augustus*, London, 1998, p. 188; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: from Republic to Empire*, London, 1984, pp. 168-171; J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, pp. 21-22; E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in K. A. Raaflaub K. A. M. & Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, pp. 395-416, pp. 405-406; N. J. E. Austin & N. B. Rankov, *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*, London, 1995, p. 111; R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 189; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, Los Angeles, 1999, pp. 90-91; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 61; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, Baltimore, 1976, p. 8; E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, pp. 147-197, 184-185. Exceptions can be found in the works of C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*.

¹⁶ Examples can be observed in: R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, vol. X, pp. 376, 381; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians 100 BC– AD 300*, p 31; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 BC to AD 69*, pp. 258-259; W. A. Oldfather, 'The Varus Episode', *The Classical Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4, Jan., 1916, pp. 226-236; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², vol. X, pp. 526-528.

In order to understand comprehensively and provide an explanation for the defensive developments, the historical narrative of events needs to be incorporated and made central to the framework of this dissertation. In undertaking this, and throughout the course of this work, it will be made clear that the historical narrative establishes the necessary context in which development of defences against the *Germani* took place, and the reasons for this. Examining the Roman defences in segments, or in isolation of each other, removed of the narrative order of events, produces only a simplistic, and at times distorted, understanding of Roman military defences. Only a holistic assessment of the defences and relevant events will produce a realistic account of the causes and circumstances which precipitated specific changes on the Rhine and Danube against the *Germani*.

Conversely, German scholars recognise the importance of the north-eastern frontier, and the Germanic tribes, to Roman imperial history; many of these scholars, apparently clouded by nationalistic fervour, have tended to focus specifically on the Germanic tribes and the frontier region that specifically relates to modern Germany, and evaluate, and attempt to justify, their importance to German and European history.¹⁷ Apart from the previously mentioned shortcomings, a weakness for both these groups is that a large proportion of scholars have centred their attentions largely on the surviving written evidence, ignoring or marginalising certain types of evidence such as archaeology, epigraphy, and numismatics. For some of these scholars this is unsurprising as their works were written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and were published before vital archaeological evidence was unearthed; for

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion on this phenomenon, see R. Wiegels & W. Woesler, *Arminius und die Varusschlacht: Geschichte, Mythos, und Literatur*, Germany, 2003; D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, 1970.

others, it is the opinion that the physical evidence detracts from the literary sources and obscures the empirical account of Roman history.¹⁸

Archaeological evidence has been a factor in generating the need for this dissertation. Sources of material evidence for the Germanic tribes, and for Roman activity along the Germanic frontier and in Germania Magna, are becoming quite extensive, and are still being added to, with a large number of archaeological excavations currently in place throughout Europe, especially in Germany, Austria, and the Balkan nations. Recent archaeological discoveries produce another source of information to help build a more complete understanding of Roman activity in the region. Unlike other sources of evidence, such as gravestones and the written accounts, there are less inherent considerations of bias or stylistic considerations; although as with all evidence the material is subject to the scholar's own particular interpretation. Generally speaking the archaeological evidence is *in situ*, and while modern academic interpretation has to be taken into account, such evidence can directly and often scientifically account for events that took place over two thousand years ago, such as the positioning of Roman defences and confirmation of the extent of Roman settlements.

Specifically the remains of settlements and forts throughout eastern Europe and along the Rhine and Danube itself, such as *Moguntiacum*, *Novaesium*, and *Vetera*, illustrate Rome's initial advance into Germania Magna, its rapid retreat back across the Rhine, and later the transformation of their defences from a military frontier into a

¹⁸ A list of nineteenth and twentieth-century scholars that followed only the literary evidence would be extensive, a few examples include: L. von Ranke, D. G. Niebuhr, G. Kossinna, H. Diels, J. Bernays, and H. Nissen. An example of a recent scholar deliberately ignoring the physical evidence can be seen in the work of Riemer, see U. Riemer, *Die römische Germanienpolitik: Von Caesar bis Commodus*, Darmstadt, 2006, p. 8.

fortified defensive line, the '*Limes*'. The sites illustrate the nature of the interaction between the Romans and the *Germani*, making them vital to an understanding of the period as they reveal the extent of Roman investment in the region. By examining these remains in conjunction with the Roman fortifications and infrastructure along the Rhine and Danube, a more accurate and nuanced understanding of the development of Roman defences, and the *Germani*, can be constructed.

As with most investigations, no single source answers the questions proposed in this dissertation. Only through the examination of all existing evidence can an accurate and well-supported answer can be given. As stipulated above, the chronological narrative attested in the literary evidence will be the main framework through which this dissertation is constructed and argued, placing the development of defences in the context of specific threats and individual events. Despite the limiting scarcity of the surviving literary sources covering this period, all still provide relevant and crucial details regarding conflicts, or alliances with, the *Germani*, information concerning specific events and threats, and an outline of Roman activity along the Rhine and Danube. The authors that offer significant insight into these areas include: Julius Caesar, Augustus, Suetonius, Tacitus, and Dio Cassius, all of whom provide the majority of the literary evidence concerning this period. Some authors' accounts are more problematic than others, and whilst all of them have their own inherent biases and stylistic considerations, all must be carefully scrutinised in greater detail in order to identify any inherent factors that may distort the historical record and the findings of this dissertation. Further analysis than that which follows immediately below, regarding specific information provided in the sources, is carried out throughout this dissertation as and when required.

Gaius Julius Caesar's *Commentarii* was composed in eleven books: eight are directly concerned with his wars in Gaul, lasting from 58 to 52 BC, including two expeditions to Britain in 55–54 BC, and three attacks across the Rhine into Germania Magna, taking place in 58, 55, and 53 BC. The work was written in order to present a positive account and a justification for Caesar's campaigns to his audience in Rome. His *Commentarii* contain information about Rome's initial contact with the Germanic tribes and provides a basic understanding of the Romans' relationship with the Germanic peoples and how Romans/Caesar distinguished them from other European tribes. Three areas of his work reveal its intrinsic value: its explanations of the early opinions of Romans towards the Germanic tribes; the discussion of the Germanic tribes, what they were like, and how they were different from other European tribes; and the exploration of previous encounters with Germanic tribes in Roman history, for example the *Teutones* and *Cimbri* in the second century BC. Importantly, the text explores how Caesar himself, and other Romans, perceived the Germans in the first century BC but this was not necessarily an accurate portrayal.¹⁹

The Emperor Augustus composed his own funerary inscription, the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* in AD 13–14. It is an account of his public life giving details of his public offices and honours; his benefactions to the empire, to the people, and to the soldiers; and his services as a soldier and as an administrator. The inscription presents and

¹⁹ For scholarship on Caesar's works, see H. J. Edwards, *Caesar, the Gallic War*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 2006, pp. vii–xviii; M. Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman*, trans. P. Needham, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1968; R. Warner, *War commentaries of Caesar*, New American Library, New York, 1960; K. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic wars, 58-50 B.C.*, Routledge, London: New York, 2003; J. Barlow, K. Welch, and A. Powell, *Julius Caesar as artful reporter: the war commentaries as political instrument*, Duckworth with The Classical Press of Wales, London, 1998; J. Osgood, 'The Pen and the Sword: Writing and Conquest in Caesar's Gaul', *Classical Antiquity* 28(2), 2009, pp. 328–358.

portrays Augustus in the best possible light and in doing so is very selective about the information provided. In terms of the main limitations of this work, its biases and its obvious purpose as propaganda must be kept in mind when considering its usefulness, accuracy, and reliability. Despite this, as the *Res Gestae* contains important information about the early empire, it is still able to contribute greatly to the understanding of the early Roman Empire and Augustus' reign, especially his view of the government and the state of the empire.²⁰

Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, born c. AD 70, was the son of a military tribune; at first an advocate and a teacher of rhetoric, he later became the Emperor Hadrian's private secretary (AD 119–121). He dedicated his work, *The Lives of the Caesars*, to Gaius Septicius Clarus, prefect of the Praetorian Guard. After the dismissal of both men from the imperial court, Suetonius apparently retired and probably continued his writing. As he was a studious and careful collector of facts, his lives of the emperors from the dictator Julius Caesar to Domitian are invaluable. Each of the *Lives* follows a general common structure: the emperor's family and early years; public and private life; death. Many anecdotes are included, as well as much gossip of the imperial court, and various details of character and personal appearance. Until his dismissal, Suetonius had access to the imperial archives to research eyewitness accounts, information, and other evidence to produce the imperial biographies. Critics opine, however, that the *Lives* are founded on gossip, and citations of historians who had lived in the time of the early emperors, rather than on primary sources of that time. There are times the author

²⁰ For scholarship on Augustus' *Res Gestae*, see J. Scheid, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti: Hauts faits du divin Auguste*, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2007; A. E. Cooley, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti: Text, Translation, and Commentary*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009; E. S. Ramage, *The Nature and Purpose of Augustus' Res Gestae*, Historia Einzelschriften, vol. 54, Stuttgart, 1987; P. A. Brunt and J. M. Moore (trans. and ed.), *Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements of the Divine Augustus*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967.

subjectively expresses his opinion and knowledge. Despite this, the *Lives* provide valuable information on the heritage, personal habits, physical appearance, lives and political careers of the first Roman Emperors. Details are provided which other sources do not give. For example, Suetonius is the main source on the life of Caligula, his uncle Claudius, and the heritage of Vespasian. Due to this particular information the *Lives* are a substantial and invaluable source for the first twelve Caesars, and a great source of the political, military, and social issues during their reigns.²¹

Publius Cornelius Tacitus, AD 57-117, considered by many scholars to be one of Rome's greatest historians, was first a politician, reaching the pinnacle of his political career, the consulship, in AD 97. Not until shortly after his consulship did Tacitus begin his career as a writer. Of his five works only three are relevant to this thesis: the *Germania*, the *Histories*, and the *Annals*. The first is an ethnographic treatise, the second a narrative covering the period from the year of the four Emperors up to the death of Domitian, and the third a narrative account of the reigns of the Julio-Claudian Emperors. Tacitus is one of the most reliable and detailed sources on the events which followed the *clades Variana*. His account, however, was written in the early years of the second century, approximately one hundred years after the events covered in his works had taken place. A key aspect to Tacitus' work was that he was profoundly influenced by the mistakes of the previous generations; the *Germania*, and to a lesser extent the

²¹ For scholarship on Suetonius' works, see J. C. Rolfe, *Suetonius*, Vol. I-II, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., pp. 1-34; C. Pelling, 'Suetonius the Biographer: Studies in Roman Lives', *The Classical Review*, 2016, Vol. 66(1), pp. 140-142; R. H. Martin, 'Suetonius. The Scholar and his Caesars', *The Classical Review*, 1985, Vol.35 (1), pp. 40-41; B. W. Jones, R. D. Milns, *Suetonius: the Flavian emperors: a historical commentary* Suetonius, Bristol Classical, Bristol, 2002; A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Suetonius: the scholar and his Caesars*, Duckworth, London, 1983.

Annals, seem directed towards his own generation as a warning, as they were both suffering from their failures to reconquer Germania.²²

Similarly to Tacitus, Cassius Dio, a third-century AD historian, was an exceptional career politician as much as a historian. Twice consul, he had been municipal governor of Pergamon and Smyrna. Dio provides the most comprehensive and thorough description of the circumstances leading up to the Varian disaster and the most detailed account of the battle itself. His account indicates the nature of Rome's position in Germania Magna, and the extent to which the Romans had converted the territory into a province.²³ Unlike the surviving works of Velleius and Tacitus, Dio goes on to provide important information about Augustus' response to the news of the disaster.²⁴ One aspect that must be recognised in Dio's work is the extent to which he is biased against barbarians. Examples of this can be seen in his contemptuous accounts of their 'ancestral habits' and his derogatory comment that they 'did not understand siege craft.'²⁵²⁶

This dissertation puts forward three fundamental arguments. Firstly, for the Romans the Germanic tribes were a distinct and quantifiable grouping during this

²² For scholarship on Tacitus' works, see R. Syme, *Tacitus*, Vol. I-II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985; R. Syme, 'Tacitus: Some Sources of His Information', *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 1 January 1982, Vol.72, pp.68-82; A. J. Woodman, *Tacitus reviewed*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998; R. Syme, *Ten studies in Tacitus*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970; A. J. Woodman, *The Cambridge companion to Tacitus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009.

²³ Dio CVI.18.

²⁴ Dio CVI.23-24.

²⁵ Dio CVI.22.2.

²⁶ For scholarship on Dio's *Historia Romana*, see F. Millar, *A study of Cassius Dio*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964; D. B. Manuwald, *Cassius Dio und Augustus: Philologische Untersuchungen zu den Büchern 45-46 des dionischen Geschichtswerkes*, Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1979; D. Fechner, *Untersuchungen zu Cassius Dios Sicht der Römischen Republik*, Olms, Hildesheim, 1986; A. M. Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio*, University of Michigan Press, USA, 1992. In regards to Augustus' later reign see, P. M. Swan, *The Augustan Succession: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's Roman History Books 55-56 (9 B.C.-A.D. 14)*, American Classical Studies 47, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

period. Secondly, for the Romans the perceived threat posed by the *Germani* to Rome and their interests was a prominent and significant factor in determining military and political decisions throughout this period. Thirdly, and of greatest importance, is that the development of defences against the *Germani*, their origins as two separate buffer zones, along the rivers Rhine and Danube, and its subsequent transition from a military frontier into a permanent, patrolled and defended defensive line (the '*Limes*'), were in response to specific events and the shifting level and nature of threat the *Germani* represented to Rome and its empire.

The first section of this dissertation is concerned with establishing the definition of key words and concepts examined in this work. The first chapter is focused on addressing the first argument, and with the problematic concept of categorizing and defining the 'Germanic' tribes. Essentially this chapter establishes a working definition for the Germanic peoples as an identifiable and quantifiable group who can be distinguished and separated from the other 'barbarian' groups in continental Europe. It will ascertain what constituted a 'Germanic' tribesman and the differences between Germanic tribes other 'barbarian' groups in the Roman Empire. Ultimately this chapter will argue that the terms *Germani*, Germanic, and Germans were Roman constructs, which were originally coined in order to distinguish between similar northern socio-political groups, and that initially the groups included in this ambiguous title did not themselves recognise or even identify with the terms. This chapter will clearly define what constituted the Germanic tribes, where their territories were located, and their relationship to Rome, each other, and other 'barbarian' groups.

Chapter Two will establish the problematic definitions of border, ‘buffer zone’, frontier, and ‘*Limes*’, exploring the debates that surround the study of Roman military frontiers and modern scholarship’s main points of contention. Overall, it will identify and define the specific points of evolution in Rome’s defence against the *Germani* along the Rhine and Danube rivers. In this dissertation all four terms will be considered to be distinct and separate. The use of either term denoted distinct features, functions, and purpose in the context of Roman defence.

The second and third arguments of this dissertation are explored in sections two and three, which consist of Chapters Three through to Eleven, which will examine the reigns of all of the Julio-Claudians, the civil war emperors, and the Flavians. The main focus of these chapters is the three separate phases in the development of Roman defences against the *Germani*, from their initial phase as two separate buffer zones, through to their transformation into military frontiers, and later through the emergence of their permanent patrolled and defended defensive lines, the ‘*Limes*’. All of these chapters will argue that changes occurred on the Rhine and Danube in response to specific events, and the shifting level and nature of the perceived threat the *Germani* represented to Rome and Roman interests.

The development of Roman defences was in response to Roman interaction with the *Germani*: changes occurred in response to specific threats and individual events, and the shifting level and nature of threat the Germanic tribes represented to Rome and Roman interests. Roman defences were planned, not through the implementation of an overarching grand military strategy, but rather that they developed organically, in an *ad-hoc* manner, over time, in response to specific threats and in connection to particular

events. Roman defences evolved in direct correspondence with the development of Rome's relationship and depth of understanding of the *Germani*. As the Germanic threat fluctuated and changed, so did the Romans' defences and the manner by which they were defended.

Under the Julio-Claudians, the Romans' response to German aggression developed into a formulaic pattern of response to German attacks or incursions which consisted of: reactionary military responses, diplomatic and financial inducements, the founding and continuation of the '*agri vacui*'²⁷, and the creation of allied tribes positioned strategically along the Rhine and Danube and against hostile groups. Later, the Flavians adopted and maintained this formula to help secure their own defences. Rome's final abandonment of their efforts to conquer and incorporate the *Germani* and their territory into their empire was signalled by the later emergence of the '*Limes*'. This abandonment is connected with their realisation that the *Germani* were not capable of being a unified people. Rome came to understand that the *Germani*'s potential threat could be limited and their impact to Rome could be minimised by following their established defensive policies.

Further to this, the '*Limes*' themselves existed and emerged under the Flavians, being a visible line of demarcation of the extent of Roman territory and being created in response to specific events and threats along both rivers. Rather than being one continuous line of defence, they were a series of loosely connected networks opposing specific, individual threats. These defensive lines were not meant to be impenetrable,

²⁷ *Agri Vacui* (vacant land) was a deliberate policy of the Julio-Claudian Emperors to leave a strip of land on the east bank of the Rhine devoid of settlements; this can be seen as a method of keeping the *Germani* at bay and strengthening the Roman position along the Rhine and Danube. This policy is discussed in detail in Chapters 7 through to 10.

but rather enabled the Romans to monitor, control, and defend against the flow of peoples into Roman territory.

The establishment of the '*Limes*' secured Roman interests using less manpower and resources along the Rhine, whilst simultaneously establishing necessary links with Rome and the Danube. This containment of the *Germani* on the Rhine, therefore, made it possible to carry out the definitive shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube. Roman military resources were now directed against the threats posed by hostile groups north of the Danube, which could not be effectively contended with or contained through negotiation or diplomacy as was evident on the Rhine, only the retention of a large military forces could adequately secure these defences.

SECTION I

THE DEFINITIONS: The *Germani*, Border, ‘Buffer Zone’, Frontier, and ‘*Limes*’

CHAPTER ONE

The Ancient *Germani*

Before the impact of the *Germani* on the Roman Rhine and Danube defences can be determined, the term *Germani* and the specific socio-political group it refers too needs to be identified and defined. This chapter highlights a central point in my dissertation, that according to contemporary Romans the term *Germani* referred to a specific and quantifiable socio-political group. Contemporary Roman understanding of the term *Germani* differed greatly from that of modern scholarship.¹ The Romans defined and perceived the *Germani* as an *ethnos*, *natio*, or *gens*, and identified and classified all the Germanic tribes as a singular socio-political group, and treated them as such throughout their written history. This chapter's purpose is not to argue whether or not the *Germani* were actually a racially or ethnically unified tribal group, but rather to illustrate that they were recognised and treated as such by the Romans.

In order to demonstrate and highlight this, four key areas will be examined: the *Germani*'s origins in the Roman historical record, their appearance and role in Roman history, the Romans' definition and perception of them, and their definition and perception of themselves. These four areas will establish what constituted a Germanic

¹ Modern scholarship considers the terms *Germani*, Germans, and Germanic tribes, along with any number of ancient or modern variations of them, as ultimately being a Roman construct, which was formed in order to distinguish between similar northern socio-political groups. Most of the modern usage of the term German derives from classical philology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that envisioned the Germanic language group as occupying a central branch of the Indo-European language tree. The modern scholarship on the terms *Germani*, Germans, and Germanic tribes, along with any number of ancient or modern variations of them, is beyond the scope of this work, for details of the complex debates and arguments, see M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, 2nd ed., Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, (2009); H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, University of California Press, Berkeley, (1997); R. Wenskus, *Stammesbildung und Verfassung: Das Werden der frühmittelalterlichen Gentes*, 2nd ed., Cologne, (1977); W. Pohl, *Die Germanen*, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, München, (2000); C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus, An Examination of the Archaeological Evidence*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1972).

tribesman, and the difference that existed amongst themselves and other ‘barbarian’ groups in the Roman Empire, firstly in the context which the Romans saw them, and secondly in how they viewed themselves.

Origins of the *Germani*

The origin of the name *Germani* is a contested and controversial issue for both ancient and modern scholars. Greek ethnography provides the first possible record of the Germanic people; as early as the sixth century BC Greek ethnographic writers had identified two main groups of people amongst the northern barbarians—the Scythians and the Celts.² However, there is mention of a group that existed between the two groups that could arguably be classed as Celto-Scyths.³ It could be speculated that these Celto-Scyths were in fact the Germanic people, but there is no evidence to substantiate this claim. Burns theorises that the term ‘German’ may have been introduced to the Greeks through their colonies along the Mediterranean coast who had contacts with the Celtic tribes.⁴ This claim, however, cannot be substantiated. Therefore, the first recorded use of the term *Germani* is in the Greek writer Poseidonios’ *Histories* in the first century BC.⁵

² Hecataeus states that the *Keltoi* inhabited the lands around the Greek colonial city of Massalia (Frag. 55 in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*). Herodotus writes that the source of the Danube River was in the lands occupied by Celts (Hero. *Hist.* IV. XLIX); P. S. Wells, *The Barbarian Speak*, p. 101; D. Rankin, *Celts and the Classical World*, pp. 8-9.

³ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and Its Germanic Peoples*, p. 5; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarian Speak*, p. 101.

⁴ T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B.C. – A.D. 400*, p. 24.

⁵ Poseidonios fr. 22. P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 101-102; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians 100 B.C. – A.D. 300*, p. 25. Also see, K. Clarke, *Between Geography and History: Hellenistic Constructions of the Roman World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.

Although the majority of this work is lost, some fragments do survive as references in later writers and these contain the first known references to the *Germani*.⁶ One significant detail evident in the work of Poseidonios, and other earlier writers, is evidence that they had known of a group of people called Germans on the Lower Rhine, but interestingly they did not distinguish them from the Celts.⁷ Unfortunately, it is not always possible to determine which ideas came from Poseidonios and which came from later writers.⁸ Furthermore, some scholars speculate on the validity of this source, arguing that because this detail only survives in a quotation by Athenaios, who was writing around AD 190, the mention of *Germani* in this context was more likely inserted by Athenaios rather than by Poseidonios himself.⁹

Caesar in his work *de Bello Gallico* provides no background on the origins of the term, nor any indication that the name was newly adopted or invented by him. It could be argued that Caesar's repeated use of the term throughout his work, accompanied with very little explanation or background, would indicate that he was familiar with term as was his Roman audience.¹⁰ An important aspect of Caesar's work that should be noted is that throughout Book I he emphasises the Rhine as being the boundary that separated and distinguished the Celts and the Germans, and supports this view by citing differences between the two.¹¹ This distinction appears to be his own innovation which directly contradicts the view held by the earlier writers mentioned previously, who

⁶ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarian Speak*, pp. 101-102.

⁷ Poseidonios fr. 22. M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, pp. 2, 5; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 25; F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* iic, pp. 169-70, commenting on iia, p. 232.

⁸ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 25.

⁹ L. Rübekeil, *Suebica: Volkernamen und Ethnos*, PhD diss., University of Innsbruck, 1992, pp. 161-6.

¹⁰ M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, p. 9.

¹¹ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 102.

made no distinction between the two peoples.¹² Moreover, Caesar himself in later books blurs the distinction he created in Book I, recognising that there had once been Gauls east of the Rhine, such as the *Boii*.¹³ Still more surprisingly in Book II Caesar records that there were well established German tribes west of the Rhine: the so-called *Germani cisrhenani*, tribes that claimed trans-Rhenane origins such as the *Eburones*, *Condrusi*, and *Segni*.¹⁴ These two points obviously distort the straightforward distinction Caesar aimed to convey to his audience: that the Germans lived east of the Rhine River, while the Gauls lived west of it. Therefore, although Caesar did not discover the Germans, he gave solidity to the vague notions the Romans had had about them, thus helping a Germanic ethnography to come into fruition.¹⁵

Strabo's work records that the Romans perceived the *Germani* as Gauls, and did not recognise them as being a separate distinct race of people. He records that the term *Germani* was given to them by the Romans, who believed that the Germans were actually Gauls and regarded them as being "genuine" Gauls (*Galatae*), and so to indicate this belief the Latin word "*germani*" was assigned to them.¹⁶ Strabo explains his justification for this view writing that:

The Romans assigned to them the name *Germani*, as though they wished to indicate thereby that they were

¹² C. M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 25.

¹³ Caesar *B. Gall.* VI. 24; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 25.

¹⁴ Caesar *B. Gall.* II. 3.4, II.4.1; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 22-23.

¹⁵ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 6.

¹⁶ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 113. To a Latin speaker the word *germani* or more accurately *germanus* meant "having the same parents, brotherly, genuine, real", see H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 3; H. H. Howorth, 'The Germans of Caesar', in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 23, No. 91, pp. 417-418.

“genuine” Galatae, for in the language of the Romans
“*germani*” means “genuine”.¹⁷

For Strabo it seems the Germans were very much like the Celts, only wilder, taller and blonder. He records no other possible explanation for how the term came into existence. Alternatively, it can be observed that this is Strabo’s own theory; he even records this sentiment himself admitting that:

I also think that it was for this reason that the Romans
assigned them the name *Germani*.¹⁸

This is therefore Strabo’s personal explanation for the origin of the name, and at no stage does he mention that the Romans held the same view. Furthermore, Howorth argues that they would be very unlikely to apply a term equivalent in their language to brothers or relatives (*Germani*) to the barbarian hordes against whom they fought so fiercely, and with whom they had no geographical contact until the time of Caesar.¹⁹

Tacitus puts forward the argument that the term *Germani* did not originate with the Romans, and that the name can be traced back before the first century BC and Caesar’s excursions into Gaul and Germania. In his *Germania*, Tacitus indicates that the term was derived from the name attributed to them by the Gauls who resided west of the Rhine. This is clearly evident in his statement that:

The name of Germania is new and a recent application.
The first tribes in fact to cross the Rhine and expel the
Gauls, though now called Tungri, then bore the name

¹⁷ Strabo VII. 2 (trans. H. L. Jones, *Loeb Classical Library*).

¹⁸ Strabo VII. 2 (trans. H. L. Jones, *Loeb Classical Library*).

¹⁹ H. H. Howorth, ‘The Germans of Caesar’, in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 23, No. 91, p. 423.

Germani: so little by little the name—a tribal, not a national, name—prevailed, until the whole people were called by the artificial name of the *Germani*, first only by the victorious tribe Tungri in order to intimidate the Gauls, but afterwards by themselves also.²⁰

Here it can be recognised that Tacitus, with the resources available to him and his known abilities as a scholar, had traced the origins of the name back to the Gauls and that later the Romans had adopted the term for themselves. In addition to this theory, Tacitus states that the *Germani* were pure indigenous inhabitants of the region, recording that:

As to the Germans themselves, I should suppose them to be indigenous and very slightly blended with new arrivals from other races and alliances...in the people of Germany there has been given to the world a race unmixed by intermarriage with other races, a peculiar people and pure...²¹

Tacitus justifies this view by arguing that nobody would voluntarily move to their dismal land. This notion of being indigenous to the land, of never having immigrated or intermarried with outsiders emphasises the view that the Germans were not derived from Celtic stock, but instead were separate race of people. However, it should be noted that Tacitus does not claim that the Gauls constructed the definition that was recognized and employed by the Romans, but rather he

²⁰ Tac. *Ger.* I. 2 (trans. M. Hutton, E. H. Warmington, *Loeb Classical Library*).

²¹ Tac. *Ger.* I. 2-4 (trans. M. Hutton, E. H. Warmington, *Loeb Classical Library*).

recorded that the Gauls were the first to call those tribes east of the Rhine *Germani*.²²

Modern scholars differ in their interpretations and evaluations of these ancient sources. In fact modern conclusions on the origins of the term *Germani* are entirely dependent upon how they view and present the importance of one source over another. Those scholars who favour the evidence put forward by Strabo argue that the name was constructed by the Romans in order to distinguish the Celtic tribes east of the Rhine and north of the Danube from the other tribes in north-western Europe.²³ An example of this can be observed in Carroll's *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome* in which she argues that the Romans constructed the term *Germani* and used it to distinguish the group from the rest of the Gauls, citing Strabo as her evidence.²⁴ It should be remembered that Strabo was not a Roman but a Syrian Greek and his theory, though logical and appealing, can be seen as the observation of an outsider. One could argue if this was indeed the truth there would be Roman sources to confirm it.

Several scholars agree with the evidence provided by Tacitus, arguing that the term *Germani* was not an original Roman construct. They theorise that the name was first coined by the Gauls, and it was only after the Romans had encountered the Germanic tribes east of the Rhine that they applied the name to

²² W. Pohl, *Die Germanen*, pp. 52-59; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4.

²³ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113; D. Williams, *Romans and Barbarians*, p. 70; C. L. Clay, 'Developing the 'Germani' in Roman Studies', in *TRAC 2007*, pp. 132-3.

²⁴ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113.

them.²⁵ These scholars do not claim that the Gauls constructed the definition that was recognised and used by the Romans, but rather were the first to call those tribes east of the Rhine *Germani*.²⁶ H. Wolfram argues that Caesar did not discover the Germans, but rather added solidity to the indistinct notions the Romans had had about the group.²⁷ Other scholars go as far and argue that Caesar invented the term *Germani* in order to reflect his own political and imperial agenda.²⁸ Whether or not the group actually existed before Caesars' arrival at the Rhine is outside the scope of this dissertation, what can be stated is that by the first century BC Caesar had recognised and identified a third group that existed as a separate ethnic identity between the Celts and the Sarmatian-Scythian steppe people, the *Germani*.²⁹

The Germania as described by Caesar, Strabo, and Tacitus and reproduced confidently on Agrippa's map never existed as a cultural, linguistic, or political entity at all.³⁰ Conversely, it clearly existed for the Romans, along with their clear, stable mental image of the "barbarian". The Romans inherently had an ideology of the foreigner, supported by the authority of literary tradition. This ideology affected how they perceived their neighbours even after first-hand observation. The terms *Germani*,

²⁵ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4; T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24.

²⁶ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4.

²⁷ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 5-6.

²⁸ A. A. Lund, *Die ersten Germanen- Ethnizität und Ethnogenese*, pp. 49, 82-100; W. Pohl, *Die Germanen*, pp. 12-13; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy- Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, p. 76; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 14-32; K. Sallman, *Die Geographie des älteren Plinius in ihrem Verhältnis zu Varro*, pp. 123-26.

²⁹ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 5-6.

³⁰ S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 76; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 14-32; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians 100 BC-AD 300*, 2nd ed., pp. 11-13; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 6-7. Conversely, Whittaker argues that the Rhine was never a cultural boundary, see C. R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: a social and economic study*, pp. 74-78; A. A. Lund, Versuch einer Gesamtinterpretation der "Germania" des Tacitus', in *ANRW*, vol. 2, 33.3, pp. 1954-1968.

Germanus, Germans, Germanic, and Germanic tribes are all references to a specific socio-political group that was situated by the Romans in the north of their Empire. *Germani*³¹ and *Germanus*³² as terms were intrinsically and interchangeably used by the Romans throughout their history to identify a specific group of peoples that dwelt near, along, or beyond the Rhine and Danube rivers, and delimited in the east by the Vistula and Don rivers.³³ This definition can be confirmed by two widely accepted concepts that featured prominently in Roman literature. Firstly, the Romans themselves clearly recognised and identified a *Germanus* (German) as someone who had either lived in Germania or hailed from there.³⁴ Secondly, the territory that the Romans demarcated as Germania was comprised of the tribes that lived within the boundaries of its four rivers: the Rhine, the Danube, the Vistula, and the Don.³⁵ These points are evident in the works of Caesar and Tacitus who indicate that the tribes east of the Rhine and north of the Danube were identified by the Romans as the *Germani*.³⁶

³¹ The word *Germani* is arguably not of Latin or Teutonic origin, but rather of Gaulish etymology meaning “neighbour”, see H. H. Howorth, ‘The Germans of Caesar’, in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 23, No. 91, pp. 422-426.

³² In Latin the word *Germanus* has a double connotation. In one sense it means “brother” or “near-relative”. The other use of the word, to denote a person belonging to a certain tribe or group of tribes whose country was hence called Germania, see H. H. Howorth, ‘The Germans of Caesar’, in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 23, No. 91, pp. 417-418.

³³ Caesar, *B. Gall.* I.1-2; Strabo, VII.I.1-3; Tac. *Ger.* 1. Other terms to identify these people were northern barbarians, northern threat. The eastern limits of Germania were never clearly defined in antiquity; see S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 15. I argue in my introduction that *Aquincum* can be considered the terminus of the northern frontier as it was the last position along the Danube that opposed a Germanic threat, defences eastward of *Aquincum* focused on opposing the Sarmatians and Dacian, see Strabo *Geo.* VII.1; Tac. *Ger.* 41. See also, Introduction p. 3 n. 6.

³⁴ Caesar *B. Gall.* I.1; Tac. *Ger.* 1-2; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 5; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 28-29; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, pp. 15, 75-76.

³⁵ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 5.

³⁶ Tac. *Ger.* 1-2; Caesar *B. Gall.* VI. 20-21.

Caesar's *de Bello Gallico* records on several occasions that the *Germani* resided east of the Rhine and he refers early in his work to '*Germani qui trans Rhenum incolunt*,'³⁷ and goes on to reinforce this concept writing that:

Caesar decided for many reasons that he must cross the Rhine. The most cogent reason was that, as he saw the Germans so easily induced to enter Gaul, he wished to make them fearful in turn for their own fortunes, by showing them that a Roman army could and durst cross the Rhine... To them [the *Germani*] Caesar sent envoys to demand the surrender of the men who had made war upon himself and Gaul. They replied that the Rhine marked the limit of the Roman Empire.³⁸

In these instances Caesar only marks the Rhine River as being the boundary that separated Gaul and the Germanic tribes. Understandably at this point Caesar only knew of the western boundary of the *Germani*, and so gave no indication in his works of knowing the extent of the region later recognised as Germania. Initially the Romans were naturally more focused on their immediate neighbours along the Rhine and the Danube. Knowledge about the entire Germanic realm and beyond only grew as a by-product of Rome's exposure and interaction with the Germanic tribes.³⁹

Tacitus' *Germania*, written in the late first century AD, gives a detailed ethnographic description of the people that the Romans recognised as the *Germani*. By

³⁷ Caesar *B. Gall.* I. I.

³⁸ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 16 (trans. H. J. Edwards, *Loeb Classical Library*).

³⁹ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 5; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 1.

this time the Romans had extended their empire up to the Danube River and with it came further knowledge of the Germanic tribes and their territory.⁴⁰ In his work Tacitus records that:

Germany as a whole is separated from the Gauls and from the Raetians and Pannonians by the rivers Rhine and Danube: from the Sarmatians and Dacians by the mutual misgivings or mountains: the rest of it is surrounded by the ocean.⁴¹

This gives a picture of the region demarcated as Germania and the *Germani* that dwelt within its limits. Furthermore, because Tacitus makes his scholarly techniques and use of sources known throughout this work it can be safely stated that this clearly represented the boundaries of Germania as far as the Roman political class were concerned during the period Tacitus was writing.

Therefore, the Romans' definition of the *Germani* can be seen as a construct, or at least a partial one, which was formed in order to distinguish between similar northern socio-political groups, and that initially the groups included in this ambiguous title did not recognise or even identify with these terms.⁴² Fundamental to this distinction is that the term *Germani* never included all the barbarians in Europe. The non-Romanised populations of Britain and Dacia, for example, were not Germanic peoples, and neither of them was called such by the Romans. Although the Romans may have borrowed the Germanic nomenclature from the conquered Gauls, they adopted the name for

⁴⁰ E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 1.

⁴¹ Tac. *Ger.* I. 1 (trans. M. Hutton, E. H. Warmington, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁴² M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, pp. 8-9; T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, pp. 21-2.

themselves and generalised it to the point of making the peoples east of the Rhine and north of the Danube into the Germans. Prior to that, Greek ethnography, the teacher of the Roman writers, had differentiated among the northern barbarians only the Scythians from the Celts, or at most had mentioned the Celto-Scyths in between the two. Only Caesar saw from personal experience that a third group of peoples existed as a separate identity between the Celts and the Sarmatian-Scythian steppe peoples.⁴³

Generally, both Greeks and Romans writers perceived a fundamental difference between civilised cultures and the groups they called barbarians—peoples of the regions who did not speak Latin or Greek and who practised customs they regarded as peculiar.⁴⁴ Wolfram expertly and concisely articulates the Roman perception of barbarians stating that:

Barbarians, as the conventional view had it, were slaves by nature; and since they lacked the second—the human—nature, they were closer to animals than human beings. They did not have a history but were simply part of the flow of natural history.⁴⁵

For the Romans the barbarians were less than human, they had no rights and the Romans recognised no consideration or obligations towards them.⁴⁶ The ancient authors represented the difference between a Roman or Greek and barbarian in one of two ways. They either portrayed the barbarians as savage, uncouth, uncivilised peoples who

⁴³ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁴ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 100; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁵ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 6.

⁴⁶ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 8-9; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 6-7.

behaved in a bizarre and abhorrent manner; or idealised them as noble, simple peoples unspoiled by corruption or decadent lifestyles.⁴⁷ On the other hand it can be argued that at one level anyone not a Roman was a barbarian, just as anyone not a Greek had been before Rome's rise to dominance, but not all barbarians were viewed as being the same.⁴⁸

This distinction can be seen with the Gallic and Germanic tribes. Caesar's account draws a sharp distinction between the *Galli* west of the Rhine and the *Germani* east of that river. The Gauls were, as barbarians went, relatively tractable material in Caesar's picture, but the Germans were simply savages. Caesar may have genuinely believed that the peoples east of the Rhine were different from those to the west.⁴⁹ Caesar drew a number of parallels between Gallic society and Rome, whilst the *Germani* in his accounts are treated as feral and uncontrollable wild men. To some extent, Caesar's portrayal of the Germans reflected a common attitude among Romans. Groups that inhabited lands near Rome were often regarded as being more like Romans in fundamental ways, while people further away were considered more different.⁵⁰ Therefore, in a Roman context there was a cultural, as well as a geographical, distinction being applied to separate the *Germani* from the neighbouring Gallic tribes.

When they first came into contact with the Romans in the late first century BC the *Germani* themselves had no knowledge of writing, and there is no certain evidence that

⁴⁷ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 100; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, pp. 76-78; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, pp. 67; D. Williams, *Romans and Barbarian*, p. 23.

⁴⁸ T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 19; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 100-101.

⁴⁹ M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, p. 26.

⁵⁰ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 101-102.

the literary arts were practised among them until after their settlement in the Roman provinces.⁵¹ However, this only remains the case if one considers the *notae* mentioned by Tacitus as not being a valid example of literacy. Many modern scholars tend to consider them as a form of runes, and as far as can be ascertained, nothing but a kind of private and personal code which was used only in connection with the casting of lots.⁵² There were of course records of German chieftains and other leaders sending letters on various occasions to Roman emperors and commanders, and these letters were written in Latin.⁵³ Several scholars, however, stress that not a single word of them need have been penned by a literate German; and suggest that Roman travellers, merchants, prisoners, slaves, and later, Christian priests, were all possible candidates to fulfil this role.⁵⁴ Thus, the early Germans could produce neither history nor the kinds of documents from which history might be written, and the available literary sources for the period are confined to the surviving works of Greek and Roman writers.⁵⁵

It was the Greeks and Romans who defined the categories Gaul (*Galli*) and German (*Germani*), associated them particular regions of temperate Europe, and ascribed specific characteristics to the people so designated.⁵⁶ These and other terms were first used by Greek and then Latin authors to discuss various cultural differences among the foreign tribes living the northern Europe. As discussed earlier, the term *Germani* may have originated among certain Celts and, through their contacts, was transferred to the Greeks. Observing Tacitus' claim that the name *Germani* 'is said to

⁵¹ M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, p. 24; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 99-100; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 7; D. Williams, *Romans and Barbarians*, p. 78.

⁵² Tacitus, *Ger.* x. 1, see also n. 7; for examples of modern scholars opinion of the *notae*, see E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 7.

⁵³ For specific examples, see Tac. *Ann.* II. 63. I, 88.I; Dio, LXVIII. 8. I; Amm. Marc. XXIX 4.7, XXXI 15.5.

⁵⁴ M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, p. 24; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Barbarians*, p. 7.

⁵⁵ M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, p. 24.

⁵⁶ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 102.

have been only recently applied to the country', and what was once the name of one tribe, 'not of the entire race, gradually came into general use in the wider sense'.⁵⁷ The 'recent' application of the name may not have predated the first century BC when contact between Rome and the Germanic peoples became firmly established. Carroll suggests that if this was indeed the case then the Romans played a role in the ethnogenesis of the Germans by identifying them as a specific group.⁵⁸ Even if this was not the case it would be reasonable to express the view that the Romans played a significant role in the construction and consolidation of tribal groups.

Tacitus' blanket term *Germani* referred to the *Treveri*, *Nervii*, *Ubii*, *Vangiones*, *Triboci*, *Nemetes*, *Batavi*, *Chatti*, *Usipetes*, *Tencteri*, *Bructeri*, *Frisii*, *Chauci*, *Cherusci* and *Cimbri*. Many of these Germanic tribes appear as historic peoples for the first time when they came in contact with Rome, and many of them were a mixture of various, probably unnamed, peoples and clans that were given the name of the dominant or favoured group by the Romans. The Roman, state-driven establishment of distinct tribal territories as *civitates* with definite boundaries further contributed to cultivating group identities. As a result, external agency could well have influenced each group's own perception of themselves.⁵⁹ But there is no indication that all these tribes really thought of themselves as belonging to the *Germani*.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Tac. Ger. II. M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113.

⁵⁸ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113.

⁵⁹ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113.

⁶⁰ C. L. Clay, 'Developing the 'Germani' in Roman Studies', in *TRAC 2007*, p. 132; R. Hachmann, *The Germanic People*, p. 16; M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, pp. 8-9; T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, pp. 21-2.

All evidence suggests that this common identity did not exist in the minds of Germanic peoples.⁶¹ Instead, they identified themselves at a tribal level in terms of nomenclature, and not with the ethnonym *Galli* or *Celtae*.⁶² Two examples can clearly illustrate this. The first can be seen in the communal cemetery of the imperial bodyguard. This bodyguard consisted of men who were responsible for the personal safety of the Emperor and included recruits from the lower Rhine, including the *Baetasii*, *Frisii*, *Batavi*, and *Ubii*. For the Romans, they were the homogeneous German bodyguard, the *Germani corporis custodes*.⁶³ All members of the bodyguard were buried together in a communal cemetery on the opposite bank of the Tiber River in Rome, and their gravestones of similar design did indeed signify a strong group identity.⁶⁴ The additional information on the nationality of the deceased, possibly supplied by their comrades, differentiated the individual men within that group. Men are named, for example, as *natione Unius* or *natione Batavus*, and thus this information identified those members of the Imperial bodyguard as ethnic Germans of a particular people.⁶⁵ This reflects the way these men perceived their ethnicity, as members of a specific native group, even if joined by external Roman agency to a larger national group. It cannot be demonstrated that one of the main attributes of ethnic community, a collective proper name, was used by the Germanic peoples.

⁶¹ C. L. Clay, 'Developing the 'Germani' in Roman Studies', in *TRAC 2007*, p. 132; R. Hachmann, *The Germanic People*, p. 16; M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, pp. 8-9; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, pp. 112-113; T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24; H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians*, pp. 21-2.

⁶² M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 115.

⁶³ Suet. *Galba* 12; *Aug.*, 23; *Tib.*, 17; Tac. *Ann.* 15.58; Dio, LVI. 23.

⁶⁴ N. Roymans, *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power: the Batavians in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 28; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113.

⁶⁵ *Batavi*: CIL VI 8802, 8803, 8804, 8807; AE (1952) 146, 147, 148, 149, (1968) 32; *Frisii*: CIL VI 4342, VI 4343; *Baetasii*: CIL VI 8808; *Ubii*: CIL VI 8809. H. Bellen, *Die Germanische Leibwache der Römischen Kaiser des Julisch-Claudischen Hauses*, p. 36; C. L. Clay, 'Developing the 'Germani' in Roman Studies', in *TRAC 2007*, p. 136.

The second example can be observed in the numerous inscriptions that record the origin of Germanic people throughout the Empire. These inscriptions consistently cite the tribal affiliation of the persons in question. An example of this is seen in a dedication on a votive altar of a grain merchant, Marcus Liberius Victor, residing in *Nijmegen* who identifies himself as ‘*cives Nervius*’.⁶⁶ A further example is seen on a dedicated of an altar to Nehalennia by a salt merchant, Marcus Exginggius Agricola, who resided in *Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium* and identified as a *Treverus*.⁶⁷ Many tribal affiliations were recorded in the sources, all of which cite their tribal affiliation rather than using the term *Germani*. Woolf argues that these inscriptions are attempts by the deceased to assert their own identity in the Roman world.⁶⁸ The consolidation of the various ethnic units in a common German identity (*Germani*) seems to be a Roman political and ideological construct, and as far as we know only the Romans explicitly used the term.

Gradually as Rome became more and more deeply involved with creating and maintaining political, economic, and cultural interaction with its northern neighbours, more precise terms of identification largely superseded Celt and German in Roman usage. Generally this took the form of specific tribal names such as *Bructeri*, *Chatti*, *Chauci*, and the *Marcomanni*. The terms *Galli* and *Germani*, ultimately, never fell completely out of favour in Roman literature.⁶⁹ All such general terms had little practical application. The gradual replacement of general terminology by more specific names also corresponded to the increasingly cohesive nature of the groups that

⁶⁶ *CIL* 13.8725.

⁶⁷ Altar kept at the Rijksmuseum in Oudheden, Netherlands. C. L. Clay, ‘Developing the ‘*Germani*’ in Roman Studies’, in *TRAC* 2007, p. 132; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans*, p. 113.

⁶⁸ G. Woolf, *Becoming Roman: the Origins of Provincial Civilisation in Gaul*, p. 78.

⁶⁹ T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24.

developed among barbarians along the frontiers, Germanic in speech or not. Burns argues that many, perhaps all, of these regional and local groups of barbarians owed their existence to direct or indirect Roman influence.⁷⁰ These developments took centuries, but the literary uses of “German” and of “barbarian” never lapsed entirely.⁷¹

How native peoples identified or thought of themselves could differ from the way in which they were identified by the Romans. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the groups whom the classical writers referred to as Gauls ever felt that they belonged to a common people, nor that those Caesar and Tacitus called Germans saw themselves as members of a distinct socio-political group.⁷² Considered from the perspective of the barbarians, the terms *Germani* and *Galli* in particular were expressions that those being described very rarely if ever used among themselves.⁷³ As far as can be ascertained from the limited evidence it was only on Roman territory that a German would call himself or his fellow tribesmen *Germanus*, as the Romans did. That is, only a German on Roman soil who was imitating Roman usage would use the word *Germanus* to refer to himself or his people.⁷⁴

The origin of the term *Germani* is thus a Roman construct, which may have been adopted by the Romans from the Gallic tribes, during Julius Caesar’s Gallic campaigns. If so, the term was significantly expanded upon, and to some extent over-simplified, by the Romans. There was no real ‘barbarian’ group that identified themselves as *Germani* or Germanic. The innumerable tribes classed as *Germani* by the Romans did not

⁷⁰ T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24.

⁷¹ T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24

⁷² M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, p. 8; P.S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 102.

⁷³ W. Pohl, *Die Germanen*, pp. 50-51; T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians*, p. 24.

⁷⁴ H. Wolfram, *The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples*, p. 4.

identify themselves with this construct. This can be confirmed through an examination of the epigraphic evidence which reveals that the 'Germanic' tribesmen identified themselves based on their specific tribe, and not as belonging to the *Germani*. Although there are indeed several references in the historical record that cite Germanic tribesmen as referring to himself and/or his people as *Germanus*, as the Romans did. Only a German in Roman territory who was imitating Roman usage would use the term *Germani*, and all its associated connotations, to refer to himself or his people. In contrast, for the Romans the *Germani* were a distinct group of people that dwelt near, along, or beyond the Rhine and Danube rivers, and Roman defences developed accordingly to oppose the threats they represented.

For the purpose of this dissertation the terms *Germani*, Germanic, and all other variants of the term, will be used along with their specific tribal names (to aid in distinguishing them from each other). The justification for this convention is the fact that the Romans identified the Germanic peoples as a singular group, albeit with competing tribal allegiances which caused rifts amongst the various tribes and thus prevented them from forming one united front. Furthermore, the Romans treated and reacted as though the Germanic tribes as a whole were a threat, even though at times they did make specific reference to a particular tribe. Overall, it can be stated that the Romans genuinely feared that the tribes would unite and move against Rome on mass. Therefore, when the *Germani* are referred to in this work, this usage is alluding to the socio-political group as defined and perceived by the contemporary Romans of the period.

CHAPTER TWO

Development of Defences Against the *Germani* – Differences Between Border, ‘Buffer Zone’, Frontier, and ‘*Limes*’.

This chapter explores and defines the development of Roman defences against the *Germani*, establishing the meaning of a border, ‘buffer zone’, frontier and the ‘*Limes*’. The debates that surround the study of Roman frontiers and the scholarship’s main points of contention will also be outlined and examined. Overall, this chapter will identify and define the specific points of evolution in Rome’s defence against the Germanic tribes along the Rhine and Danube rivers. This chapter will be divided into: the sources for frontiers, the scholarship and debates surrounding the developments of the frontiers, the use and definition of the word ‘*Limes*’, and the definitions of border, ‘buffer zone’, frontier and ‘*Limes*’ in the context of this dissertation.

Ancient Sources on Frontiers

Frustratingly, specific references to the frontiers as a concept do not feature frequently in the literary sources for the Roman Empire. In fact, literary evidence for the frontiers is so absent that there is only one clear reference regarding the construction of Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall, and one uncertain reference to the German *limes*, all of which were written several hundred years after the events to which they relate. There are some statements in the sources that are so opaque to modern scholars that many still argue about their meaning. An example can be seen with a reference in the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* regarding the creation of a palisade under Hadrian. This mention is not directly linked to the description of Hadrian’s visit to Germania and

so scholars have argued as to when this significant development took place.¹ A prominent factor that affects modern scholars' understanding of the frontiers is the tendency of Roman historians to rarely provide details regarding the destruction of military installations, they merely mention that the frontier was crossed, and provide no description of the nature of the frontier crossed.² There is still important information and evidence contained in the ancient sources, for some literary sources do provide vital information on how frontiers functioned. Overall, due to the fragmented nature of the literary sources, specifically regarding the developments along the frontiers means that other evidence must be utilised to construct a picture of the frontiers.

Modern Scholarship: Frontiers and Strategy

This thesis is limited in its scope and purpose; it is not possible to engage with such an extensive debate as that which surrounds the reality and purpose of frontiers within the confines of this dissertation. Therefore, before examining the interaction of the Romans and the *Germani* and the evolution of the frontiers, it is necessary to acknowledge and briefly outline the academic debate surrounding frontiers, and to identify the stages of frontier development. Literally hundreds of historians and archaeologists have participated in the argument regarding Roman frontiers, including notable scholars such as Luttwak, Baatz, Isaac, Mann, Breeze, Hanson, Elton, Whittaker, and Wells, to name but a few.³ The scholarly debate surrounding this subject

¹ SHA *vita Hadr.* xi, 2; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 7; D. J. Breeze, and B. Dobson, 'Hadrian's Wall: Some Problems', *Britannia*, vol. 3, 1972, pp. 182–208.

² D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 7.

³ E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, 1976; D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, 2011; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, 1972; D. Baatz, *Der römische Limes: Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau*, 2000; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, 1996; C. R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study*, 1997; C. R. Whittaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004; B. Isaac, *The limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East*, Revised Edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993; S. James, 'Writing the Legions: The Development and Future of Roman Military Studies in Britain', in *The Archaeological*

has created a number of organisations/groups (UNESCO World Heritage Centre, FRE project, Deutsche Limes-Straße) and conferences devoted to the regular consideration of the Roman frontier. Preeminent amongst these is the International Congress of Roman Frontiers Studies (also known as the *Limeskongress*), whose published proceedings in a series of *Limes* volumes (also titled *Roman Frontier Studies*), has showcased the shifting trends and debate since its inception in 1949.

The scholarship and the debates which surround the study of Roman frontiers is extensive and multifaceted, and in order to summarise the field of study concisely and adequately this dissertation will draw and focus upon three main works: M. Vrba's *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, N. Hodgson's 'The Military Limes', and E. L. Wheeler's 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I'. In his work Vrba gives an exemplary written summary on the topic which provides a detailed account of the various debates, their development and their current state.⁴ Hodgson's work provides the framework within which the term '*limes*'⁵ can be defined and employed in an academic treatise.⁶ Whilst Wheeler's article gives the most detailed, albeit hostile, critique of the works of Isaac and Whittaker.⁷

Journal 159, 2002; J. C. Mann, 'The Frontiers of the Principate', *ANRW* II (1), 1974; W.S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman frontiers', in J. C. Barrett, A. P. Fitzpatrick and L. Macinnes (eds.), *Barbarians and Romans in North-West Europe: From the later Republic to late Antiquity*; W. S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers Revisited', 2014.

⁴ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, BAR INT. SER. 1881, Oxford, 2008.

⁵ In Hodgson's work the term *limes* is italicised and placed in quotation marks in order to distinguish it from its strict definition, see N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', PhD diss., University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle, 1993, pp. 3, 126-131. Similarly, this convention is used in this dissertation, see details below.

⁶ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', PhD diss., University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle, 1993.

⁷ E. Wheeler, 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I', *The Journal of Military History* 57 no. 1, 1993, pp. 7-41.

Initially, it should be clearly established that without doubt the Romans had vast, lengthy frontiers and the majority of their resources were devoted to maintaining and defending them; the literary and archaeological evidence clearly establishes this, and the majority of modern scholarship supports this proposition. The scholarly debate does not arise from this point, but rather from whether the Romans had a preconceived notion concerning what frontiers should be and whether they had a defined policy concerning them.⁸ Attempts have been ventured by some scholars to show that the Romans did in fact have a strategy, most notably as put forward by E. Luttwak, and more recently, but in a different way, by S. Mattern.⁹ Luttwak's thesis that the Romans had a 'grand strategy' for the establishment and maintenance of the frontier that evolved over time from a mobile offensive military line to that of a static linear defence ignited intense scholarly debate.¹⁰ Ever since the publication of his theories, various scholars, notably J. Mann, F. Millar, B. Isaac, and C. Whittaker, have attempted to disprove and dismantle them, by arguing that the Romans did not have a predefined strategy for maintaining the frontier nor were they embroiled within a mindset of defence.¹¹

⁸ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, BAR INT. SER. 1881, Oxford, 2008, p. 79.

⁹ E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*; S. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, 1999, pp. xii, 81-2.

¹⁰ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, BAR INT. SER. 1881, Oxford, 2008, p. 79; E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, pp. 4-5, 57, 60, 192-3; S. James, 'Writing the Legions: The Development and Future of Roman Military Studies in Britain', p. 29; C. R. Whittaker, *Rome and Its Frontiers: The Dynamics of Empire*, 2004, p. 6. Luttwak was not alone in this view, see S. James, 'Writing the Legions: The Development and Future of Roman Military Studies in Britain', pp. 10, 11-12.

¹¹ J. Mann, 'Power, force and the frontiers of the empire', *JRS* 69, 1979; F. Millar, 'Emperors, frontiers and foreign relations', *Britannia* 13, 1982; C. R. Whittaker, 'Supplying the System: Frontiers and Beyond', in *Barbarians and Romans in North-West Europe*, J. C. Barrett, A. P. Fitzpatrick, and L. Macinnes, (eds.) BAR International Series 471, Oxford, 1989, p. 64; *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994, pp. 17-18, 35, 62-70; *Rome and Its Frontiers: The Dynamics of Empire*, 2004, 28-29; B. Isaac, *The limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East*, 1993; S. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999, pp. 89, 91, 101, 109, 112, 115-116; S. James, 'Writing the Legions: The Development and Future of Roman Military Studies in Britain', 2002, p. 29. See also, E. Wheeler, 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of

Conversely, there are scholars who reject the outright denial of Roman strategy and mindset of defence and support the case for Roman ‘grand strategy’.¹² Recently, Kagan has defended the theory of Roman ‘grand strategy’; whilst not completely redeeming Luttwak’s original thesis in its entirety, she nonetheless weakens its critics’ strict denial of its existence and establishes the grounds by which Roman ‘grand strategy’ can be identified and argued.¹³ In summary, Kagan argues that ‘grand strategy’ is not equivalent to long-term planning, nor does it imply that Rome had a clearly defined and all encompassing policy that dictated its actions far into the future.¹⁴ Furthermore, Kagan identifies a misconception amongst scholars surrounding the definition of ‘grand strategy’, whereby many detractors see strategy in the modern sense anachronistically, rather than in the context of a strict definition.¹⁵ By defining Roman ‘grand strategy’ in its most general and all-encompassing form, i.e. as being ‘the use of all of the state’s resources to achieve all of the state’s major security objectives,’¹⁶ Kagan has provided a framework that allows Roman defensive strategy to be identified and examined. Therefore in the words of Kagan, ‘grand strategy’ can now be viewed as:

Roman Strategy: Part I’, *The Journal of Military History* 57 no. 1, 1993, pp. 7-41; ‘Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part II’, *The Journal of Military History* 57 no. 2, 1993, pp. 215-240.

¹² K. Kagan, ‘Redefining Roman Grand Strategy’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 333-362; E. Wheeler, ‘Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 57 no. 1, 1993, pp. 7-41; S. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, 1999, pp. xii, 81-2.

¹³ K. Kagan, ‘Redefining Roman Grand Strategy’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 333-335.

¹⁴ K. Kagan, ‘Redefining Roman Grand Strategy’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), p. 347

¹⁵ K. Kagan, ‘Redefining Roman Grand Strategy’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 347-350.

¹⁶ K. Kagan, ‘Redefining Roman Grand Strategy’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), p. 348.

...involving the setting of a state's objectives and of priorities among those objectives, allocating resources amongst them, and choosing the best policy instruments to pursue them.¹⁷

This process was clearly being undertaken by the emperors of Rome. One factor that demonstrates this is the patterns of troop movements, undertaken due to conquest, defence, or crisis. The patterns of troop movements demonstrates that emperors made conscious decisions about how to distribute their limited force and consciously worried about how their actions affected stability and security throughout the empire. Clearly emperors made decisions about how best to allocate resources to meet objectives empire-wide.¹⁸ Setting priorities among objectives and allocated resources according to need is clear proof that the Romans made grand-strategic decisions.

In connection with the concept of a grand strategy has been the debate on whether the frontiers were open or closed. According to Vrbica, a closed frontier acted as a barrier, a clearly marked linear boundary for defence, constructed to keep the 'barbarians' out. Open frontiers were merely a marker, a point of absolute Roman control. Open frontiers were permeable, allowing movement and influence in both directions. Scholarship surrounding this topic has always had outside influences affecting its interpretation. In the nineteenth century the prominence of ideas such as nationalism, imperialism, colonialism and the presence of permanent heavily defended European frontiers greatly influenced the views of scholars, thus their support for a

¹⁷ K. Kagan, 'Redefining Roman Grand Strategy', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), p. 348.

¹⁸ K. Kagan, 'Redefining Roman Grand Strategy', *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), p. 348.

closed Roman frontier.¹⁹ Even in the twentieth century some scholars, such as Luttwak, were influenced by events and conditions of the Cold War, again supporting the view of the Roman frontier as a physical barrier, deliberately constructed through a policy to defend the Roman Empire against the external threat.²⁰

Recent scholarship has argued that the simplistic definitions of the frontier being open or closed, or the idea that it was merely a linear boundary made up of forts and defensive works is flawed: the Roman frontier was far more complex. Hanson and Whittaker have extensively argued that the frontier was far more permeable than previously thought.²¹ Evidence shows regular Roman activity beyond the frontiers, both military and civilian, whilst also indicating that those who lived beyond the border had markets and work within the empire.²² The frontier has come to be seen as a zone that straddled both sides of a physical boundary, where the surrounding inhabitants are seen as an amalgam of the cultures that share a border. Thus the zone was something distinct.²³ Furthermore, due to the distinct nature of the zone and the differing situations that existed along its length at any given point, it also meant that there was neither a

¹⁹ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 79; C. R. Whitaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, 1994, pp. 2-4; *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004, p. 6-11; P. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp. 125-6; R. Hingley, *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen*, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 36-37; see also D. Williams, *The Reach of Rome*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996, pp. xviii-xix.

²⁰ P. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, 1999, p. 126; E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 79.

²¹ W. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers', in *Barbarians and Romans in North-West Europe*, 1989, p. 60; C. R. Whitaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004, p. 9.

²² E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 79.

²³ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 79; P. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, 1999, p. 126; 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', *Journal of Archaeological Research* 13 no. 1, 2005, p. 50; C. R. Whitaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004, pp. 5-6.

consistent pattern of growth nor a standard arrangement along the frontiers. Combined with the archaeological record, the limited evidence provided by the sources indicates that the developments along the Rhine and Danube emerged in an *ad-hoc* basis in response to specific threats or events.²⁴ However, several factors can be identified which did and define the form that the frontier would take in any area, such as geography, the rate of cultural development in any specific region, and most importantly military necessity (defence against a discernible level of threat).²⁵

Frontiers cannot be identified simplistically as either “open” or “closed”. Elements of both definitions can be observed along the Rhine and Danube to varying degrees throughout their development. Initially the rivers marked a rough defensive line along which Roman forces were deployed in order to defend against a possible Germanic incursion whilst retaining the ability for future reconquest; but this was not an impenetrable barrier. Later, the certainty of reconquest was abandoned and the Romans adopted strict defensive positions on the left bank of the Rhine and on the south bank of the Danube. This was a military frontier; the Romans identified and set limits on territory that was under their direct control and restricted outside influence and access. Again, this was not a closed barrier as movement was not eliminated but controlled and monitored. Subsequently, the military frontier evolved further still; garrisons were made permanent and were dispersed strategically along the frontier, military roads and watchtowers were constructed, the overall defensive position was solidified and strengthened, swift communication and transportation links were established between

²⁴ K. Kagan, ‘Redefining Roman Grand Strategy’, *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 70, No 2 (Apr., 2006), p. 347.

²⁵ D. Potter, ‘Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy’, in *The American Journal of Philology*, vol. 113, No. 2, 1992, p. 296.

frontiers and their defending forces: these advancements signalled the emergence of the ‘*Limes*’.²⁶ At this stage Roman defences can be viewed as being ‘closed’. However, at no stage was the frontier a barrier, whereby all outside peoples were prevented from crossing into Roman territory. Such an undertaking was beyond Roman comprehension or capabilities. There was always some movement along Roman defences, but to view them as being ‘open’ is both misleading and simplistic; interaction and movement were always strictly controlled and limited.

Modern Scholarship: *Limes*

Interconnected with the view of the Roman frontier being an open and permeable zone, and thus not a closed linear defence, is the reassessment of the meaning of the term *limes*. In the nineteenth century, the term was initially accepted as meaning a system of defence along the border of the empire, with permanent forts and road systems that created a sealed barrier.²⁷ Up until the publication of Isaac’s article, ‘The Meaning of the Terms *Limes* and *Limitanei*’ in 1988, few scholars setting out to describe the military works examined in this thesis would have hesitated to use the term *limes* to describe them.²⁸ This definition continued to influence the interpretation and understanding of how the Roman frontier functioned well into the twentieth century. Vrba perceives this as a misconception, describing it as having ‘coloured the discussions about frontiers as static and too focused on the defences’.²⁹ He bases his view on the research of Isaac and Forni who argued that the term was used in the first-

²⁶ The term ‘*Limes*’ and the debate that surrounds its meaning and usage will be discussed and defined below.

²⁷ B. Isaac, ‘The Meaning of the Terms *Limes* and *Limitanei*’, in *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, p. 125; N. Hodgson, ‘The Military *Limes*: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200’, p. 127. This view was championed by Mommsen, see T. Mommsen, ‘Der Begriff des *Limes*’, *Gesammelte Schriften* V, 1908, pp. 456-64.

²⁸ N. Hodgson, ‘The Military *Limes*: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200’, p. 127.

²⁹ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 79.

third centuries AD to denote a road network or demarcated land border; references to military forces were only given in direction association with the road network.³⁰ According to those scholars the term was not used to refer to military installations, such as forts, walls, dykes, or towers.³¹ Furthermore, Isaac argues that there is no evidence to support the view that the *limes* correlates to the modern concept of a fortified border, with forts and military organisation.³² Wheeler is critical of this view and argues that Isaac:

...wishes to divorce this term from any connection with defence, since *limes* is not directly equated with military structures in ancient sources. Hence political borders are irrelevant: boundary stones marked provincial borders, but none showed where the Empire ended.³³

Wheeler argues that to accept Isaac's argument is to accept the idea that there were no definite lines of defence.³⁴ Vrba argues that this view goes too far, and points out that the premise behind Isaac's argument is a clear distinction between the political and military boundary, and that the term *limes* denotes political connotations rather than a strict military purpose. Vrba suggests that Wheeler has mistakenly perceived the *limes*, frontiers, and borders as being essentially the same device, using the terms interchangeably and effectively accepting the political boundary and the military border

³⁰ B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, pp. 125-147; G. Forni, "'limes': nozioni e nomenclature", in M. Sordi, (ed.), *Il confine nel mondo classico*, Milan, 1987, pp. 272-294.

³¹ B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, p. 146; G. Forni, "'Limes": nozioni e nomenclature', in M. Sordi, (ed.), *Il confine nel mondo classico*, Milan, 1987, pp. 282-284; W. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers', 1989, p. 55.

³² B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, p. 146.

³³ E. Wheeler, 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I', *The Journal of Military History* 57 no. 1, 1993, p. 27.

³⁴ E. Wheeler, 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I', *The Journal of Military History* 57 no. 1, 1993, p. 27. More recently Breeze is in agreement of Wheeler, see D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. xviii-xix.

as the same thing.³⁵ Clearly this is not the case; all three terms have different definitions and denote separate developments and functions in Rome's defence.

Due to the general acceptance amongst scholars of Isaac's argument it must be acknowledged that according to the current evidence the term *limes* did not refer to a line of permanent forts and road systems that created a closed barrier as defined by the scholarship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.³⁶ However, this marks the traditional definition and usage of the term and does not adequately reflect the reality of the situation that existed along the Rhine and Danube. Developments along the Rhine and Danube clearly indicate the beginning of a third phase of defence against the *Germani*, the first phase being the buffer zones and the second the military frontiers.³⁷ Both Isaac and Vrba identify this and attest to a distinct period of development occurring in the region.³⁸ Due to this acknowledgment and acceptance by other scholars of this development along the frontiers a deeper examination of two works will be undertaken in order to justify the use of the term '*limes*' in the title of this work and throughout this dissertation: Isaac's argument against the usage of the term, and the compelling case put forward by Hodgson for its acceptable restricted use.

In Isaac's argument, it must be emphasised, there is currently no evidence for the word *limes* being used in reference to specific military purposes must be accepted. In

³⁵ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, p. 80.

³⁶ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, p. 80.

³⁷ The first phase being the initial 'buffer zones' and the second the development into the military frontiers. All three phases are described and discussed in detail below.

³⁸ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, p. 79; B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms *Limes* and *Limitanei*', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, pp. 125-138.

Britain, both Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall were always referred to as a *vallum* in inscriptions. Along the Rhine and Danube individual towers are referred to as *burgus*. Furthermore, all references in the surviving sources to *limites* being constructed or laid out almost certainly use the term in the sense of a road.³⁹ In contrast, Hodgson challenges the supposed clear definition offered by Isaac. He suggests that it is possible that in the few sources which refer to *limites* in the sense of land boundaries of the empire (about which there is no inherent disagreement in these examples), that 'the concepts of 'frontier system' and 'demarcated boundary' are rather more blurred than Isaac allows'.⁴⁰ For example, in the following passage from the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*:

...in plurimis locis, in quibus barbari non fluminibus sed
limitibus dividuntur, stipitibus magnis in modum muralis saepris
funditus iactis atque conexis barbaros separavit.⁴¹

Isaac argues that *limitibus* cannot refer to military installations, because the passage refers to something – a notional, demarcated boundary – that existed before Hadrian's palisade. He wrote that, 'From the wording it is clear that it was called *limes* before Hadrian built a permanent structure to mark it as such'.⁴² Hodgson, however, argues that Hadrian's palisade was merely an augmentation of a continuous frontier line physically demarcated by watchtowers and patrol tracks since the Flavian period. He argues that

³⁹ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', p. 127; B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, p. 125.

⁴⁰ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', p. 127.

⁴¹ SHA *vita Hadr.* 12. Translated as '...in many regions where the barbarians are held back not by rivers but by artificial barriers, Hadrian shut them off by means of high stakes planted deep in the ground and fastened together in the manner of a palisade'.

⁴² B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, p. 128.

the passage could be taken literally as saying ‘where not rivers, but watchtower systems, existed, Hadrian added a palisade’.⁴³

Hodgson identifies two major difficulties with seeing the *limes* as an abstract entity or concept with no relation to the military installations except coincidence of site. Firstly, apart from the watchtower system of the two Germanies and Raetia, or the three discernible linear frontier systems of Britain, nothing else demarcates the boundary that was the *limes*. Surely, a writer with the concept of *limes* in his mind, seeking to place it in its real setting, would first think of these linear arrangements of military installations, just as Aelius Aristides did when he sought to express the nature of the frontiers by referring to forts, walls and garrisons in a ring around the world.⁴⁴ Secondly, the decision that there would be no further advance, and thus the definition of the boundary of a province such as Upper and Lower Germania, were both intimately linked with the building of artificial frontier systems. Once the decision had been made, it was the military that demarcated the boundary on the ground in its own way, for the purpose of control and security. There were no known land frontiers, identified to have possessed a *limes*, which did not have the earliest demarcation of provincial boundary set out by the military.⁴⁵ Therefore, it seems impossible to rule out the possibility that in a passage such as the following, the term *limes* conveys undertones of a line physically demarcated by the military:

⁴³ N. Hodgson, ‘The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200’, pp. 127-8.

⁴⁴ Ael. Arist. *Ad Romam* 81-2.

⁴⁵ N. Hodgson, ‘The Military Limes: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200’, p. 128.

[the emperor] per limitem Raetiae ad hostes extirpandos
barbarorum terram introiturus est.⁴⁶

In Upper Germania, especially before the construction of the palisade, there would have been no convenient catch-all term as existed in Britain, and in fact there is no notion how Romans on the ground, if they did not use the term *limes*, could have referred to a system of installations forming an interconnected linear frontier.⁴⁷

An observation of Isaac's helps to support the possibility that frontier installations could be included in the concept of *limes*. On the basis of *Scriptores Historiae Augustae Vita Hadriani* 12 Isaac points out that *limes* refers strictly to land boundaries, and not to rivers.⁴⁸ This is redolent of the conclusion arrived in Hodgson's thesis, that:

...formal linear frontier systems do not occur on the great river frontiers (where there are chains of forts, but the river itself takes the place of a cordon of watchtowers). The only provinces in the empire with demarcated land boundaries (Isaac's *limites*) are Britain, Upper Germany, Raetia and Dacia; precisely where archaeologically distinctive continuous frontiers occur.

This again suggests that the land boundary or *limes* was seen as demarcated by the early watchtower frontiers and the system into which they developed. The only addition to this description would be the inclusion of the land frontier along the Lower Rhine that

⁴⁶ *ILS* 451.

⁴⁷ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', pp. 128-9.

⁴⁸ B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS*, vol. 78, 1988, p. 128.

was established under Claudius.⁴⁹ Therefore, there is no example of a source referring to a *limes* in the sense of a boundary in circumstances where the frontier remained unsettled, or military installations had not yet formed a linear disposition – as, for example, the Lower Rhine under Claudius or the Upper Rhine under the Flavians.⁵⁰

Hodgson suggests that although *limes* may never have been used to refer to particular installations, such as the network of forts and watchtowers or later the German palisade, in territories where military setback led to the delineation of a land boundary or *limes*, this, and the military works which defined it, were in practice inseparable.⁵¹ This thesis advocates his stance. Moreover, it must be acknowledged that there is no other term known which commentators could have used to refer to the whole system of fortified land boundaries. Therefore, despite the modern anachronistic interpretation of the term *limes* it nonetheless fulfils the requirements of denoting the next stage of Roman defence against the Germanic tribes separating it from its previous phase as a military frontier and will be used as such in this work. Additionally, in order to further separate the use of the term *limes*, due to its established definition and apparent connotations, it will be substituted with the term '*Limes*'⁵² which will be used in the title of this work and throughout the extent of this dissertation.

⁴⁹ The presence of a land frontier along the lower Rhine under Claudius is discussed in chapter nine.

⁵⁰ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', pp. 129-130.

⁵¹ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', p. 130.

⁵² In this dissertation the term *limes* is capitalised, italicised and placed in quotation marks in order to distinguish it from its strict definition.

This last section explores the definition and concepts that surround the terms border and frontier. Initially, it must be made clear that ‘frontier’ is different from border or boundary. As mentioned above, scholars have long used the terms interchangeably, whilst others have noted in their studies their confusion over which term to employ.⁵³ Scholars put forward many definitions of a Roman border and or a frontier. Vrba defines the difference between a border and a frontier as being:

...a border or boundary is a fixed point, it can be a river,
mountain range or even an agreed demarcation on a map,
conversely a frontier extends beyond the confines of a border,
having a zone of influence both sides of the boundary.⁵⁴

Thompson and Lamar defined it as, ‘a territory or zone of interaction between two previously distinct societies’.⁵⁵ Elton described it as a series of overlapping zones, each different, represented by Roman soldiers, Roman civilians, local natives, and barbarians, who each had their own boundaries made up of political, social, ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic, and military elements.⁵⁶ Similarly, Whittaker views the frontier as the edge of society, where the boundaries of different cultures interact through exchange within social and economic systems; control and demarcation of territory still had an important function, making the frontier a dynamic but ill-defined zone of power.⁵⁷ Conversely, Breeze and Dobson offer three possible definitions for the

⁵³ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 80; W. Hanson, ‘The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers’, 1989, p. 55; C. R. Whittaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004, p. 5.

⁵⁴ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 80; P. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, 1999, p. 126.

⁵⁵ L. Thompson and H. Lamar, ‘Comparative Frontier History’, in *The Frontier in History*, H. Lamar and L. Thompson, (eds.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981, p. 7.

⁵⁶ H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1996, pp. 4, 5.

⁵⁷ C. R. Whittaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004, pp. 5-6.

term frontier in relation to Roman strategy – it can be defined as: a political boundary, a military measure designed to defend the province, or “... [a] natural or artificial obstacle which marks a clear boundary”.⁵⁸ Clearly many scholars, such as Whittaker, Elton, and Vrba, attribute a deeper interconnectedness existing between Rome and those outside the demarcated area under their control, seeing the frontier as a point of convergence. Other scholars, such as Breeze, Luttwak, and Dobson, see a frontier as a defended point of demarcation indicating the extent of Rome’s direct control.

Modern Scholarship: Frontiers and Boundaries

Arguments put forward by Wells, Elton, and Whittaker all stem from modern frontier studies and an analysis of frontiers of the United States, South Africa, and the Spanish colonisation in the Americas.⁵⁹ Vrba correctly identifies that the concepts put forward by these scholars can be viewed as a modified form of Lightfoot and Martinez’s idea that the frontier is a zone of, ‘cultural interfaces in which cross-cutting and overlapping social units can be defined and recombined at different spatial and temporal scales of analysis’.⁶⁰ Whittaker, Wells, and Elton, can be categorised as those that see the frontier as a place where multiple ethnic, class, and social groups come into contact and whose varied backgrounds, interests, and motivations provide a zone conducive to interaction between members of all the groups that ‘cross-cut traditionally defined boundaries’.⁶¹ As indicated previously these views were in response to frontier studies within colonial America and other regions, not a study of the Roman world. These scholars extrapolate the core ideas put forward by Lightfoot and Martinez and anachronistically rejected

⁵⁸ D. J. Breeze and B. Dobson, “Hadrian’s Wall: Some problems”, *Britannia*, vol. 3, 1972, p. 182

⁵⁹ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 80.

⁶⁰ K. Lightfoot and A. Martinez, ‘Frontiers and Boundaries in Archaeological Perspective’, in *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24, 1995, p. 472.

⁶¹ K. Lightfoot and A. Martinez, ‘Frontiers and Boundaries in Archaeological Perspective’, 1995, p. 483.

them in an attempt to help explain their concepts of the Roman frontier. Obvious problems arise with such a comparison, as even Whittaker points out, most notably that the Roman expansion and creation of frontiers was a different process, there was no mass exodus of Romans from Rome or Italy to the frontier territories comparable to what occurred in the United States, and the elimination or expulsion of the indigenous population was not a Roman policy.⁶² Instead, the Romans took control of new territory and incorporated the local population into the empire and over time integration of some sort took place between the native population and the Romans.⁶³ Furthermore, Roman control of newly acquired territory and the people contained therein was carried out by different means depending on the situation, the details of which will be explored in later chapters.

In its simplest form, the main contention of these scholars is not that there were not defined boundaries for the Roman empire, such as existed along the Rhine and Danube rivers, but rather that the frontier existing along the boundaries extended beyond into non-Roman lands. Vrba gives the example of the situation that existed on the Middle Danube, stating that scholars should not restrict themselves to the study of social interaction only at the physical border, which was the line of forts and *vici* along the river, but rather acknowledge that social interaction was taking place well beyond the border both in the province of Pannonia and in the territory of the *Quadi*.⁶⁴ This was certainly evident and also mirrored in the situation that existed along the Upper and

⁶² C. R. Whittaker, *Rome and its Frontiers: The Dynamic of Empire*, 2004, p. 13.

⁶³ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 81. See also Romanisation, in Vrba, pp. 86-89; S. Drummond and L. Nelson, *The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, 1994, p. 33; G. Woolf, *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul*, pp. 7-16; P. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, 1999, pp. 99, 122.

⁶⁴ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 81.

Lower Rhine against the Germanic tribes. Clearly the Romans did not believe that their line of forts was a barrier from themselves, since it did not prevent provincial traders operating throughout Germania, or the military conducting campaigns whenever necessary, and even more important, obstruct their manipulation of Germanic politics to ensure continued peace along the frontiers. This policy will be explored in greater depth in later chapters.

In connection with this policy, the Romans were well aware that a breakdown in their relationships could occur between themselves and those in charge of the peoples and territory that bordered their empire, and so adequate defences were a necessity and actively pursued. Thus, the militarisation of the borders of the Roman Empire was undertaken transforming them in the process into frontiers. Wheeler is correct when he argues that by separating or minimising the military aspects of the frontiers, scholars (such as Whittaker and Isaac) remove a defining and key feature of what makes up the concept and definition of Roman frontiers.⁶⁵ This is in opposition to Vrba's assessment that Wheeler confuses the concept of frontier and boundary.⁶⁶

There is no denying that Rome projected its strength beyond its frontiers and that they were zones of interaction between the two groups. But this was not the defining feature of Roman frontiers which separated this phase from its previous incarnation as a border. With Wheeler, this thesis connects the militarisation of Roman borders as a separate stage in their defence against outsiders, by defining the limits of their territory and concentrating their military resources along a set point Rome created frontiers. As

⁶⁵ E. Wheeler, 'Methodological Limits and the Mirage of Roman Strategy: Part I', pp. 16-17.

⁶⁶ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 82.

stipulated previously, this was not an impenetrable barrier or a hard external shell positioned facing outward against the enemy, but rather a protected line of defence positioned to repel internal and external threats and restrict the flow of outside influence and access.

Definitions for this Work

This dissertation argues in favour of a slightly modified version of Breeze and Dobson's definition, that a frontier is a military boundary designed to defend a set limit to Roman territory; it is distinct phase of defensive development separate from a simple border. When the term frontier is used in this dissertation it is meant in this distinct defensive development. Moreover, Vrba's definition of a border as 'a fixed point, it can be a river, mountain range or even an agreed demarcation on a map' is accepted.⁶⁷ The strict separation of the term border from frontier is unfavourable, as this thesis classifies frontiers themselves by their very function as borders and boundaries; nevertheless frontiers are distinctly different and are the next phase in Roman defensive development. Therefore, in order to differentiate between the initial roughly defined defensive borders and its next phase of development frontiers, this thesis argues instead for the use of a third term, 'buffer zone'. The term 'buffer zone' will refer to the initial roughly defensive line along which Roman forces were deployed in order to defend against a possible Germanic incursion whilst still retaining the ability for future reconquest.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 80.

⁶⁸ Another aspect of 'buffer zone' is as a Roman zone of influence encompassing both sides of the border, for more see Chapter 5.

In conclusion, for the purpose of this dissertation the terms border, 'buffer zone', frontier and '*Limes*' are considered to be distinct and separate terms. The use of each term denotes distinct features, functions and purpose in the context of Roman defence. The only exception to this will be the use of the terms border and boundary. In the context of this dissertation the term border will mean a fixed point, it can be a river, mountain range or even an agreed demarcation on a map. A 'buffer zone' is the initial roughly defensive line along which Roman forces were deployed in order to defend against a possible Germanic incursion. A frontier is defined as a military boundary designed to defend a set limit to Roman territory; it is distinct phase of defensive development separate from the initial military border ('buffer zone'). The '*Limes*' is defined as the next phase of Roman defence against the *Germani*, which denotes a shift from permeable frontiers towards a definitive limitation of Roman territory. The '*Limes*' had three objectives: a demarcation of the limit of Roman control, a conduit for communication and transportation and a method of defence against a defined enemy/threat. The '*Limes*' was not an impenetrable barrier for this was outside the capabilities of Romans. It was a defended and defined boundary that facilitated the patrol of Roman territory and allowed the monitoring of outside forces and helped regulate the transfer of people and trade.

SECTION II

CONQUEST, CONSOLIDATION, AND REVOLTS IN GERMANIA AND ILLYRICUM

CHAPTER THREE

Initial Contact and Confrontation

— 58 BC – 17 BC

This chapter examines the initial contact, and the subsequent confrontation, between Rome and the *Germani*. The starting point for this examination is the latter half of the first century BC. It should be noted that this date was not selected arbitrarily, but rather was chosen because it was the first recorded instance of consequential and significant exchange between the Romans and the Germanic Tribes east of the Rhine. Although there are earlier recorded instances of interaction and conflict between the two groups, such as the invasions of Italia by the *Teutones* and *Cimbri* in the second century BC, these exchanges were a result of the forced migration/incursion of Germanic tribes seeking new territory and/or fleeing conflict with neighbouring peoples and were not a result of Roman territorial expansion. In the scheme of Roman military planning or imperial policy and territory building these incidences of interaction can be viewed as being of minor significance. Thus, it is during the period of Julius Caesar's Gallic campaigns that the first confrontation between the Romans and the *Germani* is attested, and as a consequence the first defensive policy and the initial 'buffer zone' along the Rhine emerged.

Rome, Dacia, and the *Germani*

Furthermore, although no Roman advance was undertaken to the Danube during this period, a possible military campaign was considered by Caesar as a necessary

endeavour in order to combat the growing ‘northern threat’.¹ The threat that loomed north of the Danube was the gradual expansion of Germanic tribes southwards, and more prominently the rapidly expanding empire of the Dacians. In fact, during the period of Caesar’s *Gallic Wars* it is believed that Burebista the Dacian had probably already expanded his power across the Danube as far as the Gallic *Taurisci*.² This posed a dangerous threat to Rome and its interests, placing Burebista and his peoples perilously close to the easily passable Julian Alps and the vulnerable north-east corner of Italia.³

This Dacian expansion had occurred approximately the same time as Ariovistus and the *Suebi* had crossed the river Rhine and had begun to install a steadily increasing number of *Germani* in lower Alsace, within easy range of the still-disaffected *Allobroges* in the Roman province of Gallia Narbonensis.⁴ Adding to this emerging problem in the north, further difficulties were faced with the *Helvetii*, who were gradually migrating westward, which placed them in close proximity to the western edge of Gallia Narbonensis.⁵ The disposition of Caesar’s legions—three at Aquileia and only one in Narbonensis—indicate that the Romans perceived the Germanic tribes as

¹ Suet. *Iul.* 44; Suet. *Aug.* 8; Strabo *Geo.* VII.3.5; Plut. *Caes.* 58. E. L. Wheeler, ‘Rome’s Dacian Wars: Domitian, Trajan, and Strategy on the Danube, Part II’ in *The Journal of Military History* 75, pp. 198-199; J. J. Wilkes, ‘The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey’, *JRS*, Vol. 95, p. 137; R. Syme, ‘The Early History of Moesia’, in A. Birley (ed.) *The Provincial at Rome and Rome and the Balkans 80BC-AD14*, pp. 174-92; E. S. Gruen, ‘The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus’, in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 172; E. Rawson, ‘Caesar: Civil War and Dictatorship’, in *CAH*², vol. IX, p. 438; M. Schmitz, *The Dacian Threat, 101-106 AD.*, p. 10; J. Malitz, ‘Caesars Partherkrieg’, in *Historia* 33, pp. 21-59. See also, P. S. Frebar, *Der hellenisch-österreichische Osten und das Illyricum unter Caesar*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1993.

² Strabo VII.298, 303-5. See, J. J. Wilkes, ‘The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey’, *JRS*, Vol. 95, p. 137; T. P. Wiseman, ‘Caesar, Pompey and Rome, 59-50 B.C.’, in *CAH*², vol. IX, pp. 381, 383. See also, V. Lica, *The Coming of Rome in the Dacian World*, Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 2000.

³ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, pp. 26-7; T. P. Wiseman, ‘Caesar, Pompey and Rome, 59-50 B.C.’, in *CAH*², vol. IX, pp. 381, 383.

⁴ Caesar *B. Gall.* I.31.3-11. J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, pp. 15-16; T. P. Wiseman, ‘Caesar, Pompey and Rome, 59-50 B.C.’, in *CAH*², vol. IX, p. 383.

⁵ J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, pp. 15-16; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, pp. 26-7; T. P. Wiseman, ‘Caesar, Pompey and Rome, 59-50 B.C.’, in *CAH*², vol. IX, p. 383.

the main threat in early 58 BC.⁶ The migrating *Helvetii* and the encroachment of Ariovistus proved to be the greater threat to Roman interests; Caesar rapidly raised the necessary forces to intercept and repulse the Germanic threat. [see Map (3)]

Initial Contact: Julius Caesar (57 – 50 BC)

The initial cause for the Romans to engage with the *Germani* east of the Rhine was the perceived threat they posed to Roman interests in crossing the river and raiding the recently conquered territory of Gaul.⁷ These raids made the Gallic region unstable and disrupted Rome's process of transforming the territory into a province.⁸ Caesar recognized this threat, and was the first Roman commander to cross the Rhine as a direct response to the danger the *Germani* presented to Roman interests.⁹ Germanic raids across the Rhine continued; the *Germani*'s past history of successful raids and half successful attempts on several occasions to settle west of the Rhine were motivation enough for them to maintain their attacks and incursions.¹⁰

Along the Danube, the initial cause for Roman conflict with the Germanic tribesmen was the threat they posed to Roman interests in the Danubian and Alpine regions. At this stage the threat posed by the *Germani* north of the Danube was not directly known to the Romans, the people that inhabited northern Illyricum and

⁶ Caesar, *B. Gall.* I.2-4, I.7.3, I.12.4-7 (*Helvetii* in 61); I.7.2, I.10.3 (positions of Caesar's legions); I.33, I.35.2, I.40.5, I.43-4 (Ariovistus). T. P. Wiseman, 'Caesar, Pompey and Rome, 59-50 B.C.', in *CAH*², vol. IX, p. 383; J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, pp. 15-16.

⁷ Caesar, *B. Gall.* I. 33.

⁸ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, pp. 46-7; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, pp. 27-9; J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, p. 18.

⁹ Caesar, *B. Gall.* IV.16.

¹⁰ T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 25.

Noricum inadvertently acting as a buffer against their raids.¹¹ This threat did not directly affect the Romans until they had occupied the south bank of the Danube in the early first century AD. As with the Rhine, raids across the Danube were carried out by the *Germani*; although these were isolated to the Upper and Middle Danube regions.¹² The Romans had to contend with other threats, such as those posed by the tribes of the *Dacii* and *Sarmatae*, along the remaining stretch of the Lower Danube.

The earliest instances of interaction and conflict between the Romans and the Germanic tribes east of the Rhine River occurred during the Gallic campaigns of Julius Caesar. There are three recorded incidents involving the *Germani* during these campaigns. All of Caesar's military responses were defensive in nature; even his so called 'offensive incursions' across the Rhine can be viewed as defensive actions when considering the operations' limited scope and objectives.¹³ The first of Caesar's encounters occurred shortly after his victory over the *Helvetii* in 58 BC. Caesar claims that an assembly of Gallic tribal leaders had petitioned him for his assistance in removing the *Suebi*, a Germanic tribe led by Ariovistus, who had seized the lands of the *Sequani* in c. 71 BC.¹⁴ During the summer of 58 BC both sides raced to occupy the strategically important town of *Vesontio* (Besançon), the *Sequani*'s largest town. It was

¹¹ The theory that the people that inhabited northern Illyricum and Noricum acted as an unrealised buffer against the *Germani* is discussed further in chapter 4.

¹² Again justification of this limitation is the extent of the territories attributed to the *Germani* by the Romans; refer back to the relevant sections of the Introduction and Chapter 1. Details of German attacks/raids north of the Danube will be examined mostly chronologically in subsequent chapters.

¹³ The defensive nature of Caesar's two incursions across the Rhine will be discussed below.

¹⁴ The *Sequani* had foolishly invited Ariovistus and his tribesmen into their territory as mercenaries in their fight against the *Aedui*; Ariovistus and his men eventually turned on them and seized the *Sequani* territory for their own. For more details, see Caesar *B. Gall.* I. 3. J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul*, pp. 15-16; T. P. Wiseman, 'The Senate and the populares, 69-60 B.C.', in *CAH*², Vol. IX, pp. 368-423, 383; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 43; C. Meier, *Caesar*, trans. D. McIntock, 1995, p. 242; K. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, pp. 15-16. Some historians believe that this migration of Germanic tribesmen resulted in the *Helvetii*'s migration to western France, see K. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, p. 16; O. Brogan, *Roman Gaul*, p. 12.

Caesar who managed to occupy the town first and from there planned his attack.¹⁵ After the initial hesitation of Caesar's army was overcome, he led his forces on to victory over the *Suebi*. The battle itself reportedly resulted in the loss of 80,000 Germans, with the survivors either fleeing back across the Rhine or taken as prisoners.¹⁶ Caesar chose not to pursue the fleeing tribesmen across the Rhine and instead turned his attention back to northern Italy and attended to the civil aspects of his governorship. Overall, the German presence in the region had proven to be detrimental to both the surrounding Gallic tribes and Rome's interests in the region: by removing the *Suebi* Caesar had eliminated a significant threat to the region and brought some measure of stability to Gaul. His actions ensured that only Romans and their Germanic and Gallic allies occupied the territory west of the Rhine, with all hostile *Germani* held back east of the Rhine.

Caesar's second encounter involved the forced migration of several smaller groups of Germanic tribes across the Rhine into Gaul. There is debate over the nature and purpose of this encounter, with several modern historians arguing that Caesar's actions were nothing more than a "publicity stunt" concocted to bring him favour with the people in Rome.¹⁷ While others argue that it was an extreme measure carried out to combat the German threat and persuade them against future attempts at crossing the Rhine.¹⁸ The *Usipetes* and *Tencteri* were Germanic tribes whose territories lay on the right bank of the lower Rhine, but due to repeated attacks carried out by the *Suebi* both

¹⁵ Caesar *B. Gall.* I.38. In this passage Caesar also gives a description of the town and its strategic importance.

¹⁶ For Caesar's account of the methods he used to suppress his troop's fears, see Caesar *B. Gall.* I.39-41. For a complete account of Caesar's engagement with the *Suebi*, see Caesar, *B. Gall.* I.42-54.

¹⁷ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 47; O. Brogan, *Roman Gaul*, p. 15; K. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, pp. 43-46.

¹⁸ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 47; O. Brogan, *Roman Gaul*, p. 15; K. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, pp. 43-46.

tribes were ultimately forced to abandon their own territory in c. 58 BC.¹⁹ In 55 BC, after wandering throughout Germania for several years, both tribes eventually forced their way across the Rhine and into Gaul.²⁰ Caesar would not allow the Germans to remain in Gaul and in response to the Germans' offer of friendship he wrote:

He could have no friendship with them, if they remained in Gaul. On the one hand, it was not just that men who had not been able to defend their own territories should seize those of others; on the other hand, there was no land in Gaul which could be granted without injustice ... However, they had permission, if they pleased, to settle in the territories of the Ubii...²¹

The Germans made overtures about considering this proposal, but Caesar thought this was only a delaying tactic in order for reinforcements to arrive.²² Conflict eventually erupted between the two groups and Caesar was once again victorious; according to his account the enemy that had numbered "430,000 souls" were either slaughtered, or drowned attempting to re-cross the Rhine.²³ With the German incursion dealt with in Gaul, Caesar decided to address the issue of the hostile Germanic tribes across the Rhine.²⁴ He gives several reasons to justify his decision to cross the Rhine. First, he states that he wanted to send a message to the Germans that their attempts to enter Gaul would be met with Roman retaliation, and by crossing the Rhine he wished to make the

¹⁹ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 1, 4. The date of 58 BC is only an estimate based on Caesar's own account which states that the Usipetes and Tencteri wandered for three years in Germania before crossing the Rhine in 55 BC.

²⁰ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 4.

²¹ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 8 (trans. H. J. Edwards, *Loeb Classical Library*).

²² Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 9-11.

²³ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 12-15. Caesar's tally of 430,000 Germans is obviously an exaggeration. Gilliver suggests that the number was more likely to have been tens of thousands, see K. Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, p. 46.

²⁴ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV. 17. This passage also contains details on the method he used to construct the bridge over the Rhine.

Germans fearful of Roman reprisals.²⁵ Second, Caesar writes that he desired to bring to justice the *Usipetes* and *Tencteri* cavalry which had sought refuge with the *Sugambri*.²⁶ The final reason is recorded as his response to the request given by the *Ubii* for him to aid them in their conflict with the *Suebi*.²⁷ In the eighteen days Caesar and his forces spent in Germania they met no native resistance and found only abandoned villages and buildings.²⁸ Caesar chose not to track down and engage these absent tribes and deemed that he had accomplished all the objectives he had set out to achieve in his expedition: “to strike terror into the Germans, to take vengeance on the *Sugambri*, and to deliver the *Ubii* from a state of blockade”.²⁹ Ultimately, Caesar’s actions across the Rhine can be seen as the first instance of the Romans carrying out campaigns of retribution and suppression against the *Germani* in response to their attacks and incursions into Roman and their Gallic allies’ territory.

The final confrontation in 53 BC was in response to Germanic involvement in the Gallic uprising during the previous winter.³⁰ In that year (54 BC) the winter was one of considerable disturbance in Gaul; various Gallic tribes with some assistance from Germanic mercenaries coordinated several well-planned attacks on outlying Roman garrisons, inflicting considerable Roman losses.³¹ The campaign of 53 BC was mainly concerned with re-establishing Roman military superiority in north-eastern Gaul. However, a portion of the campaign was dedicated to carrying out further campaigns of

²⁵ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV.16.

²⁶ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV.16.

²⁷ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV.16.

²⁸ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV.18-19. Caesar destroyed all these villages and buildings along with their crops.

²⁹ Caesar *B. Gall.* IV.19.

³⁰ C. Meier, *Caesar*, p. 296.

³¹ Caesar *B. Gall.* V; VI; V.23-37 (the disaster at Cotta and Sabinus’ winter camps), V.38-58 (successful defence of other winter camps); VI. 9-10 (Caesar across the Rhine). The assistance of Germanic mercenaries relate to the attacks by the Treveri, however the German troops were too late to offer any support in the attacks, see VI. 9.

retribution and suppression across the Rhine in response to the *Germani*'s involvement in the Gallic revolt.³² Again Caesar bridged the Rhine and crossed over into Germanic territory, giving two reasons to justify his second incursion into Germania:

One reason was that the German tribes had sent auxiliaries to the Treveri against him; the other, to prevent Ambiorix from having a chance of retreating to them.³³

This course of action can be viewed as a retaliatory response; clearly the Germans had not learnt to fear Roman reprisals from Caesar's first incursion into Germania. As in 55 BC, Caesar only spent a short time in Germania. This is attributed to supply problems, the refusal of native peoples to engage with his forces, and Caesar's unwillingness to engage the *Suebi* on their own terms or on unknown terrain.³⁴ Regardless of supposed logistical problems, the limited scope of the operation indicates that this was not an offensive attack against the Germanic people, but rather a defensive manoeuvre carried out in an attempt to intimidate further the Germanic tribesmen and discourage them (and Ambiorix) from crossing the Rhine and disturbing the stability of Gaul.³⁵ Overall, all three campaigns were clearly defensive measures carried out by Caesar in order to protect Roman interests in Gaul. Thus, the initial justification for Roman interaction and conflict with the *Germani* was the threat they posed to Gaul, and Roman interests in the region.³⁶

Caesar responded to the *Germani*'s attacks and incursions with campaigns of retribution and suppression. However, these campaigns were ineffective in preventing

³² Caesar, *B. Gall.* VI. 9.

