Examining the Effects of Zero‐Dollar Unemployment Payment Sanctions

Title
Examining the Effects of Zero‐Dollar Unemployment Payment Sanctions
Publication Date
2020-08-11
Author(s)
Wright, Andrew
Dollery, Brian
Kortt, Michael
Leu, Shawn
( author )
OrcID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3620-537X
Email: cleu@une.edu.au
UNE Id une-id:cleu
Type of document
Journal Article
Language
en
Entity Type
Publication
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Asia
Place of publication
Australia
DOI
10.1111/1475-4932.12566
UNE publication id
une:1959.11/29847
Abstract
Existing evidence has demonstrated that sanctions affect unemployment payment recipients' behaviour. However, in addition to financial impacts, sanction application includes administrative processes. This study examines a feature of Australian unemployment benefits, whereby jobseekers not meeting requirements may face a zero‐dollar sanction (termed suspension). The results indicate a strong behavioural response, with previously suspended jobseekers 13.1 percentage points more likely to attend their next appointment. Further, ongoing behavioural change was observed, even for jobseekers with a history of previous non‐compliance. This suggests temporary payment suspension and associated administrative processes are effective at securing behavioural change, without the need for lasting financial impact.
Link
Citation
The Economic Record, 96(315), p. 490-505
ISSN
1475-4932
0013-0249
Start page
490
End page
505

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