³³ Caesar, *B. Gall.* VI. 9 (trans. H. J. Edwards, *Loeb Classical Library*).

³⁴ Caesar, *B. Gall.* VI. 10.

³⁵ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak: How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe*, p. 87.

³⁶ Caesar, *B. Gall.* I.33.

future incidents. In connection with this policy of military reactionary response Caesar also built and maintained legionary camps along the Rhine River, but these were never meant to be permanent and were only erected and occupied seasonally. These military camps served two purposes: they carried out the retaliatory campaigns, and acted as a deterrent against further attacks. Significantly, Caesar withdrew the majority of his troops to the interior of Gaul during the winter months; this established a pattern of seasonal defence that was not corrected until the reign of Augustus.³⁷ It can also be theorised that Caesar intended to establish a rudimentary ‘buffer zone’ between Roman Gaul and the barbarians east of the Rhine. This can be observed through his attempts to settle allied tribes on both sides of the Rhine,³⁸ and his swift military responses against any tribes that attempted to unsettle the situation clarified Rome’s position along the Rhine. Therefore, through his actions in Gaul and across the Rhine, Caesar had begun the process of establishing a defensive policy against the *Germani*. It can also be argued then that at the time of Caesar’s departure from Gaul in 50 BC the eastern and northern border for Gaul, and thus for the Romans, lay on the Rhine.³⁹ Thus, Caesar’s defensive policy against the *Germani* consisted of three parts: a formulaic military response to attacks and incursions, the deliberate positioning of Roman forces to carry out military campaigns and act as a deterrent, and the settlement of allied tribes along both sides of the Rhine acting as a ‘buffer zone’ against hostile tribes.⁴⁰

³⁷ This is discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5.

³⁸ Caesar resettles the *Helvetii*, *Tulingi* and *Latobrigi*, see Caesar *B. Gall.* I.28. Caesar specifically states that he resettled the tribes in their former territory ‘lest the excellence of the farmlands might tempt the Germans who dwell across the Rhine to cross from their own into the Helvetian borders, and so to become neighbours to the Province of Gaul’ (Caesar *B. Gall.* I.28). The nature of Caesar’s arrangement with the *Helvetii* and the other tribes is not mentioned in his work, but Cicero in his speech *Pro Balbo* in 56 BC, mentions the *Helvetii* as one among several tribes of *foederati*, see Cic. *Balb.* 32. Caesar also attempted to resettle the *Tencteri* and *Usipetes* near the Ubii east of the Rhine, see Caesar *B. Gall.* IV.8-11.

³⁹ C. Rüger, ‘Germany’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 517, see n. 1.

⁴⁰ The effectiveness of this supposed ‘buffer zone’ and rudimentary border is examined below.

Initial Contact: the Second Triumvirate and Augustus (43 – 16 BC)

After Caesar's departure from Gaul (and the Rhine) there was a period of quiescence and isolation, during which time Rome was pre-occupied with civil wars and internal politics.⁴¹ Literary sources record nothing concerning the region for a period of twelve years; the area was either forgotten by Rome during its internal conflict or the events concerning it were omitted by the relevant authors.⁴² This lack of information would suggest that the Germanic and Gallic tribes were left to their own devices, and any events that did occur in the region were of little consequence to Rome. The end of this period of isolation brought a continuation of the defensive policy established by Caesar.⁴³ An example of this continuation is seen in the governorship of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa in 39 or 38 BC, during which time he carried out campaigns of retribution and suppression against the *Germani* across the Rhine.⁴⁴ A further continuance of Caesar's policy is observed in the resettlement of the *Ubii* on the west bank of the Rhine by Agrippa.⁴⁵

Overall, the written sources which cover the thirty year period between 50 and 17 BC are relatively sparse. What is discernible is that during these decades the *Germani* east of the Rhine continued to conduct incursions across the river, causing havoc and destruction throughout Gaul.⁴⁶ These raids not only affected the native Gallic tribes but

⁴¹ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 85; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 54.

⁴² P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 152.

⁴³ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 85; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 54; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 152.

⁴⁴ Dio XLVIII.49.

⁴⁵ Strabo Geo. IV.3.4.

⁴⁶ Dio LI.20.5; LI.21.6; LIII.26.4; LIV.11.12. J. C. Edmondson, *Augustus: His Contributions to the Development of the Roman State in the Early Imperial Period*, p. 160.

also Roman citizens and their settlements.⁴⁷ These attacks gradually escalated and according to written sources, in the year 17 or 16 BC,⁴⁸ after capturing and executing a group of Roman citizens east of the Rhine, a raiding force made up of members of the *Sugambri*, *Usipetes*, and *Tencteri* crossed the Rhine and attacked a Roman cavalry unit.⁴⁹ Pursing the fleeing troops, these invaders unexpectedly encountered *legio V Macedonica*, most likely only detachments rather than a complete legion, under the command of Marcus Lollius. This incident would be known as the *clades Lolliana* (Lollian disaster). Ultimately, this incident resulted in the defeat of the legion (though not its destruction) and the capture of its eagle standard by the *Germani*.⁵⁰

Both ancient and modern historians disagree about the significance of the *clades Lolliana*. Dio represents the battle as a disaster for Roman interests in Gaul;⁵¹ Suetonius writes of the event as “humiliating” but not serious.⁵² Some modern researchers view Lollius’ defeat as a turning point in Augustus’ policy in Europe.⁵³ Other historians, persuaded that Augustus had already made up his mind about conquering more territory in Europe, view the defeat as one of many events that hastened the execution of that

⁴⁷ Dio LI.20.5; LI.21.6; LIII.26.4; LIV.11.12. J. C. Edmondson, *Augustus: His Contributions to the Development of the Roman State in the Early Imperial Period*, p. 160.

⁴⁸ The actual date of the conflict is debated. Julius Obsequens offers the date 17 BC, see Obseq. 71, whilst Dio writes that it occurred in the year 16 BC, see Dio LIV.20. Edmondson argues for the date 16 BC based on the agreement of Dio and Velleius, see J. C. Edmondson, *Augustus: His Contributions to the Development of the Roman State in the Early Imperial Period*, p. 159.

⁴⁹ Dio, LIV.20; Vell. Pat. II.97; Suet. Aug. 23; Tac. Ann. I.10.

⁵⁰ Dio, LIV.20; Vell. Pat. II.97; Suet. Aug. 23; Tac. Ann. I.10; Obseq. 71.

⁵¹ Dio LIV.20.

⁵² Suet. Aug. 23.

⁵³ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC – AD 68*, p. 127; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological survey’, *JRS*, Vol. LIX, No. 1, 1969, p. 144; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; E. S. Gruen, ‘The Imperial Policy of Augustus’, in Raaflaub K. A. & Toher M., eds., *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 405; E. S. Gruen, ‘The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 179; T. Mommsen, *A History of Rome under the Emperors*, 1996, p. 108, see n. 260; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 159; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald*, p. 28; E. M. Whiteman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 44.

policy.⁵⁴ Clearly, however, it was in response to the *clades Lolliana* and the evident threat the *Germani* posed to Roman interests that the Romans chose to alter radically the initial Caesarian policy along the Rhine. From 17/16 BC onwards the Romans would pursue offensive operations in Germania in an effort to suppress hostility east of the Rhine and secure their interests west of the river.⁵⁵

Initial Contact: Summation

Initially the relationship that existed between Rome and the *Germani* developed in response to specific threats and events. At this stage the threat posed by the *Germani* north of the Danube was not directly known to the Romans, with the people that inhabited Illyricum and Noricum inadvertently acting as a buffer against their raids. Along the Rhine the initial confrontation between Rome and the *Germani* came about due to the latter's attacks and encroachment into Roman and Gallic territory. Initially, Julius Caesar recognised the threat that the *Germani* posed to Gaul and Roman interests and undertook measures to counter their attacks and incursions. Subsequent incursions and interference by the *Germani* in Gaul was met with campaigns of retribution and suppression. Ultimately, Caesar's two forays across the Rhine were defensive, aimed at punishing those tribes responsible for hostile activities in Gaul, and were also undertaken in an effort to intimidate the tribes across the river and discourage them from further interference west of the Rhine. Furthermore, Caesar also positioned Roman forces near the Rhine in order to facilitate military operations and act as a deterrent against German hostility. Significantly, these positions were not maintained all year

⁵⁴ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 153; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 95; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 98; P. Southern, *Augustus*, pp. 154-155; J. S. Külbhorn, *Germaniam pacavi- Germanien habe ich befriedet*, p. 13; H. G. Horn, *Die Römer: In Nordrhein-Westfalen*, p. 34.

⁵⁵ Dio LIV. 20. P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 77, 87; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald*, p. 27. Details of this offensive policy is discussed in Chapter Four.

round. In concert with these military measures Caesar also established a defensive policy in the form of the settlement of allied tribes either side of the Rhine. This resettlement of 'Celtic' and 'Germanic' tribes along the Rhine effectively acted as a check on hostile tribes east of the Rhine and established a buffer zone between Roman Gaul and the *barbaricum* east of the river. All of these measures constituted Rome's initial defensive policy against the *Germani*, a policy which, however, proved ineffective, and Germanic raids into Gaul continued for the next thirty years resulting in instability in the region and a threat to Roman interests. The escalating attacks against Roman and Gallic settlements, culminating in the *clades Lolliana*, resulted in Augustus' decision to alter radically Rome's German border policy.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Conquest of the *Germani* and the Initial Roman Defences on the Danube — 16 BC – AD 6

In response to the *clades Lolliana* and in order to defend against the repeated attacks, incursions and interference by the *Germani* in Roman Gaul, the Romans reorganised and redeployed their military forces on the west bank of the Rhine. This constituted the second phase of Roman operations against the *Germani*: it is characterised by a definite shift in Rome's relationship, and methods in dealing with, towards the region and its peoples. These changes mainly occurred during Augustus' three-year exploration of the western provinces from 16-13 BC,¹ during which Augustus directed his attention to the consolidation of Gaul and the establishment of provincial infrastructure in the region, the redistribution of the legions, from the interior of Gaul to the frontier along the banks of the Rhine, and the construction of numerous military bases on the west bank of the Rhine.² Subsequent attacks by the *Germani* expedited a third phase of Roman operations against the *Germani*. This was a period of conquest and initial occupation of Germania, marked by a succession of offensive campaigns into the interior of Germania to conquer and pacify the *Germani* east of the Rhine. Ultimately, a Roman military presence was maintained along the Rhine and in the interior of Germania in an effort to consolidate their position, control the native people, and initiate their incorporation into the Roman Empire.

¹ Dio LIV.25.1. C. M. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1984, p. 78; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', p. 144; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 89; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald*, p. 28; J. S. Kühnborn, *Germaniam pacavi- Germanien habe ich befriedet*, p. 11.

² E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 180; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58.

Shifting Defences on the Rhine

Concurrently with these developments along the Rhine, the Romans undertook expansion into the Alps, Noricum, and Illyricum and as a consequence were placed in direct contact and conflict with the *Germani* north of the Danube. At this time Rome's relationship with the *Germani* north of the river Danube and their position in the southern region of Germania can be viewed as a separate and distinct endeavour from their actions along the Rhine, and can be understood to have initially developed independently and in different circumstances. As mentioned in Chapter Three, initially the Danubian territories and their associated tribes acted as a buffer zone against the Germanic tribes north of the Danube, but the conquest and annexation of these territories exposed the Roman lands to another front against the *Germani*. The Roman conquest and annexation of the territories along the Danube was a series of complex and multifaceted operations that developed over a period of approximately forty years,³ and can be divided into three distinct phases: the conquest of the Alpine territories, the conquest of Raetia and the annexation of the kingdom of Noricum, and finally the subjugation and supposed annexation of 'Pannonia' and remaining dissenting parts of Illyricum. These phases highlight a developing strategic plan that aimed at establishing a Roman defensive buffer zone along the river Danube against the *Germani*.

Along the Rhine, although no definite date can be attributed to the establishment of the military bases along the river, it is widely believed that this period is the logical time for their construction.⁴ Various historians favour different dates for the

³ There is considerable amount of scholarly works debating the significance of these actions, and any link they might have larger grand strategy; this will be discussed below.

⁴ E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 180; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 94-95. Wells states that the archaeological evidence which might

establishment of the first military bases along the Rhine, but c. 15 BC is generally considered acceptable.⁵ Archaeological research has identified six major camps of the Augustan period located on the Lower and Middle Rhine: *Fectio* (Vechten), *Noviomagus* (Nijmegen), *Novaesium* (Neuss), *Vetera* (Xanten), *Mogontiacum* (Mainz), and *Oppidum Ubiorum* (Cologne).⁶ Wells suggests that these bases can be divided into three separate periods of construction, listing *Vechten*, *Vetera*, *Novaesium*, and *Moguntiacum* as the bases built around the time of Drusus' German campaigns; the camp at *Noviomagus* is attributed to a later Augustan period; while evidence suggests that *Oppidum Ubiorum* was occupied before AD 9, although how long before is not known.⁷ Overall, the establishment of these military positions near the Rhine itself marks the Romans initial military frontier on the Rhine. [\[see Map \(2\)\]](#)

Two defensive purposes motivated the redistribution of the legions: firstly this defended the Rhine against the *Germani* to the north east, and secondly it maintained order throughout Gaul.⁸ An example of this dual role can be observed in 12 BC when an uprising in Gaul, in response to the Roman census and taxation policy, was swiftly repressed by Nero Claudius Drusus and the Rhine based army.⁹ Coinciding with this rebellion was an incursion by various Germanic tribes later in the same year; Drusus

answer the question as to when the bases were established is not yet forthcoming, but future excavation may reveal the answer, see C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 95 n. 5.

⁵ E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 180; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 94-148; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', pp. 144-7. Wells favors the period around Augustus' tour of the western provinces during 16/13 BC, but also suggests the years 18 or 17 BC, stating that the ending of Rome's war in Spain released troops for service in Gaul, see C.M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 95.

⁶ E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 180; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 94-148; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', pp. 144-7; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58. Other smaller military forts were established at other locations, see P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 89.

⁷ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 95.

⁸ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 246; P.S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 87-88; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald*, p. 28.

⁹ Livy *fr.* CXXXIX; Dio LIV.32.1.

engaged and defeated the Germans soon after they had crossed the river, and those that he did not slaughter were driven back across the Rhine.¹⁰ In addition to the Rhine bases' defensive applications, the camps also had significant offensive capabilities, as they provided ideal locations from which to launch campaigns into Germania.¹¹

The purpose of three of the bases established on the Rhine, *Fectio*, *Vetera*, and *Moguntiacum*, is clear: they were situated at the entrance of the three main invasion routes which the sources record numerous commanders as using.¹² *Fectio* was a naval base and stores depot;¹³ closely linked with it was the canal built by Drusus, the *fossa Drusiana*. This enabled the Roman fleet to sail from the Rhine into the Zuiderzee (the modern IJsselmeer) and thence along the North Sea coast to the mouths of the rivers Ems, Weser, and Elbe.¹⁴ *Vetera* faces the mouth of the River Lippe, its valley was a great invasion highway into the heart of Northern Germania.¹⁵ The third invasion route followed the Lower Main River northwards through the Wetterau towards the Weser

¹⁰ Livy fr. CXXXIX; Dio LIV.32.I.

¹¹ R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 360; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, pp. 98-99; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 86, 89; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 153; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald*, p. 28. Several historians even suggest that Augustus was preparing troops for attacks across the river as early as 15 BC; some even propose dates as early as the 20s BC, see C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 95; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 153; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', p. 144. C. M. Wells suggests that the campaigns were being planned and prepared for before the war in Spain was over, certainly before M. Lollius' defeat in 17 BC, see *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 95.

¹² C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. X, pp. 525-26. A fourth invasion route south of Mainz is also suggested to have existed south of Mainz, see C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. X, pp. 525-26; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96.

¹³ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96.

¹⁴ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96. For an in-depth discussion of *Fectio* and the *fossa Drusiana*, see C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 101-116.

¹⁵ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96. The Lippe invasion route is discussed in detail in C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 149-53. The various Roman military sites which were established along this route will be discussed further below.

and Elbe Rivers;¹⁶ directly opposite the mouth of the Main stood the legionary base at *Moguntiacum*.¹⁷ [see Map (4)]

This military build-up effectively established the Rhine River as the north-eastern boundary of the Roman Empire. Essentially, the redeployment of Rome's legions and the construction of military bases can be seen as the turning point in Rome's relationship with Germania and its peoples. It marks the preparation¹⁸ and beginning of a more aggressive Roman posture to assure their superiority in Gaul and to contend with the Germanic threat across the Rhine.¹⁹ The further incursion by the *Germani* in 12 BC served as the immediate justification for initiating Roman offensive operations across the Rhine.²⁰ From 12 BC to AD 6 the Romans adopted an offensive policy across the Rhine and into the interior of Germania; the Romans would expand their influence eastward across the Rhine and towards the Elbe River.²¹ This was the beginning of the third phase of Roman operations against the *Germani*, a period of conquest and initial occupation.

The Start of Expansion: Drusus and the Rhine

Nero Claudius Drusus carried out the first four major offensive campaigns between the years 12-9 BC. The first campaign was a naval expedition in 12 BC aimed

¹⁶ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96, who discusses the main invasion route in detail: pp. 153-54..

¹⁷ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 96, who has an in-depth discussion of Moguntiacum: pp. 138-46.

¹⁸ Dio LIV.32.2-3; Strabo *Geo.* VII.1.3; Tac. *Ann.* II.8.1; Suet. *Claud.* I.2. C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 96-146; J. C. Edmondson, *Augustus: His Contributions to the Development of the Roman State in the Early Imperial Period*, p. 159.

¹⁹ E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 180.

²⁰ Dio LIV.32.1. J. C. Edmondson, *Augustus: His Contributions to the Development of the Roman State in the Early Imperial Period*, p. 159.

²¹ Vell. Pat. II.105-108; Dio LVI.18.

at the North Sea coastline, however, this was preceded by a campaign of retribution and suppression in response to the incursion of Germanic tribesmen, mainly the *Sugambri* and the *Usipetes*, into Gaul earlier in the same year.²² In short, Drusus drove back the *Germani*, even as they were crossing the river; yet the surviving tribesmen were still a significant threat to Gaul and needed to be punished for their encroachment into Roman territory.²³ In response, Drusus crossed the Rhine and laid waste to the territories of those responsible.²⁴ [see Map (5)]

The subsequent naval expedition was carried out in an effort to secure access to strategically vital water-ways.²⁵ Later in the same year (12 BC) Drusus launched a naval expedition into the North Sea, via the *fossa Drusiana*, which he had ordered the troops to construct between the Lower Rhine and the Zuiderzee.²⁶ The results of this expedition were that he succeeded in securing the alliance of the *Frisii* and *Batavi* tribes, and access to the North Sea coastline.²⁷ The importance of the newly acquired territory is that the Romans gained access to the Zuiderzee, and from there entrance to the North Sea, ultimately giving the Rhine-fleet a safer and shorter way to the mouths of the Ems and Elbe rivers and effectively opening up the interior of Germania Magna to

²² Dio LIV.32.1.

²³ Dio LIV.32.1. T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 28.

²⁴ Dio LIV.32.1.

²⁵ T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 27; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 180.

²⁶ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 111. For a detailed discussion on the *fossa Drusiana*, and the current archaeological evidence, see C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 111-116.

²⁷ Dio LIV.32; Livy *fr.* 130. R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 363; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58. R. Syme, and other historians, suggests that the Batavians were already allies of Rome by this time, see R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 363; E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², X, p. 180 n 168. Other historians such as Mommsen, believe that it was during Drusus' expedition in 12 BC that the Batavians were incorporated as Roman allies, see T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 28. The literary evidence suggests that the Batavians were already considered to be allies before Drusus' invasion.

Roman invasion.²⁸ Friendship with the *Frisii* and the *Batavi* had three vital benefits for the Romans. First, it secured Rome's northern border and protected Gaul from attacks from northern Germania. Second, it gave the Romans access to strategically important territory on the Lower Rhine and the North Sea coast line. Third, it made available troops to be used in the advance east into the German interior.²⁹ Later in the same year Drusus made full use of these new allies and his access to the North Sea, launching an attack against the *Chauci* on the Lower Ems and perhaps occupying the island of Burchanis located off the mouth of that river, and defeated the *Bructeri* in a naval battle.³⁰ These actions by Drusus were the first Roman offensive operations against the *Germani*; they enhanced both the Romans' offensive and defensive capabilities in the region, and marked the beginning of Rome's conquest of Germania.

Drusus' second offensive campaign was launched in the spring of 11 BC, and was the first full scale invasion of Germania by Roman forces. Three separate stages made up the campaign itself. The first stage of Drusus' campaign was the attack upon the *Usipetes*, which Dio records he succeeded in subduing,³¹ after which the army continued on eastward towards the Lippe River.³² Upon reaching the river Drusus ordered the construction of a bridge to transport the army across into *Sugambri* territory.³³ The second stage of the campaign saw the army advance eastward through Sugambrian territory and into the lands of the *Cherusci*; the ancient sources record that the army achieved this feat unmolested by the native forces, penetrating into the interior

²⁸ Dio LIV.32. R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 363.

²⁹ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 58; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 28.

³⁰ Dio LIV. 32.1-3; Livy *fr.* 139; Strabo *Geo.* VII.1. 3; Tac. *Germ.* 32-4.

³¹ Dio LIV.33.

³² Dio LIV.33; Livy *fr.* 140; Flor. II. 30.25; Suet. *Claud.* 2.1.

³³ Dio LIV.33.

as far as the river Weser.³⁴ Dio records that the reason for this lack of native resistance was:

Because the *Sugambri* had fallen out with the *Chatti*, the only tribe of all their neighbours which had refused to fight on their side, and had mobilised their whole population to attack the latter...³⁵

Because of this inter-tribal warfare Drusus was able to march through the *Sugambri*'s territory unnoticed and unchallenged. The third stage of his campaign is marked by the depletion of his provisions, his inability to replenish them, and the onset of winter which induced Drusus to return to winter quarters on the Rhine.³⁶ The return journey back to the Rhine was met with fierce resistance from the natives, unlike the march to the Weser; the enemy harassed the army throughout their march, and at one stage managed to ambush and trap Drusus and his forces in a narrow pass, at a place called Arbalo, and came close to destroying his entire army.³⁷ The ambush was only narrowly averted due to the Germans' underestimation of the Roman forces, and their lack of military discipline.³⁸ Although conditions prevented Drusus from remaining in the interior he did manage to establish two bases, one on the junction of the Lippe and the Alme (Eliso) rivers, and the other near the Rhine in the region of the *Chatti*.³⁹ Florus,

³⁴ Dio LIV.33.

³⁵ Dio LIV.33 (trans. E. Cary, *Loeb Classical Library*).

³⁶ Dio LIV.33.

³⁷ Dio LIV.33.

³⁸ Dio LIV.33.

³⁹ Dio LIV.33. E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 181; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 155; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 156; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 59; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 362-363; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', p. 147 see also n. 19. E. S. Gruen suggests Haltern as the base on the Lippe, see E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 181. C. M. Wells suggests the fort at Annaburg at Haltern, see C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 155. P. S. Wells suggests Oberaden, citing the recent study of tree rings of wooden timbers dating the site to the late summer or fall of 11 BC, see P. S. Wells,

with obvious exaggeration, writes of Drusus, “posting garrisons and guard posts all along the Meuse, Elbe, and Weser”.⁴⁰ This indicates that from 10 BC onwards the new territory was being garrisoned, and that part of the Roman army had been stationed the year round in Germany.⁴¹ These bases were the first of many that would eventually be established along the Lippe River; they mark Rome’s intentions for further advances into the German interior and indicate its aspirations for added control of the region and later their occupation.

Archaeology indicates the existence of important legionary and supply bases throughout Germany, and although many of these can be attributed to the Augustan period, research does not permit a precise chronology that would fix them to specific campaigns.⁴² To date, archaeologists have discovered sites at Oberaden, Rodgen, Haltern, Holsterhausen, Beckinghausen, Anreppen, Wiesbaden, Bad Nauheim, Friedburg, and Waldgirmes.⁴³ These bases were established along the river Lippe and in the Wetterau, each of which represented a line of advance into the German interior.⁴⁴ Of the sites that populated the Lippe route, Haltern, Holsterhausen, Oberaden, and Anreppen can be accurately dated to between 12 and 7 BC.⁴⁵ Further south, another series of bases was constructed along the Main River route across the Rhine from Mogontiacum. Of these sites, Rodgen can be dated to c. 10 BC and evidence suggests

The Battle that Stopped Rome, p. 156. The location of the fort among the Chatti, near the Rhine, is unknown, see C. M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 155.

⁴⁰ Flor. II.30.26. For details discussing Florus’ exaggeration see introduction.

⁴¹ C. M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 157.

⁴² E. S. Gruen, ‘Expansion of the Empire under Augustus’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, pp. 181-182; P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 163.

⁴³ For an in-depth discussion of these various bases, see H.. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier’, pp. 144-151; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 161-233; J. S. Kühlborn, *Germaniam pacavi- Germanien habe ich befriedet*, pp. 29-144; H. G. Horn, *Die Römer: In Nordrhein-Westfalen*, pp. 36-45; R.. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald*, pp. 60-70; R.. Wiegels, *Die Varusschlacht: Wendepunkt der Geschichte*, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁴ J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, pp. 57-58; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier’, p. 147.

⁴⁵ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 89-90; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier’, pp. 147-9

that it was abandoned two or three years later. Other short-lived bases were established at Bad Nauheim and Friedburg, as well as the recently discovered fort at Waldgirmes.⁴⁶ These bases were not erected merely in connection with specific operations and then evacuated completely during winter. These bases were garrisoned in strength and constructed at strategic points; they were also important centres of communication and supply.⁴⁷ They may have developed from marching-camps, but they served also as bases for troops and supplies, placed as far into the interior in the direction of the enemy wherever possible.⁴⁸ Overall, these bases allowed the Romans to maintain a certain level of control over the surrounding territory and the native inhabitants.

In 10 BC Drusus' third offensive campaign was undertaken into Germania. The sources record that Drusus' campaign was again directed against the *Sugambri* and the *Chatti*.⁴⁹ Attacks against the *Chatti* were in response to their abandonment of lands awarded to them in an earlier diplomatic settlement by Rome and their migration to, and alliance with, the *Sugambri*, a tribe hostile to Rome.⁵⁰ The ancient sources do not elaborate on the attacks, only recording that the tribes were eventually subdued, and that afterwards Drusus returned to Roman territory on the Rhine.

Drusus' fourth and final campaign in 9 BC brought sounder results. Drusus commenced the invasion, it appears, from *Moguntiacum*. During the course of the campaign he led attacks against the *Chatti*, the *Marcomanni* and the *Cherusci*, crossed

⁴⁶ P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, pp. 89-90.

⁴⁷ H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', p. 147.

⁴⁸ H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier', p. 147; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 157.

⁴⁹ Dio LIV.36.

⁵⁰ Dio LIV.36; Livy *fr.* 141. E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 181 n. 170; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 29.

the Weser River again, and finally reached the Elbe River.⁵¹ However, the Elbe proved to be the limit of Drusus' advance into Germania. After a failed attempt at crossing the river and the construction of an altar celebrating the year's campaign and the glory of Rome, Drusus turned back.⁵² Tragically during the return journey Drusus suffered an injury from which he later died *en route* to the Rhine frontier.⁵³ In Rome, Augustus made great propaganda of Drusus' German campaigns, including his crossing of the Weser and his advance to the Elbe.⁵⁴ Official inscriptions implied that Germania had been conquered; victory celebrations were held, and honours were conferred upon Drusus including the title of Germanicus.⁵⁵ The real achievements of Drusus' campaigns were less spectacular than the Roman propaganda asserted. Wells describes Drusus' achievements east of the Rhine as "negligible".⁵⁶ Gruen goes further still, describing Drusus' campaigns as "invasions rather than conquests" and describe the Germans as being "intimidated rather than subdued".⁵⁷ This stated, the campaigns were more than just punitive raids into the German interior — the bases established along the Lippe and the North Sea coast strongly suggest that the Romans had long term plans for the region and the *Germani*.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Dio LV.1. E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 181; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 363; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak*, p. 89.

⁵² E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 181; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 363.

⁵³ Dio LV.1; Flor. II.30.23-7; Strabo *Geo.* VII.291; Livy *fra.* 141; Suet. *Claud.* I. 2.

⁵⁴ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 157.

⁵⁵ Suet. *Claud.* 1.3-4; Dio, LIV.55.2.

⁵⁶ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 157.

⁵⁷ E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 181.

⁵⁸ W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 99. Gruen disagrees with this view, arguing that the presence of garrisons in the interior does not signal a permanent and a full-scale occupation see E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 182; see also R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 363.

The Rhine: the Campaigns of Tiberius Claudius Nero

Drusus' brother, Tiberius Claudius Nero, conducted the second group of offensive campaigns during the years 8–7 BC. The details of these campaigns from the limited surviving sources are vague. It appears that Tiberius crossed the Rhine in 8 BC, the threatened tribes sent envoys to sue for peace, their petitions were rejected and some of the delegates were imprisoned by Augustus.⁵⁹ Wells suggests that during this period Tiberius probably laid out the permanent bases for the army occupation, such as that at Haltern, with its attendant stores depot, auxiliary fort, and *canabae*.⁶⁰ The following year Tiberius proceeded to launch an attack against the Sugambri and gained a major victory. The remnants of the tribe, some 40,000 people, were then moved forcibly to the west bank of the Rhine.⁶¹ There is a division amongst modern historians as to the purpose of these campaigns: some suggest that the goal was to consolidate the gains of his brother,⁶² others propose that it was a demonstration of Roman power in the wake of Drusus' death.⁶³ Wells' believes that Tiberius' work during this period, "made a show of force throughout Germany without much opposition and demonstrated that it was well on the way to provincial status".⁶⁴ Velleius Paterculus, one of the principal sources of Tiberius' campaigns, describes Germania as 'essentially' conquered, writing that Tiberius:

Carried on [the war] with his customary valour and good fortune, and after traversing every part of Germany in a

⁵⁹ Dio, LV.6; E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 182.

⁶⁰ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 157.

⁶¹ Dio LV.6.2-3; Suet. *Aug.* 21; *Tib.* 9; Tac. *Ann.* II. 26; XII. 39.

⁶² J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 21; C. M. Wells, "What's New along the Lippe: Recent Work in North Germany", *Britannia*, Vol. 29, 1998, p. 463.

⁶³ E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 182; E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in Raaflaub K. A. & Toher M., eds., *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 406; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 159.

⁶⁴ C. M. Wells, "What's New along the Lippe", p. 463.

victorious campaign, without any loss to the army entrusted to him ... he so subdued the country as to reduce it almost to the status of a tributary province.⁶⁵

That Velleius speaks only of reducing Germania, “almost to the status of a tributary province” and not as ‘conquered’, attests to the fact that Rome’s position in the region was not yet fully secure.⁶⁶ The conclusion of Tiberius’ offensive campaign in 8 BC, however, marked the end of the initial phase of rapid conquest in Germania.

After 8 BC Tiberius would introduce a new strategy in the region— a strategy of consolidation and establishing overall control of the territory. Coinciding with this new policy was the reorganisation of Drusus’ bases in the interior.⁶⁷ Camps originally constructed by Drusus during the first phase were established as impregnable strong-points in the centre of hostile territory; these bases needed to withstand native attacks and house a large military force and their vast stores of supplies. An example of this was the base established at Oberaden which was capable of holding some 12,000 men.⁶⁸ Tiberius’ next phase of expansion and occupation needed these men to be spread out around the conquered territory, and perhaps breaking up so large a force also made supply easier.⁶⁹ Accordingly Tiberius abandoned many of the bases established by Drusus, such as Oberaden, which had served their purpose; in their place Tiberius began the construction of his own bases along the routes of advance into the interior, mainly

⁶⁵ Vell. Pat. II.97. (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁶⁶ E. S. Gruen, ‘Expansion of the Empire under Augustus’, in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 182.

⁶⁷ C. M. Wells, ‘What’s New along the Lippe’, p. 463.

⁶⁸ C. M. Wells, ‘What’s New along the Lippe’, p. 463.

⁶⁹ C. M. Wells, ‘What’s New along the Lippe’, p. 463.

along the navigable water-ways which helped facilitate the transportation of troops and supplies.⁷⁰

During the next ten years, 6 BC–AD 4, the historical and archaeological records are fragmented and only a few records survive that concern events in Germania. Although a full reconstruction of events is not possible, from the surviving evidence it appears that Rome continued to sustain a strong military presence and maintained a limited level of control in the region.⁷¹ Moreover, it can be identified that in addition to the military occupation of Germania several measures were undertaken in order to gain favour with, and or influence over, the Germanic tribes that were not yet allied or friendly with Rome. These measures include: the use of force and the pressure of annexation, hostage taking, the investiture of Roman titles and privileges, and the practice of securing the allegiance of native nobility through their attachment to the Roman army. Significantly, it is during this period that tribal chieftains' sons, like Arminius, obtained officer rank in the Roman army and Roman citizenship.⁷²

During the period 6-1 BC, Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus was in command of the forces along the Rhine. At some point before AD 1, Domitius marched troops northwards from the Danube; there he encountered the *Hermunduri* whom he settled on the upper Main River, an area that was evacuated by the *Marcomanni* during Drusus' incursions in 9 BC. Cüppers speculates that the recently found traces of a Roman camp

⁷⁰ C. M. Wells, 'What's New along the Lippe', p. 463.

⁷¹ E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in Raaflaub K. A. & Toher M., eds., *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 406; C. M. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, p. 80; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 100.

⁷² (Arminius) see, Vell. Pat. II.118.2; (Ahenobarbus) see, Dio LV.102.2-3.

in the vicinity of Wurzburg could be evidence for his activities in the settlement of the *Hermunduri* in southern Thuringia and north Franconia.⁷³ Domitius continued on north-eastwardly and eventually crossed the Elbe, allegedly without any resistance; there he made alliances with people on the further bank of that river, and planned a new altar to Augustus on the site, as symbol that loyalty supposedly extended even to that distant region. Domitius even became embroiled in intra-tribal disputes among the *Cherusci*, and in the process alienated them.⁷⁴ Conflict between the Romans and the *Cherusci* escalated in the following year; Ahenobarbus proved unsuitable for the command and was replaced by Marcus Vinicius in 2/1 BC.⁷⁵ The command of Vinicius, 2/1 BC – AD 3/4, was dominated by a tribal revolt that escalated into a vast war which went on for three years. Details regarding the conflict do not survive, but it is known that Vinicius fought successfully enough to justify the award of triumphal insignia.⁷⁶

Tiberius was once again in command of the Rhine army for the final period of conquest, which occurred during AD 4–5.⁷⁷ There is disagreement amongst the ancient sources on the extent of the achievements of these campaigns. Velleius records that in AD 4 Tiberius advanced beyond the Weser River and launched attacks against the *Canninefates*, the *Attuarii* and the *Bructeri*, which he defeated, and the *Cherusci* were once again subjugated.⁷⁸ At the end of the campaign season Tiberius established his winter quarters at the source of the Lippe.⁷⁹ Tiberius launched another offensive into the

⁷³ H. Cüppers, *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, p. 83, Abb. 39.

⁷⁴ Dio LV.10. P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 158; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 159; R. Syme, 'Lentulus on the Danube (without benefit from Epigraphy)', in *Roman Papers*, A. R. Birley, (ed.), Vols. VI, pp. 435–40.

⁷⁵ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 158.

⁷⁶ Vell. Pat. II.104. 2.

⁷⁷ Vell. Pat. II.105.

⁷⁸ Vell. Pat. II.105.

⁷⁹ Vell. Pat. II.104.3–105.3.

German interior in the following summer. Velleius reports that he attacked the *Chauci* and defeated the *Langobardi*, and opened a coordinated assault into the heart of Germania that involved both land and naval forces.⁸⁰ In two years, according to Velleius, Tiberius had led the army across all of Germany; nothing remained to be conquered except the *Marcomanni*.⁸¹ In contrast to this, Cassius Dio provides a curt and sober assessment of Tiberius' achievements, recording that the campaigns of AD 4–5 “yielded no notable achievements.”⁸²

While the land between Rhine and Elbe had, according to the Romans, been restored to dependency on Rome, a new threat in the guise of the Marcomannic Empire of King Maroboduus arose on Tiberius' eastern flank. The *Marcomanni* had abandoned their ancestral lands in the Main valley under pressure of Drusus' attacks in 9 BC and had now carved out a kingdom under their formidable ruler Maroboduus.⁸³ The significance of the territory controlled by the *Marcomanni* stemmed from its location near an area bordering on regions subject to or linked with Rome: the future provinces of Pannonia and Noricum. Moreover, their migration generated a further threat to Roman territory and Rome itself due to its position near other neighbouring Germanic tribes north of the Danube. Maroboduus' absorption of some of these neighbouring tribes under his authority and the inducement of others into an alliance made the perceived threat to Rome even more apparent. However, Maroboduus made no move to threaten Rome directly, although his position and the prestige he had obtained still

⁸⁰ Vell. Pat. II.106.

⁸¹ Vell. Pat. II.106, 108.

⁸² Dio LV.2 8.

⁸³ Vell. Pat. II.108.1-2; Strabo *Geo.* VII.1.3; Tac. *Germ.* 42; cf. Flor. II.30.23-4; Dio LV.28.6. E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 183. On Maroboduus, see J. Dobiáš, 'King Maroboduus as a Politician', *Klio* 38, 1960, pp. 155-60.

represented an embarrassment and possible threat to Rome.⁸⁴ In response to this perceived threat the combined troops of Germania, Raetia and Illyricum were mobilized against the *Marcomanni*. The Romans designed a two-pronged operation in AD 6. Tiberius was to lead the army of Illyricum from *Carnuntum* on the Danube, and the legate Gaius Sentius Saturninus would bring the Rhine legions from the west through the territory of the *Chatti*.⁸⁵ For the Romans this campaign represented the removal of their final obstacle to securing Germania.⁸⁶ Although Roman defences near the Rhine (the initial Rhine frontier) were still manned and maintained (although obviously with reduced numbers, given the forces needed for the Marcomannic campaign) against any possible threat from the *Germani* across the Rhine. [see Map (6)]

Advance Towards the Danube

Along the Danube, initially the territories, which would later make up the Roman provinces of Raetia, Noricum, and Pannonia, were situated in between Roman controlled lands and the *Germani* north of the river Danube. In the past, the tribes located along the southern banks of the Danube are recorded as having suffered attacks or incursions carried out by the *Germani* north of the river.⁸⁷ The Danubian territories, therefore, acted as an early buffer zone (not of Roman design), even though initially the Romans had little or no knowledge of events or threats in this region. Subsequent interference in this region would expose the Romans to direct contact with the *Germani* and expose them to another threat, similar to that experienced along the Rhine. This

⁸⁴ Vell. Pat. II.108.2-109-4; Strabo *Geo.* VII.1.3. E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 184.

⁸⁵ Vell. Pat. II.109.5; cf. Tac. *Ann.* II.46. E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 184.

⁸⁶ Details of this belief by the Romans and the military campaign will be examined in Chapter Five.

⁸⁷ This is first recorded 118 BC with the confederation of tribes under the *Cimbri* and *Teutones*, initially along the Middle Danube (expelling the *Scordisci*) and later Noricum, see Strabo *Geo.* VII.2.2; cf. VII.3.2. As stated above, later the *Marcomanni* and other Suebian tribes migrated to occupy territory north of Upper and Middle Danube.

threat north of the Danube was a significant factor in motivating the Romans to establish a defence along this front.

The first phase of Rome's push to the Danube was its incursion into, and eventual conquest, of the Alpine region. The justification for this military endeavour was the strategic benefits it could bring to the defence of Italy and the possible offensive potential it represented to future military expeditions north of the Danube. Augustus clearly recognised the strategic importance of controlling the Alpine passes, identifying that it would not only secure Italy from incursion from the north but it would also help shore up Roman control in Gaul and improve communication between Rome and the territories in the north, but it would also open up new routes to Helvetia and the Upper Rhine and help facilitate Rome's acquisition of the Danubian territories.⁸⁸

The Alpine Incursion

The initial Roman incursion into the Alps commenced in 34 BC. Their push had some success although meeting with some minor setbacks, such as the expulsion of the Roman garrison by the *Salassi* — even though retaliation came swiftly afterwards under the command of Valerius Messalla. Even this victory was short lived. Triumph would not come until 25 BC and the subjugation of the *Salassi* under the command of M. Terentius Varro. The military colony of *Augusta Pratoria Salassorum* (modern day Aosta) would be established shortly afterwards on the site of Varro's legionary camp

⁸⁸ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC – AD 68*, pp. 101-116; M. Šašel Kos, *Appian and Illyricum*, Situla 43, Ljubljana, 2005, pp. 420-22; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 169.

and would have significant military importance throughout the Roman period.⁸⁹ Victories came in swift succession thereafter, and military installations gradually multiplied in strategic places during the next decade, such as *Turicum*, *Basilia*, *Vindonissa*, *Vitudurum*, to name but a few.⁹⁰ This penetration into the Alps established a strong military presence and a springboard that prepared the way for outright conquest.

The final push to complete the conquest of the Alps enabled and facilitated the second phase of Rome's drive towards the Danube, the conquest of Raetia and Vindelicia, and the annexation of Noricum.⁹¹ This commenced in 15 BC with a two pronged assault prepared by Augustus' stepsons Tiberius and Drusus. Tiberius moved his forces eastwards from Gaul, while Drusus went northwards through the Brenner and Reschenscheideck passes to the valley of the Inn. The justification for this assault was connected with an earlier attack in 17 or 16 BC carried out by Publius Silius Nerva, proconsul of Illyricum, who subdued the *Camunni* and the *Vennii*. According to Dio, the enemy was supposedly responsible for provoking the conflict; more probably it highlights Augustus' resolve and drive to bring the entire Alpine region finally under Roman dominion.⁹² Therefore, it can hardly be coincidence that a well planned and provisioned two-pronged assault occurred in the following year. Again, the sources direct the blame upon the enemy for inciting the assault.⁹³ However, it can be observed that the size and scope of the campaign went far beyond retaliation and pointed more

⁸⁹ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC – AD 68*, pp. 106-111; M. Šašel Kos, *Appian and Illyricum*, pp. 420-22; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 169.

⁹⁰ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 40-45; R. Frei-Stolba, 'Die Schweiz in römischer Zeit: der Vorgang der Provinzialisierung in rechtshistorischer Sicht', *Historia* 25, 1976, pp. 350-355; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 169.

⁹¹ The territories known as Raetia [Rhaetia] and Vindelicia, are the names given to the regions by the Romans, and were so named because of the dominant tribe in the area. Both areas are later amalgamated into the single province of Raetia.

⁹² Dio LIV.20.1.G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 54.

⁹³ Dio LIV.22.1-2; cf. Flor. II.22. E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 170.

towards complete subjugation and conquest. Drusus and Tiberius' assault was carried out with precision and coordination. Both had moved into Raetia from two different directions and with various columns of troops emerging simultaneously at different points.⁹⁴ This clearly shows Augustus' determination to clear out hostile elements in the central Alps and to extend Roman control throughout the Alpine regions and beyond. The brothers achieved their goals, subduing the formidable *Raeti* and *Vindelici* of eastern Switzerland, the Tyrol, and southern Bavaria.⁹⁵ Roman dominion in the Alps was total and complete.

Tiberius and Drusus' victories were followed in 14 BC by the subjugation of the *Ligurians* and annexation of the Maritime Alps.⁹⁶ Occupation of strategic sites in the lands of the *Raeti* and *Vindelici* came in subsequent years. Two legions were stationed in the region that would later become the Roman province of Raetia, and an equestrian prefect was appointed to develop the area into an administrative unit of the empire, thus incorporating all the major passes of the central Alps and extending Roman influence to the upper Danube. Under the auspices of the Alpine campaigns in 16 and 15 BC fighting also broke out against peoples further east, notably against branches of the *Norici*, who were inhabitants of the *regnum Noricum* (a Celtic Danubian kingdom) that bordered both Raetia and Pannonia.⁹⁷ Annexation of this territory was essential to ensure Roman control of the Upper and Middle Danube, and was a vital link for

⁹⁴ Dio LIV.22.3-4; Vell. Pat. II.95.1-2; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 170.

⁹⁵ Dio LIV.22.3-4; Vell. Pat. II.95.1-2; Strabo *Geo.* IV.6.9; Suet. *Aug.* 21; *Tib.* 9; Flor. II.22; Livy *Per.* 138. Cf. The discussion of K. Christ, 'Zur römischen Okkupation der Zentralalpen und des nördlichen Alpenvorlandes', *Historia* 6, pp. 416-28; J. A. Waasdorp, 'Immanes Raeti. A Hundred Years of Roman Defensive Policy in the Alps and Voralpenland', *Talanta*, 1982/3, pp. 40-7; F. Schön, *Der Beginn der römischen Herrschaft in Rätien, Sigmaringen*, pp. 43-56; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 170.

⁹⁶ Dio LIV.24.3.

⁹⁷ Dio LIV.20.2; Strabo *Geo.* IV.6.8-9; Flor. II.22 (inaccurate), see E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 170. See also, M. Šašel Kos, *Appian and Illyricum*, pp. 473-88.

communication and supplies between forces in Raetia and the army of Illyricum.⁹⁸ Moreover, the confrontation in 16 and 15 BC would serve as pretext for the later occupation and annexation of this region.⁹⁹

The reasoning behind the pacification of the Alps is still very much a topic for debate in scholarship today. Some scholars put forward the argument of a long range imperialist plan, which views the Alpine campaigns as merely establishing the foundation for a major offensive against the *Germani*, with the overall goal of expanding Roman power across both the Rhine and Danube and effectively subjugating all of Germania all the way to the Elbe.¹⁰⁰ Although possible, this explanation only gains its certainty through hindsight; at the time of the campaigns Augustus and Rome had no real understanding of the lands north of the Danube and east of the Rhine, nor the extent of the lands controlled by Germanic tribes. Other scholars have argued against the theory of Augustus' "grand designs" either for northern European conquest or for the establishment of stable borders, preferring to explain this expansion as a short-term reaction to a change in circumstances.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the motives at that time of the campaigns need not have been so ambitious or so far reaching. Other scholars propose a simpler justification: the strategic advantage of opening up the Great St

⁹⁸ Vell. Pat. II.39.3; Dio LIV.20.2; Festus *Brev. 7*. G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, London, 1974, pp. 52-6; G. Winkler, 'Noricum und Rom', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung ANRW II*, 6, 1977, pp. 197-9; D. Kienast, *Augustus: Prinzeps und Monarch*, p. 297. In contrast, P. Kneissl, 'Zur Entstehung der Provinz Noricum', *Chiron* 9, 1979, pp. 261-72, makes a stern argument denying any occupation before Claudius. See also E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, pp. 170-171.

⁹⁹ The date which Noricum was formally annexed remains in dispute. For details see, S. R. Flynt, 'The Military Vici of Noricum', PhD diss., University of Missouri-Colombia, (2005).

¹⁰⁰ K. Kraft, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur antiken Geschichte und Militärgeschichte*. Darmstadt, 1973, pp. 181-208; cf. C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 70; D. Kienast, *Augustus, Prinzeps und Monarch*, p. 297; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, p. 171.

¹⁰¹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', p. 126. For scholars that support this view see, E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, pp. 195-196; P. Southern, *Augustus*, 1998, p. 155.

Bernard Pass and the route through Helvetia. This gave the Romans swifter access from Italy to the Rhine and thus greater protection to Gaul, and also facilitated the reduction of Raetia and occupation of Noricum, providing further essential links between legions on the Rhine and the armies of Illyricum. This has more grounding in reality and represents the possible extent of Roman strategic planning during that time.¹⁰²

The Pannonian and Illyrian Wars

The third and final phase of Rome's annexation of the Danubian territories and the next stage of Rome's eventual control of the river Danube is the subjugation of the Pannonian and Illyrian tribes and the annexation of their territories. As early as 35 BC Augustus (then known as Octavian) recognised the region's importance in stemming the flow of hostile peoples north of the Danube and in removing the threat of incursions and raids against northern Italy and Rome's northern Greek interests. These campaigns also served a military and political motive: the conflict would restore morale in legions that had been fighting factional wars against fellow Romans, and would instead focus their aggression on an enemy. Additional benefits that derived from this include the commander would be able to claim effective military leadership in the national interest, and gain political advantage in Rome.

The Romans gave ample justification for their conquest of Illyricum, as the Illyrians had periodically plundered Italy, damaged the cause of Julius Caesar, destroyed the armies of Gabinius and Vatinius, and had held the captured standards of the Roman legions – reason enough for their retaliation and the restoration of Roman

¹⁰² Cf. D. van Berchem, 'La conquete de la Rhetie', in *Museum Helveticum* 25, 1968, pp. 6-8; K. Christ, 'Zur augusteischen Germanienpolitik', in *Chiron* 7, 1977, pp. 188-89; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, p. 171.

honour and pre-eminence.¹⁰³ Dio's assessment of the conflict is more critical of Augustus's actions, recording that no Illyrian provocation prompted the war, and that Augustus lacked legitimate complaint and sought a pretext to give practice to his legions against a foe whose resistance was likely to be ineffective.¹⁰⁴ Although both of these views have some elements of truth neither of them explains the underlining motive. Gruen goes to the heart of the matter, arguing that:

Octavian needed to enhance his military reputation, in an effort to match the accomplishments of his partner Antony. It is no accident that Octavian took conspicuous personal risks and twice suffered injury in Illyricum. Those badges of courage could be useful.¹⁰⁵

This pinpoints the true motivation of the initial Illyrian campaigns; Octavian used his military successes to bolster his own position in the Senate and to undermine and discredit M. Antonius.¹⁰⁶ Overall, despite how beneficial these victories were to Augustus's career, these campaigns would prove to be a prologue and a staging point for later expansion.

Despite this incentive, major expansion into the region would not take place until 13 BC and would continue until 9 BC.¹⁰⁷ Although these series of campaigns would be known to the Romans as the *Bellum Pannonicum*, they were directed against both the

¹⁰³ App. *Ill.* 12-13, 15, 18; B. *Civ.* V. 145; cf. Dio XLIX. 34. 2. E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 172.

¹⁰⁴ Dio XLIX.35.2.

¹⁰⁵ E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 172.

¹⁰⁶ App. *Ill.* 16, 27; Suet. *Aug.* 20; Pliny *NH* VII.148; Flor. II.23; Dio XLIX.35.2.

¹⁰⁷ On the operations in Illyricum from 16 to 9 BC, see A. Mócsy, 'Pannonia', *Real-Encyclopadie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, pp. 540-41; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, London, 1969, pp. 63-5; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 175; R. Syme, *Danubian Papers*, pp. 18-22.

Pannonian and Illyrian tribes. Numerous tribal uprisings and Roman reprisals accompanied this long and taxing endeavour. Even though several commanders were entrusted with command of the war before this period, including Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, it was not until the appointment of Tiberius in 12 BC that major victories and territorial advances were accomplished. During this period, probably around c. 10 BC, the former proconsular command of Illyricum came directly under Augustus' authority, to be governed by the *princeps*' legates. The Illyrican command would encompass an area that would stretch from the Adriatic to the Danube.

During the campaigns in 10 and 9 BC, Tiberius subjugated the remaining tribes that resisted Roman dominion and pacified the region up to the river Danube. Augustus acknowledges Tiberius' accomplishments in the *Res Gestae*:

He [Tiberius] had subjugated the previously unconquered peoples of Pannonia and extended the frontier of Illyricum to the banks of the Danube.¹⁰⁸

Clearly, Augustus recognised the significance of Tiberius' contribution to the campaigns and the overall effect this had on Rome's strategic position in the region. The Roman advance to the Danube meant that the region of the lower Drava and Sava valleys, around *Mursa* and *Sirmium*, was brought under Roman control, and thus established the overland connexion between Italy and the Balkans. This area would be the keystone of the empire's defensive arch against the northern peoples between the Black sea and the northern Ocean, and would enable Roman control over the Middle Danube.

¹⁰⁸ RG 30.1 (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*). See also Dio LIV.36.2; LV.2.4; cf. Vell. Pat. II.90.1.

During Augustus' reign most of the regions and tribes along the Upper and Middle Danube were supposedly now under Roman control. Rome's influence theoretically now stretched up to the south bank of the Danube.¹⁰⁹ In contrast to the Rhine during this early period, the Romans did not have direct control over this region defined by a military zone, but instead their expansion into the Middle and Upper Danube was more an enlargement of influence rather than a full annexation of these territories. Little is known about the situation in Illyricum after 8 BC, as the sources for the period between the *Bellum Pannonicum* and the *Bellum Batonianum* are extremely scarce. Dio's account is partially preserved in sombre but ultimately useful reports, and Velleius Paterculus seems to be uninterested in the region during this period due to the absence of Tiberius. Both of these key sources have been criticised for inadequacy and bias by modern scholars, especially Velleius for his noted ignorance of the events of which he did not have personal experience. Velleius relied too much on rumours and facts from uncorroborated sources and unproven witnesses. He was uninterested in and took no particular care of events that did not portray Tiberius' deeds in a favourable light.¹¹⁰ Dio's otherwise continuous narrative frustratingly breaks into two parts, and a lacuna in texts omits crucial events from the middle of AD 8. Dio's account also has positive aspects and drawbacks. Modern scholars have criticised him for incorrect and

¹⁰⁹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', p. 126.

¹¹⁰ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', p. 139; R. Rau, 'Zur Geschichte des pannonisch-dalmatischen Krieges der Jahre 6-9 n. Chr.' *Klio* 19, 1925, p. 316; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers of Augustus', in *CAH*, 1934, p. 340; A. Mócsy, 'The Civilised Pannonians of Velleius', in B. Hartle and J. Watcher (ed.), *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, Oxford, 1983, pp. 173-174 for criticism of Velleius Paterculus. J. J. Wilkes, 'Σπλονον – Splonum Again', *AAH* 13, 1965, pp. 112-114 recognised Velleius' failure to see the bigger picture behind his own experience. He was especially unreliable in reporting events on the Moesian border, but still well informed of the events that took place closer to him on the western front. E. Kostermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes* 81, 1953, p. 346 and E. Pašalić, 'Quaestiones de bello Dalmatico Pannonicoque', *Godisnjak* 8, 1956, pp. 253-256 are generally more positive about Velleius, as well as A. J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94-131)*, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 153-83.

at times confusing chronology and his lack of military knowledge, but have praised him for his objectivity and understanding of the broader picture.¹¹¹

In short, it is unclear where the northern frontier of Illyricum was located at this time. As discussed earlier, Augustus claims in the *Res Gestae*¹¹² that his power reached the Danube, and that most scholars support the idea that Trans-Danubia (the plains between the Drava and Danube rivers) was attached to Illyricum in the *Bellum Pannonicum* or shortly afterwards.¹¹³ Nagy showcases this view, arguing that most of the area came under some form of Roman control following the Alpine campaign of 15 BC and that submission of the easternmost Pannonians followed on the Roman victories south of the Drava in 12-11 BC.¹¹⁴ Conversely, other scholars argue that the Romans had not yet established their frontier on the Danube at this time.¹¹⁵ No sources mention campaigns in Transdanubia north of the Drava, Pannonia had no significant economic or strategic value for Romans, nor did its inhabitants pose any real threat to Roman interests. Interestingly the *Eravisci*, who lived in the north-eastern corner of Pannonia, continued to mint their own coinage for a long period after their supposed

¹¹¹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, 2005, p. 139. N. Vulić, 'Неколико питања из Римске старине', *Glas SKA* 88 (52), 1911, pp. 200-204; 'Неколико питања из античке прошлости наше земље', *Glas SKA* 121 (66), 1926, p. 62; B. Saria, '*Bathinus flumen*', *Klio* 23, 1930, pp. 92-93 (positive); R. Rau, 'Zur Geschichte des pannonisch-dalmatischen Krieges der Jahre 6-9 n. Chr.', pp. 314-315; E. Swoboda, *Octavian und Illyricum*, Vienna, 1932, pp. 34-36 (negative). E. Pašalić, 'Quaestiones de bello Dalmatico Pannonicoque', *Godisnjak* 8, 1956, pp. 256-267 gives a balanced opinion of Dio, with all the positive and negative sides of his account.

¹¹² '*Imperio populi Romani subieci protulique fines Illyrici usque ad ripam fluminis Danui*' (RG 30).

¹¹³ See, D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, 2005, p. 140; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS*, Vol. 95, 2005, pp. 137-138. For earlier works written on the subject, see J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', in *ANRW* 2.6, 1977 n. 2.

¹¹⁴ T. Nagy, 'Die Okkupation Pannoniens durch die Römer in der Zeit des Augustus', *AAH* 43, pp. 57-85. Also see, G. Dobesch, *Limes XIII*, 1983, Aalen, Germany, pp. 308-15.

¹¹⁵ J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', pp. 543-545; E. Tóth, '...protulique fines Illyrici ad ripam fluminis Danuvii', in *Arheoloski Vestnik* 28, 1977.

subjugation.¹¹⁶ This would suggest that the Romans did not have a strong presence along the Middle Danube area at this time. Moreover, the lack of supporting evidence would indicate that the conquest did not take place after the *Bellum Pannonicum* and most likely did not take place at least until the campaigns of Ahenobarbus, Vinicius and Lentulus, or even later.¹¹⁷

Roman Occupation Phases on the Danube

Little is certain regarding the stationing of legions in the Danube lands before AD 6. Archaeological evidence from this period is of little assistance except in the negative sense, for inscriptions are as yet rare, while production of bricks stamped by military units does not appear to have started before Claudius' time.¹¹⁸ The only known legion in the vicinity of the Upper and Middle Danube was located in Raetia, near the strategically important Brenner Pass, which was stationed there after Drusus and Tiberius' Alpine campaign in 15 BC.¹¹⁹ According to Farnum, the rest of Noricum and Raetia was controlled by various auxiliary units, although the exact details are uncertain.¹²⁰ Although Tiberius used the legions from Illyricum to conquer the region of Pannonia in 12 BC, these legions returned to their previous bases in the hinterlands

¹¹⁶ *CIL* III, p. 415; *RG* 5.21. This is an old argument of Mommsen, defended convincingly by Fitz and Tóth, see J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', in *ANRW* 2.6, pp. 543-545; E. Tóth, '...protulique fines Illyrici ad ripam fluminis Danuvii', in *AArchSlov* 26, pp. 278-87. For details regarding the low economic value of Pannonia, see A. Mócsy, 'Pannonia', in *RE*, pp. 541-542.

¹¹⁷ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', pp. 140-141; J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', pp. 551-555 puts the final Roman conquest of the Transdanubia in the context of Sarmatian settlement in the mid-1st century AD; cf. E. Tóth, '...protulique fines Illyrici ad ripam fluminis Danuvii', 1977.

¹¹⁸ R. J. Brewer, *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 102. For the first traces of archaeological evidence from the Augustan wars in Pannonia and the southern Alps, see M. Šašel Kos, 'The Roman Conquest of Dalmatia and Pannonia under Augustus – Some of the Latest Research Results', in Moosbauer, G., Wiegels, R. (eds.), *Fines Imperii - Imperium Sine Fine?*, pp. 107-110.

¹¹⁹ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 5.

¹²⁰ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 5.

when the campaign was over and were not positioned along the new frontier on the Danube.¹²¹

The situation along the Danube was thus initially drastically different from Rome's relatively strong military position on the Rhine. At this stage the Romans had not moved their legions from the interior of the Danubian provinces up to the river Danube; they remained in their respective bases in Illyricum, Raetia, and northern Greece. Throughout this period of conflict and expansion the supposed territorial gains along the Upper and Middle Danube did not result in the construction of permanent fortresses, although there were some forces temporarily stationed along the river Danube at one time or another.¹²² The lack of a military presence is supported by the paucity of material evidence. There is no trace of the construction of major Roman roads built in Illyricum during this period. Additionally, the fact that no written, epigraphic, or archaeological evidence has been found that identifies a Roman presence throughout Transdanubia only confirms that Roman occupation and long term military operations along the Danube did not take place until later. Therefore, along the Upper and Middle Danube the Romans appear to have only exercised some influence, at best a minimal or moderate level of control, over the region and its peoples, for all intents and purposes the area was a 'buffer zone' or zone of influence between Roman controlled territory and the Germanic peoples north of the Danube.

¹²¹ Dio LIV.31.2-4.

¹²² K. Christ, 'Zur römischen Okkupation der Zentralalpen und des nördlichen Alpenvorlandes', 1957, pp. 425-27; E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², p. 171.

Rome began to exercise more control over the region and its peoples shortly after the turn of the century. In the early first century AD Rome had begun to launch military operations into southern Germania. It is during this period that Roman defences in the Upper and Middle Danube regions developed from a unrealised buffer zone, largely left to its own devices (with Romans only wielding influence over the tribes rather than direct control), to that of an initial Roman buffer zone with a substantially increase in the Roman military presence. The first recorded expedition across the Danube, and confrontation against Germanic peoples north of the river, was during the command of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. According to Dio, Ahenobarbus, while ‘governing the districts along the Ister’¹²³ intercepted the wandering *Hermunduri*, and settled them in Marcomannian territory...¹²⁴ The resettlement of a possibly friendly tribe in the vicinity of an enemy was a strategy employed countless times throughout the empire.¹²⁵ The aim of the resettlement of the *Hermunduri* in Marcomannic territory was intended to act as a check or buffer against possible Marcomannic aggression. Furthermore, epigraphic evidence records that another Augustan legate, perhaps M. Vinicius, fought and routed the *Bastarnae*, and initiated agreements with several trans-Danubian tribes, which were mostly probably made up of Germanic peoples.¹²⁶ Other expeditions may have preceded or followed these excursions but the historical record around this period is particularly sparse and to date no material evidence has surfaced to expand our knowledge of events.¹²⁷

¹²³ Dio does not specify whether Ahenobarbus command was in the upper or middle Danube.

¹²⁴ Dio LV.101.2-3; Tac. *Ann.* IV.44.

¹²⁵ Examples of this can be seen with Caesar and later Agrippa along the Rhine. Caesar resettled the *Helvetii*, *Tulingi* and *Latobrigi* near the Upper Rhine (Cic. *Balb.* 32; Caesar *B. Gall.* I.28). Agrippa resettled the *Ubii* on the left bank of the Rhine, see Strabo *Geo.* IV.3.4.

¹²⁶ Evidence for M. Vinicius, see *ILS* 8965. Cf. R. Syme, ‘Augustus and the South Slav Lands’, *Danubian Papers*, pp. 26-39; A. Mócsy, ‘Pannonia’, pp. 543-544.

¹²⁷ See, R. Syme, ‘Lentulus on the Danube (without benefit from Epigraphy)’, in *Roman Papers*, A. R. Birley, (ed.), Vol.. VI, pp. 435-40.

The resettlement of loyal tribes close to the *Marcomanni*, the last remaining major threat in the region, and later the major military preparations along the Rhine and Danube in AD 6 against the *Marcomanni*, clearly points to the Romans attempting to secure Germania and the Danube River against threats from the *Germani*. This is reinforced by the establishment of the legionary marching camp at *Carnuntum*, which was the staging area for Tiberius' campaign against the *Marcomanni* in AD 6,¹²⁸ which is the first instance where *Carnuntum* is mentioned in the historical record; there is no information, however, for when it was first established or what its original purpose was. Nevertheless, by c. AD 6 the Romans military presence at *Carnuntum* confirms the extent of their annexation to the southern bank of the Middle Danube. Significantly, there is no other mention of additional Roman forts along the Danube until later in the reign of Augustus.¹²⁹ Given this lack of military presence and defences the existence of a military frontier along the Danube is debatable at this stage; however, a definite buffer zone, which separated the *Germani* north of the Danube and Roman interests south of the river, was clearly in place. As with the Rhine, the Romans had advanced to secure their territory against the *Germani*. The manipulation, intimidation and confrontation of tribes along and beyond the Danube clearly indicate that the Romans were their position on the Upper and Middle Danube.

Conclusion

The relationship and defences that existed between Rome and the *Germani* east of the Rhine and north of the Danube developed in response to specific events and threats. Along the Rhine, Caesar's initial defensive policy proved ineffective. The Romans

¹²⁸ Dio LV. 29.1-3. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC – AD 68*, p. 138; E. S. Gruen, 'The expansion of the roman empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 176.

¹²⁹ This is discussed in Chapter Five.

changed their policy in response to the growing threat posed by the *Germani* east of the river. Their escalating attacks resulted in Augustus' decision to alter radically Rome's German border policy. Augustus' decision to reorganise and redeploy the legions on the Rhine and to establish military bases close to the frontier marked the beginning of Rome's offensive policy against Germania. This effectively replaced the buffer zone with a military frontier. During 12 BC–AD 6 the Romans undertook the conquest of Germania, subduing tribal groups as Rome penetrated further into the interior. The establishment of legionary and supply bases throughout the interior enabled them to sustain a presence in the region, in some cases all year round, and maintain a certain level of control over the territory and its peoples. By AD 6 the Romans believed that their conquest of Germania was almost complete, all that remained was conquest of the *Marcomanni*.

Along the Danube, the initial confrontation between Rome and the *Germani* north of the Danube had developed during completely different circumstances. Initially, the Romans did not have to contend with the *Germani* north of the Danube. Their subsequent annexation of the Alps, Noricum, and Illyricum, however, removed the unrealised buffer zone that had previously existed and brought them in direct contact with southern Germania and the *Germani* north of the Danube. At first, the Romans only exercised influence over this region; direct control did not come until the early first century AD and the military operations into southern Germania. As with Rhine, the Romans resettled 'allied' tribes in or near enemy territory; the resettlement of tribes near the *Marcomanni* was intended to act as a check or buffer against possible Marcomannic aggression. This marks the emergence of the second, Roman buffer zone. It is during, or shortly after, this period that the Romans finally secured the middle

Danube, with the intimidation and confrontation against tribes along and beyond the Danube clearly indicating that they were undertaking militarily operations in the region. This was the beginning of Roman defences against the *Germani* along the Danube. Similar to Rhine, by AD 6 the Romans believed that their conquest of Germania was almost complete their last obstacle, the *Marcomanni*.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Occupation of Roman ‘Germania Magna’, and Revolts Along the Rhine and Danube — AD 6-9

According to the Romans, the eastern boundary of the ‘province’ of Germania Magna was now the River Elbe. For the Romans, the proof that Germania seemed secure and under their control was the basis of the decision to proceed in AD 6 with the conquest of the *Marcomanni*.¹ Along the Rhine, a large military force was assembled, possibly at *castrum Mogontiacum* (Mainz). Similar preparations were being undertaken along the Danube at *Carnuntum* (near Petronell). As illustrated in the previous chapter, a military frontier along the Danube is debatable at this stage. However, a definite buffer zone which separated the Germanic tribes north of the Danube, and Roman interests south of the river, was clearly in place. Several critical events beyond the Rhine and along the Danube drastically altered Rome’s position in these regions. Furthermore, these events radically changed the limits and perceived boundaries of the Roman Empire and how the Romans’ viewed themselves and the *Germani*. This chapter examines the three significant events that occurred during AD 6-9: the Roman occupation of Germania, the *Bellum Batonianum* (War of the Batons), and the *clades Variana* (Varian Disaster). The consequences of these events and the Roman response to these threats on the Rhine and Danube will be examined in Chapter Six.

Occupation and Policy: Germania Magna

Following the *Bellum Pannonicum* and the Roman expansion into Germania there were two major focal points for Roman foreign policy: the Dacian kingdoms, and an

¹ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 159.

even more alarming threat – the kingdom of Maroboduus in Bohemia (north of the Upper and Middle Danube). Gradually the Roman armies strategically encircled the Marcommanic kingdom and in AD 6 were preparing its elimination.² To accomplish this, the Romans had prepared a two-pronged offensive operation. Tiberius was to lead the army of Illyricum from *Carnuntum* on the Danube, and the legate Gaius Sentius Saturninus was to march the Rhine legions from the west through the land of the *Chatti*.³ However, the plan never came to fruition. News of a Pannonian revolt (*Bellum Batonianum*) reached Augustus and in a panic or on impulse the assault against the *Marcomanni* was immediately abandoned, supposedly when the two Roman armies were within days of merging their forces.⁴

Along the Danube, the situation was complex and any certainty regarding events or the Romans position there is made challenging due to the scarcity of evidence. The Romans had supposedly conquered the lands along the south bank of the river from *Abusina* (Eining) in Raetia up to *Troesmis* near the Black Sea. This effectively brought the Upper, Middle and Lower Danube under Roman control. This is explicitly expressed by Augustus.⁵ In contrast no other sources mention campaigns in the

² D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics 229 BC-AD 68*, p. 139; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 364-369; J. Wilkes, 'The military achievements of Augustus in Europe; with special reference to Illyricum', *UBHJ* 10, pp. 20-22; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 67-69. For the political career of Maroboduus; cf. J. Dobiáš, 'King Maroboduus as politician', *Klio* 38, pp. 155-159.

³ Vell. Pat. II.109.5; cf. Tac. *Ann.* II.46. E. S. Gruen, 'The expansion of the empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 184; see n. 191. Once again, the Romans used the line of advance from Mainz through Chatten territory, up the Main River towards the Saale and Elbe was used as the western offensive route against Maroboduus. The identity and location of the easternmost fortress belonging to those forward thrusts seems now to be confirmed by the recent discovery of a military base at Marktbreit on the river Main, twenty five kilometres east of Würzburg, see C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 526; H. Cüppers, *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, 83, see Abb. 39.

⁴ Vell. Pat. II.110. 1-3; Dio LV.28.7. E. S. Gruen, 'The expansion of the empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 184.

⁵ RG 30. Here Augustus claims that he extended Illyricum to the Danube. The majority of scholars support the idea that the plains between the Drava and Danube Rivers were joined to Illyricum in the

Transdanubian region north of the Drava during this period.⁶ It is still unclear where the northern frontier of Illyricum was at this time.⁷ At this stage, there is no Danubian frontier, only a buffer zone, the extent of control the Romans had over this region and its people being questionable. Following the *Bellum Pannonicum*, however, Rome had considered the Illyrians and Pannonians defeated and their territory under Roman administration and control.⁸ Under this misguided notion warriors from the Pannonian region were drafted by Tiberius in AD 6 to take part in Rome's next major military campaign against the Germanic tribes north of the river Danube.

Tiberius had already begun to assemble his force near the river Danube at *Carnuntum* before rebellion broke out in Illyricum. The force Tiberius had assembled consisted of Roman legions, auxiliary units and recruits from amongst the Illyrian tribes.⁹ The intended purpose of the campaign was a decisive thrust against the Marcomanni and their leader Maroboduus, of which Tiberius' force was the southern contingent of a two pronged offensive. The majority of the Illyrian rebels belonged to the peoples whom ancient writers thought of as the *Pannonii*. No other group in Illyricum is mentioned by the sources to have participated in the rebellion.¹⁰ Throughout the conflict the location of the main battles and movements of the Roman troops and the

Bellum Pannonicum or shortly after. See D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 140. For earlier works on the subject, see J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', *ANRW* 2.6, p. 543 n. 2.

⁶ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 140.

⁷ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 140. Some scholars argue against an established frontier at this point in time, see J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', *ANRW* 2.6, pp. 523-5; E. Tóth, '...protulique fines Illyrici ad ripam fluminis Danuvii', *AArchSlov* 26, pp. 278-87.

⁸ *RG* 30.

⁹ Dio LV. 29.1-3; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 176; D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 138.

¹⁰ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 138.

Illyrian rebels were limited to the region inhabited by those called the *Pannonii* and the *Delmatae* by the sources.¹¹

It was the assemblage itself that gave the Pannonian forces a sense of their own strength and numbers.¹² The ancient sources record that the *Pannonii* came to a realisation of their own strength and size in numbers whilst gathered together, this new generation of Illyrian warriors had a will to exact revenge for their defeat by the Romans and was further fuelled by their resentment and anger at the harsh exactions of tribute by Roman officials.¹³ A chieftain of the *Daesitiates* named Bato lead the initial uprising and is held responsible for instigating hostilities. This initial uprising of the *Daesitiates* was soon met with the rebellion of the *Breuci*, headed by two prominent figures Pinnes and another Bato.¹⁴ The resulting rebellion would continue from AD 6 to 9. So significant was the conflict that Suetonius labelled it, ‘the most serious external threat to Rome since the war with Hannibal.’¹⁵

Revolt along the Danube: Rebellion in Illyricum

As a direct result of the rebellion in Illyricum the campaign against the *Marcomanni* was immediately halted and instead peace negotiations were hastily carried out and settled. Consequently Maroboduus went from being an enemy of Rome

¹¹ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 138.

¹² S. L. Dyson, ‘Native Revolts in the Roman Empire’, *Historia* 20/2-3, 1971, pp. 250-3.

¹³ Dio LV.29.1-3; Vell. Pat. II.110.1-3. E. S. Gruen, ‘The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 176.

¹⁴ Vell. Pat. II.110.4-5; Dio LV.29.2-3. Initially Dio omits Pinnies, and only mentions him after Bato’s betrayal described in LV.34.4. Bato was a typical name amongst the *Pannonii*, see J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, 1969, p. 169 n.1; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 59.

¹⁵ Suet. *Tib.* 16. For the origins and occasion of the conflict, see Dio LV. 28.7, LV. 29.3, LVI. 16.3; Vell. Pat. II. 109.5-110.5. Cf. S. L. Dyson, ‘Native Revolts in the Roman Empire’, *Historia* 20, pp. 250-3.

to the status of a friend and ally. The outcome, of course, was interpreted differently by each party, and presented in such a way that best suited respective opinions and tastes. Maroboduus thought of the agreement as putting him equal terms with the Romans.¹⁶ Conversely, from the Roman position Maroboduus had been obliged to keep to the terms of the treaty and ensure peace.¹⁷ Conquest of the *Marcomanni* would have provided something tangible and positive for imperial authorities to report and would have aided in the consolidation of Roman gains in Germania. Subsequently the direction the Romans followed in Germania was a more systematic application of judicial and financial authority by the new legate Publius Quintilius Varus.

The reasons for the uprising are not fully understood, as the few details that are known are derived from what little was written by the surviving sources. Velleius Paterculus' explanation of the long years of peace making the Pannonians restless and eager to rebel cannot be taken seriously.¹⁸ Conversely, Dio suggests that it was the large amount of tribute demanded by the Romans that was the main cause for the hostilities.¹⁹ Two factors make Dio's explanation sound plausible; the gathering of tribute was a factor in the rebellion of the *Pannonii* in Dalmatia in 10 BC,²⁰ and the economic

¹⁶ E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 184, see. n. 193.

¹⁷ E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 184, see n. 194.

¹⁸ Vell. Pat. II.110.2. Velleius was following traditional political theories rather than just being contemptuous towards Tiberius' enemies, see A. J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative (2.94-131)*, Cambridge, 1977, p. 157.

¹⁹ Dio, LV.29.1. E. Köstermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.', *Hermes* 81, 1953, p. 346 n. 3. What needs to be borne in mind is the different definition of Dalmatians and Pannonians used by the sources, see D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, see Chapter 2.5.2, 'The Illyrian Peoples'. For Dio, the Dalmatians and Pannonians are inhabitants of the administrative provinces Dalmatia and Pannonia, not the *Delmatae* and *Pannonii*, while for Velleius they are ethnic groups, cf. A. Mócsy, 'Pannonia', *RE Supp.* 9, 1962, p. 547; A. Mócsy, 'The civilised Pannonians of Velleius', in *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, pp. 174-175.

²⁰ Dio LIV.36.2.

situation throughout the Empire was generally severe in AD 5-6.²¹ Dzino correctly points out that the other possible factors are linked with the previous one: administrative abuse and the incompetence of 'Roman administrators as well as the greed of *negotiatores* and *publicani* in the exploitation of the province'.²² There was something else, much more complicated to see and define, and that is the increasing resentment of the *Pannonii*.²³ Dyson makes an astute comparison between Vercingetorix's Gaul in the late 50s BC and with the situation in Illyricum prior to the *bellum Batonianum* and finds common reasons for both rebellions.²⁴ Dyson observes that:

The province was undergoing Romanisation and the interior regions were getting the first real sense of what Roman conquest meant for native customs and power structure. There was a native leadership class intact and this apparently had had some contact with Roman military skills. Like the Gallic assemblies, joint levies for armed service must have given the natives some sense of strength and unity. This plus the increasingly uprooted and desperate psychological state of a people undergoing cultural change, created the 'nativistic atmosphere' that helped to overcome local differences and produce a unity that completely surprised the Romans.²⁵

It is Dyson's 'nativistic atmosphere' that was the catalyst for the uprising in Illyricum. The *Pannonii* shared a common fate after being conquered; in that they both had a sudden social change forced upon them, which in turn fuelled a shared sense of

²¹ Dio LV.24.9-25.

²² Dio LVI.16.3. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 142; P. A. Brunt, 'Charges of Provincial Maladministration under the Early Principate', *Historia* 10, 1961, p. 216; J. Šašel, *Opera selecta*, *Situla* 30, p. 512.

²³ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 143

²⁴ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 143.

²⁵ S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', *Historia* 20, p. 253.

frustration. A sense of shared cultural unity joined with this frustration, developing into an ethnic homogenisation and xenophobia which resulted in a distinction between ‘us’ (the *Pannonii*) and ‘them’ (the Romans).²⁶ These elements united most conventional factions amongst the *Pannonii* and gave an impetus towards the rebellion.²⁷

It has been noted that the native inhabitants of the provinces often showed resistance to Roman rule in the early Principate, which sometimes turned into unrest or rebellion when Romans attempted to press them into service in distant provinces.²⁸ In Illyricum this was indeed such a situation and it would be no surprise if the draft of the *Delmatae* for the war against Maroboduus was the spark needed to ignite an already explosive situation.²⁹ According to the ancient sources the most prominent peoples in the rebellion are: the *Daesitiates*, *Breuci*, *Pirustae*, *Mezaei* and *Delmatae*.³⁰ Evidently, the revolt occurred rapidly and the Roman military was caught completely off guard, just as in Gaul in 52 BC or Britain in AD 60. Romans initially sustained losses: some citizens and traders as well as a detachment of veterans.³¹ The rebels were a gathering of many disparate Pannonian communities, although some of them had already undergone

²⁶ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 144

²⁷ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, pp. 143-4.

²⁸ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 144

²⁹ Dio LV.29.2-3. A. Mócsy, ‘The Civilised Pannonians of Velleius’, in *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, eds. B. Hartley and J. Watcher, Oxford, pp. 173-174. The causes of rebellion were much more complex, see D. Dzino, ‘Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate’, PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 145 see figure 3. Cf. P. A. Brunt, ‘Conscription and Volunteering in the Roman Imperial Army’, *Scripta Classica Israelica* 1, 1974, p. 104.

³⁰ Strabo VII.5.3. Dzino argues that there is little doubt there were other unmentioned smaller peoples supporting, or being compelled to support them, see D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 144. See also, E. Kostermann, ‘Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.’ *Hermes*, 81, p. 346; R. Rau, ‘Zur Geschichte des pannonisch-dalmatischen Krieges der Jahre 6-9 n. Chr.’, *Klio* 19, pp. 344-345; G. Alföldy, *Bevölkerung und Gesellschaft der römischen Provinz Dalmatien*, p. 29.

³¹ Vell. Pat. II.110.6. Rau suggests that the veteran settlement was in Central Bosnia, see R. Rau, ‘Zur Geschichte des pannonisch-dalmatischen Krieges der Jahre 6-9 n. Chr.’, *Klio* 19, p. 323. For other theories see, E. Kostermann, ‘Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.’ *Hermes*, 81, p. 348 n. 1; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 70 n. 2.

Roman military training;³² it is astonishing how they gained such a level of organisation and relative unity in such a short time.³³ Dio specifically outlines the situation at the beginning of the revolt. The rebellion was not planned in advance; it was more an emotional and spontaneous outburst in which rebellion was not certain. The initial victory by the *Daesitiates* over a small Roman detachment surely encouraged others to join the uprising.³⁴

Debate surrounds the size of the rebel force. Velleius records the numerical strength at 200,000 foot soldiers, and 9,000 cavalry recruited out of a total population of 800,000.³⁵ It is clear that the account of Velleius is influenced by his own motives and point of view as a contemporary witness of the events. Given this fact, it would not be surprising if there was at that time a rumour circulating throughout Rome that 200,000 Pannonians were preparing to invade Italy.³⁶ Earlier modern scholars failed to criticise Velleius for this obvious exaggeration.³⁷ However, modern scholarship estimates the total population of Dalmatia at around 700,000 and, excluding Roman colonies and peoples who did not take part in the rebellion,³⁸ there were only 400,000 or even fewer

³² Vell. Pat. II.110.5. Dio records that they were lightly armed and extremely mobile, see Dio LV.30.5. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 146; A. Mócsy, 'The Civilised Pannonians of Velleius', in *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, pp. 171-173.

³³ Vell. Pat. II.110.5-6. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, pp. 146-7; E. Kostermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, 1953, pp. 345-378; E. Pašalić, 'Quaestiones de bello Dalmatico Pannonicoque', *Godišnjak* 8, pp. 269-270 n. 40.

³⁴ Dio LV.29.2-3. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, pp. 146-7; E. Kostermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, 1953, p. 347.

³⁵ Vell. Pat. II.110.3.

³⁶ For details see, D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147; D. Dzino, 'Velleius Paterculus and the Pannonii: Making up the Numbers', *ANUBiH/GCBI*, 35/36, pp. 145-59.

³⁷ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147; E. Pašalić, 'Quaestiones de bello Dalmatico Pannonicoque', *Godišnjak* 8, 1956, p. 246; A. Mócsy, 'The Civilised Pannonians of Velleius', in *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, eds. B. Hartley and J. Watcher, p. 177 n. 46.

³⁸ Peoples such as the *Liburni*, *Iapodes* or southern Illyrians, for details see D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 146.

inhabitants, only a fraction of which would have taken part in the rebellion.³⁹ While these numbers are only approximations, it is not possible that the total strength of the force exceeded over 100,000 men, even if the peoples that joined from Pannonia are taken into account.⁴⁰ According to Dzino, it would be reasonable to estimate the size of the *Pannonii* at a maximum of 90,000-100,000 foot soldiers, even if mobilisation was as high as two-thirds of all militarily capable males (which is highly debatable) and 9,000 cavalry.⁴¹

Besides the records of the attack against the nearest Roman settlements and garrisons, it is unclear what the initial aims of the rebels were.⁴² The rebels certainly relied on the absence of the Illyrian army and did not anticipate the quick return of Tiberius and the legions from *Carnuntum*.⁴³ According to Velleius the rebels divided their forces into three main armies: one to attack Macedonia; another to attack Italy; and the last to remain and defend their own territory.⁴⁴ This account was based on the initial reports arriving in Rome.⁴⁵ However, at the commencement of the uprising the rebel army had four military groups, operating more or less independent of each other. Velleius fails to mention the fourth group which attacked *Sirmium*, either he did not

³⁹ G. Alföldy, *Bevölkerung und Gesellschaft der römischen Provinz Dalmatien*, pp. 24, 29 n. 17 offers the figure of 600-700,000 with 200-300,000 who did not rebel. J. Wilkes, 'The Population of Roman Dalmatia', *ANRW* 2.6, pp. 752-753 puts the total at 700,000.

⁴⁰ Dzino arrives at this number because he argues that only peoples living between the valleys of Sava and Drava, not the whole of Pannonia, need to be counted in this assessment, see D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147 n. 40. Conversely, Kostermann argues that Pannonians made up the bulk of the rebel forces, and that they supplied an equal number of rebels, see E. Kostermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes* 81, p. 347. See also, G. Alföldy, *Bevölkerung und Gesellschaft der römischen Provinz Dalmatien*, p. 29 n. 17; A. Mócsy, 'Pannonia', in *RE*, Supp. 9, p. 543.

⁴¹ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147 nn. 40-42.

⁴² The *Daesitiates* attacked Salona, and the *Breuci* *Sirmium*.

⁴³ E. Kostermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes* 81, p. 349.

⁴⁴ Velleius was unaware of the Breucian movements to *Sirmium*, Vell. Pat. II.110.4. Dio was aware of *Sirmium*, Dio LV.29.3-4. Cf. J. Wilkes, 'The Military Achievements of Augustus in Europe; with Special Reference to Illyricum', *UBHJ* 10, 1965, p. 113.

⁴⁵ Vell. Pat. II.110.4.

know of this force or he chose not to make a record of it.⁴⁶ It is only through Dio's account that knowledge of the attack on Sirmium is recorded.⁴⁷ The first contingent was led by Bato Daesitiae who attacked Salona with a select force made up of units of the Dalmatians: *Daesitiae* and *Delmatae* (possibly the detachment of the *Ditiones* and *Mezaei*).⁴⁸ Another detachment of units was sent to pillage the south-eastern coast towards Macedonia, going as far as *Apollonia*.⁴⁹ The third element, led by Bato the Breucian, attacked *Sirmium*.⁵⁰ Finally, the last group remained to defend Pannonian territory and provide reinforcements to the other armies.⁵¹

Overall, the aims and strategy of the rebels, beyond their obvious intent to expel the Romans, are obscure. Paterculus suggests that the rebels planned to invade Italy, but according to Dio, Tiberius only thought of that as a possibility.⁵² Examining the initial movements of Bato the Daesitiae reveals no obvious strategy. The troops sent to plunder the Dalmatian coast as far as *Apollonia*, and the unsuccessful attack on *Salona*, only appear to be wasteful and serve no obvious purpose to the overall rebellion.⁵³ The futility of this attack is made even more apparent considering that there was no immediate danger threatening him from the south.⁵⁴ Modern scholars, such as Syme and Köstermann, have suggested that the immediate seizure of key positions in Siscia

⁴⁶ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 148.

⁴⁷ Dio LV.29.3-4. J. J. Wilkes, 'The Military Achievements of Augustus in Europe; with Special Reference to Illyricum', *UBHJ* 10, pp. 1-27.

⁴⁸ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147.

⁴⁹ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147.

⁵⁰ Dio LV.29.2-4.

⁵¹ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 147.

⁵² D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 149 n. 50.

⁵³ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 149; E. Köstermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, 1953, p. 351.

⁵⁴ E. Köstermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, p. 351; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 149.

would have been a much better strategy.⁵⁵ Dzino suggests that an even superior strategy would have been to seize control of the passes in the Julian Alps immediately and thus cut off Roman troops from Italy.⁵⁶ It cannot be over emphasised that the rebels were not under a unified command at the start of the war evidenced by the *Daesitiates* only joined with the *Breuci* after their defeat by Marcus Valerius Messalla Messallinus in AD 6.⁵⁷

Illyricum Revolt: Aftermath

The situation in Rome and throughout the empire preceding the rebellion was generally tense. There was a fiscal deficit, rebellions in Isauria and Africa, piracy in Sardinia, famine and fire in Rome, and the conspiracy of Publius Plautius Rufus.⁵⁸ Panic gripped Rome. Augustus, now severely alarmed, ordered extraordinary levies, recalled veterans back into military service, imposed new taxes, beseeched the senators and *equites* for their support, and drafted freedmen and slaves as reinforcements for the army of Illyricum. The *princeps* sent some of these recruits with Velleius Paterculus, dispatched other additional troops with Germanicus, the nephew of Tiberius, and relocated himself and his court to *Ariminum*.⁵⁹ The literary sources differ on their accounts of events. Suetonius mentions the recruiting of slaves and freedmen in Italy only in the context of defending of the Roman colonies in Dalmatia, without suggestion

⁵⁵ For the importance of Sirmium and Siscia, see R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH* X, 1934, p. 370; E. Köstermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, pp. 353-354; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 70; M. Hoti, 'Siscia in the Ancient Sources', *Opuscula Archaeologica* 16, 1992, p. 140.

⁵⁶ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 149.

⁵⁷ Dio LV.30.2. D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 150.

⁵⁸ Dio LV.24.9-28.4. Conspiracy of Publius Plautius Rufus, see Dio LV.27.2, Suet., *Aug.* 19.

⁵⁹ Dio LV.29.3-31.4; Vell. Pat. II.110.3-112.2. E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire Under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, pp. 176-7.

the contemporary panic that is attested in Velleius Paterculus' account.⁶⁰ Dio does not record panic in Rome, but does mention that Tiberius thought that the security of Italia could be endangered, and returned from Germania with all the Illyrian legions.⁶¹ Augustus' speech in the Senate, and the subsequent conscription in Rome and throughout Italy, strongly indicates that there was a perceived danger that had to be defended against.⁶²

An accurate reconstruction of the Roman campaigns to suppress the revolt is made difficult due to the conflicting accounts of Dio and Velleius Paterculus.⁶³ It appears that after the first attacks and initial shock, the Romans tried to contain the revolt. The first serious engagement occurred between the *Daesidiates* and an undermanned *legio XX Valeria Victrix* commanded by Messalinus, the governor of Illyricum. Roman victory cut off the rebels from North Italy, removing them as a threat to Rome and halting their devastation of the coast.⁶⁴ Later, the Moesian governor Aulus Caecina Severus, reinforced by Thracian cavalry led by King Rhoemetalcus, defeated the *Breuci* near the Drave River and prevented them from taking the key stronghold of *Sirmium*. Caecina withdrew back to Moesia after suffering heavy losses.⁶⁵ As a consequence of their defeat the *Daesidiates* joined the *Breuci* on the *Mons Almus*

⁶⁰ Vell. Pat. II.110.6-111.2. G. V. Sumner, 'The Truth about Velleius Paterculus: Prolegomena', *HSCPh* 74, 1970, p. 272; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, (2005), pp. 150-1.

⁶¹ Dio LV.30.1.

⁶² Vell. Pat. II.110.6-111.2; Suet. *Aug.* 25.

⁶³ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 151. For scholars that attempted to reconstruct the campaigns see: R. Rau, 'Zur Geschichte des pannonisch-dalmatischen Krieges der Jahre 6-9 n. Chr.', *Klio* 19, 1925, pp. 313-346; E. Köstermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, pp. 345-378; J. J. Wilkes, 1965, 'The military achievements of Augustus in Europe; with special reference to Illyricum', *UBHJ* 10, pp. 1-27; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, London, pp. 69-77.

⁶⁴ Dio LV.30.1-5; Vell. Pat. II.112.1-2. For details, see D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, (2005), p. 151 n. 61; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 70.

⁶⁵ Dio LV.29.3.

(Fruška Gora), and combined their efforts to take *Sirmium*. Due to this combined attack, Caecina was compelled to resolve the threat in Illyricum, but Sarmatian and Dacian raids forced him to return to Moesia without any clear result against the rebels.⁶⁶ In the autumn of AD 6 Tiberius reached Siscia with the Illyrian army and joined with Messalinus, sometime after which reinforcements of veterans from Italy led by Germanicus, and including Velleius Paterculus amongst their number, arrived.⁶⁷ It would appear that at this stage the Romans were positioned to re-establish their control over the region and suppress the rebellion.

Revolt along the Rhine: the Varian Disaster

Along the Rhine, Publius Quinctilius Varus was appointed in AD 7 as the imperial legate of Germania. As mentioned previously, according to the Romans the region was considered to be conquered from the Rhine to the Elbe, and the land and its people ready to be fully integrated into the provincial structure of the Roman Empire.⁶⁸ There is still much debate regarding the validity of this view amongst modern historians.⁶⁹ Some historians view Rome's position as nothing more than an occupying force, and

⁶⁶ Dio LV.30.2-4.

⁶⁷ Vell. Pat. II. 112.1-6; Dio LV. 31.1. It is unclear when the reinforcements arrived, especially Germanicus. see D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 152 n. 64.

⁶⁸ R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 373-374; P.S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 83, 160; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 156-57, 239; D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, pp. 81-89; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 100; C. M. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, p. 82; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, p. 88; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, pp. 8, 18; J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, p. 21; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 168. The belief that the region was conquered and ready for the installation of the provincial system will be discussed in detail below.

⁶⁹ A sample of these views amongst modern historians can be seen in the following: R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, p. 326; D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, p. 86; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44; W. A. Oldfather, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Policy of Augustus*, p. 75; P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 188; H. Wolfram, *Die Germanen*, H. Beck, Munich, 2001, p. 39; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 102; C. M. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, p. 82; R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 177; J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, pp. 21-22; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 182.

believe that a Roman province in Germania was not even possible.⁷⁰ Wolfram goes beyond this belief and argues that a Roman province in Germania only existed, ‘on the papyri or wax tablets of Roman administrators’.⁷¹ There are very few historians willing to elaborate on their view and give a firm and clear statement on Rome’s position in Germania. Exceptions can be found in the works of C. M. Wells and D. Timpe. Wells argues that Germania was, ‘organised as a province, except that regular taxation was apparently not yet imposed.’⁷² Timpe takes a completely different stance asserting:

Meines Erachtens setzt jedoch die darauf basierende
Argumentation den „Glauben“ an die Provinz mehr voraus, als
daß sie ihn begründete (wie schon A. Riese bemerkt hat).
Umgekehrt spricht die rechtliche Stellung der germanischen
Stämme gegen einen Provenzialstatus.⁷³

Timpe’s argument presupposes that Germania was never a province, and argues that this explains why the region collapsed so quickly.

However, Augustus’ own testament in the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* records that he expanded Rome’s dominion over Germania, from the Rhine to the Elbe, and claims it as being pacified.⁷⁴ Even the earliest account puts emphasis on Romans carrying out law,

⁷⁰ This view of Rome’s position can be seen in the following: D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, p. 86; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 60; S. L. Dyson, ‘Native Revolts in the Roman Empire’, *Historia* 20, p. 254; W. A. Oldfather, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 75-76, 97-98.

⁷¹ H. Wolfram, *Die Germanen*, p. 39.

⁷² C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 156.

⁷³ ‘In my opinion the argumentation based upon it presupposes more about the belief than is justified (as A. Riese has already noted). On the other hand the legal status of the Germanic tribesmen speaks against provincial status’, see D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studeien*, p. 86, see n. 21.

⁷⁴ *RE* V. 26.

justice, and arbitration which would suggest that the region was considered a Roman dominion.⁷⁵ Velleius Paterculus records that by the end of Tiberius's campaign in AD 5:

All [Germania] was traversed by our armies, races were conquered hitherto almost unknown ... Victorious over all the nations and countries which he approached, his army safe and unimpaired ... Nothing remained to be conquered in [Germania] except the people of the *Marcomanni*...⁷⁶

If this account is correct then according to Velleius all of its peoples were decisively defeated and the whole of Germania was conquered by Rome.⁷⁷ Velleius even states earlier in his work that Tiberius, 'subdued the country as to reduce it almost to the status of a tributary province.'⁷⁸ Dio Cassius, by contrast, provides a completely different version of events. He writes that Tiberius advanced as far as the Elbe but accomplished nothing of note, and makes no mention of a Roman conquest but only records a truce between the Romans and the various Germanic tribes.⁷⁹ Dio's account goes on to describe the Roman position in Germania in further detail, recording that:

The Romans were holding portions of it—not entire regions, but merely such districts as happened to have been subdued, so that no record has been made of the fact—and soldiers of theirs were wintering there and cities were being founded.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Vell. Pat. II.117.3; Flor. II. XXX.29-36.

⁷⁶ Vell. Pat. II.106-108. (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁷⁷ E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in K. A. Raaflaub & M. Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 407.

⁷⁸ Vell. Pat. II.97.4.

⁷⁹ Dio LVI.28.

⁸⁰ Dio LVI.18 (trans. E. Cary, *Loeb Classical Library*).

Although it is clear that the Romans' aim was to conquer Germania, according Dio the Roman position in Germania was limited, they had control over some areas of the region, but they had not conquered the whole region or all its peoples.

The current archaeological record can be seen to support Dio's claim of Rome's limited conquest of the region. The fact that the country was not intersected by roads or developed a permanent communications network, as was the case with other Roman provinces, is one indicator of this.⁸¹ Another can be observed in the fact that the Romans still felt insecure in their strongholds of the interior, enough so to warrant their abandonment of their positions there for the relative safety of their winter quarters along the Rhine.⁸² These two factors would suggest that Germania was not yet completely conquered or ready to become a province. This would indicate that in reality the Roman conquest of Germania was only partially complete, and that the region and its peoples were only partly under their control.

Evidence which supports the view that the Romans perceived their conquest of the region as being largely complete and their position secure can be substantiated by the ancient sources' accounts of widespread urbanisation and the development of Roman infrastructure. Dio records that, '... cities were being founded. The barbarians were adapting themselves to Roman ways, were becoming accustomed to hold markets, and

⁸¹ R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, p. 325. This view may be modified as more regions of Germany are excavated (but that there is no evidence of the type of communication network that is expected from a province.)

⁸² The ancient sources make numerous references to the Roman practice of retreating to their winter quarters on the Rhine, see Vell. Pat. II. 117. 3; Dio, LIV.32-33, LV. 2. There are only two reference to the Romans actually wintering in the German interior, one during the campaigns of Germanicus in AD 4, see Vell. Pat. II.105.3. The other is a comment in Dio LVI.18 alluding to Romans wintering in the interior of Germany, although he does not elaborate on this.

were meeting in peaceful assemblies.’⁸³ Tacitus also makes allusions to ‘new colonies’ in his assessment of the Roman presence in Germania.⁸⁴ Unlike the lack of archaeological evidence supporting a widespread Roman conquest of the region there is substantial evidence which supports these claims of Roman urbanisation and construction. Evidence of this can be seen in the various Rhine River bases, such as *Mogontiacum* and *Vetera*, and those in the interior, such as Haltern and Waldgirmes.⁸⁵ All of these bases show clear signs of a permanent civilian settlement, examples of this can be observed in the construction of an aqueduct with lead-piping at Haltern and a large stone structure at Waldgirmes that is thought to have been a forum.⁸⁶ This evidence shows that a process of urbanisation had occurred along the Rhine and in the interior, which requires a major reassessment of the accepted view. The Romans were highly unlikely to invest such advanced and expensive infrastructure into a region they had not deemed ready to receive it. The physical evidence, along with the written sources, clearly indicates that the Romans perceived Germania as conquered and consequently began the process of transforming the region into a province.

It is in this context that Varus was appointed governor by Augustus. Modern historians are still divided on several matters relating to this period, including Varus’

⁸³ Dio LVI.18.2.

⁸⁴ Tac. *Ann.* I. 59.

⁸⁵ W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 100. For a discussion on the dating of Waldgirmes, see A. Becker, ‘Lahnau-Waldgirmes: eine augusteische Stadtgündung in Hessen’, *Historia* 52, Heft 3, pp. 344-50; R. Wiegels, *Die Varus-schlacht: Wendepunkt der Geschichte*, pp. 110-116. For details relating to *Mogonticum*, *Vetera*, and other sites on the Rhine, see: C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 93-148; J. S. Kühlborn, *Germaniam Pacavi-Germanien habe ich befriedet: Archäologische Stätten augusteischer Okkupation*, Westfälisches Museum für Archäologie-Amt für Bodendenkmalpflege, Münster, 1995, pp. 29-48, 59-77; H. G. Horn, *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, Archäologischer Teil, pp. 319-656; R. Wiegels, *Die Varus-schlacht: Wendepunkt der Geschichte*, pp. 66-94. For details relating to sites in the German interior, see C. M. Wells, *GPA*, pp. 149-236; J. S. Kühlborn, *Germaniam Pacavi*, pp. 78-144; R. Wiegels, *Die Varus-schlacht: Wendepunkt der Geschichte*, pp. 95-101.

⁸⁶ For evidence of the stone structure at Waldgirmes, see A. Becker, ‘Lahnau-Waldgirmes: eine augusteische Stadtgündung in Hessen’, *Historia* 52, pp. 344-50. For evidence of an aqueduct in Haltern, see C. M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 185; J. S. Kühlborn, *Germaniam Pacavi*, pp. 82-101.

character and his suitability for the German command. P. S. Wells articulates the situation perfectly when he writes: “different historians interpret the events leading up to the ambush and the course of the battle differently, depending upon which characterization of Varus they accept.”⁸⁷ Amongst some modern historians a lingering suspicion remains that Augustus chose poorly in his appointment of Varus. The accepted view amongst these historians portrays Varus as an incompetent and corrupt administrator who was unsuitable for the command.⁸⁸ Well’s description is more moderate than most. He describes Varus’ military skill as: “...limited experience of warfare in either post.”⁸⁹ Seager describes him as, “...an administrator rather than a general...”⁹⁰ One of the most extreme supporters of this view is Mommsen, who describes him as:

...a man of ill-acquired, but princely wealth and of princely arrogance, but inert in body and obtuse in mind, and without any military gifts or experience — one of those many Romans in high station who, in consequence of an adherence to the old mixture of administrative functions with those of higher command, wore the general’s scarf after the model of Cicero.⁹¹

This profile is ruthless in its depiction of Varus; clearly for Mommsen, Varus was not the man that the situation required. It is important to note that his portrait shows no sign of undertaking a deeper analysis of Varus’ past to justify it, but seems simply to be an

⁸⁷ P.S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 80.

⁸⁸ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 238; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, p. 40; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 44; W. A. Oldfather, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Policy of Augustus*, p. 95; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p.61; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44; E. S. Gruen, ‘The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus’, in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 184.

⁸⁹ C.M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, see p. 238.

⁹⁰ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44.

⁹¹ T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 44.

acceptance of the ancient historians' characterisation of Varus and their account of events as fact.

The negative and critical portrayal of Varus can be traced back to the literary traditions of Varus' contemporaries.⁹² A clear example of this can be observed in Gruen's portrait of Varus describing him as, "...a man more accustomed to peace than to war", which apparently draws heavily on Velleius Paterculus' depiction.⁹³ Of all the contemporary accounts that survive few have anything flattering or redeeming to say about him. Velleius Paterculus' portrait of Varus is the most damning and critical of all. His brief profile of Varus portrays him as:

...a man of mild character and of a quiet disposition, somewhat slow in mind as he was in body, and more accustomed to the leisure of the camp than to actual service in war.⁹⁴

Velleius' account describes a man who is of questionable character and unfit for the German command. He goes on to give his account of Varus' governorship, placing the blame for the disaster on him alone.⁹⁵ Given the fact that Velleius, through his service in the Roman army, knew both Varus and Arminius, an understandable amount of credibility and weight has been given to his views.⁹⁶ W. John has suggested that Velleius' critical portrayal of Varus should be understood as the complaints of a cantankerous old soldier about an administrator who was given military command over

⁹² P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86.

⁹³ E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in K. A. Raaflaub & M. Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 407.

⁹⁴ Vell. Pat. II.117 (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁹⁵ Vell. Pat. II.118-120.

⁹⁶ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86.

the legions.⁹⁷ This remark can appear to be overtly antagonistic towards Velleius, but one should ask from the outset whether it is at all plausible that Augustus would have entrusted the Rhine command to an incompetent commander, especially during a time of unrest in the west.

Other Roman writers, although writing after Velleius, also contribute to the view that Varus was the wrong person for the German post, and place the blame for disaster firmly on him. Suetonius describes Varus as rash and careless, and goes on to attribute the entire disaster to him.⁹⁸ Lucius Annaeus Florus, a writer of little value, and less discrimination, described him as immoral, proud and cruel.⁹⁹ Cassius Dio's account suggests that Varus was imperious, naïve, and militarily incompetent. Dio's work also gives a description of Varus' position in the region and the actions he carried out whilst in command. Dio wrote of Varus as:

...besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations...he did not keep his legions together, as was proper in a hostile country, but distributed many soldiers to helpless communities...¹⁰⁰

Given Dio records earlier in his work that the Romans were holding portions of the region and not the entire province, Varus's actions appear to be extremely rash, bordering on criminal incompetence. However, the validity of this view relies on two

⁹⁷ W. John, *P. Quinctilius Varus: und die Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde*, pp. 923-925, 932-935; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86.

⁹⁸ Suet. *Tib.* 18.

⁹⁹ Flor. II. 30.31. Criticism of Florus, value as a reliable source is discussed in detail in the Introduction. See also, R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, p. 326.

¹⁰⁰ Dio LVI.18-19 (trans. E. Cary, *Loeb Classical Library*).

factors. First, the extent to which Rome had actually conquered the region.¹⁰¹ Second, the origins of the orders being carried out in the area; if Varus was under orders to carry out these activities then the fault lies with the policy makers in Rome and not him.¹⁰² Overall, the writings of these ancient sources have led modern historians to accept a negative and biased representation of Varus, and incorrectly argue that he was the wrong person to be appointed as governor of Germania.¹⁰³

Other historians have held to a different view of Varus entirely; they perceive him as a skilled diplomat and military leader who proved his capability and competency in Syria, and was one of the few candidates available to Augustus to place in the complex situation in Germany.¹⁰⁴ Walther John and Ronald Syme are strong supporters of this view - both express the opinion that Varus was the ideal man for Augustus to place in command.¹⁰⁵ Syme puts this view in context by explaining that the Roman situation in Germany had changed to “a cautious and vigilant policy”; he goes on to write: “on character and experience, Varus seemed the man to take the place of Sentius in 6 or 7, being a diplomat but not incapable of prompt decisions”.¹⁰⁶ This view is formulated through a critical examination of the contemporary sources, which are generally accepted by other historians, and an exploration of other evidence which contribute to our understanding of Varus’s past. For these scholars, the key factor which cements

¹⁰¹ As discussed earlier the Roman conquest in Germania was superficial, the Romans held portions of the region but not all of it.

¹⁰² R. Syme, ‘The Northern Frontiers under Augustus’, in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 374. This point will be discussed in greater detail below.

¹⁰³ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁴ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86; R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, pp. 325-328; W. John, *P. Quinctilius Varus*, pp. 958-962; R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 177; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 44.

¹⁰⁵ R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, pp. 325-328; W. John, *P. Quinctilius Varus*, pp. 958-962; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86.

¹⁰⁶ R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, p. 325.

this view of Varus is the accounts of his performances in Syria, which portray him as a competent commander and diplomat.

An examination of Varus' past reveals a Roman aristocrat who had used everything and everyone at his disposal in order to advance his career. There is no doubt that his appointments did owe a significant amount to his connections with Augustus and other influential Romans, connections gained through service or by marriage. As this was an aristocratic norm such behaviour does not mean that Varus was necessarily unsuited or unqualified for the positions. Political advancement through either service or marriage was a common method of gaining favour or advancement throughout Roman history. Therefore, to use this aspect of Varus' political career as an argument against his suitability for the German command is simplistic; his suitability should be measured against his past military and administrative activities and the level of their success. Although his consulship in 13 BC and his proconsulship in c. 7 BC offer very little information regarding his qualifications in either sphere of operations, his actions governing Syria portray a man well qualified for the German command. These actions reveal that he was man skilled in military matters and adept at handling complex political situations. In his quick and decisive handling of the Jewish uprising in Palestine, Varus had proven himself a capable commander, and worthy of the trust and responsibility invested in him by Augustus. He had achieved a commendable record of service as a governor and general elsewhere in the Empire before he was even appointed legate of Germania. Given the importance of the German command, it was probably his successful record, more than his connections with Augustus, which gained him the governorship of Germania.

In Germania, Varus replaced Gaius Sentius Saturninus as he had done in Syria in 6 BC.¹⁰⁷ The region was of great concern to Augustus, especially in view of the fact that the circumstances which had led to revolt in Illyricum could be seen to be mirrored in the situation in Germania.¹⁰⁸ There is no reason the emperor would have appointed a commander in the position unless he had the utmost confidence in Varus' abilities.¹⁰⁹ As discussed previously, by the end of Tiberius's campaigns in AD 5 the region was considered by some to be conquered and ready to be fully integrated into the provincial structure of the Empire.¹¹⁰ In reality, the region was far from being conquered and in hindsight Rome's control was merely superficial rather than all encompassing. Therefore, whatever the actual situation may have been in Germany, understandably Varus would still have had the same assessment of Germany as the officials in Rome, and thus would have carried out his duties as governor as ordered. In order to fulfil these responsibilities Varus had five legions and numerous auxiliary units, some 60,000 men in total.¹¹¹ These troops were spread amongst the various Roman garrisons along the Rhine and in the interior of Germania.¹¹² As explored in the preceding chapter, the campaigns of previous Rhine commanders had already established military bases along various vital strategic points and had developed an ongoing military and diplomatic

¹⁰⁷ Saturninus had been left in command of the region since the aborted campaign against Maroboduus in AD 6; the campaign was abandoned due to the revolt in Illyricum, see Dio LV.29.1.

¹⁰⁸ R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, p. 325; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 374.

¹⁰⁹ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 85-86.

¹¹⁰ R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 373-374; C. M. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, p. 82; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 83.

¹¹¹ The legions on the Rhine frontier in AD 6 were: *legio XVII Classica*, *legio XVIII Libyca*, *legio XIX Paterna*, *legio I Germanica*, and *legio V Alaudae*, see H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany', p. 145; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 168; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 5-6; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 90-1, 133-135, 177-179.

¹¹² *RIC* I 389; *BMCRE* 153 = *BMCRR* Rome 4639; *BN* 503-11. Evidence of Varus' activities in the region is represented archaeologically by coins stamped with his name, see P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 85; R. Wiegels & W. Woesler, *Arminius und die Varusschlacht: Geschichte, Mythos, und Literatur*, p. 95.

policy toward the Germanic peoples there.¹¹³ Therefore, Varus' position in Germania can be observed to be hazardous and fragile: not only had he to maintain the conditions and policies that were established by his predecessors, he also had to introduce the provincial system into a region which proved too unstable to undergo the transformation.

To understand the circumstances which led to the collapse of the province Varus' governorship must be examined. This task is made difficult as a complete record of Varus' governorship does not survive, and is particularly true of the year AD 8 where there is no surviving information at all. Dio Cassius records that Varus had undertaken the task of securing the province from internal and external dangers in order to stabilize the region. Dio wrote that Varus:

... distributed many of the soldiers to helpless communities, which asked for them for the alleged purpose of guarding various points, arresting robbers, or escorting provision trains.¹¹⁴

It is highly likely that Varus did maintain a certain presence throughout the region; as governor it was one of his duties to ensure the safety and security of the various communities under his care. Dio is obviously critical of Varus' decision to undertake these tasks, stating that the governor should have kept his legions together as the region was a 'hostile country';¹¹⁵ this judgment is of course only gained through the benefits of hindsight. Dio also records that Varus was rapidly Romanising the region, which

¹¹³ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 61; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 87. See Chapter 4 for details relating to the various forts and their strategic importance, as well as Rome's diplomatic relation with various tribes.

¹¹⁴ Dio LVI.19.1 (trans. E. Cary, *Loeb Classical Library*).

¹¹⁵ Dio LVI.19.1.

involved the establishment of Roman provincial infrastructure.¹¹⁶ Dio records that he ‘strove to change them more rapidly’ and issued orders to them as if they were ‘slaves of the Romans’ and ‘exacted money’.¹¹⁷ This passage is not very detailed—it gives no mention of the methods used or the speed in which it was carried out—and it offers up more questions than answers. This passage, however, does suggest that Varus was carrying out or organising taxation in the region. Some historians believe that this was indeed the case and regard taxation as one of Varus’ primary responsibilities in the lands already regarded as conquered.¹¹⁸ Whether Roman taxation was undertaken during Varus’s governorship is still a matter of debate and until more evidence is uncovered the answer will remain a contested issue amongst historians.¹¹⁹ Varus’ formal introduction of law and order is another activity the sources are critical of. Velleius Paterculus recorded that Varus had undertaken the administration of Roman law and order throughout Germany during the entire campaign season of AD 9, writing:

...he entered the heart of Germany as though he were going
among a people enjoying the blessing of peace....holding court
and observing the proper details of legal procedure.¹²⁰

Velleius clearly believed that time was wasted and would have been better spent campaigning. Florus also makes note of this occurrence, writing that Varus was busy administering justice amongst the Germanic tribes, believing that he could control the Germans by, ‘the rod of a lector and the proclamation of a herald’.¹²¹ Clearly Varus was

¹¹⁶ This much is supported by the archaeological record, as discussed earlier.

¹¹⁷ Dio LVI.18.3.

¹¹⁸ E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 8; E. S. Gruen, ‘The Imperial Policy of Augustus’, in K. A. Raaflaub & M. Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 407; R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 177.

¹¹⁹ R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 177. Some historians argue that taxation was not even possible in Germany, see S. L. Dyson, ‘Native Revolts in the Roman Empire’, p. 254.

¹²⁰ Vell. Pat. II.117.4 (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*).

¹²¹ Flor. II.30.

carrying out a rapid and aggressive transformation of the Germanic people. All his actions indicate he intended to continue the process commenced under his predecessors; that of converting Germania into a Roman province.

The final aspect of Varus's governorship, and the one that reveals the most information regarding his failure to prevent the catastrophe, is found in the various methods used to control the native population. Control of the German province had to be, to a large extent, indirect. It would have been impossible for the Romans to have arranged every aspect of the region and maintain adequate control. They lacked both the manpower and the resources to accomplish this, and for this reason relied upon the assistance and compliance of the native ruling class.¹²² The Romans gained this through various means such as diplomacy, bribery, education, hostage taking, and the threat of military force.¹²³ Evidence of this can be seen in the gift of Roman citizenship; Arminius, the man who would ultimately betray Varus, had himself received this and had even been elevated to equestrian rank.¹²⁴ Dio records that Varus continued these policies and also maintained a close relationship with various Germanic leaders, including Arminius, treating them as trusted allies and even some as friends.¹²⁵ Dio also writes that Arminius and Segimerus, who were the leaders of the ambush, were Varus' 'constant companions' and 'often shared his mess'.¹²⁶ Varus was oblivious to these traitors in his camp: they were already an accepted part of the system on Varus' arrival and he had no reason to doubt their loyalty. His later friendship with Arminius only further blinded him to this threat, and not even his advisors, which included a member

¹²² E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, pp. 73-74, 81.

¹²³ E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, pp. 33, 36.

¹²⁴ Vell. Pat. II.117.2.

¹²⁵ Dio LVI.18-19. E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 78-79.

¹²⁶ Dio LVI.19.

of the Cheruscan elite, could convince him of the German menace.¹²⁷ It is clear then that Varus' governorship was concerned with the transformation of the 'conquered' Germanic tribes into Roman provincials; the sources reveal that he was hastily carrying out all the necessary actions in order to accomplish this goal.¹²⁸

According to the ancient sources there is little doubt that Varus' actions were the cause of the catastrophe. The sources clearly identify his activities in the region as the origin of the Germans' discontent and growing animosity towards the Romans. If this was the case then the fault lies more with those that ordered Varus into Germania and less with Varus himself.¹²⁹ This view is strongly supported by Ronald Syme who argues that:

The choice of Varus as commander of the Rhine army was that of Augustus ... and the policy of conciliation which appeared to have been responsible for his ruin must have been suggested and imposed by Augustus...¹³⁰

This argument highlights the vital fact that as the imperial legate in the region Varus was Augustus' chosen representative, and as such he was responsible for carrying out Augustus' policies in the area.¹³¹ It is highly unlikely that Varus was carrying out these activities without having had explicit, or at least implicit, instructions from Rome.

¹²⁷ Segestes was an advisor to Varus and a high ranking Cheruscan chieftain; he disclosed the details of the plot to Varus but his warning and advice went unheeded, see Vell. Pat. I.118.3-4; Dio LVI.19. Several historians have put forward the opinion that Varus perceived Segestes' advice as the result of a standing family quarrel and for this reason chose to ignore it, see R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 184.

¹²⁸ P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 188; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 109.

¹²⁹ R. Syme, 'The northern frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 374; C.M. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, p. 82; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44.

¹³⁰ R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 374.

¹³¹ R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 189; R. Syme, 'The northern frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 374; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 86.

Varus, on the other hand, cannot be completely absolved of all responsibility for the subsequent disaster. As governor of Germania it was his responsibility to ensure the obedience of the native tribesmen. In order to maintain their obedience a certain degree of intelligence gathering was necessary. Varus chose to rely upon native tribesmen for his reconnaissance and intelligence.¹³² This decision shows extremely poor judgement on Varus' part – trusting that the native peoples would supply accurate information regarding their own tribesmen proved disastrous. Syme holds Varus personally responsible for the catastrophe, citing his trusting nature as nothing less than culpable negligence.¹³³ The fact that Varus continued to believe the intelligence gathered by these sources despite evidence questioning its credibility places the consequential disaster squarely on the commander's shoulders.

The final factor in deciphering the reasons behind the Varian disaster and the collapse of the 'province' lies with the betrayal of Varus by his Germanic allies. The tenuous relationship that existed between Rome and its Germanic allies can be described as unreliable at best. Throughout their relationship the various German tribes had proven themselves untrustworthy and rebellious. Evidence which supports this view can be observed in the numerous accounts of uprisings throughout the region. Such rebellions are recorded during the commands of Agrippa, Drusus, Ahenobarbus, Vinicius, and Tiberius.¹³⁴ One example of this can be seen during the command of Marcus Vinicius in AD 4 where a major rebellion, consisting of several Germanic tribes

¹³² R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 191.

¹³³ R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy*, p. 326.

¹³⁴ For a full account of these commander's encounters with the native Germans, see R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 358-369; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, pp. 180-185. Strabo also records several of the uprisings, see Strabo *Geo.*7.1.4-5.

that had previously been dealt with in the past, had become so volatile that it required the intervention of Tiberius to suppress it.¹³⁵

The ancient sources record the tribes involved as: the *Marsi*, *Chatti*, *Bructeri*, *Sicambri*, and the *Cherusci*.¹³⁶ Written accounts regarding the battle do not go into specific details relating to all the tribes involved in the ambush, the only exception being the *Cherusci*, the remaining tribes only become known to us through accounts of subsequent events.¹³⁷ All these tribes are recorded as having had a volatile relationship with Rome and had taken part in previous rebellions at one point or another. The most influential and involved of these tribes was the *Cherusci*; they were a vital part of the conspiracy and the original instigators of the plot. Although the *Cherusci* had a well documented history of violent resistance against Rome, a portion of the *Cherusci* elite emerged as close and privileged friends of Rome after Tiberius's campaigns of AD 5.¹³⁸ Arminius, the leader of the German forces during the ambush and a key member and organiser of the plot, belonged to this elite clan, and his connection with this group is the initial explanation behind his privileged and trusted position amongst the Romans.¹³⁹ Arminius's trusted position was further enhanced by his exemplary service during the Illyrian revolt (probably AD 4-6); he served with such high distinction that

¹³⁵ Vell. Pat. II.104-107. Tiberius took over the Rhine command and succeeded in subduing the various tribes in AD 5, see also E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 183.

¹³⁶ Strabo *Geo.* VII.1.4; Vell. Pat. II.117-120, 123; Dio LVI.18-22; Flor. II.30; Tac. *Ann.* 1.3.6.

¹³⁷ The other tribes are only known to us through the accounts of Tiberius' and Germanicus' German campaigns in AD 10-17, see Strabo, *Geo.* VII. 1.4; Tac. *Ann.* I.3.6.

¹³⁸ E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 77-79; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 159; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 100. Velleius records that after Tiberius's campaign in AD 4 the *Cherusci* were again subjugated and until the revolt of AD 9, the tribe appears to have been an ally of Rome, see Vell. Pat. II.105.1. For a more detailed account of Rome's relationship with the *Cherusci*, see E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans* pp. 72-89.

¹³⁹ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 159-160; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 72-73. For a detailed account of Arminius's life and his trusted position amongst the Romans, see D. Timpe, *Arminius-Studien*, pp. 11-50.

prior to Varus' governorship the Romans had rewarded him with citizenship and the rank of knight.¹⁴⁰ By AD 7 Arminius, at the young age of twenty-six, was an influential member of the Cherusci. Due to this and his commendable service in Illyricum, he acquired a trusted position on Varus's staff as head of a Germanic contingent that accompanied Varus and his army to its summer camp in the German interior.¹⁴¹ The close relationship that developed between Varus and Arminius allowed him to keep the Romans under the impression that the Germans were a pacified people, and thus enable them to launch their attack while the Romans were vulnerable and unprepared.¹⁴² It was from this position of trust inside the Roman *commandatura* that Arminius plotted to betray and destroy the Roman armies in Germania.¹⁴³

Parallel Occurrences: the Rhine

Concurrently during these events along the Rhine, Tiberius began his operations to suppress the rebellion and restore Roman control over Pannonia. Details concerning events during the critical years AD 7-8 are limited, neither Paterculus' nor Dio's conflicting accounts provide any useful information pertaining to this period.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, what transpired in Pannonia after AD 6 and before the Breucian surrender in later AD 8 can only be speculated upon and roughly pieced together.¹⁴⁵ Due to the difficulties faced ascertaining the course of the campaign, and the relevant importance

¹⁴⁰ E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 72-73.

¹⁴¹ R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 179. E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 79 suggests that the Romans encouraged the election of Arminius.

¹⁴² This view is supported by Dio, see LVI.19.

¹⁴³ R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 179; W. A. Oldfather, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Policy of Augustus*, p. 102; E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in K. A. Raafaub & M. Toher (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, p. 407; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 185.

¹⁴⁴ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 149; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 38.

¹⁴⁵ A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 38.

of which mainly focused on the outcome of a strong military presence along the Danube River, the conflict will be explored in general outlines.

In the late autumn/early winter Augustus ordered five legions, three from Moesia led by Caecina, and two from the East led by Marcus Plautius Silvanus, with the addition of Thracian cavalry and other auxiliary troops.¹⁴⁶ These reinforcements reached Siscia, although they only narrowly averted disaster en-route when they were ambushed by a combined rebel force at the Volcaean Marshes (near Cibalae).¹⁴⁷ Tiberius' total military strength amounted to ten legions, seventy auxiliary cohorts, fourteen cavalry units and a further 10,000 veterans.¹⁴⁸ It would have been a massive and unnecessary undertaking to sustain such an army. Thus, Tiberius decided that such a force was not necessary, and he escorted the eastern reinforcements back to *Sirmium* in the winter of AD 7-8.¹⁴⁹ Perhaps Augustus had assembled the force, the product of impatience and anxiety, without consultation with Tiberius.¹⁵⁰ More likely, it was a tactic of intimidation: such a huge concentration of military force would have certainly overawed and weakened the resolve of the rebels. Silvanus remained in command of *Sirmium* and Caecina returned to Moesia.¹⁵¹ It is apparent that Tiberius was cautious when he advanced against the Pannonians in AD 7, he managed to cut off and surround part of

¹⁴⁶ J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 92-3; R. Syme, 'Some Notes on the Legions under Augustus', *JRS* 23, pp. 29-31; K. Strobel, 'Zur Geschichte der Legionen V (Macedonica) und VII (Claudia pia fidelis) unter Fröschen Kaiserzeit und zurstellung der provinz Gallatia in der augusteichen Heeregeschichte', in Le Bohec and Wolff, pp. 526-8; D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 151.

¹⁴⁷ Vell. Pat. II.112.2-3; Dio LV.32.3. E. Köestermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, p. 362; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 72; D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 151.

¹⁴⁸ Vell. Pat. II.113.1-3. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 72-3.

¹⁴⁹ Vell. Pat. II.113.1-3. D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 153 n. 69.

¹⁵⁰ E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Roman Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 177; E. Köestermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, pp. 362-63.

¹⁵¹ Silvanus is recorded by Dio operating from *Sirmium* later in AD 8 see Dio, LV.34.6-7, LVI.12.2; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 153 n. 70; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 73 n. 1. Caecina is no longer involved in the war, being back in Moesia fighting off the Dacians and Sarmatians.

the enemy forces on the *Mons Claudius* (Moslavacka Gora near Varazdin), the centre of Breucian territory, between the Save and the Drave.¹⁵² In the latter part of that year Tiberius ordered Germanicus to carry out operations against the *Maezaei* in the Vrbas and Una valleys (Northwest Bosnia) with the purpose of destroying the harvests before the onset of winter.¹⁵³ A severe winter in AD 7-8 favoured the Romans and had a devastating effect on the rebels.

In AD 8, the Pannonians, suffering from famine and disease, surrendered to Tiberius at the river *Bathinus* (Busna?). According to Velleius Paterculus, Bato (Breucian) surrendered himself, and as gesture of supplication offered up Pinnes (his fellow leader) and, as a reward, received an amnesty from the Romans and was left in charge of his people and some other Pannonian tribes.¹⁵⁴ Considering the significant size of population and its available resources, the surrender of the *Breuci* was a decisive event in the course of the war. Despite this formal surrender further unrest followed the murder of Bato (Breucian) by his Daesitiate namesake, but this was quickly suppressed by Silvanus.¹⁵⁵ Silvanus' victory brought the *Breuci* back under Roman domination and drove Bato (Daesitiate) south out of the Save valley. Effectively, the war in the Save valley (northern Pannonia) was over, the remainder of the year was spent suppressing the remnants of the rebellion in the south.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² Vell. Pat. II.112, 3. J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 72. Dio makes no mention of this; he records a summary of the battle at Volcaean Marshes and the raid of Germanicus against the Maezaei. It is not certain which of the rebel forces was on the Mons Claudius. Pliny, *HN* III.148, places it between the Taurisci and the Scordisci. For the topography see, E. Köestermann, 'Der pannonisch-dalmatische Krieg 6-9 n. Chr.' *Hermes*, 81, pp. 360-2.

¹⁵³ Dio LV.32.4.

¹⁵⁴ Vell. Pat. II.114.4. D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 152 n. 73.

¹⁵⁵ Dio LV.34.4-7. Apparently not all Breucian subjects were happy with Bato's betrayal of Pinnes, see Dio LV.34.4-5.

¹⁵⁶ Vell. Pat. II.114, 5; Dio LV.34.4-7.

Concurrently, along the Rhine the Roman position in Germania was the setting of one of Rome's greatest defeats. The narrative concerning the battle and the immediate aftermath is already well documented and thoroughly discussed in numerous historical texts; therefore a brief summary of the results and repercussions will suffice.¹⁵⁷ The ultimate outcome of the Teutoburg forest disaster was that over 30,000 men, women and children were either; killed, tortured, or enslaved.¹⁵⁸ Three Roman legions, *legio XVII legio XVIII and legio XIX*, ceased to exist, and one tenth of Rome's total legionary force was lost in a single blow.¹⁵⁹ The immediate events which followed the disaster resulted in the complete destruction of Rome's remaining military forces and its outlying garrisons in the interior of Germania, save *Aliso* (Halter), where the soldiers stationed managed to hold out against the advancing German hordes until their supplies were exhausted.¹⁶⁰ The surviving remnants of the garrison eventually managed to escape through during the night and made their way back to the Rhine, perhaps to the relative safety of *Vetera* (Xanten), where they united with the relieving force from

¹⁵⁷ For the literary account of the battle, see Vell. Pat. II.119-120; Dio LVI.19-22. A brief summary can be found in R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 375. For a detailed account of the battle, see R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, pp.179-187; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 161-176; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, pp. 44-48. For a detailed account of the events that followed the battle, see T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 48. For a detailed account of the discovery of the battle site and an examination of the site and its finds, see P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 161-176.

¹⁵⁸ R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 192. The exact number was never recorded, estimates range from 14,000 upwards towards 40,000. T. Mommsen, *A History of Rome under the Emperors*, p. 113 suggests the figure of 15,000. W. A. Oldfather, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Policy of Augustus*, p. 35 suggests 20,000. There is no record of what happened to the camp followers that accompanied the legions; they were most probably killed or enslaved by the Germans.

¹⁵⁹ P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 188; L. Keppie, 'Legiones XVII, XVIII, XIX: Exercitus omnium fortissimus', in L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2000, p. 169. The legions which were wiped out were not named in the ancient sources, but archaeologists and historians deduce that they were the XVII, XVIII, and XIX. For an account of the evidence that supports this claim, see P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 101-103. For a full discussion of the evidence, see L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000*, pp. 161-165.

¹⁶⁰ Dio tells the story of the only fort which offered resisted against the Germans, but mentions no names; the fort is widely accepted as being *Aliso*, see Dio LVI.22. Velleius mentions the bravery of L. Caecidius, *praefectus castrorum* at *Aliso*, see Vell. Pat. II.120.4.

Mogontiacum (Mainz) under the command of L. Nonius Asprenas.¹⁶¹ Asprenas' two legions and the survivors from *Aliso*, along with any other possible survivors, were the only deterrent preventing the Germans from attempting to cross the Rhine.¹⁶² The news shocked and dispirited the princeps. Augustus reportedly let his hair and beard grow for months as a sign of mourning. Those historionics buttress the common view that Varus' defeat marked another major turning point in Augustus' German policy: the plan to pacify all of Germania to the Elbe was given up and the empire's borders were withdrawn to the Rhine.¹⁶³ In response to this defeat and the perceived threat posed by the *Germani*, the Romans would focus the largest concentration of military forces along Rhine; their immediate reaction and subsequent development of defences will be examined in the subsequent chapter. [\[see Map \(7\)\]](#)

Parallel Events: the Danube

Along the Danube, the last year of the Pannonian Revolt (AD 9) centred on operations in Dalmatia, mainly around the mountainous Dinaric region. Significantly, in the winter of AD 9 Tiberius was recalled to Rome. In his place three commanders were responsible for completing the reconquest: Silvanus (southeast from *Sirmium*), Lepidus (northwest from *Siscia* along the Una valley towards *Burnum*), whilst Germanicus operated from the south in the Dalmatian hinterland.¹⁶⁴ The inexperienced Germanicus encountered problems and made little progress during his campaign. Specifically, Germanicus struggled with capturing the well defended strongholds in the interior;

¹⁶¹ L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000*, p. 169. The actual site which they retreated too is not recorded, however Mommsen suggests *Castra Vetera* as a likely location, see T. Mommsen, *A History of Rome under the Emperors*, p. 113.

¹⁶² R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome*, p. 189.

¹⁶³ Cf. Flor. II.30.39.

¹⁶⁴ Dio LVI.12.2-3. D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 154 n.77.

interestingly a similar hurdle was faced by Publius Vatinius half a century earlier.¹⁶⁵ Nothing is known about the operations of Lepidus and Silvanus in the north, other than the fact that they were victorious. In response to Germanicus' failure to pacify Dalmatia and the remaining rebels, Augustus again dispatched Tiberius to resume overall command.

Once in command of the forces in the south Tiberius aggressively pursued Bato (Daesitiate), ultimately capturing him after a brief siege at *Andretium* (near *Salona*) effectively concluding military operations.¹⁶⁶ Whilst Tiberius dealt with the displaced people of the area and the rebels that had surrendered, Germanicus was given the task of dealing with the remaining enemy strongholds. Their surrender was hampered by a significant number of Roman deserters who, in fear of punishment, obstructed all peace negotiations.¹⁶⁷ Dzino argues that these deserters were likely from auxiliary units recruited locally amongst the Celtic population of Pannonia, and the *Germani* who had accompanied Tiberius,¹⁶⁸ rather than Roman legionaries.¹⁶⁹ Ultimately, Germanicus was successful and later rejoined Tiberius.¹⁷⁰ The task all but complete, both Tiberius and Germanicus returned to Rome. The remnants of the rebellion, consisting mainly of the surviving elements of the *Daesititates* and *Pirustae*, were eventually crushed by Claudius Vibius Postumus.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵ J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 74.

¹⁶⁶ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 154, see n. 79 about location of *Andretium*.

¹⁶⁷ Dio LVI.15.

¹⁶⁸ For Germanic cavalry, see Dio LVI.11.2. Also see, J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, p. 289.

¹⁶⁹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, pp. 154-5.

¹⁷⁰ Dio LVI.12, 3-15, 3.

¹⁷¹ Vell. Pat. II.115.4.

Overall, the Roman losses had been significant in both manpower and resources, this is reflected in Dio's criticism of the conflict writing that, 'for ever so many legions were maintained for this campaign and but very little booty taken'.¹⁷² This was the last recorded attempt by the native inhabitants at organised resistance to Roman authority in Illyricum. Surprisingly, the Romans' retribution against the rebels was neither extreme nor excessive proving themselves reasonably tolerant towards the rebels. Despite both Velleius and Dio recording that the rebels that continued to resist and fight were hunted down and slaughtered, they also testify that the portion of the population that did not participate in the uprising and those that surrendered were given some degree of clemency.¹⁷³ Roman clemency for those that capitulated can be supported by two factors, the absence of evidence indicating large scale enslavement of the population, and the lack of excessive Roman retaliation after the fighting ceased.¹⁷⁴

In Illyricum, the process of consolidation and organisation of the reconquered territory still remained. The impact and damage the conflict had inflicted upon the Augustan military deployment in Europe made the Romans rethink their military and political arrangements in Illyricum. It exposed their weaknesses and resulted in many military improvements in the following decade. Similar to circumstances along the Rhine, in Illyricum the Romans had considered the Illyrian and Pannonian tribes defeated and their territory under their control. As with Germania, the governing system imposed on Illyricum was inadequate and premature. It was the Roman overestimation of their level of control in the region and the limited extent of native pacification that result in the *Bellum Batonianum*. One overarching fact was made clear: a single large

¹⁷² Dio LVI.16.4.

¹⁷³ Vell. Pat. II.115.2-4. Dio records that Tiberius was engaged in arranging the affairs of the enemies who surrendered, see Dio LVI.14.6-7.

¹⁷⁴ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics*, p. 153.

command was inadequate and could not provide effective control and security in the region. The subsequent division of command and restructuring of the Roman military presence along the Danube had a significant impact in the region and sets the foundations for Rome's interaction with the *Germani* north of the Danube.¹⁷⁵ As a consequence of the rebellion, Roman authority certainly extended to the Middle Danube, now a critical link in the defence against the *Germani* in the north. As a direct result of the conflict the region was no longer considered a political or military periphery of the Empire, with occasional military presence and trustworthy allies could maintain order, the reliance on a 'buffer zone' proved to be an inadequate defence. Illyricum now represented a vital part of the *imperium Romanum*: direct control of the territory had to be maintained and defences need to be developed to ensure the security of Rome and the defence against the *Germani* north of the Danube.

Conclusion

The initial conquest of Germania was only ever superficial; the campaigns carried out by previous commanders had only gained the Roman's partial control over the region. The belief that Germania was conquered, and its people ready to be incorporated into the Roman provincial system, was proven to be false. The disaster at Teutoburg Forest and the loss of Germania Magna was caused by a combination of factors, not just a result of one man's actions. Varus himself was an experienced diplomat and military commander, and not the incompetent fool as portrayed by some of the sources. However, a significant factor in the disaster was the relationship between Rome and the various Germanic tribes; this misplaced trust contributed greatly to Varus's defeat. Overall, the conquest was superficial; the Romans only gained partial control over the

¹⁷⁵ The division of the Illyrian command and the build up Rome's military presence and defences along the Danube is explored in depth in subsequent chapters.

region and its people and the *Germani* were not prepared or willing to suffer Rome's encroachment into their territory.

Along the Danube the situation was less certain and little is known about Rome's true position. Supposedly the lands from *Abusina* in Raetia up to *Troesmis* near the Black Sea (effectively the Upper, Middle and Lower Danube) were under Roman control. According to the Romans, the native inhabitants were conquered and pacified. This erroneous belief led to the conscription and gathering of the *Daesitiates* and *Pannonii* tribesmen, which proved to be a catalyst for the rebellion. Initially there was panic in Rome; the immediate response was reactionary and excessive. Overall, Tiberius' most effective tactic proved to be the destruction of the enemies' food supplies. This was a decisive turning point in the war, northern Illyricum quickly surrendered and the remaining resistance in the south capitulated shortly afterwards. In hindsight, the Romans' Illyrian policy preceding the revolt was reckless, inadequate and dangerous. As with Germania, the governing system imposed on Illyricum was premature, and the province proved to be seditious. It was made clear that the buffer zone was inadequate for the defence of northern Illyricum and that a single large command was insufficient and could not provide effective and efficient security in the region. As a consequence of the rebellion, direct Roman control now extended to the Middle Danube; recognised as a critical link in the defence against the *Germani* in the north and proven to be necessary to ensure the security of Rome.

SECTION III

**THE INITIAL 'GERMANIC FRONTIER',
ITS DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE '*LIMES*'**

CHAPTER SIX

The Initial ‘Germanic Frontier’– AD 9-21

The *clades Variana* was a demoralising and humiliating defeat for Rome: the Romans’ presence and influence east of the river Rhine had been removed, with a devastating blow struck against their legions by a supposedly inferior enemy. Similarly, the *Bellum Batonianum* had resulted in the heavy loss of military resources. The rebellion left Rome guarding against two threats: the *Germani* north of the Danube and the rebellious tribes of Illyricum. More than ever the Romans feared the *Germani* and the threat they posed to their Empire. As a direct consequence of this threat, the Romans built up the largest concentration of military strength along the Rhine and Danube to date in an effort to counter the perceived threat which the *Germani* represented, in the process establishing a ‘Germanic frontier’. This chapter examines the period of uncertainty and intense military activity during the period AD 9-21. It encompasses the Romans’ response to the threats and events associated to the Germanic tribes along the Rhine and Danube.

The Roman response to the *clades Variana* was one of fear and disbelief. For the Romans the threat posed by the *Germani* was tangible and genuine, not only to the surrounding provinces, but to the very city of Rome itself. Completely unexpected, the defeat came at a time when Rome’s military resources were already exhausted by the campaigns in Illyricum. However, the immediate impact that the loss of three seasoned legions, amounting to more than one tenth of Rome’s total military force, far exceeded the initial consequences of the Illyrian revolt had on the Empire. Rome’s reaction to the disaster and its military responses to the German revolt therefore demonstrated that the

Varian disaster did not just have a serious impact on Germania, but Rome also, and as a consequence of the defeat the north eastern frontier of the empire was established along the Rhine.

Primary Evidence

The written evidence, especially of the Roman reaction to the situation, shows that the impact of the disaster was so great that a Germanic invasion of Roman territory was considered to be a distinct possibility. Although modern historians have argued that the Germanic people presented no real threat to Rome or the provinces, this does not mean that the Romans assessed the situation in the same light. Syme exemplified this view when he wrote, "...the enemy made no attempt to cross. It had been a general uprising of the nations of Germany and so no invasion of Gaul was to be feared".¹ Although this may have been true, understanding can only be gained through a retrospective analysis of events as they unfolded after the disaster. Therefore confirmation of an actual Germanic invasion is not necessary: the fact remains the Romans believed in such a threat and responded accordingly.

One of the only surviving contemporary sources, Velleius Paterculus' *Compendium of Roman History*, validates the view that Rome feared a Germanic invasion, describing the Germans as, "an enemy who threatened Italy with war like that of the *Cimbri* and *Teutones*".² Historiographical consideration must be given, however, to Velleius's writing being biased in favour of Tiberius, to whom he owed much of his success, and that by expressing the view that the Germans were more of a threat than

¹ R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', *CAH*, vol. X, p. 375.

² Vell. Pat. II. 120.

they actually were he was exaggerating Tiberius's feat in halting the Germans and going on to make "aggressive war" upon the enemy.³ Whether this was the case or not cannot be known for certain, but it would have been highly unlikely this statement would have been without basis. The later acceptance by Suetonius and Dio perhaps lends weight to Velleius' statement.

In Suetonius' account of the immediate response to news of the disaster in Rome, he describes a state of genuine fear of the *Germani* in the capital; this is embodied in Augustus' reactions to the Germanic threat. He wrote:

When the news of this came, he [Augustus] ordered that watch be kept by night throughout the city, to prevent any outbreak, and he prolonged the terms of the governors of the provinces ... they say he was so greatly affected that for several months in succession he cut neither his beard nor his hair, and sometimes he would dash his head against a door crying: "Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!"⁴

This extract clearly indicates that Augustus genuinely feared not only an invasion by the Germans but also an uprising in Rome. This view is also articulated by Dio Cassius, although writing more than two hundred years after the events. He states:

Augustus, when he learned of the disaster to Varus, rent his garments, as some report, and mourned greatly, not only

³ Vell. Pat. II. 120. Velleius writes that Tiberius made aggressive war against the enemy, but Augustus and Rome would have been content to let him hold them in check. The validity of Velleius' account of Tiberius' campaigns in Germania will be discussed later. For a fuller account of Velleius' bias in regards to Tiberius, see Introduction.

⁴ Suet. *Aug.* 23. (trans. J. C. Rolfe, *Loeb Classical Library*).

because of the soldiers who had been lost, but also because of his fear for the German and Gallic provinces, and particularly because he expected that the enemy would march against Italy and against Rome itself.⁵

Here Dio explicitly states that Augustus truly feared that the Germans would break through the Rhine and invade the Empire. These three sources clearly indicate that Augustus saw the loss of three legions as a devastating blow which left the northern borders undefended, and left the provinces, including Italy, vulnerable to attack.

The psychological impact of this disaster would have been immense. Official reports that were being sent back to Rome by the commanders on the Rhine had been positive, leading Augustus to believe that the people east of the Rhine were largely under Roman control.⁶ This assessment had led Augustus to appoint Varus commander of the Rhine legions to oversee the final stages of the transformation of Germania Magna into a Roman province.⁷ Yet destruction of Varus and his army proved that the situation in Germania was far from being securely under Roman control. Losing three legions was certainly a very serious blow, especially since the Romans considered their military almost invincible.⁸ That the legions were destroyed by mere 'barbarians' would have only made the situation even more alarming in their eyes. On another level the destruction of Varus and his legions had a profound impact on the way Romans saw

⁵ Dio LVI. 23.1. (trans. E. Cary, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁶ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 44; J. A. Crook, 'Political History, 30 BC to AD 14', in *CAH²*, X, p. 110; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, X, pp. 184-5; K. Christ, 'Zur augusteischen Germanienpolitik', *Chiron* 7, 1977, pp. 194-9; C. M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 239; P.S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 200-1.

⁷ R. M. Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome: Trust in the Gods, but Verify*, p. 177; P.S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 201.

⁸ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 201.

themselves and their place in the world.⁹ It had shown them that they were not invincible, despite their many military successes, and it rekindled the deep-seated and long-standing fears created by earlier experiences with northern invaders.¹⁰ For this reason, the catastrophe in the northern forests represented an event even more alarming than simply the loss of the legions and of Roman political and military authority and control in Germania.

The Rhine: A time for Caution

The Roman reaction to the Varian disaster clearly supports the view that they feared a Germanic invasion, and more importantly highlights how significantly the defeat affected their Germanic policy. The first indicator of the significance of the defeat and the seriousness with which a possible invasion was viewed were the emergency counter-measures undertaken inside Rome. All festivals and celebrations planned for AD 9 were postponed in Rome, including Tiberius' triumph.¹¹ One of the reasons behind this was that Tiberius was immediately despatched to Germany in command of the reinforcement army hastily sent to the Rhine.¹² Imperial forces in Rome were put on alert, and a continual watch was kept day and night, to prevent news of the disaster inciting hysteria, or sympathetic rebellion in Rome. In order to contain any threat and to ensure the security of the rest of the Empire, Augustus extended the terms of the governors in the provinces.¹³ Suetonius records that this was done in order, "that the allies might be held to their allegiance by experienced men with whom they

⁹ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 201.

¹⁰ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 201. The invaders from the north were the Gauls in the early fourth century BC and the *Cimbri* and *Teutons* in the late second century.

¹¹ Dio LVI. 18, 24; Vell. Pat. II. 121. 2.

¹² This was not the only reason for cancelling celebrations throughout the city. But what would have been the implications of celebrating after discovering 24,000 soldiers had been wiped out and the German border was undefended? The details regarding the army built in AD 9 to reinforce the Rhine will be discussed later in this chapter.

¹³ Suet. *Aug.* 23.1-2.

were acquainted”.¹⁴ All of the Germanic troops in Augustus’s personal bodyguard were dismissed and were transported to remote islands away from the city.¹⁵ No longer could the loyalty of these Germanic troops be trusted, their allegiances were in question, and the possibility that they would join their fellow *Germani* in rebellion could not be risked. The final action taken was the expulsion of all remaining Germanic people that resided in the city no matter their purpose for being there or their loyalties.¹⁶ From these actions it is clear that Augustus could no longer distinguish between friend or foe; the sudden rebellion of supposed friendly Germanic tribes had made every German appear a potential threat. Extreme reactionary measures as these clearly denote that Augustus anticipated the worse possible outcome from the disaster.

The second indicator of the Romans level of fear against a Germanic invasion can be seen in the initial military response to the disaster, which will be explored in three parts: the overall impact of the defeat to Rome, the difficulties in raising legionary replacements, and the composition of these reinforcements. The total cost of the disaster recorded by Velleius Paterculus amounted to “three legions, of as many divisions of cavalry, and of six cohorts...”¹⁷ Using this data and E. Luttwak’s template for the composition of Rome’s legions and their auxiliaries, the total loss of troops amounted to approximately 24,000 men.¹⁸ Rome’s legionary forces (excluding the auxiliary forces)

¹⁴ Suet. *Aug.* 23.1-2.

¹⁵ Dio LVI. 23; Suet. *Aug.* 23; *Tib.* 17. P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 188.

¹⁶ Dio LVI. 23.

¹⁷ Vell. Pat. II. 117.

¹⁸ E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 16, see n. 3. For another assessment of the Varian legions, see W. A. Oldfather, *The Defeat of Varus and the German Policy of Augustus*, p. 35; T. Mommsen, *The History of Rome*, vol. VI, pp. 41-5. Keppie estimates between 12,000-15,000 legionaries, see L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 168.

had therefore been reduced from a total of 168,000 to 150,000.¹⁹ As discussed in Chapter Five this does not include the loss of support staff, slaves, women and children that would have accompanied the legions back to their winter barracks in the Lippe valley.²⁰

The significance to the Empire of the military losses suffered in Germania can be measured by the Roman reaction to the situation. Rome's military forces in AD 9 were overstretched and exhausted, they barely managed to contain the Illyrian revolt and the costs of its reconquest depleted the number of remaining citizens of military age.²¹ Dio notes the exhausted state of Rome's military establishment in AD 9, stating, "...for there were no citizens of military age left worth mentioning".²² Dio further comments that even Rome's allies had suffered greatly during the Illyrian campaigns.²³ With three legions and as many auxiliary forces wiped out, the situation at Rome was desperate, as Augustus needed to raise troops immediately to reinforce the Rhine. After Augustus's initial call for citizens to enrol was largely ignored, he became desperate and imposed several emergency policies in order to raise the necessary troops. Veterans who had already completed their term of service were recalled, freedmen enrolled, and additional contingents of recently freed slaves were enlisted. Augustus forced compulsory military service upon citizens of military age, selecting the required number by ballot, and

¹⁹ E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 16. Collins agrees with Luttwak's estimation, see S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, 2010, pp. 61-64; L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans*, p. 30. Le Bohec estimates 125,000, see Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, pp. 33-35 see Table 4.

²⁰ For details of the disaster and composition of Varus' forces refer back to Chapter II-II, p. 34-35. For detailed modern account, see S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, 2010, pp. 235-251.

²¹ P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 188.

²² Dio LVI. 23.1.

²³ Dio LVI. 23.2-3.

punishing those who resisted with the confiscation of their property and even death.²⁴

He only resorted to enlisting freedmen as soldiers twice in his reign; the first was to guard the Roman colonies in Illyricum, and the other to defend the banks of the Rhine.²⁵

Suetonius wrote:

Even these he levied, when they were slaves, from men and women of means, and at once gave them freedom; and he kept them under their original standard, not mingling them with the soldiers of free birth or arming them in same fashion.²⁶

These soldiers were not the standard legionaries, and were of a much lesser standard. The majority of them were raw and untested troops that had only been recently conscripted into military service. These policies were extreme, and the level of desperation and urgency shown by the *princeps* indicates how significant the Varian disaster was regarded in Rome. However, these troops were completely inadequate for any offensive military operations, and the only plausible purpose they may have had was to present a strong numerical military presence at the Rhine and act as a deterrent against any Germanic aggression.

Other evidence which supports this supposition can be observed in the forces subsequently sent to the Rhine, a large portion of which consisted of legions withdrawn from surrounding provinces and transferred to the Rhine. It is not stated in the sources when the legions were transferred to the Rhine, or even if they were part of Tiberius's reinforcements that were sent in AD 10. The only legions that are known to have been

²⁴ Dio LVI. 23.1-4.

²⁵ Suet. *Aug.* 25.1-3.

²⁶ Suet. *Aug.* 25.1-3. (trans. J. C. Rolfe, *Loeb Classical Library*).

garrisoned on the Rhine in AD 10 were the two surviving legions *legio I Germanica* and *legio V Alaudae*, under the command of Lucius Nonius Asprenas.²⁷ As mentioned previously, the Roman military presence on the Rhine was substantially increased from five to eight legions. The other six legions were gathered from Raetia, Hispania and Illyricum.²⁸ *Legio II Augusta*, *legio XIII Gemina*, *legio XIV Gemina Martia Victrix*, *legio XVI Gallica*, *legio XX Valeria Victrix*, and *legio XXI Rapax* were the legions which reinforced the Rhine.²⁹ That any legions were removed from Illyricum at all highlights the perceived severity of the situation; the province had only just recently been subdued before Augustus transferred to the Rhine *legio XIII Gemina*, previously garrisoned at Emona (Pannonia³⁰) and *legio XX Valeria Victrix*, which had been stationed in Illyricum. Overall, the total legionary force garrisoned on the Rhine after AD 10 can be estimated at 36,000 men: added to the surviving 12,000 troops, Rome's military presence on the Rhine was now approximately 48,000.³¹ This estimate does not include the number of auxiliaries that would have accompanied the legions to the Rhine, or the forces initially mobilized to reinforce the Rhine by Augustus. However, despite this the Rhine River now held one third of Rome's total military strength, a major increase clearly indicating how significantly the Varian disaster impacted upon Augustus' Germanic policy.

²⁷ Vell. Pat. II. 120.2-3. L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 168; R. Syme, 'Some Notes on the Legions under Augustus', *JRS* 23, 1933, p. 28.

²⁸ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 44-45; J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 6; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 376.

²⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.37. Also see, J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 6 n. 34,35; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany', p. 145; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 185; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 63; R. Syme, 'Some Notes on the Legions under Augustus', *JRS*, 23, 1933, p. 29; E. Ritterling, 'legio', in *RE*, Suppl. XII, vol. 2, Stuttgart, pp. 1238, 1376-7.

³⁰ This is debated. Šašel Kos argues that Emona was in northern Italy not Pannonia, see M. Šašel Kos, 'Emona was in Italy, not in Pannonia', in M. Šašel Kos, P. Scherrer, B. Kuntić-Makvić, L. Borhy, (eds.), *The Autonomous Towns of Noricum and Pannonia*, Situla 41, 2003, pp. 11-19.

³¹ This calculation is based on Luttwak's template for the size of legionary forces, see E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 16.

The initial stage of Rome's military response to the defeat can be classified as a containment exercise. As discussed earlier, Rome feared a Germanic invasion of the provinces and Rome, and the first action taken was to prevent this and contain any Germanic threat. It has already been established that the size and composition of Tiberius' relieving army is unknown, only two written sources record any details of these forces. The first is an account by Dio, who wrote:

...he made them draw lots, depriving of his property and disfranchising every fifth man of those still under thirty-five and every tenth man among those who had passed that age... He chose by lot as many as he could of those who had already completed their term of service and of the freedman, and after enrolling them sent them in haste with Tiberius into the province of Germania.³²

There is no mention of the total strength of these forces or to which military contingent they were assigned. The only other time the force is mentioned is by Suetonius who records only that slaves were purchased and freed in order to fight on the Rhine; there is no mention of any other forces sent with Tiberius to reinforce the river.³³ Without this vital calculation the true size and purpose of Tiberius' army cannot be ascertained for certain. Information regarding the identity of the legions and where they were garrisoned on the Rhine is only found later in the works of Tacitus, writing about the legions' mutiny in the Lower Rhine in AD 14.³⁴ The only piece of information that is missing is the dates on which these legions took up their posts.

³² Dio LVI. 23. 2-4. (trans. E. Cary, *Loeb Classical Library*).

³³ Suet. *Aug.* 25. 2.

³⁴ Tac. *Ann.* I. 37.

Amongst modern historians the specific details concerning the reinforcement of the Rhine is largely ignored and the general consensus regarding this is simply to state that Tiberius was sent to the Rhine with a reinforcing army, and/or that the number of legions was increased to eight.³⁵ The only facts that can be ascertained about Tiberius' reinforcement of the Rhine was that in AD 10 he arrived in Germania, garrisoned the forces that had been hastily gathered in Rome, and began the strengthening of the Rhine defences.³⁶ Dio records preparation and vigilance on the Rhine consumed Tiberius for an entire year.³⁷ Dio seems to suggest that Tiberius could have crossed the Rhine if he wished to do so. Whether Dio meant to imply this is indeterminable, as without the knowledge of the forces at Tiberius' disposal during this time the statement appears to be nothing but a mere boast.

A question arises then in regards to what actions Tiberius undertook on the Rhine to strengthen it. The most intriguing explanation is put forward by T. Mommsen who suggested that Tiberius used this period to arrange the occupation of the Rhine-frontier by eight legions, and simultaneously for the division of the Rhine command into two parts, Germania Superior and Germania Inferior, each commanded by a consular military legate.³⁸ However, supreme command encompassing both armies was retained

³⁵ See R. Syme, *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 376; E. S. Gruen, *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 185; P. Southern, *Augustus*, p. 188; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A history of Rome from 133 BC to AD 69*, 5th ed., Routledge, London, 2002, p. 259; E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in K. A., Raaflaub & M., Toher, (eds.), *Between Republic and Empire: Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1990, p. 408; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 202; C.M. Wells, *The Germany Policy of Augustus*, p. 240 (ignores any mention of the forces sent with Tiberius or the increase in legions on the Rhine); T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire: From Caesar to Diocletian*, pp. 49; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 44-45.

³⁶ Vell. Pat. II.120.1-3; Dio LVI.24.1.

³⁷ Dio LVI.24. 6.

³⁸ T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, pp. 48-49. Cf. This dissertation argues for a later date (AD c. 89) during the reign of Domitian, for details see Chapter 11.

by members of the imperial household.³⁹ This suggestion is plausible but not quite accurate; it is during this period that the divisions of the left bank of the Rhine and its armies took place. During this period of apparent idleness Tiberius did reorganise the Rhine and its armies, but this was into two military zones not provinces.⁴⁰ Current evidence does not allow a definitive answer regarding the division. However, two consular legates were appointed under Tiberius' command indicating a probable division of Germania into two separate military zones, *exercitus Germaniae Inferioris* and *exercitus Germaniae Superioris*, taking place at this time.⁴¹ Overall, examination of these events indicates that the Romans' strategy was the containment of the perceived threat posed by the *Germani* along the Rhine. [see Map (8)]

During the German campaigns of AD 11-12 the Roman strategy changed to a cautiously aggressive policy. The Romans no longer stood idle on the left bank of the Rhine but began a process of acquiring territory on its opposite bank. Tiberius' campaigns in AD 11-12 have been described as nothing more than punitive raids, mere gestures, and a show of force to threaten the Germanic tribes.⁴² The ancient sources disagree on the purpose and scope of these campaigns. Tacitus dismisses all the campaigns carried out by Rome into Germania:

³⁹ T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 49.

⁴⁰ Tac. *Ann.* I. 3. For modern scholars, see J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, p. 21, 228; C. Goudineau, 'Gaul', *CAH²*, X, p. 488; C. Rüger, 'Germany', *CAH²*, X, p. 528; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A history of Rome from 133 BC to AD 69*, p. 259; K. Christ, 'Zur augusteischen Germanienpolitik', *Chiron* 7, 1977, p. 149-51.

⁴¹ The emergence of Germania Superior and Germania Inferior is discussed in detail in Chapters 7 and 11.

⁴² Cf. D. Timpe, 'Der Triumph des Germanicus: Untersuchungen zu den Feldzügen der Jahre 14-16 n. Chr. in Germanien', pp. 31-4. Also see, E. Koestermann, 'Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14-16 n. Chr.', *Historia* 6 (4), p. 429.

waged more to redeem the prestige lost with Quintilius Varus and his army than from any wish to extend the empire or with any prospect of an adequate recompense.⁴³

Tacitus marginalises not only Tiberius' campaigns but all the campaigns undertaken in Germany; his assessment can be seen to be the main source for this view by later historians. Conversely, the accounts Velleius Paterculus and Dio Cassius disagree with Tacitus. Velleius takes the completely opposite point of view to Tacitus: his description of Tiberius's campaigns as an "aggressive war" against the Germans clearly portrays them as purposeful offensive actions.⁴⁴ His account goes on to describe what these offensive actions were, writing:

He penetrated into the heart of the country, opened up military roads, devastated fields, burnt houses, routed those who came against him, and, without loss to the troops with which he had crossed, he returned, covered in glory, to winter quarters.⁴⁵

Velleius was a military commander under Tiberius during his German campaigns, the extent to which one can accept his account must be weighed against the obvious bias he had in favour of Tiberius.⁴⁶ P. S. Wells raises the point that no archaeological traces of military roads from this period have been identified, nor have archaeologists discovered any signs of the layers of charcoal that might be expected from widespread burning of settlements.⁴⁷

⁴³ Tac. *Ann.* I. 3. (trans. J. Jackson, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁴⁴ Vell. Pat. II.120.1-2. P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 202.

⁴⁵ Vell. Pat. II.120.2. (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁴⁶ Suet. *Tib.*, 18; Vell. Pat. II.121.1-3. Velleius was still serving under him, see Vell. Pat. II.104.3.

⁴⁷ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 202.

Dio's account of the campaigns seems to fall between the accounts of Velleius and Tacitus. According to his account, Tiberius invaded Germania in AD 11 and overran portions of it, but fought no battles during this time, stating that both sides seemed to be reluctant to engage in direct military action.⁴⁸ Some modern historians seem to accept Tacitus' appraisal of the campaigns. Syme is one example, asserting the campaigns as nothing more than a collection of "ravaging raids."⁴⁹ Other historians view the campaigns in a slightly different light, as "cautious raids" and "demonstrations" to show the *Germani* that the Romans could enter their territory at will, and perhaps even to carry out preparations for subsequent activities on the right bank.⁵⁰ Seager's opinion goes further still, presenting the view that the reason behind Tiberius' limited success was because he attempted to secure territory effectively by advancing meticulously and slowly in order to take the territory piecemeal, as he had done previously in Illyricum.⁵¹ However, at no point did Tiberius attempt to re-establish the vital military bases in the interior as he had in Illyricum, a process which would have been critical in regaining control of Germania. This would suggest that a resumption of offensive operations on the right bank had taken place. However, their purpose was not to extend Roman control across the Rhine.

Throughout the period of AD 12-13 knowledge of events in Germany is limited. There is no record of activities across the Rhine or conflict with the Germanic people, though it is known that the Romans did consider themselves in a state of war with

⁴⁸ Dio LVI. 25.1-3.

⁴⁹ R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, vol. X, p. 376; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A history of Rome from 133 BC to AD 69*, p. 259; W. Eck, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, p. 103 (describes the campaigns as retaliatory raids); A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 61; P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, pp. 202-203.

⁵⁰ E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in *Between Republic and Empire*, p. 408; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 49.

⁵¹ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 45.

them.⁵² There is little known about events in Germania extends to the details concerning the recall of Tiberius to Rome, and the transfer of the supreme command of the Rhine armies to Germanicus.⁵³ In contrast, certain important events occurred in Rome that can be demonstrated to have had a direct impact on the Roman strategy in Germania. In AD 13, Tiberius was granted the same honours as had once been conferred on Agrippa.⁵⁴ At Augustus' request a consular law was passed, granting Tiberius *imperium* equal to Augustus' own throughout the empire.⁵⁵ Evidence of this can be seen in the coins of AD 13 and 14 which show the head of Augustus on the obverse, and that of Tiberius on the reverse.⁵⁶ It is indicated by the sources that Augustus's health was failing by this time, and the decision to grant Tiberius greater powers and responsibility can be viewed as a pre-emptive transferral of power to his successor.⁵⁷ This does not imply that Tiberius took control of the principate, but rather shared the decisions of government. In this light the inaction in Germania can be viewed as a joint decision executed by Augustus and Tiberius. Whether this was a deliberate abandonment of offensive actions in Germania or not cannot be determined for certain; yet it appears that the Romans had adopted a defensive policy regarding Germania during this period.

Tiberius, a New Emperor (Initial Discord)

When Augustus died Tiberius was declared Emperor by the senate. News of this did not pass without incident.⁵⁸ Upon learning of the death of Augustus and the accession of Tiberius, revolts erupted amongst the armies of Illyricum and the Lower

⁵² Vell. Pat. II. 123.1; Tac. *Ann.* I. 9; Dio LVI. 26.

⁵³ Vell. Pat. II. 121, 123; Suet. *Cal.* 1.1, 8.3 (Germanicus also received the governorship of the three Gauls).

⁵⁴ Vell. Pat. II. 121.

⁵⁵ Suet. *Tib.* 21; Vell. Pat. II. 121.3.

⁵⁶ *RIC* I, 226 (Augustus).

⁵⁷ Suet. *Tib.* 21; Vell. Pat. II. 121.3.

⁵⁸ The mutiny of the legions on the Rhine and Danube and their impact will be discussed in detail below.

Rhine. These mutinies in the provinces are extensively recorded by the ancient sources.⁵⁹ Tacitus assigns the blame for the mutiny on the Rhine mainly on the undesirables who had been enlisted to meet the emergency created by the destruction of Varus' legions.⁶⁰ He attributes this to their love of living an easy life and their being unsuitable for the hardships of military life. They seized the opportunity to make the same demands as the legions had earlier in Pannonia: demobilization for those who had served their time, higher pay for those who had not, and revenge for brutal treatment at the hands of centurions.⁶¹

During this period both the written and material evidence increase substantially and a more accurate picture can be reconstructed of the events that took place. Through the literary evidence it is known that in AD 14 the Rhine legions were all on the left bank of the Rhine. Although it was already August (normally part of the campaign season), the legions were standing idle. Tacitus records that they were, "...stationed, idle or on the lightest of duty, in one summer camp on the Ubian frontier..."⁶² He attributes this as the factor that led to the uprising. Tacitus further records that the four legions of Lower Germany were in a summer camp among the *Ubii*.⁶³ Wells suggests that this summer camp was possibly the base discovered at Neuss (Novaesium)⁶⁴ which had been occupied by seven successive forts or legionary bases of the Augustan-Tiberian period.⁶⁵ During this initial outbreak of mutiny Germanicus was away in Gaul

⁵⁹ For a detailed account of the Illyrian and Rhine revolt see Vell. Pat. II.125.1-5; Dio LVII.3-6; Tac. *Ann.* I.16-30, 31-50; Suet. *Tib.* 25.

⁶⁰ Tac. *Ann.* I. 31, cf. IV.18.

⁶¹ Tac., *Ann.* I. 31, 32, 35; Vell. Pat. II.125; Dio LVII. 5-6.

⁶² Tac., *Ann.*, I. 21.

⁶³ Tac., *Ann.* I. 31, 33, 45.

⁶⁴ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 241 see n.4, 127-132.

⁶⁵ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 127-129. For a detailed illustration of the archaeological excavations see p. 129.

on business connected with the census.⁶⁶ Both the ancient sources and modern historians criticise the methods Germanicus used to quell the mutiny.⁶⁷ The ancient sources state it was the mutiny which drove Germanicus to advance across the Rhine and focus the mutinous army's energy on the Germans rather than on each other or their superiors.⁶⁸ Tacitus portrays Germanicus as yielding to his soldiers' requests despite the lateness of the season and the lack of preparations.⁶⁹ Dio goes further and attributes the expedition to Germanicus who devised the campaign to prevent the mutiny from breaking out again.⁷⁰ Modern historians generally agree that the decision to begin another offensive policy regarding Germania stems from the mutiny of the Rhine armies. Seager goes as far as to state, "had there been no mutiny, there would have been no campaign in AD 14".⁷¹ Therefore, in this instances the immediate catalyst for the campaign were the mutinies, however, justification for them was still retribution and suppression of the *Germani*. [\[see Map \(9\)\]](#)

The final offensive campaigns in AD 15-16 mark the abandonment of Tiberius' policy of cautious incursions into Germania, and the reintroduction of far-ranging offensive campaigns into the interior under Germanicus' command.⁷² These campaigns are extensively covered by modern historians. However, an obvious divide exists around the purpose and importance of these campaigns. Some historians take the view that Germanicus' goal was to regain the lost province and re-establish Roman control up

⁶⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 31.

⁶⁷ For a full assessment of Germanicus' handling of the mutiny on the Rhine see R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 65-69.

⁶⁸ Tac. *Ann.* I. 69; Dio LVII. VI.1.

⁶⁹ Tac. *Ann.* I. 43.

⁷⁰ Dio LVII. VI.1.

⁷¹ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 71. Also see, E. Koestermann, 'Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14-16 n. Chr. ', *Historia* 6 (4), p. 429; D. Timpe, 'Der Triumph des Germanicus: Untersuchungen zu den Feldzügen der Jahre 14-16 n. Chr. in Germanien', in *Antiquitas: Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte* 16, p. 28.

⁷² R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 74.

to the Elbe.⁷³ Koestermann believes that Germanicus' judgement was sound, and supposes that he had been appointed by Augustus to recover the lost province, a policy that Tiberius did not approve of, but in which he continued to acquiesce for a year or two in order not to break too obviously with Augustus' wishes.⁷⁴ Other scholars argue that the only objectives of these campaigns were the punishment of the Germanic tribes for the destruction of Varus and his three legions, and to redeem Rome's military reputation.⁷⁵ The source of this argument stems from Tacitus who stated that the war with the *Germani* derived less from the desire to extend the empire, or to achieve tangible gain, than to wipe out the disgrace of Varus' defeat.⁷⁶ Strabo confirms these motives in his *Geographica*, writing:

...the *Cherusci* and their subjects, in whose country three Roman legions, with their general Quintilius Varus, were destroyed by ambush in violation of the treaty. But they all paid the penalty...⁷⁷

This account only describes Germanicus' campaigns as exacting retribution from those involved in the ambush in Teutoburg Forest. The fact that the campaigns were directed against the five Germanic tribes that took part in the battle of Teutoburg Forest only further supports the theory that the main objective was to punish the guilty parties. Velleius is the only surviving source that attributes another motive to the campaigns,

⁷³ D. Timpe, 'Der Triumph des Germanicus: Untersuchungen zu den Feldzügen der Jahre 14-16 n. Chr. in Germanien', p. 41; E. Koestermann, 'Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14-16 n. Chr.', pp. 429-31; F. B. Marsh, *Reign of Tiberius*, pp. 69-71; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 74.

⁷⁴ E. Koestermann, 'Die Feldzüge des Germanicus 14-16', pp. 465-6, cf. n. 80.

⁷⁵ P. S. Wells, *The Battle that Stopped Rome*, p. 204; E. S. Gruen, 'The Imperial Policy of Augustus', in *Between Republic and Empire*, p. 408; E. S. Gruen, 'The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH²*, vol. X, pp. 185-6; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 257-60; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 87; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 61; D. Timpe, *Der Triumph des Germanicus*, p. 63.

⁷⁶ Tac. Ann. I. 3.6.

⁷⁷ Strabo Geo. VII.1.4. (trans. H. L. Jones, *Loeb Classical Library*).

writing that Germanicus was dispatched to Germania to put an end to the traces of the war that still remained.⁷⁸ [see Map (10 and 11)]

Germanicus was recalled to Rome in AD 16-17, marking the end of Rome's offensive policy in Germania. Germanicus, however, was convinced that if he were granted one more year he could bring the war to a successful conclusion.⁷⁹ Nothing in Tacitus's account or in the archaeological record justifies this claim.⁸⁰ In his three years of campaigns all that he managed to achieve was the establishment or re-establishment of a few military posts some way beyond the Rhine, and the recovery of two of the lost eagles of Varus.⁸¹ No attempt was made to reoccupy the territory in force, or to cover it with a network of forts such as Drusus had done, or even attempt to reoccupy important military bases such as Haltern, which would have to have been carried out in order to take control of the province.⁸² Germanicus returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph, and as there was no replacement for him as supreme commander of the Rhine armies, the two German armies remained separated and under the command of two consular military legates. Far-ranging expeditions without military or political consolidation proved a strategic failure for Germanicus, as it had done in the past with Augustus. It was apparent that the *Germani* were determined to resist Roman intervention in their region, and Germanicus' inability to crush their resistance with eight legions only highlighted this fact. Regardless, these German campaigns had been necessary to avenge the death of Varus and his legions, and to restore Rome's tarnished military

⁷⁸ Vell. Pat. II. 123.1.

⁷⁹ Tac. *Ann.* II.26.

⁸⁰ C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 242.

⁸¹ One of the military forts thought to have been re-established by Germanicus is the one located near mount Taunus, thought to be the fort at Friedberg, although there is conjecture regarding its identification. For the argument regarding the authenticity and identification of the site see C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 225-226.

⁸² C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 242.

reputation. Now that this had been achieved, the *Germani* could be left to their own internal struggles. Tiberius then implemented a policy of containment.⁸³ By abandoning the offensive strategy against the *Germani* and strengthening his position along the Rhine he effectively limited the extent of Rome's empire and established an initial military frontier on the Rhine.⁸⁴ [see Map (12)]

The Division of Illyricum

Illyricum, as it had existed before the rebellion, ceased to be. As explained in Chapter Five, the conflict had proven that a single large command in the region was inadequate and could not provide effective control and security. The Varian disaster significantly added to this, it had instilled a real sense of fear in the Romans and as a direct result the perceived threat posed by the Germanic tribes north of the Danube River was overwhelmingly apparent and can be seen to be a major factor in their political and military policies in the area. Frustratingly the military situation along the Danube is obscured and complicated by a lack of evidence. After the suppression of the revolt Roman activities in the Danube region can only be roughly speculated upon and subsequently only a rudimentary picture can be constructed. Despite this obvious hurdle, there are a several measures attributed to this period, the most significant being: the military and administrative division of Illyricum, the positioning of legions, and the construction of roads.

The division of Illyricum is a key feature in the development of the Danubian frontier, representing the end of the existing Roman Illyrian policy due to the division it

⁸³ The new policy defensive developed by Tiberius is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

⁸⁴ Tac. *Ann.* II. 26.

caused to the administrative and political unity of Illyricum.⁸⁵ The long term effect was a dissection of the whole geo-political system of Illyricum, creating two different regional political systems.⁸⁶ The southern region, Illyricum Superius, would later become known as Dalmatia, and Illyricum Inferius, the future Pannonia.

Modern scholarship accepts that after the rebellion Illyricum was divided, but debate surrounds the exact date when this actually occurred, as the surviving sources are in conflict.⁸⁷ The majority of scholars put forward the view that the division took place in the period from the beginning of the rebellion to shortly after its culmination, mainly arguing in support of AD 8.⁸⁸ In contrast, the minority view is intriguing: it dates the division much later, after the second campaign of Drusus the Younger to Illyricum, therefore after c. AD 19-20, but still before the reign of Claudius.⁸⁹ Dzino argues that

⁸⁵ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 158.

⁸⁶ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 161. see K. Hopkins, 'Taxes and trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC – AD 400)', *JRS* 70, pp. 101-4; P. D. A. Garnsey, and R. Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society, Culture*, London, 1987, pp. 95-97.

⁸⁷ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 161. For brief review of the ancient sources and the modern scholarships interpretation, see P. Kovács, 'Some notes on the division of Illyricum', in I. Piso, (ed.), *DIE RÖMISCHEN PROVINZEN. BEGRIFF UND GRÜNDUNG*, pp. 243-253. More recently see, M. Šašel Kos, 'Pannonia or Lower Illyricum?', in *Tyche* 25, (2010), pp. 123–130.

⁸⁸ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 161. Supporters of (AD 8); G. Alföldy, 'Caesarische und augusteische Kolonien in der Provinz Dalmatien', *AAH* 10 (4), 1965, pp. 26-27; E. Ritterling, 1925, 'legio', *RE* 12, 1925, p. 1236; A. Jagenteufel, 'Die Statthalter der Römischen provinz Dalmatia von Augustus bis Diokletian', *Schriften der Balkankommission: Antiquarische Abteilung* 12, Vienna, 1958, pp. 9-10; A. Dobó, *Die Verwaltung der Römischen provinz Pannonien von Augustus bis Diocletianus*, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 11. (AD 9); T. Nagy, 'Der Aufstand der pannonisch-dalmatinischen Völker und die Frage der Zweiteilung Illyricums', in Milosavljević et al., 1970; J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', *ANRW* 2.6, 1977, p. 545. Fitz later altered his opinion, arguing in favour of a much later date, see J. Fitz, 'La division de l'Illyricum', *Latomus* 47 (1), 1988. Support of (AD 10); A. Betz, *Untersuchungen zur Militärgeschichte der römischen Provinz Dalmatien*, p. 5.

⁸⁹ J. Fitz, 'La division de l'Illyricum', *Latomus* 47 (1), 1988; G. Novak, 'La province Illyricum était-elle au temps d'Octavien Auguste et de Tibère divisée en Superior provincial Illyricum et Inferior provincial Illyricum' in Chevallier, R. (ed.), *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à André Piganiol* 3, 1966; H. Braunert, 'Omnium provinciarum populi Romani...fines auxi. Ein Entwurf', *Chiron* 7, 1977, pp. 215-216 (arguing that Illyricum was divided into two separate commands, but still remained a single province after AD 14).

the argument is quite convincing and adds that it offers an explanation for the inconsistency in the sources, and so supports the view that the division should be dated to the early Tiberian period.⁹⁰ If this were indeed the case, then it would seem that Augustus considered the division of Illyricum before his death, and that it was only due to his death and the ascension of Tiberius that it was delayed.⁹¹

Illyricum's division was geo-strategic, although socio-political considerations did have a significant role in determining the boundary between provinces; importantly the separation must be viewed in the context of a larger reorganisation of the northern provinces.⁹² Initially, all forces in Illyricum and Noricum were under a single command, and 'it is conceivable that the whole region was under a common military administration'.⁹³ Nagy favours this view, proposing the concept of the "Provinzkomplex Dalmatia-Illyricum (i.e. Pannonia)-Noricum".⁹⁴ Pannonia was structured as a frontier province and was part of a 'trans-provincial imperial system' that was made up of the Danubian provinces.⁹⁵ Alterations mainly occurred in the

⁹⁰ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 161.

⁹¹ Tiberius was en-route to Illyricum when he heard that Augustus was on his deathbed, see Vell. Pat. 2. 123.1; cf. Tac. Ann. I. 5. There was no obvious justification for Tiberius' to travel to Illyricum at that time, but reorganisation and the census, which Germanicus was undertaking in Gaul during this time, seems a likely explanation; Ann. 1.31. Cf. T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, p. 64, n. 18; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, pp. 161-2.

⁹² D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 162.

⁹³ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 162 n. 15. Also see, T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, 1989, p. 68; E. Tóth, 'Die Entstehung der gemeinsamen Grenzen zwischen Pannonien und Noricum', *Arheološki Vestnik* 31, 1980, pp. 84-86 writes that the unity of the entire Illyro-Norican administration lasted until the reign of Claudius.

⁹⁴ T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, 1989, p.68.

⁹⁵ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 162.

western parts of the new province, where sections that were formally part of the kingdom of Noricum were merged into Pannonia for strategic reasons, such as a stronger defensive front against the Germanic tribes in the north and unifying Roman control over the Amber road.⁹⁶ Fitz specifically attributes the reorganisation to fear of the *Marcommani*.⁹⁷ Whether or not the reorganisation can specifically be attributed to this can be debated, but what is not in doubt is the fear and desperation that was generated through Varus' defeat and the Romans reaction and implementation of counter measures to prevent any possible attack. An obvious indicator for this can be seen in the positioning of the legions in Pannonia,⁹⁸ which were stationed in such a manner as to secure the province itself and ensure both defensive and offensive capabilities against threats across the Danube.⁹⁹

Although uncertainty and debate surround the location of the administrative boundary between Dalmatia and Pannonia, it is possible to place it roughly in the south of the Sava and north of the Dinaric Alps.¹⁰⁰ The division of Illyricum separated the *Pannonii* into two parts: the *Breuci*, *Colapiani*, *Andizetes*, *Osi* and *Amantini* were in Pannonia; and the *Mezaei*, *Ditiones*, *Pirustae* and *Daesidiates* in Dalmatia.¹⁰¹ The aim of this course of action is clear, to destroy the socio-political unity of the *Pannonii*

⁹⁶ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 162.

⁹⁷ J. Fitz, 'Die Eroberung Pannoniens', *ANRW* 2.6, p. 549. Dzino is critical of this view, describing it as exaggerated, justifying this opinion with the belief that the date of the reorganisation to be around the mid- to late- reign of Tiberius. See D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 162 n. 17.

⁹⁸ Positions of Roman legions in Pannonia will be discussed later.

⁹⁹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 162; J. Fitz, 'La division de l'Illyricum', *Latomus* 47 (1), pp. 23-24.

¹⁰⁰ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, pp 162-3; I. Bojanovski, *Bosnie et Herzegovine a l'epoque antique*, Monographies ANUBiH 66, pp. 325-330; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 78-80.

¹⁰¹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163.

(which had proven itself to be dangerous to Rome and its interests) and remove the potential of a future threat.¹⁰² Further to this, the *Pannonii* presence was counterbalanced by the settlement of Celts, Italian settlers, and southern Illyrians in the region. A frontier positioned between the provinces fixed on the Dinaric Alps had several strategic benefits for the Romans. The mountain chain was a significant natural barrier, one that contained only a few passages that were easily defended.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the position allowed the Roman forces stationed in Dalmatia the ability to act against any threat from the north, because such an attack might circumvent the Pannonian army, which was the first line of defence. Therefore, the Dalmatian legions had a dual purpose: to maintain Roman control of the province, and act as strategic reserves, which could be utilised elsewhere if the need arose.¹⁰⁴

Dating the division exactly is a lengthy and contentious issue which goes beyond the scope of this work. Suffice to state, that around the late Augustan/early Tiberian period the administrative organisation of Illyricum was divided, regardless of when the province was in fact officially separated into Pannonia and Dalmatia.¹⁰⁵ As discussed in the previous section, Tiberius had carried out initial arrangements in the final weeks before the surrender of Bato.¹⁰⁶ According to Paterculus, the purpose of Tiberius' journey to Illyricum in AD 14 was supposedly to, "strengthen by peace the regions he

¹⁰² D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163.

¹⁰³ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, 1976, p. 27; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 156-7; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and upper Moesia*, p. 43; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 96-8.

¹⁰⁵ The use of the name Pannonia for the province does not occur until much later, see *CIL* x, 6225 = *ILS* 985 and *CIL* xvi, 14. Cf. A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, 1974, p. 39 n. 44.

¹⁰⁶ Dio LVI. 14.7-15.1.

subjugated in war”,¹⁰⁷ this which could be interpreted as being the completion of the reorganisation of the region, but the task was interrupted by the death of Augustus.¹⁰⁸ Not until the second mission of Drusus to Illyricum (AD 17-20) can activity regarding the organisation of the provinces be speculated at. Tacitus records that Drusus was dispatched to Illyricum to, “serve his apprenticeship to war and acquire the favour of the army”, and to “consolidate a peace” between the warring Germanic tribes.¹⁰⁹ There is little doubt that Drusus organised defences against the Marcommani and other northern tribes.¹¹⁰ Interestingly, Mócsy and Dzino speculate on the possibility that Drusus carried out other duties, such as an attempt to organise the administration of the Danubian provinces.¹¹¹

Reorganisation of the Roman Army on the Rhine and Danube

Several essential roles were fulfilled by the Roman military in the Danubian provinces, the most obvious being the monitoring and control of local tribes and peoples. Of equal importance were the vital tasks of the defence of the frontier and the construction and maintenance of roads. Varus’ defeat triggered a dramatic re-deployment of troops from east to west. Therefore, the deployment of troops will be observed before and after events in AD 9. During the late Augustan period the positioning of Roman legions and auxiliary forces in Pannonia, Noricum, and Raetia

¹⁰⁷ Vell. Pat. II. 123.1.

¹⁰⁸ Vell. Pat. II. 123.1; cf. Suet. *Tib.* 21. D. Dzino, ‘Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate’, PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia*, pp. 39-40.

¹⁰⁹ Tac. *Ann.* II. 44, 46.

¹¹⁰ R. Syme, ‘Some Imperial Salutations’, *Phoenix* 34 (4), p. 324; T. Nagy, ‘Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum’, *AAH* 41, p. 64.

¹¹¹ D. Dzino, ‘Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate’, PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia*, p. 40

can only be speculated on, the lack of evidence obscures any certainty.¹¹² The task is also made more tedious and uncertain with the ambiguity of separating troop movements and camp construction during the late Augustan and early Tiberian periods. In line with this then only a rough sketch of troop positions and possible camps can be postulated.

Prior to events in Germania, the three Danubian frontier provinces were garrisoned by up to five legions. In addition to the legions, significant auxiliary forces were stationed in the provinces. Modern scholars, however, dispute their exact number and position.¹¹³ In Pannonia were: *legio VIII Augusta*, *legio IX Hispana*, *legio XI Apollinaris*. During this period the legions were still positioned in the interior away from the frontier, the threat being the rekindling of unrest in Illyricum and not an immediate threat from the *Germani*.¹¹⁴ It is speculated that the legions were based as follows: Poetovium: *legio VIII Augusta* (Ptuj), Emona: *legio XV Apollinaris* (Ljubljana), and Siscia: *legio IX Hispana* (Sisak).¹¹⁵ Emona as a legionary camp remains controversial.¹¹⁶ In Raetia, there were *legio XIII Gemina*, *legio XV Apollinaris*. Possible

¹¹² J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 102. Raetia is also considered to be part of Upper Germania and not part of the Danube, see Introduction.

¹¹³ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 167; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia*, pp. 48-51.

¹¹⁴ The date of the relocation of troops to the frontier will be discussed subsequent Chapters.

¹¹⁵ J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', in *Classical Quarterly* 13 (2), p. 269 n. 3. *Legio VIII* at Poetovium: *CIL* III.4060 (centurion), 10879 (*eques*), 10878 (veteran). *Legio IX* is problematic the only possible record in Illyricum is from Gardum (the camp of *Legio VII* near Saloniae in Dalmatia) *CIL* III.13877. According to Wilkes, Siscia should have had a legion based there, especially following the war of AD 6-9. He notes that on the main route to the East, it lay near the entrance of important valleys leading into central western Bosnia. However, records of *Legio XV* from this period occur in north-east Italy: *CIL* V.3357, 3373, and 3379, all from Verona. Cf. J. J. Wilkes, p. 270 n. 4; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, pp. 166-167; Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, 1994, p. 70.

¹¹⁶ J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 269 n. 3; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide,

locations of the Raetian legionary camps were: Brenner Pass: *legio XV Apollinaris* (Area of the Brenner Pass, Raetia [exact location uncertain]), and Augsburg-Oberhausen: *legio XIII Gemina (Augusta Vindelicorum/Vindelicum)*.¹¹⁷ These locations are uncertain and debate surrounds their existence and supposed location at this time.¹¹⁸ There were no legions based in Noricum, although *Poetovium* (Ptuj) and later Carnuntum (Petronell) were technically located inside the province they were under the command of the *legatis Augustis pro praetor Illyrici* and considered part of Illyricum/Pannonia.¹¹⁹ Therefore, the defence of Noricum was carried out by detachments from the legions of the Pannonian army and *auxilia*, up until the reign of Marcus Aurelius.¹²⁰

After events in AD 9, the situation demanded the immediate replacement of the three experienced and trained legions which had been lost, in order to re-establish the Rhine frontier and defend against a possible Germanic attack across the Rhine. Concurrently, the pacification of Illyricum needed to be ensured and the Danubian frontier had to be strengthened and defended. As discussed earlier, newly formed legions would not be effective and could not replace the loss of trained and hardened

2005, pp. 166-167 see n. 46. More recently see, M. Šašel Kos, 'Colonia Iulia Emona – the genesis of the Roman city', in *Arheološki vestnik* 63, pp. 79–104.

¹¹⁷ L. Bakker, 'Der Militärplatz von Oberhausen und die weitere militärische Präsenz im römischen Augsburg', In Schlüter, W., and Wiegels, R. (eds.), *Rom, Germanien und die Ausgrabungen von Kalkriese*, pp. 451–466; J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 111; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, BAR Ser. 1458, p. 35; R. Syme, 'Some notes on the legions under Augustus', *JRS* 23, p. 28 n. 108; E. Ritterling, 'legio', in *RE*, Suppl. xii, vol. 2, p. 1226.

¹¹⁸ It is still debated whether a Augustan legionary base existed, see G. Gottlieb, 'Das römische Augsburg', *Antike Welt* 16, pp. 2-18; H. Schönberger, *Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn*, *BRGK* 66, p. 489; C. M. Well, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 76-77.

¹¹⁹ G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 57. See n. 26 On the course of the frontier cf. esp. E., Polaschek, 'Notitia Dignitatum', *RE*, Suppl. xvii (1), pp. 980-5; G. Winkler, *Die Reichsbeamten von Noricum und ihr Personal*, *SBAW* 261 (2), pp. 25-8.

¹²⁰ Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, p. 169; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 65 n. 15.

troops. The solution was the mass transfer of legions from eastern provinces to the Rhine and Danube regions. Four legions were immediately transferred to Germania, the exact dates of their transfer are not known. The Raetian and Illyrian legions transferred to Germania were replaced by moving legions westward along the frontier.¹²¹ In Pannonia, the bases garrisoned remained the same for the time being, only the legions changed. The legions and their bases were positioned as: *legio VIII Augusta* at Poetovium, *legio IX Hispana* at Siscia and *legio XV Apollinaris* at or near *Emona*.¹²² In Raetia, it is thought that the base at the Brenner Pass was no longer garrisoned by a legion and that from AD 9 *Augusta Vindelicorum* could have served as a double legion base.¹²³ Justification for this move could be connected with the Roman strategy against the Germanic tribes after AD 9, their role possibly being flank defence (a role which was assigned to the Upper German army).¹²⁴ The legions initially thought to have been based at *Augusta Vindelicorum* during this period were *legio XVI Gallica* and *legio XXI Rapax*.¹²⁵ Therefore, the positioning of legions c. AD 9 has three legions based in northern Illyricum and two legions based in a double camp in Raetia, with an unknown quantity and placement of auxiliaries throughout Noricum and across the remainder of the Upper and Middle Danube frontier.

¹²¹ *Legio XIII Gemina* from Illyricum to Raetia; *legio VII Macedonica* from Galatia to Illyricum; *legio VIII Augusta* from Egypt to Illyricum; *legio XI Moesia* to Illyricum; *legio XV Apollinaris* from Raetia to Illyricum. See, J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 6.

¹²² J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 102; J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 269 n. 3.

¹²³ J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 26, 35, 43; L. Bakker, 'Der Militärplatz von Oberhausen und die weitere militärische Präsenz im römischen Augsburg', in W. Schlüter and R. Wiegels (eds.), *Rom, Germanien und die Ausgrabungen von Kalkriese*, pp. 451-466; L. Keppie, *The making of the Roman Army*, p. 159. For debate regarding the validity of a base at Augsburg during the Augustan period, see C. M. Well, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 76-77, 87-89.

¹²⁴ H. Wolff, 'Raetia', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 538.

¹²⁵ L. Keppie, *The making of the Roman Army*, pp. 159 n. 35, 169; J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 26, 35, 43. *Legio XVI Gallica* remains until AD 15, *legio XXI Rapax* until c. AD 10, when it is transferred to *Vetera* (Xanten) on the Lower Rhine and replaced with *legio XIII Gemina*. See, J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 24, 26.

The Significance of Roman Roads

A vital component to Roman defences and closely associated with the establishment of military bases throughout the Danubian provinces, and similarly along the Rhine, is the construction of roads. Due to its significance a brief overview of road construction and the role that it played in the regions will be presented; a detailed analysis would be a large undertaking beyond the scope of this work.¹²⁶ Road building can be seen to be an extremely significant part of the Roman strategy after the Illyrian and Germanic rebellions. In order to enable fast communication and the transportation of forces and resources, the Romans had begun a massive undertaking to construct roads along the Rhine and Danubian frontiers.¹²⁷ The complicated and vital network of roads constructed led north from Italy and branched out to connect the Rhine and the Danube. There were of course some roads already established before the conflicts had erupted, however, their aftermath marked an escalation in their construction, which would carry on throughout the history of the frontiers. This important network would spread and expand interconnecting legionary and auxiliary camps, watchtowers, forts, and outposts all along the frontier and can be seen as an essential component to Roman defences.

The Alpine region, encompassing Raetia and some areas of Noricum, was a difficult and harsh terrain which effectively divided the region and severely hindered Roman administration, communication, trade, and transportation. This obstacle could never truly be overcome, only mitigated through the construction of a network of

¹²⁶ For detailed studies on the Roman roads, see R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, London, 1974.

¹²⁷ R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, London, 1974, p. 173.

roads.¹²⁸ This impediment was already recognised by the Celtic tribes and the construction of native routes had already begun in the pre-Roman period.¹²⁹ These primitive routes were utilised by the Romans themselves during their conquest and they would later expand upon them.

According to Strabo, Augustus had built up the Alpine roads and passes as much as he possibly could.¹³⁰ Early significant road construction can be observed in the Alpine campaigns of Drusus Claudius Nero in 15 BC, during which time he had marked out the route from the Po to the Danube, which later would become the *Via Claudia Augusta*.¹³¹ Similarly, it is also speculated that the roads over the Splügen and Julier Passes could have originated at this time. Even the road from *Brigantium* (Bregenz) through *Cambodunum* (Kempton), *Abodiacum* (Epfach) and *Bratananium* (Gauting) and finally to *Iuvavum* (Salzburg), has its beginnings during the reign of Augustus.¹³² Eventually the road from northern Italy would travel from *Mediolanum* (Milan), the central hub in the northern road network, and would continue on through the Raetian Alps in the direction of the Rhine valley to reach *Brigantium* (Bregenz) and *Augusta Vindelicorum* (Augsburg).¹³³ There are numerous other roads that developed throughout this period, all of them having the same aim and purpose, essentially to allow quick and reliable transportation (be it for communication, resources, or troops) from Italy to the Rhine and Danube regions.

¹²⁸ G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 11.

¹²⁹ G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, pp. 11-12.

¹³⁰ Strabo *Geo.* IV. 6.6; H. Wolff, *CAH2*, p. 540.

¹³¹ *CIL* v, 8003 (a milestone found west of Merano), see R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', in *CAH*, p. 349.

¹³² H. Wolff, 'Raetia', in *CAH2*, vol. X, p. 540; R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, p. 173.

¹³³ R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, p. 173.

In Pannonia and Noricum, road building became an extremely significant part of Rome's policy after the rebellion; here, the Romans developed an almost entirely new network of roads, connecting only vital areas and disregarding previous native settlements.¹³⁴ An example can be noted in the road connecting *Aquileia* and *Emona*, which had been built near the end of the Augustan period or just prior to it.¹³⁵ Strategically, their concerns were both offensive and defensive, linking *Carnuntum* with *Aquileia* via *Emona*, *Poetovium* and *Sabaria*, following the ancient, 'amber road'.¹³⁶ This chain of roads was crucial for keeping efficient watch over the middle Danube, and for transporting reinforcements and resources from Rome. However, the efficiency and effectiveness of this route meant that in turn it was the quickest and easiest way to invade Italy and in order to defend against this possible threat a network of fortifications and military colonies was gradually established.¹³⁷

Along the Rhine the heavy concentration of troops that had existed since 15 BC had already proven the need for a network of roads. The defensive structures and permanent camps established after AD 9 only accelerated and expanded this requirement. A major road can be identified along the left bank of the river which connected military sites, cities, and outposts, enabling the fast transportation of troops, communication and supplies. The road originated in Cisalpine Gaul, travelled through

¹³⁴ J. Šašel, 'Strabo, Ocria and Archaeology', in V. Markotic (ed.), *Ancient Europe and the Mediterranean: Studies Presented in honour of Hugh Hencken*, pp. 158-159; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 169.

¹³⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 1. 20. R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, London, 1974, p. 174; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 169.

¹³⁶ A. F. Burghardt, 'The origin of the road and city network of Roman Pannonia', *JHG* 5 (1), 1979, pp. 7-8; T. S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians: 100 BC – AD 400*, pp. 208, 213.

¹³⁷ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, 2005, p. 169. This network of fortifications and Military colonies that developed will be discussed in subsequent Chapters.

Raetia by way of *Brigantium* (Bregenz), followed the south bank of the lake and went on to *Turicum* (Zurich), *Vindonissa* (Windisch) and *Augusta Rauricorum* (Augst). It then continued towards *Argentorate* (Strasbourg), *Tabernae* (Rheinabern), *Noviomagus* (Neuss), *Bornetomagus* (Worms), *Mogontiacum* (Mainz), *Confluentes* (Coblenz), and *Rigomagus* (Remagen). Past *Rigomagus* the road entered what would become known as Germania Inferior and went on to *Bonna* (Bonn), *Colonia Agrippina* (Cologne), *Novaesium* (Neuss), *Vetera* (Xanten), *Ulpia Traiana*, *Trajectum* (Utrecht), and culminated in *Lugundunum Batavorum* (Leiden?).¹³⁸ Throughout this expanse roads interconnected with this major route joining the entire Rhine frontier with its surrounding provinces, the Danube frontier and to Rome itself. In effect the extensive road network can be clearly seen as an essential element of Roman defences, without which defence of its frontiers was impossible.

In the last years of Augustus' reign there was relative peace on the Middle and Upper Danube. Apparently Rome's position after the suppression of the rebellion in AD 9 was secure and there is no record of trouble from the Illyrian tribes. This view is generally based on limited sources for the first decades of the first century AD. During this period the literary evidence shows little interest in the Danubian region. Scholars rely more on information provided by archaeology and epigraphy to build their understanding of the situation.¹³⁹ Of the surviving written sources, Velleius and Dio only supply limited information for the years immediately after the rebellion. Tacitus remains the main source for the period,¹⁴⁰ and supplies useful information on the

¹³⁸ R. Chevallier, *Roman Roads*, p. 172.

¹³⁹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 159.

¹⁴⁰ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 159.

movements and positions of individual legionary camps and road building.¹⁴¹ A tenuous argument can be made that the lack of political and military events occurring during this period kept the region out of Tacitus' work, thus supporting the claim that the area was relatively peaceful at this time. Exceptions to this are observed in the key events during the early reign of Tiberius; the mutiny of the Pannonian in AD 14, and the conflict amongst the *Marcomanni* and other Germanic tribes during the period AD 17-21.

As discussed earlier, the death of Augustus did not pass without incident. Tiberius began his reign surprising the mutinies amongst the armies of Illyricum and Lower Germania. These mutinies are extensively recorded by the ancient sources.¹⁴² The origins of the unrest amongst the Pannonian legions can be traced back to the Illyrian revolt in AD 6-9.¹⁴³ Cassius Dio records that the arduous and extended campaigning had strained morale and the possibility of mutiny was feared by Tiberius during the last season of the war,¹⁴⁴ who decided to split the army into three separate forces in order to stem the mounting discontent and counteract the growing threat that such a large force represented to the campaign, and potentially to Rome.

A brief overview of the events and review of the outcomes relevant to this work will suffice. Tacitus provides the fullest account of the mutiny, recording that the revolt

¹⁴¹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 159. This is hardly surprising, Tacitus and other Roman authors, who wrote historic accounts knew and cared almost nothing for military and provincial affairs, see T. Cornell, 'The End of Roman imperial expansion', in J. Rich & G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*, pp. 164-168.

¹⁴² For a detailed account of the Illyrian and Rhine revolt see Vell. Pat. II. 125. 1-5; Dio LVII. 3-6; Tac. Ann. I. 16-30, 31-50; Suet., *Tib.*, 25. For modern accounts, see M. Kandler and H. Vetters, *Der Römische Limes in Österreich*, pp. 202-10; H. H. Schmitt, 'Der Pannonische Aufstand d. J. 14 n. Chr.', *Historia* 7, pp. 378-383; J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian legions in AD 14' CQ, pp. 268-271; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius: Some Imperial Virtues of Tiberius and Drusus Julius Caesar*, pp. 107-112; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 58-63.

¹⁴³ J. J. Wilkes, 'A Note on the Mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 268

¹⁴⁴ Dio LVI. 12-15.

broke out during the end of summer of AD 14, shortly before the three Pannonian legions were to leave their common field camp to spend winter in their individual permanent bases.¹⁴⁵ This mutiny by a large military force was the realisation of the potential threat Tiberius had identified five years earlier. According to Tacitus, the mutiny was centred on the hardship and injustices of legionary service. Specifically the soldier's grievances were: long terms of service (often over twenty years), low pay, the expense to buy exemption from unpleasant duties, and the quality of land allotments granted to legionaries by the *aerarium militare* on completion of their military service.¹⁴⁶

Involved in the mutiny were *legio VIII Augusta*, *legio IX Hispana*, and *legio XV Apollinaris*. Both *legio IX Hispana*, and *legio XV Apollinaris* had been in Illyricum for several years and had probably campaigned under Tiberius in the *Bellum Pannonicum* in 12-9 BC, while *legio VIII Augusta* probably arrived during the *Bellum Batonianum* in AD 6-9.¹⁴⁷ The location of the legions' combined summer camp is unknown. Wilkes suggests that a possible location could have been in the south-west of Pannonia between the Rivers Save and Drave,¹⁴⁸ basing this suggestion on a reference in Tacitus that records trouble among a military detachment tasked with road and bridge construction at *Nauportus* (Vrhnika), located on the road between *Emona* and *Aquileia*.¹⁴⁹ As mentioned earlier, the legions permanent bases are thought to be: *legio VIII Augusta* at

¹⁴⁵ Tac. Ann. I. 16-30. J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 268 n. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Tac. Ann. I. 17. J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danube Provinces', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 554.

¹⁴⁷ J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 268 n. 1. On *legio VIII Hispana* and *legio XV Apollinaris*, see E. Ritterling, 'legio', in *RE*, Suppl. XII, vol. 2, pp. 1665, 1747-8.

¹⁴⁸ J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 269.

¹⁴⁹ Tac. Ann. I. 20. J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 269.

Poetovium (Ptuj on the Drave), *legio IX Hispana* at *Siscia* (Sisak on the Save), and up until the time of the mutiny *legio XV Apollinaris* was probably at *Emona* (Ljubljana).¹⁵⁰

Quintus Iunius Blaesus, the Pannonian commander, was unable either to quell the AD 14 uprising or prevent soldiers from looting civilian settlements. In response to this threat Tiberius dispatched his son Drusus. Initially Drusus' appearance and efforts accomplished nothing. According to Tacitus, the situation remained unchanged and volatile until a lunar eclipse, followed by a break in the weather, undermined the morale of the mutineers and impaired their mobility.¹⁵¹ Drusus seized upon the opportunity, executing the ringleaders and swiftly bringing an end to the revolt. On his return to Rome, Drusus was praised for his conduct and quick resolution of the mutiny. Despite this, the concessions made by Germanicus to the legions on the Rhine were extended to the army of Pannonia.¹⁵²

No veteran settlement is known to have been implemented in Pannonia during the time of Augustus. The first recorded creation of a colony in the region is at *Emona* (*Colonia Iulia Emona*). An inscription dates the site to the first year of Tiberius' reign and connects its founding with the mutiny, and other inscriptions record that discharged

¹⁵⁰ Wilkes also argues that the legion cannot have remained at *Emona* after the colony had been established, see J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 269 n. 3. For evidence of legionary bases refer back to Chapters 4 and 5. Most records of *legio XV Apollinaris* from this period are evident in north-east Italy, see *CIL* V.3357, 3373, and 3379. The legion was moved to *Carnuntum* early in the reign of Tiberius, and the coincidence of this move with the founding of the colony at *Emona*, where archaeological evidence has suggested the earlier presence of a legion, makes it likely that *Emona* was its station at the time of the mutiny. Cf. *CIL* III. 107068. Also see, B. Saria, 'Noricum und Pannonien', *Historia* 15, pp. 454-8. More recently see, M. Šašel Kos, 'What was happening in Emona in AD 14/15? An imperial inscription and the mutiny of the Pannonian legions', in *EMONA: A City in the Empire*, Ljubljana, 2014, pp. 79-93.

¹⁵¹ Tac. *Ann.* I. 28.

¹⁵² Tac. *Ann.* I. 29-30. J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danube Provinces', in *CAH*², p. 554; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 63.

veterans were receiving their land in the territory of this new settlement.¹⁵³ Therefore, Wilkes argues that if the remark concerning the lands as being a specific complaint against those being awarded to veterans of the Pannonian legion is being correctly interpreted, then it is *Emona* that they are referring to. Clearly the veterans had no choice; it was either land at *Emona* or nothing. There can be little surprise about the resulting unrest occurring among the legionaries when they were faced with the prospect of trying to survive on such undesirable land.¹⁵⁴ The only other mentioned site for settlement in Pannonia around this time is by an early group of veterans at Scarbantia (Sopron), where later Pliny speaks of an *oppidum Iulia Scarbantia*.¹⁵⁵ This was probably not founded until *legio XV Apollinaris* (the legion to which the veterans belonged) had already been transferred.¹⁵⁶ There is little doubt that after the mutiny the legion was transferred from its base at *Emona*, with the most likely new location being *Carnuntum* (Petronell).¹⁵⁷ The transfer to *Carnuntum* offers two important and discernible benefits; it separated *legio XV* from the other Pannonia legions and, most importantly, it positioned a force close to the *Marcommani*.¹⁵⁸ It is possible to date other

¹⁵³ Pliny *NH* III. 147; *CIL* II. 6087; V. 7047; VI. 2518; 2718; 32526. It was enrolled in the tribe Claudia. Cf. J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 269 n. 4. More recently see, M. Šašel Kos, 'Colonia Iulia Emona – the genesis of the Roman city', in *Arheološki vestnik* 63, pp. 79–104; M. Šašel Kos, 'What was happening in Emona in AD 14/15? An imperial inscription and the mutiny of the Pannonian legions', in *EMONA: A City in the Empire*, Ljubljana, 2014, pp. 79–93.

¹⁵⁴ J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 270.

¹⁵⁵ Pliny *NH* III. 146. Early veterans at Scarbantia, *CIL* III. 4235, 4247, *A.E.* 1914, 5, 6, 7; and from Répceszemere east of Sopron, *CIL* III. 4229.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. E. Swoboda, *Carnuntum: Seine Geschichte und seine Denkmäler*, pp. 30, 269 n. 3; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 57. See n. 25.

¹⁵⁷ J. J. Wilkes, 'A note on the mutiny of the Pannonian Legions', p. 270; M. Kandler and H. Vetters, *Der Römische Limes in Österreich*, pp. 202 ff; H. H. Schmitt, 'Der Pannonische Aufstand d. J. 14 n. Chr.', *Historia* 7, pp. 378–383; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia*, p. 40; E. Swoboda, *Carnuntum: Seine Geschichte und seine Denkmäler*, pp. 30, 269; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 57. The choice of Carnuntum is doubted and debated see, J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, pp. 102, 112. Wilkes also speculates that under Tiberius the legion may have been stationed at *Savaria* (Szombathely), p. 112. C. M. Well, 'Emona and Carnuntum: evidence for the start of Roman occupation', in *Roman Frontier Studies*, 1969, pp. 185–90; M. Kandler, 'Die Ausgrabungen im Legionärslager Carnuntum 1968–1973: eine vorläufige Zusammenfassung', *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 111, pp. 27–40; D. Gabler, 'Zum Anfangsdatum des römischen Carnuntum', *Mitteilung der Gesellschaft der Freunde Carnuntums* 3, pp. 2–32.

¹⁵⁸ A. Mócsy, *Pannonia*, p. 40 n. 55.

strategic events coinciding with the transfer of *legio XV* to *Carnuntum*; the inclusion of *Carnuntum* and the land of the *Boii* under the auspices of the Pannonian command.¹⁵⁹ Dating these strategic changes together seems logical from a military and administrative stand point. By doing so the Romans had placed the entire stretch of the ‘amber road’ with its garrisons and adjacent territory under the authority of the Pannonian legate.¹⁶⁰ Significantly, this effectively established a single command for the legionary forces defending the Middle Danube frontier against the *Marcomanni* and other Germanic tribes north of the river.

The Initial Germanic Frontier: Internal Discord amongst the *Germani*

Coinciding with the cessation of the Roman campaigns across the Rhine tensions amongst the *Germani* escalated. The Romans’ apparent withdrawal to the left bank of the Rhine River removed a common enemy of the *Germani*, the result being internal quarrelling and bitter power struggles.¹⁶¹ Tacitus records as much, writing that, “the Romans had gained vengeance against the *Cherusci* and the other rebel tribes for their betrayal, and by removing Roman forces from their territory the *Germani* would be left to their own internal quarrels.”¹⁶² It has been assumed that by these actions and the statement recorded by Tacitus, Tiberius was renouncing future plans to recover the lands between the Rhine and the Elbe. But this extrapolates too much meaning from his words. It can be argued that his interpretation of the purpose of Germanicus’ campaigns in Germania was that of the recovery not of territory, but the pursuit of vengeance and

¹⁵⁹ *CIL* III 107068, evidence for the founding of *Carnuntum* in AD 15 by *legio XV Apollinaris*, see A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 43.

¹⁶⁰ G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 57.

¹⁶¹ Tac. *Ann.* II. 26. R. Seager, *Tiberius*, Eyre Methuen Ltd., Great Britain, p. 87; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius: Some Imperial Virtues of Tiberius and Drusus Julius Caesar*, , p. 116; R. Syme, ‘The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero’, in *CAH*, vol, X, p. 782; H. Schutz, *The Romans in Central Europe*, p. 17.

¹⁶² Tac. *Ann.* II. 26.

reclaiming honour. However, this was obviously invented to justify the cessations of hostilities and Germanicus' recall to Rome; it cannot be stated that it committed him to the view that Rome should remove itself from Germania and cease interfering in its affairs.¹⁶³ His advice that the *Germani* should be left to fight and destroy each other need only apply to the immediate problem of removing Arminius.¹⁶⁴ This is another policy that Tiberius would adopt as part of his defensive policy against the *Germani*.¹⁶⁵

This manoeuvre proved successful. The fragile unity the Germanic tribes had developed out of a necessity to combat the Romans ultimately shattered and their hostility was redirected against each other. In the year following the recall of Germanicus, Arminius turned his attention towards Maroboduus.¹⁶⁶ As predicted, former allegiances shattered and internal quarrelling ensued. Arminius secured the defection of two Suebian tribes, the *Semnones* and *Langobadri*, from Maroboduus, but this was countered by the defection of Inguiomerus, Arminius' uncle. An indecisive battle had been fought, after which Maroboduus had retreated to his capital in the forests of Bohemia. At this point he requested aid from Rome. Tiberius refused; he had no interest in involving Roman forces in an internal conflict or recommitting his forces within Germania. He denied the request on the grounds that Maroboduus had not aided the Romans in their campaigns against the *Cherusci*, and so he had no right to expect their assistance against the same enemy.¹⁶⁷ Unlike Maroboduus, who had remained neutral during Rome's campaigns in Germania, Drusus did not remain idle and instead

¹⁶³ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 87. Cf. D. Timpe, *Der Triumph des Germanicus*, p. 63.

¹⁶⁴ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 87. Cf. D. Timpe, *Der Triumph des Germanicus*, p. 63.

¹⁶⁵ This is discussed in more detail below and in Chapter Seven.

¹⁶⁶ H. Schutz, *The Romans in central Europe*, p. 17 n. 105; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 94.

¹⁶⁷ R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 94; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 117.

exploited Maroboduus' weakness and seized the opportunity to further Rome's interests.¹⁶⁸

Tacitus represents Maroboduus' appeal as the pretext for Drusus' appointment to Illyricum, indicating this as the basis for Tiberius' desire to remove his son from his decadent life in Rome and to subject him to the rigours and influence of military discipline, and the security that both his sons in command of legionary forces offered him.¹⁶⁹ Tacitus, however, contradicts himself by writing later, "*missus tamen Drusus, ut rettulimus, paci firmator*".¹⁷⁰ The warring Germanic tribes were troubling, the matter required close monitoring, and there was a genuine need to maintain peace and order along the Middle Danube and in Illyricum. This was the genuine and primary reason for dispatching Drusus. However it is indisputable that Tiberius wanted Drusus removed from the negative influences of court and desired that he serve his "military apprenticeship".¹⁷¹

Drusus was tasked with safeguarding Rome's interests in the region and protecting Roman territories from disturbance by the warring *Germani*. The sources provide little information on Drusus activities' during his governorship of the province, with only a few events mentioned. In AD 18, Tacitus records that Drusus actively pursued the policy of fostering disharmony and discord amongst the *Germani*, bringing

¹⁶⁸ Tac. *Ann.* II. 62. L. F. Pitts, 'Relations between Rome and the German 'Kings' on the Middle Danube in the first to Fourth Centuries A.D.', *JRS* 79, p. 46; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 94; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 121; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, vol. X, p. 782; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 91.

¹⁶⁹ Tac. *Ann.* II. 44.

¹⁷⁰ Tac. *Ann.* II. 46. 'Drusus, however, was sent as I have related, to establish peace'.

¹⁷¹ R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 117.

about the overthrow of Maroboduus.¹⁷² His instrument was Catualda, a warrior from amongst the *Gotones* who had been forced into exile by Maroboduus.¹⁷³ No information is provided by the sources on the relationship between Rome and Catualda, but it is likely that a friendly understanding was reached between the two.¹⁷⁴ Catualda led a strong force into *Marcomanni* territory and stormed the royal stronghold. Maroboduus escaped: the only option available to him was to seek refuge with Rome. He was granted asylum by Tiberius at *Ravenna*, supposedly free to return to Germania unmolested, and potentially useful to Tiberius who could threaten his restoration if the situation become uncontrollable.¹⁷⁵ The potential threat that Maroboduus was perceived to pose to Rome can be observed in the speech Tiberius delivered to the senate; in it he equated Maroboduus as an enemy as dangerous as Pyrrhus or Antiochus the Great had been, because of his qualities of leadership, the ferocity of his people, and the proximity of his kingdom to Italy.¹⁷⁶

Catualda did not survive Maroboduus long, for a short time later he was forced to apply for sanctuary himself after suffering a defeat at the hands of the *Hermundri*; he was granted asylum and allowed to reside at *Forum Julii* in Narbonese Gaul.¹⁷⁷ The dependants of both Maroboduus and Catualda, evidently numerous, were not permitted to reside within the Empire for fear of the threat they posed to the provinces. They were settled beyond the Danube, between the rivers Marus (March) and Cusus (perhaps the

¹⁷² Tac. *Ann.* II. 62. R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 121; L. F. Pitts, 'Relations between Rome and the German 'Kings' on the Middle Danube in the first to Fourth Centuries A.D.', *JRS* 79, p. 47; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 99.

¹⁷³ Tac. *Ann.* II.62.

¹⁷⁴ L. F. Pitts, 'Relations between Rome and the German 'Kings' on the Middle Danube in the first to Fourth Centuries A.D.', *JRS* 79, p. 47.

¹⁷⁵ Tac. *Ann.* II. 63; Vell. II.129.3; Suet. *Tib.* 37. 4. E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 101-102; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 121.

¹⁷⁶ Tac. *Ann.* II. 63. L. F. Pitts, 'Relations between Rome and the German 'Kings' on the Middle Danube in the first to Fourth Centuries A.D.', *JRS* 79, p. 46; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 95; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, pp. 121-2.

¹⁷⁷ Tac. *Ann.* II. 63.6.

Gusen or the Vah) in southern Slovakia.¹⁷⁸ Drusus established Vannius, from the tribe of the *Quadi* in Moravia, as their king, establishing the so-called *regnum Vannianum*, whose thirty-year reign over the Suebic *Quadi* brought about stability and peace in the region.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the kingdom would act as a buffer against the *Germani*, allowing the Romans some measure of security north of the Danube.¹⁸⁰ Arminius, the final obstacle to stability amongst the warring tribes during this period, also did not long survive the removal of his rival. Tacitus recorded that once the threat of the Romans and Maroboduus was removed, his desire for supreme power turned his people against him and civil war broke out among the *Cherusci*.¹⁸¹ In AD 21 after an extended and fluctuating civil war Arminius eventually succumbed to treachery at the hands of his own kinsmen.¹⁸² Besides these few events little else is disclosed by the sources, however due to the threat the warring tribes were perceived to represent by Rome there is little doubt that Drusus organised defences against the *Marcommani* and other northern tribes during this period, despite the absence of details.¹⁸³ Furthermore, Mócsy and Dzino speculate on the possibility that Drusus carried out other duties, such as an attempt to organise the administration of the Danubian provinces.¹⁸⁴ Ultimately, Tiberius' decision to remove his forces from Germania and reposition them on the bank

¹⁷⁸ Tac. *Ann.* II. 63. R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 95; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 122 n. 85; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, p. 100.

¹⁷⁹ Tac. *Ann.* II. 63. R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 95; T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, 1989; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danube Provinces', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 554; R. S. Rogers, *Studies in the Reign of Tiberius*, p. 122; M. P. Charlesworth, 'Tiberius', in *CAH*, vol. X, p. 619.

¹⁸⁰ D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC – AD 68*, 2010, p. 167; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 57; T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 43, pp. 61-71.

¹⁸¹ Tac. *Ann.* 2.88; H. Schutz, *The Romans in Central Europe*, p. 17 n. 105.

¹⁸² Tac. *Ann.* 2. 88. R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 95; E. A. Thompson, *The Early Germans*, pp. 83-84.

¹⁸³ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS*, Vol. 95, 2005, p. 138; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163; R. Syme, 'Some Imperial Salutations', *Phoenix* 33 (04), 1979, p. 324; T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tacitus an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, 1989, p. 64.

¹⁸⁴ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, p. 163; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 40.

of the Rhine proved successful. The Romans removed Maroboduus and Arminius not through direct conflict, which only stimulated further aggression and raised support for their cause, but rather through clever and underhanded statesmanship. It was the *Germani* themselves that defeated each other. The attempts by their leaders to seize power and their inability to set aside old feuds and coexist proved to be their downfall. This is yet another policy adopted by Tiberius as part of his defence against the *Germani*.¹⁸⁵

Frontier Administration

Although the Rhine and Danube frontiers were still administered as separate commands, it was the decision to remove troops from within Germania and establish their encampments along the Rhine, coupled with the build up of forces and defences along the Danube, that now a discernible ‘Germanic frontier’ can be identified. The justification for identifying a ‘Germanic frontier’ at this juncture is directly linked with the strategies and actions carried out along the Rhine and Danube to defend against the *Germani* and combat the perceived threat the Romans felt loomed at the border of their Empire. Clearly, the greater threat during this period was on the Rhine: it was from this direction that unrest or possible incursion was expected. Compared with the Rhine, the Danube Frontier was a secondary concern, although this would change later on with the growing Germanic threat north of the Danube. Importantly, it should be noted that necessity had not yet arisen for establishing a fortified system of defence; this is a development that occurs later.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ This is discussed further in Chapter 7.

¹⁸⁶ These developments are explored in Chapter 7-11.

Military and Strategic Consequences for the Wider Empire

Events on the Germanic frontiers had an obvious affect on the rest of the Roman Empire. This is seen in the distribution of military forces and the resulting affect this had on the defence of the Roman Empire. Initially this is observed with the repositioning of legions in c. 9-10 AD; both Hispania and Aegyptus lost a legion and Galatia two. They were removed to repopulate the troops along the Danube who had been rushed to the Rhine. These provinces were weakened and made vulnerable as a result. Significantly, unlike previous emergencies in the Empire, the legions would never be returned. It is possible that the defence of these provinces was eventually carried out by raising new auxiliaries units or transferring detachments of *auxilia*, or possibly legionaries, from surrounding provinces.

A massive concentration of Rome's military strength and resources was at that point positioned along the 'Germanic frontier'. As discussed earlier, eight legions were massed along the Rhine, *legio V Alaudae*, *legio XXI Rapax*, *legio I Germanica*, *legio XX Valeria*, *legio II Augusta*, *legio XIV Gemina*, *legio XIII Gemina*, *legio XVI Gallica*.¹⁸⁷ Whilst legions were based in Raetia the troops were used as part of the forces defending the Upper Rhine and hence were part of the Rhine frontier not the Danube.¹⁸⁸ Along the Danube, three legions were stationed in northern Illyricum (what would be known as Pannonia): *legio VII Augusta*, *legio IX Hispana* and *legio XV Apollinaris*.¹⁸⁹ Whilst a

¹⁸⁷ Tac. *Ann.* I. 37; Vell. Pat. II. 120.2-3. J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 6 n. 33; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 168; R. Syme, 'Some Notes on the legions under Augustus', *JRS* 23, pp. 28-29; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 63, 162-3; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany', p. 145; E. S. Gruen, 'Expansion of the Empire under Augustus', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 185; R. Syme, 'The Northern Frontiers under Augustus', *CAH*, vol. X, p. 376.

¹⁸⁸ As stated previously, this division is of course arbitrary, no contemporary record expresses this concept; the justification for this demarcation becomes more evident during the emergence of the 'Limes', refer back to Introduction and Chapter 11.

¹⁸⁹ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 102; J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the*

further two legions, *legio XI* (later *Claudia Pia Fidelis*) and *legio VII Macedonia*, were stationed in lower Illyricum (Dalmatia) and could be easily and rapidly deployed to quell troubles in Illyricum or reinforce the Danube frontier.¹⁹⁰ In total this represented almost half of Rome's legionary strength and obviously constituted a sizable proportion of the empires' resources. The remainder of the Empire, which constituted approximately three quarters of its territory, shared the remaining half of its forces, spread across the provinces of Hispania, Moesia, Syria, Aegyptus, and Africa.¹⁹¹

In addition to the legions there were the substantial forces of the *auxilia*. There are no definite record on the total size of the auxiliary forces for the empire during the first century AD; scholars generally accept Tacitus' statement according to which their numbers roughly equalled that of the legionary forces.¹⁹² Their distribution throughout

Roman Imperial Legions, p. 6; R. Syme, 'Some Notes on the legions under Augustus', *JRS* 23, p. 29; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 159; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 63, 162-3.

¹⁹⁰ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 2005, pp. 166-7; J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 102; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 97-98; J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6, 20, 22, 35. Cf. E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, 1976, p. 27; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, pp. 63, 162-3.

¹⁹¹ Tac. *Ann.* IV. 5. *Legio IX Hispania* was transferred to Africa in AD 20 but returned to Pannonia four years later cf. Tac. *Ann.* IV. 23.2. [Hispania] Three legions: *Legio IV Macedonica* (Herrera de Pisuerga [Pisoraca]) Hispania Citerior and Ulterior]], *Legio VI Victrix* (Leon [Legio] Hispania Citerior and Ulterior]], *Legio X Gemina* (Rosinos de Vidriales [Petavonium]) Hispania Citerior and Ulterior]]. [Moesia] Two legions: *legio IV Scythica* (Siliistra [Durostorum]), *legio V Macedonica* (Kostolac [Viminacum]). [Syria] Four legions: *legio III Gallica* (Antioch [Antiochea]), *legio VI Ferrata* (Latakia [Laodicea ad Mare]), *legio X Fretensis* (Belkis [Zeugma]), *legio XII Fulminata* (Rafniyeh [Raphanaea]). [Aegyptus] Two legions: *legio III Cyrenaica* (Alexandria Kasr Kayasire [Nicomopolis]), *legio XXII Deiotariana* (Alexandria Kasr Kayasire [Nicomopolis]). [Africa] A legion: *legio III Augusta* (Haidra [Amaedara]). Also see, J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 15-25, 95; R. Syme, 'Some Notes on the Legions under Augustus', *JRS* 23, p. 28-33; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 189-193 (see map 50 p. 192); H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, p. 119; Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, pp. 205-6; J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, p. 22.

¹⁹² Tac. *Ann.* IV, 5; Suet. *Aug.* 49. D. B. Saddington, 'The Roman Government and the Roman Auxilia', in Z. Visy, (ed.), *Limes XIX*, , p. 63; L. Keppie, 'The Army and Navy', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 381; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 16; B. Campbell, *The Roman Army: 31 BC – AD 337*, p. 34; L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000*, p. 30; D. Williams, *Romans and Barbarians: Four Views from the Empire's Edge, First Century AD*, p. 7; G. L. Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, p. 53; S. K. Drummond and L. H. Nelson, *The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 15-6. Also see, P. A. Holder, 'Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', in *BAR*, 70, 1980; K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau*, Berne, 1951.

the provinces is not recorded; their numbers may not have remained constant, but possibly fluctuated according to need.¹⁹³ However, it is reasonable to speculate that the number of auxiliaries in a province roughly equalled that of the legionary troops, certainly not exceeding them. Some provinces, less threatened by external threats, had a garrison consisting entirely of auxiliary *cohortes* and *alae*, but with no legions.¹⁹⁴

Clearly Rome's allocation of troops and resources were disproportionately distributed, with the obvious affect on the rest of the empire of a heavy reliance on auxiliaries and the limited use of the available legions. The Rhine and Danube, as the greatest threats, according to the Romans, had the largest concentration of its superior forces. Significantly, the total military strength posted to the Rhine was not altered during this period; their numbers were maintained no matter the need elsewhere in the Empire. The other parts of the Empire had to pool and balance their limited military resources carefully. As a result the needs of a major campaign for additional troops in a particular area were met by the transfer of legions and auxiliary forces.¹⁹⁵ Thus pressure in one area of the empire was often met by weakening the defences at another. Consequently, this concentration of military resources along the Rhine and Danube would later have serious ramifications for the Julio-Claudian emperors.¹⁹⁶

Conclusion

In response to the *clades Variana* and the perceived threat posed by the *Germani*, the Romans would implement a series of significant military countermeasures to defend

¹⁹³ L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans*, p. 30; L. Keppie, 'The Army and Navy', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 381.

¹⁹⁴ L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans*, p. 36; Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, p. 25.

¹⁹⁵ An example can be seen in AD 20 with the temporary transfer of *legio IX Hispana* from Siscia in Pannonia to Africa under L. Cornelius Scipio, returning to Pannonia four years later, see Tac. *Ann.* III. 9; IV. 23.

¹⁹⁶ This is discussed further in Chapters 7-11.

their interests against any future attacks and/or incursions. Initially, the effects of the defeat on Rome were profound and directly influenced policies in Rome, Germania, and throughout the Empire. An examination of Rome's reaction to the disaster and its military response clearly demonstrates that the Romans feared a Germanic invasion. Both the initial use of inferior troops and the rapid redeployment of forces from other vulnerable provinces, demonstrate the level of perceived threat the *Germani* represented to the Romans. Moreover, the loss of Varus's legions and the need for their reinforcement highlights the limited capabilities of Rome's available military resources. Later, Augustus' cautious military advances into Germania further emphasises the level of fear the Romans maintained against the *Germani*; the campaigns only real result being the punishment of some of the Germanic tribes.

Along the Danube, the division of Illyricum represented a turning point in Roman strategy in the region. Eventually, the reorganisation centralised the military power along the Middle Danube allowing for a stronger defensive against the *Germani*. The initial positioning of the legions after the rebellion indicates its dual purpose: internal against the Illyrian tribes and externally against the *Germani*. Significantly, the legions were not yet stationed on the Danube itself at this time; instead they were still strategically located in the interior of province, the exception being *Carnuntum* which guarded against a possible Marcomannic betrayal. Despite this potential liability, the presence and position of the *Marcomanni* (as a Roman ally) north of the Danube still represented a buffer north of the Danube. Overall, these defensive measures and the Roman military presence in this region represented the initial military frontier along the Danube.

Under Tiberius, Germanicus' campaigns into Germania achieved little tangible results. In reality, the attacks into Germania only served to unite the tribes against the Romans. Their cancellation and the Romans withdrawal to the Rhine resulted in the collapse of tribal unity amongst the *Germani*. Consequently, the various tribes turned against each other and internal conflict ensued. The Romans seized upon the opportunities presented by the civil war and exploited it to their advantage. Ultimately, the Romans were able to achieve more indirectly and through underhanded statesmanship than it had through direct conflict. As a result of this new approach two of Rome's greatest threats, Arminius and Maroboduus, were removed and a new more stable safeguard was established north of the Danube under other Suebian leaders.

Significantly, the problems associated with Augustus' initial reactionary response to the Germanic threat are made apparent early in Tiberius reign. It is clear that the mutinies in Pannonia and along the Rhine were the result of an alarming and largely neglected problem associated with the concentration of military forces. The continued high level of military presence along the 'Germanic frontier' compounded this issue. The mutinies themselves highlight several significant issues concerning the deployment of legions; the dangers of ignoring concerns and complaints, the limitations that could be placed on unnecessary loyalty and service, and the potential danger of quartering legions together in idle circumstances. The neglect of these issues would only result in further in disaster for the Romans.

Along the Rhine and Danube the noticeable increase in the construction of roads enabled the rapid transfer of information and military resources along both frontiers and

its surrounding provinces. This network of roads linked Rome with the Northern provinces and marked the beginning of the process to connect the Rhine and Danube. Its development further supports the presence of a discernible 'Germanic frontier'; a defining purpose of which was monitoring the *Germani* and enabling the Romans to quickly respond to any threat along the Rhine or Danube. Overall, the build up of military forces along the Rhine and Danube effectively established a 'Germanic frontier'. Half of Rome's legions were now positioned against the *Germani*, although the Rhine and Danube were still administrated as separate commands. It is from AD 17 that Roman forces along both frontiers can be seen to be clearly committed to defending against a common threat, the *Germani*.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A New Roman Defensive Policy Against the *Germani*: Tiberius —A.D. 21–37

The emergence of the Germanic frontier after the Roman withdrawal to the left bank of the river Rhine was the first phase in a series of developments that consolidated and later solidified the Romans' defensive position along the Rhine, and later still the Danube, against the *Germani*. The Romans undertook these developments in response to specific threats and events perpetrated by the *Germani*. This process of change was gradual and the progression was neither smooth nor uniform. The Rhine, with its recent division of command into two military zones, *exercitus Germaniae Inferioris* and *exercitus Germaniae Superioris*, as the region deemed by the Romans as the largest perceived threat, was the first section to have its military frontier strengthened and developed. The Danube would also undergo significant alterations, including the creation of three new provinces: Raetia, Noricum and Pannonia. As it was deemed by the Romans to be a less immediate threat, compared to the Rhine, the development of its defences were slower to emerge and take shape. Yet this would change towards the end of the first century AD in connection with the escalation of the threats along the Danube, and with it a definite shift in the Romans' military focus.

The Varian disaster exposed the weaknesses and fallibility of the Roman military and inflamed an already prominent fear present in the Romans of the *Germani*. Perceived or a reality, this fear compelled the Romans to amass a large proportion of their military strength against them and later, once the reconquest of Germania was effectively abandoned, the establishment of permanent defences. The most important

elements of the Roman policy against the *Germani* were: the separation of the legions into individual fortresses, the construction of permanent forts, fortresses and watchtowers, the building of extensive interconnecting road networks, and the development of settlements to support the Roman military presence. Changes cannot be observed in isolation and as the Rhine and Danube were parts of wider imperial system this chapter will place developments into the general context of provincial transformation that took place during this period. This stated, the main focus of this chapter will be maintained on the Rhine and Danube.

This chapter outlines and examines the remaining key events during the reign of Tiberius and the overall defensive developments that occurred during the Julio-Claudian period, but the discussion will be limited to matters that resulted in changes in the nature of the interaction, defence or policy between the Romans and the *Germani*. Due to spatial constraints, the lives and overarching policies relevant to individual Julio-Claudian emperors will not be explored in any detail. However, the relevant and applicable policies will be identified and examined. Subsequent chapters will explore specific threats and events relevant to the remaining emperors up to and including Domitian.

Primary Evidence

During the Julio-Claudian period it is difficult to construct any narrative concerning events outside of the metropolis, let alone regarding specific information concerning matters on the frontiers.¹ Unfortunately, the literary evidence as a whole, is

¹ T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 199. D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, p. 159. This is not a surprise. Tacitus and people of his class who produced historical accounts of the principate knew and

very limited throughout this period. In general, these sources are not concerned with matters in the provinces and very few offer any insight into Roman defences against the *Germani* during this time. Of the surviving works the main source of information is to be found in the fragments of Tacitus' *Annals*, which cover the periods AD 14-29, 31-37, and 47-66.² Significantly, it is through Tacitus that important information regarding the frontiers is gained, specifically crucial details concerning troop movements and road construction. Other written accounts by ancient authors exist but these are often based on the same earlier sources; thus their reliability is sometimes questionable due to their particular literary format. These other written accounts are still of some use for supplementing or modifying interpretations found in other works, such as Tacitus.³ Archaeology and epigraphy provide additional information to supplement the limited literary sources, through which a fuller picture of events and an account of the developments of defences against the *Germani* can be constructed.⁴

The available evidence for pre-Flavian military dispositions in the Rhine and Danube regions is very limited, therefore there is no certainty as to the course of events, and only a general outline can be constructed. Such evidence as does survive points towards a developing trend of spreading troops along the Rhine and Danube rivers over

cared almost nothing for military and provincial affairs; see T. Cornell, 'The end of Roman imperial expansion', in J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*, London and New York, 1993, pp. 164-168.

² T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 199; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, p. 159.

³ T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 199.

⁴ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, p. 159; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 199. For example inscriptions can provide information on: boundary settlements between communities, origins and extent of immigration to specific areas; composition of legions and auxiliary units; building of roads; and involvement of native aristocracy in administration.

the first century AD.⁵ Furthermore, it is apparent that the initial focus of Roman military strength was along the Rhine.

Tiberius' German Policy

AD 16-17 marked the transition from direct Roman involvement and interference east of the Rhine into an indirect method of interaction and control, manipulating events and relations with the various Germanic tribes, with little or no direct military intervention. Tiberius' frontier policy clearly sought to prevent the rise of a potentially dangerous threat on the Rhine and Danube. His mechanism to ensure control of the Germanic tribes was a combination of military threats and financial inducements.⁶ The threat and use of military force was necessary, as the cessation of occupation and the suspension of Germania's reconquest forced the Romans to implement a new retaliatory policy. All infringements or violations against Rome or Roman interest were met with swift reprisals and campaigns of retribution and suppression resulted. This was a distinct policy. The *Germani* had to be punished and kept at arm's length, fearful of Roman retribution. Later neglect of this policy would prove detrimental for the Romans and highlight its necessity.

Simultaneously, a policy of financial inducement and reward was also pursued. In stark contrast to its military threats, Rome's system of privileges not only aided specific chieftains to rise to power, but also ensured some degree of Roman control over tribal affairs.⁷ Material evidence such as bronze cutlery, ceramics, jewellery, militaria and Roman coins, suggest that the Romans either supported or even appointed certain

⁵ W.S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman frontiers', p. 57; H. Schönberger, *The Roman Frontiers in Germany*, pp. 154-5; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 48-50.

⁶ Tac. *Ger.* 42.

⁷ Tac. *Ger.* 42.

Germanic chiefs in order to exert influence over them.⁸ Connected to this and a key aspect of Tiberius' new policy in itself was the establishment and manipulation of client tribes. The Julio-Claudians would establish a chain of client or allied tribes, including the *Batavi*, the *Hermenduri*, the *Frisii*, the *Marcomanni*, the *Suebi*, and the *Quadi*,⁹ from the Lower Rhine to the Middle Danube. These clients were an integral component of Roman policy during the period between the end of Germanicus' campaigns in AD 16-17 and the Batavian Revolt in AD 69-70, which can be seen to have been dominated by a Germanic threat (albeit not constant) to Roman interests. Consequently, these clients formed an active barrier against the hostile Germanic tribes. However, as with the military threats neglect or abuse of these relationships would prove hazardous to the Romans.

The Romans responded to the potential threat posed by the *Germani* by forming a semi-connected frontier along the Rhine and Danube, which gradually became more solidified over time. As outlined in the previous chapter, this was not initially a matter of conscious policy on the Romans' part. This process came about by default in response to specific threats and events, and was not designed under some grand overarching plan or policy. Developments were reactionary and gradual; progression was neither smooth nor uniform.¹⁰ Along the Rhine, circumstances compelled Tiberius to expand and fortify the existing Roman military bases, which were constructed in

⁸ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 94-5; R. Wolters. *Die Römer in Germanien*, pp. 91-2; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 194; K. Ruffing, 'Friedliche Beziehungen: Der Handel zwischen den römischen Provinzen und Germanien', in H. Schneider, (ed.), *Feindliche Nachbarn: Rom und die Germanen*, p. 159.

⁹ R. Wolters, *Römische Eroberung und Herrschaftsorganisation in Gallien und Germanien: zur Entstehung und Bedeutung der sogenannten Klientel-Randstaaten*, pp. 246-50; E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of trade and contact along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 82.

¹⁰ W.S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers', in J. C. Barrett, A. P. Fitzpatrick and L. Macinnes (eds.), *Barbarians and Romans in North-West Europe: From the later Republic to late Antiquity*, p. 57.

order to shorten the gaps between existing bases on the Rhine and fresh outposts. Despite a lack of a reliable chronology, it appears that the existing bases were complemented by the construction of new military forts along the Upper and Lower Rhine. To monitor and defend against the Germanic threat, and protect Roman interests in Gaul, Roman forces were deployed as follows: in Lower Germania¹¹ *legio V Alaudae* and *legio XXI Rapax* were stationed at *Vetera* (Xanten), while *legio I Germanica* and *legio XX Valeria Victrix* were at *Oppidum Ubiorum* (Cologne). In Upper Germania,¹² the *legio XIV Gemina* and *legio XVI Gallica* were stationed at *Moguntiacum* (Mainz), *legio II Augusta* at *Argentorate* (Strasbourg) and *legio XIII Gemina* at *Vindonissa* (Windisch).¹³ Further bases were also constructed, such as the harbour ones at Velsen and Cologne-Alteburg, as well as military bases at Altkalkar, Moers-Asberg, Bonn, Urmitz, Koblenz, Bingen, Sasbach, Augst and Zursach.¹⁴ [see Map (12)]

That Tiberius abandoned Germania entirely at this stage is untenable. Some archaeological evidence indicates a presence of military bases in the Lower Rhine, and in the region of the Wetterau as well as in the Taunus mountain range.¹⁵ These bases

¹¹ In this thesis, the terms Lower Germania and Lower Rhine are interchangeable: they both refer to the military zone of *exercitus Germaniae Inferioris*.

¹² As above, the terms Upper Germania and Upper Rhine are interchangeable they both refer to the military zone of *exercitus Germaniae Superioris*.

¹³ *Argentorate* and *Vindonissa* had not been legionary camps before AD 9, for they could not have served as bases for invading Germany; nor did this part of the frontier require any protection, see H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany', p. 151; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 49-50, 136, 147-8; K. Dietz, 'Okkupation und Frühzeit', in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer and K. Keller, *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 66; *Rom und das Reich: 44 v. Chr.-260 n. Chr.*, p. 167; R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in CAH, Vol. X, pp. 786-7.

¹⁴ C. Lepelley, *Rom und das Reich: 44 v. Chr.-260 n. Chr.*, p. 167.

¹⁵ N. J. E. Austin, & N. B. Rankov, *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*, p. 175; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 92; D. Baatz, and F. R. Hermann, *Die Römer in Hessen*, pp. 369-72, cf. 350-7, 485-91; B. Dreyer, *Arminius und der Untergang des Varus: Warum die Germanen keine Römer wurden*, pp. 183-185; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts, & Germans: The German provinces of Rome*, p. 38; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 242-3; H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', *BRGK* 66,

were situated in the territory of allied tribes and were used to maintain surveillance in the region, offering a level of early warning and protection from hostile tribes, whilst monitoring supposed allies and aiding them with retaliatory expeditions. Furthermore, Tiberius implemented a deliberate policy of ‘*agri vacui*’ or vacant land, clearing the immediate territory on the right bank of the Rhine,¹⁶ as a method of keeping the Germanic threat at bay and strengthening the Roman position in Gaul,¹⁷ being a clear emulation of Caesar and Augustan’s earlier policy. This is seen in the early wars against the *Germani* with the settlement and re-settlement of various tribes on the left and right bank of the Rhine.¹⁸ The exact size, length and continuity of this strip of land is unknown, the only factor known was that it was kept empty of Germans.¹⁹ A similar policy was maintained along the Danube,²⁰ designed to ensure that Roman interests in Gaul were protected and to limit the potential military threat across the Rhine. This strategy therefore had a dual purpose: the limited agricultural land was utilised to support the nearby bases and their forces, whilst also serving as a vital defensive measure, allowing the Romans to maintain a level of control and aid in the monitoring of the Germanic tribes.²¹ Roman rejection of German requests – such as were made by the *Frisii* and the *Ampsivarii* in AD 58 – to settle in the limited agricultural land on the Rhine frontier suggests that the Romans continued to perceive the *Germani* as a threat

pp. 347-51, 432, 441-2; 451; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany’, p. 152. For argument on *Flevum* (Velsen), see below.

¹⁶ Cf. E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the impact of trade and contact along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 85-6; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany’, 1969, p. 152. This is discussed further in Chapter 10.

¹⁷ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, p. 85; D. S. Potter, ‘Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy’, *The American Journal of Philology* 113 (2), pp. 272-3.

¹⁸ Suet. *Aug.* 21; Dio LV.6.3. For details refer to Chapters 3-6.

¹⁹ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, p. 85; D. S. Potter, ‘Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy’, *The American Journal of Philology* 113 (2), pp. 272-273.

²⁰ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German Identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire*, p. 85.

²¹ M. Ruge. ‘Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian’, pp. 95-6; R. Wolters. *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 61; B. Dreyer, *Arminius und der Untergang des Varus: Warum die Germanen keine Römer wurden*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 2009, p. 190; E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the impact of trade and contact along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 85; D. S. Potter, ‘Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy’, *The American Journal of Philology* 113 (2), p. 273. This is discussed further in Chapter 10.

and mistrusted their intentions, and thus kept them from encroaching too closely to Roman territory.²²

Some scholars argue that Tiberius' decision to retain the Gallic and Germanic boundaries, as well as the continued independent existence of the military districts on the left bank along with the retention of the eight legions, indicates that Tiberius had not abandoned Roman claims over Germania.²³ For example, Hanson argues that the military districts were merely convenient points to halt awaiting further advance.²⁴ Subsequent actions during the reign of Tiberius, such as the division of the Rhine armies, the separation of double legions, and the handling of events later in his reign strongly indicate that he intended to maintain the Roman position at the Rhine River.

Along the Danube

Along the Upper and Middle Danube the situation showed unexpected stability throughout the Julio-Claudian period.²⁵ Across the provinces of Noricum, Pannonia and to a lesser extent Raetia, minimal activity was documented by the sources. Little is known for certain regarding the positioning of legions until the reign of Claudius, and archaeological evidence before that date is absent.²⁶ Recent research has had a minimal impact on the current understanding of events along the Danube between Caesar and Claudius, except in so far as increasing the body of physical evidence, supplementing

²² Tac. *Ann.* 13.54, 55. E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the impact of trade and contact along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 85.

²³ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 92-3; W.S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman frontiers', p. 57; D. Breeze, *The Imperial Frontiers of Rome*, p. 93; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany', 1969, p. 152.

²⁴ W.S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman frontiers', p. 57.

²⁵ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 103; D. Breeze, *Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 97-117.

²⁶ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 102.

the simplified modern accounts based on the incomplete and distorted historical records.²⁷

As discussed in the previous chapter, the earliest military bases that have been identified archeologically were in the southern region of Pannonia, and notably not on the Danube itself.²⁸ Furthermore, it is argued that *Carnuntum* was initially occupied as a result of the mutiny in AD 14, and to defend the Danube against a possible incursion by the *Germani*.²⁹ Considering the site's strategic and economic value it is more than likely that it dates from a Tiberian rather than the Claudian period. Currently, the first definitive evidence for a Roman military presence on the Danube dates to around AD 30, at Oberstimm and Weltenburg.³⁰ These appear to be only small forts, manned by 20-80 men, and staffed by auxiliaries, rather than legionaries.³¹ However, references in Tacitus attest to the construction of roads and development of the navigability of the Danube during Tiberius' reign.³² The subsequent deployment of military strength along the Danube appears to have focused on changes in topography and areas of potential

²⁷ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 95, p. 137.

²⁸ P. S. Well, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', in *Journal of Archaeological Research* 13 (1), p. 61; C. M. Hülsen, 'Die Donaugrenze von tiberisch-claudischer bis in frühflavische Zeit', in L. Wamser, (ed.), *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, pp. 58-9.

²⁹ For argument refer back to Chapter 6. *CIL* III 107068 is evidence for the founding of *Carnuntum* in AD 15 by *legio XV Apollinaris*, see A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 43.

³⁰ P. S. Well, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', in *Journal of Archaeological Research* 13 (1), p. 6. Oberstimm, see H. Schönberger, H. J. Köhler and H. G. Simon, 'Neue Ergebnisse zur Geschichte des Kastells Oberstimm', *Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 70, pp. 243-319. Weltenburg, see M. M. Rind, 'Ein neu entdecktes frühromische Funde aus Regensburg', *Bayerische Vorgeschichtsblätter* 48, pp. 63-128; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p. 154 n. 74.

³¹ P. S. Well, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', in *Journal of Archaeological Research* 13 (1), p. 6.

³² Tac. *Ann.* I. 20. D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 102; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 162-3; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 43-45.

threat.³³ In line with this interpretation, forts were situated along the river at the start and end of floodplains and mountainous regions, allowing the Romans to control the rivers, and therefore protect communications and exchange.³⁴

Overall, there was apparently no significant Roman presence along the Danube before the reign of Claudius. Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that the Romans were directly administrating along the Upper and Middle Danube before this date either. Dobesch incorrectly argues that this lack of Roman administration is an example of Roman flexibility towards communities supposedly under Roman control but not formally annexed.³⁵ There was no such flexibility; the Romans initially maintained their control in the region indirectly through neighbouring tribes and kingdoms.³⁶ There are two examples of this practice during Tiberius' reign: the settlement of the Iazyges, and the establishment of Vannius.³⁷ The *Iazyges*, a branch of the Sarmatians, were supposedly expelled by the Dacians before AD 50.³⁸ The details are not recorded with the events only known in outline. Allegedly, the *Iazyges* settled near the north Pannonian plains with the approval of the Roman government, probably

³³ C. S. Sommer, 'Why there? The Positioning of Forts Along the Riverine Frontiers of the Roman Empire', in W. S. Hanson (ed.), *Army and Frontiers of Rome*, pp. 108, 11-112.

³⁴ B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 176; D. Breeze, *Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 97-117.

³⁵ G. Dobesch, 'Die Kleten in Österreich nach den ältesten Berichten der Antike. Das norische Königreich und seine Beziehungen zu Rom im 2. Jh. v.Chr.', in *Limes XIII*, pp. 308-15; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138.

³⁶ J. Fitz, 'Noricum und Pannonien zur Zeit der römischen Okkupation', in *Röm. Österreich* 17-18, pp. 79-86; T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mittledonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, pp. 61-71; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', p. 162 n. 15; T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mittledonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', *AAH* 41, p. 68; E. Tóth, 'Die Entstehung der gemeinsamen Grenzen zwischen Pannonien und Noricum', *Arheološki Vestnik* 31, pp. 84-86; L. F. Pitts, 'Relations between Roman and the German 'Kings' on the Middle Danube in the first and Fourth Centuries AD', in *JRS* 79, pp. 45-58.

³⁷ The kingdom of Vannius has already been discussed, see Chapter 6.

³⁸ Pliny *HN* IV.80-81. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Politics*, p. 168 n. 55.

between AD 17-29.³⁹ This was a strategic manoeuvre by Rome, utilising the Iazyges as a means to control the region and more significantly as a buffer against the *Germani* and the Dacians.⁴⁰ Similar measures were undertaken against the *Germani*, utilising Vannius.⁴¹ Even after Rome's deployment along the Danube the client-king/vassal relationship would be retained and later became a key element in Rome's defence against the *Germani*, but not without serious incident.⁴²

The Role of the *Auxilia*

The Roman auxiliary deployment during the early Julio-Claudian period is difficult to interpret. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no definite information on the total size or supposed deployment of the auxiliary forces during the first century AD.⁴³ Initially the role of the *auxilia* was to supplement the forces along the Rhine and Danube, but later they would take on a more prominent role. In the second half of the first century their deployment appears to align with the process of securing gaps in the defences along the Rhine and Danube that existed between the

³⁹ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', p. 168 n. 56; A. Alföldi, 'Peoples of North Europe', in *CAH*, vol. XI, p. 85.

⁴⁰ E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the impact of trade and contact along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 82; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', p. 168 n. 56; A. Alföldi, 'Peoples of North Europe'; in *CAH*, vol. XI, p. 85.

⁴¹ For details refer back to Chapter 6. D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', p. 168 n. 57; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 57; T. Nagy, 'Die Nordpolitik des Tiberius an der Mitteldonau die zweite Mission des Drusus Caesar und die Errichtung des regnum Vannianum', in *AAH* 41, pp. 61-71; J. Fitz, 'Noricum und Pannonien zur Zeit der römischen Okkupation', in *Röm. Österreich*, pp. 79-86.

⁴² This relationship will be discussed in further detail in Chapters 8-11. Cf. E. Luttwak, *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, pp. 20-40.

⁴³ Tac. *Ann.* IV. 5; Suet. *Aug.* 49. D. B. Saddington, 'The Roman Government and the Roman Auxilia', in Z. Visy, (ed.), *Limes XIX*, p. 63; L. Keppie, 'The Army and Navy', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 381; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 16; B. Campbell, *The Roman Army: 31 BC – AD 337*, p. 34; L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000*, p. 30; D. Williams, *Romans and Barbarians: Four Views from the Empire's Edge, First Century AD*, p. 7; G. L. Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, p. 53; S. K. Drummond and L. H. Nelson, *The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 15-6. For more details, see P. A. Holder, 'Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', in *BAR* 70, 1980; K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau*, Berne, 1951. Details of the auxiliary forces are discussed in further detail in Chapters 8-11.

legionary bases and their outposts.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the evolution of their camps is in line with the development of the legions into regional defensive armies and away from their previous role as a mobile attacking force, gradually developing permanence and strength.⁴⁵ As with the legions this occurred over time and does not become apparent until the reign of Claudius.⁴⁶ Such significant developments will be discussed below.

The Importance of the Navy

Integral to the Roman positions along the Rhine and Danube, and in fact an important element in the defence and supply of the empire, were the naval fleets. To avoid repetition and the separation of information, the development of the fleets will be discussed as a whole here. Traditionally, the navy itself was considered an inferior detachment of the army and strictly under its control.⁴⁷ Roman writers took little interest in fleets and naval operations.⁴⁸ Hence, the character and origin of the naval forces outside of Italy in the early principate is obscure: when they are mentioned they are usually simply referred to as ‘provincial’ fleets.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 94; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, pp. 37-8.

⁴⁵ V. A. Maxfield, ‘Frontiers: Mainland Europe’, in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, pp. 174-5; R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, ‘The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero’, in *CAH*, vol. X, p. 787.

⁴⁶ M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, pp. 37-8.

⁴⁷ B. Campbell, *Rivers and the Power of Ancient Rome*, pp. 180-1; C. G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy: 31 BC – AD 324*; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 157, 160.

⁴⁸ B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 180; C. Star, *The Roman Imperial navy*, pp. 126-66; M. Reddé, *Mare Nostrum. Les infrastructures, le dispositif et l’histoire de la marine militaire sous l’empire romain*, pp. 288-308; D. Saddington, ‘Classes. The Evolution of the Roman Imperial Fleet’ in P. Erdkamp, *A Companion to the Roman Army*, 2007, pp. 213-17. Also see, H. Konen, *Classis Germanica. Die römischen Rheinflotte im 1.-3. Jahrhundert n. Chr.*, St Katharinen, 2000.

⁴⁹ C. G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy: 31 BC – AD 324*, p. 106-8. see n.1; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 223.

The Rhenish fleet is the most attested of the provincial fleets during the first century AD with numerous references in the historical record,⁵⁰ with the initial fleet founded under Augustus, sometime before Drusus' campaign in 12 BC.⁵¹ Under Augustus and during the early part of Tiberius' principate the fleet played a prominent role in Roman expansion into Germania. Although the fleets were involved in minor altercations, their main role was transportation and exploration.⁵² The role and significance of the river and the fleet in aiding Roman advancement can be reflect in the sites chosen for the early bases along the Rhine. As discussed in Chapter Two, the initial bases were placed to control invasion routes,⁵³ and were placed along tributaries of the river and utilised the river and the fleet to aid the invasion army.⁵⁴

From Drusus to Germanicus there is mention of the construction and use of Roman fleets along the Rhine, which implies that there was not a large core fleet maintained on the Rhine at this stage.⁵⁵ Whether there was a small fleet permanently stationed on the Rhine at this time is not apparent in the sources or attested in the archaeological record. Therefore, it would appear the fleet was constructed when

⁵⁰ C. G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy: 31 BC – AD 324*, pp. 141-52; B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 183. For an attempt to make the most out of the evidence for the role of the Rhine squadron, see M. Reddé, *Mare Nostrum. Les infrastructures, le dispositif et l'histoire de la marine militaire sous l'empire romain*, pp. 290-98, 356-61; Konen, 'Die ökonomische Bedeutung der Provinzialflotten während der Zeit des Prinzipates', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *The Roman Army and the Economy*, p. 327-40.

⁵¹ Dio LIV. 32; Flor. II.30.26. Florus implies that a base was present at *Bonna*, although this reference is disputed, for details see D. B. Saddington, 'The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets', *Britannia* 21, p. 224; C. G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy: 31 BC – AD 324*, p. 141; E. Stein, *Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im römischen Deutschland*, pp. 273-8.

⁵² D. B. Saddington, 'The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets', *Britannia* 21, p. 225.

⁵³ B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, pp. 172, 176; N. Hanel, 'Recent research on the fortifications of the headquarters of the *classis Germanica*: Cologne-Marienburg (Alteburg)', in P. Freeman, J. Bennett, Z. T. Fiema, and B. Hoffman (eds.), *Limes XVIII*, pp. 913-920. For details refer back to Chapters 4 and 5.

⁵⁴ D. Breeze, *Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 97-117; B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 176. Also see, R. Gerlach, 'Das Rhein-Limes Projekt-Wo lag der Rhein zur Römerzeit', *Beiträge zum Welterbe Limes* (3), pp. 9-17.

⁵⁵ D. B. Saddington, 'The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets', p. 225.

required as part of a campaigning force; for a lack of a better term it was an ‘invasion’ fleet.⁵⁶ Only later did the establishment of a permanent fleet on the Rhine take place, possibly during Claudius’ reign,⁵⁷ although the formal existence of the *Classis Germanica* is not attested until the reign of Nero.⁵⁸

Another event that marked the end of offensive operations in Germania was the destruction of Germanicus’ fleet in AD 16. Subsequently, the fleet did not have a decisive military role in Rome’s more limited operations in Germania. This changing role can be attested in the positioning of the fleet: as with the legionary and auxiliary camps, the fleet was divided and strategically placed along the river. However, these new positions were not placed to utilise the invasion routes as in the past, but rather were placed there because movement between tributaries and the main river could be better monitored whilst also providing excellent communications and a good place for a harbour.⁵⁹

Along the Danube there were two distinct fleets: these dual fleets were developed from necessity due to the natural barrier formed at the Kazan Gorge, named the ‘Iron Gates’, where cataracts running through a narrow defile split the course of the river and

⁵⁶ Saddington points out there is still no direct connection that can be traced between the invasion fleets and the later provincial fleets, see ‘The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets’, p. 230; D. Saddington, ‘Classes. The Evolution of the Roman Imperial Fleet’ in P. Erdkamp, *A Companion to the Roman Army*, 2007, p. 208.

⁵⁷ D. B. Saddington, ‘The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets’, pp. 229-30.

⁵⁸ Tac. *Hist.* I. 58.1. D. B. Saddington, ‘The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets’, pp. 226, 229; N. Hanel, ‘Recent research on the fortifications of the headquarters of the *classis Germanica*: Cologne-Marienburg (Alteburg)’, in P. Freeman, J. Bennett, Z. T. Fiema, and B. Hoffman (eds.), in *Limes XVIII*, pp. 913-920.

⁵⁹ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 94; W. A. M. Hessing, ‘Das Niederländische Küstengebiet’, in T. Bechert and W. J. H. Willems (eds.), *Die Römische Reichsgrenze zwischen Mosel und Nordseeküste*, pp. 89-102.

made river traffic impossible.⁶⁰ The upper, western portion of the river was patrolled by the *Classis Pannonica* (Pannonian fleet) based at *Taurunum* (Zamum) near modern Belgrade, whilst the lower, eastern portion was protected by the *Classis Moesica* (Moesian fleet) based at *Noviodunum* (Isaccea) in modern Romania.⁶¹ Although based at *Taurunum*, there is later evidence of other naval support bases.⁶²

More difficult to construct are the origins of the Danube fleet, which may have had its inception during the campaign of Augustus in 35 BC, but the earliest record specifically mentioning dates to AD 50.⁶³ Evidence indicating the presence of the fleet in the Tiberian period comes from references to the construction of roads and the development of the navigability of the Danube.⁶⁴ Similar to the Rhine, the role of the Danube shifted over time. Initially the fleet was employed to patrol the Save and Drave Rivers and aid in the advance of the army into the region; once this was accomplished and the frontiers advanced to the Danube the fleet was repositioned along the river itself.⁶⁵ However, unlike the Rhine the Danubian fleet was not initially formed to assist in the invasion of the interior of Germania: that situation was unique to the geography

⁶⁰ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 100; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 162.

⁶¹ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 102. There is also clear evidence of a base at *Sexaginta Prista* – ‘Sixty ships’ – much closer to *Novae* (Svistov), see V. Varbanov & D. Dragoev, ‘Archaeological excavations within the territory of the Roman Fort Sexaginta Prista’, *ISTROS XIV*, pp. 227-243.

⁶² G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 163. Epigraphic evidence comes from the tombstones of sailors stationed at *Brigetio* and *Aquincum*, and tiles stamped CL(ASSIS) F(LAVIAE) P(ANNONICAE) found at *Brigetio* and *Carnuntum*.

⁶³ Tac. Ann. XII. 30. B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 182; D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 100, 102; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 162.

⁶⁴ Tac. Ann. I. 20. D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 102; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 162-3; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 43-46.

⁶⁵ G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 163.

and situation along the Rhine. The Danube fleets always fulfilled the role the Rhine fleet later adopted.

The Rhine and Danube fleets were assigned an important role in the various military activities along the frontier zones. Initially the Rhine fleets provided essential support in the conquest of the interior. Once this role was abandoned the fleets readily adapted to their new tasks which included the supply of garrisons and larger armies, the movement of troops, and surveillance and scouting. The pivotal role the fleets provided was the control of movement along and across major navigable rivers, and the discouragement of river crossings by hostile bands, with the fleets acting as a visible and mobile deterrent.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the changing role of the fleets, especially on the Rhine, reflects a change in Roman policy regarding Germania and the *Germani*. This shift from an element aiding in the conquest of the region to a vital policing and surveillance tool indicates that the Romans were aiming to contain the Germanic threat and not reconquer their lost territory.

The Rhine: the Division of the military

Germanicus' recall marked a distinct change in Roman policy regarding the role of Roman forces along the Rhine. This is significant as his removal as the supreme commander of the Rhine legions with no replacement candidate being appointed is a distinct shift in policy. This alteration would directly affect the offensive capabilities of the forces deployed in that region. There had been a single supreme commander of the forces stationed along the Rhine since the initial operations of Drusus in 12 BC. This

⁶⁶ B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 181; D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 94-5.

seemingly insignificant development can only be fully appreciated when the ramifications of this shift in policy are considered. Firstly, in order to carry out offensive operations in the interior of Germania a sole military command needed to be maintained. Secondly, the Rhine was now defended by two separate armies each under the command of an imperial legate, with the exact date for the institution of a binary army system unknown. Each of the two armies (*exercitus Germaniae Superioris*, *exercitus Germaniae Inferioris*)⁶⁷ were themselves a new development on the frontier. Such a separation of legions does not immediately correlate with the emergence of the provinces of Germania Inferior and Germania Superior (this occurs in the reign of Domitian c. 89);⁶⁸ these two armies were a precursor to this development. Syme and Collingwood place the separation shortly after the Varus disaster (c. AD 10-12), others such as R ger argue for date after the death of Augustus (c. AD 14), while Sch nberger puts forward c. 15 BC (during the initial establishment of the invasions routes into Germania).⁶⁹ R ger states that the separation had taken place in AD 14, citing Tacitus.⁷⁰ But this statement is erroneous. In the relevant passage, Tacitus does not specifically state that the two armies of the Rhine were separated at this point, he wrote:

⁶⁷ Of the two military zones, *Germania superior* extended from Lake Constance to Brohl, between Bonn and Coblenz; *Germania inferior* from Brohl to the Sea; see J. Jackson, trans., Tacitus, *The Annals*, p. 297 n. 1; also refer back to Chapter 6.

⁶⁸ The establishment of the two German provinces, and their significance, is discussed in Chapter 11.

⁶⁹ Supporters of the date c. AD 10: R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, vol. X, p. 376; K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes : a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', PhD diss., Durham University, 1998, pp. 44-5; R. Wolters, *Die R mer in Germanien*, p. 56; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 37; J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, pp. 21-2; J. C. Mann, 'The Frontiers of the Principate', *ANRW II* (1), p. 518; E. M. Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 55; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, p. 49. Supporters of AD 9: C. R ger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 528. Supporters of c. 15 BC: H. Sch nberger, *The Roman Frontier in Germany*, p. 144; J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, p. 55; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 43.

⁷⁰ C. R ger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 528.

There were two armies on the Rhine bank: the Upper, under the command of Gaius Silius; the Lower, in charge of Aulus Caecina. The supreme command rested with Germanicus.⁷¹

He does not explicitly state that this separation had taken place in AD 14, only that there were two armies present at this time. This simply could have been an anachronistic error on his part. The argument supporting a date after c. AD 9 is based on two factors, the increase in the number of legions on the Rhine and the appointment there of two imperial legates (*legatus Augusti pro praetore*). Both of these factors are intrinsically connected: without the increase in legions along the Rhine, from five to eight, there would have been no military rationale at this juncture for the separation of the command of legions. After the *clades Variana* of AD 9, the surviving twenty-five legions were distributed between eight provinces, and no one single province had more than four legions.

The justification for this limitation is obvious – it removed, or at least limited, the means for a mutiny by an over-ambitious commander. No singular legate could be trusted with the command of eight legions, not even the Emperor's heir. Thus, after AD 9 the Rhine army was divided and direct command was entrusted to two separate commanders.⁷² Therefore, although Tiberius had overall command over all Rhine legions during his campaign, he did not directly control all eight legions. This restriction points to the mistrust of Augustus and the relatively legitimate fear of offering too much military power to any one commander. Later, Tiberius would emulate the same policy with Germanicus. While the latter had command of the Rhine forces, the uncertain

⁷¹ Tac. *Ann.* I. 31. (trans. J. Jackson, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁷² H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 6 n. 38; J. Wachter, *The Roman Empire*, p. 21.

duration of his command the presence of two imperial legates tempered his position and power.

The Rhine area was still officially in the territory of *Gallica Belgica*; however, the area was effectively separate military zones under the direct command of their own imperial legate.⁷³ Before AD 9 there is only mention of one *legatus Augusti pro praetore*, effectively the governor of the emerging of province of Germania, the last being Quinctilius Varus. Furthermore, there is mention of various *legati Augusti legionis*, as commanders of the individual legions; these were subordinate to the governor. After the disaster, late in AD 9, Tiberius was dispatched to take energetic command of the Rhine, coinciding with this appointment was the appearance of two consular legates.⁷⁴ These new appointments would suggest that there were now two separate armies along the Rhine. This marked the beginning of a new phase along the Rhine, although this would not become apparent until the end of the first century AD. Considering this development, considerable doubt is raised on the supposed ‘temporary’ postponement of the reconquest of Germania Magna marked by Tiberius’ withdrawal of Roman troops east of the Rhine.

The implicit acknowledgment of the abandonment of the intention to conquer Germania can be recognised in the breakup of the double legionary fortresses. Initially

⁷³ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 162 n. 29; E. M. Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 55; J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, pp. 54-6; C. B. Rüger, *Germania Inferior*, pp. 104-7.

⁷⁴ W. Eck, *Die Statthalter der germanischen Provinzen vom 1.-3. Jahrhundert*, Cologne, 1985; E. M. Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 55; C. B. Rüger, *Germania Inferior*, pp. 104.; R. Sherk, ‘Specialization in the Provinces of Germany’, in *Historia* 20 (1), pp. 110-121. In the three-hundred year period between Augustus to Diocletian, one hundred and six Senators are known to been legates of one of the Germanies, see *AE*, 1957, p. 161; E. Ritterling & E. Groag, *Fasti des römischen Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat*, E. Stein (ed.), Vienna, 1932.

Varus' surviving troops were withdrawn to the left bank of the Rhine by Tiberius and settled there in temporary camps (as detailed above). Two legions occupied each of the fortresses positioned along key invasion routes along the river.⁷⁵ The subsequent separation of these double legionary camps is another key event in the evolution of the Rhine frontier; it marked the first phase of a transition from a temporary military staging area to an established permanent boundary. In turn, this process gave an impetus to the development of the frontier. The separation of all the double legions along the Rhine occurred over time, and it was only by the end of the first century AD that all legions were camped in individual bases. Although the partitioning occurred over this period, the cause of those divisions and the ramifications for the Rhine frontier and the changing role of its army are essential to understanding the development of Roman defences against the *Germani* and as such will be explored here rather than on an individual bases, thus avoiding repetition.

In AD 35, the initial separation of legions took place, with the splitting of *legio I Germanica* and the *legio XX Valeria* at *Oppidum Ubiorum/Colonia Agrippinensis* (Cologne).⁷⁶ This base was closed in favour of other positions; the legions were transferred to *Bonna* (Bonn) and *Novaesium* (Neuss) respectively, but the Rhine fleet

⁷⁵ L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, pp. 193-4. For details refer back to Chapters 3-5.

⁷⁶ This is considered the initial separation of legions along the Rhine, the division of *Augusta Vindelicum* (Augsburg-Oberhausen) in AD 16 was based in Raetia, although its separation also indicates the abandoned conquest of Germania and the positioning of bases along the Rhine. *The legio XIII Gemina* opened Windisch in AD 16, for details see Chapter 6. D. Breeze, *The Imperial Frontiers of Rome*, pp. 93-4; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, pp. 193-4; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 126; J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 229; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 151; J. C. Mann, 'Legionary Recruitment and Veteran settlement During the Principate', University of London: Institute of Archaeology Occasional Publication (7), London, 1983, p. 25; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, pp. 1247. Cf. E. Ritterling, 'legio', pp. 1378, 1772.

(*Classis Germanica*) remained near Cologne-Alteburg.⁷⁷ The motives for this first separation are not stated by the sources, but scholars speculate that it was the beginning of the process of displacing legions along the river. There is no reference to disloyalty or mutiny as justification, although the strategic benefits are obvious. Subsequent separations are more attested.

Vetera (Xanten) ceased to be a double camp in AD 69. Initially the reconstruction of the camp into a permanent stone fort late in Nero's reign indicated that the base was still at that stage intended to be a double camp.⁷⁸ The subsequent destruction of the base and its two legions during the civil war in AD 69 by the Batavian rebel Julius Civilis highlighted the two legion system's military disadvantages.⁷⁹ In this instance, the double legion had maintained its concentration of force, ideal for launching military campaigns across the river, but flawed when regular assaults were not undertaken. Clustering camps close together resulted in long gaps between bases, initially unimportant whilst the army maintained regular assaults across the river. As the army, however, began to adopt a primarily defensive role, the monitoring of the frontier line and the activities and movement of the *Germani* was essential.⁸⁰ Furthermore, once regular campaigns and incursions were suspended and the threat of Roman interference

⁷⁷ H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 151; H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6, 44. For *Colonia Agrippinensis* see M. Gechter, 'Köln', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, pp. 459-521. For *Novaesium* see M. Gechter, 'Neuss', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1987, pp. 580-592. For *Bonna* see M. Gechter, 'Bonn', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, pp. 364-383.

⁷⁸ L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, p. 194 see fig. 52; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, Adam & Charles Black, London, 1983, p. 247. Cf. M. Gechter, 'Xanten', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1987, pp. 619-625; H. von Petrikovits, 'Vetera', *RE* viiia, pp. 1801-1834.

⁷⁹ L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, p. 194; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 49-50; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 152. For an account of the rebellion see, Tac. *Hist.* IV,18; IV,22; IV,61,2-3. This is covered in more detail in Chapter 10.

⁸⁰ L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, pp. 193-4.

lessened, some of the tribes no longer had the same level of fear, and grew bolder in their actions against Rome. Therefore, the double camps were a hindrance to the new policy along the Rhine, and the Batavians were able to build up their strength and resources without raising suspicions. *Vetera* was still a key military position and so it was retained; other Roman bases, however, were dispersed throughout the region in order to maintain a better defence on the frontier and observation on the *Germani*.

The double legionary base at *Mogontiacum* (Mainz) was separated in AD 89⁸¹ with the justification for this being straight forward: rebellion. Lucius Antonius Saturninus led *legio XIV Gemina* and *legio XXI Rapax* into revolt, which while short lived, had significant ramifications. Domitian officially adopted the policy of segregating legionary bases; no legate would be able to influence multiple legions directly so easily: the risk of rebellion was too great.⁸²

Clearly this was a key turning point in the policy and strategy along the Rhine. The original purpose of the double legion was removed; their continued existence had military as well as political ramifications.⁸³ Through the separation of the legions the emperors had signalled the cessation of offensive campaigns across the Rhine. These six legions were now given new bases along the Rhine, or moved to the Danube, and the

⁸¹ Cf. H. Cüppers, 'Mainz', in H. Cüppers (ed.), *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, pp. 458-469. Further details are discussed in Chapter 11.

⁸² For Domitian's restriction on legions, see Suet. *Dom.* 7. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 8 see n. 85, 86; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, pp. 194, 196; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, p. 122. Note: *legio XXI Rapax* was sent to *Poetouium* (Ptuj) in Pannonia. The only exception to this restriction is in Egypt where two legions continued to occupy a site at Alexandria-Nicopolis until the reign of Hadrian. Continuing the exceptional status of this base it was ruled by a *praefecti* of equestrian rank rather than one of senatorial rank. In this instance the presence of a lesser ranked commander made the use of a double legion supposedly safe. The rebellion and its ramifications are discussed in detail in Chapter 11.

⁸³ N. J. E. Austin, & N. B. Rankov, *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*, p. 126; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 59; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, p. 196.

gaps gradually came to be occupied by auxiliary forts.⁸⁴ As argued earlier, each of these newly constructed forts was positioned at strategic points along the river in order to monitor and contain the Germanic threat.⁸⁵

Tiberius: Significant Events

During the later stages of Tiberius' reign there would be further incidents along the Rhine, notably in AD 21 with the revolt of Julius Florus and in AD 28 with the rebellion of the *Frisii*. Both of these incidents highlight a specific function of the Rhine armies; the former brought back attention to the armies' role outside of defence against the *Germani*, whilst the latter had a significant implication to the Rhine frontiers and would highlight problems that would continue to affect the Empire in the following centuries. Details will only be briefly explored; the main focus always being the Roman response to the *Germani* and the affect on Roman positions along the Rhine frontier.

Revolt of Julius Florus

In AD 21 the rebellion of Gallic and Germanic⁸⁶ tribes in the provinces of Gallia Belgica and Gallia Lugdunensis was not directly related to Roman defence against the *Germani* east of the Rhine, rather it is an illustration of another key function which the Rhine legions performed, that of securing the provinces of Gaul; it further highlights the necessity of such a large force in the region. Julius Florus of the *Treveri* and Julius

⁸⁴ L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, p. 196.

⁸⁵ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 93-4 n. 2; W. A. M. Hessing, 'Das Niederlandische Küstengebiet', in T. Bechert and W. J. H. Willems (eds.), *Die Römische Reichsgrenze zwischen Mosel und Nordseeküste*, pp. 89-102.

⁸⁶ The *Treveri* are recorded as claiming Germanic ancestry, see Caes. *B. Gall.* II, 4; Tac. *Ger.* XXVIII. A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 154; M. Todd, *The Northern Barbarians: 100BC- AD 300*, p. 23; M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, p. 46; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 112. Their name may mean 'river crossers', referring to their links with the east side of the Rhine, see E. M., Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, pp. 10-14.

Sacrovir of the *Aedui* were main protagonists for the uprising.⁸⁷ Both Florus and Sacrovir are recorded to have been descendants of prominent noble families in Gaul.⁸⁸ As the actual course and details of the revolt are not crucial, they will be omitted. In essence, the rebellion was raised by a collection of debtors and their supporters from amongst the two Gallic provinces against Rome, caused by the burden of heavy taxation and abuse by officials.⁸⁹ The German campaigns in AD 15-16 had placed a further strain on the provinces, and news of Germanicus' death had made the armies of the Rhine agitated.⁹⁰ Significantly, the revolt was punctuated by a quarrel between the commanders of the Rhine armies: Visellius Varro (Lower Germania) and Gaius Silius (Upper Germania), each seeking to take command instead of combining their efforts to suppress the revolt.⁹¹ This dispute led to a prolonging of the rebellion. Had the two commanders combined their efforts the uprising would have been quelled sooner. Clearly the separation of the armies effectively diluted the potential power and influence wielded by either of the commanders and any potential threat was counter balanced by the presence of the other. Conversely this event also highlights a flaw in the dual army structure, i.e. without an overall commander the military effectiveness of the forces was severely diminished. If the rebellion had been more substantial the new command structure would have been a major issue. Despite this hindrance both Tacitus and Velleius Paterculus record that the rebellion was dealt with as immediately it occurred; Velleius goes as far as to state:

⁸⁷ Other tribes involved included the *Andecavi* and *Turoni*.

⁸⁸ Tac. *Ann.* III. 40.

⁸⁹ Tac. *Ann.* III.40-42. T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 212; G. Goudineau, 'Gaul', in *CAH²*, vol. X, pp. 490-1; H. W. Benario, 'Tacitus, Trier and the Treveri', in *CJ* 83 (3), p. 234; E. M., Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 64; J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, p. 28; R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 165; B. Levick, *Tiberius: The Politician*, p. 132.

⁹⁰ Tac. *Ann.* III. 40. R. Seager, *Tiberius*, p. 166; E. M., Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 64; B. Levick, *Tiberius: The Politician*, p. 134.

⁹¹ Tac. *Ann.* III. 40-42. B. Levick, *Tiberius: The Politician*, pp. 134-5. Conversely, Rogers doubts the validity of the conflict, see R. S. Rogers, 'Notes on the Gallic Revolt, AD 21', *The Classical Weekly* 36 (7), pp. 75-6.

... the Roman people learned that he [Tiberius] had conquered before they knew he was engaged in war, and the news of victory preceded the news of the danger.⁹²

This clearly illustrates the diminutive threat that the uprising actually posed to Rome. Regardless of this, Goudineau raises the issue that the episode's significance has been overestimated by some historians.⁹³ Such an interpretation is to be rejected: sources such as Tacitus clearly indicate that Gallic elites continued to be obsessed with status and privilege well into the second century.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the failure of Florus and Sacrovir to raise significant support amongst the other Gallic tribes, even with the leverage of securing hostages from Autun, signifies the degree by which the Gallic nobility generally supported or were at least resigned to Roman dominion.⁹⁵ More significant than the revolt is the knowledge regarding the limited capacity of the Rhine legions to function as a cohesive military unit and as a direct consequence of this their capability to act as a campaigning force against the *Germani* was severely diminished. This further reinforces the view that the Rhine legions' role was to become more defensive in nature and that Rome's position was one of containment of the Germanic threat not of conquest.

Revolt of the *Frisii*

The Frisian rebellion in AD 28 reinforces the emergence of Tiberius' new policy of non-interference east of the Rhine, and it is a clear indicator of the military's role

⁹² Vell. Pat. II. 129. (trans. F. W. Shipley, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁹³ G. Goudineau, 'Gaul', in *CAH²*, vol. X, pp. 490-1. Goudineau raises the point that rather than utilise this episode to explain archaeological destruction layers there is a tendency to represent the event as either: the last revolt of the *equites*, who had their position and power usurped by an emerging ruling class of artisans and merchants, or else, on the contrary, an attempt to seize power from those *equites*.

⁹⁴ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 68-9. G. Goudineau, 'Gaul', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 491 n. 56.

⁹⁵ H. W. Benario, 'Tacitus, Trier and the Treveri', in *The Classical Journal* 83 (3) p. 234; G. Goudineau, 'Gaul', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 491.

along the Rhine and is a display of Rome's abandonment, temporary or otherwise, of the reconquest of Germania Magna.⁹⁶ Tacitus describes the causes and course of the rebellion, but frustratingly is the only surviving source for this event.⁹⁷ In summary, the revolt erupted due to excessive taxation and the overbearing exaction of Roman officials.⁹⁸ According to Tacitus, there was no desire on the part of the *Frisii* part to rebel or seek independence, but rather this was forced upon them after their 'indignation and complaints' went unanswered.⁹⁹ Lendering and Bosman contest this view, arguing that the sheer number of men mobilised for the rebellion, in a relatively short period of time, indicates that the uprising was prepared well in advance and thus not just a taxation protest that had dramatically escalated.¹⁰⁰ The subsequent battle with Lucius Apronius, the *propraetor* of Lower Germania, though indecisive, resulted in considerable Roman losses. Recently the site of *castellum Flevum*, which was besieged by the *Frisii*, has been tentatively identified at Velsen, although positive identification is still being sought.¹⁰¹ However, the excavation of the site appears to be in line with Tacitus' account of the siege.

Resulting from this defeat was the apparent expulsion of the Romans from this region, a view based on Tacitus' account, which alludes to the Roman government of the northern tribes came to an abrupt end, although he does not explicitly state such.¹⁰² No literary evidence specifically records Tiberius' activity in the area after this event;

⁹⁶ E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World: From 30 BC to AD 138*, p. 128.

⁹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* IV. 72.

⁹⁸ Tac. *Ann.* IV.72. A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 163.

⁹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* IV.72.

¹⁰⁰ J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Fronteir on the Lower Rhine*, p. 74.

¹⁰¹ J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Fronteir on the Lower Rhine*, pp. 74-5; A. K. Bowman, R. S. O. Tomlin and K. A. Worp, 'Emptio Bovis Frisica: the 'Frisian Ox Sale' Reconsidered', *JRS* 99, pp. 167-8; J. M. A. W. Morel, A. V. A. J. Bosman, 'Velsen-Noord Spaarndammer polder', in *Archeologische Kroniek van Holland* 1, pp. 311-314.

¹⁰² Tac. *Ann.* IV. 72-4.

although it is generally believed that no attempt to punish the Frisians was undertaken during his reign.¹⁰³ There is evidence that contradicts this view. At *Flevum* (Velsen) dendrochronological analysis of wood samples shows Roman activity there in the thirties AD.¹⁰⁴ The so-called *Emptio Bovis Frisicia* ('Frisian ox sale' tablet) indicates that there was still a military presence at an unknown site within Frisian territory in AD 29.¹⁰⁵ However, the evidence is minimal and could be proven as isolated incidents rather than Roman rule, and additional proof would be needed to determine the level of Roman occupation in the area. If substantiated it would mean that Roman dominion continued on after the revolt, most likely to a lesser extent, or if suspended was so only for a short period. Frustratingly, Tacitus' account is fragmented during the period 37-47 and offers no insight into subsequent events. Ultimately this event highlights the level of avoidance Tiberius showed in appointing anyone too decisively, or even adequately, deal with the situation.¹⁰⁶ Tacitus expresses clear contempt for the decision in writing that, 'rather than entrust anyone with the conduct of the war, [he] suppressed our losses.'¹⁰⁷ Tiberius' lack of resolve to exact retribution and reaffirm Roman dominance over the region and the *Frisii* was criticised and seen as a betrayal. Two points are thus emphasised: Tiberius unwillingness to extend Roman influence east of the Rhine, and his hesitance to appoint any candidate to a position of power which could threaten or rival his authority.

¹⁰³ Tac. *Ann.* IV. 74. L. A. Springer, 'Rome's Contact with the Frisians', *CJ* 48 (4), pp. 109-10 n. 12.

¹⁰⁴ J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, p. 75; J. M. A. W. Morel, A. V. A. J. Bosman, 'Velsen-Noord Spaarndammer polder', in *Archeologische Kroniek van Holland* 1, pp. 311-314.

¹⁰⁵ Bowman, Tomlin and Worp suggest two possibilities: either the Romans maintained a presence in Frisian territory after the defeat, or the revolt and the military activity extended over into AD 29 and Tacitus erroneously recorded it occurring over a single year, see A. K. Bowman, R. S. O. Tomlin and K. A. Worp, '*Emptio Bovis Frisica*: the 'Frisian Ox Sale' Reconsidered', *JRS* 99, p. 167.

¹⁰⁶ Tac. *Ann.* IV.74.

¹⁰⁷ Tac. *Ann.* IV.74.

The Frisian revolt signals an underlying issue of neglect present in the latter stage of Tiberius' rule. Tiberius' failure to reassert Roman dominance in the lower Rhine region and effectively punish the *Frisii* appears to have been a harbinger for Germanic incursions into Roman controlled territory. Both Suetonius and Tacitus record that the *Germani* were making inroads into Gaul during the latter part of Tiberius' reign.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, Apronius and Gaetulicus seemed incapable of preventing the Germanic incursions. The archaeological record seems to support this view, with evidence indicating that German settlers were occupying territory supposedly under Roman control on the Necker.¹⁰⁹ So far this is an isolated incident and further evidence is required to determine the level of threat posed by the *Germani* during this period. An indication of the level of threat posed the *Germani*, or at least the level of perceived threat by the Romans, can be measured by the subsequent preparations undertaken by Gaius c. AD 39.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the overall development of the Julio-Claudian defences and policies against the *Germani*. Although only an outline of the period between the reign of Tiberius and Nero can be reconstructed, by examining all of the evident events on both rivers it is possible to discern a pattern of reactionary defence against the *Germani*. Significantly, this chapter identified the emergence of a trend to deploy Roman forces along the Rhine and Danube Rivers which would develop further over the first century AD. Initially, the Roman military focus was firmly on the *Germani* along the Rhine,

¹⁰⁸ Tac. *Ann.* IV.72-4; Suet. *Tib.* 41; cf. *Gal.* 44.1.

¹⁰⁹ A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The Corruption of Power*, p. 130. Nierhaus argues that their presence represents local militia, see R. Nierhaus, 'Das Swebische Gräberfeld von Diersheim', *Römisch-Germanischen Forschungen* 28, pp. 182-198, 230-34.

however, defences along the Danube were not entirely neglected they were only slower to develop.

An examination of the military changes initiated under Tiberius after AD 16-17, and that were later developed by the Julio-Claudians, reveals the emergence of a new policy to defend against and mitigate the potential threat posed by the *Germani*. This policy shift is marked by the removal of most of the Roman forces from the interior of Germania and their repositioning on the Rhine. As part of this, a military presence was still maintained in the territory of allied tribes in order to monitor the region, offering a level of early warning and protection from other hostile tribes, whilst also assuring allegiances and aiding with retaliatory expeditions. Deliberate campaigns of aggression against the *Germani* were abandoned, cessation of which resulted in disunity and conflict amongst the *Germani*. In lieu of overt aggression, Tiberius implemented a new indirect method of interaction and control, manipulating events and relations with the *Germani*, with modest or no direct military intervention. This was a deliberate and distinct policy, consisting of military threats and financial inducements: it was retaliatory, with all infringements or violations met with campaigns of retribution and suppression. The introduction of *agri vacui* east of the Rhine, and later north of the Danube, was implemented in an effort to secure further Roman provinces and provide local Roman forces with arable farming land. All Germanic attempts to settle there, without consent, were met with aggression.

Most significantly, Tiberius' defensive policy developed physical defences on the Rhine in response to the potential threat posed by the *Germani*. These [physical defences] took the form of a semi-connected military frontier along the Rhine and

Danube, a frontier that slowly developed and became more permanent over time. At no point were these developments matter of a conscious grand overarching policy, nor were they smooth or uniform: these developments were reactionary and gradual. Along the Rhine, circumstances compelled Tiberius to expand and fortify existing Roman military bases. Some of these bases were new outposts. Others were constructed in order to: shorten the intervals between existing bases, monitor and defend against the *Germani*, and protect Roman interests in Gaul. Consequently, to maintain these defences and enforce his defensive policies, Tiberius had to retain a high concentration of military resources; the retention of which would prove volatile. His decision to retain eight legions, their division into two separate military commands, the initial separation of double legions, and the handling of latter events of Tiberius' reign strongly indicate his intention of maintaining Roman defences on the Rhine and show a definite shift in the Roman relationship with *Germani*.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A Frontier Revived: Gaius

— AD 37–41

During the reign of *Gaius Caesar Augustus Germanicus* (AD 37-41), commonly known as Caligula, there were two events of significance against the *Germani*. The first was concerned with activities along the Rhine and in the interior of *Germania* in AD 39-40, while the second was the possible recruitment of two new legions, the *legio XV* and *legio XXII Primigenia*, and their supposed purpose in either an invasion of *Germania* or Britain.¹ Both of these developments had an impact along the Rhine, and Roman relations with the *Germani*. The limited availability of sources and the questionable bias of those that survive make determinations regarding Gaius' reign difficult. Despite this limitation, overall Gaius' reign can be seen as a revival of the defensive policy established under Tiberius, its neglect and subsequent crucial restoration validates the need for a frontier against the *Germani* on the Rhine.

Primary Evidence

Gaius' northern campaign is described in the literary evidence as farcical, undertaken with little consideration, either to exploit the wealth of Gaul, or to recruit more Germanic bodyguards.² Tacitus describes the endeavour as a farce (*ludibrium*).³ Suetonius records the visit to *Germania* as an impulsive decision to recruit Batavians into his bodyguard.⁴ Dio wrote that the emperor used the hostility caused by the *Germani* as a pretext to go north, but his actual motive was the exploitation of Gaul and

¹ D. Breeze, *The Imperial Frontiers of Rome*, p. 93.

² A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The Corruption of Power*, pp. 125-6.

³ Tac. *Ger.* 37.5.

⁴ Suet. *Cal.* 43.

Spain.⁵ This negative portrayal has been accepted by some scholars.⁶ Others adopt a different interpretation. Barrett for example, identifies in the sources a suppressed or negated outline of Gaius' level of preparations.⁷ Suetonius reports that Gaius raised military levies everywhere and organised all necessary supplies 'on a scale never before matched' and writes of the forces being 'drawn from all provinces.'⁸ Dio records that he gathered a massive force, numbered between 200,000 and 250,000.⁹ Even if only a fraction of that force was raised it would have had been a formidable host. Even Tacitus' denigrating account speaks of Gaius' 'enormous efforts against Germany' and the threat he potentially posed to it.¹⁰ Clearly there were extensive preparations being undertaken by Gaius before his move north.

Identifying the exact preparations is more challenging: specifically, the possibility that two new legions were created, *legio XV Primigeneia* and *legio XXII Primigeneia*. Barrett argues that their absence in Tacitus' record of the twenty-five legions in AD 23 suggests that they were raised in the period AD 37-47 (the years AD 38-46 are missing from the surviving *Annals*).¹¹ Ritterling initially proposed the theory, arguing that their numeric series fitted in sequence with those already along the Rhine, but less convincing was his case for their title *Primigeneia*, though his strongest evidence is epigraphic.¹² The first literary record of these units is in connection with events in AD

⁵ Dio LIX.21.

⁶ A. Ferrill, *Caligula, Emperor of Rome*, p. 119;

⁷ A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, pp. 125-6.

⁸ Suet. *Cal.* 43.1; *Galb.* 6.3. A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 125.

⁹ Dio LIX.21.1-2. See A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 125.

¹⁰ Tac. *Ag.* 13.4; *Ger.* 37.5. See A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 125.

¹¹ A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 126; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 199; D. Dzino, 'Illyrian Policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', PhD diss., University of Adelaide, p. 159.

¹² E. Ritterling, 'legio', pp. 1244-9. The first to argue against Ritterling's theory in support of Claudius was Parker, see H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 93-8.

69; Tacitus places *legio XV* on the Lower, and *legio XXII* on the Upper Rhine.¹³ Epigraphic evidence indicates their earlier presence, initially both at Mainz-Weisenau,¹⁴ later *legio XV* at *Vetera* (Xanten) and *legio XXII* at *Moguntiacum* (Mainz), during the Julio-Claudian period.¹⁵ This evidence, and the references in Suetonius and Dio, clearly illustrates Gaius' recruitment, training, and implementation of new forces along the Rhine.¹⁶ Therefore, from around AD 39 there were ten legions deployed there.

The intended purpose of the new legions is debated amongst scholars. Some supporting the view that these were needed in Gaius' campaign in Germania, others arguing that the legions were to boost the depleted ranks along the Rhine left by departing legions participating in the proposed conquest of Britain,¹⁷ while most remain undecided.¹⁸ The latter would prove to be true. Claudius' invasion of Britain in AD 43 would employ three veteran legions from the Rhine, whilst only *legio IV Macedonica* from Spain is recorded to have replaced them. Such a massive transfer of legions would have created a large defensive gap along the Rhine.¹⁹ A change of this magnitude, against Rome's most feared threat, would have only made sense if *legio XV* and *legio XXII* were already positioned to replace them.

¹³ Tac. *Hist.* I. 55. E. Ritterling, 'legio', pp. xii, 1246; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 93-5; A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, pp. 125-6.

¹⁴ Evidence supporting the presence of *legio XV Primigenia* and *legio XXII Primigenia* at *Mogontiacum*, see *CIL* XIII.11853-6; C. M. Wells, *The German Policy of Augustus*, p. 146; D. Baatz, *Mogontiacum: neue Untersuchungen am römischen Legionlager in Mainz* (Limesforschungen iv), Berlin, 1962, pp. 81.

¹⁵ For the epigraphic evidence, see *CIL* 10. 4723. See also, E. Ritterling, 'Legio', pp. 1759, 1800; A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, pp. 125-6; J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Imperial Legions*, pp. 6 n. 42-3, 23, 25, 28.

¹⁶ Suet. *Cal.* 43.1; (training of raw recruits) see *Gal.* 6.3; Dio LIX.21.1-2. A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 126.

¹⁷ For the campaign in Germania, see J. H. Farnum, *The positioning of the Imperial Legions*, pp. 6. For campaign in Britain, see A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, pp. 126-139; R. W. Davies, 'The 'Abortive Invasion' of Britain by Gaius', *Historia* Bd. 5 H. 1, pp. 124-128.

¹⁸ G. W. Adams, *The Roman Emperor Gaius 'Caligula' and his Hellenistic Aspirations*, Universal Publishers, 2007, pp. 241-52; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions during the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), 1963, p. 483; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, 1934, p. 69; R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, vol. X, pp. 788-9.

¹⁹ A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 129.

Gaius' northern campaign had several objectives, the first and foremost being securing the Rhine frontiers and obtaining military *gloria* in operations against Rome's most feared threat, the *Germani*. Other objectives, of equal importance, include the subsequent conspiracy of Gaetulicus, political and military instability, and the secondary expansion into Britain. The first argument is already presented; the campaign north was not undertaken at the 'last minute', but was an extensively prepared and provisioned military expedition. Further argument for a German campaign is based on Gaius' possible motivations, an examination of the relevant ancient sources, and the chronological sequence of events.

Gaius' motivations for undertaking a military campaign into Germania are obvious. He himself had no military experience, but his predecessors had proven themselves in battle and had established their *imperium* before taking up the purple. Military *gloria* was a fundamental requirement and feature of the principate, a foundation on which the imperial position had been built and maintained.²⁰ It was essential for the principes to prove their military dominance and their capacity as leaders. Without a public perception of them as successful military leaders, their position proved uncertain and their authority was questioned and challenged. Further pressure was placed on him through his own ancestry, for Gaius was directly descended from a line of celebrated military commanders. As with his imperial predecessors, there was a genuine political necessity to emulate their accomplishments.²¹ Significantly, both his father and grandfather had established their military reputations against the *Germani*, and it was natural and expected that he would aim to gain his own military

²⁰ G. W. Adams, *The Roman Emperor Gaius 'Caligula' and his Hellenistic Aspirations*, p. 241.

²¹ Suet. *Cal.* 19.2, 52; Dio LIX.7.1, 17.3. A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, (1990), p. 125.

reputation and credentials against the same enemy. The *Germani* as being perceived as Rome's greatest threat at this time only reinforced the motivation Gaius would have had. That both his predecessors and ancestors had proven unable to conquer the *Germani* made it one of the only conceivable opponents Gaius could attack in order to obtain *gloria* equal to, or even greater than, his forbears. This did not explicitly imply that he aimed at Roman reconquest of the lost province, but rather involved emulating his forebears and vindicating his right to rule.

Reconstructing the situation along the Rhine in AD 39 is difficult. The lack of contemporary sources detailing the campaigns makes the reconstruction challenging, but the hostility and clear disdain by later sources makes it well-nigh impossible.²² Surviving sources covering the expedition make little coherent sense and do their utmost to mock the endeavour.²³ As discussed earlier, there is ample reason to be sceptical concerning the historiographical accuracy of their accounts, which need to be critically examined before accepting any information or interpretations they provide. To assess their accuracy, the first necessary step is determining the course of events and from this to extrapolate a possible scenario and justification for Gaius' campaign and his actions during AD 39-40.

Neglect: Trouble along the Rhine

There was trouble reported from the *Germani* along the Rhine before a conspiracy against Gaius was discovered, with the sources describing German hostility during this

²² S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, p. 38; A. Winterling, *Caligula: A Biography*, pp. 108-9; J. P.V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, p. 59; A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*.

²³ S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, pp. 39-40.

period.²⁴ Both Suetonius and Tacitus record that the *Germani* were making inroads into Gaul during the latter part of Tiberius' reign, and that Gaetulicus, the governor of the *exercitus Germaniae Superioris*, seemed incapable of preventing their incursions.²⁵ The archaeological record seems to support this view.²⁶ Clearly the situation along the Rhine was troubling and needed to be addressed. For the Romans, the potential threat that the *Germani* posed to Gaul could not go unresolved. Therefore, in view of this, the extensive preparations undertaken by Gaius can be interpreted as having been initially carried out to address this issue. Moreover, the considerable size of the host can be attributed to the level of threat the Romans' ascribed to the *Germani*.

It is not until later that Gaius decided to make a sudden rapid advance to the Rhine, as described by Suetonius and Dio.²⁷ This change was brought about by the discovery of Gaetulicus' conspiracy.²⁸ Who betrayed the plot is not revealed by the sources, and the full scope of the conspiracy was not exposed until later.²⁹ Initially, apparently only Gaetulicus and certain senators came under suspicion. Both of the consuls were removed from office, and Gaius rushed north. Lentulus Gaetulicus represented a significant potential threat, for he had held the governorship of the Upper Rhine for ten years, a position of considerable power, and his position would have been well established. Moreover his lax disciplinary standards would have only endeared him

²⁴ Dio LXI.21.2 ; Tac. *Ger.* 37, 5; *Hist.* 4. 15.3; *Agr.* 14.4; Eutropius vii, 12. Also see, J. P.V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, p. 59.

²⁵ Tac. *Ann.* IV.72-4; Suet. *Tib.* 41; cf. *Gal.* 44.1.

²⁶ A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 130. Nierhaus argues that their presence represents local militia, see R. Nierhaus, 'Das Swebische Gräberfeld von Diersheim', *Römisch-Germanischen Forschungen* 28, 1966, pp. 182-198, 230-34.

²⁷ Suet. *Cal.* 43; Dio LIX.21.

²⁸ P. Bicknell, 'The Emperor Gaius' Military Activities in AD 40', *Historia* 17 (4), p. 498; J. P.V. D. Balsdon, *The Emperor Gaius*, pp. 66-8;

²⁹ A. Winterling, *Caligula: A Biography*, p. 108.

more to his men.³⁰ Dio hints at Gaetulicus' popularity, though it is Tacitus that states he 'sought excessive popularity' and that he was a man 'of much clemency, restrained in handing out punishment.'³¹ Gaetulicus' guilt was established and his execution followed swiftly. Winterling correctly assesses that Gaetulicus, in an attempt to save his own life, revealed the extent of the conspiracy. For Gaetulicus implicated Gaius' heir apparent Marcus Lepidus, and his sisters Agrippina and Livilla, explaining Lepidus' expedited execution.

Gaetulicus' removal highlighted several alarming factors regarding the Rhine armies and immediately halted Gaius' planned campaign against the *Germani*. Gaius expected to have eight fully trained, disciplined, and battle-ready legions to spearhead his advance against the Germanic tribes. Instead he was confronted with undisciplined and unconditioned troops unfit and ill-prepared to undertake a major campaign.³² Stability and loyalty of the military was the foundation of his power and therefore his first step was to redress this problem. In order to accomplish this Galba was appointed commander of the upper Rhine army: he quickly began instilling military discipline and order.³³ The legions were purged: incompetent, undeserving or corrupt officers and men unfit for service were discharged. A similar situation existed along the lower Rhine where Lucius Apronius was removed and Publius Gabinius Secundus was appointed commander. Apronius had a decade earlier proven he was unable to contend with the Frisian tribes and had similarly let the military efficiency of the Lower Rhine army deteriorate. Alarming, Apronius was Gaetulicus' father-in-law making the potential

³⁰ R. Syme and G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 788.

³¹ Dio LIX.25.3; Tac. *Ann.* 30.3.

³² A. Winterling, *Caligula: A Biography*, pp. 112-3; P. Bicknell, 'The Emperor Gaius' Military Activities in AD 40', *Historia* 17 (4), p. 498.

³³ Suet. *Cal.* 44.1; *Galb.* 6.2-3.

threat posed by Gaetulicus was even more obvious. That two closely connected commanders were able to wield almost half of Rome's legions was a potential disaster and points to the political neglect exhibited towards the end of Tiberius' reign.

Post-conspiracy accounts, especially concerning Gaius and his involvement, do not make sense and are often contradictory. In his account, Suetonius records bizarre stories depicting Gaius' military actions and describing them as a farce³⁴, such as the anecdotes of picking up shells, and attempts to massacre his own legions, yet contradicts this later in his *Life of Galba*, writing that as the new governor appointed by Gaius, Galba repelled 'barbarians' who had advanced into Gaul.³⁵ In the *Life of Vespasian*, he recorded that Vespasian, then a praetor, proposed special games in honour of the emperor's victory over the tribes in *Germania*.³⁶ Considering these other passages in the biographies of later emperors regarding serious engagements across the Rhine, the references to Gaius' 'farce' are clearly distorted. For example, the military forays described across the Rhine were probably an attempt to instil military discipline, to gain the legions' loyalty, and to divert their attention from the loss of their popular commander.³⁷ If indeed the case, then Suetonius' description of Gaius' gaining German prisoners 'by tricks' is most probably an example of military stratagems and tactics which were misunderstood and corrupted by the sources into something more sinister. Furthermore, Dio's account states that Gaius had himself acclaimed *imperator* on several occasions, and while he mentions this in mockery of this princeps,³⁸ it implies that several military engagements had occurred and were successful. Physical evidence for the victories can be seen in a crude relief dedicated to Gaius discovered in *Koula* in

³⁴ Suet. *Cal.* 44.1.

³⁵ Suet. *Galb.* 6.

³⁶ Suet. *Ves.* 2.

³⁷ A. Winterling, *Caligula: A Biography*, p. 114.

³⁸ Dio LIX.21.5-6.

Lydia, it depicts a Roman cavalryman with a couched spear directed at a cowering bound woman (*Germania* personified).³⁹

Tacitus briefly reports the enormous scale of the campaign, though states that no extensive military actions could be carried out before winter in AD 39,⁴⁰ when Gaius is said to have conceived a British invasion, the likelihood of which is beyond the scope of this work. It was surely considered as a possibility only after it became apparent how difficult and costly a German campaign would have been. A British campaign would gain Gaius his military glory, at a lesser cost than *Germania*. That there are no records of him possessing a fleet, or constructing a new one at this time, capable of transporting several legions across the channel, is a strong indicator that it was a planned future endeavour not seriously undertaken in AD 40.⁴¹ Furthermore, in order for any British invasion to occur the Germanic frontier had first to be secured.⁴²

Conclusion

Gaius' aim was never a conquest of *Germania*, but to continue his predecessor's policy on the Rhine. Ineffectual commanders and their failed campaigns had allowed the *Germani* to advance into Roman Gaul. Both Augustus and Tiberius had established a precedent that any violation of Roman territory or area of control was met with immediate and ruthless military reprisals; the enemy was punished and their territory laid waste, in an effort to ensure that they (the *Germani*) were kept at bay. Such

³⁹ ILS 8791. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 134; S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, p. 43.

⁴⁰ Tac. *Ger.* 37.5; *Hist.* IV.15.3; *Agri.* 13.4.

⁴¹ The Rhine fleet was not large enough in AD 39-40 and many of the ships not capable of surviving the open sea: as seen with Germanicus' campaign in AD 16, they were designed for riverine operations. See B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome* pp. 183-4. For comparison Caesar needed over 800 vessels for his invasion of Britain, see Caes. *B. Gal.* 5.8. See also, A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. 135; C. G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy: 31 BC – AD 324*, p. 152.

⁴² A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, pp. 129-131; S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, pp. 41-42; P. Bicknell, 'The Emperor Gaius' Military Activities in AD 40', *Historia* 17 (4), pp. 503-4.

measures secured the area and the frontier whilst also raising military morale. Gaius' actions on the Rhine, reconstructed from what can be reliably elicited from the sources, are entirely consistent with such measures.

Gaius' campaign was intended to drive back the Germanic incursion, and the subsequent raids ordered by him were undertaken to restore morale and loyalty, in a similar process to the campaigns carried out after the mutiny in AD 14. Unintelligible accounts in the sources, with their anecdotes of picking up shells, and attempts to massacre his own legions, distract and detract from what Gaius actually accomplished.⁴³ He strengthened the defence of the Rhine, appointed capable, seasoned men to command the armies, and prevented Germanic incursions into Gaul. Loyalty was instilled in the legions and discipline was restored. This was accomplished with very few casualties; any significant losses would have been seized upon by the sources. Though the sources focus on Gaius' failures with the campaign and a lack of results, nothing could be further from the truth. Furthermore, despite the Rhine armies' initial lapse in military efficiency and capability, Gaius' managed to reverse the situation; campaigns were undertaken across the Rhine with the armies' once again successfully fulfilling their role.⁴⁴ Ultimately Gaius' actions halted Germanic encroachment, and his preparations and reorganisation along the Rhine ensured later successes along the frontier and further abroad.⁴⁵

⁴³ S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, p. 44. For 'seashells', see Suet. *Cal.* 46; Dio LIX.25.1.3. For attempted massacre of the legions, see Suet. *Cal.* 48. For interpretations of the events, see A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, p. pp. 125-39; J. P.V. D. Balsdon, *Emperor Gaius*, pp. 88-95; D. Woods, 'Caligula's Seashells', in *Greece & Rome*, Vol. 47 (1), pp. 80-87.

⁴⁴ Both Galba and Gabinius are recorded as fighting the *Chatti* and *Chauci* across the Rhine, see Dio LX.8.7. A. A. Barrett, *Caligula: The Corruption of Power*, p. 135; S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, p. 43; P. Bicknell, 'The Emperor Gaius' Military Activities in AD 40', *Historia* 17 (4), p. 503.

⁴⁵ Gaius' preparations arguably ensured Claudius' victories against the *Chatti* and *Chauci* and his successful invasion of Britain.

CHAPTER NINE

The Rhine System Indurated and Danubian Reforms: Claudius

A.D. 41–54

The reign of *Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus* (Claudius), AD 41–54, had considerably more significance than Gaius' for Roman and Germanic relations along the Rhine, and especially the Danube, and can be interpreted as yet another turning point in Roman imperial policy towards the *Germani*. Significantly, during his principate the river Rhine would become a more defined defence against the *Germani*. Additionally, the importance of the Danube would be recognised and development of its defences would be a prominent feature of Claudius' reign. In both instances, legionary and auxiliary troops would be stationed along the length of the frontier. Moreover, Claudius' reforms strengthened the ties between the military and the emperor, hence changing the manner by which the empire was defended. Claudius' reign can be identified as being of a more interventional nature against the *Germani* than Gaius' and he aimed at containing the threat they posed to the Romans and their interests along the Rhine and Danube.

Although there was no full-scale military invasion of *Germania*, Claudius was even more aggressive with his attempts to destabilise the Germanic tribes than his predecessors. His policy was to lessen the *Germani*'s potential threat with minimal military force, implementing methods of indirect control and manipulation in an effort to destabilise the tribes and prevent them from forming a united front. Success can be measured by examining Roman interactions with the *Cherusci* and *Chatti*. Several

events throughout the course of Claudius' reign' require discussion; his military reforms, the suppression of the *Cherusci* and *Chatti*, the invasion of Britain, and the military containment along the Rhine and Danube. All of these developments had an impact along the Germanic frontier and Roman relations with the *Germani*.

Claudius and the Sources

Evidence for Claudius' reign, as for all the Julio-Claudians emperors, is sparse, with the literary sources being mainly limited to the works of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio. Significantly, Books VII through to X of Tacitus' *Annals*, which covered the decade from AD 37 to 47, are lost, depriving scholars of an important source of specific details for the earliest years of Claudius' principate.¹ Furthermore, other major sources such as military diplomas, and epigraphy in the form of memorials, gravestones, and votive altars, are likewise relatively meagre for the early years of his reign. Claudius' own autobiography has not survived, but the work was consulted and utilised as a source for the surviving histories of the Julio-Claudians.² Both Suetonius and Pliny cite Claudius as a source in their work, and doubtless other writers also did so.³ Of the surviving ancient sources, most depict Claudius as a fool, a weakling, and a bloodthirsty tyrant who only became emperor by accident.⁴ A clear example of this view is expressed in Seneca's satire the *Apocolocyntosis*, written some months after Claudius'

¹ J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 14-15; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 193; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 427.

² A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The Emperor and his Achievements*, pp. 4-6.

³ Suet. *Claudius* 41; Pliny *NH* VII. 35. J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 15; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 187-97; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, pp. 4-6, 77-79; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 44.

⁴ Tac. *Ann.* xi, 1-4; Suet. *Claud.* 29; Seneca *Apocolocyntosis*. T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 229; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, Oxford University Press, London, 1940, pp. 5-34; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1961, p. 8; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 BC – AD 138*, p. 157; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 427.

death, in which Claudius is represented as vicious, stupid, and fearful.⁵ Dio departs significantly from this depiction, describing Claudius as good natured, hard-working, and concerned with the welfare of his people.⁶ Dio absolves Claudius of direct involvement in heinous activities carried out during his reign, assigning to Claudius an ignorance of such activities, attributing the disreputable acts of his administration to the mechanics of the freedmen and Messalina.⁷ Other later sources also radically depart from Tacitus and Suetonius, giving Claudius credit for his achievements as emperor.⁸ The obvious historiographical bias against Claudius stems from the emperor's efforts to secure his position, and retaliate against plots against his life during his reign.⁹ Sources generally agree that the beginning of Claudius' reign was marked by moderation, noting his attempts to work with the Senate to govern the empire.¹⁰ Subsequent plots alarmed him and in effort to protect and buttress his rule he made efforts to limit the power and influence of the Senate. As a consequence some 200 equestrians and 35 senators, including many of his relatives, were executed.¹¹ These actions clearly damaged his reputation among the ancient sources and influenced their depiction of Claudius and his reign.

⁵ Seneca *Apocolocyntosis*. See J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 254-5; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, pp. 74-79; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 188-9; M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 5.

⁶ Dio LX. 8. 4.

⁷ Dio (misdeeds): LX. 18. 2; LX. 28. 4; LV. 10. 13; (intimidation): LX. 14. 1; LX. 24. 7. V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, pp. 34.

⁸ Hegesippus give Claudius credit for good judgment, see Heg. iii, 1. Eutropius judges Claudius reign as holding a balance between moderation and cruelty, see Eutr. vii, 13. Orosius presents Claudius as a wise ruler and a noble character, see Oros. vii, 6,3-4. Aurelius Victor praises his achievements in the field of lawmaking, see Aur. Vict. *Caes.* iv.

⁹ J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 15-16; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 93; M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, pp. 45-50.

¹⁰ B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 93; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 6.

¹¹ Suet. *Claud.* 29; Seneca *Apocolocyntosis* 14.1. B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 103, 118; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 229.

Significant Military Reforms: Claudius and the Army

There was a deliberate and broad series of Roman military reforms during Claudius' principate, which affected most parts of the Roman army, in areas of its organisation, strategy, and technology.¹² Attention will be paid to organisational and strategic reforms, while advances in technology and other innovations will be omitted. These changes would profoundly affect the manner by which the army was to function and wage warfare over the next century, both in regards to its tactics and strategic role.¹³

The control of the imperial Roman army was the exclusive preserve of the princeps, as his control over the military was essential and the foundation on which he based his which he derived his authority and power. Consequently, later emperors, especially those in a weak position, insisted that they were the sole source of influence and power as far as the military was concerned. This applied particularly to the structure of the army, its hierarchy, and the appointment of commanders. This is because imperial power was exercised through the control of patronage, a foundation of life in the empire. In an effort to secure further the loyalty of the army, Claudius had the Senate pass a decree forbidding soldiers from entering senators' houses to pay their respects as clients, effectively criminalising and eliminating any outside association with the military.¹⁴ Clearly military appointments and advancement had to be strictly controlled and any changes to its structure could only be safely implemented by the emperor himself.¹⁵

¹² C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', in *Historia* 53, H. 4, 2004, p. 424.

¹³ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', pp. 424-5; Y. Le Bohec, *L'armée romaine sous le haut-empire*, 3rd ed., Picard, Paris, 2001, p. 197.

¹⁴ Suet. *Claud.* 25.1. V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 127; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 428; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The Emperor and his Achievements*, p. 47.

¹⁵ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 428.

Claudius inherited an army which was essentially unchanged from the force established by Augustus fifty years previously. Therefore, the army's structure and organisation still mirrored the purpose and usages of the Republican period, rather than meeting the need for a full-time, professional force which was a necessary requirement to maintain the empire. One such feature of the republican army was the *ad hoc* manner in which auxiliary officers and commanders were appointed; with centurions, equestrians, and senators all holding various offices.¹⁶ In response to this, Suetonius recorded that Claudius restricted the *cursus* for equestrian officers.¹⁷ Previously, auxiliary commands were a series of appointments made without any structure, rather than being postings in a career pattern. Commands were held by senators,¹⁸ *primipilares*,¹⁹ as well as by equestrians. Thomas points out that the less structured system of command in Augustus' reign reflected the fact that the *auxilia* themselves were only partially developed, and it was not until Tiberius' reign that the system began to emerge fully.²⁰ Therefore, Claudius restricted the auxiliary commands to the equestrians, creating a recognised path of promotion and establishing the opportunity for the *equites* to build a military career and the possibility for their further advancement. Significantly, this restriction included native leaders who had been raised to equestrian rank by the Romans. In concert with these changes similar appointments were introduced for senators and *primipilares*. Two military posts were reserved exclusively for senators: the senior legionary tribunate and the command of the legion. For the *primipilares*, their next posting was in command of the city cohorts in Rome

¹⁶ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 428.

¹⁷ Suet. *Claud.* 25. 1; see also 22. 1. Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, p. 185; L. Keppie, 'The Army and the Navy', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, pp. 391-393.

¹⁸ *Auxilia* commands held by senators, see *ILS* 911; 912.

¹⁹ Commands held by *primipilares*, see *ILS* 2684; 2686; 2690; 2692; 2693; 2694; 2705.

²⁰ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 429; D. B. Saddington, *The Development of the Roman Auxiliary forces from Caesar to Vespasian (49 BC – AD 79)*, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1982, p. 89.

and tribunes in the *vigiles*, the urban cohorts, or the praetorian cohorts.²¹ These organisational changes would enable tighter control of the army by Claudius. Nevertheless, the restriction of the *auxilia* still allowed native leaders to rise to command. With the removal of senators and *primipilares* as obstacles to their advancement, the newly defined structure of promotion could not but facilitate their ascent through the ranks. Lessons learned from Arminius' betrayal in AD 9 were ignored and the subsequently unobstructed rise of native commanders would have a disastrous impact in reign of Nero and his successors.

Further reforms were undertaken in the legions, auxiliaries, and the imperial fleets so as to increase their loyalty and facilitate support for the emperor, effectively binding the army even more closely to the principate. In AD 44 Claudius granted to the individual legionaries the right to marry; this was previously forbidden.²² Significantly, during Claudius' reign the auxiliaries are seen to fulfil a more prominent role, similar to that of the legions. Consequently their increased importance meant further alterations were carried out to reflect this role and, as with the legions, bind them closely to the emperor. Claudius implemented two reforms in connection with auxiliary conditions of service. The first was the regularising of the thirty-three year length of service, most likely implemented soon after the invasion of Britain. Most importantly and far-reaching, the second reform granted *civitas* and *conubium* (the legitimisation of their offspring) to auxiliaries after twenty-five years or more service.²³ Evidence

²¹ H. Devijver, 'Suétone, Claude, 25, et les milices équestres', *Ancient Society* 1, 1970, pp. 72-75.

²² Dio LX. 24. 3.

²³ E. Birley, 'Before Diplomas and Claudian Reform', in W. Eck and H. Wolff (eds.), *Heer und Integrationspolitik: Die römischen Militärdiplome als historische Quelle*, Köln and Wien, 1986, pp. 249-50 see n. 60; K. Gilliver, 'The Augustan Reform and the Structure of the Imperial Army', in P. Erdkamp, ed., *A Companion to the Roman Army*, Blackwell, United Kingdom, 2011, p. 187; P. A.

documenting the granting of *civitas Romana* comes from military certificates dated to the year AD 52.²⁴ These incentives were not only motivations for the continued service of troops but also future recruitment. As with the legions, auxiliary units became permanent, and similarly they were given names and titles. Evidence aligning this reform under Claudius is provided by the six auxiliary units honoured with the title *Claudia*: four units were new formations and two existing units were given this as an extra honour.²⁵ These titles eventually consisted of various combinations of numbers, tribal names, name of individuals (probably famous commanders), provincial names, imperial *nomina*, descriptions of size and type of armament and occasionally, records of mass grants of citizenship.²⁶ Although this practice had long been established with Republican and Imperial legions, this new undertaking indicated two significant points: the auxiliaries' permanent presence in the army, and their increased importance in the military structure. These titles have an added benefit for modern researchers, as the tribal name indicates where the unit was initially raised, while the added personal name could indicate a prominent or popular commander (indicating the command of a native leader), and more importantly, the addition of the name of the province where the unit was stationed (such as *ala Augusta Germanica*). This information has allowed modern scholars to plot more accurately the dispersal, deployment, and movements of the *auxilia*.²⁷

Holder, 'Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', pp. 47-8; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 148.

²⁴ *CIL* XVI 1-3.

²⁵ The title was almost certainly awarded to some of the units; at least those stationed in Dalmatia, at the same time as the *legiones* VII and XI, for their loyalty in the Scribonianus Revolt, see C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 434.

²⁶ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', pp. 433-4, see also pp. 436-8.

²⁷ V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 148.

As discussed previously, the emergence of permanent provincial fleets did not occur until later in the Julio-Claudian period.²⁸ Evidence indicates a possible permanent naval presence at Koln-Alteburg along the Rhine, dating to Claudius' reign.²⁹ Although this is not conclusive proof of its establishment, it does present a plausible case for its formation during his reign.³⁰ More substantial evidence exists for the establishment of the *classis Britannica* as a part of Claudius' preparations for the invasion of Britain, which required the transportation of large numbers of troops and supplies. In order to successfully facilitate such a massive military manoeuvre the naval arrangements for the whole North Sea, Channel, and Lower Rhine fleets would had to have been established or at least reorganised in order to undertaken the campaign.³¹

According to Tacitus, Claudius' speech to the Senate in AD 41 sympathetically recounted the history of the extension of Roman citizenship over the centuries.³² Claudius outlined his predecessors' reluctance to grant citizenship, especially to provincials. Their attitudes can be starkly contrasted to that of Claudius, who granted Roman citizenship to men from the provinces on a large scale. Evidence for his prolific generosity of citizenship can be seen in numerous individuals bearing the name of Tiberius *Claudius*, in the west and in the east. Seneca reinforces this in his *Apocolocyntosis* writing:

²⁸ D. B. Saddington, 'The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets', pp. 229-30. Refer back to Chapter 7.

²⁹ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 435; M. Reddé, *Mare Nostrum*, Rome, 1986, p. 291.

³⁰ Tac. *Hist.* I. 58. 1. D. B. Saddington, 'The Origin and Nature of the German and British Fleets', pp. 226, 229.

³¹ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 435.

³² Tac. *Ann.* XI.24; *ILS* 212.

...he [Claudius] should make Roman citizens of the half dozen who are still outsiders. (He made up his mind, you know, to see the whole world in the toga, Greeks, Gauls, Spaniards, Britons, and all.)³³

Clearly Claudius' grants were widespread and not universally accepted in Rome, yet his motivation in this can be associated with the example established by Augustus and Tiberius, but pursued far more extensively. By extending citizenship throughout the provinces Claudius established a foundation of loyalty and stability. An example of this can be seen in the granting of citizenship to the Alpine tribes of the *Anauni*, *Tulliasses*, and *Sinduni*.³⁴ Through incorporation into Roman society, outsiders were now an integral part of the empire, and continued Roman prosperity was a shared concern. In concert with these grants of citizenship went the establishment of *coloniae* (colonies), the chief purpose of which was to advance Romanisation in hostile or uncertain provinces. Therefore, *coloniae* had a dual function, part political and part military.³⁵ This is evident along the Rhine with the establishment of *Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium*, and *Colonia Claudia Savaria* along the Danube.³⁶ Therefore, both of these measures supplemented Roman military forces and helped stabilise their control along the frontiers.

³³ Seneca *Apocolocyntosis* 3. 3. (trans. M. Heseltine, *Loeb Classical Library*).

³⁴ *ILS* 206.

³⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 12, 27, Tac. *Ger.* 28, 5. B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 154 n. 17; H. Schmitz, *Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium*, Veröffl. des Köln. Geschichtsver. 18, Köln, 1956; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 65.

³⁶ B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 154; H. Schmitz, *Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium*, Veröffl. des Köln. Geschichtsver. 18, Köln, 1956; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 64 n. 46. For the colonies see E. Kornemann, 'Colonia', in *RE*, Suppl. iv, pp. 535-539; E. Ritterling, 'Legio', in *RE*, Suppl. xii. pp. 1252-56.

Roman Strategy under Claudius: the Rhine and Danube

Significantly, another distinctive turning point in Roman imperial strategy towards the *Germani* can be identified in Claudius' reign. Tiberius had halted Roman expansion into Germania, his actions indicated a withdrawal from the interior (although permanent withdrawal was perhaps never intended at this stage). Tiberius' subsequent policies of division, bribery, and intimidation managed to blunt the Germanic threat. From his reign onwards Roman forces were dispersed along the Rhine, although not concentrated along the rivers themselves. The *status quo* had been maintained until Gaius' forays across the Rhine in AD 39/40, these actions only being necessary due to neglect in the latter years of Tiberius' reign after AD 29. Ultimately, further conquest was deemed untenable. This made it clear that Tiberius' policies towards the *Germani* were only effective if they were adequately maintained. However, there was still no permanence to legionary or auxiliary fortresses, or established fortifications. Claudius' reign marked the turning point in this regard. During his reign the river Rhine became a more defined barrier between the Romans and the *Germani*. A clear indicator of this permanence is seen in the replacement of the earth-timber military bases with permanent stone structures.³⁷ Those attributed to Claudius' reign include *Castra Vetera* (Xanten) in the Lower Rhine, *Mogontiacum* (Mainz), and *Vindonissa* (Windisch) in the Upper Rhine, strongly suggesting an abandonment of the reconquest of Germania. This view is reinforced by the positioning of legions and auxiliaries along the Rhine and Danube rivers and in concert with this new deployment went a marked reduction in military occupation in the territory behind the legions. A concentration of military force was maintained at potentially vulnerable areas, such as *Vetera*, *Novaesium*,

³⁷ R. Wolters, *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 70; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 85; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 234; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 440.

Mogontiacum and *Argentoratum* along the Rhine³⁸ and *Carnuntum*, Oberstimm and Weltenburg along the Danube: ³⁹ Claudius clearly pursued a permanent system of defence against the *Germani*. Furthermore, the defence of these positions was bolstered by the Germanic tribes allied to Rome; the *Batavi* and the *Chauci* along the Rhine and the various tribes united under Vannius along the Danube. All these changes signal an abandonment of the reconquest of Germania and the beginning of a policy of consolidation and containment. These points are discussed in further detail below.

Claudius' major contribution to the defence against the *Germani* was through alterations to Roman fortifications and troop deployments along the Rhine and Danube. Along the Rhine, his policies can be seen to be largely aligned with those of Tiberius, although significantly there was a shift towards establishing a permanent defensive system against the *Germani*. There were still no deliberate campaigns of conquest in the interior. Military activity was limited to eliminating specific threats, such as the campaign against the *Chauci* and *Chatti* in AD 41-42, the impact of the invasion of Britain, the campaigns of Corbulo in AD 47-49, and the second campaign against the *Chatti* in AD 50. These events highlight several key developments under Claudius, which include: the establishment of permanent bases and fortifications, the redeployment of the legions, the increased numbers and role of the *auxilia*, and the

³⁸ L. Schumacher, 'Mogontiacum: Garnison und Zivilsiedlung im Rahmen der Reichsgeschichte', in M. Klein (ed.), *Die Römer und ihr Erbe: Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration*, Verlag Philipp von Zabern, Mainz, 2003, p. 5; D. Schmitz, 'Der Bataveraufstand im Kontext des römischen Bürgerkrieges 68-70 n. Chr.', in M. Müller, H-J. Schalles and N. Zielsing (eds.), *Colonia Ulpia Traiana: Xanten und sein Umland in römischer Zeit*, p. 98; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', 1969, p. 153.

³⁹ P. S. Well, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', in *Journal of Archaeological Research*, Vol. 13 (1), March 2005, p. 6. Oberstimm, see H. Schönberger, H. J. Köhler and H. G. Simon, 'Neue Ergebnisse zur Geschichte des Kastells Oberstimm', *Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission* 70, 1989, pp. 243-319. Weltenburg, see M. M. Rind, 'Ein neu entdecktes frühromische Funde aus Regensburg', *Bayerische Vorgeschichtsblätter* 48, 1990, pp. 63-128; H. Schonberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p. 154 n. 74.

augmented role of neighbouring Germanic tribes in the defence of the frontier. All these point towards a permanent defence system against the *Germani* and a definite indicator of the relinquishment of Roman claims on Germania. Claudius' changes to Roman policies with the *Germani* and the incidents involved will be examined.

Claudius' reign began with military activities against the *Germani* along the Rhine. Shortly after his elevation to *princeps*, Roman forces were deployed to deal with the threat arising from incursions and raids by the *Chauci*, *Canninefates*, and *Chatti* along the Rhine.⁴⁰ Previous Roman intervention under Gaius against the *Canninefates* in the lower Rhine region in AD 39/40 played a role in the emergence of this threat.⁴¹ In AD 41 Servius Sulpicius Galba, commander of the upper Rhine, engaged with the *Chatti* and swiftly suppressed them in the same year. Publius Gabinius Secundus commanded the lower Rhine army against the *Chauci* and *Canninefates*. Gabinius' success resulted in the recovery of what may have been the third of the eagles lost with Varus in AD 9;⁴² in reward for his victory of the tribes he was permitted to assume the *Chaucicus*, the last time such a name was bestowed upon an individual outside the imperial house.⁴³ Significantly, considering Claudius' weak political position, the suppression of the Germanic tribes along the Rhine procured for him a vital boost to his position and provided him with a degree of much-needed military credibility. Levick

⁴⁰ Suet. *Claud.* 24.3; *Galba* 6.2-7.1; Dio lx. 8. 7. B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 152 n. 11; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 237 n. 72; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 197 n. 60.

⁴¹ Tribesmen and Galba, see Suet. *Galba* 6. *Canninefates*, see Tac. *Hist.* IV. 15; Suet. *Gaius* 45. B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 151- 2 n. 6; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 237; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 197 n. 60; B. Gallotta, *Germanico*, Rome, 1987, p. 131.

⁴² Eagles still lost, see Florus II, 30, 38. For further details, see H. K  thmann, 'Claudius, Germanicus und Divus Augustus', *JNG* 10, 1959-60, pp. 47-50.

⁴³ Suet. *Claud.* 24, 3; Dio lx, 8, 7. B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 152 n. 11; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 88, 237; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 197 n. 60.

suggests that this victory gained Claudius a salutation as *imperator*.⁴⁴ These military actions were undertaken in an effort to ‘pacify’ Germania east of the Rhine and strengthen the Roman position along the river itself.⁴⁵ Seneca implies as much in his *de consolatione ad Polybium*.⁴⁶ There was no intention of annexation of territory in the interior or for Roman occupation, temporary or otherwise. However, the justification for the suppression of these tribes is even clearer: the *Germani* needed to be pacified and the river adequately secured before any invasion of Britain could be attempted.⁴⁷

Continuity with Tiberius’ policy of diplomacy and manipulation of the Germanic tribes can be seen with Roman interaction with the *Cherusci* in the Lower Rhine region. In summary, the *Cherusci*, who had been torn apart with an internal power struggle since the assassination of Arminius and had suffered significant losses from their conflict with the *Chatti*, sought Claudius’ aid in resolving the dispute.⁴⁸ His decision to appoint Italicus as a chieftain was a brilliant strategic and political move. Italicus, a highly Latinised Cheruscan, was the son of Rome’s ally, Flavus, and the grandson of the Chatten chieftain, Actimerus effectively bound a former hostile tribe to Rome.⁴⁹ In AD 47 Italicus became chieftain of the *Cherusci*, the first Roman citizen, born in a Roman

⁴⁴ B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 152. Claudius was Imp. III by 24 Jan. AD 43 (*ILS* 201).

⁴⁵ B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 151 n. 6; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 237; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 197 n. 60; B. Gallotta, *Germanico*, p. 131; K. E. Waugh, ‘Germans beyond the Limes: a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda’, pp. 45-46.

⁴⁶ Seneca *Cons. Ad Pol.* 13. 2.

⁴⁷ A. Barrett, *Caligula: The corruption of Power*, pp. 129-131; S. Wilkinson, *Caligula*, pp. 41-42; P. Bicknell, ‘The Emperor Gaius’ Military Activities in AD 40’, *Historia* 17 (4), Oct., 1968, pp. 503-4; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 153; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 205; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 61.

⁴⁸ Tac. *Ann.* xi.16-17. J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 237-8 n. 74; M. Ruge, ‘Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian’, p. 96; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 152-3 n. 12; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 61 n. 41.

⁴⁹ Tac. *Ann.* xi.16-17. M. Ruge, ‘Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian’, p. 96; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 152-3 n. 12; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 61 n. 41.

city, to be instated in such a position amongst the *Germani*.⁵⁰ Given the lack of a detailed literary account, measuring Roman interference in *Cherusci* affairs is difficult to gauge, but it seems plausible to suggest that the Roman interference in these affair was designed to ensure two specific key outcomes: destabilising the *Cherusci*, and the cultivation of a safe-guard against the *Chatti*. Such a barrier against the *Chatti* was obviously necessary; their actions in AD 41-42 had identified them as a perceived threat. Therefore, in conjunction with their existing alliance with the *Mattiaci*,⁵¹ the pact with the *Cherusci* established a buffer which enclosed the *Chatti*.⁵² Ultimately, the *Cherusci* could not be entirely trusted - their betrayal of Rome in AD 9 was a permanent reminder of their capacity to threaten Rome. Thus it was in Rome's interest to limit the stability and growth of the tribe. Destabilisation of the *Cherusci* was achieved through the cultivation of an anti-Roman faction amongst the tribe, which caused division and perpetuated an internal power struggle. Italicus' subsequent expulsion was only reversed through the support of the neighbouring tribe, the *Langobardi*, although even this reinstatement was only short lived.⁵³

⁵⁰ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 442; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The Emperor and His Achievements*, p. 61 n. 41; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 151.

⁵¹ There are archaeological indications of settlements of the *Mattiaci* round Wiesbaden in a *civitas Mattiacorum* in the years AD 16, see D. Baatz and F. R. Herrmann, *Die Römer in Hessen*, 2nd Ed., Stuttgart, 1982, p. 53; A. Becker, *Rom und die Chatten*, Quellen und Forschungen zur hessischen Geschichte 88, Darmstadt – Marburg, 1992, p. 97; W. Cysz, *Wiesbaden in der Römerzeit*, Stuttgart, 1994, p. 224; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533. Further south and directly adjacent are the *civitates* of the *Triboci* were transferred under Augustus to the left bank of the Rhine, and of the *Nemetes* and *Vangiones* who were integrated into the empire in the reign of Claudius at the latest, see C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533. Their old territory beyond the frontier on the right bank of the Rhine appears to been taken over by unnamed Elbe Germanic groups, see C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533.

⁵² M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 96-7; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 152; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 164; H.-G. Simon, 'Mattiaci', in D. Baatz, F.-R. Herrmann (ed.), *Die Römer in Hessen*, 1989, pp. 38-65; A. Becker, *Rom und die Chatten*, Quellen und Forschungen zur hessischen Geschichte 88, Darmstadt – Marburg, 1992, p. 97; W. Will, 'Roms 'Klientel-Randstaaten' am Rhein?', in *BJ* 187, 1987, 1-61.

⁵³ Tac. *Ann.* xi, 16-17. C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 442; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 152-3 n. 12.

In concert with Claudius' activities with the *Cherusci* in the Lower Rhine was the Roman employment of the *Suebi* in the defence of the upper Rhine region. There is no literary evidence which details the relationship that existed between the *Suebi* and the Romans during this period nor is there any record of a formal alliance or treaty. However, material finds of jewellery, pottery, charred bodies with weapons and jewellery, as well as Roman cultural goods, such as metal cutlery and vases, all point to a long-standing presence of the *Suebi* close to the Rhine, and indicate close political ties to Rome. The numerous discoveries of weaponry indicate that Rome employed the *Suebi* on the upper Rhine to defend against potential threats posed by other hostile tribes.⁵⁴ These discoveries attest to a Suebian presence at Diersheim, east of the legionary fortress of *Argentoratum* (Strasbourg), near the mouth of the Neckar, and as far as Ladenburg and Heidelberg.⁵⁵ Evidence also indicates their presence south-east of *Moguntiacum* and near the fort of Gross-Gerau.⁵⁶ Considering the imperial policy of forbidding Germanic settlement close to the Rhine, the presence of the *Suebi* in these areas must have occurred with imperial permission. However, none of these settlements were substantial or indicate vibrant communities. Furthermore, the lack of Roman military paraphernalia discounts the possibility that their role was as auxiliary forces. More probably they served in the capacity of mercenaries, being granted limited lands on the condition that they protected Roman interests on the Rhine. Clearly this was yet another safety measure undertaken by Claudius to ensure the security of the Rhine and offset the effect of the withdrawals of Roman legions in AD 43.

⁵⁴ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 196; O. Schlegel, 'Germanen an Oberrhein und Neckar: Fremde zwischen Tradition und Integration', in D. Planck (ed.), *Imperium Romanum: Roms Provinzen an Neckar, Rhein und Donau*, Archäologische Landesmuseum Baden Württemberg, Esslingen an Neckar, 2005, p. 87; M. Kemkes, J. Scheuerbrand and N. Wilburger, *Der Limes: Grenze Roms zu den Barbaren*, Jahn Thorbecke Verlag, Stuttgart, 2008, p. 239; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 98-9.

⁵⁵ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 99; O. Schlegel, 'Germanen an Oberrhein und Neckar: Fremde zwischen Tradition und Integration', 2005, p. 87.

⁵⁶ O. Schlegel, 'Germanen an Oberrhein und Neckar: Fremde zwischen Tradition und Integration', p. 87.

The perceived threat the *Germani* posed to the Romans still necessitated the presence of a large military force: Tiberius' policy reflects this. The enlarged legionary garrison on the Rhine under Gaius posed a significant threat to the emperor's position due to the potential such a large force of 10 legions could be used against an emperor.⁵⁷ Such a possibility had always been feared. Tiberius' policy called for the continuation of a large military force to act as a deterrent and as a strike force against any potential threat or incursion. Furthermore, the positioning of the legionary fortresses distributed along the east bank of the Rhine signalled a departure from the mobile invasion force and was aimed at containing and limiting the threat. However, the lack of permanent structures and fortifications imply possible future conquest were not officially abandoned. Furthermore, without the deterrent of overwhelming force and the threat of retaliation the *Germani* had proven to be hostile, as evidenced in periods of neglect when the *Germani* seized the opportunity to encroach into Roman territory and contest their supremacy. As discussed, Claudius addressed this concern, establishing permanent military structures, reinforced by fortifications and monitored with outposts and watch towers. Only after hostile tribes were suppressed, and permanent defences and bases constructed, were military forces reduced.

The Significance of Claudius' invasion of Britain

Claudius' subsequent invasion and occupation of Britain was another indicator signalling Rome's abandonment of any conceivable plan for an invasion and reconquest

⁵⁷ R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp 789-90.

of Germania, as made evident through the withdrawal of several Rhine legions.⁵⁸ Details of the invasion are difficult to reconstruct: the books dealing with the invasion in AD 43 are missing from Tacitus, and other literary evidence is limited to the later account of Dio, which is minimal and lacking in detail.⁵⁹ The invasion would remove three legions from the Rhine: *Legio II Augusta* (Argentorate),⁶⁰ *legio XIV Gemina* (Moguntiacum),⁶¹ and *legio XX Valeria* (Novaesium).⁶² Additional forces included a fourth legion from Pannonia *legio IX Hispana* (Siscia)⁶³ and an equal number of *auxilia* cohortes.⁶⁴ In total, it is estimated that the invasion force consisted of some 20,000 legionaries and the same number of auxiliaries, amounting to 40,000 men.⁶⁵ This reduction in military force did not leave the Rhine severely depleted of forces. This is due to the presence of two legions previously raised by Gaius and already positioned at Mainz-Weisenau *legio XV Primigenia* and *legio XXII Primigenia*, which were then

⁵⁸ J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 88-89; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 98; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 151-2 n. 9; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 153.

⁵⁹ Dio LX.19-22. J. Wachter, 'Britain 43 BC to AD 69', in *CAH²*, p. 507; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 427; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Invasion of Britain in AD 43 – An Alternative Strategy for Aulus Plautius', p. 2.

⁶⁰ Tac. *Ann.* xiv.34.

⁶¹ Tac. *Hist.* iii. 44.

⁶² Tac. *Ann.* xiv.34; iv, 5, 2; Suet. *Claud.* 17; Dio lx.19.1. J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6 n. 44, 15-25; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 88-89; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 98; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 151-2 n. 9; S. Frere, *Britannia: A History of Roman Britain*, 3rd ed., Routledge, London, 1987, p. 48; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 56; K. Kagan, 'Redefining Roman Grand Strategy', in *The Journal of Military History* 70, 2006, pp. 333-62; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 151-3.

⁶³ Tac. *Ann.* xiv.32.

⁶⁴ Tac. *Ann.* iv, 5, 2; Suet. *Claud.* 17; Dio lx.19.1. J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6 n. 44, 21; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 88-89; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 98; K. Kagan, 'Redefining Roman Grand Strategy', in *The Journal of Military History* 70, 2006, pp. 333-62; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 151-2 n. 9; S. Frere, *Britannia: A History of Roman Britain*, 3rd ed., Routledge, London, 1987, p. 48; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 151-3.

⁶⁵ D. J. Breeze, *The Northern Frontiers of Roman Britain*, 1982, pp. 73-92; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, p. 91; J. Wachter, 'Britain 43 BC to AD 69', in *CAH²*, p. 507; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 141; S. Frere, *Britannia: A History of Roman Britain*, 3rd ed., Routledge, London, 1987, p. 48;

redeployed at *Vetera* and *Moguntiacum* respectively.⁶⁶ A third legion, *legio IV Macedonica* (Pisoraca) was withdrawn from Spain and stationed at *Moguntiacum*.⁶⁷ Consequently the Rhine was still defended by eight legions in AD 43. Sometime after the initial invasion, the various legions stationed on the Rhine and Danube were rearranged. Most notably the Upper Rhine army lost a legion, *legio XIII Gemina* stationed at *Vindonissa* which was moved to *Poetovium* in Pannonia to replace the one taken for use in Britain c. AD 45.⁶⁸ Several of the remaining legions were repositioned: in the Lower Rhine; *legio I Germanica* at *Bonna*, *legio V Alaudae* and *XV Primigenia* at *Vetera*, *XVI Gallica Novaesium*, and in the Upper Rhine: *legio IV Macedonica* and *XXII Primigenia* occupied *Moguntiacum*. *Legio XXI Rapax* seems to have spent several years at *Argentoratum* before being transferred to *Vindonissa* where it was required to take the place of *legio XIII Gemina*. Whilst in Pannonia, *legio XIII Gemina* occupied *Poetovium* and *legio XV Apollinaris* was garrisoned on the Danube at *Carnuntum*.⁶⁹ While the Rhine garrison was reduced to seven legions, as mentioned earlier auxiliary forces had already been increased and deployed to bridge the gaps in defence between the legions⁷⁰ and diplomatic relations were continued with loyal allied tribes such as the *Cherusci*, *Mattiaci* and the *Suebi*.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Tac. *Ann.* iv, 5, 2; Suet. *Claud.* 17; Dio lx.19.1. J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6 n. 45, 24-25; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 89; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions during the Principate', in *Hermes*, Bd. 91, H. 4, 1963, p. 483; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 56;

⁶⁷ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6 n. 45, 18; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 128-9.

⁶⁸ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6, 22-23; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 167-8.

⁶⁹ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6, 15-25; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 167-8, 172; R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp 789-790.

⁷⁰ Tac. *Ann.* iv, 5, 2. B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 151-2 n. 9; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', 1969, p. 153.

⁷¹ Tac. *Hist.* iii.1. M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 98C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 533 n. 34; D. Baatz and F. R. Herrmann, *Die Römer in Hessen*, 2nd Ed., Stuttgart, 1982, p. 53.

Defences along the Lower Rhine

Along the Lower Rhine, especially in the delta region, Claudius' new permanent defence against the *Germani* is most evident. In the reign of Tiberius, there were few forts in the delta, perhaps only *Fectio* (Vechten), strategically placed near to the junction of the Old Rhine and the *Vecht* which flowed into the IJsselmeer.⁷² Under Claudius, for the first time, the chain of forts along the Rhine became an interconnected permanent system.⁷³ As discussed in Chapter 7, evidence indicates that after their revolt in AD 28 the *Frisii* still had some Roman military presence in their territory. Roman withdrawal from the region did not come until Claudius' reign c. AD 47. Significantly, this resulted in the area being invaded by the neighbouring *Chauci* and *Canenefatae*.⁷⁴ In response to this threat Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, commander of the lower Rhine army, was deployed. He neutralised the threat, but later exceeded his authority when he began to annex and establish a stable military position deep in Frisian territory.⁷⁵ Claudius ordered his immediate recall.⁷⁶ Coinciding with this recall was the

⁷² K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes: a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', PhD diss., Durham University, p. 45; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 96-7.

⁷³ K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes: a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 46.

⁷⁴ Tac. *Ann.* XI. 18-20; Dio LX-LXI. 30.4-6. D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, London, 2011, p. 95; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 237-8 n. 74; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 153; W. Eck, 'Statthalter', pp. 118-20; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 442; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 236; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533; M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', p. 949; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, pp. 197-8; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 145; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 61 n. 41.

⁷⁵ Tac. *Ann.* II, 20, I; Dio LX-LXI. 30. 4-6. K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes: a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', PhD diss., Durham University, p. 45; H. Callies, 'Römer und Germanen im Nördlichen Deutschland', in R. Busch (ed.), *Rom an der Niederelbe*, Neumünster, 1995, p. 22; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 237-8 n. 74; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 153 n. 13; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 236; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533; M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', p. 949; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, pp. 197-8; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 145; A. Momigliano, *Claudius: The emperor and his Achievements*, p. 61 n. 41; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 152.

⁷⁶ Tac. *Ann.* II, 19-20.

construction of several auxiliary forts, built on south bank of the Rhine, between Vechten and the North Sea.⁷⁷ There were early smaller bases evident further westward, at Meinerswijk, Vechten, and Velsen. Claudius' forts downstream of Vechten were established at Alphen aan den Rijn, Woerden, Roomburg, and Valkenburg.⁷⁸ There is also some evidence supporting the presence of timber watchtowers in the same area which date to the same period.⁷⁹ A later road linked the towers and forts in the region.⁸⁰ These forts were laid out immediately adjacent to the river, prone to flooding, even when less vulnerable locations were available nearby.⁸¹ Three important functions were facilitated by the positioning of these installations: they secured the Rhine delta against the neighbouring *Germani*, facilitated the support of the conquest of Britain, and controlled German piracy. In effect Romans defences against the *Germani* were now indurated. The function of this system can be viewed as the precursor of what would be the '*Limes*', marking a pivotal point in the defence against the *Germani*.

The Upper Rhine: the Chattan Threat

Despite the arrangements made by Rome to safeguard the frontier along the Upper Rhine against the Chattan threat, in AD 50 the tribe raided across the river into Roman

⁷⁷ M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', in A. Morillo, N. Hanel & E. Martín (eds.), *LIMES XX*, p. 945 see n. 1; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533; J. E. Bogaers & C. B. Rüger (eds.), *Der Niedergermanische Limes: Materialien zu seiner Geschichte*, Kunst und Altertum am Rhein 50, Klein, 1974, pp. 44-58; J. K. Haalebos, *Zwammerdam – Nigrum Pullum: Ein Auxiliarkastell am Niedergermanischen Limes*, Cingula 3, Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 248-5; H. Schönberger, 'Roman Army Camp of the Early and Middle Imperial Period between the North Sea and the Inn', *BRGK* 66, pp. 345-6.

⁷⁸ M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', in A. Morillo, N. Hanel & E. Martín (eds.), *LIMES XX*, pp. 945-8 see n. 1, 5; J. E. Bogaers & C. B. Rüger (eds.), *Der Niedergermanische Limes: Materialien zu seiner Geschichte*, Kunst und Altertum am Rhein 50, Klein, 1974, pp. 44-58; J. K. Haalebos, *Zwammerdam – Nigrum Pullum: Ein Auxiliarkastell am Niedergermanischen Limes*, Cingula 3, Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 248-5; H. Schönberger, 'Roman army camp of the early and middle imperial period between the North Sea and the Inn', *BRGK* 66, pp. 345-6.

⁷⁹ M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', p. 948; D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, London, 2011, p. 95 see pl. 10.

⁸⁰ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, London, 2011, p. 95 see pl. 10; M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', p. 948.

⁸¹ M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', p. 949.

territory. Tacitus' account of the incident does not mention the size of the force or the location of the incursion, only citing a panic in Upper Germania, and the desire for plunder is the only apparent motivation attributed.⁸² In response to this incursion Publius Pomponius Secundus, commander of the Upper Rhine, deployed two forces. The first was made up of the local auxiliary forces composed of the Vangiones and the Nemetes, along with allied cavalry in support.⁸³ The second force consisted of at least two legions under Pomponius' command. Such a response would indicate that it was more than just a few maunders, but rather at least a substantial force perhaps dispersed into smaller groups. Significantly, this incident highlights the new role Germanic forces had in the defence of the Rhine. Here is a clear example of how Rome utilised allied tribes as part of the frontier and as a supply of manpower to combat hostile elements east of the river. The forces were divided into three groups. One force consisted of the auxiliaries and cavalry who were sent off to, 'head off the raiders, or, if they scattered, to envelop and surprise them'.⁸⁴ The second and third were made up of the legions which were divided into two columns, one column was sent left and managed to entrap some of the raiders,⁸⁵ the second force took the shorter route and managed to inflict more significant losses on the enemy as they approached the *Mons Taunus*. In the hopes of inflicting more severe losses on the *Chatti*, Pomponius established an ambush position at the heights of the Taunus. The position of the ambush was ideal; it offered the Romans control of the battlefield and added support was given through the close

⁸² Tac. *Ann.* xii.27-28.

⁸³ Tac. *Ann.* xii.27. Both of these tribes were from the Hesse-Nassau districts, the Vangiones and Nemetes were settled on the west bank of the Rhine, their principal towns being *Borbetomagus* (Worms) and *Noviomagus* (Speyer) respectively, see B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 154; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 238 n. 75; A. Goldsworthy, 'War', in P. Sabin, Hans Van Wees and M. Whitby (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare: Volume II Rome from the late Republic to the late Empire*, p. 93; J. Jackson trans., *Tacitus: The Annals, Books IV-VI, XI-XII*, Harvard University Press, London, 2006, pp. 352-3 n. 1. The identity of the cavalry forces is not mentioned.

⁸⁴ Tac. *Ann.* XII. 27.

⁸⁵ Supposedly whilst overcoming the Chatti the Romans managed to free a few survivors of the Varian disaster who had been enslaved for 40 years, see Tac. *Ann.* XII. 27.

proximity of their allies, the *Cherusci*.⁸⁶ Revenge alone not being motivation enough, the *Chatti* were unwilling to risk an engagement under these circumstances, sending a deputation to Rome with hostages, essentially becoming a vassal tribe.⁸⁷ This incident highlights the success of several of Claudius' Germanic policies: the increase in numbers and deployment of the auxiliaries on the Rhine, the role and use of allied Germanic tribes in the defence of the Rhine and as a buffer against hostile forces, and importantly significant success gained despite the limited use of the legions. Claudius' changes on the Rhine were enough to combat this level of threat from the *Germani*, successfully removing Rome's largest threat in the region, redeeming and justifying his decision to reduce the number of legions. His actions along the Rhine therefore effectively embodied, and improved upon, Tiberius' policy of defending against the Germanic threat with minimal risk and resources whilst gaining maximum advantage and profit.

Defences along the Danube (the initial shift in Military focus)

In conjunction with the changes implemented along the Rhine similar important developments occurred along the Danube, where, Claudius clearly deviated from the policies implemented by his predecessors. These changes further reflect Claudius' renunciation of military operations in Germania and highlight the increased importance of the Danube. The largest indicator of this policy can be seen through the greater emphasis placed on the strategic defence of the Roman position in Raetia and Noricum. This policy can be seen as a direct result of the growing military problems on the

⁸⁶ Tac. *Ann.* XII. 27.3-28. B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 154; V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 198 n. 63; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 238 n. 76; A. Goldsworthy, 'War', in P. Sabin, Hans Van Wees and M. Whitby (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare: Volume II Rome from the late Republic to the late Empire*, p. 93;

⁸⁷ Dio LX. 8. 7; Tac. *Ann.* 11. 20; 12. 27-8. V. M. Scramuzza, *The Emperor Claudius*, p. 198. For a commemorative coin of these victories, see H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, *Roman Imperial Coinage*, vol. I, p. 125, pl. V, n. 87.

Danube evident in both the literary and archaeological record.⁸⁸ This shift in policy was further prompted by the increased threat north of the Danube generated from the collapse of Vannius' kingdom and the menace represented by the tribes of *Sarmatae* and *Dacii*. Claudius' intent to consolidate and defend the Roman position on the Danube can be seen in several areas: the construction of roads, the annexation of Thrace and Moesia on the Lower Danube and incorporation of Raetia and Noricum on the Upper Danube, and most significantly the expansion of military and naval bases along the river.⁸⁹

During Claudius' principate a shift to the Danube is discernible after AD 50, being evident in the literary record with Tacitus' *Annals*, which indicates that there were no military triumphs awarded between AD 17 and 83 for Germania.⁹⁰ As extensively explained above, along the Rhine the decision against reconquest was taken on rational grounds; thereafter *aemulatio Caesaris* was limited to engineering achievements, such as copying his exploits in bridging the Rhine. With Claudius' restriction of military activities across the Rhine the capacity for a commander to distinguish himself in combat was very limited, hence the practice of bridging the river effectively become common practice amongst the commanders of the Upper and Lower Rhine, and can arguably be seen as amounting to be the pinnacle of their career in Germania.⁹¹ Legates were now given recognition and awards for engineering achievements and especially for

⁸⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 2. 64-67, 3. 38-39, 4. 46-51. Revolts in Thrace, see Dio 69.8.2; *ILS* 2713; *ILS* 9197. M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 99.

⁸⁹ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 99; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, 1969, p. 96; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 157; J. J., Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138.

⁹⁰ Rhine legions, see Tac. *Ann.* iv. 5. 2. B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 151-2 n. 9; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 153.

⁹¹ C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 531; H. Wolf, 'Raetia', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 541; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p.154 n. 71.

maintaining peace and quiet along the Rhine.⁹² This is attested in Tacitus when, writing of events in Nero's reign, he reports that commanders believed that triumphal insignia had been so cheapened that they would win more recognition if they kept things quiet.⁹³ Thereafter, ambitious commanders would need to seek a command on the Danube in order to gain military glory and rapid advancement.⁹⁴

As outlined in the previous sections the first phase of Roman activity along the Danube was under Augustus and Tiberius; these were mainly strategic manoeuvres undertaken in response to threats resulting from the aftermath of Augustus' wars of conquest. The second phase was undertaken during Claudius' reign, with a concerted effort to secure the Danubian frontier and defend against specific threats north of the river. This phase consisted of stationing legionary and auxiliary forces in bases along roads leading to the Danube and near the river itself, placed at strategic and vulnerable positions, such as crossings and valleys.⁹⁵

Justification for this strategic change can be attributed to two factors: the collapse of Vannius' kingdom, and the hostility and encroachments south of the Sarmatians and Dacians. These threats were significant: they identified Rome's vulnerability to attack from the north. As discussed earlier, AD 50 marked Vannius' defeat and expulsion from his territory located east of the Rhine and north of the Danube, occupying much of modern Bohemia and Moravia. Rome and Vannius' relationship was formed shortly

⁹² B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 154-5.

⁹³ For quit control see, Tac. *Ann.* xii, 28-30; 13, 53.

⁹⁴ D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 96; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 156 n. 22; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 175.

⁹⁵ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 149.

after Maroboduus' downfall. Vannius filled the power vacuum left after the former's collapse, gathering to himself many of the tribes in the region. As stipulated earlier, the Romans feared above all the development of a large stable power east of the Rhine.⁹⁶ Despite the threat this new kingdom posed to the Romans, they decided to work with Vannius and form an alliance, effectively establishing Vannius' kingdom as a buffer against threats from the north and east. Rome's decision to abandon Vannius and condone the coup was due to his successors' (Vannius' nephews Sido and Vangio) willingness to maintain the relationship with Rome.⁹⁷ Whilst both parties were willing to preserve an alliance, it was in Rome's interests to remain uninvolved in the conflict and then lend their support to the victor, thus avoiding losses and yet still gaining a favourable result.

Along the Lower Danube the situation was becoming more threatening with the hostile presence of the Sarmatians and Dacians north of Moesia and east of Pannonia.⁹⁸ The situation was not new to Claudius' reign, it was apparent in the first half of the first century AD with the Sarmatians, nomadic Iranian horsemen driven westwards from the steppes of Kazakhstan by the Huns, who were moving south pushing both east and west of the Dacians. Both the Sarmatians and Dacians had participated in raids into Moesia in AD 6-7, forcing Aulus Caecina Severus to return to the province.⁹⁹ Since the time of Caesar, the Dacians had been considered a threat, but since the demise of Burebista their

⁹⁶ B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 151 n. 8; J. Dobiáš, 'King Maroboduus as a Politician', *Klio* 38, 1960, pp. 155-66.

⁹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* XII.29-30.

⁹⁸ V. Bârcă, 'Nomads of the Steppes by the Danube frontier of the Roman Empire in the 1st C CE', *Historical Sketch and Chronological Remarks, Dacia*, LVII, 2013, p. 99-125; J. J., Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138; D. Shotter, *Nero*, p. 29; J. Harmatta, *Studies on the History of the Sarmatians*, 1950, pp. 3-10; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 176; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 151.

⁹⁹ Dio LV. 30.2-4. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Politics*, p. 150.

potential danger significantly declined with the inherent disunity that followed his death.¹⁰⁰ Despite this decline and disunity, Roman forces continued to defend against constant raiding into the adjacent provinces of Moesia and Pannonia.¹⁰¹ Specific threats from the Sarmatians can be mainly attributed to two distinct tribes in this period, the *Roxolani* and the *Iazyges*. By mid-century the *Roxolani* were established to the east of the Dacians beyond the Danube delta, the *Iazyges* in the Great Hungarian Plain. As discussed earlier, the *Iazyges*, supposedly expelled by the Dacians before AD 50, were deliberately settled by the Romans as a defensive measure.¹⁰² Similar to Vannius, the *Iazyges*' settlement was strategically positioned as a buffer between the *Marcomanni* and the Dacians.¹⁰³ Florus' description of the Sarmatians as a people who 'did not know the meaning of peace' depicts them from a Roman perspective as a tribe that could not be fully trusted and needed to be monitored.¹⁰⁴ This view seems justified considering the Sarmatians' involvement in affairs throughout the region, such as their provision of cavalry for Vannius in AD 50.¹⁰⁵ These two threats exposed Rome's weak and disjointed defence against threats north of the Danube. In response to this situation actions were undertaken to counteract these weaknesses, thus a policy of stabilisation and consolidation was commenced.

¹⁰⁰ Suet. *Iul.* 44.3; Strabo 298; Vell. Pat. 2.59.4; App. *B. Civ.* 2.110. D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 102; I. A. Oltean, *Dacia: Landscape, Colonisation and Romanization*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 47, 50; M. Schmitz, *Roman Conquests: The Danubian Frontier*, Pen & Sword, London, 2014, pp. 95-96.

¹⁰¹ I. A. Oltean, *Dacia: Landscape, Colonisation and Romanization*, p. 50.

¹⁰² Pliny *NH* iv.80-81. D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Politics*, p. 168 n. 55; A. Alföldi, 'Peoples of North Europe'; 'The central Danubian provinces', in *CAH*, Vol. XI, 1936, p. 85.

¹⁰³ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate', p. 168 n. 56. A. Alföldi, 'Peoples of North Europe'; 'The Central Danubian Provinces', in *CAH*, Vol. XI, 1936, p. 85; E. M. Vrba, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: the Impact of Trade and Contact Along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 82

¹⁰⁴ Florus II. 29.

¹⁰⁵ Tac. *Ann.* XII. 29-30.

Vannius' defeat identified that Rome effectively relied heavily on a fragile kingdom, which was effectively a loose alliance of several Germanic tribes. This kingdom had proven it could be swiftly overthrown and easily turned into a liability for Rome. In response to this potential threat the governor of Pannonia, Sex. Palpellius Hister, was instructed to deploy on to the south bank of the Danube, in order to prevent the incident from escalating and defend against a possible incursion into Roman territory.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, in order to strengthen the frontier and consolidate a defence along the Danube, Rome seized direct control of Raetia, Noricum, and Moesia.¹⁰⁷ The province of Raetia was formally constituted sometime during Claudius' reign with its governing seat presumably at Kempten, later moved to *Augusta Vindelicum* (Augsburg).¹⁰⁸ Formal annexation during this period is deduced from epigraphical evidence attesting to Claudius' appointment of an equestrian procurator to Raetia and Vindelicia.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, dating Noricum's formal annexation in AD 46 is derived from citing an inscription discovered on a milestone, the earliest known date referencing the province.¹¹⁰ Annexation of Thrace and Moesia was undertaken between AD 44 and 47, as the previously existing client kingdoms had proved too unstable and Claudius deemed direct rule preferable over constant Roman intervention.¹¹¹ As a result of these

¹⁰⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 2. 63, 7; 12, 29-30; Pliny *NH* 4. 81. J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 238 n. 77; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 155-6 n. 21. Arrabona, see E. Szönyi, *Alba Regia* 19, 1982, pp. 135-40; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 175;

¹⁰⁷ H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p. 154 n. 71; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 441; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, London, 1974, p. 84 see n. 85; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 156. For Noricum, see P. Kneißl, 'Die Entstehung der Provincia Noricum', *Chiron* 9, 1979, p. 263, citing *CIL* III 5709 as the oldest milestone in the province.

¹⁰⁸ H. Wolf, 'Raetia', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, pp. 541-2 n. 18; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 441; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, London, 1974, p. 84 see n. 85; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p. 154 n. 71.

¹⁰⁹ *CIL* V 3936= *ILS* 1348.

¹¹⁰ *CIL* III 5709. B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 156; P. Kneißl, 'Die Entstehung der Provincia Noricum', p. 263; E. Weber, 'Noricum und die Verleihung des 'Provinzialstatuts'', in H. Valentinitich (ed.), *Recht und Geschichte*, Festschrift H. Baltl, 1988, pp. 611-617.

¹¹¹ B. Gerov, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der römischen Provinzen Moesien und Thrakien*, vol. 3, 1998, pp. 1-406; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 122; M. Ruge,

annexations Rome now wielded direct control over the length of the Danube and the process of establishing an integrated defence of the river was begun.¹¹²

Noricum and Raetia both underwent dramatic military alterations under Claudius. Noricum which had previously had primarily auxiliary forces deployed (mainly to secure trade routes and monitor local tribes), had its military forces moved up to the line of the Danube. An indication of this shift north is seen in the abandonment of the mining centre at Magdalensberg, which had a unit of *auxilia* stationed there under Augustus, as well as other military posts in the interior, such as Celeia (Celje).¹¹³ Similarly, in Raetia, which had previously held military forces deployed to supervise the alpine tribes and passes, had no evidence of military camps in the interior Alpine region.¹¹⁴ All these changes suggest that internal unrest was not the prominent issue but that the defence of the frontier was a priority. Essential to the redeployment along the Danube was the *Via Claudia Augusta*, which led from the river Po to Augsburg via the Alps and to Lech on the river Danube.¹¹⁵ This was expanded under Claudius in AD 46/47,¹¹⁶ thereby connecting the military garrisons along the bank of the Danube and

‘Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian’, p. 99; J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 96-8; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 156-7; J. J. Wilkes, ‘The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey’, p. 138; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 43; B. Gerov, ‘Die Grenzen der römischen Provinz Thrakien’, in *ANRW* II 7.1, 1979, pp. 212-240.

¹¹² C. Thomas, ‘Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms’, p. 441; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey’, *JRS* 59 (1-2), p. 154 n. 71; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 84 see n. 85; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 156 n. 22; P. Kneißl, ‘Die Entstehung der Provincia *Noricum*’, p. 263.

¹¹³ C. Thomas, ‘Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms’, p. 441; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, pp. 103-4; J. J. Wilkes, ‘The Danubian and Balkan Provinces’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 572. Pannonia, see A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 48-51. Noricum, see G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 65;

¹¹⁴ H. Wolf, ‘Raetia’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 542; D. Kortüm, ‘Zur Datierung der röm. Militäranlagen im obergermanischen-rätischen Grenzgebiet’, in *Saalburg-Jb.* 49, 1998, pp. 5-65.

¹¹⁵ R. Wolters, *Römische Eroberung und Herrschaftsorganisation in Gallien und Germanien: zur Entstehung und Bedeutung der sogenannten Klientel-Randstaaten*, Bochum, Studienverlag Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer, 1990, p. 62; J. J. Wilkes, ‘The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey’, p. 146; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 58; K. Dietz, ‘Okkupation und Frühzeit’, in W. Czersky, K. Dietz, T. Fischer and K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, Nikolverlagsgesellschaft GmbH, Hamburg, 2005, p. 73.

¹¹⁶ *CIL* V 8002-3 (cf. *ILS* 208).

establishing improved communications with the Rhine through the Black Forest.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the control of the river itself was also crucial for communication and transportation as well as being essential for defence. By the reign of Claudius, the *classis Pannonica* was patrolling the upper course of the Danube as far as *Carnuntum*, though perhaps not yet fully organised with permanent bases, evident in the fleet's role in transporting the exiled Vannius across the river.¹¹⁸

Claudius' first phase of securing the Danube was in the form of the establishment of several military bases including, Hüfingen an der Berg, Unterkirchberg, Ristissen, Aislingen and Burghöfe, as well as smaller installations at Neuburg on the Danube and Weltenburg.¹¹⁹ At this stage there is no evidence for the presence of a large fortress or a significant military presence. However, the placement of the small bases in strategically significant defensive locations cannot be overlooked. These bases were strategically located on higher ground and enabled the Romans to observe the surrounding terrain, such as mouths of rivers and valley passages.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 187-8; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 441; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, pp. 103-4; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, p. 238 see n. 78; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 155 n. 20; G. Mildenberger, *Germ.* 39, 1961, pp. 60-87; L. P. Filtzinger, 'Bemerkungen zur römischen Okkupationsgeschichte Südwestdeutschlands', in *BJ* 157, 1957, pp. 181-98; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p. 154 n. 72; H. Wolf, 'Raetia', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 542.

¹¹⁸ Tac. *Ann.* ii.63; xii.29-30. B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 182 n. 90.

¹¹⁹ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 60; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 155 n. 20; G. Mildenberger, *Germ.* 39, 1961, pp. 60-87; L. P. Filtzinger, 'Bemerkungen zur römischen Okkupationsgeschichte Südwestdeutschlands', pp. 181-98; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1-2), p.154 n. 71; H. Wolf, 'Raetia', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 542; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danubian and Balkan Provinces', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 572; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and upper Moesia*, pp. 48-51; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 65.

¹²⁰ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 99.

Bases at Hüfingen an der Breg, Risstissen and Oberstimm on the Danube clearly indicate that Claudius sought to defend Roman interest in Raetia and Noricum.¹²¹ Hüfingen an der Breg was a defensive fort, though evidence suggests it was built as part of a civilian settlement on the western side of the Danube. Development of this site indicates that Claudius intended a permanent occupation of the area. Epigraphic evidence indicates the presence of auxiliary forces at the fort, inscriptions mentioning LEG XI CPE,¹²² suggesting that it could house a legion and had a defensive purpose. Hüfingen was a significant site, measuring 3.5 hectares in area with a ditch and wooden-earth wall, with its strategic importance indicated by its location between the Black Forest and the upper Rhine: a vital defensive position along the frontier. Furthermore, its position could support the theory Claudius sought to shorten the communication route between the Rhine and Danube.¹²³

Archaeological evidence at Risstissen indicates a military base, and later a settlement, demonstrating Claudius' decision to defend the Roman position in Raetia.¹²⁴ The required extension of the west-east route in the Danube Valley and the effective northern closure of provincial Raetia confirm the purpose of the base.¹²⁵ Again the

¹²¹ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, pp. 58, 62; K. Dietz, 'Okkupation und Frühzeit', 2005, p. 75; M. Kemkes, 'Vom Rhein an den Limes und wieder zurück: Die Besetzungsgeschichte Südwestdeutschlands', in D. Planck (ed.), *Imperium Romanum: Roms Provinzen an Neckar, Rhein und Donau*, Archäologische Landesmuseum Baden Württemberg, Esslingen an Neckar, 2005, p. 46; D. Planck (ed.), *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, Theiss, Stuttgart, 2005, pp. 128-9; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 155 n. 20; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danubian and Balkan Provinces', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 572; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and upper Moesia*, pp. 48-51; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 65;

¹²² D. Planck (ed.), *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, 2005, p. 129.

¹²³ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 100; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 62; D. Planck (ed.), *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, 2005, p. 129.

¹²⁴ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 100; D. Planck (ed.), *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, 2005, pp. 65-6; K. Dietz, 'Okkupation und Frühzeit', 2005, p. 75; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 155;

¹²⁵ D. Planck (ed.), *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, 2005, p. 65.

location of the site reveals its defensive purpose. Positioned approximately twenty metres above the river Danube, the main encampment was 1.7 hectares in area with a ditch, wooden earth wall and guard towers, which served as protection and observation posts. The importance and permanence of the base is apparent with the existence of a *principia*, a *praetorium*, a supply warehouse, and a five metre warehouse for the storage of military equipment and baggage.¹²⁶ The supply warehouse would indicate that the base had a further role on the Danube, perhaps serving as a logistical support base supplying the legions during the construction phase along the Danube.¹²⁷

Oberstimm is a further display of Claudius' defensive policy in Raetia on the river Danube. The precise size of the fort and the presence of supply and trade warehouses is an indication of Rome's permanent occupation of the area.¹²⁸ Although there is no evidence regarding the presence of military units, it seems probable that a *cohors quingenaria equitata* was stationed here.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the existence of warehouses would suggest the base had a logistical role, similar to Risstissen. Confirmation of this role can be seen in Oberstimm strategic location, positioned between two important routes between the Alps and the river Danube, as well as between the Danube and Niederterassenrücken.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ D. Planck (ed.), *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, 2005, p. 66.

¹²⁷ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 101.

¹²⁸ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 62.

¹²⁹ K. Dietz, 'Okkupation und Frühzeit', 2005, p. 127.

¹³⁰ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 101; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 62.

Further east, in Pannonia and Moesia, it is apparent that Claudius made minimal changes from policies of his predecessors.¹³¹ Unlike Raetia and Noricum, these provinces were not directly on the path to Rome; their defence was important but they did not present a distinct vulnerability at this time. The threat posed by the *Marcomanni*, Sarmatians, and Dacians was reason enough to build up military strength on the Danube. Thomas argues that there was a possible relationship between the provinces that had imperial visits during Claudius' reign and had consequent reorganisation and development (Upper and Lower Rhine, Raetia and Noricum), and those that did not receive a visit and underwent less change (Moesia and Pannonia).¹³² In Pannonia, as was the situation along the Rhine, large numbers of auxiliaries were positioned on the Danube in place of a reduced legionary presence. Notably under Claudius a large number of cavalry units were deployed along the main roads leading to the Danube, specifically units were strategically stationed at *Sala* (Zalalövo), *Savaria*, *Scarbantia*, and *Carnuntum*. Evidence of other units deployed near the *termini* of other roads in the north and east of Pannonia, at *Arrabona*, *Brigetio*, *Aquincum*, *Gorsium*, *Mursa*, and *Teutoburgium* (Dalj) may have been established under Claudius, or possibly earlier.¹³³ *Legio XV Apollinaris* was still maintained at *Carnuntum* confronting the *Marcomanni*, *legio VIII Augusta* at *Poetovium* (Ptuj), whilst *legio IX Hispana*, perhaps at *Siscia*, was reassigned to the conquest of Britain and only replaced by *legio XIII Gemina* in c. AD 45.¹³⁴ In Moesia, legionary bases appear on the Danube positioned to observe the Sarmatians and Dacians, *legio IV Scythia* possibly at *Scupi* (Skopje) and *legio V*

¹³¹ C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 441; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, 1974, London, pp. 40-1.

¹³² C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 441.

¹³³ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danubian and Balkan Provinces', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 572. A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and upper Moesia*, pp. 48-51; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 65.

¹³⁴ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 6, 15-25; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 172, 150-151, 167-8; R. Syme & R. G. Collingwood, 'The Northern Frontiers from Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*, Vol. X, pp. 789-790; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 156-7 n. 23; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and upper Moesia*, p. 43; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 96-8.

Macedonica garrisoned at *Oescus* (Ghigen).¹³⁵ Furthermore, legions in Dalmatia were reorientated to support forces on the Danube, both stationed on river valleys leading into the interior: *legio VII* at *Tilurium* (Gardun) and *legio XI* at *Burnum* (Ivosevci).¹³⁶

Therefore, under Claudius the military was deliberately positioned at nodal points located along the Danube. It was concerned with the maintenance of internal security, and was a continuous and connected defence against the external threats present north of the river. This also enabled improved transportation and communications between the Rhine and Danube. The removal of troops from the Danube command for the British expedition and later for the Armenian campaigns have been interpreted as an indicator of pacification in the region or as a measure of the emperor's lack of interest in the region as a whole.¹³⁷ That supposition might be presumed correct if not for the subsequent events in AD 50. These events highlight Claudius' misjudgement of the situation and the apparent vulnerability it exposed: vulnerability made apparent through the instability and unreliability of allied peoples north of the Danube.

In response, Claudius endeavoured to contain and rectify this oversight. The increased number of auxiliaries and bases are evidence of a programme to develop a

¹³⁵ S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 132, 136; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 18-9; J. Osgood, *Claudius Caesar: Image and Power in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 123-4; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, pp. 174-5; B. Gerov, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der römischen Provinzen Moesien und Thrakien*, vol. 3, 1998; V. Velkov, *Geschichte und Kultur Thrakiens und Moesiens*, Gesammelte Aufsätze, 1988.

¹³⁶ D. Dzino, 'Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and Early Principate', p. 163; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 27; B. Levick, *Claudius*, pp. 156-7; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and upper Moesia*, p. 43; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia*, pp. 96-8.

¹³⁷ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', pp. 102-3; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 144, 163.

permanent coordinated defence on the Danube and a change in concept and function for the military in the region. As with the Rhine, the army can now be viewed as a guarding the frontier, whereas previously it had been a mobile force suited to conquest and occupation. These measures effectively contained the potential threat north of the Danube and established an initial, though not closed, defence against the threats posed by the *Germani*, *Sarmatae* and *Dacii*.

CHAPTER TEN

Consequences of Neglected Frontiers and the Inadequacy of the Julio-Claudian Defences: Nero to Vespasian— AD 54–70

The reign of *Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus* (Nero), AD 54-68, was one marked by rebellion and upheaval, culminating in the demise of the Julio-Claudian dynasty. Significantly, Nero's downfall and the subsequent civil war resulted in the distortion and fragmentation of the historical record, and any account of his reign can only ever be partially reconstructed. Although events concerning Nero are centred on Britain, the East, and the emperor himself, there are some points that can be ascertained regarding Rome's interaction with the *Germani* and events along the Rhine and Danube. Nero maintained the military and diplomatic policies implemented by his predecessor Claudius; only in the east was there any significant divergence. Nero continued the conciliatory approach to the frontiers with respect to the *Germani*, and enforced the controls implemented by Tiberius and maintained by his successors.

The subsequent *bellum Neronis* brought about the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and with it a temporary fracturing of the Roman Empire. The ensuing Civil Wars, AD 68-9, divided Roman resources and military strength amongst competing candidates and as a result Rome's defences along the Rhine and Danube were neglected and weakened. As a consequence of the civil conflict the neighbouring tribes on both frontiers, most significantly the *Germani*, took advantage of Rome's compromised position. These events reinforced the Romans' view of the threat posed by the *Germani* and exposed a growing concern with other tribes north of the Danube. As a direct result of these events, Vespasian would direct considerable strength and resources to

consolidate and reinforce both frontiers in an effort to defend against the Germanic threat and the emerging menace posed by the Sarmatian and Dacian tribes.

In this chapter, the various installations and movements along the Rhine and Danube will be explored, along with the limited recorded interactions with the Germanic tribes. There are three events of note: the incursions of the *Frisii*, the attempted settlement and war with the *Ampsivarii* and most significantly the betrayal by the *Batavi*. These events highlight Nero's policy of maintaining the *status quo* against the *Germani*, and only Nero's failures as an emperor resulted in disaster. Additionally, this chapter examines the tumultuous period entitled the 'Year of the Four Emperors', AD 69. Key events and developments that occurred during this period will once again be the focus; details concerning specific emperors, however, will be limited, and the reigns of the Flavian emperors will be explored in the subsequent chapter. Overall, this chapter identifies the impact of Roman neglect along the Rhine and Danube frontiers, and the resulting necessary containment of the *Germani*, *Sarmatae*, and *Dacii*.

Nero: Historical Context (Bias in the Primary Evidence)

Evidence for Nero's reign is sparse, with the little that is known clearly biased against him, making any account of his rule fragmented and inadequate. The surviving literary evidence of Nero's reign is commonly divided into three distinct phases: his initial rule, the middle years, and his final 'monstrous' years. Generally speaking, very little contemporary evidence survives; the majority of the evidence is contributed by later sources. Significantly, most of the existing evidence for Nero's reign covers the earlier years, and the accounts of the later and final years of his reign are either missing or distorted. This distortion or destruction of the historical record is to be expected, as

the succeeding Flavians would have felt the need to erase or alter the legacy and image of Nero's reign in order to legitimise their usurpation of power and their own rule.¹ Some later sources that cover the initial period of Nero's reign, the so-called *quinquennium Neronis*,² refer to it as a good and promising beginning to his rule,³ recording it as a time of enlightened despotism when a young princeps was guided by a group of knowledgeable and trusted advisors. Chief amongst them was his tutor Lucius Annaeus Seneca, and the Praetorian Prefect Sextus Afranius Burrus, both of whom are depicted in the accounts as guiding the young emperor and aiding in the running of the empire. Historiographically, however, this version of events, may well have been a myth, conjured up by those attempting to justify and excuse their initial cooperation with Nero, all agreeing later that Nero had become a monster and his removal and death necessary.⁴ In line with the concept of an initial period of good rule, AD 59 marked the turning point in Nero's reign; the restraint shown in his first five years was forgotten, as he resented and eventually rejected the interference of his mother Agrippina and that of his advisors. The debate surrounding Nero's involvement in his mother's death is an old and long one, the truth of which is beyond the scope of this work. According to the sources, Nero's position after this event is clear, the restraining and controlling influences were removed, and he reigned over the empire uninhibited and his enlightened rule descended into a tyranny.

¹ M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 110; D. Shotter, *Nero*, pp. 38-9.

² A comment attributed to the emperor Trajan by Sextus Aurelius Victor (*Liber de Caesaribus*, 5, 1-4) and in the *Incerti Auctoris Epitome de Caesaribus* (5, 1-5). T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*², vol. X, pp. 243-4. For the debate surrounding the comment, see M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, pp. 112-15; F. A. Lepper, 'Some Reflections on the Quinquennium Neronis', *JRS* 1957, pp. 95-103; O. Murray, 'The Quinquennium Neronis and the Stoics', *Historia* 14 (1), pp. 41-61.

³ Debate also surrounds which time period the comment is referring to, this is discussed below.

⁴ O. Murray, 'The Quinquennium Neronis and the Stoics', *Historia* 14 (1), pp. 41-61; M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, pp. 109-11; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 5-10; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the End of a Dynasty*, pp. 37-49; M. Goodman, *Roman World 44 BC- AD 180*, p. 56.

Conversely, Hind argues for AD 65 as the most significant date of Nero's reign, stating that after the exposure of the conspiracy Nero's principate degenerated into a tyranny.⁵ His argument is based on the premise that the main historical sources for this period, Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio, contain no concept of an initial good five years. All focus their works on Nero's excesses and obscenities, as well as his repression of the Senate.⁶ Therefore, in line with these accounts the turning points of Nero's reign are viewed as the following: AD 55, removal of Agrippina as a policy maker and the assassination of Britannicus; AD 59, the murder of Agrippina; AD 62, most significantly, the death of Burrus, the forced retirement of Seneca, and the political murders of Cornelius Sulla and Rubellius Plautus; and finally AD 65, the Conspiracy of Piso (maturing since AD 62), marked Nero's breaking point and descent into unrestrained tyranny.⁷

Connected to the argument presented by Hind is the debate surrounding the period indicated by the comment *quinquennium Neronis*, supposedly uttered by Trajan in reference to a specific period during Nero's reign. It is partially due to this phrase that the Neronian period is often divided into three parts, and has certainly been influential in moulding modern scholars' opinions of Nero's reign.⁸ Both Lepper and Murray agree on the first five years as Nero's finest period of rule (and the most likely point to be considered Trajan's 'quinquennium'), but differ in their explanation of the remark, giving occasion for further academic controversy.⁹ Lepper concludes that the remark

⁵ J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 500.

⁶ J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 500.

⁷ J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 500.

⁸ B. W. Henderson, *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, pp. 75-9; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 489.

⁹ F. A. Lepper, 'Some Reflections on the Quinquennium Neronis', *JRS* 1957, pp. 95-103; O. Murray, 'The Quinquennium Neronis and the Stoics', *Historia* 14 (1), pp. 41-61.

was most likely apocryphal, and only invented and voiced by Trajan to lend weight to the statement.¹⁰ Conversely, Murray does attribute the remark to Trajan, or rather he specifically attributes it to a circle of Stoic associates.¹¹ Both argue that the administration of Seneca and Burrus is the period referred to as the ‘five good years’.

There is no need, however, to separate or identify the *quinquennium Neronis*, as there are points in all aspects of Nero’s reign to distinguish and denigrate. All these theories have some merit, as the early years of Nero’s reign can be seen to have promise. He may have been guided by knowledgeable and experienced advisors. Whether this was the case or not, the decision to continue on with his predecessors’ policies was certainly a correct measure, his middle years certainly were a period of foreign expansion giving him cause to celebrate in AD 65, and his later years were a period of construction. The most vital consideration is the initial discovery of a conspiracy and the real threat it represented to his reign in AD 65, which marked the turning point and beginning of Nero’s descent into tyranny. However, it must be noted that it is Nero’s subsequent countermeasures of oppression and the renewed outbreaks of rebellion that revealed Nero’s ‘monstrousness’ (as described by Suetonius and Tacitus).¹²

¹⁰ F. A. Lepper, ‘Some Reflections on the Quinquennium Neronis’, *JRS* 47, pp. 102-3.

¹¹ O. Murray, ‘The Quinquennium Neronis and the Stoics’, *Historia* 14 (1), pp. 51-61.

¹² T. E. J. Wiedemann, ‘Tiberius to Nero: Nero’, in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 244; J. G. F. Hind, ‘The Middle Years of Nero’s Reign’, in *Historia* 20 (4), pp. 503-4.

Nero's German Policy

The Neronian period witnessed a continuation of Claudius' policies of consolidation and the avoidance of new commitments.¹³ Nero succeeded an emperor who had made the integration and consolidation of the empire his main purpose. Furthermore, for Claudius the defence of Rome and Italy was a central feature of his policies; Italy was not neglected nor stifled in the pursuit of provincial advancement, as would effectively come to pass later on. Grants of citizenship, for example, were bestowed upon 'deserving individuals' and those that lacked commitment and loyalty were not made citizens. The Romans had become more discerning of their choices for this status after the betrayals of past recipients, such as Arminius. Claudius was not so critical of the foundation of *coloniae* and franchise grants, which were approved quite copiously throughout the empire. Nero was far less liberal with his authorization in both cases.¹⁴ One area of divergence in Nero's reign can be seen in the reversal of Claudius' policy of having client kingdoms; this is seen in the absorption of the territory of the Icenii in eastern Britain,¹⁵ the Alpes Cottiae (c. AD 58), and Pontus Polemoniacus (c. AD 64).¹⁶

Britain was the main focus of Nero's principate in the west. Trouble in the new territory simmered during the end of Claudius' reign and was ongoing throughout Nero's, especially along the frontiers. Boudicca's revolt in AD 61 nearly caused the loss

¹³ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 247; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 43.

¹⁴ D. Shotter, *Nero*, p. 37.

¹⁵ This action is argued to have precipitated the Boudican revolt, see G. Webster, *Boudica, The British Revolt against Rome AD 60*, pp. 1-25; W. S. Hanson, 'Why did the Roman Empire Cease to expand?', in *Limes XVIII*, p. 26. See also, D. R. Dudley and G. Webster, *The Rebellion of Boudica*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962.

¹⁶ W. S. Hanson, 'Why Did the Roman Empire cease to Expand?', in *Limes XVIII*, p. 26; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 192; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), pp. 492-3; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*, pp. 312-3.

of the new province and the situation was said to have sparked some discussion on the abandonment of the region.¹⁷ Nero rejected such a move; his need and desire for military glory and self-aggrandisement would not allow it.¹⁸ Suetonius is the source of this evidence, stating that Nero contemplated a withdrawal from Britain, but kept his forces there, because a retreat would have tarnished the glory won by his predecessor, Caesar.¹⁹ Q. Veranius' appointment as governor marked a change in imperial policy, and upon his death the region was only salvaged through the machinations of his replacement, C. Suetonius Paullinus.²⁰ In the east, Rome was threatened by the interference of Parthia in a power struggle that initially centred on Armenia.²¹ Furthermore, the Roman position in Syria at this time was perceived to be uncertain, under threat, and weakly held by ill-disciplined and inferior troops.²² So dire was the position perceived to be that Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, the governor of Galatia and Cappadocia, was placed in command of the Syrian legions and further reinforcements from the Danubian frontier, with *legio XV Apollinaris* sent from *Carnuntum* in

¹⁷ This point has been the centre of much debate. The threat was supposedly real enough for Seneca to start calling in loans made to British chiefs, another of the factors that supposedly sparked the revolt, see Dio LXII. 2, 1. G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 43; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, pp. 191-192; H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*, pp. 312-3.

¹⁸ E. Birley, 'Britain under Nero: the significance of Q. Veranius', in *Roman Britain and the Roman Army*, pp. 1-9. A. R. Birley, *The Fasti of Roman Britain*, 1981, pp. 50-4. See also, G. Webster, *Rome Against Caratacus*, pp. 104-18. G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 43; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 492 see n. 17.

¹⁹ Suet. *Nero* 18.

²⁰ J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* Bd. 20, H. 4 (1971), p. 492 see n. 17. On the governor Q. Veranius, see A. E. Gordon 'Quintus Veranius, consul A.D. 49' in *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* II (5), pp. 241-9.; E. Birley 'Britain under Nero: the Significance of Q. Veranius', *Durham University Journal*, pp. 88-92; E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army: Collected Papers*, T. Wilson (ed.), pp. 1-9. See also, G. Webster, *Boudica, The British Revolt against Rome AD 60*, Batsford, London, 1978; D. R. Dudley and G. Webster, *The Rebellion of Boudica*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962.

²¹ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 7-9, 34-41; XIV. 23-26; XV. 1-17, 24-31; Dio LXII. 19-23. G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 43; J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 24; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 493; B. W. Henderson, *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, pp. 153-95.

²² J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 493; B. W. Henderson, *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, pp. 153-95; J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 24.

Pannonia and *legio V Macedonica* sent from Oescus in Moesia.²³ Along the eastern frontier, Corbulo restored the reputation of the legions, and negotiated a resolution to significant hostilities with Parthia which would last until the reign of Trajan.²⁴ Hostilities in the east were not limited to Parthia: the Jewish revolt in AD 62, which escalated into a major rebellion four years later and ultimately required three legions to suppress it, drained Rome's limited resources, causing the Romans to concentrate their military strength there when it was required elsewhere.²⁵ Overall an indication of the level of military success during Nero's reign can be observed with the closure of the temple of Janus in AD 64 (or 66).²⁶ Numismatic evidence announces this event, the first occurrence when peace had reigned throughout the empire since the time of Augustus.²⁷

In regards to relations with the Germanic tribes, efforts were maintained to win the allegiances of tribesmen, grants of citizenship were given to individual leaders, and the *Germani* were actively recruited into auxiliary units of the Roman army (such as the ten thousand members of the Batavian cohorts), and into the *classis Germanica*.²⁸ Not

²³ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7 n. 53; J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and Their fortress in the Danube lands – First to Third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their legions*, p. 103; J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 24.

²⁴ D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 104; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero: Nero', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 248; A. A. Barrett, 'Annals 14.26 and the Armenian Settlement of A. D. 60', *Classical Quarterly* 29 (2), pp. 465-9; R. Syme, 'Domitius Corbulo', *JRS* 60, pp. 37-9; K. Gilmartin, 'Corbulo's campaigns in the East', *Historia* 22, pp. 583-626; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 493; B. W. Henderson, *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, pp. 153-95.

²⁵ *Legio V Macedonica*, *legio X Fretensis*, *legio XV Apollinaris*.

²⁶ E. Champlin, *Nero*, 2003, p. 140 n. 92; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 104; G. B. Townend, 'Tacitus, Suetonius, and the Temple of Janus', *Hermes* 108, pp. 233-242; C. H. V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy*, pp. 148-72; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', p. 496. Henderson puts the closure of the temple at AD 64, see B. W. Henderson, *The life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, p. 19; E. Champlin, *Nero*, p. 140. Momigliano dates the closing to AD 66, see A. Momigliano, 'Nero', *CAH*, vol. X, p. 734.

²⁷ Coins depicting the closure of the temple of Janus (with slight variants to the legends): *RIC* 50-51, 58, 263-271, 283-291, 300-311, 323-328, 337-342, 347-350, 353-355, 421, 438-439, 468-472, 510-512, 537-539, 583-585. E. Champlin, *Nero*, p. 140; C. H. V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy, 31 BC – AD 68*, pp. 148-72; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', in *Historia* 20 (4), p. 496 see n. 36. B. W. Henderson, *The life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, p. 191.

²⁸ D. Shotter, *Nero*, pp. 27-8.

until the end of the Nero's reign was the unchecked and uncontrolled recruitment of tribesmen recognised as a serious error, one posing a significant and real threat to Rome and its empire. Another key aspect of Nero's reign was the first recorded mention of an enforced military exclusion zone (or *agri vacui*) east of the Rhine. This is not to say that this was the initial implementation of this zone, but rather was the first record of it and its supposed purpose.²⁹ Potter argues that this zone served both a military and ideological purpose, and that the latter function was derived from German practice.³⁰ Tacitus' account of the events along the Rhine in AD 57/8 is the earliest known reference to such a zone.³¹ The details and significance of this policy and the Roman military response is discussed in detail below, the focus here being on the purpose and enforcement of the 'empty fields'. It can be argued that the *Frisii* movement into the *agri vacui* north of the Rhine was undertaken because they felt that Rome no longer had an interest in projecting their military strength across the river.³² Potter argues that their movement into this area was a symbolic act and that to the *Germani* the ability to maintain such a zone was a measure of Roman military power. Clearly the Romans viewed the situation in a similar fashion, for when they were challenged by the encroachment of the *Frisii* and then the *Ampsivarii*, they immediately employed military force to re-exert ruthlessly their dominion of the area through forceful evictions.³³ Both sides recognised that the zone symbolised Rome's claim as the

²⁹ As discussed in Chapter 7, these zones were located near the Roman frontiers and were deliberately left vacant; tribes were actively expelled and kept from settling.

³⁰ D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', in *The American Journal of Philology* 113 (2), p. 296; S. K. Drummond, & L. H. Nelson, *The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 89; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 145; M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, p. 54.

³¹ Tac. *Ann.* XIII.54.1.

³² D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', p. 274; E. Frezouls, 'Les fluctuations de la frontière orientale de l'empire romain' in T. Fahd (ed), *La Géographie administrative et politique d'Alexandre à Mahomet. Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg 14-16 juin 1979*, pp. 177-225.

³³ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 54. 4. D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', p. 274 see n. 1; K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes: a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', PhD diss., p. 46; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman

preeminent power in the region. Therefore these frontiers, and hence the empty zones, were established both for military convenience and to highlight the nature of Roman power. To this end, Potter explains that the techniques chosen for the latter were carried out in terms the *Germani* could recognise and comprehend, and to this end native customs could be – and were – exploited.³⁴

In general, ancient and modern scholars attribute no serious problems along the Rhine and Danube frontiers during the Neronian period,³⁵ the exception being Roman activity along the stretch of the Lower Danube; evidence records significant operations there. The issues concerning the *Germani* that are mentioned are only briefly recorded; these are discussed in detail below. This limited quantity of evidence could be seen as a matter of scholarly focus rather than actual reality. As discussed earlier, most of the evidence for Nero's reign comes from the earlier years; the absence of provincial discord for this region in later years makes it likely that the lack of documentary evidence is due more to changing preoccupations on the part of the historians.³⁶

Nero continued with Claudius' positioning of seven legions along the Rhine; four legions held Lower Germania and three were positioned in Upper Germania. In Lower Germania, *legio V Alaudae* and *legio XV Primigenia* were stationed at *Vetera* (Xanten), *legio XVI Gallica* occupied *Novaesium* (Neuss) and *legio I Germania* was stationed at

Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59 (1), p. 152; S. Drummond and L. Nelson, *The Western Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 89-91.

³⁴ D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', p. 274.

³⁵ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 53. J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, pp. 89-90.; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 45; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 192; D. Shotter, *Nero*, p. 29; D. B. Campbell, *The Rise of Imperial Rome AD 14-193*, p. 40.

³⁶ D. Shotter, *Nero*, pp. 38-9.

Bonna (Bonn). Upper Germany held *legio IV Macedonica* and *legio XXII Primigenia* at *Moguntiacum* (Mainz), and *legio XXI Rapax* at *Vindonissa* (Windisch). Archaeological evidence indicates that Nero continued the programme to replace the earlier turf-and-timber structures (the fortresses, forts and other defensive structures) with ones of stone and brick, and the arranging and organising of the range of support services that the legions required outside of the fortresses.³⁷ Furthermore, Nero continued with Claudius' construction of smaller forts for auxiliary troops at intervals between the legionary fortresses.³⁸ To separate and attribute certainty to the construction of many of the sites is difficult due to limited material evidence and the relatively short reigns of some emperors. As a result archaeologists roughly place many in the later Julio-Claudian period.³⁹ The highly complex arrangements of forts, watchtowers, roads and palisades south of Mainz, forming the so-called the *limes Germanicus* and the *limes Raeticus*, were a later construction and largely the creation of the Flavian and later emperors. On the Lower Rhine the legionary fortress at *Vetera* was probably completely rebuilt in stone during Nero's reign.⁴⁰ One building project along the Rhine that can be attributed to Nero's reign with certainty is the completion of an embankment on the west bank in Lower Germania, which had initially been begun by Nero's great-grandfather, Nero Claudius Drusus, in c. 10-9 BC, to control the Rhine.⁴¹ A similar project was proposed by Antistius Vetus, the governor of upper Rhine, which planned to link the Moselle and

³⁷ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 247; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 151-5; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, pp. 90-1.

³⁸ E. Schallmayer, *Der Limes, Geschichte einer Grenze*, pp. 18-9; C. Rüger, 'Germany', p. 533; D. Baatz, *Der römische Limes: Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau*, pp. 13-14.

³⁹ See fn. 43.

⁴⁰ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 247; H. von Petrikovits, 'Vetera', in *RE*, Suppl. VIII, pp. 1801-1834; H. von Petrikovits, 'Die Legionsfestung Vetera II', in *BJ* 159, pp. 89-133; M. Gechter, 'Xanten', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, (1987), pp. 619-625; D. von Detten, 'Die Überreste der augusteischen und tiberischen Legionslager von V. I', in J. S. Köhlborn (ed.), *Germaniam pacavi*, pp. 59-77; H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', in *BRGK* 66, pp. 321-495, esp. 427; C. Thomas, 'Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms', p. 440

⁴¹ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 53-7; *Hist.* V. 19. 3. D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 90; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the end of a Dynasty*, pp. 21, 61, 225.

Saone rivers with a canal that would enable transportation from the Mediterranean to the Rhine and on to the North Sea.⁴² These projects were obviously undertaken for their military, logistical, and strategic benefits, but also served another necessary purpose, that of occupying and directing the efforts of the legionaries, who had proven themselves dangerous when left unoccupied.⁴³

The Danube as a frontier had only begun to take on importance during the reign of Claudius. As discussed earlier, he had commenced the process of pushing Roman influence to the river and bolstering this with some troops positioned along its upper length under the command of the governors of Raetia and Noricum.⁴⁴ Between *Vindonissa* (Windisch) and *Carnuntum* (Petronell-Carnuntum) there were still no legions permanently posted; only detachments of troops and auxiliaries spread along its length. The nearest legion (XV *Apollinaris*, later replaced by X *Gemina*) was posted along the middle Danube in Pannonia at *Carnuntum*, the only other (XIII *Gemina*) positioned inland at *Poetovio* (Ptuj).⁴⁵ There was also one legion (XI *Claudia Pia Fidelis*) at *Burnum* (Ivoševci) in Dalmatia, retained there to ensure the peoples pacification and Roman control in the region. The majority of Roman military strength

⁴² Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 53. B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 223.

⁴³ Embankment was completed by Pompeius Paulinus in AD 58, see Tac. *Ann.* 13.53, 4. D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 90; K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes: a Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', PhD diss., p. 46; B. Campbell, *Rivers & the Power of Ancient Rome*, p. 223; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the end of a Dynasty*, p. 61.

⁴⁴ R. Wolters, *Römische Eroberung und Herrschaftsorganisation in Gallien und Germanien: zur Entstehung und Bedeutung der sogenannten Klientel-Randstaaten*, p. 62; J. J., Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 146; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, 2004, p. 58; K. Dietz, 'Okkupation und Frühzeit', in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer and K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 73; D. Shotter, *Nero*, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁵ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman legions and their fortress in the Danube lands – First to third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and Their Legions*, pp. 102-3; D. Dzino, *Illyricum in Roman Politics, 229 BC – AD 68*, p. 168; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 48; S. Ferjančić, *Settlement of Legionary Veterans in Balkan Provinces I-III century AD*, pp. 29-30.

was positioned along the lower section of the Danube, with the province of Moesia containing three legions.⁴⁶ Legions posted in this region faced off against the growing threat of Dacians, Scythians, and Sarmatians.

Later in the Claudian-Neronian period, the security of the Danube frontier became a priority. The decline of the *Marcomanni* and the collapse of Vannius' kingdom in AD 50 presented a weakened barrier along the upper and middle Danube. To compensate for this weakened front, Roman forces were positioned up to the Danube. Along the Lower Danube the situation was more complicated and threatening. In the late fifties and early sixties AD there is evidence of westward movement by tribes such as the *Alani*, *Roxolani*, and *Dacii*. Some scholars theorise that such tribal movement was presumably caused by population pressure from further east.⁴⁷ Rome began to manoeuvre to counteract this threat. Probably as early as AD 57 Flavius Sabinus had advanced from Lower Moesia to the mouth of the river Dniester and secured Tyras.⁴⁸ By AD 62/63 Plautius Silvanus Aelianus had annexed part of Scythia Minor and had placed large portions of coastal southern Russia under Roman control.⁴⁹ During the same period Silvanus intervened against the Sarmatians, who had steadily been forcing their way south displacing large numbers of Dacians, *Bastarnae*, and *Roxolani*.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 48; D. Shotter, *Nero*, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁷ V. Bârcă, 'Nomads of the Steppes by the Danube Frontier of the Roman Empire in the 1st C CE', *Historical Sketch and Chronological Remarks, Dacia*, LVII, p. 99-125; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138; P. Conole and R. D. Milns, 'Neronian Frontier Policy in the Balkans', pp. 186-7; D. Shotter, *Nero*, p. 29; J. Harmatta, *Studies on the History of the Sarmatians*, pp. 3-10.

⁴⁸ J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', p. 493; M. I Rostovtzev, 'Olbia and the Roman Occupation', *Izvestia Arkheologicheskoi Komissii* 58, pp. 1-16.

⁴⁹ *CIL* XIV 3608.

⁵⁰ P. Conole and R. D. Milns, 'Neronian Frontier Policy in the Balkans', pp. 186-7; M. Treister, 'New Discoveries of Sarmatian Complexes of the 1st Century AD: A Survey of Publications in *VDI*', *Ancient Civilizations from Scythia to Siberia* 4, pp. 37-42; M. Olbrycht, *Parthia et ulteriores gentes. Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen dem arsakidischen Iran und den Nomaden der eurasischen*

Silvanus had forced the displaced people to submit to Rome, taking hostages and placing trusted leaders in power. A further measure was the resettlement of a 100,000 tribesmen in Roman held territory south of the Danube.⁵¹ Garrisons made up of detachments of the Moesian legions, and auxiliaries, were positioned at Tyras, Olbia, Chersonnesos, *Ai Todor* (Charax) and possible at Pantikapaion. This secured the north-eastern section of the Danube and effectively gave the Romans dominance over the Black Sea.⁵²

Nero Maintains Roman Dominion and Dominance along the Rhine

During Nero's reign, there is very little recorded of Roman interaction with the *Germani* and incidents involving them along the Rhine or Danube, the three exceptions being: the initial encroachment of the *Frisii* into Roman territory and Rome's military response, the settlement of the *Ampsivarii* that followed, and the rebellion of the Batavian cohorts in AD 68-70. Settlements of the *Frisii* and *Ampsivarii* opposite *Oppidum Ubiorum* highlight the consequence of Roman idleness, and were a direct challenge to Roman dominance in the region. Subsequent campaigns carried out by L. Duvius Avitus and Ti. Curtilius Mancina across the Rhine against the *Germani* were a reassertion of Roman pre-eminence in the region. In effect, both incidents reinforced the

Steppen, p. 194. Others argue against Plautius or even Roman troops in Crimea during this period, see V. Zubar, 'The Crimean Campaign of Tiberius Plautius Silvanus', in D. Braund (ed.), *Scythians and Greeks*, pp. 176–80; T. Sarnowski, 'Ti. Plautius Silvanus, Tauric Chersonesos and Classis Moesia', *Dacia* 50, pp. 85–92.

⁵¹ CIL XIV 3608 = ILS 986. Cf. D. M. Pippidi, 'Stiri noi despre legaturile Histriei cu getii in secolul al III-lea', in *Contributi la istorie veche a Romanici*, pp. 287–348; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 138; J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danube Provinces', in *CAH*², vol. XI, p. 557; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the End of a Dynasty*, p. 118; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 41; P. Conole and R. D. Milns, 'Neronian Frontier Policy in the Balkans', *Historia* 32, pp. 186–7; J. G. F. Hind, 'The Middle Years of Nero's Reign', p. 494; M. Charlesworth, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Claudius and Nero*, p. 38; D. Shotter, *Nero*, p. 29.

⁵² M. Bais, *Albania caucasica: ethnos, storia, territorio attraverso le fonti greche, latine e armene*, p. 86; T. Sarnowski, 'Ti. Plautius Silvanus, Tauric Chersonesos and Classis Moesia', *Dacia* 50, pp. 85–92; P. Conole and R. D. Milns, 'Neronian Frontier Policy in the Balkans', *Historia* 32, pp. 186–8.

Romans' military superiority and renewed proven policies that curtailed the potential Germanic threat. Significantly the actions of the *Batavi* during the last years of Nero's reign are important to explore, as it is during this time that the origins of the later rebellion can be better measured and interpreted. As always, details will only be briefly explored; the main focus being the Roman reaction and interaction with the *Germani* and the affect on empire and Rome's position along the frontier.

In AD 58, the newly appointed commander of the Lower Rhine, L. Duivius Avitus, discovered the settlement of the *Frisii* in the Roman military exclusion zone maintained on the east side of the Rhine.⁵³ Potter suggests the location of the settlement was in the 'empty fields' near the riverbank opposite Cologne.⁵⁴ His argument being that the location is secured by Tacitus' reference to the territory of the *Tencteri* in this context.⁵⁵ Tacitus' statement that they had, 'already fixed their abodes and sown the fields, and were tilling the soil,'⁵⁶ clearly indicates that the *Frisii* had been in the area for some time prior to their discovery. This can be supported by Roman inactivity in the region since the command of Corbulo. Tacitus affirms this view; according to him, an extended period of inactivity by Roman forces garrisoned in the Lower Rhine had led several Germanic tribes to believe that the legates had been denied the right to lead their

⁵³ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 53-4. The importance of the exclusion zone has previously been discussed and established as a key feature of the Roman Germanic frontier policy. Many scholars argue for AD 58 for this incident, see K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes : a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', PhD diss., Durham University, 1998, p. 46; V. A. Maxfield, 'Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 145; M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, (2009), p. 54; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 95; J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, pp. 89-90. Austin and Rankov argue for AD 59, see N. J. E. Austin, & N. B. Rankov, *Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople*, p. 179.

⁵⁴ Tac. *Ann.* LV. 1. See also, D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', p. 269.

⁵⁵ D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', p. 269.

⁵⁶ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 54.

forces across the Rhine.⁵⁷ The significance of this lapse for the *Germani* and the consequence for the Romans has already been discussed: in short, the Romans fail to project their strength and dominate the Germanic tribes resulted in the latter's incursion into Roman territory. Initially, Avitus ordered the *Frisii* to abandon their settlement, though this was postponed to give the Frisian kings Verritus and Malorix time to petition the emperor. Nero rejected their appeal and instructed them to abandon their settlement.⁵⁸ Their subsequent refusal to leave was met by force; all those that remained were either captured or killed by a body of auxiliary cavalry.⁵⁹ This incident demonstrates the consequence of Rome's failure to project their strength consistently against the *Germani*, mirroring the scenario mentioned above during the end of Tiberius' reign, in both cases in effect failing to carry out one of their own policies which had proven in the past to curb Germanic aggression and blunting their potential threat.

In order to comprehend fully the subsequent settlement of the *Ampsivarii* that followed the expulsion of the *Frisii* and thus Rome's military response, the situation amongst the Germanic tribes east of the Lower Rhine needs to be established. Conflict amongst various tribes was in itself nothing new. As discussed previously, deliberate disharmony was sought by the Romans and in some cases intensively cultivated, as a matter of policy, in order to keep the Germanic tribes weak and lessen their potential threat against Rome. Tacitus records two such events of inter-tribal warfare occurring in AD 58, the first was amongst the *Ampsivarii* and the *Chauci*,⁶⁰ the other between the

⁵⁷ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 54.1.

⁵⁸ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 54.1.

⁵⁹ Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 54.

⁶⁰ Tac. *Ann.* XIII.57.

Chatti and the *Hermunduri*.⁶¹ In the case of the former altercation, the *Chauci* seized an opportunity to expel the *Ampsivarii* and occupy their land at the mouth of the River Ems, gaining prime agricultural lands and a border with the Frisians to the west.⁶² This event was a catalyst for the *Ampsivarii*'s migration towards the Rhine and the consequent altercations with the Romans. Conversely, the latter conflict between the *Chatti* and the *Hermunduri* had a different and positive outcome for the Romans, as the ensuing battle resulted in a devastating defeat for the former. In the past, the *Chatti* had proven themselves to be an enemy and threat to Rome, especially in AD 39/40, and again in AD 50. The defeat they suffered severely weakened their numbers and position, reducing their potential to threaten Rome so much so that they would not rise to become a major threat again until AD 162. Therefore, in this instance the conflict between the tribes was beneficial to Rome, reinforcing the positive impact disharmony amongst the *Germani* had on Roman interest and security along the frontier.

Consequences from the expulsion of the *Ampsivarii*, who attempted to settle in the same military territory abandoned by the *Frisii*, were more significant than explicitly expressed by Tacitus.⁶³ Supposedly their settlement was short lived; Avitus quickly ordered their removal from the area. This clearly demonstrates that the Romans learnt from their early altercation with the *Frisii*. Their military zone policy was enforced, and the *Ampsivarii* encroachment into Roman territory was swiftly addressed. According to Tacitus, they supposedly made the claim that the Romans had the right to keep the fields empty but stated that the land would be better served by having friendly people settled

⁶¹ Tac. Ann. XIII.55.

⁶² Tac. Ann. XIII.55. G. Neumann, 'Chauken', in *RGA* 4, pp. 393-413; W. Will, 'Roms 'Klientel-Randstaaten' am Rhein?', in *BJ* 187, pp. 1-61, especially 31-38; B. Walker, *The Annals of Tacitus: A Study in the Writing of History*, pp. 33-4; D. Potter, 'Empty Areas and Roman Frontier Policy', p. 269; W. Eck, 'Die Statthalter der german. Prov. vom 1. bis 3. Jh.', in *Epigraphische Stud.* 14, pp. 123-5.

⁶³ Tac. Ann. XIII. 56. For the location of *Frisii* north of the *Chatti* see Tac. Ger. 32.

there, rather than a wasteland.⁶⁴ This practice of using allied tribes as a ‘buffer’ against hostile forces was not a new concept; it was demonstrated earlier along the Danube with the resettlement of the *Iazyges* in c. AD 17-20.⁶⁵ Avitus refused this proposal and threatened to use force if they did not abandon their settlement and leave the area.⁶⁶ Tacitus records that the *Ampsivarii* response to their expulsion was to ‘[invite] the *Bructeri*, the *Tencteri*, and still more remote tribes, to join them in war.’⁶⁷ This was a genuine threat; this situation represented one of the Romans’ greatest fears, a cause that united the despairing tribes. Roman policies against the *Germani* were aimed at preventing such a threat. Such an alliance had not been faced since Arminius. Tacitus’ account, however, gives no indication that this was an actual threat, writing that:

Avitus wrote to Curtilius Mancina, the commander of the upper army, asking him to cross the Rhine and display his arms in the rear; he himself led his legions into the territory of the *Tencteri*, threatening them with annihilation unless they dissociated their cause from that of the confederates. They seceded accordingly; the same threat deterred the *Bructeri*.⁶⁸

Tacitus clearly represents this incident as a minor threat, one that was dealt with simply and without further loss. Yet the threat was such that it warranted the marshalling of not only Avitus’ legions, but also those of Mancina. Tacitus does not record the number of legions deployed but states that multiple legions were sent from both commands. This represented a force that consisted of a least four legions and up to a maximum of seven,

⁶⁴ Tac. Ann. XIII. 55. 2.

⁶⁵ D. Dzino, ‘Illyrian policy of Rome in the Late Republic and early Principate’, p. 168 n. 56. A. Alföldi, ‘Peoples of North Europe’; ‘The Central Danubian provinces’, in *CAH*, vol. XI, 1936, p. 85; E. M. Vrbá, *Ancient German identity in the Shadow of the Roman Empire: The Impact of Trade and Contact along the Middle Danube Frontier, 10 BC- AD 166*, p. 82

⁶⁶ Tac. Ann. XIII. 56. 1.

⁶⁷ Tac. Ann. XIII. 56.

⁶⁸ Tac. Ann. XIII.56. (trans. J. Jackson, *Loeb Classical Library*).

with a number of auxiliary forces in support. Such an application of force can be interpreted in two ways: either the situation warranted such a response, or the Romans' perception of the Germanic threat exaggerated their response. The Romans' reaction to the threat indicates that they had clearly learnt from prior experiences. Instead of allowing the tribes to unite their forces and establish a combined front, they instead engaged individual tribes in their own territory and dealt with them separately and decisively. Thus the Romans decreased the Germanic tribes' accumulative strength with minimal risk to their own forces. Therefore, the deployment of such extensive military force against the *Germani* is either a demonstration of the perception the Roman military had of the Germanic threat, or else Tacitus' account limited their potential threat. Evidence supporting the former can be seen in the work of Seneca, who was concerned enough to write of the Germanic tribes' martial prowess and ferocious toughness.⁶⁹ Thus the Ampsivarii response to the Roman eviction can be seen to validate Rome's policies to maintain the military exclusion zone east of the Rhine and to sustain the level of disunity amongst the *Germani*. Neglect of either had proven, and would continue to be, detrimental.

Revolt: Betrayal by the *Batavi*

Rome's relationship with the *Batavi* is an example of Roman recognition and exploitation of military skill and strength. The Batavians had proven themselves to be allies of Rome. The excellence of their cavalry was such that their tribute was in the form of troops rather than a monetary payment.⁷⁰ Their connection with Rome goes

⁶⁹ Seneca *On Anger* 1. 11, 3 and 2.15. It should be noted though that Seneca had other possible motives for writing about the threat represented by the Germani, as his brother-in-law (or possibly his father-in-law) was commander of lower Germania: see D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 90.

⁷⁰ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 12. S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', *Historia* 20, p. 264; M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', p. 277.

back to the command of Drusus c. 13-9 BC, evidence indicating that auxiliaries from this tribe had served with the Romans at least since the time of Germanicus c. AD 14.⁷¹ This examination focuses on the relationship between Rome and the *Batavi* and their initial betrayal of Nero in AD 68, a precursor leading to their more serious treachery during the civil wars that followed Nero's death, the so-called Batavian Rebellion. (The subsequent rebellion is not the focus here and will be examined later).

Virtually the only source of information of the rebellion and the prior betrayal is Tacitus' account.⁷² Of the other available works, Josephus and Dio offer very little information regarding the incidents.⁷³ Although Tacitus indicates that the Batavian uprising was a significant moment in Roman history,⁷⁴ he nevertheless only provides an incomplete account of their movements and a cursory overview of events. This lack of any detailed narrative except his is compounded by the absence of epigraphical evidence, ultimately reducing historical analysis of the incident to an examination of the information given by Tacitus himself.⁷⁵ He was a contemporary of these events and though too young to have had first-hand knowledge himself, it would be methodologically sound to state that his account would escape many of the distortions and preconceptions prevalent in later works. Brunt argues, however, that it is probable that he derived his account chiefly (though not exclusively) from the elder Pliny, who was a contemporary of the revolt and very familiar with the region and its peoples.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Tac. *Ann.* II. 8. 3; *Ger.* 29.1-2. S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', *Historia* 20, p. 264; J. Klose, *Roms Klientel-Randstaaten am Rhein und der Donau*, pp. 18-26.

⁷² P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33; M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', p. 277;

⁷³ Jose. *BJ* I, 5; VII, 75-88; Dio LXVI. 3. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33.

⁷⁴ Tac. *Hist.* I. 59.

⁷⁵ M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', p. 277; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33.

⁷⁶ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33.

Modern scholars have therefore, for the most part, been content to follow Tacitus' account, in which they discern no incoherence or historical implausibility.⁷⁷

The Batavians' initial betrayal of Rome and Nero is connected with the emperor's military preparations in Caucasian Albania. Tacitus recorded that in AD 66 or 67 eight cohorts of Batavi, as *auxilia* of *legio XIV Gemina*, had been recalled from Britain for a campaign through the Caspian Gate against the *Albani*.⁷⁸ Both the *Legio XIV Gemina* and the Batavian cohorts were en route to the east, possibly reaching as far as Dalmatia, when Vindex's rebellion broke out in Gaul.⁷⁹ *Legio XIV*, or more accurately detachments thereof,⁸⁰ was recalled by Nero to aid in the suppression of the revolt. At this time, it is important to note, the cohorts were still commanded by their native leaders, an error which certainly made it more than possible for the *Batavi* to betray the Romans,⁸¹ which betrayal came in the form of obstructing the recalled detachments from going to the aid of Nero. Later they boasted of their actions claiming, according to Tacitus that, 'they had taken Italy from Nero, and that in their hands lay the whole fortune of the war.'⁸² There is no mention of how this was accomplished, only that once completed they separated from the legion. Their next recorded among the Lingones in

⁷⁷ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, pp. 174-5; S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', p. 264. Some scholars refute the reliability of Tacitus' account, see G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker*, pp. 86-127; E. Paratore, *Tacito*, p. 245.

⁷⁸ Tac. *Hist.* I. 6.

⁷⁹ M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', pp. 277-8.

⁸⁰ Tacitus does not make reference to the presence of the *legio XIV Gemina* in Rome but rather refers to detachments, see Tacitus *numeri* (*Hist.* I. 6) and *electos* (*Hist.* I.31). Nero did not regard the revolt of Vindex as a serious threat (see, Tac. *Hist.* II. 11; Suet. *Ner.* 40); therefore only detachments from *legio XIV* was recalled, the rest of the legion remained awaiting the resumption of the Albanian campaign.

⁸¹ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 12. K. Strobel, 'Anmerkungen zur Gesch. der Batavikohorten in der hohen Kaiserzeit', in *ZPE* 70, pp. 271-292; S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', *Historia* 20, p. 264.

⁸² Tac. *Hist.* II. 27.

Gaul during the time of Vitellius's uprising.⁸³ Justification for such actions on their part must be connected with their change in loyalties or allegiances, meaning that they either declared for Galba or Vindex. They were assuredly moving in the direction of Gaul, possibly in an effort to return to their homeland in Lower Germania, and their subsequent ardent participation in the civil war and their later rebellion would indicate that they were on their way to join Vindex.⁸⁴ It can be argued that their postponement of the arrival of the legionary detachment from Dalmatia had two considerations, the first to prevent the legionaries' arrival until after Nero's death, and secondly to cover part of their journey to Gaul and join Vindex's Rebellion. Vindex's death halted their advance and they remained among the Lingones until Fabius Valens added them to his force.

The Batavians clearly sided against Nero; their actions marked them as willing to forgo their oaths and betray the emperor. This initial betrayal highlights two significant flaws in the Roman relationship with the Batavi, and by extension *auxilia* in general: first the severe consequences of retaining native leaders in command of their own forces, and secondly the potential devastation trained Germanic auxiliaries could inflict upon Roman interests when they are not constantly monitored and controlled.

Nero: Conspiracies and Rebellions

Nero's later reign was dominated by conspiracies, ultimately culminating in the disastrous civil war that followed his suicide. Civil discord caused division and

⁸³ Tac. *Hist.* I. 59. M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', p. 277.

⁸⁴ M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', p. 279.

weakness which resulted in the neglect of Roman defences against the *Germani*. This would provide the Germanic tribes with an opportunity to revolt against Roman authority and control, their subsequent actions demonstrating the danger the Germanic tribes, specifically those recruited as auxiliaries, posed to Rome. (Due to the limitations of this work, details of many of the conspiracies will be largely omitted, with the focus being on the role of the Rhine legions and the involvement and impact of the Germanic tribes.)

The initial conspiracy in AD 65 centred on Gaius Calpurnius Piso, whose ancient lineage and tenuous family relationship with the Caesars gave some minor credence to his ambitions to the throne. His claim was tentative at best. Significance and creditability is derived from the number and eminence of his co-conspirators, who included members of the Praetorian Guard, senators, and even Nero's former advisor Lucius Annaeus Seneca.⁸⁵ At least forty-one individuals were accused of being complicit in the conspiracy: of the known conspirators, nineteen were senators, seven equites, eleven soldiers, and four women. Tacitus, the main source of the incident, outlines the narrative of the conspiracy.⁸⁶ In short, the conspiracy planned to remove Nero with the aid of the Praetorian prefect Faenius Rufus, and with the support of the Praetorian Guard, to declare Piso emperor. Varying motives were ascribed to the conspirators: some were Imperialists (those that supported the imperial system of

⁸⁵ T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 252; M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, pp. 125, 127; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 146; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the End of a Dynasty*, p. 166; M. Goodman, *Roman World 44 BC- AD 180*, p. 56; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 BC – AD 138*, pp. 183-4; A. Momigliano, 'Nero', *CAH*, vol. X, pp. 727-8.

⁸⁶ Tac. *Ann.* XV. 48-74. Tacitus mentions his sources Elder Pliny (XV. 53. 3-4), Fabius Rusticus (XV. 61. 3) and participants of the conspiracy (15.73.2). See also, R. S. Rogers, 'Heirs and Rivals to Nero', in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 86, p. 208.

government), while others were Republicans.⁸⁷ Significantly the plot reflected the growing discontent among the ruling class with Nero's increasingly despotic rule reminiscent of Gaius' reign of terror.⁸⁸ However, the failed coup would trigger increased despotism in an attempt to eliminate all opposition. As a result, a vicious cycle ensued whereby the increased authoritarian rule and oppression incited further opposition and rebellion. Significantly, it was after the Pisonian conspiracy that Nero began to exhibit a fear of prominent army commanders.

The conspiracy of Annius Vinicianus⁸⁹ the following year only strengthened Nero's resolve to eliminate this perceived threat. Thus the leading commanders were summoned to Greece and driven to commit suicide: in AD 66/7 Domitius Corbulo, commander in the Syria, and the brothers Scribonius Proculus and Scribonius Rufus, governors of Upper and Lower Germania.⁹⁰ In both cases the large and influential armies were hereafter commanded by senators who were less competent and even less likely to aspire to, or even gain, greater power for themselves. Such appointment can be seen with the Licinius Mucianus in Syria, Fonteius Capito in Lower Germania, and Verginius Rufus in Upper Germania.⁹¹ Altering these vital commands, and the removal

⁸⁷ T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Tiberius to Nero', in *CAH*², p. 252; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 BC – AD 138*, p. 183; A. Momigliano, 'Nero', *CAH*, vol. X, pp. 727-8.

⁸⁸ Tac. *Ann.* XVI. 57. M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 127; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 60; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 BC – AD 138*, p. 183; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 152.

⁸⁹ Vinicianus' conspiracy is poorly documented: there is no clear account of this event and it is only mentioned by Suetonius, see Suet. *Nero* 36. D. C. A. Shotter, 'A time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 60; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the End of a Dynasty*, p. 178; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 149; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, Vol. II, p. 560.

⁹⁰ Dio LXIII.17.2-6. M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 127; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 60; R. S. Rogers, 'Heirs and Rivals to Nero', in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 86, p. 211.

⁹¹ M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the End of a Dynasty*, p. 117; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 60; G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics, AD 68-70', *JRS* 47, p. 28; B. H. Warmington, *Nero: Reality and Legend*, pp. 156-8.

of capable and popular commanders, would have three significant impacts along the Rhine: first it weakened the military capability and effectiveness of the forces under their new command, secondly it presented Roman weakness to the *Germani* and the Gauls, and thirdly, most significantly of all, was the growing anger and disloyalty the armies had towards the emperor.

Vindex's Rebellion

Nero's retribution against the conspirators, increased despotism against the Roman upper class, and his suppression of any opposition, incited further rebellion. In the spring of AD 68 Julius Vindex, the praetorian governor of Gallia Lugdunensis, rose in revolt. Although his rebellion itself was swiftly suppressed, its significance is derived from the subsequent events which wrought momentous change throughout the Roman Empire. His insurrection triggered events that would see the extinction of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, a civil war, another revolt of the Germanic tribes, and the rise of a new imperial dynasty. This uprising provides another example of the Rhine armies' secondary function, that of securing the provinces of Gaul. Moreover, it outlined the threat popular governors or legionary commanders represented to the emperor. Most importantly, it demonstrated the danger the Germanic tribes posed to Rome during periods of weakness and civil discord.

Vindex's insurgency has mistakenly been interpreted by some scholars as a native uprising for Gallic independence.⁹² Syme has argued a similar point referring to the

⁹² D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 157; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 9.

uprising as, “a native insurrection against the Roman power.”⁹³ This theory, for some scholars, gains plausibility primarily due to the subsequent outbreak of the Batavian rebellion in AD 69. In short, Julius Vindex’s motives were based on the governance and personality of the princeps, the rebellion’s ultimate goal being to replace Nero with a more suitable emperor. According to Dio, Vindex denounced Nero’s murders, robberies, and sexual outrages, as well as his vulgar and inappropriate stage performances.⁹⁴ Tacitus’ account supports this view, recording the confession of Subrius Flavus, citing the moment he turned against Nero when the princeps, ‘turned into the murderer of your mother and wife – a chariot-driver, an actor, a fire-eater.’⁹⁵ A significant contributing factor was the widespread resentment of Nero’s financial depredations. Consequently the financial burden of Nero’s extravagance had to be augmented by heavier taxation and forced levies in Gaul and Britain, in Africa wealthy landowners were executed and their wealth seized, and in Judea and Egypt they suffered the exactions of Nero’s representatives.⁹⁶ According to Plutarch, Vindex had been planning the revolt for quite some time prior to his declaration.⁹⁷ In his account, Plutarch records that Vindex had sounded out provincial governors, including Servius Sulpicius Galba, before announcing his uprising.⁹⁸ Furthermore, Joannes Antiochenus, Dio’s Epitomator, adds that exiled senators were also approached.⁹⁹ It is an indication of some level of success on Nero’s policy towards provincial commands that most of the

⁹³ R. Syme, *Tacitus*, Vol 1, pp. 462-3.

⁹⁴ Dio LXIII. 22-3.

⁹⁵ Tac. *Ann.* XV. 67.

⁹⁶ Gaul and Britain, see Dio XLIII. 22. Africa, see Plin. *NH* XVIII. 35. Judea and Egypt, see Jose. *BJ* II. 293; Dio LXIII.11. M. Griffin, ‘Nero’, in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 128; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 10; E. M. Smallwood, *Documents Illustrating the Principates of Gaius, Claudius and Nero*, p. 391.

⁹⁷ Plut. *Gal.* 4. 2.

⁹⁸ Plut. *Gal.* 4. 2.

⁹⁹ Joann. Antioch fr. 19; Muel. V. 6-10. D. C. A. Shotter, ‘A Time-table for the “Bellum Neronis”’, in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 61; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 11.

commanders sent Vindex's proposals straight to the emperor.¹⁰⁰ Galba's failure to follow suit is the most likely explanation for Nero's assassination order against him.¹⁰¹ Consequently, Galba's interception of these orders was a factor that persuaded him to join with Vindex.¹⁰² These correspondences indicate that Vindex's goal was definitely to remove Nero and replace him with a suitable replacement, rather than instigating a Gallic revolt. Certainly Vindex had no illusions about the fragility of his position and the unlikelihood of his success. Julius Florus' failure in AD 21 was an abject lesson and illustrated the futility of rebelling against Rome with the backing of its forces stationed along the Rhine. Vindex himself could not gain the loyalty of the Rhine legions, nor any others, without which his revolt was doomed to failure.¹⁰³

Initially Nero ignored Vindex's insurrection.¹⁰⁴ According to Suetonius, he did not immediately move against Vindex and waited eight days before informing the Senate.¹⁰⁵ This was not wholly irrational: Vindex possessed no legions, and the loyalty of the Rhine legions and the urban cohorts stationed at *Lugdunum* was not in doubt.¹⁰⁶ Tacitus speaks as if the Gallic provinces supported him almost unanimously, with the exceptions of the *Treveri*, *Lingones*, and the colony of Lyons.¹⁰⁷ In reality, Vindex's initial base of support consisted of the *Aedui*, *Arverni*, *Sequani*, and the titular colony of

¹⁰⁰ M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 127; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A Time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 61; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, pp. 11-2; J. Malitz, *Nero*, p. 110;

¹⁰¹ Suet. *Gal.* IX. 2.

¹⁰² M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 127; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A Time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), p. 61; J. Malitz, *Nero*, pp. 100-1.

¹⁰³ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 10; J. Malitz, *Nero*, p. 110.

¹⁰⁴ Suet. *Gal.* X. 2; XIV. 2; Plut. *Gal.* V; Dio LXIII. 23; LXIV. 6, 5; Tac. *Hist.* I. 13. 4; I. 53. M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, p. 181; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 157; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 10.

¹⁰⁵ Suet. *Nero* XL. 4.

¹⁰⁶ M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the end of a Dynasty*, p. 181; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 10; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, pp. 160-1; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A Time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), pp. 65-6.

¹⁰⁷ Tac. *Hist.* I. 8; 51; 65; II. 94; IV. 17; 57; 69.

Vienna in Narbonensis.¹⁰⁸ Plutarch records Vindex' claim of having 100,000 men under arms, besides others whom he might raise.¹⁰⁹ This was doubtless an exaggeration; at Vesontio, according to Tacitus, his army was annihilated, although Plutarch set his losses at only 20,000.¹¹⁰ Moreover, however prevalent the revolt was in Gaul, Vindex's forces were inevitably poorly equipped and trained, and no match for the professionalism of the Rhine legions. This only reinforces the point that Vindex sought the support and protection of a Roman leader able to win the loyalty and support of the Roman military. Thus the rebellion only gained importance and potential success with the support of Servius Sulpicius Galba, the long serving governor of Hispania Tarraconensis.¹¹¹ Although Galba only had one legion under his command, Spain had a large Roman citizen population from which he began to recruit another, *legio VII Galbiana*.¹¹² His position was strengthened by the support of Marcus Salvius Otho, the governor of Lusitania, Titus Vinus, the commander of *legio VI Victrix*, and the quaestor of Baetica.¹¹³ Nero responded to the increased threat, dismissing one of the presiding consuls,¹¹⁴ assuming the office himself, directing the senate to declare Galba a public

¹⁰⁸ Tac. *Hist.* I. 51. 4; IV. 17. 3; Plin. *NH* IV. 106, 109. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 10.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. *Gal.* 4. 5.

¹¹⁰ Tac. *Hist.* I. 51; Plut. *Galba* IV. 5. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 10; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A Time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), pp. 61-4.

¹¹¹ Suet. *Gal.* X. 2; XIV. 2; Plut. *Gal.* V; Dio LXIII. 23; LXIV. 6. 5; Tac. *Hist.* I. 13. 4; I. 53. M. Griffin, 'Nero', in A. A. Barrett (ed.), *Lives of the Caesars*, p. 127; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, p. 181.

¹¹² Tac. *Hist.* II. 86. This title have been a nickname, its official name may have been *Hispana*. After AD 70 it was altered to *Gemina*, see S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 146-7; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 21; L. J. F. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 213; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions during the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), p. 484; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 99-100; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, pp. 157-8; E. Ritterling, 'Legio', in *RE*, Suppl. XII, p. 1629.

¹¹³ Suet. *Gal.* X. 2; 14.2; Plut. *Gal.* V; Dio LXIII. 23; LXIV. 6. 5; Tac. *Hist.* I. 13. 4; I. 53. M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the end of a Dynasty*, p. 181; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 159; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 46; R. Syme, 'Partisans of Galba', *Historia* 31, pp. 346-57.

¹¹⁴ For Nero's consulship see, Suet. *Nero* XLIII. 2; Pliny *Pan.* LVII. 2; *CIL* VI.9190; 8639; X. 6637. Suetonius records that Nero replaced both consuls, but both Pliny and the *Fasti* mention only one consul, Galerius Trachalus, with Nero, see P. A. Gallivan, 'The *Fasti* for the Reign of Nero', *The Classical Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (2), p. 292 see n. 3; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the end of a Dynasty*, p. 181; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), pp. 67-8.

enemy, and declared his estate forfeit.¹¹⁵ He recalled the legions he had transferred east for his projected campaign against the *Albani*. As discussed above, some were delayed deliberately by the Batavians.¹¹⁶ Nero also established a new legion, *legio I Adiutrix*, composed of members of the fleet at Misenum and other troops in Rome.¹¹⁷ All of these forces were positioned in northern Italy, and despite the growing threat he did not take the field and assume personal command, instead empowering Petronius Turpilianus to do so.¹¹⁸

Vindex's rebellion and the defection of Galba appear to have been the catalyst for further upheaval. At some point after Galba's defection became known, Nero was informed of the revolt of Lucius Clodius Macer, the legate of *legio III Augusta* in Africa.¹¹⁹ This defection threatened the essential corn supply from Africa, which contributed to the emperor's unpopularity in Rome.¹²⁰ Paradoxically, the defeat of Vindex at *Vesontio* (Besançon) by the legions of Upper Germania (reinforced by detachments from the Lower Germania) was the tipping point that marked the downfall of Nero. Details of the battle and events that led up to it are limited; supposedly the Rhine legion finally moved against Vindex's forces at Vesontio, which were soundly defeated causing Vindex to take his own life.¹²¹ The Rhine legions had again

¹¹⁵ Galba a public enemy, see Plut. *Gal.* V.4.

¹¹⁶ Troops summoned home, see Tac. *Hist.* I. 6; 9; 31; 70.

¹¹⁷ Tac. *Hist.* I. 6; Suet. *Nero* XLIV. 1; *Gal.* XII; Dio LXIII. 27. 1a. For details see J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 7 see n. 60; G. E. F. Chilver, *Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories I and II*, pp. 6-7; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions During the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), p. 484; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, p. 100; E. Ritterling, 'Legio', *RE* XII, 1925, pp. 1758, 1797, 1407.

¹¹⁸ M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, p. 181; D. Shotter, Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome, p. 161; D. C. A. Shotter, 'A Time-table for the "Bellum Neronis"', in *Historia* 24 (1), pp. 67-8.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Gal.* VI; Tac. *Hist.* I. 73; II. 97. 2; IV. 49. 4. D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, p. 160; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: the end of a Dynasty*, p. 181.

¹²⁰ Suet. *Nero* XLV. 1. G. Morgan, 'The Publica Fames of AD 68 (Suetonius Nero 45, 1)', *CQ* 50, pp. 210-22; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, p. 181.

¹²¹ Tac. *Hist.* I. 51.

successfully fulfilled their secondary role of securing the Gallic provinces. The pivotal moment came after the victory with the Rhine legions had offered to make their commander, Lucius Verginius Rufus, emperor. Verginius refused, maintaining that the choice of Princeps must be made by the Senate and the Roman people.¹²² A major danger that was recognised by Augustus had come to pass; the emperor had lost the loyalty of the Rhine legions, almost half of Rome's military strength. In quick succession troops in Germania, Hispania, Africa and Illyricum abandoned Nero.¹²³ Significantly, this event would have adverse effects on the Germanic frontier. The Rhine legions, distracted with Vindex's rebellion and their abandonment of Nero, neglected their defence against the *Germani*, who would once again seize this opportunity to threaten Roman interests during the subsequent civil war.

Nero's support rapidly declined after this point and his demise shortly followed. In short, news of the legions' support for Verginius and the abandonment of Petronius convinced Nero that the rest of the army had defected. Believing his control was lost, he attempted to abandon Rome. His attempts to persuade others to accompany him, including members of the Praetorian Guard, failed; their support had shifted to Galba.¹²⁴ Seized the initiative, the Senate declared Nero a public enemy and conferred all powers on Galba.¹²⁵ Clearly abandoned and his power usurped, Nero committed suicide shortly afterward. Serious consequences subsequently followed. With no obvious heir, the senate elected Galba; having had no precedent, the decision was challenged and a war of succession ensued. Ultimately, *bellum Neronis* drained Roman resources, fractured

¹²² Plut. *Gal.* VI; Dio LXIII. 25. 1; Tac. *Hist.* I. 8. 2.

¹²³ Tac. *Hist.* I. 6; Plut. *Gal.* XV. 2; XVII. 3; Dio LXIII. 27. I.

¹²⁴ Suet. *Nero* XLVII; XLVIII. 2; Plut. *Gal.* II. 2; XIV. 2; Tac. *Hist.* I. 5.

¹²⁵ Suet. *Nero* XLIX. 2; Plut. *Gal.* VII; Dio LXIII. 29. M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, p. 182.

the cohesiveness of the military, and presented a weakened front along the Rhine and Danube. This division resulted in the neglect of Rome's defence against the *Germani*. The Batavians' initial betrayal of Nero was an indication of the potential threat the Germanic tribes posed to Rome, the Romans failed to address this threat. Their lack of strong leadership and direction after the death of Vindex postponed their revolt until the following year and the rise of Gaius Julius Civilis.

Year of the Four Emperors

The end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty resulted in a fracturing of the Roman Empire, while the ensuing civil wars divided Roman resources and military strength amongst competing candidates, as a result of which Rome's defences along the Rhine and Danube were neglected and weakened. The period AD 68-69 marked a turbulent and crucial period in Roman history; it witnessed the accession of four emperors in quick succession and as such AD 69 has come to be known as the 'Year of the Four emperors'. The contest for the principate embroiled the empire into a series of civil wars that in consequence weakened Roman defences along the Rhine and Danube and enticed attacks from not only the *Germani*, but also the Gauls, Dacians and Sarmatians. As a result of actions undertaken by claimants to the principate the tentatively stabilised frontiers and complex relationships established with the neighbouring peoples, particularly the *Germani*, during the course of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, were made vulnerable and threats emerged on both the Rhine and Danube.

This period would highlight several key factors in the defence of the frontiers: the importance of military unity against the *Germani* and other northern peoples, the threat

posed by large military commands, and the potential threat posed by native leaders of auxiliary forces. The role and impact of large provincial armies and the consequences of actions undertaken in the civil wars also needs to be assessed, along with a discussion of several key events in this period: the Batavian revolt, the emergence of the *imperium Galliarum*, and incursions north of the Danube. These highlight the consequences of Roman disunity and the potential threat a unification of Germanic tribes represented, especially when defences were neglected. Details of the civil wars will need to be omitted; the focus will centre on the *Germani*, and Roman neglect of and vulnerability on the Rhine and Danube.

Evidence

Evidence for the Year of the Four Emperors is certainly more prevalent than during the previous Julio-Claudian dynasty. However, difficulties arise when determining bias and interpretation of events, in that it is clear the focus of the surviving evidence are primarily centred on Vespasian and his role in the civil war, and as a result his personality and motives dominates both the primary and secondary sources. There is little doubt the history of this period was written and shaped by the Flavians, including the denigration of other claimants of the throne, each to their own degree and for a specific purpose.¹²⁶ Such methodological problems make it difficult to determine to what extent information conveyed through the sources is accurate and trustworthy, and to what degree works were produced to justify the actions undertaken by Vespasian through the course of the civil war.¹²⁷ This is certainly true of the five surviving literary

¹²⁶ G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics', *JRS* 47, p. 34; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'From Nero to Vespasian', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 265; E. S. Ramage, 'Denigration of Predecessor under Claudius, Galba, and Vespasian', *Historia* 32 (2), pp. 209-241; A. Ferrill, 'Otho, Vitellius, and the Propaganda of Vespasian', *CJ* 60 (6), pp. 267-269; M. P. Charlesworth, 'Flaviana', *JRS* 27, pp. 54-62.

¹²⁷ L. E. Andress, 'Establishing the Flavian Dynasty: The Fortuitous Ascent of Vespasian and Titus', pp. 27-8; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 3 n. 7; G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics, AD 68-70', p. 34.

sources which include: the excerpts and fragment of Cassius Dio, Books LXIII-LXV; Plutarch, *Lives of Galba and Otho*; Suetonius, *Galba, Otho, Vitellius and Vespasian*; and Tacitus, *The Histories*.¹²⁸ Furthermore, scholars argue for the existence of a common source which is apparent in the works of Plutarch, Tacitus, Suetonius, to a less extent in Dio, and perhaps Josephus.¹²⁹ In each case, it is evident that substantial portions of material, and on occasion even the phrasing of that material, can be attributed to an earlier Roman writer.¹³⁰ An example of this shared source can be seen in Plutarch and Tacitus' accounts of the campaign between Otho and Vitellius. Both works have clearly utilised large sections of the same material, and at times even used the same wording, clearly derived from the same earlier writer.¹³¹ Morgan argues that it is impossible to identify the common source, first because there is no specific reference to its author, and secondly, because the work of Tacitus seems to have eclipsed every earlier historian who dealt with this period. Therefore not even small fragments of their works have survived to provide a basis for comparison.¹³²

Debate surrounding interpretation of individuals and events, in particular the analysis of the literary evidence, is central to establishing a chronology of the civil war. Noted scholars on the topic include Morgan, Murison, Greenhalgh and Wellesley.¹³³ In

¹²⁸ K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, (2000), p. xiii, xviii; L. E. Andress, 'Establishing the Flavian Dynasty: The Fortuitous Ascent of Vespasian and Titus', pp. 27-8; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, 2005, p. 3 n. 7; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 4.

¹²⁹ R. Mellor, *Tacitus*, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 33; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 281; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 10; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, App., p. 29; G. B. Townsend, 'Cluvius Rufus in the Histories of Tacitus', *The American Journal of Philology* 85, p. 337.

¹³⁰ K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 281.

¹³¹ Tac. *Hist.* II. 22-40; Plut. *Otho* 7-11. See also, K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 281; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, SPUDASMATA 52, pp. 93-94.

¹³² K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 281. For theories regarding the possible identity of the 'common source', see K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 281-20

¹³³ G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, SPUDASMATA, Bd. 52, Georg

summary, understanding of the civil war is determined largely through the interpretation of the Tacitean evidence, and whether the information is doubted or dismissed in favour of material from other sources. Opposing arguments present by Greenhalgh and Wellesley are an example of this, whereby Greenhalgh is too accepting of Tacitus, and Wellesley is too critical: as a result their interpretations of specific events differ.¹³⁴ Scholarship's reliance on Tacitus' account as the framework within which the description of the military and political history of this period is constructed is the main point of contention for these differing interpretations. Significantly, details concerning specific events along the Rhine and Danube are limited, the sources which cover these matters to any extent are reduced to three: Tacitus, and to a lesser extent Josephus and Dio.¹³⁵ Furthermore, frustratingly Tacitus' *Histories* abruptly ends in AD 70 during the account of the final phase of the Batavian revolt.¹³⁶ Therefore, further details are obtained from the material evidence, in order to construct a more complete understanding of the situation along Rhine and Danube.¹³⁷ Notably the Flavian era has a significant increase in such evidence, including numismatics, epigraphy, and archaeology.¹³⁸ Archaeological material in particular plays a crucial role during this period, distinctively in highlighting the impact and significance of the Germanic revolt along the Lower Rhine which is mentioned later in this work.

Olms Verlag Hildesheim, Zurich, 1993; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, Routledge, London, 2000; P. A. L. Greenhalgh, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1975.

¹³⁴ K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, Routledge, London, 2000; P. A. L. Greenhalgh, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1975. For details, see G. N. Morgan, 69 AD: *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 3.

¹³⁵ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33.

¹³⁶ Tac. *Hist.* V. 26. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 46; C. H. Moore, trans., Tacitus, *The Histories*, Harvard University Press, Loeb, Cambridge, Mass., 2005, pp. 218-219; D. R. Dudley, *The World of Tacitus*, p. 184; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 3.

¹³⁷ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 3 n. 7.

¹³⁷ K. Wellesley, *The long Year AD 69*, p. xiii; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 3 n. 7.

¹³⁸ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 3; G. N. Morgan, 69 AD: *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 3 see n. 1; B. Levick, 'Introduction', in K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. xviii see n. 11; K. Wellesley, *The Long Year AD 69*, p. xiii,

AD 69 witnessed the struggle of four contenders for the supremacy of the Roman Empire: Servius Galba Imperator Caesar Augustus (Galba), Marcus Otho Caesar Augustus (Otho), Aulus Vitellius Germanicus Imperator Augustus (Vitellius), and finally Caesar Vespasianus Augustus (Vespasian). The narrative of events for this period has been a contentious and extensively argued subject for scholars, numerous debates centring on interpretation of evidence; individuals, motives and consequences have all been extensively explored. As such, the progression of events and justification for the conflict has been extensively researched and argued.¹³⁹ Therefore, a re-examination is neither necessary nor relevant to this work. In summary, the resulting civil war, or series of civil wars, was instigated by the death of Nero, the last of the Julio-Claudians; a succession of struggles ensued between separate claimants to the principate. As discussed in the previous section, Galba's investiture in AD 68 was a radical and dangerous precedent; a *princeps* not of the houses of Julii or Claudii was now acknowledged by the Senate, while most significantly a princeps could be declared outside of Rome through the support of a military forces.¹⁴⁰ Subsequently, other claimants followed suit, first Vitellius, then Otho, and finally Vespasian.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Refer to the works of: K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, Routledge, London, 2000; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, Routledge, London, 2005; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2006; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, SPUDASMATA, Bd. 52, Georg Olms Verlag Hildesheim, Zurich, 1993; P. A. L. Greenhalgh, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1975; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'From Nero to Vespasian', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, pp. 256-282.

¹⁴⁰ Tac. *Hist.* I. 4.2. L. E. Andress, 'Establishing the Flavian Dynasty: The Fortuitous Ascent of Vespasian and Titus', p. 26; G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics', *JRS* 47, pp. 29-35.

¹⁴¹ Vitellius was declared emperor by the Rhine armies in January 2/3 AD 69 (Suet. *Vitellius* 8.1), Otho's coup did not take place until January 15 (Tac. *Hist.* I. 1-49) and Vespasian was not proclaimed by the Aegyptus legions until July 1 (Tac. *Hist.* II. 79; Jose. *BJ* IV.2; see also *CPJ* 418a). For details see, T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'From Nero to Vespasian', pp. 265-275; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 55-6, 64-73, 184-185; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 15-17, 21-27, 122; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 62-3, 81, 148; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 43-53; C. L. Murison, 'Some Vitellian Dates: An Exercise in Methodology', *TAPA* 109, pp. 188-194; L. Holzapfel, 'Römische Kaiserdaten', *Klio* 13, pp. 289-295; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 BC – AD 138*, pp. 201-2, 206.

The army's role in the events of AD 69 was central to the outbreak and continuation of the civil wars. A revolt of a military force was feared even under Augustus, with the realisation that a concentration of Roman forces could erupt into a rebellion and a usurper would emerge to challenge the emperor's authority always a consideration. Several incidents during the Julio-Claudian period had come close, reinforcing the perceived potential of this threat, such as the revolts by the Pannonian and Rhine legions in AD 14, and Scribonianus' attempt in the province of Dalmatia in AD 41. An even more contemporary occurrence emerged in AD 68 after the suppression of Vindex's revolt by a combined Roman force made up of troops from the legions of the Upper and Lower Rhine.¹⁴² Lucius Verginius Rufus, commander of the Lower Rhine, refused the army's proposition to elevate him to emperor and their second offer after Nero's death.¹⁴³ This was the second and third attempts by forces based near the Rhine to reject the reigning emperor and propose their own candidate. Further attempts were carried out in quick succession by forces in other provinces. Galba in Hispania Tarraconensis, which preceded the Rhine army's uprising, gained the support of *legio VI Victrix*, later raising a second *legio VII Galbiana*, although ultimately it was his seduction of the Praetorians that secured him the principate.¹⁴⁴ Vitellius, who followed Verginius in command, did not refuse the Rhine army's fourth attempt to

¹⁴² These forces are merely alluded to in the literary sources and their size is nowhere specified, however, Tacitus specifies that men were utilised from both armies, see Tac. *Hist.* I. 53. 2-3; Plut. *Gal.* X. C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 9-10 see n. 25, 26.

¹⁴³ Plut. *Gal.* VI; Dio LXIII. 25. 1; Tac. *Hist.* I. 8. 2.

¹⁴⁴ Suet. *Gal.* X. 2; 14.2; Plut. *Gal.* V; Dio LXIII. 23; LXIV. 6. 5; Tac. *Hist.* I. 13. 4; I. 53. G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics', *JRS*, Vol. 47, 1957, p. 32; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 146-7; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 21; L. J. F. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army*, p. 213; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions During the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), p. 484; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 99-100; M. T. Griffin, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, p. 181; D. Shotter, *Nero Caesar Augustus: Emperor of Rome*, pp. 157-8; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 46; R. Syme, 'Partisans of Galba', *Historia* 31, pp. 346-57; E. Ritterling, 'Legio', in *RE*, Suppl. XII, p. 1629.

revolt, and gained the support of the ‘Germanicus exercitus’ consisting of: *legiones I, V Alaudae, XV Primigenia, XVI* from the Lower Rhine; *legiones IV Macedonica, XXI Rapax*; and *XXII Primigenia* from the Upper Rhine.¹⁴⁵ Otho is the exception in this instance; he cultivated a relationship with the Praetorian Guard rather than a provincial army, although it is speculated that he initially fostered a relationship with *legio VII Galbiana* before they were moved to the Danube beyond his reach.¹⁴⁶ Lastly, Vespasian and his supporters carefully cultivated the support of the legions of the East, skilfully gaining the loyalty of *legiones III Cyrenaica, XXII Deiotariana, V Macedonica, X Fretensis, XV Apollinaris, IV Scythica, VI Ferrata, and XII Fulminata*.¹⁴⁷ In each instance of rebellion the initial force was shortly followed by the support of other neighbouring troops, in this manner Roman forces and effectively the empire were divided amongst different candidates. [\[see Map \(13\)\]](#)

Consideration of these incidents indicates that the majority of them were instigated by officials and members of the higher command. Galba, and his officers, gathered support when the threat of his assassination by Nero was apparent and his position was untenable.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, Otho cultivated support and removed Galba after being rejected as his heir.¹⁴⁹ Conversely, Vespasian’s uprising is seen as a carefully orchestrated revolt, too well organised to be spontaneous, with the driving force originating from the Flavians and their supporters rather than from the troops

¹⁴⁵ G. E. F. Chilver, ‘The Army in Politics’, *JRS* 47, pp. 33-4; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World 30 BC – AD 138*, p. 202 n. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Tac. *Hist.* I. 23.

¹⁴⁷ Jose. *BJ* III. 4. 2; IV. 10. 6; Tac. *Hist.* II. 79. 1; Suet. *Vesp.* VI. 3. N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 51 see. n. 12-18; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 47; G. E. F. Chilver, ‘The Army in Politics’, *JRS* 47, pp. 34-35; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 124-5; G. Morgan, *69 A.D.: The Year of Four Emperors*, pp. 184-187.

¹⁴⁸ G. E. F. Chilver, ‘The Army in Politics’, *JRS* 47, p. 32.

¹⁴⁹ G. E. F. Chilver, ‘The Army in Politics’, *JRS* 47, p. 33.

themselves.¹⁵⁰ The Rhine is the only instance where it can be argued that the legionaries and their officers deliberately decided to split from the senate and appointed a princeps through their own volition.¹⁵¹ Therefore, in this case Vitellius was not the instigator, but rather the instrument through which the legions projected their desire to empower their own candidate and thus ensure favourable treatment and support for their interests.¹⁵² Tacitus emphasises this fact when he portrays the soldiers as the dominant force of the revolt, ignoring their officers, and insisting that if Vitellius would not accept the position they would find another candidate.¹⁵³ This view is further reinforced through the actions of Vitellius' Praetorian Guard, who were made up of loyal legionaries from his Rhine legions, and along with the remaining troops left to safeguard the Rhine, continued to support the Vitellian cause even through the desertion of their officers and Vitellius' own abdication.¹⁵⁴

Civil War: Impact on the Rhine and Danube

Significantly, actions undertaken during the course of the civil wars had a considerable and devastating impact on the Rhine and Danube. Galba's treatment of the north alienated some Gallic and Germanic tribes along with the Rhine legions, destabilising the region and effectively setting the scene for events to follow in the course of the unrest.¹⁵⁵ It was the succeeding emperors' willingness, however, to place their claim on the throne above the defence of the rivers which made the Rhine and

¹⁵⁰ Tacitus records that Vespasian and Mucianus had been planning their revolt before Vitellius was even appointed as the commander of the Lower Rhine (Tac. *Hist.* II. 5). G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics', *JRS* 47, pp. 34-35; L. E. Andress, 'Establishing the Flavian Dynasty: The Fortuitous Ascent of Vespasian and Titus', pp. 31-32.

¹⁵¹ Tac. *Hist.* I. 51-57. G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics', *JRS* 47, p. 34.

¹⁵² G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics', *JRS* 47, p. 34.

¹⁵³ Tac. *Hist.* I. 55-57; II. 90.

¹⁵⁴ Tac. *Hist.* III. 61, 73-87; IV. 27.

¹⁵⁵ C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 60-2; E. T. Salmon, *A history of the Roman World*, p. 200; C. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., p. 155.

Danube vulnerable. Along the Rhine, the two armies were made up of seven legions with an estimated 40,000 legionaries and as many auxiliary troops, totalling approximately 80,000 men.¹⁵⁶ Vitellius' strategy called for the withdrawal of between a third and half of these troops in his campaign, with the exact numerical strength of the force being difficult to determine. Tacitus' account records a force totalling 100,000 invading Italy; assigning about 40,000 men to Valens and 30,000 to Caecina and Vitellius.¹⁵⁷ These figures are probably exaggerated and align with the approximate estimate of the total strength of the Rhine garrison and with the addition of the forces gathered from Gaul and Britain. Clearly the Rhine was not completely stripped by Vitellius; subsequent events along it attest to this. A realistic approximation of the forces withdrawn from the Rhine can be seen in the works of Morgan and Murison.¹⁵⁸ In summary, both Valens and Caecina each had the bulk of their forces formed around a single legion, *legio V Alaudae* and *legio XXI Rapax* respectively, probably 4,000 men each, and detachments (*vexillationes*)¹⁵⁹ of between 2,000 and 2,600 men from each of

¹⁵⁶ This figure is derived from the equation that each legion would have approximately 5,500 men, see E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, p. 16, see n. 3 (on size of the Roman legion); C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 85; J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer*, München, 1963, pp. 478, 492-495; W. Liebenam, 'Excercitus', in *RE*, Suppl. vi, p. 1606. Scholars that estimate a force between 70,000 and 80,000 defending the Rhine, see C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 85; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 37; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, p. 51; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 83-5; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 44-5.

¹⁵⁷ Tac. *Hist.* I. 61; II. 57. K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 36; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 85.

¹⁵⁸ G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 84; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 60-2

¹⁵⁹ A detachment (*vexillatio*) drawn from a legion could vary in size. The four Balkan legions that Otho summoned to his assistance each sent on ahead detachments of 2,000 men (Tac. *Hist.* II. 11). Detachments of 1,000 and 2,000, however, were the standard numbers, see A. K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War: 100 BC–AD 200*, pp. 27-8; K. Gilliver, 'The Augustan Reform and the Imperial Army', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, pp. 196-7; Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, pp. 30-32. Detachments from the three British legions that joined Vitellius totalled 8,000 men, near enough to 2,600 (Tac. *Hist.* II. 57.1). See also, C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 86.

the remaining legions in their commands.¹⁶⁰ In each case auxiliary units were dispensed in equal numbers.¹⁶¹ Vitellius also took the bulk of *legio XXII Primigenia* (4,000 men), together with detachments from the remaining forces along the Rhine (possibly between 1,000 and 2,000) along with the 8,000 men from the three British legions.¹⁶² Therefore, approximately 25,000 to 30,000 legionaries and as many auxiliaries were removed from the Rhine frontier and deployed south against Otho.¹⁶³ This left approximately 10,000 to 15,000 legionaries and auxiliaries, a portion of which were new recruits enlisted by Vitellius whilst in Gaul,¹⁶⁴ in defence of the Rhine and the Gallic interior.¹⁶⁵

Along the Danube, overwhelmed by Vitellius' forces, Otho recalled troops from Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Moesia.¹⁶⁶ Four legions¹⁶⁷ from Pannonia and Dalmatia were summoned by Otho, initially dispatching *vexillationes* of 2,000 men from each of the legions with the majority of the legions to follow.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, it is apparent in Suetonius and from remarks by Tacitus, that a similar number of troops were requested

¹⁶⁰ Valens (Lower Rhine) V Alaudae (4000), I Germanica (2600), XV Primigenia (2600), and XVI (2600) totalling approximately 12,000 troops. Caecina (Upper Rhine) *legio XXI Rapax* (4000), IV Macedonica (2600) and XXII Primigenia (2600) totalling approximately 9,000 men.

¹⁶¹ Tac. *Hist.* I. 61.

¹⁶² G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 149-50 n. 5; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 85-6.

¹⁶³ C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 85-6.

¹⁶⁴ Tac. *Hist.* II. 57. G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 149-50 n. 5;

¹⁶⁵ K. E. Waugh, 'Germans beyond the Limes: a reassessment of the archaeological evidence in the Limesvorland of southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 46; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 101-2; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 54; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 86.

¹⁶⁶ Suet. *Ves.* VI.2; Tac. *Hist.* II. 46.3; 85.1. *Legio VII Galbiana*; *legio XIII Gemina* (in Pannonia); *legio XI Claudia*; *legio XIV Gemina* (in Dalmatia); *legio III Gallica*; *legio VII Claudia*; *legio VIII Augusta* (in Moesia). See also, C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 96-100; E. T. Salmon, *A history of the Roman World*, p. 203.

¹⁶⁷ *Legio VII Galbiana*, *legio XI Claudia*, *legio XIII Gemina*, and *legio XIV Gemina*.

¹⁶⁸ Tac. *Hist.* II. 11. G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 84 n. 3; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 28; C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 96-100; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate*, p. 96.

from the three legions in Moesia.¹⁶⁹ In total, this first recall of troops from the Danube removed approximately 14,000 to 28,000¹⁷⁰ legionaries and an uncertain number of auxiliaries, leaving approximately 10,000 to 25,000 legionaries behind to defend the Danube. After Otho's defeat the Danubian forces were returned to their posts by Vitellius; yet his execution of their senior officers prior to this would have only increased their hostility towards him and made their subsequent defection easier.¹⁷¹ Significantly, the eight Batavian cohorts were also returned to the lower Rhine and although this manoeuvre would make no overall impact on the available troops present on the Rhine, it would still have serious repercussions.¹⁷²

A second withdrawal of Danubian forces occurred during Vespasian's campaign, with Marcus Antonius Primus, commander of *legio VII Galbiana*, leading an advanced force made up of detachments of auxiliary *cohortes* and *equitum* cavalry and possibly vexillationes from *legio VII*.¹⁷³ Aponius Saturninus, governor of Moesia, also led his three legions, *Legiones III Gallica*, *IV Augusta*, and *VII Claudia*, to Rome but there is no mention of their numbers, but considering that Tacitus only mentions the legions themselves and does not refer to detachments, it can be assumed that the bulk of the legions were deployed, approximately 12,000 legionaries, leaving behind a token force of about 4,500.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, it is recorded that *legio VII Galbiana* and *legio X*

¹⁶⁹ Suet. *Vesp.* VI. 2; Tac. *Hist.* II. 46; 85.

¹⁷⁰ This figure depends on whether the 2,000 initial troops were deployed or a further 2,000 was also dispatched later: as stipulated above a majority deployment of a legion would amount to approximately 4,000. It appears, however, that *legio XIII Gemina*, as the closest legion (stationed at Poetovio), was the only force to field the majority of its legions (Tac. *Hist.* II. 43.2): but this does not mean that the other six legions had not already deployed their forces, only that they did not arrive in time to aid Otho, see C. L. Murison, *Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, p. 98.

¹⁷¹ Tac. *Hist.* II. 60. K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 114; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 57; C. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., p. 157.

¹⁷² Tac. *Hist.* II. 69.

¹⁷³ Tac. *Hist.* III. 2, 6.

¹⁷⁴ Tac. *Hist.* III. 5; III. 10. K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 133.

Gemina were deployed to reinforce Antonius; again their numbers are not mentioned but considering the absence of the term *vexillatio/nes* and bearing in mind the presence of their commander it is likely the majority, if not the entirety of the legions, was mobilised, amounting to a force of between 8,000 and 11,000.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, in total as many as five legions, or at least a considerable proportion of their strength, between 20,000 and 27,500, were withdrawn from the Danube, effectively leaving the river to be defended by an estimated 13,000 to 20,000 legionaries.¹⁷⁶ In addition, auxiliary forces would have constituted the bulk of its defence, possibly between 20,000 and 30,000; their lack of mention in events in Rome would indicate that the majority of these units remained along the frontier.¹⁷⁷ This view can be reinforced by the strategic role of the *auxilia* in the defence of Moesia and Noricum.¹⁷⁸ Consequently these troop withdrawals undertaken by Vitellius, Otho, and Vespasian would leave the Rhine frontier, and to a lesser extent the Danube, severely depleted of troops and leaving them vulnerable to attacks from both external and internal threats.

Consequences of the civil wars and the military responses along the Danube under Otho and Vespasian were not as severe as those along the Rhine, but still alarming and an indication of that frontier's potential threat in the near future. As a result of the weakened Roman position projected outside of the empire during the internal conflict and the division of military strength and resources the Danube was made vulnerable to

¹⁷⁵ Tac. *Hist.* III. 7.

¹⁷⁶ This figure is based on an estimate of *vexillationes* of 4,000 men (if the majority of the legion were dispatched, leaving behind a token force 1,500) and 5,500 (if the entire legion was deployed) from each of the five Danube legions.

¹⁷⁷ Tac. *Hist.* III. 5.

¹⁷⁸ Auxiliaries used in the defence against Vitellian troops in Raetia, see Tac. *Hist.* II. 5. Auxilia used in the defence of the Danube in Moesia, see Tac. *Hist.* III. 46.

the north from threats by the *Germani*, *Sarmatae*, and *Dacii*. Two significant incursions in the province of Moesia occurred as a result of events in AD 68-69.

Threats along the Danube

The first involved the *Rhoxolani*, a semi-nomadic Sarmatian tribe from the Caucasus area which had settled on the lower Istros on the Danube in the first century AD.¹⁷⁹ Initially using the turbulent atmosphere surrounding Nero's reign during the winter of AD 67/68, the *Rhoxolani* had destroyed two auxiliary *cohortes*; details concerning the units and their garrison are not mentioned.¹⁸⁰ According to Tacitus, this victory and the supposed instability generated in the empire through the civil war was motivation enough for 9,000 horsemen to carry out another raid across the Danube early in AD 69 when conditions offered the opportunity to do so.¹⁸¹ This incursion, however, was intercepted and destroyed by *legio III Gallica* and their auxiliary forces when weather conditions hampered the Sarmatians' return back across the Danube and their ability to combat the Romans effectively. In this instance the *Rhoxolani* had miscalculated the level of Roman military instability along the Danube at this time; the Danubian forces were not directly involved in the civil war until later in AD 69 and were still manning their garrisons along the frontier. Despite the Sarmatians' defeat this event highlights their perceived view of Rome's weakened position and the opportunity this presented if Roman defences were depleted.

¹⁷⁹ Strabo *Geo.* VII. 3. 17; Plin. *NH* IV. 80; Ptol. *Geo.* 3, 5. 19; 24-6. G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 98; E. Diehl, 'Roxolani', in *RE*, Suppl. vii, pp. 1195-1197; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, 1974, pp. 41-42.

¹⁸⁰ Tac. *Hist.* I. 79; III. 24. J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danubian and Balkan Provinces', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 558; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 46-7; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 98; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, 1974, p. 42.

¹⁸¹ Tac. *Hist.* I. 79.

Later in AD 69, the subsequent removal of five Roman legions under Saturninus and Antonius would again present an opportunity for peoples north of the Danube to exploit Rome's vulnerable frontier. Unlike the perceived weakened position assumed and acted upon by the Rhoxolani earlier in the year, the Roman defence of the Danube was in fact now significantly weakened. Tacitus records that the Dacians initially evaluated the situation before committing to an incursion. Assured of Roman focus elsewhere and the concentration of Roman military forces in Italy, the *Dacii* crossed the Danube, first defeating the auxiliary units of cavalry and cohorts stationed on the river, and then advancing further in an attempt to destroy the abandoned legionary camps.¹⁸² This attack was only prevented because of the coincidental arrival of Gaius Licinius Mucianus, governor of Syria and commander of Vespasian's eastern forces, on his march to Italy. Initially *Legio VI Ferrata*, the largest and core unit of Mucianus' forces, was diverted to dispatch the Dacians.¹⁸³ Further measures were undertaken to secure the frontier after Antonius' victory at Cremona; the Vitellian *legio I Italica* and *legio V Alaudae* were sent as reinforcement, and Gaius Fonteius Agrippa, governor of Asia, was reassigned as its governor.

These measures would prove to be inadequate; a third Sarmatian incursion would occur in AD 70.¹⁸⁴ Wilkes disputes the identity of these invaders as Dacians, arguing that they were instead Sarmatians, on the basis that Tacitus notes that Mucianus' subsequent triumphal honours were in recognition for his expedition against the

¹⁸² Tac. *Hist.* III. 46. D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 102; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, 1974, p. 42; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 204-5; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 223-4.

¹⁸³ Tac. *Hist.* III. 46.

¹⁸⁴ Jose. *BJ* VII. 89-91; Tac. *Hist.* IV. 54. J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danubian and Balkan Provinces', in *CAH*², vol. X, p. 558.

Sarmatae, which in itself was a pretext for services during the civil war.¹⁸⁵ This could have been an error on Tacitus' part, or that of the transcribers, or this honour could have been in recognition of the subsequent Sarmatian attack in AD 70. Furthermore, Tacitus clearly indicates it was the *Dacii* in Book III. 46.¹⁸⁶

Two factors limited the potential threat and the level of destruction along the Danube during this period. Essentially these revolve around the preparations undertaken by the Roman commanders prior to the withdrawal of their legions; the retention of auxiliary forces and the securing of 'alliances' north of the Danube. First, as mentioned above, the Romans did withdraw five legions, or at least the bulk of their total legionary forces, from the Danube. However, the majority of the auxiliary forces were retained in the area and situated in defensive positions along the frontier. Although this precaution did fail along the Lower Danube it nevertheless still acted as a deterrent and offered some level of security. Along the middle and upper Danube it was the addition of the second factor which secured the stability of this region. In summary, according to Tacitus, to avoid exposing the provinces whilst they were unprotected the Romans took as hostages the chiefs of the *Iazyges*¹⁸⁷ and the Suebian rulers Sido and Italicus.¹⁸⁸ Significantly, the *Iazyges*' military forces were returned to their lands whilst the *Germani* were retained and taken to Italy. Clearly the *Germani*, deprived of their pro-Roman leaders, could not be trusted to maintain their allegiance to Rome. Therefore,

¹⁸⁵ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 4. The real reason for the honours was in recognition of his actions in the civil war: his defeat of the Sarmatians was only the pretext. See also, J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danubian and Balkan Provinces', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 558.

¹⁸⁶ Tac. *Hist.* III. 46.

¹⁸⁷ The *Iazyges* dwelt between the Danube and the Theiss, occupying the land between the Vannius kingdom and the Dacians, see J. Harmatta, *Studies on the History of the Sarmatians*, pp. 3-15; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 41.

¹⁸⁸ Tac. *Hist.* III. 6. Italicus is thought to have been Vangio's successor, possibly his son, see Tac. *Hist.* III.5.1; III.21.2. See also, L. Rübekeil, 'Ethnisches in germanischen Personennamen?', in U. Ludwig, T. Schilp, *Nomen et Fraternitas: Festschrift für Dieter Geuenich zum 65. Geburtstag*, pp. 31-3.

Roman precautions against the *Germani* resulted in two benefits: an influx of needed troops for their campaign, and more importantly a significant potential threat was nullified. Through these actions the Romans secured the Danube west of the *Dacii*. Ultimately the absence of similar protection along the Lower Danube resulted in the Sarmatian and Dacian incursions.

A Threat along the Rhine: Civilis and the Batavian Revolt

The destruction caused by the Batavian revolt highlights the dangers associated with neglecting defences against the *Germani* clearly reiterating and underlining the potential threat posed by the *Germani*. The rebellion was not only another significant event in Roman interaction with the Germanic tribes but also, as with the *clades Variana*, an important event in Roman history and one that had further implications for both Rome and the *Germani*. In essence, the revolt itself is an excellent example of the fragility of Rome's position along the Rhine against the *Germani*, it highlights three key aspects: the vulnerability and power of the army to affect Rome's position on the frontier, the willingness of the *Germani* to exploit any Roman neglect or weakness, and underlines the divided loyalties that existed in the region, even among the legions, as to where their interests may best lie, despite (or because of) a century of provincial development and assimilation. To understand the circumstances which led to the revolt and comprehend the significance of events the causes, impact, and resolution of the conflict must be examined, a task made challenging due to the limited available literary sources. Tacitus is virtually the only source for both the revolt of the *Batavi* and the emergence of the supposed *Imperium Galliarum*.¹⁸⁹ Josephus and Dio provide some

¹⁸⁹ Tac. *Hist.* III. 46. 1; VI. 12-37; 54-59; V. 14-26.

information, but contribute virtually nothing to a precise understanding of events.¹⁹⁰ Further evidence is found in the material remains, mainly archaeology and epigraphy, which illustrate and confirm the extent of the destruction present during this period.

The revolt and its narrative have already been extensively explored in modern scholarship. As such only an overview of the scholarship and an assessment of the contributing factors, the rebels' possible motivations, and an evaluation of the impact of the incidents will be examined. Significantly, modern scholarship is divided on the issue of determining the 'true nature' of the revolt; the debate centres on whether the uprising was an intentional indigenous rebellion against Rome and an attempt to gain independence or merely an undertaking to better their standing in the empire, an effort to receive their perceived entitlements, or a continuation of the civil wars. A majority of modern scholars support the former argument, their common view best encompassed in the works of Brunt and Wellesley,¹⁹¹ who argue that Civilis' actions were always intended as a tribal uprising aimed at gaining independence from Rome, similar to the Frisians in AD 27 during the reign of Tiberius.¹⁹² Conversely, support for the latter position is championed by Walser and Urban.¹⁹³ Though this argument was initially

¹⁹⁰ Jose. *BJ* I. 5; VII. 75-88; Dio LXVI. 3. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33.

¹⁹¹ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 34; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 170-183; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 107-112; G. E. F. Chilver, 'The Army in Politics, AD 68-70', *JRS* 47, pp. 29-35; C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* 2, 33, pp. 1686-1713; H. W. Benario, 'Tacitus, Trier and the Treveri', *CJ* 83 (3), p. 234; S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', pp. 264-7; M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', p. 283; D. Timpe, *Romano-Germanica: Gesammelte Studien zur Germania des Tacitus*, pp. 71-78.

¹⁹² P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 34; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 170-183.

¹⁹³ G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker*, pp. 86-128; R. Urban, 'Der 'Bataveraufstand' und die Erhebung des Iulius Classicus', *Trier Hist. Forsch.* 8, p. 92; E. P. Nicolas, *De Néron à Vespasien. Etudes et perspectives hisoriques, suivies de l'analyse, du catalogue, et de la reproduction des monnaies 'oppositionnelles' cnnues des années 67 à 70*, vol. 2, pp. 1268-70; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'Emperors, Usurpers and Bandits: The Power of the Centre and the Power of the Provinces in the Politics of the Principate', in L. Aigner Foresti (ed.), *Federazioni e federalismo nell'Europa antica*, pp. 425-434, esp. 427-30; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, vol. 2, pp. 174-5 see n. 2.

proposed by Münzer,¹⁹⁴ first Walser then Urban built on this theory, which casts doubt on the reliability of Tacitus' interpretation and the narrative of events, and in essence can be seen as a defence of Civilis.¹⁹⁵ Significantly, as with the majority of events during the Year of the Four Emperors, both of these arguments centre on a particular interpretation of Tacitus' *Histories*.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, according to Brunt there is an intensity and perversity to the modern scholarly attacks on Tacitus' work that is so prolific that it can be viewed as constituting a historiographic conundrum in its own right.¹⁹⁷ In response to the detractors of Tacitus' account, Murison simply and eloquently refutes their attacks, writing, 'There is really no reason to assume either malice or naïveté on Tacitus' part and though there are obviously gaps and difficulties in his account of these events, in general, it is reliable.'¹⁹⁸

A similar debate surrounds the emergence of the *imperium Galliarum* and in many ways the objections voiced with Civilis' revolt are utilised to refute the existence of this separatist movement. According to Tacitus, Civilis' true purpose was to found a Gallo-German empire in which the *Germani* would dominate and which he would rule over.¹⁹⁹ Scholars are divided on this issue: several, such as Urban and Walser, argue that there was no separatist movement in Gaul in AD 69-70, no *imperium Galliarum*; they

¹⁹⁴ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33; G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker*, pp. 86-128.

¹⁹⁵ G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker in der Geschichtsschreibung der frühen Kaiserzeit*, pp. 86-128; R. Urban, 'Der 'Bataveraufstand' und die Erhebung des Iulius Classicus', *Trier Hist. Forsch.* 8, pp. 92-3; C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* 2, 33.3, pp. 1707-1709.

¹⁹⁶ B. Levick, 'Introduction', in K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. xx see, n. 48; K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. 170;

¹⁹⁷ P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 33; B. Levick, 'Introduction', in K. Wellesley, *The Year of the Four Emperors*, p. xx.

¹⁹⁸ C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* II, 33. 3, p. 1709; T. W. Africa, 'The One-Eyed Man Against Rome: An Exercise in Euhemerism', *Historia* 19, pp. 535-536; W. O. Moeller, 'Once More the One-Eyed Man against Rome', *Historia* 24, p. 409.

¹⁹⁹ Tac. Hist. IV. 61. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 41.

argue instead that Tacitus' rebels were simply partisans of Vespasian who eventually turned on him and attempted to put forward their own candidate as emperor.²⁰⁰ Simply put, in their view the uprising was only a continuation of the civil wars and that it was a historiographical manipulation of the events by the Flavians and their supporters, such as Pliny the Elder, which falsely transformed the civil war into a foreign conflict.²⁰¹ Conversely other scholars, such as Willems, Brunt, and Murison, support Tacitus' account and argue that Civilis had always aimed to gain independence from Rome and had greater ambitions to found a Gallo-German empire himself; they argue that from the onset Civilis strove to incite other German and Gallic subjects of Rome to revolt; his invitation to the Germanic tribes east of the Rhine to join him only reinforces the measures he was willing to take in order to succeed.²⁰² Only Civilis' awareness of Roman power led him to conceal his true objectives and this also accounts for his apparent acceptance of Sabinus' authority over him. Yet the fact that neither he himself nor any of the Batavians swore allegiance to the *imperium Galliarum* indicates that Civilis had his own motives and ambitions and therefore he wished to keep himself separate from the Gallic cause, perhaps in order to limit accountability in case of

²⁰⁰ G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker in der Geschichtsschreibung der frühen Kaiserzeit*, pp. 86-128; R. Urban, 'Der 'Bataveraufstand' und die Erhebung des Iulius Classicus', p. 33; L. Bessone, *La rivolta batavica e la crisi del 69 d. C.*, pp. 40-41; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'From Nero to Vespasian', in *CAH²*, vol. X, p. 281; C. L. Murison, 'The Historical value of Tacitus' "Histories":', p. 1708.

²⁰¹ C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', p. 1708; E. P. Nicolas, *De Néron à Vespasien. Etudes et perspectives hisoriques, suivies de l'analyse, du catalogue, et de la reproduction des monnaies 'oppositionnelles' cnnues des années 67 à 70*, Vol. 2, pp. 1241, 1268-70; T. Wiedemann, 'Emperors, Usurpers and Bandits: the Power of the Centre and the Power of the Provinces in the Politics of the Principate', pp. 427-30.

²⁰² Civilis' initial appeal to the *Germani*, Tac. *Hist.* IV. 14. 1. Other calls followed, see Tac. *Hist.* IV. 23; 64; V. 26. Calls to specific tribes: *Bructeri* (IV. 21. 2; 77; V. 18.), *Chatti* (IV. 37), *Chauci* (V. 19), *Mattiaci* (IV. 37), *Tencteri* (IV. 21; 64; 77), *Usipi* (IV. 37). See also, P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, pp. 34-48; C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', pp. 1708- 1709; J. H. W. Willems, 'Romans and Batavians: a regional study in the Dutch eastern river area. II', *Bericht. v. d. Rijksdienst. voor het Oudheidkundig Bodemonderzoek* 34, pp. 226-31, 241; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 110; G. E. F. Chilver with G. B. Townend, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories IV and V*, pp. 8-13; H. Heubner, *P. Cornelius Tacitus, Die Historien: Kommentar. Bd. IV*, Heidelberg, Winter, 1976, pp. 33-36; D. R. Dudley, *The World of Tacitus*, pp. 182-3;

failure.²⁰³ Considering the narrative of events it is probable that Civilis intended to seize power if the opportunity arose, and the choice of Sabinus as the emperor of the Roman Empire in Gaul can be viewed as an attempt to gather further support from Gallic tribes. There is little doubt that Civilis could have always seized power when or if it was advantageous, as was the case after the death of Sabinus. However, whether or not the *Imperium Galliarum* was a reality does not detract from the fact that Germanic tribes on both sides of the Rhine seized the opportunity to exploit Rome's weakness and devastated their interests throughout the region.

Considering that the reliability of Tacitus' account of these events is tantamount to determining the nature of both the Batavian revolt and the *imperium Galliarum*, it is therefore necessary to establish the historiographical reliability of his work. In relation to these events several factors can support the likelihood of the historical validity and reliability of Tacitus' overall account. Firstly, Tacitus can be considered as a contemporary of the events of AD 69-70, although he himself was too young to have firsthand knowledge of matters on the Rhine at this time. However, it is not necessary to assume (as noted earlier) that his account is distorted by preconceptions drawn from a later period.²⁰⁴ Secondly, it is probable that he derived his account from other contemporary sources, ones with personal knowledge of the Rhine and the conflict itself. Benario puts forward five possible sources for Tacitus' account: Pliny the Elder's *Naturalis Historia* and *Bella Germaniae*, personal accounts gathered from Sextus Iulius Frontinus and Quintus Petillius Cerialis (who both had firsthand knowledge of the

²⁰³ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 61. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 41.

²⁰⁴ F. Münzer, 'Die Quelle des Tacitus für die Germanenkriege', in *Bonner Jahrb.* 104, pp. 67-111.

Rhine and events), and finally Tacitus' father who served as an official in Belgica.²⁰⁵ The use of Pliny the Elder, a pro-Flavian source, in Tacitus' work is a key point used to refute the reliability of his account.²⁰⁶ There is little doubt, however, that Tacitus could have failed to detect Pliny's 'pro-Flavian' bias, and critiqued his version accordingly. Furthermore, as stated above, Pliny would not have been his only source. Lastly, the level of detail present in Tacitus' writing concerning specific aspects of the people, events, places, and especially the terrain during the revolt, indicates a level of creditability in his account.²⁰⁷ Examples of this can be seen in Tacitus' description of the topography of the camp and surrounding area at *Vetera*,²⁰⁸ and his depiction of *Rigodulum*,²⁰⁹ which is accurate enough to allow a detailed reconstruction of the battle.²¹⁰ Overall these factors would suggest that Tacitus' account was a credible reconstruction of events, yet it does not follow from this that his account, is not without problems or inconsistencies: therefore his work still needs to be subjected to due criticism and analysis.

Roman military activity and subsequent treatment of the Germanic and Gallic tribes in the Lower Rhine region directly contributed to the emergence of tribal

²⁰⁵ H. W. Benario, 'Tacitus, Trier and the Treveri', *CJ* 83 (3), pp. 235-6; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, pp. 33-52; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, pp. 44-5; K. Wellesley, *The Long Year AD 69*, pp. 172-178; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 273-277; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 203; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, vol. 2, pp. 675-6; C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* 2, 33. 3, pp. 1707-1709, 1711-13.

²⁰⁶ C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* II, 33.3, pp. 1708-9. Against the use of Pliny the Elder, see G. Walser, *Rom, das Reich, und die fremden Völker in der Geschichtsschreibung der frühen Kaiserzeit*, pp. 86-90; R. Urban, 'Der 'Bataveraufstand' und die Erhebung des Iulius Classicus', pp. 32-33; R. Syme, *Tacitus*, vol. 2, p. 174 n. 5;

²⁰⁷ C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* 2, 33. 3, pp. 1707-9; H. W. Benario, 'Tacitus, Trier and the Treveri', *CJ* 83 (3), p. 235; M. M. Sage, 'Tacitus' Historical Works: A Survey and Appraisal', *ANRW* II, 33.3, p. 929.

²⁰⁸ *Tac. Hist.* IV. 23. 1.

²⁰⁹ *Tac. Hist.* IV. 71. 3.

²¹⁰ For details, see K. Wellesley, trans., Tacitus, 'The Histories', p. 6. C. L. Murison, 'The Historical Value of Tacitus' "Histories"', *ANRW* 2, 33.3, p. 1709; M. M. Sage, 'Tacitus' Historical Works: A Survey and Appraisal', *ANRW* II, 33.3, p. 929.

resentment and hostility. Consideration of the factors which first alienated the *Batavi* from Rome and subsequently led to their revolt reinforces the view that they had substantial cause to resent Rome and sought to regain their independence. Their initial resentment could have stemmed from the increased Roman presence in their territory during Claudius' fortification of the Lower Rhine under Corbulo.²¹¹ Galba's subsequent mistreatment of the *Batavi*,²¹² other northern tribes²¹³ and especially the Rhine legions,²¹⁴ only increased hostility in the region.²¹⁵ Gaius Julius Civilis as leader of the Batavian revolt had an overwhelming personal motivation to instigate and pursue insurrection against Rome. Civilis had been arrested twice for plotting against Rome but never condemned; however, his brother Paulus Claudius was executed.²¹⁶ Under Vitellius, the policy of forced recruitment of the *Batavi* into the Roman army by corrupt officials was the ignition point that finally persuaded the tribe to rebel.²¹⁷ According to Tacitus, Civilis used the corrupt practice as evidence that the Romans perceived the Batavians as subjects rather than allies.²¹⁸ Significance can be attributed to this incident when it is considered that the *Batavi* had already contributed eight cohorts, around

²¹¹ H. Van Enckevort, 'The Significance of the Building Activities of Trajan and the Legio X Gemina for the Integration of the Batavians into the Roman Empire', in Z. Visy, in *Limes XIX*, p. 85; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, pp. 48-49; E. T. Salmon, *A history of the Roman World*, p. 238. For details, refer back to Chapter 9.

²¹² Galba dismissed the Batavians in the *Germani corporis custodes* and sent them home without any compensation, which would have been very insulting, see Tac. *Hist.* I. 56. 1; IV. 13; Suet. *Gal.* XII. 2. See also, M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', pp. 278, 283; S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', p. 264-265; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 78.

²¹³ Galba punished the tribes which sided with the Rhine legions and helped suppress Vindex's revolt, see Tac. *Hist.* I. 53-4.

²¹⁴ Tac. *Hist.* I. 51-57. The Rhine legions had substantial cause to resent and reject Galba as they were denied any reward for their quick suppression of Vindex – furthermore one commander was replaced and the other assassinated, see C. L. Murison, Galba, *Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 60-61.

²¹⁵ Suet. *Vesp.* VII; Tac. *Hist.* I. 51-56. N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, pp. 18, 21; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 45; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, pp. 9-32; C. L. Murison, Galba, *Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies*, pp. 61-61; G. N. Morgan, *69 AD: The Year of the Four Emperors*, pp. 41-43; C. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., p. 155.

²¹⁶ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 13. S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', p. 267; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, pp. 77-8; J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, p. 94.

²¹⁷ Tac. *Hist.* II. 64. 1.

²¹⁸ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 78. 1.

5,000 men: demanding further recruits went beyond what was reasonable or tolerable.²¹⁹ A similar policy was most likely pursued with other tribes, such as the *Canninefates* and Frisians who were the first tribes to revolt.²²⁰ As discussed previously, another underlining issue connected to the recruitment of *auxilia*, particularly with the *Batavi*, was their outrage at being posted to foreign locations far away from their own lands and peoples.²²¹ All of these factors can be considered as contributing to tribal resentment of Rome, but the ultimate impetus for the Batavian revolt was the civil war itself and of course the subsequent reduction of Roman military strength and the breakdown in administrative control. This resulted in the neglect of Rome's defence against the *Germani* and their perception of Roman weakness. Therefore, these contributing factors were justification for their hostility and discontentment with Rome, but it was Rome's neglect and weak military position which persuaded the *Germani* to attack – as it always had been the case in the past.

The initial attacks carried out by the *Cananefates* and *Frisii* in the far North West resulted in the destruction of two Roman camps, the first at *Praetorium Agrippinae* (modern Valkenburg), the other at *Traiectum* (modern Utrecht); the archaeological

²¹⁹ N. Roymans, *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power: The Batavians in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 207-8; M. St. A. Woodside, 'The Role of Eight Batavian Cohorts in the Events of 68-69 AD', in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, Vol. 68, 1937, pp. 277-283. On the impact this level of recruitment would have had on the Batavi, see W. J. H. Willems, 'Romans and Batavians: a Regional Study in the Dutch Eastern River Area II', *BROB* 34, pp. 235-7; I. Vossen, 'The Possibilities and Limitations of Demographic Calculations in the Batavian Area', in Th. Grünewald and S. Seibel (eds.), *Kontinuität und Diskontinuität. Germania inferior am Beginn und am Ende der römischen Herrschaft*, pp. 414-435.

²²⁰ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 15. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 49; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 50; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 109.

²²¹ Tac. *Hist.* IV.12, 4.14. M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 102; P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, pp. 38-39; N. Roymans, *Ethnic Identity and Imperial Power: The Batavians in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 207; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 108; S. L. Dyson, 'Native Revolts in the Roman Empire', p. 266.

discovery of thick charred layers in these places attests to their annihilation.²²² In the course of these attacks two cohorts of auxiliaries, probably *Cohors III Gallorum equitata*,²²³ and at least a portion of the Roman British and German fleets, was either destroyed or defected.²²⁴ Other forts along the Lower Rhine shortly followed suit, with the burnt layers identified by archaeologists confirming the extent of the destruction in the region.²²⁵ Significantly, Civilis and his forces managed to destroy the depleted ranks of *legio V Alaudae* and *legio XV Primigenia*, around 5000 men,²²⁶ along with the stronghold of *Vetera*.²²⁷ A coin minted in Gaul commemorates the fall of *Vetera* and the destruction of *legio XV Primigenia*.²²⁸ The subsequent surrender of *Legiones I Germanica*, *XVI Gallica*, and the remnants of *legio XV Primigenia* and *legio V*

²²² Tac. *Hist.* IV. 14–15. For details, see A. De Hingh & W. Vos, *Romeinen in Valkenburg (ZH), de opgravingsgeschiedenis en het archeologische onderzoek van Praetorium Agrippinae*, Leiden, 2005; A. E. van Giffen, *De Romeinsche castella in de dorpsheuvel te Valkenburg aan den Rijn (Z.H.) (Praetorium Agrippinae), II, De opgravingen in 1942-1943 en 1946-1950, Jaarverslag van de vereniging voor Terpenonderzoek 33-37, 1948-1953*, Groningen, 1955; W. Groenman-van Waateringe, *Romeins lederwerk uit Valkenburg Z.H.*, Groningen, 1967; L. A. W. C. Venmans, 'De incendio castrorum romanorum, quae fuerunt in media urbe Traiecto ad Rhenum', *Mnemosyne*, Vol. 3, 1935/6, pp. 83-87.

²²³ *AE*, 1975, p. 633. See also, W. Glasbergen, W. Groenman-van Waateringe, 'The Pre-Flavian Garrisons of Valkenburg Z.H., *fabriculae* and bipartite barracks', p. 15; D. B. Cuffs, 'The *auxilia* in Roman Britain and the Two Germanies from Augustus to Caracalla: Family, Religion and 'Romanization'', PhD diss., University of Toronto, Toronto, 2010, p. 286.

²²⁴ Several ships of the *Classis Britannica* carrying *legio XIV Gemina* weer destroyed by the *Canninefates*, see Tac. *Hist.* IV. 79. *Cerialis*' naval squadron destroyed, see Tac. *Hist.* V. 21-22. See also, C. G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy: 31 BC – AD 324*, pp. 144-145.

²²⁵ K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 46; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, pp. 249-250; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, p. 194; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 49-50; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 152; A. W. Byvanck, 'De opstand der Bataven', *Antiquity and Survival* 3, pp. 15-27. See also, W. Sprey, *Tacitus over de opstand Bataven*, Groningen, 1953.

²²⁶ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 21.

²²⁷ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 60. K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 46; D. von Detten, 'Die Überreste der augusteischen und tiberischen Legionslager von V. I', in J.-S. Kühlborn (ed.), *Germaniam pacavi*, pp. 59-77; M. Gechter, 'Die Legionslager Vetera I und II', in Horn, H.-G. (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, (2002), pp. 619–25; P. S. Wells, *The Barbarians Speak: How the Conquered Peoples Shaped Roman Europe*, pp. 66-69, 138; H. von Petrikovits, 'Vetera', *RE*, Suppl. viiia, pp. 1801-1834; L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971–2000*, p. 57.

²²⁸ *RIC I* Civil Wars: no. 130. C. H. V. Sutherland, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, pp. 201-2, 214 see n. 130; H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, vol. I, 1st ed., London, 1923, p. 180; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, p. 143;

Alaudae,²²⁹ resulted in the loss of Novaesium and their defection to the *pro imperio Galliarum*.²³⁰ This treachery left two loyal legions, *legio XXI Primigenia* and *legio IV Macedonica*, both of which were not at full strength, to defend the remainder of Rome's interest along the Rhine at *Moguntiacum*.²³¹ This effectively left the Lower Rhine in control of Civilis, and Julius Classicus with his *Imperium Galliarum*. Moreover, the defection of the Germanic and Gallic auxiliaries along the Rhine, including those serving in the Rhine fleet, during the course of the revolt only made the situation more volatile, enabling Civilis and Classicus to gain some level of initial success against the Romans. Unchecked, Civilis' forces plundered the province of Belgica, reaching as far as communities situated on the Channel, whilst Germanic tribes east of the Rhine managed to raid unmolested along the length of the Rhine and even temporarily seized *Moguntiacum* and *Colonia Agrippinensis*.²³²

In summary, before Roman reinforcements arrived in AD 70 the Batavian revolt had led to the destruction or defection of all Roman forces and their military bases between the North Sea and *Moguntiacum*, a situation far more precarious than that which had faced Augustus and Tiberius in AD 9. Depletion of Roman forces along the Rhine, and the subsequent neglect of the frontier, enabled this uprising to be possible let alone so disastrous. Significantly, the extent and seriousness of the revolt can be seen to have been mitigated by the hesitation of several of the Germanic and Gallic tribes, and in some cases their outright refusal, such as with the *Tungri* and *Sequani*, to join in the

²²⁹ 1,000 men were removed from *Vetera* by Gaius Dillius Vocula, see Tac. *Hist.* VI. 35.

²³⁰ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 59.1.

²³¹ Although both legions were under strength, Vocula left them to defend *Moguntiacum* against raids by the *Chatti*, *Usipi*, and *Mattiaci*, see Tac. *Hist.* VI. 37. *Legio XXI Rapax* had been removed to support Vitellius in Rome, see Tac. *Hist.* IV. 68.

²³² G. E. F. Chilver with G. B. Townend, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories IV and V*, p. 18; E. M. Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 69; J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, p. 99.

rebellion.²³³ In fact, it was this division amongst the tribes which diverted the attentions of Sabinus and Civilis from establishing an effective defence against Rome's reinforcements in AD 70. Clearly the Romans' neglect of their established policies against the *Germani* resulted in disaster, whilst conversely their cultivation of tribal loyalties, and perhaps the tribes' level of Romanisation, and hence their affinity and identification with Rome, limited the extent and duration of the revolt.

Rome's response to this threat indicates the level of perceived danger they attached to the situation along the Rhine. Gaius Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian's representative in Rome at this time, immediately dispatched a total of eight legions under the command of Gallus Annius, commander of the Upper Rhine, Quintus Petilius Cerialis, *legatus* of the Lower Rhine, and Domitian; from Italy *legio VIII Augusta*, *legio XI Claudia Pia Fidelis*, *legio XIII Gemina*, *legio XXI Rapax*, *legio II Adiutrix*, from Britain *legio XIV Gemina* and from Hispania *legio VI Victrix* and *legio I Adiutrix*.²³⁴ Furthermore, it is more than likely that the auxiliary units and *vexillationes* withdrawn from the legions along the Rhine by Vitellius had accompanied this force north. Given that Tacitus records that Cerialis returned the troops forcibly levied in Gaul during the civil wars by Vitellius it is likely that he had the benefit of these additional troops.²³⁵ A force of this size had not been deemed necessary or implemented since Varus' defeat in AD 9 and thus indicates the Romans perceived that the current threat was on a comparable level. Similarly to that disaster, Rome's response to the Batavian threat can be broken into three parts: containment, consolidation, and retribution.

²³³ Tac. *Hist.* VI. 59-62, 66-7.

²³⁴ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 68. N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, pp. 79-80; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 7; J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, p. 102; H. Heubner, 'Mucians Reisevorbereitungen', in W. Kraus, A. Leskey (et al.), *Latinität und alte Kirche*, pp. 150-8.

²³⁵ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 71.

Rome's immediate priority was to contain the threat in both Gaul and along the Rhine. For this purpose their forces were divided into two elements: the first consisting of legions from Italy marched across the Alps, the second made up of legions from Britain and Hispana. The Italian element was further divided as it progressed north; *legio VIII Augusta* was dispatched to garrison *Argentoratum*, while *legio XI Claudia* occupied *Vindonissa*. This effectively secured the upper Rhine for Rome. Similarly, *legio XIV Gemina*, *legio VI Victrix*, and *legio I Adiutrix* were deployed to subdue and pacify parts of Gaul. This in effect limited the rebels' territory and allowed the Romans to concentrate their remaining forces in Gallia Belgica and the Lower Rhine. Therefore, Cerialis' initial army which advanced north past *Argentoratum* consisted of *legio II Adiutrix*, *legio XIII Gemina*, *legio XXI Rapax* and most likely their auxiliaries and the returning *vexillationes*: a very substantial force, more than enough to discourage and dissolve Julius Tutor's force and instigate the re-defection of *legiones I Germanica*, *XVI Gallica*. As discussed above, both Sabinus and Civilis were pre-occupied with their own campaigns which left Tutor vulnerable and severely depleted of resources and manpower. Cerialis' campaign was further aided by the fact that *legio IV Macedonica* and *legio XXII Primigenia* managed to defend and retain *Moguntiacum*. Therefore, in the space of a few short months Cerialis had managed to contain the threat, whilst in the process boosting his initial force from eight to at least twelve complete legions, regaining large amounts of territory, denying the enemy access to their superior troops, and regaining the advantage of greater numbers.

Cerialis' next objective was *Augusta Treverorum* which not only housed the hostile *Treveri* but was also strategically vital to his campaign, as the *colonia* dominated

an important road which linked Rome and the surrounding provinces with the Rhine. At *Rigodulum*, the *Treveri* were decisively defeated and Cerialis occupied *Augusta Treverorum*. Civilis and his allies, Tutor and Classicus, attempted a night attack whilst Cerialis' forces were divided between *Augusta Treverorum* and *Moguntiacum*, which failed and ultimately ended in their defeat. For the rebels further setbacks came swiftly: news that *Colonia Agrippinensis* had liberated itself and destroyed the occupying troops, and that *legio XIV Gemina* from Britain would be landing on the continent to the north of Civilis' position. This was a turning point in the campaign, as from this point onwards Cerialis converged and concentrated his forces on the Lower Rhine against the *Germani* and begun the reconstruction of the border. Civilis withdrew his forces to the 'Island of the Batavians', and there made a final attempt to offer resistance by occupying *Vetera* with a sizeable army. Cerialis responded with an overwhelming force made up of *legiones XXI Rapax*, *II Adiutrix*, the newly arrived *VI Victrix*, and *XIV Gemina*.²³⁶ Archaeological evidence confirms the site of the battle, and the discovery of a monument erected by *legio VI Victrix* commemorates Rome's triumph over the *Germani*.²³⁷ This victory pushed Civilis and his forces back to their own territory but did not result in his surrender. He subsequently razed the Batavian capitol *Noviomagus* and destroyed the mole that had been constructed by Drusus, thereby creating a river barrier between their Island and the Romans' position on the bank.²³⁸

After Cerialis' victory at *Vetera*, he began the second phase of the campaign, consolidating and reconstructing the Rhine frontier. Either this was his intention, or as mentioned earlier, the destruction of part of the Roman navy by the *Cananefates*

²³⁶ Tac. *Hist.* V.14-15.

²³⁷ C. Rüger, 'Ein Siegesdenkmal der Legio VI Victrix', *Bonner Jahrb.* 179, pp. 187-200; M. Gechter, 'Die Legionslager Vetera I und II', in Horn, H.-G. (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, (2002), 619-25; J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, pp. 103-4.

²³⁸ Tac. *Hist.* V. 19.

deprived Cerialis of the ability to retaliate immediately against Civilis. In order to defend the Rhine, Cerialis dispersed troops along the river occupying strategic and vulnerable positions; *legio VI Victrix* was deployed at *Novaesium*, *legio XXI Rapax* was stationed at *Bonna*, *legio XXII Primigenia* was moved to *Vetera*, *legio X Gemina*, recently arrived from Hispana, was stationed at an unidentified location called *Arenacium*, and auxiliary units were stationed at Grinnes and Vada – also unidentified.²³⁹ Whilst these preparations were being simultaneously undertaken in an effort to secure the Rhine, a means to retaliate against the *Germani* was being developed; towards that objective Cerialis ordered a fleet built, and *legio II Adiutrix* had begun the construction of a bridge at *Batavodurum*.²⁴⁰ In an effort to disrupt Cerialis' reconstruction of the Rhine and prevent the construction of both the fleet and the bridge, Civilis orchestrated raids on four of the Roman camps: at Vada, Grinnes, *Batavodurum*, and *Arenacium*.²⁴¹ It can be stated with certainty that the Batavians underestimated the Romans' ability to respond effectively and immediately to their attacks, and met with little success. Furthermore, their subsequent attempt to capture Cerialis and his flagship only managed to humiliate themselves and incite the Romans to attack immediately.²⁴²

Retribution came rapidly after the attempt on Cerialis, with the invasion of the 'Island of the Batavians' being rapidly implemented, consisting of a two pronged attack: the Roman fleet, now ready for action, invaded from the west, while Cerialis crossed the river Waal near *Noviomagus* in the southeast. While there is no record of the forces

²³⁹ Tac. *Hist.* V. 20-22. H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 46; R. Urban, 'Der 'Bataveraufstand' und die Erhebung des Iulius Classicus', *Trier Hist. Forsch.* 8, pp. 90-97; H. G. Horn (ed.), 'Kleve-Rindern', in *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, (1987), p. 458; J. Seibert, 'Arenacium', *RGA* 1, p. 399; J. Lendering & A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, p. 104; P. Goessler, 'Vada', in *RE, Suppl.* VIIa, pp. 2043-2046.

²⁴⁰ Tac. *Hist.* V. 20.

²⁴¹ Tac. *Hist.* V. 20.

²⁴² Tac. *Hist.* V. 21.

utilised by Cerealis in this endeavour, its size must have been substantial considering Civilis' immediate retreat before it. Cerialis devastated the Batavians' Island, and according to Tacitus spared the property of Civilis in an effort to cast suspicions and dissent amongst the insurgents.²⁴³ This attack quickly brought about the surrender of the remaining rebels; shortly thereafter Civilis began negotiations with the Romans. Tacitus' account breaks off abruptly at this point and details of the negotiations are lost; it is known, however, that the alliance between Rome and the Batavians was restored and under the same terms as previously.²⁴⁴

Conclusion

Along the Rhine, the Batavian revolt encapsulates the fragility of Rome's position along the Rhine against the *Germani*, it highlights three key aspects: the vulnerability and the capacity of the military to affect Rome's position on the frontier, the inclination of the *Germani* to exploit any Roman neglect or weakness, and emphasises the divided loyalties that existed in the region, even among the legions, as to where their interests may best lie, despite (or because of) a century of provincial development and assimilation. Along the Danube, the increased threat posed by the tribes north of the river also brings to light the inadequacy of Roman defences in that region. Ultimately, events in both areas highlight the flaws inherent in the Julio-Claudian system and clearly demonstrate the threat the *Germani* still posed to the Romans. As a direct repercussion of these events, the Flavians would undertake several reforms along the Rhine and Danube and with the military in general. These will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter.

²⁴³ Tac. *Hist.* V. 23.

²⁴⁴ Tac. *Germ.* 29; *Hist.* V. 26. P. A. Brunt, *Roman Imperial Themes*, p. 46; C. H. Moore, trans., Tacitus, *The Histories*, pp. 218-219; D. R. Dudley, *The World of Tacitus*, p. 184; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 3.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Emergence of the '*Limes*': The Flavians

A.D. 71–96

Following the division and disaster of the civil wars, the Flavian dynasty was a period of necessary consolidation and stabilisation for the Roman Empire. Short lived, the dynasty spanned only twenty-seven years and the reigns of three emperors: *Caesar Vespasianus Augustus* (Vespasian), AD 69-79, *Titus Caesar Vespasianus Augustus* (Titus), 79-81, and *Caesar Domitianus Augustus* (Domitian), AD 81-96. The focus of discussion will remain with Vespasian and Domitian; Titus' reign will be largely omitted, as his short rule contributed very little to the overall defence against the *Germani* or the emergence of the '*limes*'. Inheriting an unstable and untenable position, the Flavians devoted the majority of Rome's military strength and resources into rectifying this situation, developing a policy which further strengthened and connected the defences of the Rhine and Danube. This period would demonstrate several key events and developments in the defence of the frontiers: the reorganisation and changes to the military, creation of the German provinces, the definitive shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube, and most significantly the containment of the *Germani* on the Rhine and the emergence of permanent patrolled and defended boundaries, the '*limes*'. These factors make up the new defensive policy of the Flavians and the method by which the Germanic threat would be contained and mitigated.

Details of the Flavian emperors' reigns and the threat posed by the Sarmatians and Dacian tribes will be largely omitted; the focus will remain on Rome's interaction with the Germanic tribes and the consolidation of their defences against them. In this chapter the emphasis will remain on developments that occurred during this period;

details concerning specific reigns and events, however, will be limited. Overall this chapter will explore the emergence of a permanent defence against the *Germani* along the Rhine and Danube: the '*Limes*'.

Flavians and the Sources

Evidence for the Flavian dynasty has similar historiographical difficulties to those that exist for the preceding civil wars period; namely, inherent source bias and the limited literary evidence that has survived. Significantly there is a notable problem that emerges in the available literary sources from the reign of Vespasian onwards, namely the highly fragmented historical narrative which makes constructing a complete history of the dynasty impossible. Previously, the Julio-Claudian dynasty and to a large extent the civil war period had the benefit of a literary sources to contextualise events, albeit with inherent biases. For a narrative of the Flavian period, scholars largely rely on the fragments of Cassius Dio, the surviving epitomes of which offer limited information about the reigns of the Flavian emperors and their disjointed nature often makes it difficult to date the events it mentions.¹ Suetonius' biographies of the Flavians constitute the other main source; these works, however, are less detailed than those of preceding emperors and are tainted by obvious bias, particularly in regards to Domitian.² Frustratingly, the surviving works of Tacitus contribute little to knowledge of the Flavians; although he did write about the period, the Books on the Flavian emperors in his *Histories* do not survive, therefore the extent of his observations are

¹ M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 3-4; R. Alston, *Aspects of Roman History, AD 14-117*, p. 123.

² R. Alston, *Aspects of Roman History, AD 14-117*, p. 123. For details regarding the bias evident in Suetonius, see G. W. Adams, 'Suetonius and His Treatment of the Emperor Domitian's Favourable Accomplishments', in *Studia Humaniora Tartuensia* 6, pp. 1-15; B. Baldwin, *Suetonius*, p. 299; W. C. McDermott, A. E. Orentzel, *Roman Portraits: The Flavian-Trajanic Period*, p. 5; D. Shotter, *Suetonius: Lives of Galba, Otho and Vitellius*, pp. 7-8.

contained in the *Agricola* and the *Dialogus*, neither of which provides any narrative of events for this period.³

Consideration of the existing evidence reveals that it cannot be argued that the Flavian emperors themselves explicitly commissioned or encouraged favourable historical accounts of their reign. That the elder Pliny the Elder left his obsequious historical work unpublished when died in AD 79 is taken as support of this argument; the apparent extent of partiality towards the Flavians by contemporary writers is, however, attested by Tacitus, writing that:

...the contemporary historians, who wrote accounts for this war while the Flavian house occupied the throne, have indeed recorded their anxiety for peace and devotion to the State, falsifying motives in order to flatter.⁴

Here Tacitus, in an exercise of source methodology, clearly identifies and condemns the practice of favourable interpretation of Flavian rule. A clear example of this type of obsequiousness can be seen in Josephus' account of the *Bellum Judaicum*, which is patently pro-Flavian. Furthermore, unlike in the works of Josephus, Suetonius or Dio, Tacitus did attempt to adopt a critical approach to Vespasian's reign; this can be seen in the surviving portions of the *Histories*, for example, Tacitus claims it was best for Rome that Vespasian won the civil war (III. 86), and yet raises criticisms against his methods for obtaining money (II. 84), and later his choice of associates (II.93.3).⁵ Clearly critical source examination is therefore necessary for all determinations by ancient authors in regards to the Flavian era, especially with respect to their denigrations relating to

³ R. Alston, *Aspects of Roman History, AD 14-117*, p. 123.

⁴ Tac. *Hist.* II.101 (trans. C. H. Moore, *Loeb Classical Library*).

⁵ M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 4.

military undertakings which were highly criticised and unfairly relegated as inconsequential.

Frustratingly few details are known about the reigns of Vespasian and Titus. For Vespasian, it is impossible to reconstruct a detailed chronology of his reign after AD 70: Tacitus' *Histories* breaks off at the end of the Batavian revolt, while Josephus finished his account at the end of the Jewish War.⁶ Literary evidence is limited to Suetonius' non-chronological biography and the fragments of Dio, all of which amounts to a vague and disjointed account of his reign. Conversely, as outlined earlier, it is during the civil wars period and the first years of Vespasian's reign that the issue of bias in the evidence is most acute. For Titus, his short reign is favourably remembered by ancient historians and he was even considered to be one of the most exemplary of any emperor. All surviving accounts, many of which were written by contemporaries of his own reign, such as Suetonius, Cassius Dio, and Pliny the Elder, present a highly approbatory perspective on his rule.⁷ Conversely, in contrast to this idealised portrait of Titus in Roman and Greek histories, Jewish accounts, with the exception of Josephus, have an extremely negative and hostile view of Titus which can be attributed to his role in the destruction of Jewish Temple and the suppression of the Jewish revolt.⁸ This view, however, is not reflected in the Greco-Roman tradition; in fact, the opposite is true: the victory was celebrated by the Romans and considered an act worthy of commemoration on the Arch of Titus.⁹ Significantly, the reigns of Vespasian and Titus were closely

⁶ M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 3-4.

⁷ Suet. *Titus* I.1; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* X. 6. Other favourable accounts can be seen in, *Epit. De Caesaribus* 10.6; Eutropius VII.21.1.

⁸ M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 54; G. Stemberger, 'Die Beurteilung Roms in der rabbinischen Literatur', *ANRW* II,19.2, pp. 351-8.

⁹ J. A. Overman, 'The First Jewish Revolt and Flavian Politics', in A. M. Berlin and J. A. Overman, (eds.), *The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology*, pp. 214-18; R. H. Darwall-

associated with each other. Politically both shared power and accomplishments, Vespasian holding the consulship with Titus on seven separate occasions and sharing the triumph for suppressing the Jewish rebellion.¹⁰ This association proved beneficial, as the succession was carried out with few difficulties and the transition between principes occurred without incident, and moreover paved the way for Domitian's subsequent accession. Overall, Vespasian's reign was remembered positively, and Titus' seems to have been regarded almost as a golden age. The latter's principate, however, was short lived and he was succeeded by the later despised Domitian, from which stems the source difficulties and hostility associated with the Flavian dynasty.¹¹

Obvious methodological and historiographical difficulties present themselves during an objective historical approach to an examination of Domitian's reign. Most surviving accounts of his reign were written by his enemies and are clearly hostile and critical. By tradition, he was damned by his surviving contemporaries and his successors, both of whom labelled him a tyrant.¹² Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Suetonius, and Juvenal all present an extremely hostile and negative portrayal of Domitian himself and his reign. Criticism was centred on three factors: his personal behaviour, his handling of the senate, and his conduct of military and administrative affairs.¹³ An examination of the latter, especially Domitian's conduct of the Chattan

Smith, *Emperors and Architecture: A Study of Flavian Rome*, p. 69; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 54.

¹⁰ Suet. *Titus* 6; Dio LXV. 6.

¹¹ R. Alston, *Aspects of Roman History, AD 14-117*, p. 123; E. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, p. 53.

¹² B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 196; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 55; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 160-1; E. S. Ramage, 'Juvenal and the Establishment. Denigration of Predecessors in the Satires', *ANRW II*, 33.1, pp. 640-707.

¹³ G.W. Adams, 'Suetonius and his Treatment of the Emperor Domitian's Favourable Accomplishments', p. 2; B. W. Jones, 'Domitian's Attitude to the Senate', *AJPh* 94 (1), pp. 79-91. See also, B. W. Jones, *Domitian and the Senatorial Order*, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1979.

War, would prove that their criticism was ruthless, exaggerated, and unfounded.¹⁴ Consequently, the authority and accuracy of Tacitus, Pliny, Juvenal, and Suetonius is somewhat compromised and their reliability questioned; this is particularly the case when other, positive, and less subjective contemporary accounts, in conjunction with an examination of the archaeological record, are considered. Overall, due to the nature of the majority of the surviving sources and their nearly universal hostility any reconstruction of Domitian's reign proves to be erroneous, flawed, and limited.¹⁵ Furthermore, the lack of a complete narrative account of his reign and due to the senate's passing of *damnatio memoriae* against Domitian, the difficulties are only compounded further.¹⁶ As a result of these factors, a thematic rather than a chronological approach must be taken when examining the reigns of the Flavians; accordingly, each specific event relevant to this dissertation will be examined against all other existing material evidence: namely archaeology, numismatics, and surviving inscriptions.¹⁷

Flavian Military Reforms

Extensive reorganisation, and to a lesser extent reforms, of the Roman military was a major focus during the Flavian period. Considering the fragmented and volatile

¹⁴ This view is based on an examination of the defences established under Domitian and the motives behind his campaigns; this is explored in detail below. For scholars that doubt the criticism of the ancient sources and interpret the Chattan campaigns in a positive light, see P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 85; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 128-131; L. Schumacher, 'Mogontiacum: Garnison und Zivilsiedlung im Rahmen der Reichsgeschichte', in M. Klein (ed.), *Die Römer und ihr Erbe: Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration*, p. 8; K. Strobel, 'Der Chattankrieg Domitians: Historische und politische Aspekte', *Germania* 65, pp. 423-52.

¹⁵ B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 196.

¹⁶ G.W. Adams, 'Suetonius and His Treatment of the Emperor Domitian's Favourable Accomplishments', p. 2; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 201; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 55. For the issues that arise in the evidence resulting from the senatorial decree abolishing his memory, see J. M. Paillet and R. Sablayrolles, 'Damnatio memoriae: une vraie perpétuité?', *Les Années Domitien*, *Pallas* 40, pp. 11-14.

¹⁷ R. Alston, *Aspects of Roman History, AD 14-117*, p. 132; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 56.

position of the Roman Empire after the civil wars, especially along the Rhine and Danube frontiers, immediate change was vital and necessary. Two factors provoked these developments: the immediate requirement of securing the Rhine and Danube frontiers, and the necessity to ensure and strengthen the military's allegiance to the new *princeps*. In response to these concerns, both the legions and auxiliaries would undergo significant alterations to their deployment and strategic focus, whilst individually the *auxilia* would undergo modifications to their configuration and command structure.

As discussed previously, civil war had fragmented the military and the empire between contenders for the principate. Effectively, Roman troops were turned against each other, resulting in heavy losses; more significant, however, were the consequences of the withdrawal of forces from their posts along the frontiers: the attacks and incursions of Germanic, Sarmatian, and Dacian tribesmen. These assaults resulted in the loss of at least one legion at *Vetera*, *legio XV Primigenia*, and the incalculable losses inflicted during the course of the revolt; less significant losses are attested along the Danube, with only the destruction of several auxiliary cohorts recorded. Furthermore, the disloyalty and mutiny of both legionary and auxiliary troops can be seen to have amounted to even more significant losses. As a consequence, establishing military loyalty was a major consideration for the Flavians. For Vespasian, without doubt the legions which sided with Civilis and Sabinus were untrustworthy, and those that had marched for Vitellius were at best unreliable. Accordingly, three legions were disbanded: *legio I Germanica*, *legio IV Macedonica*, and *legio XVI Gallica*. Other legions were repositioned: *legio V Alaudae*, initially believed by scholars to have been destroyed or disbanded, is now thought to have been moved to an as yet unidentified

base in Moesia;¹⁸ *legio XXI Rapax* and *legio XXII Primigenia* were transferred from the Upper Rhine to *Bonna* and *Vetera II* respectively on the Lower Rhine.¹⁹ Moreover, in order to be assured of their loyalty, the remaining garrisons were populated by Flavian and former Othonian legions: on the Lower Rhine, *legio X Gemina* occupied *Noviomagus*, and *legio VI Victrix* was posted to *Novaesium*.²⁰ On the Upper Rhine, *Mogontiacum* was garrisoned by *legio XIV Gemina* and *legio I Adiutrix*, *Argentorate* with *legio VIII Augusta*, and *legio XI Claudia* at *Vindonissa*.²¹ Replacing the disbanded

¹⁸ The theory of the redeployment of *legio V Alaudae* to Moesia is largely based on the discovery of an inscription which commemorates a veteran of *V Alaudae* in a colony at *Scupi* (IMS VI 41), see E. Birley, 'The Flavian Colonia at Scupi', *ZPE* 64, pp. 209-12. A new base in Moesia has been inferred from this and Tacitus' remark about defeated Vitellian legions being sent to Illyricum (Tac. *Hist.* III. 35). Furthermore, the end of the legion is linked to the defeat of Cornelius Fuscus by the Dacians in AD 86, and Dio implies that a legion's eagle (*V Alaudae*) was lost, see Dio LXVIII. 9. 3; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 110, 155. See also, B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 152; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 27, 73; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 81-82; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 497; F. Matei-Popescu, 'The Auxiliary Units from Moesia Superior in Domitian's Time and the Problem of CIL XVI 41', in *Ephemeris Napocensis* 16-17, 2006-2007, pp. 31-32; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7 n. 63, 19; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, p. 135; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 81; G. H. Stevenson and A. Momigliano, 'Rebellion Within the Empire', *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 849. For doubts surrounding this theory, see K. Strobel, 'Die Legio V Alaudae in Moesien, Eine Phantomtruppe der römischen Militärgeschichte', in *Historia* 37, pp. 504-508; T. Franke, 'Legio V Alaudae', in Y. Le Bohec, *Les légions de Rome sous le Haut-Empire*, pp. 39-48.

¹⁹ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7 n. 63, 24; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 183-187; T. Bechert and W. J. H. Willems, *Römische reichsgrenze, zwischen Mosel und Nordseeküste*, Stuttgart, 1995, pp. 24-8; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155; C. B. Rüger, *Germania Inferior*, pp. 51-60; G. E. F. Chilver with G. B. Townend, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories IV and V*, pp. 15-18; E. Stein, *Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im römischen Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat*, pp. 100-105; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 7; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 81.

²⁰ *Legiones XXI Rapax XXII Primigenia* are the exceptions to this general trend: they had initially supported the Vitellian cause but had redeemed themselves with their efforts in suppressing the Batavian revolt, see previous n. 137. J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7 n. 64, 20-22; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 141, 161-162; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 321; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 166; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 81; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155; E. Stein, *Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im römischen Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat*, pp. 100-15.

²¹ L. Schumacher, 'Mogontiacum: Garnison und Zivilsiedlung im Rahmen der Reichsgeschichte', in M. Klein (ed.), *Die Römer und ihr Erbe: Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration*, p. 7; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7, 15, 21-23; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 84-89, 148-9, 163-4, 169-171; M. P. García-Bellido, 'Numismatic Documentation on the Arrival of Spanish Troops in Gallia and Germania during the Augustan and Tiberian period', in G. A. Lehmann and R. Wiegels (eds.), *Römische Präsenz und Herrschaft in Germanien der augusteischen Zeit*, p. 176; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 321; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies*

legions were two newly formed units: *legio IV Flavia Firma*, and *legio XVI Flavia Firma*. Later Domitian would raise a third, *legio I Flavia Minerva Pia Fidelis*, to assist him in his Chatten war.²² Although these units were more than likely to have been partially reconstituted with men discharged from the disgraced legions, their potential capacity for disloyalty was limited through their redeployment along the Danube amongst other legions whose allegiance to the regime was assured.²³ On the Danube itself, as mentioned earlier, *legio V Alaudae* was transferred to as yet an unknown base in Moesia in order to strengthen the defence against the Sarmatian and Dacian threats. Aside from *legio V Alaudae*, the other six legions which made up the defence of the Danube were: *legio XV Apollinaris*, *legio IV Flavia*, *legio XIII Gemina*, *legio VII Claudia*, *legio V Macedonica*, and *legio I Italica*.²⁴ Initially, specific measures would have most probably been taken to limit the potential for further dissension; this probably involved the removal of the legions' officers and ringleaders that had been proven or were suspected of disloyalty, and replacing them with supporters of the Flavian

and Anarchy, p. 81; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 105-6; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155; G. E. F. Chilver with G. B. Townend, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories IV and V*, pp. 15-18.

²² Tac. *Hist.* IV.57-62, 5.19; Dio LV.24. 3; *ILS* 2084, 2085 (*legio IV*); 1066, 2655 (*legio XVI*). J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7, 15, 19, 23-4; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 94-95, 130, 176; K. Gilliver, 'The Augustan Reform and the Structure of the Imperial Army', in P. Erdkamp, ed., *A Companion to the Roman Army*, p. 188; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 27; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'From Nero to Vespasian', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 281; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 107-8, 145; G. E. F. Chilver with G. B. Townend, *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus' Histories IV and V*, pp. 14-16; E. Birley, 'A note on the title Gemina', *JRS* 18, 1928, pp. 56-60. Mann does not see the raising of legiones IV and XVI as the founding of new legions but rather as re-foundations, see J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions During the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), p. 484 n. 5. Domitian formed a new legion to aid in his war against the Chatti c. AD 83, see Dio LV. 24. 3; *RE* XII 1276, 1420; *CIL* XIII 8071. See also, M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 7; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions During the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), pp. 483, 485; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 108-9.

²³ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 7-8, 19, 23; K. Gilliver, 'The Augustan Reform and the Structure of the Imperial Army', in P. Erdkamp, ed., *A Companion to the Roman Army*, pp. 188-189; T. E. J. Wiedemann, 'From Nero to Vespasian', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 281; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 32.

²⁴ *Legio V Alaudae* and *legio I Italica* were former Vitellian legions. Legions loyal to Vespasian were made up of: *Legio XV Apollinaris*, *legio IV Flavia* and *legio V Macedonica*. *Legio XIII Gemina* and *legio VII Claudia* were former Othonian legions.

regime.²⁵ Additionally, the potential for disloyalty was further restrained by distributing loyal forces in close proximity to legions with questionable allegiances; an example can be seen with the placement of *legio I Italica* (a Vitellian legion) at *Novae*, and Vespasian's *legio V Macedonica* garrisoning the neighbouring fortress at *Oescus*.²⁶ In this manner, Vespasian secured the Rhine and Danube frontiers from threats within the legions themselves. Further details regarding the initial positioning of military forces along the Danube are discussed in more detail below.

A further, and equally pressing, consideration for the redeployments was the immediate threat posed by northern tribesmen along the Rhine and Danube. In summary, the number of legions on the Rhine was initially returned to eight, and then subsequently decreased to six in the reign of Domitian; whilst on the Danube, the number of legions was initially boosted to seven and later increased to nine (the Danube receiving the two legions removed from the Rhine). The following outlines the initial Flavian defence of the Rhine and Danube; details regarding the reinforcement, fortification and expansion will be explored in detail in the following sections. Along the Rhine, in response to the perceived Germanic threat, the legions were further dispersed along the river and positioned according to the enemy they faced. As to the Lower Rhine, the double legionary base at *Vetera* was abandoned in favour of a single legionary base of the same name which was repositioned closer to the river 1.5 kilometres east of the original (titled *Vetera II* by modern scholars), being so positioned

²⁵ J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 7.

²⁶ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and Their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, p. 103; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 15, 19; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 92-3, 136-7; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 69, 83, M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 321-22.

to oppose the *Cherusci* and *Tencteri*.²⁷ In order to monitor the *Batavi*, *Frisii*, and other surrounding tribes in the Rhine delta, *legio X Gemina* re-established the Augustan garrison at *Noviomagus*, which was reconstituted in stone.²⁸ Both *Novaesium* and *Bonna* were reoccupied and also rebuilt in stone, the former opposite the *Bructeri*, and the latter the *Tencteri* and the *Usipetes*.²⁹ Effectively this deployment of the legions and the rebuilding of their bases in stone expanded upon the work of Claudius: the legions were now spaced farther apart and covered a large area. Supplementing this force and defending the gaps between the legionary bases were auxiliary units, which had their numbers increased and were placed in forts at intervals along the bank.³⁰ Significantly,

²⁷ M. Gechter, 'Xanten', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, p. 625; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, p. 250 n. 37; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 156-7; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; T. Bechert and W. J. H. Willems, *Römische reichsgrenze, zwischen Mosel und Nordseeküste*, pp. 24-6; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 81; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 85; D. Schmitz, 'Das Lager Vetera II und seine Legionen', in M. Müller, H.-J. Schalles and N. Zieling (eds.), *Colonia Ulpia Traiana: Xanten und sein Umland in römischer Zeit*, p. 151; H. von Petrikovits, 'Die Legionsfestung Vetera II', *BJ* 159, pp. 89-133; H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', in *BRGK* 66, pp. 321-495; J. C. Mann, 'Colonia Ulpia Traiana and the occupation of Vetera II', *Bonner Jahrbücher* 162, pp. 162-5; J. E. Bogaers and C. B. Rüger, 'Der Niedergermanische Limes', *Kunst und Altertum am Rhein*, 50, pp. 107-10.

²⁸ J.K. Haalebos, H. van Enckevort, 'Frührömische Lager in Nimwegen (NL)', in: J.-S. Kühlborn (ed.), *Germaniam pacavi*, 1995, pp. 29-58; C. Lepelley, *Rom und das Reich: 44 v. Chr.-260 n. Chr.*, p. 168; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 85; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 112-3; H. Schönberger, 'the Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 156-7; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 96; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, p. 250; J. E. Bogaers and C. B. Rüger, 'Der Niedergermanische Limes', *Kunst und Altertum am Rhein* 50, p. 79.

²⁹ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, p. 250; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 112-3; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 156-7; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 8. For details about *Novaesium*, see H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', in *BRGK* 66, p. 440 ref. map B 16; G. Müller, 'Neuss', in H.G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, pp. 581-6; C. B. Rüger, 'Eine kleine Garnionsgeschichte des römischen Neuss', in H. Chantraine, M. Gechter, H.-G. Horn, G. Müller, C. B. Rüger, and M. Tauch, *Das römische Neuss*, pp. 9-52; H. von Petrikovits, *Novaesium. Das römische Neuss*, Führer des Rheinischen Landesmuseums in Bonn, Vol. 3, pp. 37-41. For details about *Bonna*, see M. Gechter, 'Bonna', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 1987, pp. 364-88; L. Bakker, R. Kaiser, 'Bonna', in *LMA* 2, pp. 426-28; W. Dahlheim, 'Bonna', in *RGA* 3, pp. 224-32.

³⁰ M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', in A. Morillo, N. Hanel & E. Martín (eds.), *LIMES XX*, p. 949; J. K. Haalebos, 'Traian und die Hilfstruppen am Niederrhein: Ein Militärdiplom des Jahres 98 n. Chr. Aus Elst in der Over-Betuwe (Niederlande)', *Saalburg Jahrb.* 50, pp. 40-2; M. Roxan and P. Holder, *Roman Military diplomas 1985-1993*, Institute

stronger contingents of *auxilia (milliaria)*³¹ were positioned in sectors that faced a more prominent threat; a key example of this was the stretch between *Vetera* and *Bonna* opposite the *Cherusci*, *Tencteri*, and *Usipetes*.³² Along the Upper Rhine, initially a similar pattern was followed; legionary bases were rebuilt in stone, auxiliary units were deployed at intervals along the river, and their positioning placed to counter identified or potential threats. An additional and vital task was the maintenance of communication and links with the Alps, Danube, and Rome. An example of the former role can be seen in the retention of the double fortress at *Moguntiacum* which opposed the significant Chattan threat. While both *Argentorate* and *Vindonissa* fulfilled the latter function and maintained the vital communication and links with Rome and forces on the Danube and with Rome.³³

Along the Danube, positioning of its legions mirrored the purpose and scope of its counterparts along the Rhine. As such, both legionary and auxiliary forces were deployed in response to threats, real or perceived, along the river. Raetia and Noricum

of Archaeology Occasional Publication, 82, London, p. 437; D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, p. 60; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 166; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; G. Alföldy, *Die Hilfstruppen der römischen Provinz Germania inferior*, Epigraphische Studien 6, pp. 140-8.

³¹ A *milliaria* was a formation of large, double-size units, both infantry and cavalry, of a nominal strength of 1,000 men (*cohors/ala milliaria*), though they were actually mostly smaller (720 for an *ala milliaria* and 800 for a *cohors milliaria*), see Pseudo-Hyginus, *De Munitionibus Castrorum* 27-28. E. Birley, 'Alae and Cohortes Milliariae', in E. Birley, *The Roman Army: Papers 1929-1986*, p. 349; P. A. Holder, 'Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', in *BAR* 70, pp. 5-10, 142; A. K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War: 100 BC-AD 200*, pp. 21-24; G. L. Cheesman, *The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army*, pp. 25-28; L. Keppie, 'The Army and the Navy', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 396; S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed., p. 225.

³² G. Alföldy, *Die Hilfstruppen der römischen Provinz Germania inferior*, Epigraphische Studien 6, pp. 145-152; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 166; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 320-323; L. Keppie, 'The Army and the Navy', in *CAH²*, Vol., p. 396; H. G. Horn, *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, pp. 63-8.

³³ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; N. Fields, *AD 69: Emperors, Armies and Anarchy*, p. 81; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; T. Bechert and W. J. H. Willems, *Römische reichsgrenze, zwischen Mosel und Nordseeküste*, pp. 24-7; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155.

still lacked legionary garrisons, the potential threat not yet deemed significant enough to warrant their deployment. These relied instead on auxiliary units that were positioned at strategic points near or on the banks of the river; although this undertaking was first implemented under Claudius, this practice was further developed under the Flavians.³⁴ In Pannonia, its two legions were initially positioned to counter its two main threats: the external threat, the *Marcomanni* and *Quadi* in the north where *legio XV Apollinaris* was garrisoned at *Carnuntum* (Petronell), and the internal threat, the Pannonian tribes which were monitored and controlled by *legio XIII Gemina* at *Poetovium*.³⁵ In Dalmatia, a single legion, *legio IV Flavia*, was initially still based at *Burnium* to secure the province.³⁶ In both provinces this positioning would change under Domitian, during conflicts with Germanic and Sarmatian tribes along the Middle Danube. In Moesia, the number of legions increased to four legions: the base of *legio V Alaudae* is uncertain, but the other three certainly lay in fortresses on the Danube, *legio VII Claudia* at *Viminacium*, *legio V Macedonica*, and *legio I Italica* at the neighbouring fortresses of *Oescus* and *Novae*.³⁷ These bases were strategically positioned to counter the Dacian and Sarmatian incursions across the Danube, the legions' fortresses being located at vulnerable positions along the river. Similarly, the arrangements for the Danube

³⁴ G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, pp. 143-144; S. R. Flynt, 'The Military Vici of Noricum', PhD diss., University of Missouri-Colombia, 2005, pp. 23-4; J. Fitz, 'Noricum und Pannonien zur Zeit der römischen Okkupation', in *Röm. Österreich 17-18*, pp. 79-86.

³⁵ A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 80-2; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 23, 96; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 167-8, 172-3; S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed., pp. 841-842.

³⁶ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and Their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third Centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, p. 103; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 19, 96; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, p. 130; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 96, 103-104 n. 2.

³⁷ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and Their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third Centuries AD', in R.J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and Their Legions*, p. 103; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 8 n. 74, 15, 19, 21, 96; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 92-93, 133-137, 143-145; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 81-82; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 321-2; S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed., pp. 839-41.

emulated the Rhine, with auxiliary units being positioned at intervals between the fortresses at locations that provided defence and facilitated surveillance. Significantly their numbers were increased under the Flavians to fulfil this role.³⁸ Overall there were now 29 legions under arms during the Flavian dynasty, the number of auxiliary units was still indeterminable but there was a notable increase from the Julio-Claudian era; eight legions were on the Rhine and seven in the Danubian provinces. Significantly, an indication of this zone's continued importance and crucial significance is attested by the fact that more than fifty percent of the Roman military strength was still dedicated to defending against threats in this region. Further details regarding activities and development along the Rhine and Danube is the focus of the subsequent sections.

Similarly, auxiliary regiments went through necessary and concurrent changes during the Flavian dynasty. As with the legions, the *auxilia* had proven themselves to be disloyal and detrimental to the stability of the empire. This was particularly evident in north-eastern Gaul and the Lower Rhine. In concert with these precautionary measures for the legions, Vespasian further expanded upon earlier imperial measures to disperse auxiliary forces throughout the Empire.³⁹ After the revolt, auxiliary units that had proved to be dangerous or were distrusted were dealt with by disbandment or transfer to distant postings. Under Vespasian alone, three *ala* units disappear along with several

³⁸ D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200; J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia and Upper Moesia*, p. 81; M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', in A. Morillo, N. Hanel & E. Martín (eds.), *LIMES XX*, p. 949; J. K. Haalebos, 'Traian und die Hilfstruppen am Niederrhein: Ein Militärdiplom des Jahres 98 n. Chr. Aus Elst in der Over-Betuwe (Niederlande)', *Saalebürg Jahrb.* 50, pp. 40-2; M. Roxan and P. Holder, *Roman Military diplomas 1985-1993*, p. 437.

³⁹ Tac. *Hist.* I.67; V.13-37, 70-72; Frontin. *Strat.* 4.13.4. M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; P. A. Holder, 'Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', in *BAR* 70, p. 142; L. Keppie, 'The Army and the Navy', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 396; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 33-4 see n. 128; A. K. Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, p. 126.

infantry cohorts from the Lower Rhine.⁴⁰ Those units that were transferred away from the Lower Rhine were relocated to the Balkans and more notably Britain. Military diplomas attested to this; evidence indicates the transfer of Raetian cohorts to Wiesbaden and Mainz, and the transfer of further Batavian cohorts from *Germania* to Britain.⁴¹ In Britain, Knight has identified the appearance of a cavalry unit and twenty-three cohorts, consisting of tribes from the Lower Rhine which include: Batavian, two Tungrian, three Lingonian, and four Nervian.⁴² Furthermore, Knight speculates the possibility of a further influx under Cerialis in AD 71.⁴³ Troops that replaced the Germanic auxiliary units along the Lower Rhine were sourced from Moesia, whilst others were transferred from Upper Rhine; markedly only two units remained in the region that had existed in the region from before the revolt.⁴⁴ In total, the Lower Rhine now consisted of 27 auxiliary units, consequently new forts were constructed to house their increased numbers; notably these units were deployed accordingly to the enemy they faced, sparingly in the south, densely and in the form of cavalry in the centre opposite the Tencteri, with infantry cohorts in the north.⁴⁵ Furthermore, in concert with the decision to distribute the *auxilia* throughout the empire was the decision to remove native leaders from overall command of their own regiments, appointing instead commanders who had no ties of blood with the districts with which the units were

⁴⁰ P. A. Holder, 'Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', in *BAR* 70, p. 142; D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200; A. K. Bowman and J. D. Thomas, *The Vindolanda Writing Tablet* 2, pp. 22-4; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113.

⁴¹ Tac. *Agr.* 83 (Batavians in Britain, AD 83); see also *CIL* XIII 7584. D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 497 n. 4.

⁴² B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 50.

⁴³ D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200; D. Mattingly, *An Imperial Possession: Britain in Roman Empire 54BC – AD 409*, 132.

⁴⁴ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200.

⁴⁵ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 166 see n. 42; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 113; D. J. Knight, 'The Movements of the Auxilia from Augustus to Hadrian', *ZPE* 85, pp. 195-200.

associated.⁴⁶ There were of course still some instances of native commanders, notably Flavius Cerealis⁴⁷ and other Batavian commanders during the second century AD.⁴⁸ However, these cases can be viewed as exceptions and were not a common occurrence or usual practice.⁴⁹ Considering the absence of recorded disturbances by native peoples during the Flavian dynasty, these methods appear to have been effective. In this manner the Flavians mitigated the potential of localised threats and ensured the security and loyalty of the forces stationed on the Rhine and Danube frontiers.

Army Recruitment

Modern debate surrounding alterations to the composition of the legions during the Flavian period centres on supposed changes to recruitment. This certainly was not applicable along the Rhine and Danube. Lessons had been learned from allowing allegiances to be clouded by their interaction and intermingling with local Germanic peoples which had weakened legionaries' resolve and loyalties. This disloyalty had caused Vespasian to replace the legions stationed along the Rhine with those that were

⁴⁶ Tac. *Hist.* V.16. D. B. Cuffs, 'The *Auxilia* in Roman Britain and the Two Germanies from Augustus to Caracalla: Family, Religion and 'Romanization'', PhD diss., University of Toronto, Toronto, 2010, p. 4 n. 14; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 105-6; K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 47; L. Keppie, *Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000*, p. 396; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 154; P. A. Holder, 'Studies in the *Auxilia* of the Roman Army from Augustus to Trajan', in *BAR* 70, p. 142; L. Keppie, 'The Army and the Navy', in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 396; G. H. Stevenson and A. Momigliano, 'Rebellion Within the Empire', *CAH*, Vol. X, p. 849; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 212; C. Wells, *The Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., pp. 162-3; C. Rüger, 'Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 497. Saddington disagrees with this view, arguing that foreign kings and tribal leaders continued to command *auxilia* during the Flavian period, see D. B. Saddington, 'The Development of the Roman Auxiliary Forces from Augustus to Trajan', *ANRW*, II.3, p. 191.

⁴⁷ A case can be argued that Flavius was a Batavian like the men he commanded, see reference to Cerialis in *Tab. Vindol.* II. 225-90. See also, B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 154; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 50; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 335.

⁴⁸ The Batavian units, in particular *coh. VIII Batavorum* at Vindolanda, have been the focus of scholarship, see D. B. Cuffs, 'The *Auxilia* in Roman Britain and the Two Germanies from Augustus to Caracalla: Family, Religion and 'Romanization'', p. 4 n. 14; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 33-4. Native leadership is explicitly stated by Tacitus in the second century, see Tac. *Ger.* 29.

⁴⁹ In regards to the Batavians specifically, the comment by Tacitus (*Hist.* IV 12.3) could suggest the practice was obsolete by the time of Tacitus. See also, D. B. Saddington, 'The Development of the Roman Auxiliary Forces from Augustus to Trajan', *ANRW*, II.3, pp. 190-1; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 33-4 see n. 128.

untainted and loyal to the *princeps*. Moreover, although the newly formed legions did contain former members of the disbanded legions the majority would have consisted of new recruits which were recruited from traditional sources.

Some scholars argue that the composition of the new units raised by the Flavians was now altered and that soldiers recruited from Rome and Italy were now limited.⁵⁰ These scholars' cite the regime's desire to quash the legions' long-term political motivations and aims; this view is largely based on the supposed lessons learned during the civil war. Rostovtzeff argues that Vespasian deliberately eliminated the Italian influence from the legions, with the exception of the Praetorian Guard, in order to create 'an army of provincials', stating that the sack of *Cremona* in AD 69 had demonstrated a class struggle between the Italian bourgeoisie and the proletariat soldiers.⁵¹ Last adds further to this theory, arguing that Vespasian increased the intake of provincial soldiers in order to limit the units' awareness and comprehension of Roman politics.⁵² Both these arguments rely on the supposed 'established fact' that the percentage of provincial to Italian legionaries increased under Vespasian.⁵³ Research of epigraphic evidence, however, has illustrated two major points that cast significant doubt on this view. Firstly, the limited amount of data and the uneven representation in different areas makes any interpretation difficult, let alone providing evidence of a new widespread recruitment policy. Secondly, that the majority of surviving evidence, originating from

⁵⁰ See, M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 1957, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 87, 101-110. See also, L. Homo, *Vespasien: l'empereur du bon sens: 69-79 ap. J. C.*, Albin Michel, Paris 1949; H. R. Graf, *Kaiser Vespasian; Untersuchungen Zu Suetons Vita Divi Vespasiani*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1937. Other scholars dispute this view, see H. Dewijver, *The Equestrian Officers of the Roman Imperial Army*, Stuttgart, 1992, p. 120; J. C. Mann, 'Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement During the Principate', University of London: Institute of Archaeology Occasional Publication (7), pp. 25-29, 54; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 32; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 153; Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, pp. 78-79.

⁵¹ M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 106-116.

⁵² H. Last, 'The Principate and the Administration', *CAH*, Vol. XI, p. 396; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 32.

⁵³ M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 32-3.

the Danube, Rhine, and Africa, indicates no dramatic shift in the composition of the legions nor an aversion to Italian recruits.

Inscriptions indicate that new legions and emergency levies continued to be raised primarily in Italy, perhaps for symbolic reasons, but mainly due to proximity and convenience.⁵⁴ Exceptions to this are of course seen in the east, where legions in Syria, Cappadocia, and Egypt were replenished with eastern recruits from Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, presumably due to geographical constraints.⁵⁵ The limited nature of the evidence, however, makes determinations of this trend impossible. More significantly, evidence along the Rhine and the Danube shows no dramatic change, with the legions still being largely drawn from the Roman *coloniae* of northern Italy and southern Gaul.⁵⁶ Overall, evidence demonstrates that Italians continued serving in the legions, forming barely over one-fifth of the men whose origins are determinable between the reigns of Vespasian and Trajan.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the eventual decline in the proportion of Italian legionaries was slight and gradual; it was not due to imperial intervention but rather the difficulties of recruiting in Italy, or perhaps the quality of manpower available after the civil wars.⁵⁸ There was no concerted effort by the Flavians to produce a ‘provincialisation’ of the legions or an aversion to the recruitment of Italian troops. Along the Rhine and Danube the composition of the legions remained the same.

⁵⁴ J. C. Mann, ‘The Raising of New Legions During the Principate’, *Hermes* 91 (4), pp. 483-89.

⁵⁵ M. Griffin, ‘The Flavians’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 33.

⁵⁶ G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano*, pp. 177-86; G. Forni, ‘Estrazione etnica e sociale dei soldati delle legioni nei primi tre secoli dell’impero’, *ANRW* II.2, pp. 380-85; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army*, p. 108; J. C. Mann, ‘Legionary Recruitment and Veteran settlement during the Principate’, pp. 25-9; M. Hassall, ‘The Army’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 330-31; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 153-54.

⁵⁷ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 153-54; G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano*, pp. 177-86; G. Forni, ‘Estrazione etnica e sociale dei soldati delle legioni nei primi tre secoli dell’impero’, *ANRW* II.2, pp. 380-5; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army*, p. 108; J. C. Mann, ‘Legionary Recruitment and Veteran settlement during the Principate’, pp. 25-9.

⁵⁸ M. Griffin, ‘The Flavians’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 33 see n. 127; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 153.

Domitian Military Pay Reforms

Subsequent alterations to the military under Domitian centred on pay. There is little doubt that these fiscal changes were undertaken in effort to cement further the loyalty of the military to the reigning *princeps*. This increased loyalty by the military had the added benefit of bolstering Roman defences along the frontiers. Notably an important difference between the legionary and auxiliary soldier was that the former was always a Roman citizen, while the auxiliary often was not.⁵⁹ Reflective of this difference in status, the two forces were paid accordingly. Furthermore, prior to Domitian's reforms, it is possible to identify the varying pay scale of the military. Hassall provides a sound summary of the various units pay rates, recording that,

...the ordinary foot-soldier was paid seven and half gold pieces (aurei), one and a half aurei less than the nine paid to the legionary, the trooper in an *ala* actually received one and a half aurei more. In fact, it is possible to detect three basic pay grades among the auxiliaries in this period: lowest paid were the foot-soldier in the cohorts or part-mounted cohorts at seven and half aurei, then came the troops in part-mounted cohorts at nine, whilst best paid were the troopers in the *alae* at ten and a half.⁶⁰

Therefore, overall a differential of one and a half *aurei* in each of the various units rate of pay can be identified. Subsequently in AD 84 Domitian increased this rate of pay for all branches of the military; the lowest paid, the infantry soldier, had his pay set at ten

⁵⁹ R. Alston, 'Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian', *JRS* 84, pp. 113-4, 120-123; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 336; M. A. Speidel, 'The Pay of the *Auxilia*', *JRS* 63, pp. 141-7; M. A. Speidel, 'Roman Army Pay Scales', *JRS* 82, pp. 87-106; J. Jahn, 'Zur Entwicklung römischer Soldzahlungen von Augustus bis auf Diocletian', *Studien zu Fundmünzen der Antike* 2, pp. 53-74.

⁶⁰ M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 336.

aurei, five-sixths of the new legionary pay of twelve *aurei*, therefore increasing the disparity between grades to two *aurei*.⁶¹ Although this significant increase in pay would have affected the overall costs of maintaining the military, it was certainly necessary considering the fact that Roman forces had not received a pay increase since the time of Julius Caesar in the first century BC.⁶² Consequently, there is little doubt that the increase helped secure the loyalties of the troops for Domitian and ensured that Roman defences along the Rhine and Danube were maintained according to imperial policy; certainly it was a factor in the support Domitian received from the military during his reign and after his death.

Flavian Frontier Reforms

Interconnected with the reorganisation and changes to the military is the Flavian pursuit of a policy which further strengthened and connected the defences of the Rhine and Danube, the emergence of the '*Limes*'. Two factors generated the need for this development: the realisation of the limited potential gains in *Germania*, and the rising threat along the Danube. These factors resulted in three significant developments: the definitive shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube, the transformation of military to civil administration along the Rhine with the creation of the German provinces, and most significantly the containment of the *Germani* on the Rhine and the emergence of permanent patrolled and defended boundaries, the '*Limes*'. These

⁶¹ Suet. *Dom.* 7.3; Dio LXVII.3. Using this equation part-mounted cohort would have received twelve *aurei* and in an *ala*, fourteen, see M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 336; M. A. Speidel, 'The Pay of the *Auxilia*', *JRS* 63, pp. 141-7; M. A. Speidel, 'Roman Army Pay Scales', *JRS* 82, pp. 87-106; J. Jahn, 'Zur Entwicklung römischer Soldzahlungen von Augustus bis auf Diocletian', *Studien zu Fundmünzen der Antike* 2, pp. 53-74.

⁶² Suetonius attests to Julius Caesar's doubling of the legions' pay, see Suet. *Div. Iul.* 26.3. Tacitus clarifies the current rate of pay, writing that the mutinous legionaries of AD 14 complained about their pay of ten *asses* per day and demanded that they be paid one denarius per day, suggesting an annual rate of 225 *denarii*, see Tac. *Ann.* I. 17. See also, R. Alston, 'Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian', *JRS* 84, p. 114.

developments, acting in concert, constituted the new defensive policy of the Flavians and would be the means by which the threat posed by the Germanic tribes would be mitigated and contained. Due to the summary nature of this chapter, details of events which helped provoke the emergence of the '*Limes*', such as Domitian's war against the *Chatti*, will be mostly abridged. Focus will remain with the defensive and strategic changes that constituted the development from frontier to '*Limes*'.

There is considerable debate regarding the nature of Flavian defensive policy. Several scholars, such as Schönberger and Levick, argue that the Flavians may have considered advancing further than the Wetterau and the Black Forest regions if the Romans had not already over-extended themselves with the occupation of Britain and the increasing threat on the Danube.⁶³ This view, however, is highly speculative and attributes a degree of military expansion that the Romans had already ruled out in *Germania*. On the contrary, it is the case that the Flavians adopted a more interventionist but limited expansion and engineering campaign to contain and mitigate the threats on the Rhine and Danube.⁶⁴ This undertaking was aimed at establishing a superior defence against threats posed on these rivers, and therefore a conquest of *Germania* was never considered — nor was it attempted by the Flavians. An examination of the Flavians' actions reveal that they identified and calculated the zones of potential threats and prioritised their defences accordingly, ensuring that areas of

⁶³ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 103; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59, p. 159; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 156.

⁶⁴ This is similar to Bengtson who describes the Flavians' German policy as a 'fortification policy', see H. Bengtson, *Die Flavier*, p. 95. This argument is supported by other scholars, see M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 103; S. Pfeiffer, *Die Zeit der Flavier: Vespasian – Titus – Domitian*, pp. 89-90; B. Dreyer, *Arminius und der Untergang des Varus: Warum die Germanen keine Römer wurden*, pp. 202-3; T. Sonnenwald, *Domitian und die Germanen*, pp. 8-9; R. Wolters, 'Die Chatten zwischen Rom und den germanischen Stämmen: Von Varus bis zu Domitianus', in H. Schneider (ed.), *Feindliche Nachbarn: Rom und die Germanen*, p. 89; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 158, 160.

high potential threat would be monitored, defended, and that any conflict would occur beyond Roman defences.⁶⁵ All of this indicates a high level of organisation and strategic consideration pointing towards an active pursuit of defined defended borders and the emergence of the '*Limes*'.

As discussed previously, after the initial suppression of the Batavian revolt the next step was the reorganisation and reforms of the military. These changes ensured that the military bases were rebuilt and that forces deployed along the Rhine and Danube frontiers were loyal and organised, being adequately equipped and supplied.⁶⁶ In doing so Vespasian consolidated and secured Rome's position along both frontiers. Only after these initial preparations were complete did Vespasian carry out his campaigns of retribution, suppression, and later strategic expansion and defensive engineering works. Vespasian's initial military activities were similar to those of his predecessors, the Julio-Claudians, who carried out offensive campaigns against the *Germani* as a matter of established protocol in response to German attacks and incursions.⁶⁷ Significantly, it is Vespasian's deviation from the established Julio-Claudian response through the additional phase of strategic and defensive expansion and engineering works that marks the beginning of a new policy. This phase of expansion and engineering marks the beginnings of the '*Limes*', and will be the focus of this section.

Flavian Policy on the Rhine

⁶⁵ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 103.

⁶⁶ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 85; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59, pp. 156-7; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, pp. 240-1.

⁶⁷ For details refer back to Chapters 7-10.

A difficulty, it should be noted, lies in determining the extent of Vespasian's plan for *Germania*. There is no literary or archaeological evidence to indicate Vespasian's intentions against the *Germani* after AD 74/5. Some scholars suggest that Vespasian had expansionist intentions across the Rhine, and that Domitian adopted this practice at first, but later allowed it to lapse.⁶⁸ Given the paucity of evidence, this argument is dubious and it is preferable to consider that Vespasian's initial plans of creating a shorter link between the Rhine and Danube were expanded by Domitian, seeking a shorter route between *Mogontiacum* (Mainz) on the Upper Rhine and *Augusta Vindelicorum* (Augsburg) in the province of Raetia.⁶⁹ This theory appears to have merit when it is considered in conjunction with the construction of roads and the chain of forts between the Rhine-Main area and the Danube. Moreover, the military presence identified in the Upper Neckar region in AD 73/4 suggests that Vespasian had this undertaking in mind during his expansion across the Rhine.⁷⁰ Therefore, Domitian's intervention against the Chatti and the initial construction phase of the '*Limes*' in AD 85 can be seen as a continuation of Vespasian's military policy. Domitian's reign can be holistically viewed as a continuation of the programs pursued by his father, which were aimed at solving the unsatisfactory nature of the Rhine-Danube defensive line.⁷¹

Along Lower Rhine

⁶⁸ W. Schleiermacher, 'Die Neckarlinie von Wimpfen bis Rottweil und Hüfingen', *ORL A Strecke II*, p. 35 n. 1. Nesselhauf argues that the defensive line was Domitian initiative, see H. Nesselhauf, 'Umriss einer Geschichte des obergermanischen Heeres', in *Jb RGZM* 7, pp. 162-5. For details regarding the debate of the Flavian policy, see H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59, p. 157.

⁶⁹ K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Czysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 105; K. Christ, *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 12, pp. 207-10.

⁷⁰ H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59, p. 158; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 38. Details of Vespasian expansion in this area are explored below.

⁷¹ Details of this argument will be discussed below.

Along the Lower Rhine, the Flavian policy can be viewed as a continuation of the defensive strategy commenced during the reign of Claudius, under whom several auxiliary forts had already been constructed on the south bank of the Rhine, between Vechten and the North Sea.⁷² As discussed in chapter 10, Claudian forts downstream of Vechten were established at Alphen aan den Rijn, Woerden, Roomburg, and Valkenburg.⁷³ Additionally, there is evidence supporting the presence of timber watchtowers in the same area dating from the same period.⁷⁴ Therefore, this defensive line already had many of the characteristics which constituted the ‘*Limes*’, with only the gaps between forts and an established patrolled military road linking all parts of the defences absent. As a consequence of this, the Romans still had to retain a large military presence in the region in order to maintain control. As detailed in the previous chapter, the Batavian revolt would later reveal the flaws in this defence, especially when the frontier was depleted of its forces, resulting in widespread destruction. Archaeological evidence attests to the extent of this destruction, revealing burn layers in almost all the Rhineland forts dating to this period.⁷⁵ Consequently, the reign of Vespasian is

⁷² M. Polak, ‘The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140’, in A. Morillo, N. Hanel & E. Martín (eds.), *LIMES XX*, p. 945 see n. 1; C. Rüger, ‘Germany’, in *CAH²*, Vol. X, p. 533; J. E. Bogaers & C. B. Rüger (eds.), *Der Niedergermanische Limes: Materialien zu seiner Geschichte*, Kunst und Altertum am Rhein 50, pp. 44-58; J. K. Haalebos, *Zwammerdam – Nigrum Pullum: Ein Auxiliarkastell am Niedergermanischen Limes*, pp. 248-45; H. Schönberger, ‘Roman army camp of the early and middle imperial period between the North Sea and the Inn’, *BRGK* 66, pp. 345-46.

⁷³ M. Polak, ‘The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140’, in A. Morillo, N. Hanel & E. Martín (eds.), *LIMES XX*, pp. 945-8 see n. 1, 5; J. E. Bogaers & C. B. Rüger (eds.), *Der Niedergermanische Limes: Materialien zu seiner Geschichte*, Kunst und Altertum am Rhein 50, pp. 44-58; J. K. Haalebos, *Zwammerdam – Nigrum Pullum: Ein Auxiliarkastell am Niedergermanischen Limes*, pp. 248-5; H. Schönberger, ‘Roman Army Camp of the Early and Middle Imperial Period between the North Sea and the Inn’, *BRGK* 66, pp. 345-6.

⁷⁴ W. S. Hanson, ‘The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers Revisited’, in R. Collins and F. McIntosh, (eds.), *Life in the Limes: Studies of the people and objects of the Roman Frontiers*, p. 4; M. Polak, ‘The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140’, p. 948; D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, London, 2011, p. 95 see pl. 10.

⁷⁵ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, pp. 249-250; K. E. Waugh, ‘Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda’, p. 46; L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*, p. 194; G. Webster, *The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 49-50; H. Schönberger, ‘the Roman Frontier in Germany: An

characterised by the complete rebuilding of the defences along the Lower Rhine in concert with the first clear sign of a strategic concept being adhered to in the stationing of troops, as outlined above.

Rebuilding of the defensive line began shortly after the revolt, the first step being the rebuilding of the bases and watchtowers lost during the revolt. That many of these structures were rebuilt in stone indicates that this was now a permanent defence network. Vespasian, however, went beyond just merely re-establishing the old defensive works, but improved upon the network of bases and watchtowers initially established by Claudius. Moreover, there was an identifiable strategy for this defence system and the specific deployment of troops in this period. Waugh argues that this can be explained as being a direct result of the circumstances and conditions existing in the Germanic territory across the Rhine.⁷⁶ An example of this can be seen opposite the tribal territory of the *Tencteri*, located on the southern side of the River Lippe, which was defended exclusively by cavalry units; no infantry were stationed in the immediate vicinity.⁷⁷ Justification for the deployment of this type of combatant was probably owing to the fact that the *Tencteri* provided some of the best horse riders amongst the *Germani*; the Romans, therefore, deployed similar forces to combat this threat.⁷⁸ This was not an isolated case, for it appears that the *alae*, whose military expertise and manoeuvrability surpassed that of the *cohortes*, protected what was seen viewed to be some of the most

Archaeological Survey', p. 152; A. W. Byvanck, 'De opstand der Bataven', *Antiquity and Survival* 3, pp. 15-27; W. Sprey, *Tacitus over de opstand Bataven*, Groningen, 1953.

⁷⁶ K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 47.

⁷⁷ K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 47.

⁷⁸ Tac. *Ger.* 32.

dangerous and vulnerable sections of the defensive line.⁷⁹ This consideration supports the view that the Romans had a strategic model being adhered to in the deployment of troops, specifically that Romans stationed similar forces against each other or, if not appropriate, forces that were best suited to combat that specific threat.

Under Vespasian, another key factor to the Roman defence along the Lower Rhine was the shortening of the interval between each fort; on average, this was reduced to a distance of ten kilometres, which closed the remaining gaps that had previously existed in the Claudian system.⁸⁰ Furthermore, it is from Vespasian's reign that a military road linking all the towers and forts in the region can now be discerned.⁸¹ This road was a *limes*, in the traditional sense of the word, as outlined by Isaac,⁸² and allowed for rapid communication and transportation of resources and troops along the length of the Lower Rhine defensive line. Moreover, the road in conjunction with the system of watchtowers and forts facilitated the conduct of patrols and improved the Romans' ability to monitor and control the *Germani*. From this point, with the construction of permanent stone bases, the establishment of a system of towers and bases at regular intervals encompassing the length of the Lower Rhine linked by a road (which was patrolled, monitored, and defended by strategically placed forces), that the Lower Rhine can be

⁷⁹ D. J. Breeze, 'Cavalry on Frontiers', in D. J. Breeze and B. Dobson (eds.), *Roman Officers and Frontiers*, pp. 288-297; K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 47; G. Alföldy, *Die Hilfstruppen der römischen Provinz Germania inferior*, Epigraphische Studien 6, pp. 145-152; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 166; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 320-323; L. Keppie, 'The Army and the Navy', in *CAH²*, Vol., p. 396; H. G. Horn, *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, pp. 63-8.

⁸⁰ C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 500; K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 47.

⁸¹ D. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 95 see pl. 10; M. Polak, 'The Roman Military Presence in the Rhine Delta in the Period c. AD 40-140', p. 948; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 500.

⁸² B. Isaac, 'The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei', *JRS* 78, pp. 125-147. Refer back to Chapter 2 for the argument surrounding the use of this word.

viewed as being in the next phase of its defensive development, the initial '*Limes*'. Under Domitian, the almost peaceful situation that existed along the Lower German '*Limes*' remained almost unchanged as it had been under Vespasian. After AD 80 the provinces of *Germania Inferior* and *Germania Superior* were formed under their own separate civil commands and administrations. This will be discussed in more detail below. This concept of defence was to remain the strategy for the control of the Lower Rhine (*Germania Inferior*) '*Limes*' until the third century AD.

Connected with the development of the '*Limes*' on the Lower Rhine were the Flavians' campaigns of retribution and suppression. These military actions were needed to nullify areas of hostility immediately facing the Roman defences. Two such threats are known to have existed along this defensive line: the *Batavi*, and the *Bructeri*. Cerialis had suppressed the Batavian threat in AD 70-71. To ensure the *Batavi*'s continued pacification, part of their territory was annexed and the legionary fortress of *Noviomagus* was re-establishment and garrisoned.⁸³ The *Bructeri* had taken part in the same revolt, but had initially escaped Roman retribution and represented an active threat along this front. In one of the years between AD 75-78, the *legatus* of the Lower Rhine, C. Rutilius Gallicus, conducted a successful campaign against the *Bructeri* which also resulted in the capturing of the German prophetess Veleda.⁸⁴ Moreover, according to Tacitus, the Romans were supposedly fortunate when approximately 60,000 *Bructeri* (a

⁸³ J.K. Haalebos, H. van Enckevort, 'Frührömische Lager in Nimwegen (NL)', in: J.-S. Kühlborn (ed.), *Germaniam pacavi*, pp. 29-58; W.J.H. Willems, *Romeins Nijmegen. Vier eeuwen stad en centrum aan de Waal*, Utrecht, 1990; C. Lepelley, *Rom und das Reich: 44 v. Chr.-260 n. Chr.*, p. 168; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 105; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 85; M. Hassall, 'The Army', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 322; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 112-3, 160; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 96; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts of the 1st and 2nd Centuries AD in Britain and the German Provinces*, p. 250; J. E. Bogaers and C. B. Rüger, 'Der Niedergermanische Limes', *Kunst und Altertum am Rhein* 50, p. 79; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', *JRS* 59, p. 155.

⁸⁴ *Stat. Sil.* 1, 4, 89-90; *CIL* 16, 23. B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 160; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 241.

Roman exaggeration) were later destroyed by rival tribes, the *Chamavi* and the *Angrivarii*, perhaps in the first years of Domitian's reign, but possibly in the year after his death.⁸⁵ Later, T. Vestricius Spurinna forced them to re-instate a puppet king they had expelled.⁸⁶ Beyond the basic outline of these events little else can be ascertained. It appears, however, that the Flavians had continued the Julio-Claudian policy of weakening resistance through military campaigns and ensuring the continued pacification of the *Germani* through political manipulation. Through these campaigns the *Bructeri* were removed as a threat, the last powerful tribe hostile to Rome on this front. Subsequently, with the suppression of hostile tribes and the establishment of the 'Limes', diplomatic rather than military means were more readily employed in dealing with the *Germani*. Furthermore, with this defence firmly established by the reign of Domitian, either through design or simply due to necessity, the Romans proved able to defend the Lower Rhine 'Limes' with considerably less forces and were in a position to re-deploy half of its legionary strength along the Danube in order to combat the growing threat on that frontier. [\[see Map \(14\)\]](#)

Along the Upper Rhine

Concurrently, while the Lower Rhine developed its 'Limes' along the length of the river Rhine itself (which would remain the eastern border of the empire throughout the Roman Imperial period), conversely, the 'Limes' on the Upper Rhine would develop its defensive position beyond the banks of the river in a series of four separate periods

⁸⁵ Tac. *Ger.* 33. D. Timpe, *Romano-Germanica: Gesammelte Studien zur Germania des Tacitus*, pp. 203–228; G. Neumann, 'Bructerer', in *RGA* 3, pp. 581–586; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 160.

⁸⁶ Pliny *Letters* 2.7. K. E. Waugh, 'Germans Beyond the Limes: A Reassessment of the Archaeological Evidence in the Limesvorland of Southern Germania Inferior/Secunda', p. 48. There is speculation that this occurred under Nerva, see J. Klose, *Roms Klientel-Randstaaten am Rhein und an der Donau*, pp. 45–7.

of extension in which ever-smaller improvements were implemented.⁸⁷ The first period of extension was under Vespasian during the campaigns of Gn. Pinarius Cornelius Clemens in AD 73-74 which resulted in the annexation of the initial expansion area. A second period of extension occurred during the reign of Domitian, who continued to expand on the work of his father: it was then that the ‘*Limes*’ took on the form of a patrol road with wooden watchtowers and smaller bases dispersed along its length. Trajan and Hadrian jointly developed the third phase, erecting a wooden palisade in front of the road.⁸⁸ Later emperors carried out the fourth and final stage, improving upon the work of Hadrian by building towers, forts, and even some sections of a defensive wall out of stone.⁸⁹ Only the first two phases of development, which constitute the emergence of the ‘*Limes*’ on the Upper Rhine, will be the focus of this section.

Under Vespasian, Roman policy on the Upper Rhine can initially be interpreted as one of reconstruction, similar to that which was undertaken on the Lower Rhine. However, the policy later diverted from this direction during the early stages of his reign, shifting to one of gradual strategic expansion. This was the first period of extension and it resulted in the positioning of Roman defence beyond the river itself. In

⁸⁷ C. Rüger, ‘Roman Germany’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 500; H. Schönberger, ‘Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn’, *BRGK* 66, pp. 392-4.

⁸⁸ W. S. Hanson, ‘The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers Revisited’, in R. Collins and F. McIntosh, (eds.), *Life in the Limes: Studies of the People and Objects of the Roman Frontiers*, p. 5; D. Baatz, D. *Der römische Limes: Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau*, pp. 46-7. The Trajanic date for some of these developments is largely based on numismatics, see K. Kortüm, ‘Zur Datierung der römischen Militäranlagen im obergermanisch-rätischen Grenzgebiet: Chronologische Untersuchungen anhand der Münzfund’, *Saalburg-Jahrbuch* 49, pp. 5-65. The validity of Kortüm’s work in relation to dating some of the forts along the Upper Rhine and Raetia is discussed below.

⁸⁹ A. Thiel, ‘Innovation and perfection: Antoninus Pius’ Frontier in Germany’, in P. Bidwell (ed.), *Understanding Hadrian’s Wall*, pp. 83-7; W. S. Hanson, ‘The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers Revisited’, in R. Collins and F. McIntosh, (eds.), *Life in the Limes: Studies of the People and Objects of the Roman Frontiers*, pp. 5-6; C. Rüger, ‘Roman Germany’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 500; H. Schönberger, ‘Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn’, *BRGK* 66, pp. 394-395; G. Alföldy, ‘Caius Popilius Carus Pedo und die Vorlegung des obergermanischen Limes’, *Fundberichte aus Baden-Württemberg* 8, p. 55.

summary, Vespasian repositioned forts onto the right bank of the Upper Rhine, and connected these reclaimed positions with new roads. In effect, Vespasian had established an advanced military frontier, similar to the one established by Claudius on the Lower Rhine, which would be the foundation of the emerging '*Limes*'. Both the construction of the forts and the roads had a strategic purpose; they established a superior link between forces situated on the Rhine and Danube, facilitating prompter communication and transportation between the two fronts, even as it also served the purpose of monitoring and defending against perceived threats on the Rhine and Danube.

As stated previously, the strategic problems caused by the Batavian revolt and the increasing threat of tribes north of the Danube indicate that Vespasian's defensive policy needed to shorten the link between the Rhine and Danube in order to enable better communication and movement. Inherited from the Julio-Claudians, the difficulty faced by Vespasian stemmed from the L-shaped form of the Rhine-Danube defensive line, which pivoted on *Vindonissa* in Raetia. This formed a wedge approximately 290 kilometres long at the base and 275 kilometres long to the apex, thereby cutting a large salient into Roman held territory.⁹⁰ This effectively meant that Rome's perimeter between *Mogontiacum* and *Castra Regina* (the most northerly base established on the Danube) would have been at least 370 kilometres in length, rendering any redeployment of forces between the two frontiers difficult and prolonged. An example which highlights the impact of this issue is the redeployment problems faced by Vespasian's

⁹⁰ E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, Luttwak, p. 89.

forces during the Batavian revolt.⁹¹ There is no doubt that had Augustus' original plan of an advance to the Elbe been permanently accomplished, the northern frontier would have been considerably shorter and the Rhine-Danube salient would not have been an issue. The subsequent setback under Varus, however, had resulted in the problem of an inadequate defensive line, which Vespasian had to resolve. Therefore, the only viable solution available to the Flavians was to achieve the shortest and quickest defensive line as was still possible to establish with the available limited military resources.

Initial expansion east of the Upper Rhine occurred during the campaign of Gn. Pinarius Clemens in AD 73-74. During this campaign, troops advanced from *Argentoratum* on the Upper Rhine through the Black Forest against Germanic tribes east of the Rhine. Interpretations of the inscriptions *CIL* XIII 9082⁹² and *CIL* XI 5271⁹³, have led to the conclusion that Pinarius led a large-scale campaign in order to secure the Roman position in the Neckar Valley and that he was confronted by considerable hostilities.⁹⁴ These inscriptions, however, lack details concerning the nature of this campaign or the identity of the hostile tribe or tribes that were fought. Without further literary or archaeological evidence it is impossible to connect this campaign securely with any specific group. Likely targets for the campaign, either individually or as a combined force, include: the *Mattiaci*, the *Usipetes*, or the *Chatti*. All of these tribes had

⁹¹ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 64; K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 239.

⁹² *CIL* XIII 9082 = *ILS* 5832. This inscription at Offenburg suggests that Pinarius also incorporated the territory of the Neckar Valley to Raetia in the empire. J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, p. 148; C. P. Charlesworth, *Trade-Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., pp. 186, 276.

⁹³ *CIL* XI 5271 = *ILS* 997. This inscription is attributed to Pinarius, indicating that he was awarded *triumphalia ornamenta* in AD 74.

⁹⁴ Pfeiffer suggests that Pinarius launched a military campaign in the Black Forest, but he does not identify against whom, see S. Pfeiffer, *Die Zeit der Flavien: Vespasian – Titus – Domitian*, p. 90; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 106-7. For detractors of this view, see H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 156; R. Wolters, *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 66; K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 102.

represented a significant threat to Rome as they had formed a coalition during the Batavian rebellion and launched an assault on the military base at *Mogontiacum*.⁹⁵ This attack could not go unanswered and a response similar to that undertaken on the Lower Rhine against the *Batavi* and the *Bructeri* is a distinct possibility. Despite lacking specific details of the campaigns it can be suggested that Vespasian made a concerted effort to counter the high-intensity threat posed by these tribes, in particular the *Chatti*. Therefore, in part it could be argued that Pinarius' actions can be seen as a necessary campaign of retribution and suppression. This motive is made apparent when the location and purpose of the engineering works constructed by Pinarius during the course of his campaign is considered.

Connected, and in concert, with this campaign of suppression and retribution, Vespasian pursued the establishment of an effective defensive line which enabled the Romans to patrol, monitor, and defend against the potential threat posed by these tribes. One aspect of this defensive line took the form of a chain of stone military fortifications constructed from *Mogontiacum* into the territory of the Wetterau.⁹⁶ This suggests that

⁹⁵ Tac. *Hist.* IV.37. This view was first theorised by S. Gsell, *Essai sur la regne de l'Empereur Domitian*, p. 183. Other scholars support the view the campaign was undertaken as a campaign for military glory and conquest, see H. Bengtson, *Die Flavii*, pp. 196-7; U. Riemer, *Die römische Germanienpolitik von Caesar bis Commodus*, p. 104; R. Wolters, 'Die Chatten zwischen Rom und den germanischen Stämmen: Von Varus bis zu Domitianus', in H. Schneider (ed.), *Feindliche Nachbarn: Rom und die Germanen*, p. 90; D. Timpe, 'Die Germania des Tacitus: Germanische Ethnographie und römische Geschichte', in H. Schneider (ed.), *Feindliche Nachbarn: Rom und die Germanen*, p. 190.

⁹⁶ C. S. Sommer, 'Recent Developments in South-west Germany (eastern Germania Superior-Western Raetia)', in P. Freeman, J. Bennett, T. Fiema Zbigniew, and B. Hoffmann (eds.), *Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies held in Amman, Jordan (September 2000)*, p. 442; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155; H. Schönberger, *Roman Army Camp of the Early and Middle Imperial Period Between the North Sea and the Inn*, BRGK 66, p. 542; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 166; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 64; T. Sonnenwald, *Domitian und die Germanen*, p. 8; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald: Arminius, Varus, und das römische Germanien*, pp. 203-4; B. Dreyer, *Arminius und der Untergang des Varus: Warum die Germanen keine Römer wurden*, pp. 202-3; N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the comparative development, function and significance of the linear frontier system of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', pp. 6-7.

Vespasian sought to prevent, or more likely limit, the ability of the *Germani* to move without detection across the Rhine. This can be seen as the first part of the Flavian engineering works in their defence of *Germania*. Given their locations, these forts were clearly directed at the tribes of the *Mattiaci*, the *Usipetes*, and in particular the *Chatti*.⁹⁷ Vespasian demonstrated his military experience and knowledge of the region with his selection of *Mogontiacum* as the central point for the immediate security of this zone. Further archaeological evidence discovered at Frankfurt points towards the presence of supply bases in this region, which indicates that Vespasian was also concerned with supplying the legions for their advance south to the Danube.⁹⁸ The locations of these bases were well situated both geographically and strategically; in particular, the military forts at Hofheim, Heddenheim, and Okarben provided the Romans with a large operational zone and provided them with effective control of the Taunus and Wetterau regions.⁹⁹

Vespasian also sought to strengthen control of the Black Forest region from the legionary base at *Argentoratum* in order to consolidate Rome's defensive position. Strategically, because the Roman position was endangered by the deep wedge of the Neckar Valley and the Black Forest, the gradual incorporation of this area was important. The strategic significance of this region is connected to the potential vulnerability against outside incursion into Roman controlled territory, which not only

⁹⁷ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 106; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 64. These military bases included fortifications at Mainz-Kastell, Wiesbaden, Hofheim, Frankfurt-Höchst, Frankfurt-Heddenheim, Okarben, and Friedberg, see H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 155.

⁹⁸ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 64; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 38.

⁹⁹ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 106; H. Schneider, 'Die Chatten: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer', in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chatten vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, p. 20.

threatened links north of the Alps, but also meant that any force would only be a week's march from the northern edge of Italy. In order to counteract this problem, Vespasian advanced some of his forces to Offenburg-Rammerweier and Offenburg-Zunsweier, both of which places appear to have been used as military forts between *Argentoratum* and the Upper Neckar. Both of these military installations occupied strategic positions on high ground, which suggests that they served as observation posts and as sites securing further road construction.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, the fort at Waldmössingen, which was situated on the eastern edge of the Black Forest, had an observation role.¹⁰¹ The Romans appear to have continued the road south to Kingzigtal, Sulz on the river Neckar, and the early legionary base at *Ara Flaviae* (Rottweil).¹⁰²

Most significantly, Pinarius' campaign can be seen considered to have opened the route from *Argentoratum* through the Kinzig valley to the Upper Neckar, as well as incorporating into the defensive system the region to the east of the Rhine and south of the Main-Rhine as far as the hills of the Odenwald and Black Forest, and as mentioned earlier securing the Wetterau with a series of fortifications stretching from the lower Main and up the Nidda. A milestone records the building of this road during Pinarius' march through the Black Forest.¹⁰³ The route established from *Argentoratum* through to the Upper Danube passed through the region labelled the *Agri Decumates*. This road shortened the distance between *Mogontiacum* (on the Upper Rhine) and *Augusta*

¹⁰⁰ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 66.

¹⁰¹ D. Planck, *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, pp. 311-12.

¹⁰² C. S. Sommer, 'recent developments in south-west Germany (eastern Germania Superior-Western Raetia)', in P. Freeman, J. Bennett, T. Fiema Zbigniew, and B. Hoffmann (eds.), *Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Roman Frontier Studies held in Amman, Jordan (September 2000)*, p. 442.

¹⁰³ *CIL* XIII 9082= *ILS* 5832.

Vindelicorum (in Raetia on the Upper Danube) by c. 160 km.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, it can be seen that the project was designed to link the legionary fortress of *Argentoratum* with the province of Raetia at *Augusta Vindelicorum*, and to incorporate the territory between the Upper Rhine and the Danube, the *Agri Decumates*.¹⁰⁵

The *Agri Decumates* is roughly identified as being the triangle of land located in the southern sector below the lower Main and the Upper Danube and where the Neckar runs through the Black Forest.¹⁰⁶ Tacitus describes this area as the ‘*Decumates agri*’,¹⁰⁷ possibly an obsolete and native title; it has never been satisfactorily explained, although several scholars support the view that it probably meant ‘The Ten-Canton Lands.’¹⁰⁸ It was this re-entrant angle that called for the uneconomical deployment of Roman forces

¹⁰⁴ D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 58; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey’, pp. 155-6; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 161-2; J. C. Mann, ‘The Frontiers of the Principate’, *ANRW II* (1), p. 518.

¹⁰⁵ H. von Bernhard, ‘Die römische Geschichte in Rheinland-Pfalz’, in H. Cüppers (ed.), *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, p. 70; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, pp. 250-51.

¹⁰⁶ D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 58; H. von Bernhard, ‘Die römische Geschichte in Rheinland-Pfalz’, in H. Cüppers (ed.), *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, p. 70; G. Neumann, D. Timpe, H. U. Nuber, ‘*Decumates agri*’, in *RGA* 5, pp. 271-286; J.G.F. Hind, ‘Whatever Happened to the ‘*Agri Decumates*’?’, *Britannia* 15, p. 187; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 160-61; C. Rüger, ‘Roman Germany’, in *CAH*², Vol. XI, pp. 501-2; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, pp. 250-1; J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 28; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts and Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 39; S. Hornblower, S. & A. Spawforth, (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed., pp. 43-44; E. T. Salmon, *A history of the Roman World*, p. 241; R. von Uslar, *Westgermanische Bodenfunde des ersten bis dritten Jahrhunderts nach Christus aus Mittel- und Westdeutschland*, Berlin, (1938). For an introduction to the complex argument and archaeological evidence, see H. B. Leibinger, *Decumates agri. Eine Einführung in die provinzialrömische Archäologie*, Re Di Roma-Verlag, Remscheid, (2009).

¹⁰⁷ Tac. *Ger.* 29. 4.

¹⁰⁸ This argument is based on the view that the phrase refers to an ancient Celtic term indicating the political division of the area into ‘ten cantons’, for details regarding this argument refer to the article by J.G.F. Hind, see J.G.F. Hind, ‘Whatever Happened to the ‘*Agri Decumates*’?’, *Britannia* 15, p. 188. A detailed bibliography of the debate that surrounds the meaning of this term can also be found in the work of A. A. Lund, ‘Kritischer Forschungsbericht zur ‘*Germania*’ des Tacitus’, *ANRW II*, 33.3, pp. 2109-2124. See also, B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 160; D. Baatz, ‘Die ländliche Besiedlung im römischen Reichsgebiet östlich des Ober- und Mittelrheins’, in H. Hinz (ed.), *Germania Romana. III. Römisches Leben auf germanischem Boden*, Gymnasium Suppl. 7, pp. 95-8; S. Hornblower, & A. Spawforth, (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd ed., pp. 43-4; M. Grant, *A Guide to the Ancient World, A Classical Dictionary of Place Names*, p. 17; R. Syme, ‘The Flavian Achievement’, in *CAH*, Vol. XI, p. 181; E. Norden, *Alt-Germanien: völker- und namengeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig and Berlin, 1934, pp. 137-40; F. Hertlein, ‘Die Entstehung des Dekumatlandes’, *Klio*, XXI, pp. 30-43.

on the Upper Rhine and Danube.¹⁰⁹ Annexing this territory both shortened and straightened the defensive line and improved the link between forces on the Rhine and Danube. In the process Vespasian also safeguarded Roman interests on the Rhine and obtained an abundance of land on which to settle veterans.¹¹⁰ Considering, however, that at this time this area was sparsely populated,¹¹¹ supposedly unclaimed, and the annexation was achieved quickly and with little resistance, Roman occupation still did not proceed very rapidly.¹¹² Roman advancement was marked by the construction of fortresses which were established to consolidate their gains. An example of this, and of Vespasian's strategic acumen, is seen at *Ara Flaviae*. Dated from the Vespasianic era, it is one of the largest collections of military structures that can be attributed to the Flavian period.¹¹³ Archaeological excavations, which are still ongoing, have confirmed five forts located on either side of the river Neckar.¹¹⁴ Large quantities of inscriptions, military equipment as well as water pipes, administrative buildings, workshops, and supply warehouses as discovered in these bases suggest a permanent garrison in this area.¹¹⁵ However, considering Rottweil's strategic location between the Black Forest and the Danube, this level of material evidence is to be expected. Adding furthermore to the strategic significance of Rottweil's location, it appears that it was situated near two

¹⁰⁹ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 160-61; J. Wachter, *Roman Empire*, p. 28.

¹¹⁰ E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 241

¹¹¹ This assessment is made according to surviving literary accounts and the limited material evidence indicating settlement prior to this period, see K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des röm. Bayern', in W. Czesz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, H.-J. Kellner (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, 1995, pp.100-76; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 39; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 501; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 155-57; E. T. Salmon, *A history of the Roman World*, p. 241.

¹¹² K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des röm. Bayern', in W. Czesz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, H.-J. Kellner (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, pp. 100-176; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 501; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 241.

¹¹³ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 251.

¹¹⁴ R. Franke, *Arae Flaviae V: Die Kastell I und II von Arae Flaviae/Rottweil und die römische Okkupation des oberen Neckargebietes*, pp. 12-13; P. M. Allison, *People and Spaces in Roman Military Bases*, pp. 152-66; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 107-8; D. Planck, *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, pp. 293-97; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 251.

¹¹⁵ R. Franke, *Arae Flaviae V: Die Kastell I und II von Arae Flaviae/Rottweil und die römische Okkupation des oberen Neckargebietes*, pp. 52-6; P. M. Allison, *People and Spaces in Roman Military Bases*, pp. 160-62; D. Planck, *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, pp. 293-97.

important transport routes: the west-eastern axis from *Argentoratum* through the Kinzigtal and further south to the Danube, and the south-north axis from *Vindonissa* via the Wutachtal, the Baar, and further north to the territory of Stuttgart.¹¹⁶ By AD 79 Roman forces had at least reached a line that stretched from *Argentoratum* by way of *Arae Flaviae*, to *Lacus Brigantinus*, and it is possible that they advanced as far north as the line that runs from Baden to Günzburg on the Upper Danube. Occupation and control of this territory was therefore crucial to Rome's strategic advance; the Roman annexation and control of which also enabled further advancement under Domitian.

During the reign of Domitian the second expansion beyond the Upper Rhine was undertaken, occurring in concert with Roman campaigns of retribution and suppression against the *Chatti*, who had begun to encroach into the central sector around *Moguntiacum* previously annexed by Vespasian.¹¹⁷ Again the Romans advanced eastward from *Moguntiacum*, extending their control beyond the Wetterau towards the Taunus region. Domitian annexed this new territory and established what would evolve into a two-tiered defensive network, with numerous forts and watchtowers along this new front and larger forts to the rear of this advanced defensive line on the Rhine.¹¹⁸ The *cohortes* fort at Saalburg (near modern-day Bad Homburg) is an example of the advanced bases established on the outer defences in the Taunus region; this fort would

¹¹⁶ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 107-8; D. Planck, *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*, p. 292.

¹¹⁷ Debate surrounding the justifications for Domitian's campaigns against the *Chatti* will be discussed below.

¹¹⁸ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', pp. 6-7; H. Schönberger 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', p. 369; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 498, 500-1; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 158-59; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; H. Schneider, 'Die Chatten: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer', in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chatten vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 20-1; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome*, p. 39.

be continually occupied until the mid-third century, in the process undergoing several phases of enlargement and redevelopment.¹¹⁹ This advance along the Taunus precipitated the need for further defensive development in the Wetterau region in order to consolidate the prior annexations under Vespasian in AD 74/5. Domitian's defensive line now extended from the Main across the upland of the Odenwald to the upper waters of the Neckar, this extensive military front being defended by a chain of forts and watchtowers, linked by a patrolled cleared track and connected by a network of roads to larger forts on the Rhine, affectively establishing the initial Upper Rhine (*Germania Superior*) 'Limes'.¹²⁰

Between AD c. 82 to 89¹²¹ Domitian campaigned against the *Chatti*, whose land lay immediately adjacent to Roman territory in the Wetterau plain in the central Rhineland,

¹¹⁹ D. Baatz, 'Saalburg (Taunus)', in D. Baatz & F. -R. Herrmann (eds.), *Die Römer in Hessen*, pp. 469-74; H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', pp. 322-497. In the modern numbering system for the 'Limes' it is ORL 11.

¹²⁰ Front. Strat. 1.3.10. C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 497-98 n. 9; E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, p. 95; C. R. Whittaker, 'Frontiers', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 303; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 158-59; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; H. Schneider, 'Die Chatten: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer', in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chatten vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 20-1. More details are discussed below.

¹²¹ Most scholars argue that conflict begun in AD 83, justifying this view with a passage from Cassius Dio and a military diploma dated to September AD 82, see Dio LXVII.3.4-5; *ILS* 1995. See also, R. Syme, 'Rhine and Danube Legions Under Domitian', in *JRS* 18, p. 44; S. Gsell, *Essai sur la regne de l'Empereur Domitian*, pp. 184-5; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 158; H. Bengtson, *Die Flavii*, pp. 158, 197; C. S. Mackay, *Ancient Rome: A Military and Political History*, p. 219; U. Riemer, *Die römische Germanienpolitik von Caesar bis Commodus*, p. 105; K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Cyszcz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 105; R. Wolters, 'Die Chatten zwischen Rom und den germanischen Stämmen: Von Varus bis zu Domitianus', in H. Schneider (ed.), *Feindliche Nachbarn: Rom und die Germanen*, p. 90; D. Timpe, 'Die Germania des Tacitus: Germanische Ethnographie und römische Geschichte', in H. Schneider (ed.), *Feindliche Nachbarn: Rom und die Germanen*, p. 190. For arguments supporting a slightly earlier date, see B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 128-131; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 79-80; B. W. Jones, 'The Dating of Domitian's War Against the Chatti', *Historia* 22, pp. 79-90; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 109.

between the Taunus and Vogelsberg mountains.¹²² During this period Domitian conducted two separate campaigns against the *Chatti*, the first between c. 82-5 and the second c. 89-90. As discussed earlier, the literary accounts of Domitian's campaigns against the *Chatti*, and his reign in general, pose several methodological problems. In short, the sources are fragmentary, biased, and inadequate.¹²³ As a consequence, Domitian's campaigns were ridiculed and diminished by his contemporaries after he was dead, and as a result evaluation of the campaigns by modern scholarship is speculative and problematic. These campaigns, therefore, will be examined objectively, albeit in summary.

The first Chattan campaign utilised a large combined force¹²⁴ that consisted of a newly raised legion *legio I Minervia*,¹²⁵ *legio XXI Rapax* from the Lower Rhine, and

¹²² Tac. *Ger.* 30; Strabo *Geo.* VII.1.3-4. D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 58; K. Strobel, 'Der Chattenkrieg Domitians', in *Germania* 65, p. 423; S. Hornblower, and A. Spawforth, (eds.), *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, p. 320; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 260; G. Neumann, 'Chatten', in *RGA* 4, pp. 377-8.

¹²³ For example, the poet Statius sought to glorify Domitian's achievements, see Stat. *Silv.* 1.1.27. Conversely, Tacitus was highly critical of Domitian and his campaigns, see Tac. *Ger.* 37. See also, B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 128-131; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 79-80; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, pp. 92-3; K. Strobel, 'Der Chattenkrieg Domitians: Historische und politische Aspekte', *Germania* 65, pp. 423-452; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 126-131.

¹²⁴ The total size of this force is not known or agreed upon by scholars; debate surrounds its size and the possible units that participated in the campaign. It is thought that Domitian used the four legions of the Upper Rhine, a further legion from *Bonna*, and auxiliaries from Britain. This has led scholars to conclude that Domitian led approximately 30,000-36,000 legionaries against the *Chatti*; for details see R. Syme, 'Rhine and Danube Legions under Domitian', *JRS* 18, p. 44; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 130-31; Y. Le Bohec, *The Roman Army*, Rome, pp. 34, 45; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 158; L. Schumacher, 'Mogontiacum: Garnison und Zivilsiedlung im Rahmen der Reichsgeschichte', in M. Klein (ed.), *Die Römer und ihr Erbe: Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration*, p. 7; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; S. Pfeiffer, *Die Zeit der Flavii: Vespasian – Titus – Domitian*, p. 90; K. von Jürken, 'Die Militärgeschichte Niedergermaniens', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, p. 69; H. von Bernhard, 'Die römische Geschichte in Rheinland-Pfalz', in H. Cüppers (ed.), *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, p. 72.

¹²⁵ For details concerning the recruitment and deployment of *legio I Minervia*, see Dio LV. 24. 3; *CIL* XIII 807I. See also, J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 8, 15; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 94-5; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 92; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 7; J. C. Mann, 'The Raising of New Legions During the Principate', *Hermes* 91 (4), pp. 483, 485; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 108-9; E. Ritterling, 'Legio', in *RE*, XII, pp. 1276, 1420.

*vexillationes*¹²⁶ from eight other legions: the four in Britain,¹²⁷ and the four in Upper Germany.¹²⁸ This amalgamated army proceeded to expel the *Chatti* from the valley of the Main.¹²⁹ Although details of this campaign are scarce, surviving sources record that this campaign was ultimately unsuccessful.¹³⁰ This branding as a failed campaign by the sources, however, can only be accurate if it is considered that Domitian's goal was the re-conquest of *Germania* and the defeat and submission of the *Chatti*.¹³¹ On the latter, this was certainly proven true in part, as the *Chatti* were clearly not subdued in AD 83, the supposed date of Domitian's triumph,¹³² as Cassius Dio records them attacking the neighbouring *Cherusci* in c. AD 84.¹³³ Conversely, if Domitian's goal was to defeat the *Chatti* and expel them from Roman territory, then his mission was successful.

¹²⁶ AE 1903, 368, is thought by some scholars to record Rufus as a prefect of a *vexillatio* of nine legions in reference to the Chattan war, see B. Dobson, *Die Primipilaries*, pp. 216-17; H. –G. Pflaum, *Les Carrières Procuratoriennes Équestres*, I, no. 50, pp. 114-17. This is disputed by others who propose this inscription is in reference to the AD 89 campaign against the Dacians, see D. Kennedy, 'C. Velius Rufus', in *Britannia* 14, pp. 183-96; Z. Visy, 'Der Beginn der Donau—Kriege des Domitian', *AAH* 30, (1978), pp. 50-4.

¹²⁷ *legiones II Adiutrix, II Augusta, IX Hispana, XX Valeria Victrix*.

¹²⁸ *legiones I Adiutrix; VIII Augusta; XI Claudia; XIV Gemina*.

¹²⁹ Front. *Strat.* I.1.8, 3.10. C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 498; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 144-50; H. von Bernhard, 'Die römische Geschichte in Rheinland-Pfalz', in H. Cüppers (ed.), *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*, pp. 72-3.

¹³⁰ Dio LXVII.4.1; Tac. *Ger.* 37.6. S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 92; K. Strobel, 'Der Chattankrieg Domitians: Historische und politische Aspekte', *Germania* 65, pp. 423-452; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 126-131; E. Ritterling, 'Legio', in *RE*, XII, p. 1276; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 158-59.

¹³¹ Some modern scholars still believe that this was Domitian's ultimate goal, see S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 95 n. 49-50; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 167; K. Strobel, 'Der Chattankrieg Domitians: Historische und politische Aspekte', *Germania* 65, pp. 423-52; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 159; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 156.

¹³² *RIC* 2.39; *IGR* 1.1138; *Pap. Flor.* 3.361; *Pap. Oxy* 2.331. The dating of Domitian's imperial acclamations and the adoption of the title Germanicus is also a matter of debate, see P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 81-82; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 128-9; T. V. Buttrey, *Documentary Evidence for the Chronology of the Flavian Titulature*, *Beiträge für Klassischen Philologie* 112, pp. 30-1; R. Syme, 'Flavian wars and frontiers', in *CAH*, Vol. XI, p. 164. On obtaining and using the title Germanicus see, H. Braunert, 'Zum Chattenkriege Domitians', in *Bonner Jahrbuch* 153, 1953, pp. 98-101 n. 11; R. C. Kneissl, *Die Siegestitulatur der römischen Kaiser*, pp. 44-8 nn. 12-15; B. W. Jones, 'The Dating of Domitian's war against the Chatti', *Historia* 22, pp. 79-90; K. Strobel, 'Der Chattankrieg Domitians: Historische und politische Aspekte', *Germania* 65, pp. 433-4; A. Martin, 'Domitien Germanicus et les documents grecs d'Égypte', *Historia* 36, 1987, pp. 73-82; G. Perl, 'Frontin und "der limes": zu Strat 1,3,10 und 2,11,7', *Klio* 63, pp. 571-72.

¹³³ Dio LXVII.5.1. A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 167 see n. 44; Tac. *Ger.* 36.1; K. von Jürken, 'Die Militärgeschichte Niedergermaniens', in H. G. Horn (ed.), *Die Römer in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, p. 69; W. Will, 'Roms "Klientel-Randstaaten" am Rhein?', *BJ* 187, pp. 44-55; G. Neumann, 'Cherusker', in *RGA* 4, pp. 430-35.

Concerning the former claim, that Domitian sought to reconquer *Germania*, which as discussed earlier was certainly not his aim, he certainly failed. Domitian's motivation was twofold, both personal ambition and strategic considerations served as justification for his campaigns. His personal ambition can be seen through his necessity to establish himself both politically and militarily, as was the case with predecessors Gaius and Claudius.¹³⁴ Victory against the *Chatti* would yield three benefits: it would provide him with military experience against the feared and menacing *Germani*, it emphasised Roman claims over certain sections of *Germania*,¹³⁵ and linked his name with Roman victories of the past.¹³⁶ Domitian's strategic considerations can be seen through his establishment of a new defensive line in the Taunus region in advance of the annexation begun under Vespasian in the Wetterau, a development which offered a better defence against the Chatten threat. Evidence of this is provided by the defence network established by Domitian that ran north of the Taunus and was made up of a chain of earthen forts, wooden watch-towers, connected by a network of patrolled roads.¹³⁷ As a further consequence of these developments, Domitian, assured of his defences in this

¹³⁴ P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 85; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p.67; U. Riemer, *Die römische Germanienpolitik von Caesar bis Commodus*, p. 107; T. Sonnenwald, *Domitian und die Germanen*, pp. 10-11; R. Wolters, *Die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald: Arminius, Varus, und das römische Germanien*, p. 204; B. Bleckmann, *Die Germanen: Von Ariovist bis zu den Wikingern*, pp. 146-7; B. Dreyer, *Arminius und der Untergang des Varus: Warum die Germanen keine Römer wurden*, p. 208; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 64.

¹³⁵ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; B. Bleckmann, *Die Germanen: Von Ariovist bis zu den Wikingern*, pp. 146-47.

¹³⁶ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 110.

¹³⁷ On roads and defences, see Frontinus *Str.* I.3.10. See also, D. Baatz, *Der römische Limes: Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Donau und Rhein*, pp. 18-20; D. Baatz, 'Zur Grenzpolitik Hadrians in Obergermanien', in E. Birley, B. Dobson and M. G. Jarrett (eds.), *Roman Frontier Studies*, pp. 112-24; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 58-61; H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', in *BRGK* 66, pp. 370-71; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 131; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 84-5; E. Schallmayer, 'Limites', in T. Fischer (ed.), *Die römischen Provinzen: Ein Einführung in ihre Archäologie*, pp. 123-25; S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 92; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; H. Schneider, 'Die Chatten: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer', in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chatten vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 20-1; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 158-59; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 168. Further details are examined below.

region, transferred some forces from the Rhine needed for the defence of the Danube against the increasing Dacian threat.¹³⁸

Domitian's second campaign against the *Chatti* commenced in AD 89, in connection with the rebellion of L. Antonius Saturninus, legate of the Upper Rhine. In relation to the nature of Saturninus' command, it is not certain whether the two provinces of *Germania Superior* and *Germania Inferior* had been created when he was appointed.¹³⁹ This dissertation argues that at the time of Saturninus' rebellion the Upper and Lower Rhine were still military zones,¹⁴⁰ administered from *Gallia Belgica*.¹⁴¹ Saturninus' rebellion provided the final motivation to transform the military commands into regular provinces.¹⁴² Details of this division will be discussed below. In regards to the revolt itself, very few details are known to scholars.¹⁴³ In summary, Saturninus

¹³⁸ *Legio I Adiutrix* moved to Pannonia, certainly with its attached auxiliary units. J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 8, 15; J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, p. 103; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 151-2; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 94; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 131; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 167 see n. 46; H. von Petrikovits, 'Altertum', in *Rheinische Geschichte*, p. 80; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498; R. Syme, 'Rhine and Danube Legions under Domitian', *JRS* 18, p. 44.

¹³⁹ It is not certain whether the two provinces of *Germania Superior* and *Germania Inferior* had been created when he was appointed, but he was almost certainly still *legatus* of *Exercitus Germaniae Superioris*, see P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 101-109; H. Elton, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 45; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 65; H. –G. Pflaum, *Les Carrières Procuratoriennes Equèstres*, I, no. 50, pp. 1056-7; G. Walser, 'Der Putsch des Saturninus gegen Domitian', *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart, Provincialia* 40, p. 507; M. T. Raepsaet-Charlier, 'Germania inferior et Germania superior', *Latomus* 32, pp. 158-61. *ILS* 1998 attests that the first *legatus Augusti pro praetore provinciae Germaniae Superioris* was Lucius Javolenus Priscus in October AD 90. For details see, W. Eck, *Die Statthalter der germanischen Provinzen vom 1.-3. Jahrhundert*, pp. 40-3; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498.

¹⁴⁰ *Exercitus Germaniae Superioris* and *Exercitus Germaniae Inferioris*.

¹⁴¹ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 162 n. 29; E. M. Wightman, *Gallia Belgica*, p. 55; J. F. Drinkwater, *Roman Gaul: The Three Provinces, 58 BC – AD 260*, pp. 54-6; C. B. Rüger, *Germania Inferior*, pp. 104-7.

¹⁴² B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 145. The transition from military zone to province is discussed in more detail below.

¹⁴³ For details regarding the uprising, see B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 144; J. Assa, 'Aulus Bucius Lappius Maximus', *Akten des IV: Internationalen Kongressess für griechische und lateinische Epigraphik*, pp. 31-9; G. Walser, 'Der Putsch des Saturninus gegen Domitian', *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart, Provincialia* 40, pp. 497-507; G. Winkler, 'Norbanus, ein bisher unbekannter Prokurator von Raetien', *Akten des VI: Internationalen Kongressess für griechische und lateinische Epigraphik*,

seized the savings from the pay of the two legions¹⁴⁴ garrisoned at *Moguntiacum* and revolted against Domitian. Supposedly, Saturninus could count on the support of these legions and had, apparently, reached an agreement with several nearby German tribes, including the *Chatti*.¹⁴⁵ The revolt itself was short-lived: Aulus Bucius Lappius Maximus, legate of the Lower Rhine, with the aid of the procurator of Raetia, Norbanus, swiftly suppressed it. However, consequences of the revolt were far more significant: the military zones were transitioned into provinces,¹⁴⁶ restrictions were placed upon individual legionaries' savings,¹⁴⁷ double legionary camps were forbidden,¹⁴⁸ and the concentration of military forces was further diluted.¹⁴⁹ The *Chatti* themselves arrived too late to render assistance to Saturninus before the revolt was suppressed;¹⁵⁰ they did, however, manage to destroy part of the defences constructed

pp. 495-98; R. Syme, *Roman Papers*, E. Badian & A. R. Birley (eds.), Vol. III, pp. 12-21, 1070-84; B. W. Jones, *Domitian and the Senatorial Order. A Prosopographical Study of Domitian's Relationship with the Senate, AD 81-96*, pp. 30-6; C. L. Murison, 'The revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany', in *ECM* 29, pp. 31-49; K. Strobel, 'Der Aufstand des L. Antonius Saturninus und der sogenannten zweite Chattenkrieg Domitians', *Tyche* 1, pp. 203-20.

¹⁴⁴ *Legio XIV Gemina* and *legio XXI Rapax*.

¹⁴⁵ Suet. *Dom.* 6. 2. B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 144; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 66; K. Strobel, 'Der Aufstand des L. Antonius Saturninus und der sog. zweite Chattenkrieg Domitians', *Tyche* 1, 1986, pp. 203-220. Murison argues that, whilst the destruction later caused by the Chatti is attested archaeologically, Saturninus's alleged invitation might simply be 'post-mortem vilification', see C. L. Murison, 'The Revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany', *ECM* 29, p. 37.

¹⁴⁶ B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 149; G. Walser, 'Der Putsch des Saturninus gegen Domitian', *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart, Provincialia* 40, p. 506 nn. 53-6; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 66. See further details below.

¹⁴⁷ Suet. *Dom.* 7.3. B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 149; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 105; G. Walser, 'Der Putsch des Saturninus gegen Domitian', *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart, Provincialia* 40, p. 506 nn. 53-6.

¹⁴⁸ Suet. *Dom.* 7.3. P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 106; G. Walser, 'Der Putsch des Saturninus gegen Domitian', *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart, Provincialia* 40, p. 506 nn. 53-6; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 149; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 66; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 8.

¹⁴⁹ *Legio XXI Rapax* and *Legio XIV Gemina* moved to the Danube, most likely to Pannonia. It is thought that *Legio XIV Gemina* was moved to Pannonia later as *Legio XXI Rapax*'s replacement, see J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and Their Fortress in the Danube lands – First to Third Centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, pp. 103-4. See also, P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 106; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 149; J. J. Wilkes, 'Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the First and Early Second Centuries', in B. Hartley and J. Wachter (eds.), *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, pp. 283, 285 see nn. 74, 83; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 8, 24; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 167-8, 183-7; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 154-6.

¹⁵⁰ B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 146; G. Walser, 'Der Putsch des Saturninus gegen Domitian', *Festschrift für R. Laur-Belart, Provincialia* 40, p. 455.

during Domitian's previous campaign.¹⁵¹ Lappius responded in kind with a swift campaign of retribution and suppression, defeating the *Chatti* and extracting a peace treaty.¹⁵² As a consequence, the *Chatti* again withdrew beyond the Taunus and Vogelsberg mountains; the Romans responded with further fortifications in the Taunus and Wetterau region, and possibly made additional territorial advances in the Odenwald and the Neckar valley (the lands of the *Mattiaci*).¹⁵³ From these advances and defensive developments it is apparent that Domitian sought to ensure the protection of Roman interests against any possible Germanic threat, in particular from the *Chatti*. Moreover, although the revolt clearly contributed to the need for further reductions in the concentration of military force on the Rhine, it was the development of these defences that safely facilitated those transfers.¹⁵⁴ After AD 92-3 there were only three legions in each part of the Rhine: at *Noviomagus*, *Augusta Treverorum* and *Bonna*, and *Moguntiacum*, *Argentoratum* and *Vindonissa*.¹⁵⁵ Again, Domitian's gradual transferral of forces from the Rhine to the Danube shows that the main military focus had now shifted from the former to the latter.

¹⁵¹ H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 159; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 150; C. L. Murison, 'The revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany', in *ECM* 29, p. 37; K. Strobel, 'Der Aufstand des L. Antonius Saturninus und der sog. zweite Chattenkrieg Domitians', *Tyche* 1, pp. 215-16.

¹⁵² *ILS* 1006; Suet. *Dom.* 6.2; Stat. *Silv.* 3.3.168. See also, B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 150.

¹⁵³ Further details are examined below. A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 167; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 131; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498; D. Baatz, 'Saalburg (Taunus)', in D. Baatz & F.-R. Herrmann (eds.), *Die Römer in Hessen*, pp. 469-471; H. von Petrikovits, 'Altertum', in *Rheinische Geschichte*, p. 80.

¹⁵⁴ M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, pp. 52-3; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 89-91; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 131; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 167; H. von Petrikovits, 'Altertum', in *Rheinische Geschichte*, p. 80.

¹⁵⁵ *Legiones I Adiutrix* and *XXI Rapax* were repositioned to the Danube, presumably their partnered auxiliaries would have gone with them. M. Todd, *The Early Germans*, pp. 52-3; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 131, 149; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 167; J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, pp. 103-4. P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 106; J. J. Wilkes, 'Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the first and early second centuries', in B. Hartley and J. Wacher (eds.), *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, pp. 283, 285, see nn. 74, 83; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, pp. 8, 24; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, pp. 167-68, 183-87; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions*, pp. 154-56.

The construction of forts, watchtowers, and roads under Domitian reinforces the interpretation that he actively pursued the creation of a permanent defence against the *Germani* in the regions of the Taunus, Wetterau, and to a lesser extent the Odenwald and the Neckar valley. Strategically, it can be realised that Domitian sought to end Roman claims of the extent of *Germania*, shifting military focus to the increased threats along the Danube whilst still ensuring that any military threat on either front could be responded to effectively and rapidly. Examination of the material evidence supports Frontinus' account of the construction of a network of defences in the Taunus and Wetterau regions during Domitian's First Chattan War.¹⁵⁶ Archaeological discoveries confirm the presence of Roman roads and a chain of watchtowers, substantiating Frontinus' account.¹⁵⁷ This defensive line commenced in the territory of the Taunus, and was clearly developed to monitor and defend against the *Chatti*. This view is reinforced by Dietz, who argues that military patrols were undertaken along the routes which traverse along the Taunus, northwest to the mouth of the river Lahn and eastwards in the territory of the Wetterau as far as the river Main and Hanau.¹⁵⁸ Lending credence to this theory is a network of strategically positioned wooden watchtowers,

¹⁵⁶ Front. *Strat.* I.3.10. L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; H. Schneider, 'Die Chattan: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer', in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chattan vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 20-1; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 158-9.

¹⁵⁷ D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 58-61; N. Hodgson, 'Stanegate: A Frontier Rehabilitated', *Britannia* 31, pp. 13-14; J. Thorne, 'Battle, Tactics, and the *Limites in the West*', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, p. 231; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 497-98; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; H. Schneider, 'Die Chattan: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer', in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chattan vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 20-1; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 158-9; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 168.

¹⁵⁸ K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Czysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 108.

erected from four to seven hundred metres apart.¹⁵⁹ Considering the mountainous and forested terrain in this region, this network of watchtowers and patrolled tracks was the only effective and economical method Domitian could have employed to monitor and respond to threats.

Additional defences are seen with a system of earth and timber forts which were constructed initially for *cohortes* and *alae* at Wiesbaden, Hofheim, Heddenheim, Okarben, Friedberg and Frankfurt-Höchst.¹⁶⁰ These forts defended the region between the Taunus region and the river Main. Furthermore, a stone fort at Kesselstadt, possibly positioned to protect the eastern flank of this defence network, could support a legion sized garrison but more likely only held *vexillationes*.¹⁶¹ Connecting the whole system was a road network which enabled easier patrols between the watchtowers and forts,¹⁶² effectively consolidating the advances made by Vespasian in AD 74-75. Significantly, whether these engineering works were constructed by Domitian during his first Chattan campaign or at a later date is difficult to determine and is a matter of debate.¹⁶³ Further

¹⁵⁹ K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Czysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 108; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 58-61; D. J. Woolliscroft, *Roman Military Signalling*, p. 105; V. A. Maxfield, 'The Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter (ed.), *The Roman World*, pp. 149, 153.

¹⁶⁰ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 112-13; K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Czysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 105.

¹⁶¹ W. Czysz, 'Hanau-Kesselstadt. Rom. Castles Kesselstadt and Salis mountain' in D. Baatz, F. R. Herrmann (eds.), *The Romans in Hesse*, pp. 334-336; D. J. Woolliscroft, *Roman Military Signalling*, pp. 103-4; M. Mackensen, 'Frühkaiserzeitliche Kleinkastelle an der oberen Donau', *Zivile und Militärische Strukturen im Nordwesten der römischen Provinz Raetien*, 3rd Heidenheimer Archäologie Colloquium, Heidenheim, pp. 13-16; J. Lander, *Roman Stone Fortifications: Variation and Change From the First Century AD to the Fourth*, pp. 28-30.

¹⁶² K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Czysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 105; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 58.

¹⁶³ N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', pp. 6-7; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 85, 90; D. J. Woolliscroft, *Roman Military Signalling*, p. 103; K. Kortüm, 'Zur Datierung der römischen Militäranlagen im obergermanisch-rätischen Limesgebiet, Chronologische Untersuchungen anhand der Münzfunde', in *Saalburg-Jahrbuch* 49, pp. 5-65; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', pp. 144-97; H.

speculation surrounds defences in the Odenwald and the Neckar valley. Defences in Odenwald were similar in form to those found in the Wetterau with a system of fortlets and watch-towers, though it appears that its defences were more heavily manned.¹⁶⁴ Thiel suggests that this was because forces in the Odenwald did not have a direct communication with the provinces, as was the case with the Wetterau and the Taunus, and could not easily receive reinforcements.¹⁶⁵ Developments in the Neckar valley are more difficult to establish, especially in the south-east where the defensive line presumably merged with the Raetian '*Limes*' (developed at roughly the same time).¹⁶⁶ Some scholars suggest that it was likely that the potential threat diminished towards the south and accordingly the angle between the two provinces had a low priority set for the construction of defences in the region.¹⁶⁷ Significantly, there is conjecture largely based on numismatic evidence presented by Kortüm, and a study of Samian ware by Pferdehirt, that defences in this region, and in the Taunus and Wetterau, began to be constructed at a later date, possibly under Trajan.¹⁶⁸ Kortüm and Pferdehirt's findings,

Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', in *BRGK* 66, p. 321.

¹⁶⁴ A. Thiel, 'The Odenwald *limes* and its relation to the Antonine Wall', pp. 136-7; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 168; N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', p. 26; E. Schallmayer, *Der Odenwaldlimes: Entlang der römischen Grenze zwischen Mainn und Neckar*, pp. 23-25; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, p. 38; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 168; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498.

¹⁶⁵ A. Thiel, 'The Odenwald *Limes* and its Relation to the Antonine Wall', p. 136.

¹⁶⁶ Developments in Raetia will be discussed below as part of development along the Upper Danube.

¹⁶⁷ A. Thiel, 'The Odenwald *Limes* and its Relation to the Antonine Wall', in W. S. Hanson (ed.), *The Army and Frontiers of Rome: Papers Offered to David J. Breeze on the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday and His retirement from Historic Scotland*, pp. 136-138; W. S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers Revisited', in R. Collins and F. McIntosh (eds.), *Life in the Limes: Studies of the people and objects of the Roman frontiers*, p. 5; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, p. 168. C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498 n. 11.

¹⁶⁸ K. Kortüm, 'Zur Datierung der römischen Militäranlagen im obergermanisch-rätischen Limesgebiet, Chronologische Untersuchungen anhand der Münzfunde', in *Saalburg-Jahrbuch* 49, pp. 5-65; B. Pferdehirt, 'Die Römische Okkupation Germaniens und Rätien von der Zeit Tiberius bis zum Tode Trajans: Untersuchen zur Chronologie südgallischer Reliefsigillata' in *Jahrbuch des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums Mainz* 33, pp. 221-320; C. S. Sommer, 'From Conquered Territory to Roman Province: Recent Discoveries and Debate on the Roman Occupation of SW Germany', in J. D. Creighton and R. J. A. Wilson (eds.), *Roman Germany: Studies in Cultural Interaction*, JRA SS 32, Portsmouth, Rhode Island, 1999, pp. 177-78; E. Schallmayer, *Der Odenwaldlimes: Entlang der römischen Grenze zwischen Mainn und Neckar*, pp. 24-5; A. Thiel, 'The Odenwald *limes* and its relation to the Antonine Wall', in W. S. Hanson (ed.), *The Army and Frontiers of Rome: Papers*

however, do not explicitly confirm that all construction occurred under Trajan, nor do these rule out any development under Domitian.¹⁶⁹ However, considering that the state of research in this region is comparatively poor, with only a few studies focused on its development, nothing can be said regarding initial Roman expansion.¹⁷⁰ Perhaps future discoveries and research will clarify developments in this region.

This defensive line, therefore, established an effective system of monitoring and security against the *Chatti*, reducing the potential for future attacks and enabling a level of control of movement into Roman territory. This forward line of defence along the Taunus and the Wetterau was not intended to be impenetrable; it was intended to be a means to monitor and control the movement of trade and people into Roman territory and served as an early warning system.¹⁷¹ This ensured that attacks would be detected and countered not only by the existence of Roman auxiliaries along the defensive line but also by the presence of a legion stationed at *Moguntiacum* which could use the

Offered to David J. Breeze on the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday and his Retirement from Historic Scotland, pp. 135-36; W. S. Hanson, 'The Nature and Function of Roman Frontiers Revisited', in R. Collins and F. McIntosh (eds.), *Life in the Limes: Studies of the People and Objects of the Roman Frontiers*, pp. 442-43; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, pp. 58-9.

¹⁶⁹ Regarding Kortüm's, 'Zur Datierung der römischen Militäranlagen im obergermanisch-rätischen Limesgebiet, Chronologische Untersuchungen anhand der Münzfunde', in *Saalburg-Jahrbuch* 49, pp. 5-65, presents a numismatic argument which is based on questionable theoretical coin retention modelling, see also C. S. Sommer, 'Recent developments in south-west Germany (eastern Germania Superior-Western Raetia)', p. 442. Regarding Pferdehirt's, 'Die Römische Okkupation Germaniens und Rätien von der Zeit Tiberius bis zum Tode Trajans: Untersuchen zur Chronologie südgallischer Reliefsigillata' in *Jahrbuch des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums Mainz* 33, pp. 221-320, this article may cast doubt upon dating developments on this defensive line before c.90; her argument, however, is far from absolute given its foundation in a relative and selective data set and methodology, see N. Hodgson, 'The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200', pp. 11-15. See also, F. Hunter, 'Traprain Law and the Roman World', in *Journal of Roman Archaeology*, p. 227, who cautions against the use of Roman coinage and samian ware as exclusive dating methods.

¹⁷⁰ A. Thiel, 'The Odenwald Limes and its Relation to the Antonine Wall', in W. S. Hanson (ed.), *The Army and Frontiers of Rome: Papers Offered to David J. Breeze on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday and his Retirement from Historic Scotland*, p. 137.

¹⁷¹ D. J. Woolliscroft, *Roman Military Signalling*, p. 135; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 58; J. Thorne, 'Battle, Tactics, and the *Limites in the West*', in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, p. 229; C. R. Whittaker, 'Frontiers', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 303; M. Carroll, *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, p. 39; V. A. Maxfield, 'The Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, pp. 149, 153.

network of roads to rapidly deploy against any threat.¹⁷² This two-tiered defence by the Flavians effectively represented the early stages of defence-in-depth which would be expanded upon by their successors.¹⁷³ Thus this defensive line, consisting of a chain of watch-towers, forts, and interconnecting with a series of patrolled tracks and roads made up the initial ‘*Limes*’ for the Upper Rhine (*Germania Superior*). [see Map (15)]

As a consequence of the Chattan wars, Saturninus’s revolt, and the emergence of the Upper Rhine ‘*Limes*’, and in connection with Domitian’s shift of military focus to the Danube, the transition of the Rhine military zones into provinces was orchestrated. The creation of these provinces can be seen as the effective end of Roman claims over *Germania*. Previously the armies had been administered from *Gallia Belgica*, but the increasing civilian development of the Rhineland and the realisation that the armies were to be permanently positioned on the Rhine brought pressure for provincial reorganisation.¹⁷⁴ Saturninus’ revolt had reaffirmed the potential threat the military

¹⁷² M. Ruge, ‘Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian’, p. 113; R. Wolters, *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 169; L. Schumacher, ‘Mogontiacum: Garnison und Zivilsiedlung im Rahmen der Reichsgeschichte’, in M. Klein (ed.), *Die Römer und ihr Erbe: Fortschritt durch Innovation und Integration*, p. 10; K. Dietz, ‘Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern’, in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 104; C. Lepelley, *Rom und das Reich: 44 v. Chr.-260 n. Chr.*, p. 168; Y. Le Bohec, *Die römische Armee*, pp. 191-92; R. Syme, ‘Rhine and Danube Legions under Domitian’, pp. 44-5.

¹⁷³ This two-tiered defence system does not imply the modern strategic theory and planning of defence-in-depth, but merely describes the defence system as it appears on the ground, i.e. a two-tiered defence system, an advanced early warning and defensive line, and reinforcements in strength at the rear, giving the Romans depth in their defence, see E. N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third*, p. 136; N. Hodgson, ‘The Military Limes: Aspects of the Comparative Development, Function and Significance of the Linear Frontier System of the Roman Empire up to AD 200’, pp. 6-7; H. Schönberger ‘Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn’, p. 369; C. R. Whittaker, ‘Frontiers’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 303 n. 39; C. Rüger, ‘Roman Germany’, in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 498, 500-1 n. 21; H. Schönberger, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey’, pp. 158-9; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 67; H. Schneider, ‘Die Chattan: Der Widerstand eines germanischen Stammes gegen die imperial Macht der Römer’, in D. Rohde and H. Schneider (eds.), *Hessen in der Antike: Die Chattan vom Zeitalter der Römer bis zur Alltagskultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 20-1.

¹⁷⁴ E. M. Whiteman, ‘The Longones: Lugdunensis, Belgica or Germania Superior?’, *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms II*, pp. 207-17; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, pp. 167-68; C. B. Rüger,

commands with their concentration of military forces still posed to the stability of the empire and the emperor's own position. In c. AD 89,¹⁷⁵ in an effort to limit the powers of ambitious commanders and minimise their potential threat, Domitian was compelled to authorise the transition of these military zones into two administrated provinces: *Germania Inferior* and *Germania Superior*.¹⁷⁶ This conversion resulted in the reshuffling of borders in the region, specifically *Gallia Belgica*, which lost a large portion of its territory. *Germania Inferior* was to consist of the lands of the *Tungri* and the defensive zone behind the Lower Rhine, while the middle Rhine valley, the *Agri Decumates*, and the lands of the *Helvetii*, *Sequani*, and the *Lingones* would be incorporated into *Germania Superior*.¹⁷⁷ Significantly, *Augusta Treverorum* and its surrounding territory were retained by *Gallia Belgica* despite the importance of this region to the defence of the Lower Rhine. Effectively this divided the two provinces between the lands of the *Treveri*; considering the Saturninus's recent revolt, this could have been a deliberate political decision to further separate forces on the Rhine.¹⁷⁸

Germania Inferior, pp. 80-4; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 113-14.

¹⁷⁵ As stated above, this dissertation argues that the last motivator for the emergence of the German provinces was Saturninus' revolt. Debate surrounding the specific date of the founding of the German provinces is extensive: scholars argue for a date ranging between AD 82-90, see J. Lendering, and A. Bosman, *Edge of Empire: Rome's Frontier on the Lower Rhine*, pp. 82-84; C. B. R ger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. X, p. 498; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', pp. 113-4; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 145; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 90; P. Filtzinger, *Die R mer in Baden-W rttemberg*, (1986), p. 54; D. Baatz and F. R. Hermann, *Die R mer in Hessen*, pp. 76-80; Y. Le Bohec, *The Imperial Roman Army*, p. 168; K. Strobel 'Der Chattankrieg Domitians: Historische und politische Aspekte', *Germania* 65, pp. 437-8; T. Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, pp. 48-49. Lucius Javolenus Priscus is the first attested governor of *Germania Superior*, see military diploma dates 27 October AD 90, *CIL* XVII 36 = *ILS* 1998. This evidence, however, is contested, see W. Eck, *Die Statthalter der germanischen Provinzen vom 1.-3. Jahrhundert*, pp. 40-3; C. R ger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 498.

¹⁷⁶ B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 149.

¹⁷⁷ E. M. Whiteman, 'The Longones: Lugdunensis, Belgica or Germania Superior?', *Studien zu den Milit rgrenzen Roms II*, pp. 207-17; C. R ger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, pp. 498-9; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, pp. 167-8; C. B. R ger, *Germania Inferior*, pp. 80-84; A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, pp. 167-8. M. Carroll gives a detailed description of the boundaries of both provinces, see *Romans, Celts & Germans: the German Provinces of Rome*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁷⁸ A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany*, pp. 167-8; E. M. Whiteman, 'The Longones: Lugdunensis, Belgica or Germania Superior?', *studien zu den Milit rgrenzen Roms II*, pp. 207-17; C. B. R ger, *Germania Inferior*, pp. 80-4.

The conversion of these provinces can also be viewed as a brilliant piece of imperial propaganda.¹⁷⁹ The successes with the war with the *Chatti* may have helped to make it possible to perceive *Germania*, now with two newly designated provinces, as being conquered.¹⁸⁰ Certainly, Roman lack of geographical knowledge in this region aided Domitian's reinvention of Rome's effective abandonment of Germanic territory as a conquest of *Germania*.¹⁸¹ With the lines of defences established in the Upper and Lower Rhine, the creation of civil administration rather than military commands, Domitian's attention soon switched to the Danube, his transfer of four legions there to counter the Dacian threat removed the concentration of forces on the Rhine whilst simultaneously confirming the end of further Roman claims over *Germania*.

Along the Danube (A Definite Shift in Roman Military Focus)

In concert with alterations occurring along the Rhine, developments of equal significance were also taking place along the Danube. Similar to the Upper Rhine, these developments occurred in four identifiable phases between the reigns of Augustus and Hadrian.¹⁸² In summary, the development of defences on the Danube under the Flavians was a direct consequence of the significant political and military threats that existed north of the Danube immediately prior to, and during, the Flavian dynasty.¹⁸³ As

¹⁷⁹ U. Riemer, *Die römische Germanienpolitik von Caesar bis Commodus*, pp. 106-7; R. Wolters, *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 67; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 85; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 499. Another example of imperial propaganda can be observed on Domitian's coinage, on the reverse: the goddess Peace (Pax) burns a heap of piled-up weapons and the coin-legends celebrate the capture of Germania (*Germania Capta*), see *RIC* II 253, 278, 312, 341, with all *sestertii* dating to AD 85-7.

¹⁸⁰ C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 498; R. Wolters, *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 67.

¹⁸¹ R. Wolters, *Die Römer in Germanien*, p. 67; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 111; C. Rüger, 'Roman Germany', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, p. 499. For an argument on the Romans' lack of geographical knowledge, see C. Nicolet, *Space, Geography and Politics in the Early Roman Empire*, pp. 52-94.

¹⁸² The division of developments on the Danube into four parts are based on Wilkes, see J. J. Wilkes, 'The Roman Danube: An Archaeological Survey', p. 149.

¹⁸³ The political considerations relate to the possible implications of a large concentration of Roman forces along the Danube close to Rome, see J. Karavas, 'The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence

discussed in previous chapters, potential threats could be identified as arising from three distinct groups: the *Germani*, the *Dacii*, and the *Sarmatae*. Initially, it was the increased pressure being asserted from across the Lower Danube region during the Year of the Four Emperors by the Dacians, and possibly also by Sarmatian tribes, that instigated the Flavian defence improvements.¹⁸⁴ As outlined above, following the suppression of the Batavian revolt, Vespasian's initial steps to strengthen the defences on the Danube took the form of additional forces deployed along that river. Further defensive development took the shape of a cordon of military bases along the right bank of the river which extended between Raetia and Moesia. Although bases were already established on the Danube to monitor and counter these northern threats during the reign of Tiberius and later expanded under Claudius, the Flavians developed them further and transformed them into permanent structures.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore under the Flavians, as discussed in chapter 8, Roman fleets, *Classis Pannonica* and *Classis Moesica*, were reconstituted and efforts were made to overcome obstacles in the waterway in order to make the river more navigable, effectively facilitating communications and transportation, and offering another link for military resources on the Danube.¹⁸⁶ In Raetia, Noricum, and Pannonia, the majority of legionary and auxiliary forces were moved up to bases on the banks of the Danube, with bridgehead forts established across the river from the legionary fortresses. Significantly, it was the subsequent defeats and prolonged campaigns during Domitian's reign against the Dacians, Sarmatians, and *Germani*, which brought about the considerable increase of military resources on the Danube, effectively shifting the

Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD', p. 51; V. A. Maxfield, 'The Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter (ed.), *The Roman World*, p. 176.

¹⁸⁴ Tac. *Hist.* III.46.

¹⁸⁵ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danube Provinces', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, p. 580; S. R. Flynt, 'The Military Vici of Noricum', PhD diss., University of Missouri-Colombia, p. 24; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 162-3; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 81.

¹⁸⁶ J. J. Wilkes, 'The Danube Provinces', in *CAH*², Vol. XI, pp. 580-81; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 163; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 81; J. Karavas, 'The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD', p. 53.

Roman military focus away from the Rhine. Thus, in the Upper and Middle Danube regions there was a chain of military bases by the end of Domitian's reign, manned by legionary and auxiliary forces, extending through the provinces and interconnected by a network of patrolled roads and supplemented by river transport, constituting the initial Danubian '*Limes*'. It must be noted that, similar to the Rhine, the Danubian defences were not a singular continuous defensive line, but rather a collection of interconnected defensive works which utilised the surrounding terrain and incorporated obstacles to monitor, control, and defend against the flow of peoples south into Roman territory.

Danubian defences were in need of reinforcement and development under Vespasian; the urgency for this was second only to the immediate threat on the Rhine. An invasion by the *Roxolani* had succeeded in killing Fonteius Agrippa, legate of Moesia.¹⁸⁷ In response it is thought that *legio V Alaudae* was transferred to Moesia to replace losses and further strengthen Roman defences.¹⁸⁸ As outlined in chapter 11, Vespasian was more engrossed with the suppression of the revolt on the Lower Rhine.¹⁸⁹ Concurrently with activities on the Rhine and earlier efforts to reinforce the Lower Danube, Vespasian pursued an initial programme of consolidation and rebuilding, which is evident in the restoration of the auxiliary forts damaged during the Civil War from Hüfingen to Oberstimm, including Ristissen, Unterkirchberg and Burghöfe, which bolstered defences in Raetia in the Upper Danube region.¹⁹⁰ Following

¹⁸⁷ Tac. *Hist.* III.46; Jose. *B. Jud.* II.4, 3. Fonteius Agrippa's replacement was Rubrius Gallus; under Gallus a programme to restore Roman control of the Danube was undertaken; details of this are outside the scope of this work, but for further details see, Jose. *B. Jud.* VII.94; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 80-1; V. A. Maxfield, 'The Frontiers: Mainland Europe', in J. Wachter, *The Roman World*, Vol. 1, p. 176.

¹⁸⁸ See previous, n. 18.

¹⁸⁹ For details, refer back to Chapter 10 and previous relevant sections of this chapter.

¹⁹⁰ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161; M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 108; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 66; K. Dietz, 'Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern', in W. Cyszcz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p.

this initial period, Vespasian embarked on a programme of construction of bases on the Danube, which continued under the reigns of Titus and Domitian, that were the outlines of a discernible ‘*Limes*’ system. In Raetia, this programme of expansion and defensive improvement can be seen to be interconnected with the concurrent developments that were being undertaken in southern *Germania*. Expansion can be identified with the military bases constructed between Oberstimm and *Lentia* (Linz).¹⁹¹ Evidence potentially indicating this expansion is observed in a partial inscription discovered at *Castellum Guntia* (Günzburg) which suggests the presence of the *ala II Flavia milliaria pia fidelis* in AD 77/8.¹⁹² Some scholars suggest that this site could have been a replacement for the base at Aislingen.¹⁹³ Moreover, other building inscriptions from Kösching (AD 80),¹⁹⁴ taken in concert with the findings from excavations at Risstissen, demonstrate that rebuilding in stone was being undertaken in the latter years of Vespasian’s reign.¹⁹⁵ Similar to developments along the Lower Rhine, this effectively filled the gaps in the defences that were established under Claudius, and secured the southern bank of the Upper Danube.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, Roman expansion in the *Agri Decumates* north of the Danube generated the need to have a new link between this territory and Raetia. The terrain on the southern bank of the Upper Danube, however,

102; F. Hertlein, *Die Römer in Württemberg: Die Geschichte der Besetzung des römischen Württemberg*, pp. 20-5.

¹⁹¹ S.R. Flynt, ‘The Military Vici of Noricum’, p. 24; K. Dietz, ‘Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern’, in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 103.

¹⁹² This was a fragment of a building inscription from the year AD 77/78 attributed to a prefect of an auxiliary cavalry unit; unfortunately, the piece with the exact designation of the unit is broken off, see F. Vollmer, *Inscriptiones Baiuariae Romanae*, no. 196. See also, K. Dietz, ‘Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern’, in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, pp. 103, 131, 134; D. Baatz, *Der Römische Limes: Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau*, pp. 20, 348; E. Schallmayer, *Der Limes, Geschichte einer Grenze*, p. 108; M. Junkelmann, *Die Reiter Roms Teil II*, pp. 84-5; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 252.

¹⁹³ K. Dietz, ‘Die Blütezeit des römischen Bayern’, in W. Cysz, K. Dietz, T. Fischer, & K. Keller (eds.), *Die Römer in Bayern*, p. 134; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161; F. Hertlein, *Die Römer in Württemberg: Die Geschichte der Besetzung des römischen Württemberg*, p. 24.

¹⁹⁴ F. Vollmer, *Inscriptiones Baiuariae Romanae*, no. 257.

¹⁹⁵ A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 252. Conversely, Mócsy argues that the inscriptions does not prove the construction of stone forts at *Carnuntum* and *Aquincum* as another stone building inscription (*CIL* III.4591) has been dated to AD 53-4, see A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 81.

¹⁹⁶ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161.

was mostly mountainous and ill-suited for the placement of a road for the purpose of linking this chain of bases with Roman territory in *Germania*. An important road still existed on the southern bank; its function, however, was to connect the chain of forts on the southern bank, acting as a vital artery for communication and transportation along the Danube, and not across it.¹⁹⁷ To overcome this, Vespasian, and later Titus, constructed a road north of the Danube eastwards from near Neuburg.¹⁹⁸ This northern road passed through Kösching, a newly constructed cavalry fort, and recrossed the river at *Abusina* (Eining), a fort under construction in the reign of Titus.¹⁹⁹ As outlined previously in the introduction, it is from *Abusina* onwards that defences are considered to have been connected with Danubian defences proper and not associated with Upper *Germania*.²⁰⁰

Archaeological sites at *Castra Regina* (Regensburg) and eastwards towards the confluence with the river Inn, at Straubing, and near Moos-Burgstall east of the river Isar, suggest that this territory was initially annexed during the reign of Vespasian.²⁰¹ The remaining forts that stretch eastwards along this defensive line from Haardorf down to *Batava* (Passau) are dated to the reign of Domitian or later.²⁰² Effectively, this limited expansion in areas of *Germania* ensured that the Romans consolidated their position in

¹⁹⁷ W. Czyst, A. Faber, C. Flügel, and C. S. Sommer, *Sites on the Danube Limes in Bavaria*, p. 3.

¹⁹⁸ W. Czyst, A. Faber, C. Flügel, and C. S. Sommer, *Sites on the Danube Limes in Bavaria*, p. 4; P. S. Wells, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', p. 61; L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, p. 66; H. Schönberger 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 157; T. Fischer, and K. Spindler, *Das römische Grenzkastell Abusina-Eining*, pp 1-10.

¹⁹⁹ An inscription dates the fort to AD 79-81, see F. Vollmer, *Inscriptiones Baiuariae Romanae*, no. 331. See also, M. Gschwind, 'The Flavian Timber Fort at Eining (Abusina) on the Upper Danube', in *Limes XVIII*, p. 549; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161; see H. Schönberger, 'Die römischen Truppenlager der frühen und mittleren Kaiserzeit zwischen Nordsee und Inn', in *BRGK* 66, p. 365; A. Johnson, *Roman Forts*, p. 252.

²⁰⁰ See Introduction.

²⁰¹ L. Wamser, *Die Römer zwischen Alpen und Nordmeer*, pp. 66-7; P. S. Wells, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', p. 61; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 157.

²⁰² B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161.

three zones: up to the river Weser and the Ems in central *Germania*, the right-bank territory in the south of the Upper Rhine, and along the Upper Danube itself.²⁰³ This defensive line along the Upper Danube continued into Noricum, and further fortifications were established at Passau-Innstadt, Wallsee, Mautern, Traismauer, Zwentendorf, Tulln, *Canabiaca* (Zeiselmauer).²⁰⁴ These bases were constructed of wood and earth on the southern bank of the Danube and joined with the existing earlier installations to form another chain of forts. Traces of earth walls, palisades, ditches, and wooden interior buildings have been identified at Passau-Innstadt, Wallsee, Mautern, Traismauer, Zwentendorf and Tulln.²⁰⁵ As stipulated above, during the Flavian period in the Upper Danube sector both Raetia and Noricum still lacked legionary garrisons, no threat warranted their presence at this time, and instead only auxiliary units garrisoned this cordon of bases.²⁰⁶ [see Map (16)]

In Pannonia, along the Middle Danube, the Flavians initially had the benefits of an affable alliance with the *Marcomanni* and *Quadi* through the Suebian kings Sido and Italicus.²⁰⁷ As discussed previously, whilst allied with Rome these tribes acted as a buffer against other northern peoples along this section of the Danube, enabling the Romans to deploy a lesser concentration of military resources than otherwise would have been necessary to defend this region. This did not mean, however, that defences were adequate to meet any possible threat. An exception is seen with the defences

²⁰³ M. Ruge, 'Roman Imperialism in Germania: From Caesar to Domitian', p. 108; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 161.

²⁰⁴ S. R. Flynt, 'The Military Vici of Noricum', p. 24; G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, p. 144.

²⁰⁵ S. R. Flynt, 'The Military Vici of Noricum', p. 24.

²⁰⁶ G. Alföldy, *Noricum*, pp. 143-144; S. R. Flynt, 'The Military Vici of Noricum', pp. 23-4; J. Fitz, 'Noricum und Pannonien zur Zeit der römischen Okkupation', in *Röm. Österreich* 17-18, pp. 79-86.

²⁰⁷ B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 163; B. Levick, *Claudius*, p. 151 n. 8; J. Dobíáš, 'King Maroboduus as a Politician', *Klio* 38, pp. 155-66. For details of Rome's relationship with the Suebian kings, refer back to Chapters 9 and 10.

aimed against the *Marcommani*; regardless of the alliance with them, they were clearly not trusted, which was evident in the continued presence of the legionary garrison at *Carnuntum*, positioned to protect a vulnerable invasion route across the Danube.²⁰⁸ Moreover, the *Iazyges*, opposite *Aquincum*, constituted an additional threat in this region, and their raids during the late 60s and early 70s clearly indicated that Roman defences were inadequate.²⁰⁹ Later events would confirm that the area around *Aquincum* was a volatile and vulnerable position, and this area would be the main focus of Transdanubian attacks and incursions.²¹⁰ To counteract these threats the Romans pursued a programme of base constructions and fortifications throughout the Middle Danube.

Concurrent with the initial programme of reinforcement and rebuilding on Upper Danube, the defences on the Middle Danube were similarly reconstituted. At *Carnuntum* the legionary fortress was rebuilt in AD 73 under the Pannonian legate, C. Calpetanus Rantius Quirinalis. Inscriptions attest to the construction of military buildings both at *Carnuntum* and at a new auxiliary fort constructed at *Aquincum*.²¹¹ Following this initial period the Flavians embarked on a programme of defence

²⁰⁸ P. S. Well, 'Creating an Imperial Frontier: Archaeology of the Formation of Rome's Danube Borderland', in *Journal of Archaeological Research*, Vol. 13 (1), p. 6; J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 55; H. Schönberger, 'The Roman Frontier in Germany: An Archaeological Survey', p. 153.

²⁰⁹ J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 51-2; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 37, 39; L. Barkóczi, 'Transplantation of Sarmatians and Roxolani in the Danubian Basin', *ActaAnthHung* 7, pp. 443-48; B. Levick, *Vespasian*, p. 162; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 136-7; J. J. Wilkes, 'Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the First and Early Second Centuries', in B. Hartley and J. Wachter (eds.), *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, p. 259.

²¹⁰ L. Barkóczi, 'Transplantation of Sarmatians and Roxolani in the Danubian Basin', *AAH* 7, pp. 443-48; J. Wilkes, 'Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the first and early second centuries', in B. Hartley and J. Wachter (eds.), *Rome and her Northern Provinces*, p. 259.

²¹¹ *CIL* III.11194-7. A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 80-1; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 137. For the inscription at *Aquincum*, see E. Tóth and G. Vékony, 'Beiträge zu Pannoniens Geschichte im Zeitalter des Vespasianus', in *AAH* 22, pp. 133-35; E. Tóth and G. Vékony, 'A Building Inscription in Aquincum from the Vespasian Period', *AERT* 97, pp. 109-15.

development in northern Pannonia. Difficulties are faced when determining the chronology of development due to the problems in distinguishing between the work of Vespasian, Domitian, and Trajan.²¹² An example of this is seen in the dating of the construction of a series of forts at Hurlec, Leskovec, Nikopol, Donji Milanovac, Orehovo, and Adony, which were initially attributed to Domitian but are now thought to have been built under Vespasian.²¹³ Further bases are recorded throughout northern Pannonia, such as the auxiliary camp at Óbuda (Budapest) which dates to AD 73,²¹⁴ and other nearby installations to the south, at Aday (Budapest), Albertfalva, *Vetus Salina* (Adony) and *Intercisa* (Dunaújváros). In fact, of all the constructions on the Middle Danube from *Carnuntum* to Budapest which are attributed to the Flavians, only the forts on the Danube bend at *Cirpi* (Dunabogdány) and *Solva* (Esztergom) are thought to have been added during a later period.²¹⁵ These new installations joined the already existing auxiliary camps at *Vindobona* (Vienna), *Arrabona* (Győr), *Brigetio* (Szöny), *Lussonium* (Paks), *Cornacum* (Šotin) and *Mursa* (Osijek).²¹⁶ In effect, the newly constructed bases filled the gaps that had existed in the defensive line in northern Pannonia and established the initial Pannonian (or Middle Danube) ‘*Limes*’.

Additional defences were necessary on the eastern boundary of Pannonia to counter the threat posed by the *Iazyges*. Significant attention under the Flavians was

²¹² Individual wooden and earthen forts are often extremely difficult to identify, and still more problematic to establish a precise date for; this is especially the case in the Croatian and Serbian regions of Pannonia. For details, see J. J. Wilkes, ‘Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the First and Early Second Centuries’, in B. Hartley and J. Wachter (eds.), *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, pp. 266, 279-80; K. Strobel, *Die Donaukriege Domitians*, pp. 1-24; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 94.

²¹³ *AE* 1957: 307. B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 137; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 80-81; J. J. Wilkes, ‘Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the First and Early Second Centuries’, in B. Hartley and J. Wachter (eds.), *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, p. 266.

²¹⁴ D. Gabler, ‘Early Roman Occupation in the *Pannonian* Danube Bend’, pp. 86-7.

²¹⁵ D. Gabler, ‘Early Roman Occupation in the *Pannonian* Danube Bend’, pp. 86-7; Z. Visy, *Der pannonische Limes in Ungarn*, pp. 75-6.

²¹⁶ D. Gabler, ‘Early Roman Occupation in the *Pannonian* Danube Bend’, pp. 86-90.

given to address this vulnerability and bases were established between *Aquincum* to *Teutoburium*.²¹⁷ Under Vespasian, aside from the already mentioned fort at *Aquincum*, further auxiliary bases were established at *Vetus Salina* and *Albertfalva*.²¹⁸ Additional auxiliary bases were added by Domitian at *Campona*, *Matrica*, *Intercisa*, *Annamantia*, *Alta Ripa*, *Lugio*, and *Teutoburgium*.²¹⁹ The positioning of military bases was deliberate, with due consideration and planning going into their exact locations and the choice of their garrisons. Moreover, these forts were built with consideration of the specific peoples they faced and manned according to their potential threat. An example of this is seen in the case of *Aquincum*, which was positioned directly opposite the main occupation zone of the *Iazyges*. This base occupied a key strategic position that enabled the Romans to monitor the movements of the *Iazyges* and respond to any threats from them.²²⁰ A further example of strategic placement can be observed in the pattern of forts south of *Aquincum*, between *Campona* and *Intercisa*. These bases were constructed at the entrances to the Csepel-Sziget valley, effectively restricting undetected movement in an area which, according to surviving evidence, represented one of the main incursion routes into Pannonia.²²¹ In order to use this position effectively, these forts were garrisoned by *alae*, which, given the terrain,²²² were ideal

²¹⁷ J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 52-3; D. Gabler, 'Flavian Limes in the Danube-Bend (Eastern Pannonia)', *ComArchHung*, pp. 76-81; E. Tóth and G. Vékony, 'A Building Inscription in Aquincum from the Vespasian Period', *AErt* 97, pp. 109-15.

²¹⁸ D. Gabler, 'Flavian Limes in the Danube-Bend (Eastern Pannonia)', *ComArchHung*, pp. 76-81; E. Tóth and G. Vékony, 'A Building Inscription in Aquincum from the Vespasian Period', *AErt* 97, pp. 109-15.

²¹⁹ J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 53; K. Póczy, 'Das Strassennetz und die Wichtigeren Gebäude der Militärstadt von Aquincum im 2 und 3 Jahrhundert', *AErt* 110, pp. 252-73; S. Dušanić, 'Rimska vojska u Istocnom Srem', *Zbornik Filozofskog Fakultet Beograd* 10, pp. 87-108.

²²⁰ J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, p. 55.

²²¹ J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 55-6.

²²² J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 55-6.

for both monitoring the border as well as conducting rapid retaliatory raids into Sarmatian territory when required.²²³ The subsequent relocation of *legio II Adiutrix* to *Aquincum*²²⁴ can then be interpreted as an attempt to bolster the defences against the *Iazyges* at its weakest point,²²⁵ whilst at the same time enabling the garrisoning of other bases to the south with its displaced cavalry units.²²⁶ All of these bases were developed in an effort to defend against a specific threat in an area that had previously been inadequately protected; to counter the *Iazyges*, the Flavians established a permanent military presence and developed a system of defence, monitoring and control, in essence an emerging ‘*Limes*’. The completion of the road network along the Danube’s southern bank under Domitian, in concert with the Danubian fleets, connected this whole system of forts and combined Rome’s defence in this sector with its northern Pannonian counterpart.²²⁷ Similar to the Upper Rhine, this defensive line along the Middle Danube established a system of monitoring and security against the *Marcomanni*, *Quadi*, and *Iazyges*, enabling the Romans to respond to, and reduce the impact of, future attacks whilst also allowing them to have some level of control over movement into Roman territory. As with the Rhine, the Danube ‘*Limes*’ was not designed to be impenetrable; it was intended to be a mechanism to monitor and control

²²³ J. Karavas, *The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD*, pp. 55-6.

²²⁴ For the relocation of *legio II Adiutrix* to *Aquincum* in AD 89, see J. J. Wilkes, ‘Roman Legions and their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third Centuries AD’, in R.J. Brewer, ed., *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, p. 106; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 16; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of every Imperial Roman Legion*, p. 108; B. Lörincz, ‘Besatzungstruppen des Legionslagers von Aquincum am Ende des 1 – Anfang des 2 Jahrhunderts’, *AAH* 30 p. 310.

²²⁵ J. Karavas, ‘The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD’, p. 55.

²²⁶ J. Karavas, ‘The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD’, p. 53.

²²⁷ J. Karavas, ‘The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD’, pp. 53-4.

the movement of trade and people into Roman territory and to coordinate and respond to incursions or attacks.²²⁸ [see Map (17)]

Despite the obvious defensive function and purpose of the Flavian ‘*Limes*’ in the Middle Danube, its capabilities and overall potential as a base of tactical supply for forward offensive operations should also be recognised. Domitian’s Danubian wars, and later Trajan’s, would demonstrate that the Middle Danubian ‘*Limes*’ would be used as a springboard for Rome’s offensive across the Danube.²²⁹ Similar to the Romans’ campaigns of retribution and suppression on the Rhine which were carried out in concert with the development of the ‘*Limes*’, comparable reactionary military activity was also undertaken on the Upper and Middle Danube. These military measures were required to nullify areas of aggression immediately facing the Roman defences. Four such threats are identified along the Danube defensive line: the *Marcomanni*, *Quadi*, *Iazyges*, and *Dacii*. Details of the Dacian wars will be omitted. In summary, the Dacian tribes were once again united under a new king, Decebalus, and became a threat to Roman interests on the Lower Danube.²³⁰ Invading in late AD 85 or early 86, the Romans were taken unprepared; their defeat resulted in the death of the Moesian legate, Oppius Sabinus, and the destruction of a legion, or more likely *vexillationes*, probably of *legio V Alaudae*.²³¹ Domitian’s retaliatory response under the praetorian prefect,

²²⁸ D. J. Woolliscroft, *Roman Military Signalling*, p. 135; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of Imperial Rome*, p. 58; J. Thorne, ‘Battle, Tactics, and the Limites in the West’, in P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, p. 229; J. Karavas, ‘The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD’, p. 56.

²²⁹ J. Karavas, ‘The Evolution of Roman Frontier Defence Systems and Fortifications in the Lower Danube Provinces in the First and Second Centuries AD’, p. 56.

²³⁰ D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 102; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 82; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 92-5; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 138-39; E. T. Salmon, *A history of the Roman World*, p. 248.

²³¹ Suet. *Dom.* 6; Eutropius *Brev. Hist. Rom* VII, 23, 4; Jord. *Get.* 76. A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 82-3; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 102; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 92; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 138.

Cornelius Fuscus, resulted in further defeat and the annihilation of a legion, probably the surviving elements of *legio V Alaudae*.²³² Preceding, or immediately after, this defeat Domitian reinforced Moesia, and *legio IV Flavia Firma* was transferred from Dalmatia, bringing the total number of legions in Moesia to five.²³³ Consequently, due to its increased concentration of military forces the province was divided into Moesia Superior and Moesia Inferior.²³⁴ Reversal of Roman losses against the Dacians did not occur until AD 88 under the command of Tettius Julianus, and the Roman victory at *Tapae*.²³⁵ Saturninus's revolt on the Upper Rhine hampered the victory; as outlined above, considering the concentration of military forces along the Rhine, its past record of political upheavals and the threat posed by the Chatti, Domitian immediately acted to remove this threat.

Around the same time further problems emerged on the Danube in connection with the *Iazyges*, *Marcomanni*, and *Quadi*. Domitian's attempt to punish the Germanic and Sarmatian tribes for not supporting his war against the Dacians escalated into open conflict.²³⁶ As a result a legion, or more likely several *vexillationes*, was destroyed by

²³² Dio LXVII.6.3-5; Suet. *Dom.* 6.1; Jord. *Get.* 77. A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 83; M. Griffin, 'The Flavians', in *CAH²*, Vol. XI, pp. 64-5; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 92; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 141.

²³³ B. Levick, *Vespasian*, pp. 162-3; J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third Centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, p. 103; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 19; S. Dando-Collins, *Legions of Rome: The Definitive History of Every Imperial Roman Legion*, p. 130; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 141-42; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 81.

²³⁴ J. J. Wilkes, 'Roman Legions and their Fortress in the Danube Lands – First to Third Centuries AD', in R. J. Brewer (ed.), *Roman Fortresses and their Legions*, pp. 103-4; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 103; J. H. Farnum, *The Positioning of the Roman Imperial Legions*, p. 8; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, pp. 82-3; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 94; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 141-2; K. Strobel, *Die Donaukriege Domitians*, p. 66; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 248.

²³⁵ Eutropius *Brev. Hist. Rom.* vii, 51; D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, pp. 102-3; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 92; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 142; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 84; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, p. 248.

²³⁶ Dio LXVII.7.1.

the *Marcomanni* and *Quadi*.²³⁷ It is this defeat that motivated Domitian to offer notoriously generous terms to Decebalus.²³⁸ Furthermore, after the quick resolution on the Rhine and owing to the military defences established along its length, Roman forces were redeployed from the Rhine to meet the threats along the Middle Danube.²³⁹ This increased both the number of legions and auxiliaries in Pannonia.²⁴⁰ This escalation in legionary strength enabled Domitian to devote a large military force to combat the threats in northern Pannonia,²⁴¹ resulting in a questionable Roman victory in AD 92/3.²⁴² Unlike the situation on the Rhine, neither these campaigns, nor the Roman attempts at applying negotiations or diplomacy, resulted in the pacification of these threats along the Middle Danube.²⁴³ In fact, despite reaching agreements, all four tribes continued to represent a varying level of threat to Rome. In order, therefore, to combat these threats, Domitian had gathered on the Danube the largest concentration of military forces in the empire with a total of eight legions: four in Pannonia and four in the two Moesian provinces.²⁴⁴ As a consequence, the Rhine would be defended by only seven

²³⁷ Dio LXVII.7.1-2; Suet. *Dom.* 6.1. It is thought that the legion was *legio XXI Rapax*: see P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 106-9; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, p. 151; A. Mócsy, *Pannonia and Upper Moesia*, p. 85; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, pp. 249-50.

²³⁸ Dio LXVII.6-7. Under the terms of peace with Dacia, Decebalus surrendered all his prisoners of war and in return was recognised by Domitian as king of the Dacians. Domitian also lent Decebalus a number of Roman engineers to help him build defence works and paid him an annual subsidy in money. For ancient criticisms of Domitian, see Dio LXVII.7; Pliny *Pan.* 12.2. See also, S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 92; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, p. 108; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 151-2; P. M. Rogers 'Domitian and the Finances of State', in *Historia* 33, pp. 60-78; E. T. Salmon, *A History of the Roman World*, pp. 249-50.

²³⁹ Initially, *legio I Adiutrix* went to *Brigetio* and *legio XXI Rapax* to *Aquincum*.

²⁴⁰ D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 103; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 151-2.

²⁴¹ *ILS* 9200. S. P. Mattern, *Rome and the Enemy*, p. 92; J. J. Wilkes, 'Romans, Dacians and Sarmatians in the First and Early Second Centuries', in B. Hartley and J. Wachter (eds.), *Rome and Her Northern Provinces*, pp. 268-70; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 150-55.

²⁴² D. J. Breeze, *The Frontiers of the Roman Empire*, p. 103; B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 150-153.

²⁴³ For Domitian's negotiations with the Dacians, Sarmatians, and Germans, see Martial *Epigrams* 5.3; Dio LXVI.7.2-4; *ILS* 9200. B. W. Jones, *The Emperor Domitian*, pp. 150-2; S. Gsell, *Essai sur la regne de l'Empereur Domitian*, pp. 224-25; P. Southern, *Domitian: Tragic Tyrant*, pp. 92-3, 99.

²⁴⁴ In Pannonia: *legio I Adiutrix* at *Brigetio*; *legio II Adiutrix* at *Aquincum*, *legio XV Apollinaris* at *Carnuntum*; *legio XIII Gemina* at *Vindobona*. Moesia Superior: *legio VI Flavia* at *Singidunum*; *legio VII Claudia* at *Viminacium*. Moesia Inferior: *legio V Macedonica* at *Oescus*; *legio I Italica* at *Novae*.

legions, three in *Germania Inferior* and four in *Germania Superior*.²⁴⁵ In doing so Domitian had completed the shift of Rome's military focus from the Rhine to the Danube; under him more legions were stationed in Pannonia than in any other province, positioned to counteract the threat posed by the *Iazyges*, *Marcomanni*, and *Quadi*.²⁴⁶ This concentration of force clearly indicates that the Middle Danube 'Limes' had two functions: to monitor, defend and react to any immediate threat along this defensive line, and to facilitate and support offensive operations across the Danube.

Conclusion

The Flavians undertook a necessary campaign of consolidation and stabilisation in order to rectify the division and destruction that had resulted from the civil wars and to ensure it was prevented from reoccurring. It is manifestly clear that the biased nature of the surviving literary sources distorts any positive interpretation of the Flavian dynasty. Specifically, closer examination of events and the material evidence reveals that Domitian's achievements against the *Chatti* were far more significant than was described and attributed to them by the ancient sources. Despite these fragmented and distorted accounts of the Flavian dynasty, it is possible to reconstruct a reasonable picture of events and determine the Flavian motivation behind military developments along the Rhine and Danube. Immediate military changes were necessary, and undertaken in order to secure Roman defences on the Rhine and Danube and to assure and strengthen military's allegiance to the new *princeps*. Later undertakings initiatives by Domitian served to reinforce the military's support of the regime.

²⁴⁵ In *Germania Inferior*: *legio V Gemina* at *Noviomagus*; *XXII Primigenia* at *Vetera*; *legio VI Victrix* at *Novaesium*; *legio I Minervia* at *Bonna*. *Germania Superior*: *legio I Minervia* at *Bonna*; *legio XIV Gemina* at *Mogontiacum*; *legio VIII Augusta* at *Argentoratum*; *legio XI Claudia* at *Vindonissa*.

²⁴⁶ The disposition of Roman forces changed again shortly after Domitian's death, both legions and auxiliaries shifted from the Rhine to the Danube under subsequent emperors. This, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Interconnected with the military reorganisation and reforms was the Flavians' programme of defensive engineering works. These defensive developments made up the initial '*Limes*' and served to further strengthened and connected the defences of the Rhine and Danube. The '*Limes*' were not one continuous line of defence, but rather a series of loosely connected networks opposing specific threats, such as the *Chatti* on the Rhine and the *Marcomanni* on the Danube. The Flavians only occupied certain areas of German territory east of the Rhine and north of the Danube in order to serve two main strategic functions: to monitor and defend against specific threats, and to shorten the link between the Rhine and Danube facilitating quicker communication, movement, and transportation. The emergence of the '*Limes*', the establishment of the German provinces marking the transition from military to a civilian administration, coupled with Domitian's transfer of legions from the Rhine to the Danube, signalled the end of Roman claims over *Germania*. These developments contained the *Germani* on the Rhine and enabled the definitive shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube. Roman military resources were now directed against the threats posed by hostile groups north of the Danube, which could not be reliably contended with or contained through negotiation or diplomacy; only through a display of military strength could the threats be mitigated.

CONCLUSION

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This dissertation set out to examine the circumstances and causes that led to the development of defences on the Rhine and Danube rivers in response to Roman interaction with the *Germani*. It achieves this through explaining the high concentration of military resources in this region and specifically the rationalisation for the initial implementation of the buffer zones, the reasons for the emergence of the Rhine and Danube frontiers, their subsequent developments, and later the emergence of the ‘*Limes*’ and the shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube. This examination was undertaken due to the lack of existing research covering the entirety of Rome’s interaction with the *Germani* from its initial contact under Caesar up to the emergence of the ‘*Limes*’ under the Flavians. In order to comprehend fully and provide an explanation for these defensive developments, the narrative of events needed to be incorporated and made central to the framework of this thesis. In doing so, and throughout the course of this work, it has been made clear that the narrative establishes the context in which the development of defences took place, as well as the justification for their appearance. An examination of the defences in segments or in isolation of each other, removed from the narrative order of events would have produced merely a simplistic, and at times distorted, understanding of these changes. Only a chronological and holistic assessment of the defences and events yielded a realistic account of the causes and circumstances which precipitated specific changes on the Rhine and Danube against the *Germani*.

Categorising and defining the ‘Germanic’ tribes and their territories is problematic, as is defining the ancient concept and definition of the ‘*Germani*’ group. Originally the term may have been adopted by the Romans from the Gallic tribes,

during Caesar's Gallic campaigns. If so, the term was significantly expanded upon, and to some extent over-simplified by the Romans. Examination of the surviving epigraphic evidence reveals that the 'Germanic' tribesmen identified themselves based on their specific tribes, not as belonging to the *Germani*. The few references that cite a Germanic tribesman referring to himself or his people as *Germanus*, as the Romans did, were examples of an outsider attempting to mimic Roman usage of the term in order to gain Roman comprehension. Thus the origin of the term *Germani* was a Roman construct.

While recognising that the terms *Germani*, Germanic, and all other variants were a Roman construct, this dissertation employed them along with their specific tribal names. As was established throughout this work, the justification for this convention was the fact that the Romans identified the Germanic peoples as a distinct and quantifiable group, albeit with competing tribal allegiances. In spite of this, the Romans regarded and reacted as though the *Germani* as a whole were a threat to Rome and Roman interests, although at times they did give specific reference to a particular tribe. Overall, the Romans feared that the disparate tribes, or a significant proportion thereof, would unite and move against Rome. In response to this threat, the Romans established defences that corresponded with the territory that the ancient writers attributed to the *Germani*, east of the Rhine and north of the Danube. All of these factors established the limits of Roman and Germanic control and the area to be examined in this dissertation.

The definitions of border, 'buffer zone', frontier, and '*Limes*', are problematic. In this dissertation all four terms were considered to be distinct and separate. The use of any of these terms denoted distinct features, functions, and purpose in the context of

Roman defence. In this thesis the term border meant a fixed point: it could be a river, mountain range or even an agreed demarcation on a map. A 'buffer zone' was the initial roughly defensive line along which Roman forces were deployed in order to defend against a possible attack or incursion by the *Germani*. A frontier was defined as a military boundary designed to defend a set limit to Roman territory; it was a distinct phase of defensive development separate from the initial military border ('buffer zone'). The '*Limes*' was the next stage of Roman defence against the *Germani*; it denotes a shift from frontiers towards a definitive limitation of Roman territory. The '*Limes*' had three objectives: to mark the limit of Roman control, as a means for communication and transportation, and a method of defence against a defined enemy or threat. The '*Limes*' was not an impenetrable barrier; that was outside the capabilities of the Romans. Rather it was a defended and defined defensive line that facilitated the patrol of Roman territory, allowing the monitoring of outside forces and aiding in the control of trade and people.

The initial interaction between Rome and the *Germani*, the resulting conflict, and the measures undertaken to remove them as a threat, led to the evolution of Roman defences against the *Germani*, from their origins as separate buffer zones into military frontiers, as a response to specific threats and events on the Rhine and Danube. The initial defensive policy on the Rhine under Caesar proved inadequate against the *Germani* and in response to the escalating threat from them the Romans switched to an offensive campaign of conquest. On the Danube, Roman defences developed later. Initially the native inhabitants acted as an unrealised buffer zone. Later, the Romans would have to contend with two threats: internally the Illyrian tribes, and externally the *Germani*.

Julius Caesar recognised the threat that the Germans posed to Roman interests in Gaul, and to combat this he implemented an initial defensive policy, which had two components. Firstly, in response to Germanic incursions and interference in Gaul, Caesar carried out campaigns of retribution and suppression. Caesar's two forays across the Rhine can be seen as such, aimed at punishing the tribes responsible for hostile activities in Gaul, and to intimidate and discourage further interference across the Rhine. Secondly, in an effort to secure Roman interests, Caesar settled allied tribes either side of the Rhine. This resettlement of 'Celtic' and 'Germanic' tribes along the river effectively acted as a check on hostile tribes east of the Rhine and established a buffer zone between Roman Gaul and the *Germani*. This initial policy was maintained until 17 BC; the losses suffered in the *clades Lolliana* proved its ineffectiveness. At this stage the threat posed by the *Germani* north of the Danube is not directly known to the Romans, with the people that inhabited Illyricum and Noricum inadvertently acting as a buffer against their raids.

Military changes were implemented in response to the escalating attacks against Roman interests in Gaul by the *Germani* and their growing concerns against Germanic tribes, such as the *Marcomanni*, north of the Danube. Augustus decided to alter radically Rome's German border policy due to the escalating threat posed by the *Germani*. The decision to reorganise and redeploy the legions on the Rhine itself, and to establish military bases close to the frontier, marked the beginning of Rome's offensive policy against the *Germani* and effectively replaced the buffer zone along the Rhine with a military frontier. Although this military frontier offered defensive capabilities, its main purpose was to facilitate the offensive campaigns across the Rhine.

This is made evident by the positioning of the military camps near or along the invasion routes into Germania. Between 12 BC–AD 6, the Romans undertook the conquest of Germania, subduing tribal groups as the Romans advanced into the interior. This was a consistent policy up to the governorship of Varus. The establishment of legionary and supply bases throughout the interior enabled the Romans to sustain a presence in the region, in some cases all year round, and maintain a certain level of control over the territory and its peoples.

Initially, the Romans were defended against the German threat north of the Danube by a buffer zone, not of their design, provided by the presence of native tribes in Noricum and northern Illyricum. Roman expansion into Raetia, Vindelicia, Noricum, and Illyricum brought direct contact with southern Germania and the Germanic tribes north of the Danube. As was the case along the Rhine, the Romans resettled ‘allied’ tribes in or near Marcomannic territory, establishing a deliberate buffer zone along the Middle Danube. The existence of a military frontier along the Danube is debatable at this stage. This was the beginning of Roman defences against the *Germani* along the Danube. Under Augustus, further military campaigns were carried out in order to secure the Middle Danube. By AD 6 the Romans believed that their conquest of Germania was almost complete; the major military preparations along the Danube and Rhine were undertaken in an effort to remove the last obstacle, the *Marcomanni*.

According to the Romans, the boundary of the Roman province of Germania Magna was the River Elbe, and they believed the Germanic tribes defeated and ready for incorporation into the Empire. Similarly, the tribes of Illyricum were considered

suppressed and ready for Roman governance. Examination proved that both of these assumptions were premature and ill-conceived. The *clades Variana* was caused by a combination of factors, not just a result of Varus's actions. A significant contributor to the disaster was the relationship between Rome and the various Germanic tribes; this misplaced trust in the *Germani* resulted in Varus's defeat. As a conquest, it was superficial, with the Romans only gaining partial control over the region and its people. Similarly, along the Danube after the *Bellum Pannonicum*, the Romans had considered the Illyrian and Pannonian tribes defeated and their territory under their control. As with Germania, the governing system imposed on Illyricum was inadequate and premature; although high taxes, native resentment, and inadequate pacification motivated the revolt, it was the transfer of troops for the *Marcomanni* campaign and the subsequent gathering of native forces in northern Illyricum that precipitated it. Roman overestimation of their level of control in the region and the limited extent of native pacification resulted in the *Bellum Batonianum*.

Specific events on the Rhine and Danube precipitated the development of Roman defences, with the perceived threat posed by the *Germani* motivating these defensive developments. Initially, the Romans feared a northern invasion and in response saturated the Rhine and Danube with troops, resulting in the emergence of the initial 'Germanic frontier'. Subsequently, in response to specific threats and events, the Romans implemented further changes to their military frontiers, and later the emergence of the '*Limes*' and the shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube. There was a distinct correlation between specific threats, events, and the development of Roman defences.

The *clades Variana* and the *Bellum Batonianum* had a significant impact on the nature of Roman defences, and an increase at Rome in the perception that the *Germani* posed a significant and dangerous threat on the Rhine and Danube. Following the *clades Variana*, Roman forces were removed from the interior of Germania and surviving troops were repositioned along the Rhine. Losing Varus's three legions damaged the delicate balance that existed between the limited available military resources. Similarly, the *Bellum Batonianum* had resulted in the heavy loss of men and resources. Significantly, it also meant that the Romans now guarded against two threats; externally, the *Germani* north of the Danube, and internally the tribes of Illyricum, depleting Roman resources even further. As a direct result of the revolt, Illyricum was divided into two separate commands. Effectively these two conflicts terminated the Roman advance to the Elbe, and marked the loss of Roman Germania Magna. More than ever the Romans feared the *Germani* and the perceived threat they posed to their empire. This is made evident from their initial use of inferior troops to reinforce the Rhine, and later the repositioning of troops removed from other volatile provinces. As a direct result of these events, Rome would build up the largest concentration to date of military forces along the Rhine and Danube in an effort to counter this perceived threat, establishing an initial 'Germanic frontier'. This 'Germanic frontier' was not a combined command: the Rhine and Danube remained separate. Subsequently, this concentration of troops would result in both military and political conflicts.

The noticeable increase in road construction throughout the Empire, especially along the Rhine and Danube, indicates a strategic move to facilitate rapid communication and transport, and establish an initial link between the two frontiers.

The emergence of this link further supports the presence of a discernible ‘Germanic frontier’, enabling the Romans to monitor and respond to any threats along either the Rhine or Danube. Large scale campaigns into the interior under Augustus and Tiberius were undertaken in retribution and in an effort to suppress hostile tribes, not an attempt to reconquer Germania.

The limited available evidence for pre-Flavian military dispositions on the Rhine and Danube, and the Julio-Claudian response to specific threats and events, made an account of the development of the ‘Germanic frontier’ very difficult to compose. Although only an outline of this period could be attempted, by examining all of the evidence for the events on both rivers it was possible to discern a pattern of reactionary defence. There was, indubitably, a developing trend over the first century AD to deploy more troops along the Rhine and Danube rivers. Initially, Roman military focus was on the *Germani* along the Rhine. Not until the latter half of the first century AD did the military focus shift to the Danube and the increased threat posed by the *Germani*, *Dacii*, and the *Sarmatae*.

Tiberius after AD 16-17 initiated several military changes, and it was during his reign that Roman military policy against the *Germani* was significantly altered. This shift is marked by the removal of most Roman forces from the interior of Germania and their repositioning on the Rhine. Tiberius still maintained a Roman presence in the territory of allied tribes, in order to monitor the region, offering a level of early warning and protection from hostile tribes, whilst also assuring allegiances and aiding with retaliatory expeditions. Overall, deliberate campaigns of aggression against the *Germani* were abandoned, cessation of which resulted in disunity and conflict amongst the

Germani. In place of overt aggression, Tiberius implemented a new indirect method of interaction and control, manipulating events and relations with the *Germani*, with little or no direct military intervention. This was a deliberate and distinct policy, consisting of military threats and financial inducements, as well as being retaliatory, with all infringements or violations met with retribution. The introduction of ‘*Agri Vacui*’, east of the Rhine and later north of the Danube, was implemented in an effort to secure further Roman provinces and provide local Roman forces with arable land. All attempts to settle there, without consent, were deterred with force. Key elements of this policy were monetary inducement and reward, the Romans granting privileges and support to specific leaders and in return gaining influence and alliances. Connected to this was the establishment and manipulation of client tribes, which were an integral part of imperial policy throughout the Julio-Claudian period. Consequently, these clients would form an active barrier against other hostile tribes, the neglect or abuse of which would prove disastrous.

Tiberius’ defensive policy had as its most significant aspect the development of physical defences on the Rhine in response to the potential threat posed by the *Germani*, taking the form of a semi-connected military frontier along the Rhine and Danube, a frontier that slowly developed and became more permanent over time. Yet this is not to be interpreted as a matter of a conscious, grand overarching policy; such developments were reactionary and gradual: progression was neither smooth nor uniform. Along the Rhine, circumstances compelled Tiberius to expand and fortify existing Roman military bases; some of these bases were new outposts, others were constructed in order to shorten the intervals between existing bases. These bases were constructed in order to monitor and defend against the *Germani*, and protect Roman interests in Gaul.

Consequently, in order to maintain these defences and enforce his defensive policies, Tiberius had to retain a high concentration of military resources, the retention of which would prove volatile. His decision to maintain eight legions there, their division into two separate military commands, the initial separation of double legions, and the handling of latter events of his reign strongly indicate his intention of maintaining Roman defences on the Rhine.

After Tiberius, Gaius did not aim to reconquer Germania; his reign was a continuation of his predecessor's defensive policy. Towards the end of Tiberius' reign his own defensive policy was neglected and as a consequence the *Germani* had encroached into Roman territory. Gaius' increase in the number of the legions along the Rhine to ten was only in response to this threat, indicating the Romans' level of fear of the *Germani*. Under Gaius, the *Germani* were driven out of Roman territory and campaigns of retribution and suppression soon followed; the subsequent military expeditions were carried out in order to restore morale and loyalty amongst Roman forces. His actions on the Rhine were entirely consistent with the established frontier policy of Tiberius. Ultimately, Gaius strengthened Roman defences on the Rhine, halted Germanic encroachment, and his preparations and reorganisation along the Rhine ensured later successes along the frontier and further abroad.

The impact of specific events, and the significant military and defensive developments under Claudius, identifies his reign as another turning point in Roman defensive policy towards the *Germani*, with both the Rhine and Danube becoming a more defined and defended military frontier. Claudius' military reforms strengthened

the ties between the military and the emperor and enhanced the approach by which the empire was defended. His defensive policy aimed to lessen the potential threat of the *Germani* with minimal military force, implementing methods of indirect control and manipulation in an effort to de-stabilise the tribes and encourage disunity. His major contribution to the defence against the Germanic threat was through alterations to Roman fortifications and the deployments of forces along the Rhine and Danube.

On the Rhine, Claudius' policies shifted towards establishing a permanent defensive system against the *Germani*. Military activity was limited to eliminating specific threats, such as the campaign against the *Chauci* and *Chatti*. These military actions were undertaken in an effort to pacify Germania east of the Rhine and strengthen the Roman position along the river itself. These events highlight several key developments under Claudius, which include: the establishment of permanent bases and fortifications, the redeployment of the legions, the increased numbers and role of the *auxilia*, and the augmented role of neighbouring allied Germanic tribes in the defence of the frontier. Raids in AD 50 by the *Chatti* highlight the new role the Germanic forces had in the defence of the Rhine. All of these developments point towards a permanent defence system against the *Germani* and a definite indicator of the relinquishment of Roman claims on Germania.

Claudius' interaction with the *Cherusci* and the *Suebi* continued Tiberius' policy of diplomacy and manipulation of the *Germani*. This is identified as another measure undertaken to ensure the security of the Rhine and offset the effect of the withdrawals of Roman forces. The perceived threat posed by the *Germani* still warranted the presence

of a large military force. When Gaius increased the Rhine's legionary strength, however, it posed a significant threat to the emperor's position. While Claudius' planned invasion of Britain helped reduce this concentration of legions, this was not undertaken before hostile Germanic tribes were suppressed and permanent defences and bases were established. Claudius' new permanent defence against the *Germani* is most evident along the Lower Rhine, especially the delta region with the construction of several auxiliary forts. Positioning these installations there facilitated three important functions: they secured the Rhine delta against the neighbouring *Germani*, facilitated the support of the conquest of Britain, and controlled German piracy. This induration of Roman defences can be viewed as the foundations of the initial '*Limes*'. Claudius' changes on the Rhine were enough to combat this level of threat from the *Germani*, successfully removing Rome's largest threat in the region, redeeming and justifying his decision to reduce the number of legions. His actions along the Rhine therefore effectively embodied, and improved upon, Tiberius' policy of defending against the Germanic threat with minimal risk and resources whilst gaining maximum advantage and security.

Claudius recognised the importance of defences along the Danube, and in his reign forces were deliberately positioned at strategic points along the frontier. Bases as constructed by Claudius established a continuous and connected defence against the external threats north of the Danube, and improved transportation and communications between the Rhine and Danube. The initial removal of troops from the Danube for campaigns in Britain and Armenia proved premature; events in AD 50 exposed the instability and unreliability of allied peoples north of the Danube and the vulnerability of Roman defences. Claudius increased auxiliary forces and established additional bases

in response to these events, in a program to establish a permanent coordinated defence on the Danube. These measures effectively contained the potential threats north of the Danube and established an initial connected frontier along the Danube.

The significant weaknesses of the Julio-Claudian defences were exposed during the reign of Nero and the Year of the Four Emperors. Nero maintained the defensive policies established by his predecessors; only in the east was there any real divergence. He maintained the conciliatory approach to the frontiers with the *Germani* and enforced the controls implemented by Tiberius and maintained by his successors. Two events highlight Nero's compliance with this policy: the incursions of the *Frisii*, and the attempted settlement and war with the *Ampsivarii*. Nero's failure to maintain control over the *Batavi* did result in their betrayal and is an early indicator of a larger problem in the Julio-Claudian system. The *bellum Neronis* brought about the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and with it came a fracturing of the Roman Empire. The ensuing civil wars divided Roman resources and military strength amongst competing candidates and as a result Rome's defences along the Rhine and Danube were neglected and weakened. As a consequence of this, neighbouring tribes on both frontiers took advantage of Rome's compromised position.

Several key factors in the defence of the frontiers have been identified: the need for Roman military cohesiveness, the continuation of German disunity, the internal Roman threat posed by the concentration of military forces and the potential threat posed by native leaders of auxiliary forces. All of these considerations needed to be addressed in order for the Julio-Claudians defences to be stable and effective.

Collectively, the neglect of these factors resulted in disaster. Ultimately, the Batavian revolt reinforced the Romans' perceived threat of the *Germani* and the incursions along the Danube exposed their growing problems with other tribes north of the Danube. Vespasian, as a direct result of these events, would direct considerable military resources to consolidate and reinforce both frontiers. These incidents highlight the consequences of Roman disunity and the potential threat a unification of Germanic tribes represented, especially when Roman defences were neglected.

Under the Flavians, the Roman defences of the military frontiers established by the Julio-Claudians developed into their initial permanent boundaries, the '*Limes*'. This dynasty undertook necessary campaigns of consolidation and stabilisation in order to rectify the division and destruction that had resulted from the civil wars. Immediate military changes were instigated to secure Roman defences on the Rhine and Danube and to assure and strengthen military's allegiance to the new *princeps*. These changes were undertaken in concert with the Flavians' program of defensive engineering works, which defensive developments made up the initial '*Limes*'. Overall, it is only in comparison with the Julio-Claudians that the Flavians can be observed to have adopted a more judicious form of annexation policy. The Flavians only occupied certain areas of German territory east of the Rhine and north of the Danube in order to serve two main strategic functions: to monitor and defend against specific threats, and to shorten the link between the Rhine and Danube facilitating quicker communication, movement, and transportation. The emergence of the '*Limes*', the establishment of the German provinces marking the transition from military to a civilian administration, coupled with Domitian's transfer of legions from the Rhine to the Danube, signalled the end of

Roman claims over *Germania*. These developments contained the *Germani* on the Rhine and enabled the definitive shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube.

In short, this dissertation establishes that although there were other contributing factors, the changes that occurred on the Rhine and Danube were largely in response to specific events, and the shifting level and nature of threat the Germanic tribes represented to Rome and Roman interests. It is made clear that Roman defences were planned, not through the implementation of an overarching grand military strategy, but rather that they developed organically, in an ad-hoc manner, over time, in response to specific threats and in connection to particular events. As the Germanic threat fluctuated and changed, so did the Romans' defences and the manner by which they were defended.

Under the Julio-Claudians, the Romans' response to German aggression developed into a formulaic pattern of retribution and suppression. For every German attack or incursion into Roman territory, the Romans retaliated. They expelled the *Germani* from Roman territory and followed this up with campaigns into Germania to inflict retribution and suppress native hostilities. Diplomatic measures and monetary incentives were used by the Romans to mitigate native unrest and aggression. Native kings and chiefs who had favourable attitudes towards the Romans were also kept in power through military and monetary incentives; as was seen with the Suebian kings Sido and Italicus. In this manner, tribes were allied to Rome and used as a buffer against other peoples hostile to Rome, as was seen with the settlement of the *Iazyges* against the *Marcomanni* and the *Dacii*. Later, the Flavians adopted and maintained this formula to help secure their own defences.

The '*Limes*' themselves were a visible line of demarcation of the extent of Roman territory and emerged in response to specific events and threats along both rivers. They were not one continuous line of defence, but rather a series of loosely connected networks opposing specific threats, such as the *Chatti* and the *Marcomanni*. These defensive lines were not meant to be impenetrable, but rather enabled the Romans to monitor, control, and defend against the flow of peoples into Roman territory. Rome came to understand that the *Germani*'s potential threat could be limited and their impact on Roman interest could be minimised by following their established defensive policies. The emergence of the '*Limes*' secured Roman interests using less manpower and resources whilst at the same time establishing necessary links with Rome and the Danube. Containment of the *Germani* on the Rhine made it possible to carry out the definitive shift of military focus from the Rhine to the Danube; Roman military resources were now directed against the threats posed by hostile groups north of the Danube, which could not be reliably contended with or contained through negotiation or diplomacy as was evident on the Rhine, only the retention of a large military forces could adequately secure these defences.

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Ael. Arist. – Aelius Aristides

Ad Romam

Amm. Marc. – Ammianus Marcellinus

Res Gestae

App. – Appian

B Civ. – Civil Wars

Ill. – Illyrike

Caesar – Gaius Iulius Caesar

B. Civ. – Bellum Civile

B. Gall. – Belum Gallicum

Cic. – Marcus Tullius Cicero

Att. – Epistulae ad Atticum

Dio – Cassius Dio

Historia Romana

Eutropius – Flavius Eutropius

Brev. Hist. Rom. – Breviarium historiae Romanae

Festus – Rufus Festus

Brev. – Breviarium

¹ All editions used are from the Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, except where indicated in the dissertation.

Flor. – Lucius Annaeus Florus

Epitomae de Tito Livio bellorum omnium

Frontin. – Sextus Iulius Frontinus

Str. – Stratagemata

Fronto – Marcus Cornelius Fronto

Correspondence

Hdn. – Aelius Herodianus

History of the Roman Empire

Hdt. – Herodotus of Halicarnassus

Hist. –The Histories

Jose. – Titus Flavius Josephus

BJ –Bellum Judaicum

Jord. – Jordanes

Get. – Getica (De origine actibusque Getarum)

Livy – Titus Livius

Ab Urbe Condita Libri

Mar. Aur. – Marcus Aurelius Antoninus

The Communing with Himself

Obseq. – Iulius Obsequens

Epitomae

Onas. – Onasander

The General

Pliny Eld. – Gaius Plinius Secundus

NH – Naturalis Historia

Pliny – Gaius Plinius Caecilius Secundus

Epi. – Epistulae

Pan. – Panegyricus

Plut. – Plutarch

Lives

Caes. – Caesar

Cic. – Cicero

Ant. – Antony

Gal. – Galba

Mar. – Gaius Marius

Polyb. – Polybius

Histories

Ptol. – Claudius Ptolemy

Geo. – Geographia

RG – *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*

Seneca – Lucius Annaeus Seneca

Apocol. - Apocolocyntosis

Cons. Ad Pol. - De Consolatione ad Polybium

SHA – *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*

vita Hadr. – Vita Hadriani

Stat. – Publius Papinius Statius

Silv. – Silvae

Strabo

Geo. – Geographica

Suet. – Gaius Tranquillus Suetonius

De Vita Caesarum

Div. Iul. – Divus Iulius

Aug. – Divus Augustus

Tib. – Tiberius

Cal. – Gaius Caligula

Claud. – Divus Claudius

Gal. – Galba

Titus – Titus

Tac. – Publius Cornelius Tacitus

Ann. – Annalium ab excess divi Augusti

Agr. – De vita Iulii Agricolae

Ger. – De origine et situ Germanorum

Hist. – Historiae

Vell. Pat. – Gaius Velleius Paterculus

Historiae Romanae

EPICGRAPHIC COLLECTIONS

<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année épigraphique</i> , Paris
<i>CIG</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , Berlin, 1869-
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> , Berlin, 1828-
<i>CPJ</i>	<i>Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum</i>
<i>ILJ</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMII et MCMLX repertae et editae sunt</i> , A. Šašel / J. Šašel (eds.), (<i>Situla</i> 5 (1963); 19 (1978); 25 (1986)), Ljubljana.
<i>ILS</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , ed. H. Dessau, Berlin, 1892-1916
<i>Insc. It.</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Italiae Academiae italicae consociate ediderunt</i> , Rome, 1931-

ABBREVIATIONS AND LIST OF PERIODICALS

AAA	<i>Antichità Altoadriatiche</i> , Udine.
AAH	<i>Acta Archaeologica Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae</i> , Budapest.
AArchSlov	<i>Arheološki vestnik Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti</i> .
AErt	<i>Archaeologiai Ertesito</i> . Budapest.
AJPh	<i>American Journal of Philology</i> , Baltimore.
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> . Berlin, New York.
ANUBiH	<i>Izdanja Akademije Nauka i umjetnosti Bosnie i Hercegovine (Academie des Sciences et des Arts de Bosnie-Herzegovine – publications)</i> , Sarajevo.
BAR	<i>British Archaeological Reports</i> (1974-8), Oxford.
BAR-Brit. Ser.	<i>British Archaeological Reports – British Series</i> (1978-), Oxford.
BAR-Int. Ser.	<i>British Archaeological Reports – International Series</i> , Oxford.
BJ	<i>Bonner Jahrbücher des Rheinischen Landesmuseums in Bonn und des Rheinischen Amtes für Bodendenkmalpflege im Landschaftsverband Rheinland und des Vereins von Altertumsfreunden im Rheinlande</i> . Essen.
BRGK	<i>Bericht der Römisch-Germanischen Kommission</i> . Mainz.
Chiron	<i>Mitteilungen der Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</i> , Munich.
CJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i> , Chicago.
ComArchHung	<i>Communicationes Archaeologicae Hungariae</i> , Budapest.

<i>Glas SKA</i>	<i>Bulletin of Serbian Royal Academy</i> , Belgrade.
<i>Godišnjak</i>	<i>Godišnjak društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine (Annuaire de la société historique de Bosie et Herzégovine)</i> , Sarajevo.
<i>Historia</i>	<i>Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte</i> , Wiesbaden.
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i> , Harvard.
<i>Ja RGZM</i>	<i>Jahrbuch des Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums</i> , Mainz.
<i>JHG</i>	<i>Journal of Historical Geography</i> , London.
<i>JRS</i>	<i>The Journal of Roman Studies</i> , London.
<i>Klio</i>	<i>Beiträge zur alten Geschichte</i> , Berlin.
<i>MH</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum</i> , Switzerland
<i>Phoenix</i>	<i>The Journal of the Ontario Classical Association</i> , Toronto.
<i>RE</i>	<i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Alterumswissenschaft</i> , Stuttgart.
<i>RGA</i>	<i>Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde</i> . Strasbourg.
<i>SBAW</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften</i> , Vienna.
<i>Situla</i>	<i>Dissertationes Musei nationalis Labacensis</i> , Ljubljana.
<i>Talanta</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Dutch Archaeological and Historical Society</i> , Amsterdam.
<i>UBHJ</i>	<i>University of Birmingham Historical Journal</i> , Birmingham.
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i> , Bonn.

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MAPS




[Map (1)] The Extent of Germania Magna. Listed are the Known Locations of the Germanic Tribes.¹

¹ Location of the Germanic tribes are only approximate.




[Map (2)] The Six Confirmed Major Legionary Camps of the Augustan Period.¹

¹ This map does not include the various auxiliary camps/forts on the Rhine.



[Map (3)] Caesar in Gaul, 58-51/50 BC.


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
[Map (4)] The Three Main Invasion Routes into Germania Magna, and the Locations of the Augustan Camps on the Rhine River, c. AD 6-9.¹

(1) Vechten (Fectio)	(11) Moguntiacum (Mainz)	(21) Beckinghausen	(31) Frankfurt-Höchst
(2) Noviomagus (Nijmegen)	(12) Mainz-Weisenau	(22) Oberraden	(32) Marktbreit
(3) Arnhem-Meinerswijk	(13) Wiesbaden	(23) Anreppen	
(4) Vetera (Xanten)	(14) Mainz-Kastel	(24) Wachtposten	
(5) Moers-Asberg	(15) Trebur-Geinsheim	(25) Hedemünden	
(6) Novaesium (Neuss)	(16) Worms	(26) Oberbrechen	
(7) Oppidum Ubiorum (Cologne)	(17) Speyer	(27) Waldgirmes	
(8) Bonn	(18) Strassburg	(28) Dorlar	
(9) Andernach	(19) Holsterhausen	(29) Rödgen	
(10) Bingerbrück	(20) Haltern	(30) Bad-Nauheim	


¹ This map does not distinguish between legionary camps/forts and those used by auxiliary units.



[Map (5)] Drusus' German Campaign Routes, 12–9 BC.




[Map (6)] The Invasion Routes Taken by Tiberius and Saturninus During Their Bohemian Campaign, AD 6.




[Map (7)] The Surviving Bases Along the Rhine After the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, AD 9.

(1) Vechten (Fectio)	(6) Novaesium (Neuss)	(11) Moguntiacum (Mainz)
(2) Noviomagus (Nijmegen)	(7) Oppidum Ubiorum (Cologne)	(12) Mainz-Weisenau
(3) Arnhem-Meinerswijk	(8) Bonn	(13) Wiesbaden
(4) Vetera (Xanten)	(9) Andernach	(14) Mainz-Kastel
(5) Moers-Asberg	(10) Bingerbrück	(15) Trebur-Geinsheim



[Map (8)] The Establishment of *Exercitus Germaniae Superioris* (Army of Superior/Upper Rhine or Germania) and *Exercitus Germaniae Inferioris* (Army of Inferior/Lower Rhine or Germania), and the Location of the Forts on the Rhine.


(1) Vechten (Fectio)	(6) Novaesium (Neuss)	(11) Moguntiacum (Mainz)
(2) Noviomagus (Nijmegen)	(7) Oppidum Ubiorum (Cologne)	(12) Mainz-Weisenau
(3) Arnhem-Meinerswijk	(8) Bonn	(13) Wiesbaden
(4) Vetera (Xanten)	(9) Andernach	(14) Mainz-Kastel
(5) Moers-Asberg	(10) Bingerbrück	(15) Trebur-Geinsheim



[Map (9)] Germanicus' Campaign in AD 14

(FROM: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germania_14_Germanico_jpg.jpg, accessed 20 JULY 2015)¹


¹ Description: La campagna di Germanico nel 14 d.C.; Author: Cristiano64; Source: self-made; Permission: Cristiano64/CC-BY-SA-3.0; Date uploaded: 11 SEPTEMBER 2007.



[Map (10)] Germanicus' Campaign in AD 15

(FROM: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germania_15_Germanico.jpg, accessed 20 JULY 2015)¹


¹ Description: La campagna di Germanico nel 15 d.C.; Author: Cristiano64; Source: self-made; Permission: Cristiano64/CC-BY-SA-3.0; Date uploaded: 12-09-2007.



[Map (11)] Germanicus' Campaign in AD 16

(FROM: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germania_16_Germanico_jpg.jpg, accessed 20 JULY 2015)¹


¹ Description: La campagna di Germanico nel 16 d.C.; Author; Cristiano64; Source: self-made; Permission: Cristiano64/CC-BY-SA-3.0; Date uploaded: 14 SEPTEMBER 2007.



[Map (12)] The Known Rhine Bases and the Approximate Location of the Germanic Tribes, c. AD 17.¹


(1) Velsen	(1) Noviomagus (Nijmegen)	(21) Mainz-Weisenau
(2) Winsum	(2) Arnhem-Meinerswijk	(22) Trebur-Geinsheim
(3) Bentumersiel	(3) Vetera (Xanten)	(23) Mainz-Kastel
(4) Altkalkar	(4) Moers-Asberg	(24) Wiesbaden
(5) Alteburg	(5) Novaesium (Neuss)	(25) Worms
(6) Urmitz	(6) Oppidum Ubiorum (Cologne)	(26) Lich-kloster Arnsburg
(7) Koblenz	(7) Bonn	(27) Speyer
(8) Hofheim	(8) Andernach	(28) Strassburg
(9) Friedburg	(9) Bingerbrück	
(10) Vechten (Fectio)	(10) Moguntiacum (Mainz)	

¹ The forts constructed during Tiberius' reign are all included in this map, the dates of which have yet to be confirmed.



[Map (14)] (The Lower Rhine) Germania Inferior ‘Limes’
(FROM: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Limes1.png>, accessed 20 AUGUST 2015)¹

¹ Description: Karte des Niedergermanischen Limes/ Map of Limes The Lower (Northern) Germanic Limes; Author: Eigenes Werk; Source: Own work; Sources used: Putzger – Historischer Weltatlas, 89. Auflage, 1965; Westermanns Großer Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, 1978; Hugo Thoen (Red.): De Romeinen langs de Vlaamse Kust. Gemeentekrediet, Koksijde en Oudenburg 1987; Permission: Ziegel Brenner/GNU FDL; Date uploaded 27 MARCH 2009. **NOTE:** Not all currently known military sites are recorded. The purpose of this map in this dissertation is for familiarisation of defences along the Lower Rhine only.



[Map (15)] (The Upper Rhine) Germania Superior and (The Upper Danube) Raetian ‘Limes’
(FROM: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Limes2.png>, accessed 1 AUGUST 2015)¹

¹ Description: Karte des Obergermanisch-raetischen Limes/Map of Limes Germanicus (system of fortifications representing the boundary of Roman control in the Rhine-Danube angle); Author: Ziegel Brenner; Source: ownwork; Sources used: Putzger – Historischer Weltatlas, 89. Auflage, 1965; Westermanns Großer Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, 1978; Martin Kemkes: „Römer an Donau und Iller. Neue Forschungen und Funde.“ Thorbecke, Sigmaringen 1996, S. 152f.; Dietwulf Baatz: *Der Römische Limes. Archäologische Ausflüge zwischen Rhein und Donau*. 4. Auflage. Gebr. Mann, Berlin 2000; Thomas Fischer und Günther Ulbert: *Der Limes in Bayern. Von Dinkelsbühl bis Eining*. Theiss, Stuttgart 1983; Heinz Cüppers: *Die Römer in Rheinland-Pfalz*. Lizenzausgabe. Nikol, Hamburg 2002; Cliff Alexander Jost: *Der römische Limes in Rheinland-Pfalz*. (Archäologie an Mittelrhein und Mosel, Band 14), Landesamt für Denkmalpflege Rheinland-Pfalz, Koblenz 2003; Dietwulf Baatz und Fritz-Rudolf Herrmann: *Die Römer in Hessen*. Lizenzausgabe. Nikol, Hamburg 2002; Dieter Planck (Hrsg.): *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*. Theiss, Stuttgart 2005; Philipp Filtzinger, Dieter Planck und Bernhard Cämmerer (Hrsg.): *Die Römer in Baden-Württemberg*. 3. Auflage. Theiss, Stuttgart 1986; Wolfgang Cyszcz u.a.: *Die Römer in Bayern*. Lizenzausgabe. Nikol, Hamburg 2005; Dieter Planck u.a.: *Imperium Romanum. Roms Provinzen an Neckar, Rhein und Donau*, Theiss, Stuttgart 2005; Permission: Ziegel Brenner/GNU FDL; Date uploaded: 18 DECEMBER 2008. **NOTE:** Not all currently known military sites are recorded. The purpose of this map in this dissertation is for familiarisation of defences along the Upper Rhine and the Upper Danube only.



[Map (17)] (The Middle Danube) Pannonian ‘Limes’
(FROM: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Limes4.png>, accessed 20 AUGUST 2015)¹

¹ Description: Karte des Limes in Österreich, Slowakei, Ungarn, Kroatien und Serbien (Pannonischer Limes). Die Karte wurde zunächst für das „Projekt Römischer Limes“ in der deutschen Wikipedia angelegt und später in andere Sprachen übersetzt/ Map of Limes in Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Serbia (Pannonia/system of fortifications representing the boundary of Roman control); Author: Ziegel Brenner & Mediatius; Source: own work; Sources used: Putzger – Historischer Weltatlas, 89. Auflage, 1965; Westermanns Großer Atlas zur Weltgeschichte, 1978; weitere Quellen sind durch die Wikipedia-Artikel mit den jeweils angegebenen enzyklopädischen Quellen erschlossen; Permission: Ziegel Brenner & Mediatius /GNU FDL; Date uploaded: 4 AUGUST 2009. **NOTE:** Not all currently known military sites are recorded. The purpose of this map in this dissertation is for familiarisation of defences along the Middle Danube only.